[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 6]
[House]
[Pages 7770-7784]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




DECLARING STATE OF WAR BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GOVERNMENT OF FEDERAL 
                         REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 151, I call up 
the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 44) declaring a state of war between 
the United States and the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.
  The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.
  The text of H.J. Res. 44 is as follows:

                              H.J. Res. 44

       Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America in Congress assembled, That pursuant 
     to section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 
     1544(b)), and article 1, section 8 of the United States 
     Constitution, a state of war is declared to exist between the 
     United States and the Government of the Federal Republic of 
     Yugoslavia.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). Pursuant to section 4 of 
House Resolution 151, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) and the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Meeks) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).


                             General Leave

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks 
on H.J. Res. 44.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, when our Committee on International Relations considered 
this measure yesterday, I was sorely tempted to vote for this 
resolution. This is not because I am eager for a fight and a war with 
Yugoslavia, because I am not. But I am eager for our Nation and the 
NATO alliance to avoid a humiliating defeat in the Balkans, which is 
where we could end up if we continue down the path of halfway measures.
  After the successful conclusion of Operation Desert Storm, many of us 
were relieved that our Nation finally appeared to have learned from the 
bitter experiences in Vietnam how not to fight a war. But everything we 
have seen to date in Operation Allied Force suggests that the lessons 
of Desert Storm may have been forgotten and that we are at risk of 
repeating in the

[[Page 7771]]

Balkans the very same mistakes we made in Vietnam.
  We do have an interest in preventing ethnic cleansing, the forcible 
relocation of hundreds of thousands of refuges, and the destabilization 
of Albania, Macedonia, and the other countries in that region. I 
believe the President was right to try to stop President Milosevic from 
doing these things. And now that we are involved, I believe that we 
must do everything within our power to restore peace to the region. 
That is a coherent position.
  But what is not coherent, however, is the in-between position that we 
have enough of a national interest to become involved in an armed 
conflict with President Milosevic but not enough of a national interest 
to do what is required to prevail in that conflict. That certainly is a 
prescription for defeat. And this is what brought us the agony of 
Vietnam. This is where we may end up in the Balkans if we forget the 
very first lesson of Vietnam, that we have no business getting into 
wars that we are not determined to win.
  I oppose the Campbell joint resolution declaring war on Yugoslavia, 
because I do not think Congress should declare wars if we are not 
determined to prosecute them.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi).
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the resolution that is on the 
floor before us to declare the United States at war with the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. In doing so, I want to make three points.
  First of all, this is deadly serious business that we are talking 
about. This is not an academic discussion about when war should be 
declared, and what Congress's role is. As one who was a party to the 
suit that was sent to the Supreme Court under the leadership of Ron 
Dellums, I firmly believe in Congress's prerogative to declare war. So 
on that, the gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell) and I agree. But 
on the timing of this resolution and the substance of it I disagree.
  I think that there is a tremendous need for us to do something to 
stop what is happening in the former Yugoslavia. I was there myself 
last week. I held those babies in my arms. I spoke to 95-year-old women 
who had walked across the woods and the mountains to get to the camps.
  We do not need any reiteration of all of the suffering, and we all 
stipulate that we all want to end the suffering there. So this vote is 
not about how serious we are about ending the suffering.
  The other point I want to make is that the United States is the 
greatest democracy in the world. People look to us as they aspire to be 
stronger democracies, especially the emerging democracies throughout 
the world. When they see us play games with something as serious as the 
declaration of war, it sends a very strange message to them.
  Now, I know playing games is not the intent of the gentleman, but 
that is what the appearance of this is. Again, this is not an academic 
discussion. It is a debate about as serious as it gets in this body. 
And we have to be very clear about what our goals are. We have to be 
very clear about the timing of our actions. And we have to be very 
clear about what it means to other countries when they see us engage in 
a debate at a time when the prospect for war, sending ground troops, is 
not a lively one.
  When I was in the Balkan region last week, and at the end of last 
week, talking to the representatives of NATO who were here for the 50th 
anniversary, there was no will for sending in ground troops. So there 
is no urgency to this resolution today. The timing is very bad. The 
lesson that we send to other democracies is very poor.
  I urge my colleagues, for the sake of the seriousness of the war and 
the example that we set as a democracy, to vote ``no'' on the Campbell 
resolution.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Salmon) a member of our committee.
  Mr. SALMON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to applaud the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Campbell) for having the courage to stand up in a very 
tumultuous time and risk I think some very, very nasty accusations 
about playing games and trying to create this academic discussion in 
the face of a very, very tumultuous time.
  I congratulate him, because he understands that our duty as 
Congressmen of the United States of America is to uphold the law of the 
land and the law of the land, as passed in 1973, under the War Powers 
Act requires this kind of action.
  Many of us believe this very strongly. It is not just an academic 
discussion. It is the law of the land. And we take that very seriously.

                              {time}  1715

  I opposed this mission from the get-go for three very important 
reasons. Number one, I believed that there were no national security 
interests at risk, there was no clear objective, and finally, there was 
no clearly delineated exit strategy. While I do believe that the 
intentions are good, to stop the ethnic cleansing or to try to stop the 
ethnic cleansing, to try to stop war crimes from occurring in that 
region of the world, the road to hell is paved with good intentions.
  When the President stood up the day before the bombing campaign 
began, he said one of the goals was to stop Milosevic's ability to 
prosecute atrocities against the ethnic Albanians, and another goal was 
that every ethnic Albanian be allowed to return to their home. What we 
have seen since the bombing began painfully shows us that the 
objectives have not been met. In fact they have been exacerbated. While 
there were 1.6 million ethnic Albanians in Kosovo before the bombing, 
now there are somewhere between 500,000 and 700,000. Anywhere from 
100,000 to 500,000 are missing and may be dead. We have not achieved 
these goals by any stretch of the imagination.
  I have to look at this from a father's perspective. I have a son who 
is 17. If I am not comfortable sending my son over there with such an 
ill-defined mission, how could I be comfortable sending other sons and 
other daughters of my constituents into harm's way?
  Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume. I rise to speak out against House Joint Resolution 44 to 
declare war on Yugoslavia. The U.S. and our NATO allies do not consider 
themselves at war with Yugoslavia or its people. NATO is acting to 
deter unlawful violence in Kosovo that endangers the stability of the 
Balkans and threatens wider conflict in Europe.
  Yesterday, the Committee on International Relations reported this 
resolution with a negative recommendation by a unanimous vote. This was 
a right vote. Today, I hope my colleagues will follow suit and vote 
unanimously against this resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, in my opinion a declaration of war is a very serious 
step. Congress has declared war in only five conflicts: the War of 
1812; the war with Mexico in 1846; the war with Spain in 1898; and the 
first and Second World Wars. In the 20th century, without exception, 
presidential requests for a formal declaration of war by Congress have 
been on findings by the President that U.S. territory or sovereign 
rights had been attacked or threatened by foreign nations.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith), the distinguished chairman of 
the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I thank the distinguished gentleman for 
yielding me this time. Mr. Speaker, the votes today are extraordinarily 
difficult ones for each of us. The difficulty arises not because we are 
afraid to face up to these decisions, but because we must find a way to 
support freedom and democracy for the people of Kosovo and for the 
people of Serbia without writing a blank check for more fatal blunders 
on the part of the Clinton administration.
  I do not agree with our bombing campaign, but the present ``bombing 
only''

[[Page 7772]]

policy appears to have been based on the tragic miscalculation by 
President Clinton that Milosevic would back down if we bombed Serbia 
for a week or maybe two. This seems to have been based on an even more 
fundamental miscalculation, that Milosevic cares more about Serbia than 
he does for Milosevic.
  Former Governor George Allen of Virginia pointed out recently, and it 
was a very good and apt analogy when he said it was the equivalent of 
being in a football game and you say you are going to pass on every 
play. You have really given away your options. We did the same thing 
when we told Milosevic there would be no ground troops. That permitted 
him to anticipate and adjust to NATO moves. Another miscalculation.
  Whatever happened to ``loose lips sink ships''? U.S. and NATO 
spokesmen--including the President, babble on and on. Such carelessness 
puts the lives of our servicemen at risk and it's wrong.
  Mr. Speaker, let me just say a couple of things. I have had more than 
a dozen hearings on the Balkans in my subcommittee, the International 
Operations and Human Rights Committee and in the Helsinki Commission. I 
chair them both. We have looked again and again at the problems, first 
with Bosnia and Croatia and now with Kosovo and sought to understand 
and react prudently to mitigate the suffering. We've looked at the war 
crimes that have been committed by Slobodan Milosevic's military, 
police and hoods.
  I find it incredible that the Clinton administration for the last 6 
or more years has not sought to bring action against Slobodan Milosevic 
at the War Crimes Tribunal at the Hague. In public and private I have 
asked repeatedly, where is the dossier, the documents, the evidence, 
why are we not trying to bring this war criminal to trial. To my shock, 
I am informed that the administration has collected nothing on this 
tyrant. Thus, last year virtually every Member of this Chamber voted in 
favor of my resolution that petitioned, admonished, and encouraged the 
administration to begin the effort to bring Milosevic to justice.
  Mr. Speaker, just let me also say that I do not believe voting for 
this declaration of war is the right thing to do. Our fight is not with 
the Serbian or Yugoslav people. It is with a cunning madman, and a very 
small number of very dedicated terrorists who surround him.
  I ask for a ``no'' vote on the declaration of war.
  Mr. Speaker, the votes today will be extraordinarily difficult ones 
for many Members of Congress. The difficulty arises not because we are 
afraid to face up to these decisions, but because we must find a way to 
support freedom and democracy for the people of Kosovo--and for the 
people of Serbia--without writing a blank check for more fatal blunders 
on the part of the Clinton Administration.
  I don't agree with NATO's bombing campaign but the present ``bombing 
only'' policy appears to have been based on the tragic miscalculation, 
by President Clinton and his top advisors that Slobodan Milosevic would 
back down if we bombed Serbia for a week or so. This seems to have been 
based on an even more fundamental miscalculation--that Milosevic cares 
more about Serbia than he does about Milosevic.
  Former Governor George Allen of Virginia has pointed out that to 
announce in advance that we would only use bombs and missiles and never 
use ground troops is the equivalent of announcing at the beginning of a 
football game that you intend to pass on every play. Even if we had no 
intention of using ground troops, it was yet another miscalculation to 
tell Milosevic about this plan. In war, you don't put your plan on CNN. 
In effect, we were telling him that we would punish the Serbian people 
for his regime's crimes, but that we would do nothing to prevent them. 
The campaign of murder, rape, and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was 
already under way--there were over 150,000 displaced persons there even 
before Rambouillet, and as early as June of last year Physicians for 
Human Rights issued a report that found ``intensive, systematic 
destruction and ethnic cleansing''--but when we announced that we would 
bomb and do nothing else, Milosevic knew he could get away with 
intensifying this campaign, and that is exactly what he did.
  So our options now are stark indeed:
  We cannot turn the clock back to a time when it might have been 
possible to persuade the people of Kosovo to accept some kind of 
autonomy within Serbia. The mass rapes and mass murders, the beatings 
and tortures, the burning of villages and clearing of cities, have made 
this next to impossible. Nor can the Muslim population of Kosovo forget 
the Dayton agreement, in which the Clinton Administration brokered the 
dismemberment of Bosnia. Instead of arresting Milosevic on the spot and 
bringing him before the War Crimes Tribunal, our diplomats exchanged 
toasts and compliments with him and turned over half of Bosnia to his 
murderous cronies.
  Speaking of the War Crimes Tribunal, I have tried for years, Mr. 
Speaker, to get this Administration to turn over all relevant evidence 
of Milosevic's responsibility for crimes against humanity. Last 
September, the House passed my resolution admonishing the Clinton 
Administration to work to bring Milosevic to justice at the Hague, 
sadly, nothing was done. This begs the question as to why the Clinton 
Administration has, in essence, given one of the most brutal dictators 
on the face of the earth defacto immunity from prosecution.
  Mr. Speaker, we cannot simply continue the bombing forever, in the 
face of mounting collateral deaths and injuries of men, women, and 
children--Serbs, Montenegrins, and Kosovars alike--and mounting 
evidence that the campaign is not likely to succeed in bringing down 
the Milosevic regime or in bringing peace and freedom to Kosovo.
  Nor can we simply consign the Kosovars to their fate. For the 
hundreds of thousands outside Kosovo, this would mean being refugees 
forever. For those still inside, it would mean more murders, more 
rapes, more tortures. For those of us who are lucky enough to live in 
safety and freedom, it would almost certainly mean in the last analysis 
that we stood by and watched yet another genocide.
  So our only real choice is to come up with a plan--perhaps a new 
diplomatic initiative along the lines suggested by Curt Weldon of 
Pennsylvania.
  Unfortunately, there is no sign that the Administration has such a 
plan or is trying very hard to come up with one. So Congress today must 
vote in a way that signals clear support for a just solution to the 
crisis in Kosovo, without inviting the Administration to blunder its 
way into further non-solutions.
  Mr. Speaker, I will not vote for the declaration of war, because our 
fight is not with Yugoslavia--and our fight is most certainly not with 
the peoples whose governments might come in on the side of Yugoslavia 
in an all out war. Our fight is with Milosevic.
  Mr. Speaker, I also will not vote for an absolute and inflexible 
legal requirement that all U.S. forces be removed from the zone of 
hostilities within 30 days, because this would be yet another 
gratuitous decision to tie our own hands in advance, without knowing 
what may happen in the next day or week or month. To announce in 
advance that we will withdraw our forces no matter what Milosevic does 
would be eerily reminiscent of President Clinton's decision to announce 
in advance that we would use only bombs and never ground troops. Its 
most likely effect would be to spur Milosevic on to further atrocities. 
It would also probably have the effect of depriving the humanitarian 
campaign on behalf of the refugees in Albania and Macedonia of the 
invaluable assistance of the U.S. military. I want to make clear that 
my criticisms of the Administration's military policy are not intended 
to reflect on the humanitarian campaign. All indications are that 
everyone involved--UNHCR, the non-governmental organizations, and 
government agencies emphatically including our armed forces--are doing 
the Lord's work and doing it as well as can be expected under the 
circumstances. My only suggestion is that we urgently need even more 
resources for this humanitarian campaign.
  Mr. Speaker, I will vote for the Goodling bill, which will require 
Congressional authorization for the use of ground troops.
  At the beginning of the decade, President Bush persuasively made his 
case--to Congress and the American people--for ground troops for the 
Persian Gulf War.
  Mr. Clinton, it seems to me, has no less of a responsibility to 
explain why he might be willing to risk the lives of Americans in a 
ground action.
  It's bad enough the President initiated the misguided bombing with 
its disastrous consequences to Kosovar Albanians without prior 
Congressional approval. Any potential, new, escalation must include 
clear authorization from the Congress.
  Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman).
  Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Campbell) for bringing this

[[Page 7773]]

issue to a head. We have cast and will cast momentous votes for today.
  I think it is important that we clarify the record. We voted for the 
Goodling-Fowler bill. I should point out that distributed to virtually 
every Member of this House by the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. 
Fowler) was a statement in writing that should be part of the record, 
that says in part that this bill does not prevent the use of Apache 
helicopters and does not preclude the introduction of small numbers of 
personnel for intelligence or targeting functions.
  I think that our adoption of that resolution, at least by this House, 
made sense. I know there are those who argue that Congress should not 
be involved in the momentous decision that lies ahead, but as I have 
said before, those who say that our enemies should tremble in fear 
because one man should be allowed to deploy 100,000 American soldiers, 
should be answered that Americans should tremble in fear if one man 
without congressional approval can deploy 100,000 men and women into 
battle.
  I should point out that the President of the United States 
distributed to all Members of Congress today a letter stating, in part, 
that he would ask for congressional support before introducing U.S. 
ground forces into Kosovo, into a nonpermissive environment.
  The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson) will be bringing up a 
matter later today. It has been interpreted by some as more than a mere 
authorization of the air campaign but it states, and I interpret it, as 
providing only support for the air campaign and not a legal 
authorization for more.
  I would hope that any wise court would look at the record today. A 
letter from the President saying he will not put in ground troops, a 
vote by this House not to put in ground troops. Under those 
circumstances, a wise court should interpret the Gejdenson resolution 
as nothing more than what it states.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Sanford), a member of our committee.
  Mr. SANFORD. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the timing and 
consideration of this bill because ultimately I think that this is a 
constitutional question. It is one that the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Campbell) has raised because he knows what our Founding Fathers 
knew, and that is that when body bags come back from some foreign 
deployment, they do not stop within the Beltway. They go across 
America. They go to Charleston, South Carolina; they go to Knoxville, 
Tennessee; they go to Los Angeles, California.
  It is for this reason, and it came up yesterday in debate, that in 
contrast to the English system, the Framers did not want the wealth and 
blood of the Nation committed by the decision of a single individual, 
which was just pointed out by my colleague from California.
  So, one, I rise in support of the timing of this because of the 
constitutional element. I will ultimately vote ``no'' because of the 
foreign policy element of this decision.
  Now, all of us would like to solve every ill in this world, but both 
individually and collectively it is something we do not have the 
resources to do, so for foreign policy to be effective, it has got to 
be limited and it has got to be focused. Part of focus means 
consistency. If we stay in Kosovo, we are going to create a very 
inconsistent foreign policy.
  In fact, I do not even want to be part of a government that would 
ever signal to people around the world that if you are of European 
ancestry, we care about your human rights, but if you happen to be 
unlucky enough to be born in Africa, well, then, good luck. Because in 
January 3,000 people were killed in Sierra Leone, and if we are going 
to stay in Kosovo, we owe it to them to go to Sierra Leone. 300,000 
people were killed in Angola since 1992. 500,000 people were killed in 
Rwanda in the genocide there. 1.9 million people have been killed in 
the south of Sudan basically over the last 15 years. It is important 
for our foreign policy to be effective that we be consistent and that, 
I think, is what this bill is all about.
  Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee).
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to this 
resolution because I believe that a declaration of war will only 
increase instability in the region and exacerbate the atrocities 
against ethnic Albanians. My support and prayers go out to the brave 
men and women of the United States Armed Forces who have been 
dispatched to Yugoslavia. We must take every measure to ensure their 
safe and expeditious return home.
  While I will vote against this resolution, it is my belief that this 
debate and these votes should have been taken before a single bomb was 
dropped and before any U.S. troops were sent. Our inaction prior to 
military strikes abdicated our constitutional responsibility and, 
furthermore, prevented the voice of the people I represent, who are 
overwhelmingly against air strikes, from being heard. I agree that we 
have a moral imperative to bring an end to the horrific genocide and 
suffering in the Balkans. However, violent means have only and will 
only escalate the crisis.
  As a person who strongly believes in the teachings and the work of 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. I profoundly subscribe to the principles of 
nonviolence. If peace is our objective, then I implore us to consider 
the words of Dr. King, not only on his birthday but each and every day 
of the year. In his last book, ``The Trumpet of Conscience,'' he wrote 
about United States policy in North Vietnam. He said, ``They are 
talking about peace as a distant goal, as an end we seek. But one day 
we must come to see that peace is not merely a distant goal we seek, 
but that it is a means by which we arrive at that goal; destructive 
means cannot bring about constructive ends.''
  I am convinced that our best hope for peace and stability is the 
negotiation of an immediate cease-fire, and a strong belief that the 
United States and NATO must reach out to Russia, the United Nations, 
China and others to develop an internationally negotiated political 
settlement. Our actions must set an example for our young people that 
violence should never be an option. I ask for a ``no'' vote.
  I rise today in opposition to H.J. Res. 44, which would declare a 
state of war between the United States and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. I oppose this resolution because I believe that a 
declaration of war, like the NATO air strikes, will only increase 
instability in the region and exacerbate the atrocities against ethnic 
Albanians.
  At this very volatile time, my support and prayers go out to the 
brave men and women of the United States Armed Forces who have been 
dispatched to Yugoslavia. We must take every measure possible to bring 
an end to this crisis to ensure their safe and expeditious return home.
  While I will vote against the declaration of war, I would like to 
commend my colleague from California, Congressman Campbell, for 
introducing this resolution into the House of Representatives and 
bringing forward Congressional action on the US involvement in Kosovo. 
It is my belief that these debates should have taken place six weeks 
ago, before a single bomb was dropped and before any US troops were 
sent into the hostile situation in the Balkans.
  By failing to vote on the air strikes before their commencement, and 
instead debating authorization now, when we are already heavily 
involved, the Administration is conducting a war without Congressional 
consent as required by the Constitution. A vote to authorize the 
President to conduct military air strikes at this juncture is nothing 
more than a rubber stamp from Congress for an action that has already 
begun. I my opinion, our inaction prior to military strikes abdicated 
our Constitutional responsibility and furthermore, prevented the voice 
of the people I represent, who are overwhelmingly against the air 
strikes, from being heard.
  There are those who rise today in support of the Administration's 
action in order to end the genocide of the ethnic Albanians. I agree, 
in the strongest terms possible, that we have a moral imperative to 
intervene and to bring an end to the horrific suffering. However, 
whether air strikes, ground forces, or a declaration of war--these 
violent means as a method to

[[Page 7774]]

bring peace and stability to the Balkans have only, and will only 
escalate the crisis.
  As a person who strongly believes in the teachings and work of Dr. 
Martin Luther King Jr., not just on his birthday, but throughout the 
year, I profoundly subscribe to the principles of nonviolence. Our 
policies, and our actions, must set an example for our young people 
that violence should never be an option. If peace is our objective, and 
I am certain that this is a goal upon which all in this chamber can 
agree, then I implore us to consider the words of Dr. King. In his last 
book, The Trumpet of Conscience, A Christmas Sermon on Peace, Dr. King 
discusses bombing in North Vietnam, and the rhetoric of peace that was 
connected to those war making acts.
  He wrote, ``What is the problem? They are talking about peace as a 
distant goal, as an end we seek. But one day we must come to see that 
peace is not merely a distant goal we seek, but that it is a means by 
which we arrive at that goal. We must pursue peaceful ends through 
peaceful means. All of this is saying that, in the final analysis, 
means and ends must cohere because the end is pre-existent in the means 
and ultimately destructive means cannot bring about constructive 
ends.''
  The Administration's policy and the NATO campaign in Kosovo to date 
have produced only counterproductive and destructive results: a mass 
exodus of over half a million ethnic Albanians, significant civilian 
deaths, an escalation of Milosevic's campaign of racial hatred and 
terror, and greater instability in the region. The results are just the 
opposite of what we want to achieve. Our goal is to prevent innocent 
people from being killed. In the name of saving Kosovars, we are 
destroying Kosovo.
  At this juncture, I am convinced that our best hope for peace and 
stability in the region is the negotiation of an immediate cease fire. 
It is my strong belief that the United States and NATO must reach out 
to the United Nations, Russia China, and others to work together to 
develop a new, internationally negotiated peace agreement and to secure 
Serbian compliance to its terms. In order to end the suffering in the 
Balkans and to achieve long term stability, support of a diplomatic 
political settlement is the only action we can employ.
  As we today speak of a policy to end genocide in the Balkans, I am 
also greatly disturbed to think of the people in many countries in 
Africa and all over the world, who have also suffered unthinkable 
atrocities, beyond our worst nightmare. As a result of ethnic conflict 
in Africa, over 150,000 have been killed in Burundi; 800,000 in Rwanda; 
and 1.5 million in Sudan. More than 200,000 Kurds have died in Iraq and 
Turkey, and hundreds of thousands in Burma, and over 1 million in 
Cambodia.
  It is my hope that our nation can develop a foreign policy framework 
to address suffering and killing all over the world, without the use of 
force, ground troops, air strikes and other violent means.
  I urge a ``no'' vote on the declaration of war.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Jones).
  Mr. JONES of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I join my colleagues who 
express grave doubts about the conduct of Operation Allied Force in 
Yugoslavia. I am deeply troubled that the administration has started 
our country down the path of only bad options.
  The debate before us illustrates the inability of the War Powers 
Resolution to effectively deal with post-Cold War realities. In many 
respects, the War Powers Resolution is a tool of a bygone era.
  Mr. Speaker, there are numerous Kosovo type operations in this 
country's future. These operations require significant military 
resources and challenge our country's ability to meet the primary 
objective of our national security strategy. This is nothing new. 
Congress has not formally declared war since World War II, and yet 
American troops have since fought and died around the world in numerous 
hostilities. The framework of the War Powers Resolution has not allowed 
Congress a voice in the commitment of troops in these engagements.
  While the United States may be the world's superpower, we cannot be 
the world's police force. Our military is simply not prepared to do so. 
If anything, this fumbling foreign policy escapade should alert this 
body that we must reflect upon the failings of the current process by 
which we are forced to deal with these types of military operations. In 
the near future Congress should work to improve the process by which we 
consider and debate these critical issues to our national security.
  Today, I would ask my colleagues to pay close attention to this 
debate and to keep in mind the state of our military. Congress's role 
is not limited simply to the declaration of war. It is imperative that 
we look closely at where we commit our troops and ensure that our 
military is prepared for such commitments.
  I do not believe that Kosovo is the kind of conflict where we should 
be committing our troops. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to oppose the 
resolution to declare war.
  Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from American Samoa (Mr. Faleomavaega).

                              {time}  1730

  Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to House 
Joint Resolution 44 which asks our colleagues for a declaration of war 
by the United States against the Government of the Republic of 
Yugoslavia. Although I have the greatest respect for the author of the 
resolution, the gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell) and certainly 
a dear friend, I must respectfully oppose the resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, America's Founding Fathers, in their wisdom, 
deliberately drafted the Constitution to provide flexibility in the use 
of U.S. armed forces abroad. The President, as Commander in Chief, 
clearly has the authority to send our forces into potentially hostile 
situations without a declaration of war. In fact, since 1798 in our 
conflict with France over the Dominican Republic, to our air strikes in 
Afghanistan and Sudan against Bin Laden in 1998, CRS, the Congressional 
Research Service, has documented over 270 instances where America's 
Presidents have sent U.S. armed forces abroad into hostile situations. 
Over two centuries, and only five of these instances has the Congress 
actually declared war.
  Mr. Speaker, a declaration of war is neither necessary nor 
appropriate for our actions in Kosovo and Serbia. Our Nation and NATO 
are not at war with Yugoslavia. We are there to stop a sociopathic 
criminal from committing genocide against his Albanian citizens, 
actions which threatened to destabilize the Balkan nations, as well as 
Europe. A unilateral U.S. declaration of war would irresponsibly 
escalate the conflict, undermine our alliance with our NATO partners, 
and needlessly jeopardize our already tense relations with Russia.
  As a Vietnam veteran, Mr. Speaker, I have seen the violence of 
conflict, and it is not pretty. However, there are certain times when 
America must act because no other country can provide the leadership 
that we can. Almost a quarter of a million innocent people died from 
Milosevic's handiwork in Bosnia which Europe could not stop alone.
  Mr. Speaker, the call to action has come again, and America cannot 
stand idly by and let this madman continue with his genocidal campaign 
in Kosovo. The stakes are too high to play political games. I strongly 
urge our colleagues to defeat the resolution before us and support our 
armed forces in Kosovo and Serbia that are fighting to protect against 
these evil forces that Milosevic provides.
  Mr. Speaker, are we willing to allow China and Russia perhaps to take 
the lead in providing the leadership in global issues that affect all 
human beings on this planet? I dare not say, Mr. Speaker. Let America 
become the leader of the world as it should be in this issue affecting 
the Balkan area.
  Mr. Speaker, there have been only five instances in our nation's 
history that formal declarations of war were made by the Congress--the 
War of 1812 against England; the War of 1846 against Mexico; the War of 
1898 against Spain; World War I and World War II. Mr. Speaker, there 
are ample precedents set not only by this President but by previous 
administrations as well, whereby acts of war have been always been part 
and parcel of U.S. foreign policies and security interests--I believe 
the Founding Fathers of this nation purposely placed the critical 
issues of war as a political and public policy matter rightfully as a 
matter to be decided by both the Administration and the Congress.
  Mr. Speaker, the crisis in Yugoslavia is not an American issue--it is 
a serious matter

[[Page 7775]]

taken collectively with our Nation Allies. It is a matter that history 
has given all those European countries to seriously consider the 
alternative, if Milosevic is allowed to continue his policy of ethnic 
cleansing and atrocities by murdering and killing well over 300,000 
human beings in that country, and the displacement of some 3.5 million 
persons now as refugees because of Milosevic's military activities in 
Yugoslavia.
  Mr. Speaker, am I to believe now that the most powerful nation on 
this planet is telling the world that the crisis in Yugoslavia is not 
in our national interest? If so, then why did the Congress allow our 
President to intervene and for which he provided a negotiated 
settlement on the Bosnia matter? Our President did his best to 
negotiate a settlement with Milosevic, but Milosevic refused and the 
bombing of Milosevic's military resources and related facilities was 
the only option left--simply to prevent more reckless killings and 
atrocities committed by Milosevic and his military forces.
  Mr. Speaker, this is not the time to tell the world and our NATO 
allies that we have now Americanized this conflict by officially 
declaring a war against Yugoslavia. Vote this resolution down.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. McCollum).
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, there is a tragic war in the Balkans. 
There is every indication that this war will expand, and so will the 
role of the United States. So far, there is no sign that absent the 
introduction of ground forces the intensified bombing campaign will 
cause President Milosevic and the Serbs to agree to the terms regarding 
Kosovo demanded by NATO. President Clinton has never asked Congress to 
declare war on Yugoslavia or Serbia. He has never even requested the 
type of resolution President Bush requested and was granted in advance 
of Desert Storm. At no time has he spelled out to the American public, 
let alone Congress, a consistent, coherent foreign policy that 
demonstrates a compelling United States' national security interest in 
waging war against the forces of the Government of Yugoslavia.
  I am just as moved as anyone else by the atrocities reported in 
Kosovo, but I am deeply troubled by our continued engagement. If the 
United States is going to engage in war, the commitment must be made to 
let the military use whatever force is necessary, which means paying 
whatever price in lives of American soldiers is required, and if the 
American national security interests are not great enough to justify 
such a price, then there should be no war.
  To date, President Clinton has not demonstrated to my satisfaction 
America's national security interest in the Kosovo matter is great 
enough to justify paying such a price. For this reason I voted for the 
resolution offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell) to 
withdraw American forces, and it is for this reason that I will not be 
a party to sending American men and women in uniform to die in an ill-
conceived, ill-planned war and I am strongly against this resolution 
declaring war.
  Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos), a senior member of the 
Committee on International Relations.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, it is important to put this resolution by my 
good friend from California in proper perspective.
  When yesterday a deeply divided Committee on International Relations 
debated and then voted on this matter, we voted unanimously to reject 
this proposal.
  As a matter of fact, my good friend, the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Campbell), himself voted against his own resolution.
  So I think it is sort of important to realize that what we are 
dealing with here is an academic legalistic exercise, the purpose of 
which is to take this issue to the courts. No one seriously believes, 
fortunately, that the United States should declare war against 
Yugoslavia.
  Now there are many reasons why we should not do that. The first and 
perhaps the most important is that this is not an American engagement, 
this is a NATO engagement, and not one of the other of the 18 NATO 
countries has declared war on Yugoslavia. Were we to do so, this would 
be an Americanization of a war with all the negative consequence that 
implies. It would divide the alliance. It would indicate that we are 
determined, as we were during the Second World War, to move on until 
there is an unconditional surrender.
  Those are not our goals. Our goals are limited, clearly defined and 
specific. We wish to see the 700,000 individuals who were driven out of 
Kosovo to return there in peace and security. That is the goal we seek. 
Therefore, a declaration of war under these circumstances would be ill-
advised, ill-timed and clearly contrary to U.S. national interests.
  I urge all of my colleagues to reject this resolution.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Rohrabacher).
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, the United States has been blessed in 
so many ways, and not the least of which is the good sense that our 
Founding Fathers had in keeping us out of foreign entanglements and 
military engagements overseas. George Washington threatened us of these 
foreign entanglements that would drain our Treasury and drain our 
national will. So it has been written into our Constitution that we 
have such limitations on foreign commitments. We have not obviously 
declared war. This administration is unwilling to declare war even 
though it is clearly written into our Constitution that we need to come 
to Congress.
  Now, realizing that during the Cold War we gave certain powers to the 
executive branch for the security of our country and during this four 
decades of Cold War we felt we needed to centralize this power and give 
the President a little more authority. The Cold War is over. What we 
are engaging in now is a process of evolving back. That is what we are 
doing this very moment, evolving back the power as defined in our 
Constitution, what our Founding Fathers wanted us to have, and that is 
the legislative branch must have a check and a balance to the decisions 
of the Federal branch when it comes to foreign commitments and military 
operations, and this is something that is part of our Constitution. We 
are demanding that the Constitution be followed. We are demanding that 
the War Powers Act, which of course came about after the Vietnam 
debacle, the War Powers Act is still part of our law, we demand that 
that part of the law be followed.
  Obviously the President of the United States and those people in this 
body that agree with him do not believe that that part of our law and 
that part of our Constitution need to be followed. Well, this is what 
the debate is about. The American people should understand that no one 
person, as our Founding Fathers so demanded it in writing the 
Constitution, no one person, whether he be or she be the President of 
the United States or any other officeholder, should be able to get us 
into war and cause the deaths of tens of thousands of people. We all 
must be part of that process.
  That is what our Constitution is about. That is why I support the 
efforts of the gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell) to ensure this 
type of congressional participation.
  I rise in support of Mr. Campbell's position on this resolution. 
Seriously, I'd like to take this opportunity to thank Mr. Campbell for 
giving us this opportunity to discuss, through this declaration of war 
resolution, the legal ramifications of the Balkan conflict.
  Here in the United States we have been blessed in so many ways, not 
the least of which was a product of the good sense of our founding 
fathers and mothers in keeping us out of foreign conflicts and 
entanglements.
  George Washington warned of the threat of military alliances that 
would lead to foreign adventures that would drain our treasury and 
undermine our national will to meet the serious challenges to our own 
security. Written into our Constitution are limitations on power and 
hurdles that must be dealt with in order to engage the United States in 
war.
  In World War One and the Second World War we followed those 
constitutional requirements. During that second great conflagration 
that engulfed this planet we permitted, for the safety of our country 
and the cause of peace,

[[Page 7776]]

power to be centralized in the hands of the executive branch as never 
before. Then, during the decades of, what John Kennedy described as the 
twilight struggle, Congress acquiesced and endorsed the policy of a 
strong executive in order to deal with the dangers of the cold war.
  My friends and colleagues, the cold war is over. What we do today is 
part of the process in evolving back to the constitutional system that 
served our country so well in the past. First and foremost we must 
reestablish the checks and balances in our federal system, checks and 
balances that apply to foreign and military commitments as well as 
domestic policy.
  There is no doubt that the intent of our Constitution was to assure 
that one person, whatever his or her office, could not get our country 
into war. We had revolted against the power of a king to rule. Congress 
must declare war, or it is illegal for our President or military 
commanders to spend our treasure and spill the blood of our defenders 
in fighting a war.
  Yes, during the cold war, which was an uncommon and unique period in 
our history, the legal necessity of such declarations of war was 
intentionally by consensus, overlooked. The frustrations of Korea and 
Vietnam, perhaps, call into question that strategy. And in the 
aftermath of Vietnam, the War Powers Act was enacted into law to 
prevent the very kind of questionable foreign military commitments that 
we debate today.
  So in this debate let us as law makers admit that the law is not 
being followed and that it should be. The Constitutional requirements 
for conducting war have not been met because the majority of this 
Congress and more importantly, the President, are unwilling to declare 
war.
  The legal requirements to an extended military operation, as mandated 
by the War Powers Act, have not been met, because this President and 
his allies, who represent a majority in this Congress, are not 
concerned with this law.
  Mr. Speaker, the crisis of the cold war is over and the Constitution 
and the law, as reflected in the body of the Constitution and in the 
War Powers Act, should be obeyed. If it cannot be obeyed, it should be 
changed. As it stands, we are making a mockery of the law, which is 
evident when the Secretary of State testified at the International 
Relations Committee. Secretary Albright has to speak in convoluted 
rhetoric, twisting and turning like a semantical acrobat, in order to 
prevent a legal case that can be easily made against her. There is 
something wrong if a Secretary of State cannot speak directly to the 
congressional body which has the constitutional mandate of overseeing 
American foreign policy.
  Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Oregon (Mr. DeFazio).
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this 
time to me.
  We in Congress are in a position we should never be in. We are 
confronted with a failed law, failed leadership and a military action 
that failed to meet its initially stated objectives. Here we are, 
finally having a belated and truncated debate because of the War Powers 
Act, but a War Powers Act which is totally defective, and for 8 years I 
have been introducing legislation to fix the War Powers Act. We need to 
reclaim our constitutional authority and require prior authorization 
before Presidents engage in wars or warlike activities using our armed 
forces.
  This is not unique to President Clinton. President Reagan, President 
Bush went down the same path, as did Presidents before them and as they 
will continue to do until this body has the guts to change the law and 
require that not a penny be spent except in defense of our country 
against immediate attack or armed forces overseas or as a citizen 
without the authority of Congress in a war or warlike action.
  We have a failed congressional leadership. They were engaged in duck-
and-cover and get everybody out of town before the bombing began. They 
did not allow us to have a debate. Even with the defective law, we 
could have had a vigorous debate here, and if we had that debate, I 
believe we could have had a better policy.
  Did not everybody know that it rained in that area at this time of 
year? Did not our intelligence forces perhaps know that bombing and 
removal of the OSCE observers would lead to increased, accelerated 
ethnic cleansing and slaughter? And what if, what if Slobodan was not 
going to come to the bargaining table after a few bombs fell? Those 
questions were not asked by this Congress, and they were not answered 
by this administration, and now we are in the midst of a failed policy.
  I believe we need to go forward from here with productive ideas, but 
this debate is not going to allow us to talk about productive ideas. 
What about the idea of a temporary cease-fire, working with our allies 
to try and force productive negotiations? What about having enough time 
to talk about this issue? It is not allowed under this absurd rule.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Cunningham).
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, probably in 8 years this is the first 
time I have agreed with the gentleman from Oregon, or second time.
  If not, what? I am trying to do everything I can to keep us out of 
war. Then what? First of all, the Pentagon said not to bomb. 
Rambouillet, according to Kissinger and Larry Eagleburger, said it was 
to fail. NATO and General Clark told me, face to face, that NATO only 
wanted to bomb 1 day and quit. The President called Mr. Blair and the 
German Chancellor and forced this. So what? Halt the bombing, get our 
POWs back.
  Seventy percent of the Russians support the overthrow of Yeltsin. 
That is why they are so squirrelly on us. Let us use Russian, let us 
Greek troops that are petrified about the Albanian expansion. Instead 
of having Russia be the problem, let us make them part of the solution. 
The President has got to look the President of Albania in the face and 
say we want the Mujaheddin and Hamas out of the KLA and deported within 
30 days. He has got to do the same thing with Izetbegovic.
  Kosovo can be cantonized, but it has got to go off the table, that 
resolve.
  The gentleman from Oregon is right. There is not enough time to talk 
about a very important issue.
  Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman 
from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, the truth is war is being waged and will 
continue to be waged without declaration. But such violence is neither 
redemptive nor justified in law or morality. Hope is redemptive, love 
is redemptive, peace is redemptive, but the violence of this conflict 
stirs our most primitive instincts. When we respond to such instincts, 
we enact the law of an eye for an eye, and we at last become blind and 
spend our remaining days groping to regain that light we had once 
enjoyed.
  He only understands force, it is said of Mr. Milosevic, but we must 
understand more than force.

                              {time}  1745

  Otherwise, war is inescapable. We must make peace as inexorable as 
the instinct to breed, as inevitable as the sunrise, as predictable as 
the next day. With this vote, let us release ourselves from the logic 
of war and energize a consciousness of peace, peace through implied 
strength, peace through express diplomacy, peace through a belief that 
through nonviolent human interaction, we can still control our destiny.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Washington (Mr. Metcalf).
  Mr. METCALF. Mr. Speaker, I have opposed U.S. military action in the 
Balkans without a declaration of war. There are no vital U.S. interests 
now being threatened anywhere in Europe, certainly not in the Balkans, 
worthy of a declaration of war. We really have no business there 
militarily. We should not be committing acts of war there. Yes, bombing 
is an act of war.
  This whole military intervention is truly illegal under international 
law, and I urge a no vote on this resolution. We do need to revise our 
War Powers Act. Congress should reclaim the power to decide to take 
this Nation to war.
  Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New 
York for his leadership, and I

[[Page 7777]]

thank my colleague from California for giving us the opportunity to 
discuss a very important issue as to whether or not we stand for war or 
peace. I must acknowledge that the gentleman who proposed this 
particular resolution himself voted against it.
  I grappled today and struggled with the vote on the Goodling 
amendment, because I have concern about whether or not we are forcing 
ourselves into war, or looking for ways of peace.
  I want peace. I have indicated over and over again that we must have 
peace, but we must have peace with justice. We must have peace for the 
37,000 refugees in Montenegro, the 260,000 refugees in Albania and the 
120,000 in Macedonia. We must have peace for those in the former 
Yugoslavia.
  So a declaration of war is not, I believe, in the best interests of 
the United States of America, the best interests of those refugees who 
are looking to go home, and the best interests of us trying to force or 
bring about a real peace.
  We have only declared war in not more than 5 conflicts in our 
history: The War of 1812, the war with Mexico in 1846, the war with 
Spain in 1898, the First World War and the Second World War.
  I do believe that the President's hands must not be tied. We must 
have the ability to send peacekeeping troops in. We must get back our 
POWs, two of whom are from the State of Texas, but all of them are 
Americans. We must not be weak in the eyes of the former Yugoslavia and 
Mr. Milosevic. We must stand united.
  And to my friends who have mentioned where were we in Rwanda, and 
maybe where were we in Ireland, we must not stand while there is ethnic 
cleansing and killing and murdering in any part of the world.
  I want to stand with an America that has principles. I want to stand 
with an America that believes in human life and human dignity, against 
the murder of children and women and raping.
  I hope we will never stand by against a Rwanda. I hope no matter what 
race of people are in trouble, or being attacked or being murdered, we 
will stand up against it. Declaring war, however, is not the way that 
we should go.
  I want us to have a sustained air strike, but, most of all, I want 
Mr. Milosevic to come to the peace table. I want a negotiated 
settlement. And for us to declare war today, we will not get that.
  So I would say, Mr. Speaker, I want to stand on behalf of the 
refugees returning to their home, I want peace to come in the Balkans, 
and I stand by the vote that I took some years ago for the Dayton peace 
treaty. Yes, our troops are still in Bosnia, but there is peace there, 
there is a united peace there, the United Nations peacekeeping troops, 
and I do not see why America has to step away from providing for peace 
around the world.
  We are not police officers, no, but we have a conscience and we 
believe in humanity and dignity.
  So I would offer to my colleagues as they vote against this 
declaration to declare war, that we should vote for the sustained air 
strikes, we should make sure that we force or encourage or demand that 
those who have the power, including our NATO allies, come to the peace 
table, and that we remember that the greatest of all those that we can 
give to the world is love and charity. I hope that we will stand for 
what is right.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Callahan), the distinguished chairman of 
the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related 
Programs of the Committee on Appropriations.
  Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, I think this is unprecedented. Maybe some of you who are 
more historically informed and more constitutionally informed can 
correct me, but I think this is the first time in the history of this 
Congress where Congress has initiated a declaration of war.
  Generally, as I understand it, the President comes to the Congress 
when he finds situations such as required and requests that Congress 
declare war. Conceivably I am erroneous on that, but I do not recall. 
Maybe some of my more learned colleagues can recall a time when the 
Congress initiated a declaration of war.
  I think this is ill-conceived. A declaration of war I think would be 
divisive within NATO. It would put restrictions on the front line 
states. It would make them unable to assist us in the efforts they are 
giving us in providing landing operations and staging operations in 
those countries, and I think it would be a very dangerous precedent for 
this Congress to tell the commander-in-chief that he must go to war if 
he does not want to. I know that is not necessarily the case as we see 
it today, but I think to start this in this Congress at this time, with 
the Congress initiating a declaration of war, is ill-advised, and I 
urge Members to vote ``no''.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Hayes).
  Mr. HAYES. Mr. Speaker, I oppose a declaration of war, having just 
returned from the Balkans more firmly convinced, no ground troops.
  I know you cannot see it, but this is a picture of a young Apache 
pilot in the Balkans who graduated with my son. He said, ``No ground 
troops. The cost in human life would be too high.''
  We need a negotiated settlement, not a declaration of war. I am 
working to provide momentum, leverage and direction to the 
administration to settle this conflict.
  My colleagues on the other side are dissatisfied because of a lack of 
leadership by the administration. We are dissatisfied with a lack of 
leadership and failed foreign policy.
  Do not declare war. Do not lose lives of our military. Focus our 
attention on rebuilding the military, helping the refugees, and 
negotiating a settlement that returns the refugees to their homes in 
safety and brings our POWs and our troops home.
  Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Capuano).
  Mr. CAPUANO. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose this particular proposal 
and to urge my colleagues to keep our eyes open.
  This conflict today, we may not like the cards we are dealt, but they 
are dealt. We may not like how we got there, but we are there. There 
are millions of people in Europe whose lives are at stake, whose 
happiness and soundness are at stake, and, if we walk away, if we walk 
away, we will have done the wrong thing, and you will know that today 
and you will know that 20 years from now.
  Many of us can debate how we got here, how we should do it the next 
time. I think those are good debates. I think we should discuss what 
should happen the next time, because there will be a next time.
  For those of you who did not have the opportunity today to read the 
papers, look at what is happening in Indonesia. We are about to send 
what they call ``police advisers'' from the United Nations to 
Indonesia. It is happening elsewhere across this globe, and I do think 
we need to discuss that.
  At the same time, we do not have the luxury to always deal the cards. 
We are sitting here today, we have to deal with it today. We have to 
support the efforts to bring those people home, to bring our men and 
women home, and to do the right thing by humanity, today, tomorrow, and 
every time we have to do it.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Horn).
  Mr. HORN. Mr. Speaker, I am against this declaration of war, as I am 
sure practically everyone in this Chamber is.
  The origin of many European parliaments was when the leaders of a 
country got together, formed an organized body and reined in the king 
who was engaged on various adventures. That is, in a sense, what we are 
trying to do here today.
  If the Europeans have a European problem, they ought to be making the

[[Page 7778]]

decision and they ought to be sending their own ground troops.
  Russia should be deeply involved. It has not been included. There is 
only one other superpower in the world; that is Russia. They should be 
tied to the West, and they should be helpful in this particular matter. 
If the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] is to keep Europe at 
peace, then Russia should be a member.
  The Serbs cannot move north, that is NATO territory; and if they move 
south toward Greece, that is NATO territory, and that would be one 
sovereign nation invading another, and that would be appropriate for 
NATO to take action and defend Greece.
  I include for the Record, Mr. Speaker, portions of the speech 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger made back in 1984. He was an 
outstanding Secretary and a very wise man. He developed six major 
criteria which should be met when we use U.S. combat forces abroad.

                       The Uses of Military Power

       Thank you for inviting me to be here today with the members 
     of the National Press Club, a group most important to our 
     national security. I say that because a major point I intend 
     to make in my remarks today is that the single most critical 
     element of a successful democracy is a strong consensus of 
     support and agreement for our basic purposes. Policies formed 
     without a clear understanding of what we hope to achieve will 
     never work. And you help to build that understanding among 
     our citizens.
       Of all the many policies our citizens deserve--and need--to 
     understand, none is so important as those related to our 
     topic today--the uses of military power. Deterrence will work 
     only if the Soviets understand our firm commitment to keeping 
     the peace . . . and only from a well-informed public can we 
     expect to have that national will and commitment.
       So today, I want to discuss with you perhaps that most 
     important question concerning keeping the peace. Under what 
     circumstances, and by what means, does a great democracy such 
     as our reach that painful decision that the use of military 
     force is necessary to protect our interests or to carry out 
     our national policy?
       National power has many components, some tangible--like 
     economic wealth, technical pre-eminence. Other components are 
     intangible--such as moral force, or strong national will. 
     Military forces, when they are strong, and ready and modern, 
     are a credible--and tangible--addition to a nation's power. 
     When both the intangible national will and those forces are 
     forced into one instrument, national power becomes effective.
       In today's world, the line between peace and war is less 
     clearly drawn than at any time in our history. When George 
     Washington, in his farewell address, warned us, as a new 
     democracy, to avoid foreign entanglements, Europe then Lay 2-
     3 months by sea over the horizon. The United States was 
     protected by the width of the oceans. Now in this nuclear 
     age, we measure time in minutes rather than months.
       Aware of the consequences of any misstep, yet convinced of 
     the precious worth of the freedom we enjoy, we seek to avoid 
     conflict, whiled maintaining strong defenses. Our policy has 
     always been to work hard for peace, but to be prepared if war 
     comes. Yet, so blurred have the lines become between open 
     conflict and half-hidden hostile acts that we cannot 
     confidently predict where, or when, or how, or from what 
     direction aggression may arrive. We must be prepared, at any 
     moment, to meet threats ranging in intensity from isolated 
     terrorist acts, to guerrilla action, to full-scale military 
     confrontation.
       Alexander Hamilton, writing in the Federalist Papers, said 
     that ``It is impossible to foresee or define the extent and 
     variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent 
     and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy 
     them.'' If it was true then, how much more true it is today, 
     when we must remain ready to consider the means to meet such 
     serious indirect challenges to the peace as proxy wars and 
     individual terrorist action. And how much more important is 
     it now, considering the consequences of failing to deter 
     conflict at the lowest level possible. While the use of 
     military force to defend territory has never been questioned 
     when a democracy has been attacked and its very survival 
     threatened, most democracies have rejected the unilateral 
     aggressive use of force to invade, conquer or subjugate other 
     nations. The extent to which the use of force is acceptable 
     remains unresolved for the host of other situations which 
     fall between these extremes of defensive and aggressive use 
     of force.
       We find ourselves, then, face to face with a modern 
     paradox: The most likely challenge to the peace--the gray 
     area conflicts--are precisely the most difficult challenges 
     to which a democracy must respond. Yet, while the source and 
     nature of today's challenges are uncertain, our response must 
     be clear and understandable. Unless we are certain that force 
     is essential, we run the risk of inadequate national will to 
     apply the resources needed.
       Because we face a spectrum of threats--from covert 
     aggression, terrorism, and subversion, to overt intimidation, 
     to use of brute force--choosing the appropriate level of our 
     response is difficult. Flexible response does not mean just 
     any response is appropriate. But once a decision to employ 
     some degree of force has been made, and the purpose 
     clarified, our government must have the clear mandate to 
     carry out, and continue to carry out, that decision until the 
     purpose has been achieved. That, to, has been difficult to 
     accomplish.
       The issue of which branch of government has authority to 
     define that mandate and make decisions on using force is now 
     being strongly contended. Beginning in the 1970s Congress 
     demanded, and assumed, a far more active role in the making 
     of foreign policy and in the decisionmaking process for the 
     employment of military forces abroad than had been thought 
     appropriate and practical before. As a result, the centrality 
     of decision-making authority in the executive branch has been 
     compromised by the legislative branch to an extent that 
     actively interferes with that process. At the same time, 
     there has not been a corresponding acceptance of 
     responsibility by Congress for the outcome of decisions 
     concerning the employment of military forces.
       Yet the outcome of decisions on whether--and when--and to 
     what degress--to use combat forces abroad has never been more 
     important than it is today. While we do not seek to deter or 
     settle all the world's conflicts, we must recognize that, as 
     a major power, our responsibilities and interests are now of 
     such scope that there are few troubled areas we can afford to 
     ignore. So we must be prepared to deal with a range of 
     possibilities, a spectrum of crises, from local insurgency to 
     global conflict. We prefer, of course, to limit any conflict 
     in its early stages, to contain and control it--but to do 
     that our military forces must be deployed in a timely manner, 
     and be fully supported and prepared before they are engaged, 
     because many of those difficult decisions must be made 
     extremely quickly.
       Some on the national scene think they can always avoid 
     making tough decisions. Some reject entirely the question of 
     whether any force can ever be used abroad. They want to avoid 
     grappling with a complex issue because, despite clever 
     rhetoric disguising their purpose, these people are in fact 
     advocating a return to post-World War I isolationism. While 
     they may maintain in principle that military force has a role 
     in foreign policy, they are never willing to name the 
     circumstance or the place where it would apply.
       On the other side, some theorists argue that military force 
     can be brought to bear in any crisis. Some of these 
     proponents of force are eager to advocate its use even in 
     limited amounts simply because they believe that if there are 
     American forces of any size present they will somehow solve 
     the problem.
       Neither of these two extremes offers us any lasting or 
     satisfactory solutions. The first--undue reserve--would lead 
     us ultimately to withdraw from international events that 
     require free nations to defend their interests from the 
     aggressive use of force. We would be abdicating our 
     responsibilities as the leader of the free world--
     responsibilities more or less thrust upon us in the aftermath 
     of World War II--a war incidentially that isolationism did 
     nothing to deter. These are responsibilities we must fulfill 
     unless we desire the Soviet Union to keep expanding its 
     influence unchecked throughout the world. In an international 
     system based on mutual interdependence among nations, and 
     alliances between friends, stark isolationism quickly would 
     lead to a far more dangerous situation for the United States: 
     we would be without allies and faced by many hostile or 
     indifferent nations.
       The second alternative--employing our forces almost 
     indiscriminately and as a regular and customary part of our 
     diplomatic efforts--would surely plunge us head-long into the 
     sort of domestic turmoil we experienced during the Vietnam 
     war, without accomplishing the goal for which we committed 
     our forces. Such policies might very well tear at the fabric 
     of our socieity, endangering the single most critical element 
     of a successful democracy: a strong consensus of support and 
     agreement for our basic purposes.
       Policies formed without a clear understanding of what we 
     hope to achieve would also earn us the scorn of our troops, 
     who would have an understandable opposition to being used--in 
     every sense of the word--casually and without intent to 
     support them fully. Ultimately this course would reduce their 
     morale and their effectiveness for engagements we must win. 
     And if the military were to distrust its civilian leadership, 
     recruitment would fall off and I fear an end to the all-
     volunteer system would be upon us, requiring a return to a 
     draft, sowing the seeds of riot and discontent that so 
     wracked the country in the '60s.
       We have now restored high morale and pride in the uniform 
     throughout the services. The all-volunteer system is working 
     spectacularly well. Are we willing to forfeit what we have 
     fought so hard to regain?

[[Page 7779]]

       In maintaining our progress in strengthening America's 
     military deterrent, we face difficult challenges. For we have 
     entered an era where the dividing lines between peace and war 
     are less clearly drawn, the identity of the foe is much less 
     clear. In World Wars I and II, we not only knew who our 
     enemies were, but we shared a clear sense of why the 
     principles espoused by our enemies were unworthy.
       Since these two wars threatened our very survival as a free 
     nation and the survival of our allies, they were total wars, 
     involving every aspect of our society. All our means of 
     production, all our resources were devoted to winning. Our 
     policies had the unqualified support of the great majority of 
     our people. Indeed, World Wars I and II ended with the 
     unconditional surrender of our enemies . . . the only 
     acceptable ending when the alternative was the loss of our 
     freedom.
       But in the aftermath of the Second World War, we 
     encountered a more subtle form of warfare--warfare in which, 
     more often than not, the face of the enemy was masked. 
     Territorial expansionism could be carried out indirectly by 
     proxy powers, using surrogate forces aided and advised from 
     afar. Some conflicts occurred under the name of ``national 
     liberation,'' but far more frequently ideology or religion 
     provided the spark to the tinder.
       Our adversaries can also take advantage of our open 
     society, and our freedom of speech and opinion to use 
     alarming rhetoric and disinformation to divide and disrupt 
     our unity of purpose. While they would never dare to allow 
     such freedoms to their own people, they are quick to exploit 
     ours by conducting simultaneous military and propaganda 
     campaigns to achieve their ends.
       They realize that if they can divide our national will at 
     home, it will not be necessary to defeat our forces abroad. 
     So by presenting issues in bellicose terms, they aim to 
     intimidate western leaders and citizens, encouraging us to 
     adopt conciliatory positions to their advantage. Meanwhile 
     they remain sheltered from the force of public opinion in 
     their countries, because public opinion there is simply 
     prohibited and does not exist.
       Our freedom presents both a challenge and an opportunity. 
     It is true that until democratic nations have the support of 
     the people, they are inevitably at a disadvantage in a 
     conflict. But when they do have that support they cannot be 
     defeated. For democracies have the power to send a compelling 
     message to friend and fore alike by the vote of their 
     citizens. And the American people have sent such a signal by 
     re-electing a strong chief executive. They know that 
     President Reagan is willing to accept the responsibility for 
     his actions and is able to lead us through these complex 
     times by insisting that we regain both our military and our 
     economic strength.
       In today's world where minutes count, such decisive 
     leadership is more important than ever before. Regardless of 
     whether conflicts are limited, or threats are ill-defined, we 
     must be capable of quickly determining that the threats and 
     conflicts either do or do not affect the vital interests of 
     the United States and our allies . . . and then responding 
     appropriately.
       Those threats may not entail an immediate, direct attack on 
     our territory, and our response may not necessarily require 
     the immediate or direct defense of our homeland. But when our 
     vital national interests and those of our allies are at 
     stake, we cannot ignore our safety, or forsake our allies.
       At the same time, recent history has proven that we cannot 
     assume unilaterally the role of the world's defender. We have 
     learned that there are limits to how much of our spirit and 
     blood and treasure we can afford to forfeit in meeting our 
     responsibility to keep peace and freedom. So while we may and 
     should offer substantial amounts of economic and military 
     assistance to our allies in their time of need, and help them 
     maintain forces to deter attacks against them-- usually we 
     cannot substitute our troops or our will for theirs.
       We should only engage our troops if we must do so as a 
     matter of our own vital national interest. We cannot assume 
     for other sovereign nations the responsibility to defend 
     their territory--without their strong invitation--when our 
     own freedom is not threatened.
       On the other hand, there have been recent cases where the 
     United States has seen the need to join forces with other 
     nations to try to preserve the peace by helping with 
     negotiations, and by separating warring parties, and thus 
     enabling those warring nations to withdraw from hostilities 
     safely. In the Middle East, which has been torn by conflict 
     for millennia, we have sent our troops in recent years both 
     to the Sinai and to Lebanon, for just such a peacekeeping 
     mission. But we did not configure or equip those forces for 
     combat--they were armed only for their self-defense. Their 
     mission required them to be--and to be recognized as--
     peacekeepers. We knew that if conditions deteriorated so they 
     were in danger, or if because of the actions of the warring 
     nations, their peace keeping mission could not be realized, 
     then it would be necessary either to add sufficiently to the 
     number and arms of our troops--in short to equip them for 
     combat, or to withdraw them. And so in Lebanon, when we faced 
     just such a choice, because the warring nations did not enter 
     into withdrawal or peace agreements, the President properly 
     withdrew forces equipped only for peacekeeping.
       In those cases where our national interests require us to 
     commit combat forces, we must never let there be doubt of our 
     resolution. When it is necessary for our troops to be 
     committed to combat, we must commit them, in sufficient 
     numbers and we must support them, as effectively and 
     resolutely as our strength permits. When we commit our troops 
     to combat we must do so with the sole object of winning.
       Once it is clear our troops are required, because our vital 
     interests are at stake, then we must have the firm national 
     resolve to commit every ounce of strength necessary to win 
     the fight to achieve our objectives. In Grenada we did just 
     that.
       Just as clearly, there are other situations where United 
     States combat forces should not be used. I believe the 
     postwar period has taught us several lessons, and from them I 
     have developed six major tests to be applied when we are 
     weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad. Let me now 
     share them with you:
       (1) First, the United States should not commit forces to 
     combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion 
     is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our 
     allies. That emphatically does not mean that we should 
     declare beforehand, as we did with Korea in 1950, that a 
     particular area is outside our strategic perimeter.
       (2) Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat 
     troops into a given situation, we should do so 
     wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If 
     we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary 
     to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all. 
     Of course if the particular situation requires only limited 
     force to win our objectives, then we should not hesitate to 
     commit forces sized accordingly. When Hitler broke treaties 
     and remilitarized the Rhineland, small combat forces then 
     could perhaps have prevented the Holocaust of World War II.
       (3) Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat 
     overseas, we should have clearly defined political and 
     military objectives. And we should know precisely how our 
     forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And 
     we should have and send the forces needed to do just that. As 
     Clausewitz wrote, ``no one starts a war--or rather, no one in 
     his senses ought to do so--without first being clear in his 
     mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he 
     intends to conduct it.''
       War may be different than in Clausewitz's time, but the 
     need for well-defined objectives and a consistent strategy is 
     still essential. If we determine that a combat mission has 
     become necessary for our vital national interests, then we 
     must send forces capable to do the job--and not assign a 
     combat mission to a force configured for peacekeeping.
       (4) Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the 
     forces we have committed--their size, composition and 
     disposition--must be continually reassessed and adjusted if 
     necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change during 
     the course of a conflict. When they do change, then so must 
     our combat requirements. We must continuously keep as a 
     beacon light before us the basic questions: ``Is this 
     conflict in our national interest? '' ``Does our national 
     interest require us to fight, to use force of arms? '' If the 
     answers are ``Yes'', then we must win. If the answers are 
     ``No'', then we should not be in combat.
       (5) Fifth, before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, 
     there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the 
     support of the American people and their elected 
     Representatives in Congress. This support cannot be achieved 
     unless we are candid in making clear the threats we face: The 
     support cannot be sustained without continuing and close 
     consultation. We cannot fight a battle with the Congress at 
     home while asking our troops to win a war overseas or, as in 
     the case of Vietnam, in effect asking our troops not to win, 
     but just to be there.
       (6) Finally, the commitment of U.S. Forces to combat should 
     be a last resort.
       I believe that these tests can be helpful in deciding 
     whether or not we should commit our troops to combat in the 
     months and years ahead. The point we must all keep uppermost 
     in our minds is that if we ever decide to commit forces to 
     combat, we must support those forces to the fullest extent of 
     our national will for as long as it takes to win. So we must 
     have in mind objectives that are clearly defined and 
     understood and supported by the widest possible number of our 
     citizens. And those objectives must be vital to our survival 
     as a free nation and to the fulfillment of our 
     responsibilities as a world power. We must also be farsighted 
     enough to sense when immediate and strong reactions to 
     apparently small events can prevent lion-like responses that 
     may be required later. We must never forget those 
     isolationists in Europe who shrugged that ``Danzig is not 
     worth a war'', and ``Why should we fight to keep the 
     Rhineland demilitarized? ''
       These tests I have just mentioned have been phrased 
     negatively for a purpose--they are intended to sound a note 
     of caution--caution that we must observe prior to committing 
     forces to combat overseas. When we ask

[[Page 7780]]

     our military forces to risk their very lives in such 
     situations, a note of caution is not only prudent, it is 
     morally required.
       In many situations we may apply these tests and conclude 
     that a combatant role is not appropriate. Yet no one should 
     interpret what I am saying here today as an abdication of 
     America's responsibilities--either to its own citizens or to 
     its allies. Nor should these remarks be misread as a signal 
     that this country, or this administration, is unwilling to 
     commit forces to combat overseas.
       We have demonstrated in the past that, when our vital 
     interests or those of our allies are threatened, we are ready 
     to use force, and use it decisively, to protect those 
     interests. Let no one entertain any illusions--if our vital 
     interests are involved, we are prepared to fight. And we are 
     resolved that if we must fight, we must win.
       So, while these tests are drawn from lessons we have 
     learned from the past, they also can--and should--be applied 
     to the future. For example, the problems confronting us in 
     Central America today are difficult. The possibility of more 
     extensive Soviet and Soviet-proxy penetration into this 
     hemisphere in months ahead is something we should recognize. 
     If this happens we will clearly need more economic and 
     military assistance and training to help those who want 
     democracy.
       The President will not allow our military forces to creep--
     or be drawn gradually--into a combat role in Central America 
     or any other place in the world. And indeed our policy is 
     designed to prevent the need for direct American involvement. 
     This means we will need sustained congressional support to 
     back and give confidence to our friends in the region.
       I believe that the tests I have enunciated here today can, 
     if applied carefully, avoid the danger of this gradualist 
     incremental approach which almost always means the use of 
     insufficient force. These tests can help us to avoid being 
     drawn inexorably into an endless morass, where it is not 
     vital to our national interest to fight.
       But policies and principles such as these require decisive 
     leadership in both the executive and legislative branches of 
     government--and they also require strong and sustained public 
     support. Most of all, these policies require national unity 
     of purpose. I believe the United States now possesses the 
     policies and leadership to gain that public support and 
     unity. And I believe that the future will show we have the 
     strength of character to protect peace with freedom.
       In summary, we should all remember these are the policies--
     indeed the only policies--that can preserve for ourselves, 
     our friends, and our posterity, peace with freedom.
       I believe we can continue to deter the Soviet Union and 
     other potential adversaries from pursuing their designs 
     around the world. We can enable our friends in Central 
     America to defeat aggression and gain the breathing room to 
     nurture democratic reforms. We can meet the challenge posed 
     by the unfolding complexity of the 1980's.
       We will then be poised to begin the last decade of this 
     century amid a peace tempered by realism, and secured by 
     firmness and strength. And it will be a peace that will 
     enable all of us--ourselves at home, and our friends abroad--
     to achieve a quality of life, both spiritually and 
     materially, far higher than man has even dared to dream.

  In brief, there is no vital United States interest in what is going 
on in Kosovo. What is going on in Kosovo is tragic, but it is not at 
the level of defending vital interests of the United States by making 
war in the area. Kosovo should receive humanitarian aid.
  I think all of us abhor Milosevic. He should be tried as an 
international war criminal, and, if convicted, a bounty ought to be 
offered for him.
  The Balkans are a quagmire of ethnic and religious rivalries that we 
cannot solve alone. Let us remember Dien Bien Phu, when many of his key 
advisers pressured President Eisenhower to send our armed forces to 
bail out the French. He was a wise President; he turned them down. 
There was not vital interest of the United States at stake. Eisenhower 
had 800 advisers in Vietnam. He told them not to get involved in the 
battle--simply train the soldiers. He was a wise President.
  John F. Kennedy was not a wise President when it came to Vietnam. He 
put 16,000 people there and told them to get engaged and shoot. Lyndon 
Baines Johnson was not a wise President when it came to foreign 
affairs. LBJ upped the ante to 550,000 American troops. They were 
heavily engaged. We lost that war. There was no vital interest for our 
country.
  During the Bush administration the United States put an arms embargo 
on sending arms to Bosnia. That was the wrong decision. If the Bosnians 
had weapons, they could have protected their country and its people. 
The Albanians should have arms to protect their people.
  Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Taylor).
  Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, of the many books that have 
been written about the failed American policy in Vietnam I think one of 
the most damning was a book called ``Dereliction of Duty.'' It talks 
about how the generals and admirals who comprised the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff during the early Vietnam years knew that President Johnson was 
intentionally lying to the American public about his plan, or lack of a 
plan, in Vietnam, that there was no plan to win the war, there was no 
plan as to how to win the war, and yet not one of these people who 
claimed to be looking out for their troops was willing to step forward 
and risk their career by saying, ``Mr. President, do it right, or do 
not do it at all. If you are not willing to do it right, I will resign 
my commission and go out and tell the American people the truth about 
what is going on.''
  Mr. Speaker, this Congress is doing the exact same thing. This 
Congress is criticizing the American President for the way he is 
handling this conflict. Yet the American President says he will not 
introduce ground forces, and the Congress that is damning him today by 
250 votes said, ``Do not introduce ground forces.''
  We have a President who says, ``I am not going to stop the bombing.'' 
We have a Congress, 250-plus votes, said, ``Do not stop the bombing.''
  We share in the responsibility for what is happening right now. 
Tonight, brave young Americans will get in F-15s, F-16s, A-6s, and they 
will put their lives on the line in what is for them a very real war.

                              {time}  1800

  One cannot wish it away. We just voted not to end it. The choice we 
have is to do it right or to repeat the mistakes of the Congresses and 
the Presidents during Vietnam and to pretend that some half-hearted 
policy is going to achieve American objectives, and to look the other 
way as the casualties mount because we are not willing to put our necks 
out, we are not willing to risk our careers, but we are going to let 
those kids risk their lives.
  Think about it. This is our constitutional obligation. The vote to 
get the kids out failed. That leaves but one other alternative, and 
that is to do it right for the sake of those kids who are putting their 
lives on the line right now.
  Now, if we want to revoke the last vote, if we have changed our 
minds, then vote it. But if we are going to ask those kids to make the 
ultimate sacrifice, then we as a Nation ought to commit this Nation to 
the effort and not just a handful of pilots.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon).
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I thank my distinguished 
chairman for yielding time to me.
  I rise in strong opposition to this particular resolution, and I 
especially am concerned about the timing of these votes. I understand 
the reasons why my friend and colleague from California did what he did 
to maintain the integrity of the process and the responsibility that we 
have as parliamentarians to engage in that process. I, however, went to 
the leadership and asked if we could postpone these votes at least 
until next week, as a group of Members of this body, in fact 10 of us, 
travel to Austria, Vienna, Austria tomorrow evening to meet with the 
senior leadership of the Russian Duma and their major factions to try 
to find some common ground to provide leverage to convince Milosevic 
that it is time to come to the table and end this conflict.
  We have an opportunity, Mr. Speaker. We have not used that 
opportunity before this debate and this vote, and that is extremely 
unfortunate. We should not be locked into an artificial vote time frame 
that tells us when to come forward and have Members in such disarray as 
we are going to see today watch the results of this vote. And that will 
tell us the problem that Members have in terms of what we are doing.

[[Page 7781]]

  I understand the process is important, but I also understand the 
substance of what we are about is even more important, because we are 
talking about an issue and decisions and votes that could affect our 
ability to bring Russia in in a way that helps us bring this to a 
resolution peacefully. In my mind, Mr. Speaker, that is the top 
priority. Keeping our ground troops, keeping NATO ground troops from 
having to confront the Russian military, and from those Serbs in a 
confrontational way that will lead to additional bloodshed.
  It is unfortunate we are having these votes today. In my opinion, it 
is not in our country's best interests that we have these votes. I wish 
we could have avoided that. I think the vote results will show the 
concern that Members have, not necessarily with just the issue of what 
we are about, because anyone could argue that, in fact, we are in war 
today with the things that are occurring. But rather, the timing, the 
sequence, and the way this is being done without full consideration to 
what I think is one very real opportunity.
  Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to 
the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings).
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, yesterday I spoke to my dear 
colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell) regarding the 
need for clarity with reference to the War Powers Act. On that I agree 
with him thoroughly, and I indicated to him at that time that I would 
be prepared to stand with him, and I am sure others will, once this 
matter is litigated. I think the timing is poor, and I agree and 
associate myself with the remarks of the previous speaker with 
reference to the preserving of the process.
  That said, the question is, why would we act unilaterally in 
declaring war with Yugoslavia? Presently, we are not at war with 
Yugoslavia; we are engaged in an international mission to bring about 
peace in Yugoslavia. A unilateral declaration of war would signal that 
the United States was intensifying the war, while others were fighting 
for more limited objectives. OSCE and NATO this past week confirmed as 
our partners the objectives that we have set forth. Why, then, would we 
destroy our credibility with NATO and destroy NATO's credibility?
  I suggest that we defeat this declaration.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time is 
remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). The gentleman from New York 
(Mr. Gilman) has 7\1/2\ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Meeks) has 3\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Bachus).
  Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Speaker, war is hell, but at times it is our most 
dreaded necessity. At times it is unavoidable. At times it is a matter 
of self-defense. None of this is the case in Kosovo. This war was not, 
nor is it now unavoidable. It is neither a dreaded necessity, nor is it 
fought in self-defense against an attacking enemy. All the good 
intentions in the world do not justify continuing such a war. A war 
that has every potential for disastrous consequences and catastrophe, 
not only for the United States, but also for our NATO allies, and for 
all of the people of Europe, both east and west.
  The deep divisions and misgivings expressed here in Congress over 
continuing this war are heard throughout the Nation and among our NATO 
allies. These divisions and misgivings are understandable, they are 
justified, and they cannot be ignored. The administration has failed to 
make a persuasive case to Congress or to the American people.
  For these reasons, and consistent with my concern and support for our 
troops, I voted to withdraw U.S. forces from the war in Kosovo, and I 
will vote against ratifying this war with a declaration from Congress.
  Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to 
the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Rothman).
  Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, I do not believe that the conflict in Yugoslavia 
requires this body to take the extraordinary step of declaring war 
today, for the first time in the last 50 years of American history. To 
declare war today could have dangerous consequences that nobody, 
regardless of party, wants to have occur. If war is declared, then any 
country that has a connection to Serbia becomes a potential enemy of 
the United States and could be drawn into the conflict in the Balkans. 
We could find ourselves at war technically with Russia or China, who 
have a relationship with Serbia, two of the world's most potent nuclear 
powers.
  We did not declare war when we engaged in the conflict in Korea, 
Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, Panama, Haiti or Grenada. Why are some 
forcing Congress, or trying to force Congress to declare war now? We 
have not done so in 50 years, since World War II. Now is not the time 
to escalate the conflict. We should not tie our military's hands with 
the red tape and other legal obligations that flow from a declaration 
of war. We should not engage in an action that might cause this 
conflict to spread to other regions of Europe beyond our control.
  This measure demands defeat, and I urge my colleagues to vote against 
it.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to 
the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Gejdenson), the ranking member of 
the Committee on International Relations.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. 
Gejdenson) is recognized for 2\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I am confident the House will reject this 
unwarranted proposal for a declaration of war. What we should do when 
we complete rejecting this constitutionally-propelled resolution by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell), who wants to bring this to 
court and test it, and he will apparently have his day in court, is 
then to make sure we leave no confusion about where the Congress and 
the American people are. We must pass the Senate language which I will 
offer to authorize the activities we are under.
  We have created sufficient confusion today by contradicting even our 
own statements here on the floor. Many of those who argued against the 
President unilaterally, saying he would not use ground troops, have now 
passed what is potentially a statute that would prohibit the President 
from using ground troops unless Congress comes together, meets and 
passes it in both Houses.
  So let us not leave this Chamber leaving confusion in Belgrade or 
anywhere else. The bulk of the American people are with the President 
on this action; the bulk of the American people are proud that we are 
fighting to save human beings from murder. There is no second agenda 
here. There is no oil, there is no Communist threat, there are simply 
human beings who will then be murdered. Reject this amendment, reject 
the proposal to declare war, and join us to simply state that we 
support the actions that are being taken, so that Mr. Milosevic can 
take no heart in the debate in this great, free and Democratic 
institution that we speak clearly and honestly, that we want to set 
Kosovo free.
  Mr. MEEKS of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield the balance of my time 
to the gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell), who is the proponent 
of this measure.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell) 
is recognized for 5\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, we are at war. There is no question that 
that is the truth. We are at war. And I believe that it is fair under 
the Constitution for us to declare that war if we are at war, and if we 
do not wish to engage in the war, to withdraw from that war. That is 
why I offered these alternatives to this body.
  I am going to go through evidence that is unmistakable that we are at

[[Page 7782]]

war, both quotations from the administration and just average facts 
that would compel the conclusion to any fair observer that we are at 
war.
  Before I do so, though, I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Cunningham), my colleague, my good friend, and a distinguished veteran 
of the Vietnam war.
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I would ask my colleagues to look. If 
NATO and OSCE are unanimous, then why are Hungary and France still 
shipping oil to Serbs? Why do we have Hungary and Poland and the Czechs 
who say that if we go to war they will not support us, and we had to 
fight for airspace.
  Please look at other solutions to this problem besides ground troops 
and bombing, and realize that there are many, many nationalists lined 
up behind Milosevic to take his place. It is not just Milosevic. We 
have caused the nationalism in many cases. But look at the Mujahedin 
and Hamas who, in my opinion, will cause problems for the next 100 
years unless the President looks at the Albanian President and 
Izetbegovic and says, deport them within 30 days.
  Have we looked into the children's eyes that are the refugees? They 
do not have a clue as to why they are being uprooted from their homes. 
And in my opinion, we have caused a lot of it. It is not just a single 
focus. We have to reach out and look at all of the different factors 
that are affecting Kosovo and Bosnia.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I thank my colleague.
  To this day, we have flown 11,574 missions. We have 4,423 air 
strikes, but this is not war, says the administration. Please, this is 
war. Recognize it, say it, admit it.
  The Secretary of Defense said in testimony in the Senate Committee on 
National Security on April 15, ``We are certainly engaged in 
hostilities. We are engaged in combat. Whether that measures up to a 
classic definition of war I am not qualified to say.''
  For heaven's sakes, Mr. Speaker, the Secretary of Defense of the 
United States says he is not qualified to say whether we are at war 
when he admits we are engaged in hostilities, we are engaged in combat.
  The Secretary of State of the United States, in testimony before the 
Committee on International Relations on April 21, refused to answer my 
question whether we were in hostilities. It is shameful that the 
Secretary of State of the United States did not answer a question put 
by a member of the Committee on International Relations, the committee 
of jurisdiction over international relations, as to whether we were in 
hostilities.

                              {time}  1815

  The reason she didn't, I believe, is because I explained in asking my 
question to her that the word ``hostilities'' appears in the war powers 
resolution, and she was afraid of confessing that hostilities were in 
existence, because that might trigger the War Powers Resolution. She 
did admit we were in conflict.
  The next day, April 22, her spokesperson, the Assistant Secretary of 
State, admitted we were in an armed conflict. The President's executive 
order of April 13 accords extra pay to our soldiers who are in, and I 
quote the word, ``combat.''
  The Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Pickering on February 10 before 
our committee answered my question, ``Would Serbia be within its rights 
to consider the bombing of sovereign Serbian territory as an act of 
war?,'' by saying ``Yes, they would be within their rights to consider 
it an act of war.'' I asked him, ``Is Kosovo a part of sovereign 
Serbia?'' He said, yes, it was.
  We have prisoners of war, admitted by the President and called as 
such by him and by the Assistant Secretary of State Jacobs. We had a 
call-up yesterday of 33,102 troops from our Reserves.
  We are at war. It is inconvenient, perhaps, to admit the truth, but 
it is the truth. We are at war. I applaud two of our colleagues who 
have spoken today, our colleague, the gentlewoman from Hawaii (Mrs. 
Mink) and our colleague, the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Taylor), 
who said, this is war. We should declare it to be war if we wish to be 
at war.
  But if we do not wish to be at war, then we must not permit the 
incidents of war, the bombing and the troops. Why do we have this 
distinction? Why do we say the bombing is okay but the troops are not? 
Is bombing any less war? Is it less war to the people in Yugoslavia? It 
is war.
  The President needed the approval of Congress before he commenced the 
bombing. It is no victory that today he sends us a letter saying that 
he will come to Congress before commencing ground troops, because he 
says ``before commencing ground troops in a nonpermissive 
environment,'' he does not say ``before putting in ground troops to 
fight.'' And he does not say he will wait for a Congressional vote.
  If the Serbs are sufficiently diminished, ``degraded'' is the word 
they use in the administration, so that entry will be quasi-permissive, 
then I take it the President would put in ground troops.
  Please, we are at war. The honest choice is this: If we are at war, 
declare we are at war. If my colleagues do not wish us to be at war, 
withdraw the troops. I ask my colleagues to stand up to their 
constitutional obligation and to honesty on this resolution.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to 
this joint resolution. This resolution would pursuant to section 5(b) 
of the War Powers Resolution, declare a state of war between the United 
States and the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Again, 
Mr. Speaker this joint resolution is not in the best interest of United 
States of America.
  Neither NATO nor the United States believes that a state of war 
exists in the current conflict in the Balkan region. The President has 
not requested that Congress issue a declaration of war. I believe that 
a declaration of war would be entirely counterproductive as a matter of 
policy and is unnecessary as a matter of law.
  On only five occasions in the United States history and never since 
the end of World War II has the Congress declared war, reflecting the 
extraordinary nature of, and implications attendant on, such a 
declaration. While we are not at war with either the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia or its people, Slobodan Milosevic should not doubt the 
determination of NATO to see the stability of Europe reasserted. With 
resolve NATO can attain a durable peace that prevents further 
repression and provides for democratic self-government for the Kosovar 
people.
  Mr. Speaker, if this resolution is adopted this body would convey the 
wrong message. The adoption of H. J. Res. 44 would indicate the 
existence of a bilateral war between the United States and Yugoslavia. 
A bilateral war between the United States and Yugoslavia has not been 
declared and in my opinion should not be declared; rather our efforts 
must remain in concert with the allied effort under the NATO umbrella.
  As a matter of law, there is no need for a declaration of war. Mr. 
Speaker, every use of U.S. Armed Forces since World War II has been 
undertaken pursuant to the President's constitutional authority. In 
some cases like the Persian Gulf War, action was taken under 
congressional authorization, but not since World War II has Congress 
declared war.
  Mr. Speaker, in the time in which we live, the President must have 
the discretion and authority to use U.S. Armed Forces when there is a 
clear and significant risk to our national security interests. I would 
hope that if nothing else we would have learned that instability in 
Europe does have an immediate impact on our own security interests.
  In addition, a declaration of war could have serious 
counterproductive effects on NATO cohesion and regional stability. 
Russia, already agitated over NATO action, could be further alienated 
from joining in diplomatic efforts to achieve a lasting peace.
  As NATO reaffirmed at its 50th Anniversary, it remains committed to 
the stability of Europe. NATO is acting to deter unlawful violence in 
Kosovo that endangers the fragile stability of the Balkans and 
threatens a wider conflict in Europe. The NATO alliance is as united as 
ever, and there is no sense in giving up now, and there is no better 
prospect for getting a fair and lasting settlement.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose this resolution and let us proceed 
with our NATO allies to bring about a peaceful settlement.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, as with all Americans I am greatly 
distressed by the brutality and loss of freedom the Kosovars are 
suffering at the hands of military forces of the

[[Page 7783]]

Serbian regime in Belgrade. However, NATO military policy, while 
inflicting heavy penalties on the infrastructure of Yugoslavia, has 
done nothing to stop the forced removal of the Albanian residents of 
Kosovo, the original objective announced by President Clinton and our 
NATO allies. It may, in fact, have aggravated the situation. And the 
effort of the honorable Congressman from California, Tom Campbell, and 
his supporters, to move for a congressional declaration of war is 
fraught with additional danger with regard to both our domestic 
tranquility and the possibilities of expanding the conflict.
  On the domestic front the President as Commander in Chief would be 
empowered to call up the Reserves and federalize the National Guard. 
All regular enlistments in the armed services would be extended until 6 
months after the termination of the conflict. (10 U.S.C. 506, 671a) 
Private property deemed necessary for military purposes could be 
seized. (10 U.S.C. 2663-64) Under certain conditions, the President 
could take over private manufacturing plants, transportation systems, 
and regulate the transmission of electrical energy. (10 U.S.C. 4501-02, 
9501,-02, 4742, 9742, 16 U.S.C. 824) Private vessels could be 
requisitioned by the government (46 U.S.C. App1242-a), radio and 
television transmission rules could be suspended (47 U.S.C. 606), and a 
variety of controls could be established with regard to aliens, 
particularly those from states considered enemies. While it is not 
certain, it is highly probable that Congress would agree to pass other 
legislation deemed necessary to achieve victory, which would curtail 
other aspects of civil life we take for granted.
  With regard to United States foreign policy, the negative costs could 
be equally grave. Such a declaration could be divisive in NATO, with 
some members (Greece, Italy) determining that the effects of such a war 
declaration by the U.S. Congress would decrease the support among their 
own citizens, thus ending their cooperation and producing a rupture in 
the alliance. It would certainly increase the sense of hostility with 
Russia, the Ukraine and possibly other former Soviet states.
  While we are all agreed with the objective of bringing peace and 
justice to the Balkan region, there needs to be further reflection and 
discussion regarding the terms we wish to establish with the Yugoslav 
government and the means by which we achieve this end. It may be 
desirable to consider establishing an ad hoc group within the UN 
General Assembly, beyond just the NATO members, to aid in the search 
for an honorable and sensible end to this increasingly grave crisis.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to H.J. Res. 44, 
which would declare a state of war between the United States and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I oppose this resolution because I 
believe that a declaration of war, like the NATO air strikes, will only 
increase instability in the region and exacerbate the atrocities 
against ethnic Albanians.
  At this very volatile time, my support and prayers go out to the 
brave men and women of the United States Armed Forces who have been 
dispatched to Yugoslavia. We must take every measure possible to bring 
an end to this crisis to ensure their safe and expeditious return home.
  While I will vote against the declaration of war, I would like to 
commend my colleague from California, Congressman Campbell, for 
introducing this resolution into the House of Representatives and 
bringing forward Congressional action on the U.S. involvement in 
Kosovo. It is my belief that these debates should have taken place six 
weeks ago, before a single bomb was dropped and before any U.S. troops 
were sent into the hostile situation in the Balkans.
  By failing to vote on the air strikes before their commencement, and 
instead debating authorization now, when we are already heavily 
involved, the Administration is conducting a war without Congressional 
consent as required by the Constitution. A vote to authorize the 
President to conduct military air strikes at this juncture is nothing 
more than a rubber stamp from Congress for an action that has already 
begun. In my opinion, our inaction prior to military strikes abdicated 
our Constitutional responsibility and furthermore, prevented the voice 
of the people I represent, who are overwhelmingly against the air 
strikes, from being heard.
  There are those who rise today in support of the Administration's 
action in order to end the genocide of the ethnic Albanians. I agree, 
in the strongest terms possible, that we have a moral imperative to 
intervene and to bring an end to the horrific suffering. However, 
whether air strikes, ground forces, or a declaration of war--these 
violent means as a method to bring peace and stability to the Balkans 
have only, and will only escalate the crisis.
  As a person who strongly believes in the teachings and work of Dr. 
Martin Luther King Jr., not just on his birthday, but throughout the 
year, I profoundly subscribe to the principles of nonviolence. Our 
policies, and our actions, must set an example for our young people 
that violence should never be an option. If peace is our objective, and 
I am certain that this is a goal upon which all in this chamber can 
agree, then I implore us to consider the words of Dr. King. In his last 
book, ``The Trumpet of Conscience, A Christmas Sermon on Peace,'' Dr. 
King discusses bombing in North Vietnam, and the rhetoric of peace that 
was connected to those war making acts.
  He wrote,

       What is the problem? They are talking about peace as a 
     distant goal, as an end we seek. But one day we must come to 
     see that peace is not merely a distant goal we seek, but that 
     it is a means by which we arrive at that goal. We must pursue 
     peaceful ends through peaceful means. All of this is saying 
     that, in the final analysis, means and ends must cohere 
     because the end is pre-existent in the means and ultimately 
     destructive means cannot bring about constructive ends.

  The Administration's policy and the NATO campaign in Kosovo to date 
have produced only counterproductive and destructive results: a mass 
exodus of over half a million ethnic Albanians, significant civilian 
deaths, an escalation of Milosevic's campaign of racial hatred and 
terror, and greater instability in the region. The results are just the 
opposite of what we want to achieve. Our goal is to prevent innocent 
people from being killed. In the name of saving Kosovars, we are 
destroying Kosovo.
  At this juncture, I am convinced that our best hope for peace and 
stability in the region is the negotiation of an immediate cease fire. 
It is my strong belief that the United States and NATO must reach out 
to the United Nations, Russia, China, and others to work together to 
develop a new, internationally negotiated peace agreement and to secure 
Serbian compliance to its terms. In order to end the suffering in the 
Balkans and to achieve long term stability, support of a diplomatic 
political settlement is the only action we can employ.
  As we today speak of a policy to end genocide in the Balkans, I am 
also greatly disturbed to think of the people in many countries in 
Africa and all over the world, who have also suffered unthinkable 
atrocities, beyond our worst nightmare. As a result of ethnic conflict 
in Africa, over 150,000 have been killed in Burundi; 800,000 in Rwanda; 
and 1.5 million in Sudan. More than 200,000 Kurds have died in Iraq and 
Turkey, and hundreds of thousands in Burma, and over 1 million in 
Cambodia.
  It is my hope that our nation can develop a foreign policy framework 
to address suffering and killing all over the world, without the use of 
force, ground troops, air strikes and other violent means.
  I urge a ``no'' vote on the declaration of war.
  Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Speaker, last November, I asked Iowans to remember 
the victims of Hurricane Mitch * * * and in America's generosity, we 
responded with private and public philanthropy. I voted for federal 
assistance not only for humanitarian reasons, but also because it is in 
our own country's interest that the economics of our trading partners 
to the South be salvaged.
  Sharing our nation's treasure is a long tradition of United States 
humanitarianism. Perhaps the best example was the Marshall Plan to 
rebuild Europe after World War II and there are countless others.
  We are now facing a man-made disaster with hundreds of thousands of 
homeless in the Balkans. Our country is partially responsible for these 
refugees, because without President Clinton's go ahead, there never 
would have been NATO military action. We should give strong financial 
support to Albania and Macedonia to help them clothe, feed and shelter 
the displaced Kosovars.
  However, there is a big difference between providing humanitarian 
financial assistance to homeless victims whether in Guatemala or 
Albania and spending the blood of our sons and daughters in a ground 
war in the Balkans. One of the lessons we should have learned in 
Vietnam is that the public will tolerate loss of life and limb only 
when it is convinced that its vital national interest is at stake. 
While the American public is rightly concerned about the human rights 
violations in Kosovo, few believe that our own country's interests are 
at risk.
  Vietnam also taught us that military might is only one factor in 
determining the outcome. We were much stronger militarily than the Viet 
Cong, but they were much more committed. It was their country. We have 
an analogous situation in Kosovo, a province of Yugoslavia, which the 
Serbs consider the birthplace of their nation.
  We are hearing arguments that the credibility of NATO is at stake. 
For those of us who remember the Vietnam era only too clearly,

[[Page 7784]]

these were the same arguments that got us deeper into a Southeast Asia 
war. The lesson we should have learned then was: Unless you are willing 
to wade in a swampy pit, don't dig your hole deeper. The consequences 
of failing to carry through later will be much worse than not getting 
more deeply involved now.
  So where do we go from here? First, Congress ought to assert its 
Constitutional duty. The Framers assigned the power to enter wars to 
Congress only, not the President. Congress should step up to the bar 
and not let the President take the risks of war and then either cheer 
or castigate depending on the outcome.
  I support Congressman Tom Campbell's attempt to get Congress to vote 
on a declaration of war. I will vote ``No,'' since our country has not 
been attacked by Yugoslavia nor do we have such an overriding national 
interest to justify going to war over their own civil war.
  If Congress votes for war, then we will have upped the ante a 
thousand fold. If Congress votes no, then I would support taking this 
to the courts in order to get a cease and desist order on the 
executive.
  But what about Kosovo itself? Milosevic is indicating that he would 
now accept non-NATO international observers in Kosovo. We should 
suspend bombing, institute a full UN-sponsored economic boycott, and 
resume negotiations. Probably the best that can be achieved is a 
partition of Kosovo with the Serbs and their religious and historical 
sites on one side and the Albanian Kosovars on the other. A UN 
peacekeeping presence will be necessary for generations.
  One thing, though, is clear to me. I just completed town hall 
meetings in every county in my district. Iowans are very skeptical 
about our military involvement in that part of the world. Of the nearly 
one thousand people who attended, only a handful were for placing U.S. 
ground troops in Kosovo under any circumstances.
  Humanitarian aid, yes. U.S. ground forces, no.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
  Pursuant to section 4 of House Resolution 151, the joint resolution 
is considered as read for amendment, and the previous question is 
ordered.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the joint 
resolution.
  The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed and read a third 
time, and was read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on passage of the joint 
resolution.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 2, nays 
427, not voting 5, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 102]

                                YEAS--2

     Barton
     Taylor (MS)
       

                               NAYS--427

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Bartlett
     Bass
     Bateman
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Blumenauer
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Bono
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Conyers
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Cox
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cummings
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Everett
     Ewing
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gejdenson
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (IN)
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     Kuykendall
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Largent
     Larson
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, George
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Ose
     Owens
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pease
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pickering
     Pickett
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Regula
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rothman
     Roukema
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Rush
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sabo
     Salmon
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sanford
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Schakowsky
     Scott
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stump
     Stupak
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Tierney
     Toomey
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Waters
     Watkins
     Watt (NC)
     Watts (OK)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--5

     Aderholt
     Blagojevich
     Slaughter
     Tauzin
     Wynn

                              {time}  1837

  Messrs. McINTOSH, McINNIS, UPTON, HUTCHINSON, and NADLER, and Ms. 
PRYCE of Ohio and Ms. KILPATRICK changed their vote from ``yea'' to 
``nay.''
  So the joint resolution was not passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________