[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 6]
[House]
[Pages 7743-7756]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




 MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA LIMITATION 
                              ACT OF 1999

  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 151, I call up 
the bill (H.R. 1569) to prohibit the use of funds appropriated to the 
Department of Defense from being used for the deployment of ground 
elements of the United States Armed Forces in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia unless that deployment is specifically authorized by law, 
and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of H.R. 1569 is as follows:

                               H.R. 1569

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Military Operations in the 
     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Limitation Act of 1999''.

     SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON USE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUNDS FOR 
                   DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES GROUND FORCES TO 
                   THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA WITHOUT 
                   SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION BY LAW.

       (a) In General.--None of the funds appropriated or 
     otherwise available to the Department of Defense may be 
     obligated or expended for the deployment of ground elements 
     of the United States Armed Forces in the Federal Republic of 
     Yugoslavia unless such deployment is specifically authorized 
     by a law enacted after the enactment of this Act.
       (b) Rule of Construction.--The prohibition in subsection 
     (a) shall not apply with respect to the initiation of 
     missions specifically limited to rescuing United States 
     military personnel or United States citizens in the Federal 
     Republic of Yugoslavia or rescuing military personnel of 
     another member nation of the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a 
     result of operations as a member of an air crew.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 2 of House Resolution 
151, the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter) and the gentleman from 
Mississippi (Mr. Taylor) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter).
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from San 
Diego, California (Mr. Cunningham).
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, this is a difficult time for most of us. 
And I heard my colleague a minute ago say we want to stop ethnic 
cleansing.
  The Pentagon told the President, and I know every one of them by 
their first names and I have fought in combat with most of them, told 
the President not to do this, that it would only cause more problems. 
And that is what we have done.
  There was only a little over 2,000 people killed in Kosovo prior to 
the bombing. NATO and the United States have killed more Albanians than 
the Serbs had in the year prior. We would not have a million refuges in 
the outlying countries. We have forced that.
  The Pentagon told the President that Milosevic would increase the 
ethnic cleansing. And when my colleague says that no more will we stand 
up, Tudjman murdered 10,000 Serbs in 1995, 750,000 refugees, where was 
he then? There are other ways.
  Maybe some of us who have fought in combat and have held our friends 
in our arms do not want to get in and see this again. Do not let us put 
ground troops into this thing. And there is a peaceful way to resolve 
this and we can do that. I went through it just a minute ago.
  Russia: Seventy percent of the Russians support the overthrow of 
Yeltsin. Let them be part of the solution. Let them come in with their 
peacekeepers and divide this. Serbs will agree to this. The Orthodox 
Catholic Church agrees with this. The 200,000 Serbian Americans agree 
with this.
  We can get Milosevic's troops out of there and restore some sanity 
into Kosovo without killing a bunch more and having another Vietnam.
  Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel).
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from Mississippi for 
yielding me the time.
  Mr. Speaker, I was one of those Democrats in 1991 that crossed party 
lines to support President Bush in the Persian Gulf War. In my 
estimation, President Bush was right then and President Clinton is 
right now. And I wish my friends on the other side of the aisle would 
give President Clinton the same flexibility that we wanted to give 
President Bush back in 1991.
  This bill sends the wrong signal to Milosevic, the absolute wrong 
signal. I have met with Milosevic. I know what he is all about. I have 
seen him face to face. The man is a liar and a tyrant. And this will 
encourage him to hunker down. This will encourage him to hold out. This 
will encourage him to think that, somehow or the other, the Congress 
will step in and deny the President the right to win this war.
  We hear from our friends on the other side of the aisle that the 
President, once he moves in, ought to be allowed to win, that our 
people should not be fighting these wars with their hands tied behind 
their backs. And I agree.
  So why would we want to do this? Why would we want to make it 
difficult for the President to be the Commander in Chief? Why would we 
want to tie the hands of the President? Why would we want to hurt our 
men and women in the area? Because that is what this will do.
  Instead of authorizing the way we did with President Bush, this is 
negative, this places negative restrictions. This is exactly the wrong 
signal that we should be sending.
  I am co-chair of the Albanian Issues Caucus. I have dealt with Kosovo 
for years and years and years. We hope the bombing will work. But if it 
does not, in my estimation, all options should remain on the table, 
including the option of ground troops. If not, if those options do not 
remain on the table, we tell Milosevic just hunker down, wait us out 
and he will win, because we are announcing ahead of time what we will 
not do. This, in my estimation, aids and abets Milosevic. Ethnic 
cleansing should not be allowed. Ethnic cleansing and genocide should 
not be allowed on the Continent of Europe or anywhere in the world in 
1999.
  The previous speaker mentioned that the bombing somehow was 
responsible for the genocide. This ethnic cleansing was going on for 
the past 10 years by Milosevic and his people. Oh, it was slower. It 
was what I call slow ethnic cleansing. But make no mistake about it, my 
colleagues, it was going on and would continue to go on.

                              {time}  1345

  He has accelerated it now because I said on the floor of the House 3 
years ago that Milosevic wanted to drive a million Albanians over the 
border and kill half a million Albanians. I am right about the million 
Albanians. I hope I am wrong about the half a million. But I think when 
we finally get into Kosovo, we are going to see mass graves and tens of 
thousands if not hundreds of thousands of people will have been 
ethnically cleansed.
  I introduced a bill last week with the gentleman from South Carolina 
(Mr.

[[Page 7744]]

Sanford) to arm and train the KLA. The KLA is the only counterbalance 
to the Serbs on the ground. In my estimation if we do not want American 
troops on the ground for years, we ought to be strengthening them and 
drop them antitank weaponry. The only solution in my estimation long-
range for Kosovo will be independence, because it is clear that ethnic 
Albanians have no future in Serbia. This is ill-timed, it undermines 
the President, and it ought to be rejected.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the very distinguished 
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Goodling).
  Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time. I want to make sure that everybody understands what the 
legislation says and what the legislation does.
  First of all, it basically very simply says that no DOD funds can be 
used to send ground forces into battle in Yugoslavia without the 
approval of the Congress. It does not interfere with our intelligence 
ability to support our air war, it does not interfere with our ability 
to rescue downed airmen of our forces or of NATO, it does not restrict 
ground forces all around Yugoslavia. It just basically says, ``You come 
to the Congress of the United States if you are going to use DOD funds 
to send ground forces into Yugoslavia.''
  Why did I introduce that legislation? I introduced it primarily 
because I do not believe the President can conduct a war in Yugoslavia 
without the consent of Congress. Opposite of what Secretary Cohen and 
Secretary Albright said in their note, they said H.R. 1569 would 
unacceptably restrict the President's ability to carry out his 
responsibility as Commander in Chief. I do not believe he can carry 
that out with a ground war without the consent of Congress. That is 
exactly what this legislation says: ``You come to Congress.''
  I think we have to be very, very careful when we talk about 
committing ground troops at this particular time. Where are the ground 
troops that we are going to commit? If you speak to a college group as 
I have the last 10 days to three different colleges, the first things I 
mention is the word ``draft.''
  Why do I mention the word ``draft''? Where are we going to get the 
ground troops? We have 250,000 now spread all over the world. You have 
to have that draft. We make that decision, not the President of the 
United States.
  So we have to become involved. If we do not become involved, then we 
are going to see something much worse than what we saw during Vietnam. 
Members are now getting, I am sure, all sorts of e-mails and letters 
from senior citizens. They are saying, ``You're taking my Social 
Security money.'' We are getting e-mails from college students because 
they are concerned about being drafted. We are getting e-mails from 
parents of teenagers who have this concern.
  Congress just has to be involved. The President cannot carry on this 
responsibility without our involvement. So we take the time as Congress 
to make sure that, first of all, we have the troops, that they are well 
prepared, that they have the material, they have the armaments, they 
have the equipment, they have the machinery in order to protect them, a 
decision we have to make because we are going to be responsible for 
their safety.
  I was very disappointed, apparently I did not know the gentleman as 
well as I thought I did, who spoke during the rule and made a statement 
that I did not know what was in my bill, that the leadership put it 
before me. The leadership did not even know I was introducing the 
legislation and I do not even know if they support the legislation.
  What he asked me was, the last paragraph, and I made it clear to him 
that I introduced H.R. 1368. The last paragraph became part of H.R. 
1569. So again, I call on everyone to make sure that we, the Congress 
of the United States, gets an opportunity to be involved if we are 
going to send troops on the ground into Yugoslavia.
  Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.
  Mr. Speaker, I have heard on two or three occasions this morning that 
the operation in Kosovo will come at the expense of the Social Security 
trust fund. I find it ironic that many of the people who made that 
statement just a few weeks ago were advocates of massive tax cuts for 
hundreds of billions of dollars which they assured the American people 
would not come at the expense of the Social Security trust fund. Either 
it is or it is not. And we do have to set priorities.
  I do agree with the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter) that 
equipping our troops, that we have as a Nation already sent into this 
combat, is a higher priority than anything else at the moment.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
King).
  Mr. KING. I thank the gentleman for yielding time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Goodling amendment. I do so 
despite the fact that I have serious differences with the President on 
the conduct of this war, specifically the command authority as far as 
selecting targets and the fact that he took ground troops off the table 
before the engagement began. But I oppose this amendment because it 
flies in the face of traditional Republican philosophy.
  Mr. Speaker, throughout our history, certainly for the last 50 years, 
the position of the Republican Party has been to support the 
constitutional right of the Commander in Chief to deploy ground troops. 
That is why the overwhelming majority of Republicans oppose the War 
Powers Act. That is why the overwhelming number of Republicans opposed 
attempts by the Democrats to require President Bush to seek prior 
approval before troops went into Saudi Arabia.
  It is also important to note, Mr. Speaker, the original commitment in 
Kosovo was made by President Bush on Christmas of 1992, when he said he 
would unilaterally send in American troops if Milosevic in any way 
moved on Kosovo. It is also significant to note that the Republican 
candidate for President in 1996 supports the action in Kosovo, as did 
President Reagan's former Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.
  Mr. Speaker, the powers of the President as Commander in Chief 
transcend whoever the President is at the moment. I ask that this House 
vote down this amendment to preserve the constitutional powers of the 
President as long defined by the Republican Party.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the very distinguished 
gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler).
  Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Speaker, H.R. 1569, which is not an amendment, this 
is a freestanding bill, would make it clear that this body has a vital 
role in determining whether U.S. military forces should be dispatched 
to participate in a ground war in Yugoslavia.
  Last month the Congress authorized the President to send peacekeeping 
troops into Kosovo in the context of Rambouillet and a permissive 
environment. Now, since that time, Rambouillet has collapsed and we 
have engaged in hostilities, changing the context for any such 
deployment.
  Today our Nation is fighting an air war against Yugoslavia and 
dictator Slobodan Milosevic. The President commenced U.S. participation 
in hostilities without any congressional authorization. Today our 
airmen are in harm's way as a result.
  Now, while the President and his national security team have stated 
that they do not intend to deploy ground forces to Yugoslavia, there is 
a real possibility that this conflict will escalate to involve them. 
Administration officials have clearly indicated that contingency 
planning is proceeding. Heavy armor and several thousand ground troops 
have been deployed to countries that neighbor Yugoslavia, and could 
become the nucleus of an invasion force. Meanwhile, questions about the 
air campaign's efficacy have led several NATO allies to push for ground 
forces.
  The situation in Kosovo is a tragedy. My heart truly aches for the 
people there, just as it does for so many who are victims of war and 
hatred around this world. But it simply is not within our power to 
solve all of the world's problems. We should not compound the

[[Page 7745]]

tragedy in Kosovo by deploying American ground troops there and 
subjecting them to virtually certain casualties.
  Simply put, I do not believe that our national security interests in 
Kosovo rise to a level that warrants the commitment of U.S. ground 
troops.
  Moreover, I am deeply concerned that this administration has not 
articulated an exit strategy for U.S. forces.
  I would also note that U.S. ground operations would severely 
undermine our ability to meet the requirements of the national military 
strategy which calls for being able to fight and win two major regional 
wars, in Korea and the Persian Gulf, not in the Balkans. Yesterday the 
administration authorized the call-up of 33,000 reservists. The Joint 
Chiefs have apparently formally determined that the air war against 
Yugoslavia has increased the level of risk associated with meeting 
these requirements from high to very high. Ground operations there will 
further erode our ability to meet vital national security commitments.
  Now, let me clarify that the intent of this bill is to preclude the 
deployment of a large-scale invasion ground force unless and until 
Congress authorizes it. This bill does not tie the President's hands. 
It simply requires him to come to the Congress first. It will not 
impair search and rescue missions, the use of Apache helicopters or, 
hypothetically, small numbers of personnel for intelligence or 
targeting functions. These are not invasion forces. Also, because our 
NATO allies have limited search and rescue capabilities, we allow U.S. 
forces to perform that mission.
  Whether one believes that the air operation in Yugoslavia is in the 
Nation's best interests or not, it is only appropriate that this body 
exercise its prerogatives with regard to the expansion of this conflict 
to a full-blown ground war. I urge support for this bill.
  Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks).
  Mr. DICKS. I thank the gentleman from Mississippi for yielding me 
this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in very strong opposition to H.R. 1569. I believe 
that this restriction, which is in essence a limitation on spending, is 
premature. I think the President has conducted this air campaign in a 
very vigorous, forthright way. I think all of us recognize the problem 
with ethnic cleansing and what the Serbian forces have been doing in 
Kosovo. I think to put this restriction, and the language, by the way, 
I think is very poorly drafted.
  I urge my colleagues to look at the second section which talks only 
about limited rescue opportunities, only in Yugoslavia. What if we need 
to use ground forces somewhere else? I just think this is premature. I 
would hope that if the President makes a decision that we are going to 
have to use ground forces, that in fact Congress would vote on it at 
that time, but not at this time. This is premature.
  And so I urge our colleagues to reject this and to support the Senate 
resolution that was passed with bipartisan support, carefully worked 
out, that basically expresses our support for the ongoing air campaign. 
I have had an opportunity to go over to the Pentagon to see how the air 
war is doing. It is becoming very effective. And so I think there is a 
lot of hand wringing here that is premature. I think we ought to give 
the air war additional time to work. I think we are weakening Mr. 
Milosevic. I think there is still a prospect that we may achieve our 
objective.
  To have this Congress divided and not have a bipartisan effort here 
to find common ground I think is extremely disappointing. I think, to 
the majority, there was a bipartisan effort in the other body, I think 
there needs to be a bipartisan effort here to support our troops and to 
support the air war in Yugoslavia.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the very distinguished 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. DeLay), the Republican whip.

                              {time}  1400

  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to state that no defense funds 
should be used for ground forces in Kosovo unless authorized by 
Congress.
  The Secretary of Defense last year, just last year, opposed sending 
troops to Kosovo, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned that our 
military strength has already been compromised.
  Since all the whereas clauses have been struck from this resolution, 
I will add my own whereas clauses:
  Whereas fighter planes are being cannibalized for parts to repair 
other aircraft,
  Whereas we are running out of cruise missiles,
  Whereas the Navy is undermanned by 18,000 sailors and the Air Force 
will be 1,300 pilots short within a year,
  Whereas to pursue bombing campaigns in Iraq and Serbia, the 
administration has played musical chairs with aircraft carriers and 
left the Pacific without a single carrier to defend our allies and our 
forces there,
  Whereas this is the reality of a downsized force, cutting military 
budgets has direct consequences, and vulnerability and trouble spots 
are a very real problem today.
  Despite these growing military deficiencies, the administration is 
considering sending ground forces for an open-ended, peacemaking 
mission that would further erode military readiness.
  Bosnia has already cost the United States over $10 billion. The 
administration has projected that Kosovo will cost $5 billion just this 
year, but has already admitted that it is impossible to determine how 
long the NATO mission will take. Considering that two withdrawal 
deadlines have already been broken in Bosnia, and considering that the 
President thought this would only take a week or two and now has 
extended it to open endedness, it is clear that any deployment to 
Kosovo will similarly drag on and go enormously over budget.
  So sending troops and carriers to the Balkans only makes a weakened 
military even weaker. If nothing else, Kosovo shows us that we have to 
rebuild our forces and not hollow them out even more. And before 
sending troops to Yugoslavia, Macedonia or Albania, the President is 
obligated by law to report to Congress on the cost, and the funding, 
the schedule and the exit strategy for deployment. He has not done 
this, and so today we should vote to forbid any deployment without 
congressional approval.
  Mr. Speaker, the Republicans in support of Bush were actually 
consulted and listened to and advised, and President Bush came to 
Congress for those votes. This President has given us briefings and 
then gone and done what he wanted to do in the first place.
  So, Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote to bar defense funds 
from being spent on ground forces in Kosovo unless Congress actually 
allocates such funding.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Tennessee (Mr. Tanner).
  Mr. TANNER. Mr. Speaker, I was in Brussels about a month ago as part 
of the North Atlantic Assembly, now NATO Parliamentary Group, and had a 
briefing with General Clark who is Supreme Allied Commander in Europe 
as well as the Commander of Operation Allied Force, and it was his 
opinion then and it is his opinion now that we are going to have to 
deal with Milosevic sooner or later; sooner being preferable, speaking 
militarily, to later. For one to think for a moment that a war in 
Europe will not engage directly the United States sooner or later is to 
turn a blind eye to history this century, No. 1.
  No. 2, Mr. Speaker, I would like to remind everyone that this is a 
NATO operation. NATO has been the most successful military alliance 
this country has ever engaged in. Since NATO was formed, no country in 
Europe has fallen under the Iron Curtain, and this is a part of a much 
bigger operation than just the United States.
  One other thing:
  To send a signal to one's enemy that we are not going to do something 
or take something off the table is a mistake, whether it is this vote, 
or whether it is a time line, or whether it is any other signal that 
sends a conflicting message.

[[Page 7746]]


  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the very distinguished 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman).
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time 
to me.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this measure, and I commend 
the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Goodling), a senior member of our 
committee, for bringing this measure before the House along with the 
gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler).
  Those of us who believe that the Congress should have a say in both 
the actual assignment of U.S. armed forces to conflict overseas as well 
as the funding of such deployments should join in voting in favor of 
this measure. Regardless of where our Members stand on our present 
policy in Kosovo, I believe it is indisputable that the Congress does 
have a constitutional role where U.S. military personnel are sent 
abroad into hostilities; and although the President has indicated he 
has no plan to send our troops into Kosovo on the ground unless there 
is an agreement from the Yugoslav authorities permitting such a 
presence, none of us can rule out the possibility that if circumstances 
do change, if the humanitarian situation worsens, or if the conflict 
spreads, that the President could decide to send in ground troops.
  I believe that it would now be prudent and timely for the 
administration to seek statutory authorization for the deployment of 
our armed forces in Yugoslavia. The President and his key officials 
have thus far, however, not requested the Congress for such an 
authorization. I think it is incumbent upon the administration to 
request such an authorization.
  This bill, I believe, is a proper response to where we now find 
ourselves in the terms of asserting our congressional role under the 
Constitution, under the War Powers Resolution. Accordingly, Mr. 
Speaker, I urge our Members to vote in favor of H.R. 1569.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Alabama (Mr. Callahan).
  Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Speaker, let me say that these resolutions always 
pose problems for me because I believe so strongly in the separation of 
the branches of our government. I think that 1569 certainly expresses 
my sentiments with respect to the sending of American land troops into 
Kosovo, and I am going to vote today in favor of this resolution, but I 
do it with some reservation. The President informed a group of us this 
morning that he will not, and I repeat, he will not send Americn land 
troops into Kosovo until he brings this message to the Congress to 
allow a full debate by the Congress.
  I appreciate the President recognizing the concern of those of us in 
the legislative branch of government about this endeavor in Kosovo.
  My vote today is with hesitation, with some reservation, but simply 
because of the word ``funds.'' The bill says it prohibits the use of 
``funds'' by the President or by the Department of Defense for 
deploying forces. I think that a more clearer resolution would be an 
expression of Congress to not deploy U.S. ground forces in Yugoslavia 
until the deployment is authorized by law.
  I have expressed so many times on this floor that I did not vote for 
Bill Clinton, but the American people did, and in that expression of 
the American people they gave him express authority to do what he is 
doing. However, we in the legislative branch have authority also to 
express our views. I intend to vote for this, and I am going to vote no 
on the other two House resolutions. But my favorable vote on this 
amendment is simply an extension of what I have personally already 
expressed to the President, what I have expressed to the people I 
represent in south Alabama; that I do not want to send the first 
American soldier into any part of Yugoslavia. But I think, in the 
expression of our views that we should not have use the word ``funds.'' 
We do not want to give an indication to our soldiers we do not want to 
pay them when we simply could have said that the Defense Department is 
not authorized to deploy ground troop into Yugoslavia.
  I think we should be very careful. There is always the possibility 
that this endeavor is on the verge of some type of diplomatic 
settlement, and we want to be very certain that we do not tie the hands 
of the President by expressing opinions that could send a message to 
the enemy that conceivably could be construed by Milosovic that the 
President will not be able to carry out his threats of military action 
if a diplomatic resolve is not reached.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Andrews).
  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend for yielding this time to 
me.
  Mr. Speaker, having the power to do something does not mean it is the 
right thing to do. I have very little doubt that we have the 
constitutional power to tell the President he may not consider the 
option of ground troops, but I have even less doubt that that is the 
wrong thing to do for us in these circumstances.
  Decisions that are about life and death are not decisions that lend 
themselves to decision-making by a committee. As young Americans are 
put in the line of fire as we speak, the idea that 435 people, each 
with a separate point of view, each with a separate analysis, is 
somehow going to weigh into a process that is ongoing, communicate a 
message to a foreign enemy and make a right decision on behalf of those 
people in uniform, is to me preposterous.
  As someone who speaks with some grave doubt about the initiation of 
this mission, I have no doubt about its morality, and I have no doubt 
about the impropriety of the resolution that is before us. We should 
each of us, Republican and Democrat, oppose it.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, I had a law school professor that in difficult 
discussions in class, he would say, ``Read it.'' I suggest, Mr. 
Speaker, that every Member read the bill that is before them. This is 
not a bill that prohibits the use of ground troops. This is a bill that 
prohibits the use of ground elements, a far broader, more difficult-to-
define definition.
  Look at this through the eyes of a sergeant stationed in Albania, 
working on helicopters as a mechanic; look at it through his eyes. Does 
this term, does this prohibition of ground elements, include 
helicopters because it is an air-to-ground weapon system? What is that 
sergeant going to think of what Congress is doing?
  Even if not, what if a helicopter lands in Kosovo for whatever 
reason; does it then become a ground element if they engage in a 
firefight, therefore illegal under this bill? Are the rescue operations 
which are permitted under this bill limited to those who are in the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a result of their operations only? 
What if troops, Mr. Speaker, of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
cross the border into Albania, or into Macedonia, and capture U.S. 
personnel? And that happened. Would a rescue operation then be 
prohibited if we saw them a hundred yards away and we could bring them 
back? That would be illegal under this bill.
  Is hot pursuit of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia troops 
prohibited by this? Do they have a safe haven? Remember the argument, 
the discussions, in the Korean War that there was a sanctuary north, 
north of the Yalu River?

                              {time}  1415

  This is creating a sanctuary for those troops who could cause harm to 
the sergeant and his men and women who serve under him.
  We cannot allow this bill to pass. This is not a prohibition of 
ground troops; this is a prohibition of a much broader definition.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Florida (Mrs. Fowler) to address the statement the gentleman just made.
  Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Speaker, I want to clarify the statement made by my 
good friend from Missouri (Mr. Skelton). As we all have dealt with the 
Legislative Counsel, and this is where the language came from, whenever 
we submit a bill to this body and it goes through that process, the 
legislative counsel informed us that the term ``ground elements'' has 
been used for

[[Page 7747]]

many, many years in this body to refer to our ground forces, just like 
we used the words ``aviation elements'' of the U.S. Army to refer to 
the aviation part of the Armed Forces of the U.S. Army.
  This language is from the Legislative Counsel. They said this has 
been used for years and years and years in this body to refer to our 
ground forces. That is where it came from. That is clearly the intent 
of this bill, to refer to the ground forces, as opposed to the aviation 
elements of our U.S. Army. I want to clarify that for the record, that 
that is clearly the intent and meaning of this bill.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.
  Mr. Speaker, I had the privilege of practicing law some 20 years, of 
helping debate definitions in court, and I can read a proposed statute. 
``Ground elements'' is all inclusive. It disallows preparation, it 
disallows hot pursuit, it disallows so many things other than just 
ground forces.
  If we are talking about ground forces, why does the bill not say 
that? Why does it not limit it to ground troops or ground forces? It 
does not do that.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Colorado (Mr. Hefley), the chairman of the Subcommittee on Military 
Installations and Facilities of the Committee on Armed Services.
  Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Committee on Armed 
Services, I rise in support of this resolution to prohibit the use of 
funds for the deployment of ground troops in Yugoslavia unless 
specifically approved by Congress.
  Now, this does not prohibit ground troops from ever going into this 
area for combat, but if the people of America are going to be sent into 
war, it seems to me the representatives of the people of America should 
be in a position to approve that. In fact, Mr. Speaker, I believe we 
should actually remove our forces from that area that are already 
there.
  In the last 6 years the manner in which this administration has 
circumvented Congress when it comes to deployment of the U.S. military 
forces around the world has been unprecedented, so it should come as no 
surprise that the House is here on the floor pleading to at least have 
a say in the process.
  The President is the commander-in-chief, but Congress should not 
relax in its role as a consultative partner when it comes to the 
deployment of our servicemen and women.
  So I agree with this measure wholeheartedly, but I want to talk about 
why I believe that we should not be there at all.
  In any military exercise, there should be a clear, succinct mission 
and exit strategy, similar to our successful efforts in Desert Storm. 
The Kosovo plan, and I hesitate to even call it that much, does not 
have a clear mission, clear goals, a way to measure accomplishment 
standards, or an exit strategy.
  For United States ground forces to enter that region, I also believe 
a more stable environment must be achieved by diplomatic means. This is 
not a desert. Our technological superiority will only give us so much 
of an advantage in the rugged terrain of Yugoslavia. It will not take 
only 4 days, as it did in the Gulf. The Serb army has entrenched itself 
over hundreds of years, and, unlike in Iraq, they appear to have 
complete loyalty to their leader, Mr. Milosevic. In other words, if we 
go into this hostile situation, we will lose American troops.
  Look at the history. Hitler had many, many divisions in Yugoslavia 
during the Second World War, and look how much good that did him.
  Mr. Speaker, I would hope that we would all support this measure.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt), the minority leader.
  Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I urge all Members, Republican and 
Democratic, to vote against this resolution, and I urge you to do it 
for three simple reasons: First, the language in this resolution is 
unnecessary.
  I was at a meeting a few minutes ago in the White House. Many of the 
Members here were in the meeting as well. The President was asked, as I 
have asked him many times, if as a practical matter he would change the 
policy and ask for ground troops in this situation without a vote of 
the Congress. And his unequivocal answer then and every time that I 
have asked him this was that he would not. He would not as a practical 
matter ask for an introduction of ground troops without coming here, 
talking to us and allowing time for a vote.
  As minority leader I believe strongly that if there is to be a change 
in the policy by NATO or the United States and we should be seeking 
ground troops, that it must be debated in the Congress and a vote must 
be taken in the Congress. I do not know how I would vote. I would want 
to hear what they have to say, why they want to do it, how it would be 
done and what the feasibility of it would be.
  So I would say to all Members in both parties, on both sides of the 
aisle, you have my pledge that if there is a change in the policy, I 
will be asking the Speaker to put on the floor an authorization, and we 
will debate it and decide it and vote on it.
  Second, I think this bill, if it passes, would be harmful to our 
effort. I say that because you have got to think about who is going to 
be listening to what we are saying.
  Mr. Milosevic will be listening carefully to what we say here today. 
Over the weekend he got a message of unity and resolve by 19 NATO 
countries. He is probably having to think today, wow, maybe NATO really 
means this; maybe they really are going to stay with this air campaign; 
maybe they really do have their act together.
  Do you really want to say to him today that we do not know what we 
are doing, we probably will not be for ground troops? Do you want to 
take that option off the table? I do not think so.
  Third, and most important, is what the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. 
Skelton) said: The language in this resolution is unclear, not as well 
put as it could be, and it leaves in question what can be done in the 
prosecution of the air war, which has been going on for 30 days.
  There are lots of questions about people going across the border to 
do this, that and the other thing in cooperation with the air war that 
has nothing to do with the big ground force going over to try to 
reclaim all or part of Kosovo that I do not think you want to get into.
  I appreciate tremendously and respect the sentiment of the 
gentlewoman and the gentleman that brought this resolution. I share 
their view. I do not think there ought to be a ground war, unless we 
vote on it and debate it. I totally share their view. But I, with all 
respect, believe this is not the way to do it. I believe that will 
happen if that is the decision of NATO.
  I urge Members to vote against this so that we can send the right 
message to Mr. Milosevic and to the American public and to the world. I 
urge Members to vote no on this. Let us keep the right message out 
there and stand behind our troops, that are out there every day trying 
to do the right thing to get this done without a ground war.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Armey), the distinguished majority leader.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, I want to begin by thanking the gentleman 
from Pennsylvania and the gentlewoman from Florida for bringing this 
measure forward, and commending them for the care by which they have 
drawn their language and the willingness that they have to listen to 
people, to respond to people, and to amend the language to meet the 
concerns of so many people. Indeed, I would take exception to the 
previous speaker in that regard. I think they have done a very good job 
and the language is very clear and precise.
  What is the problem here? The problem is we really want to reaffirm 
our partnership relationship with the administration along the lines of 
what the President has already, with so many of us, made as a 
commitment, and we want to reverse something of what has been the 
discouraging history of this.

[[Page 7748]]

  The President first began working and talking with NATO on this and 
made a commitment to NATO. After first saying to NATO we would 
participate in an air war and we would participate in peacekeeping 
troops on the ground and having made an agreement with various allied 
nations in NATO, he then came to Congress and said, ``Will the Congress 
endorse or reject this? But, if you reject that, understand it hurts 
our relationship with NATO.'' Well, perhaps he should have talked to us 
before NATO.
  Then later on he says, ``Well, we will threaten the air campaign.'' 
He agrees with NATO, and then comes to us to confirm or reject. Again, 
perhaps we should have been consulted first. Now when we begin the 
bombing, they have already made the commitment with NATO, and then he 
asks us to reject or accept.
  With our troops committed to the field we are facing a fait accompli, 
where any measure, any statement we make, can be misconstrued as 
failure to support our troops in the field, misconstrued by Milosevic 
as a failure of will on the American people, misconstrued by NATO as an 
unwillingness of this Congress to support this President's ability to 
make agreements with NATO.
  We want to change that cycle. We want to say, Mr. President, your 
relationship between the executive branch in this government and the 
Congress of the United States, the legislative branch of this 
government, comes before your relationship with allied nations; that in 
order to have a unified American government presence on any position we 
should take, Mr. President, we should come to agreement within this 
great government first. Then when we make an agreement with our NATO 
allies, there can be no doubt about it that we are in agreement.
  If Mr. Milosevic should ever see American troops on the ground, he 
should have no doubt that that has been the product of a unified 
decision between the presidency and the Congress prior to those troops 
being present on that soil. In that case, he can have no doubt that we 
mean business.
  But let us not put our young men and women, those brave young men and 
women that accept this responsibility and put their lives at risk, in 
the position where they are on the ground, under fire, and the 
President is consulting with the Congress of the United States after 
the fact of their being in harm's way.
  Let us make this relationship very clear. If you put on the uniform 
of this great land, if you are willing to risk your life, if you allow 
your son or daughter to be at risk and take on the horrible, fearful 
worries that families accept, let the families of America know that 
these young brave people will not be made as people in a theater of 
open conflict without first the prior unified agreement between the 
legislative branch and the executive branch of this government.
  Congress and the President together can make a commitment to those 
troops to define a mission and equip them to complete that mission at 
the highest possible degree of effectiveness with the lowest 
conceivable level of personal threat. We can do this if we do it 
together, Mr. President. We cannot do that for these brave young men 
and women if you act first and consult with us later. Let us straighten 
out the cycle.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Rothman).
  Mr. ROTHMAN. Mr. Speaker, I believe that if and when the President 
and our military commanders come to the conclusion that they need to 
introduce American ground forces into Kosovo, that they should come to 
the Congress and make the case before us. However, I do believe that 
the Goodling-Fowler bill, while well-intentioned, is the wrong way to 
go about this.
  The bill before us prevents American troops in NATO from rescuing 
refugees just across the border into Kosovo, even if the tragedy and 
the massacre is occurring right before our soldiers' eyes.

                              {time}  1430

  It would prevent the prepositioning of supplies and ammunition in the 
event we and NATO need to intervene on the ground in the future, and it 
would prevent our military from providing necessary intelligence 
assistance to conduct our air campaign. But worst of all, it tells 
Slobodan Milosevic that he will have plenty of time to do what he wants 
to do and slaughter and mutilate and rape almost 1 million people in 
Kosovo, because the United States Congress and my Republican colleagues 
have decided they are going to tie the President's hands, even in the 
case of an emergency military intervention, should it be necessary; to 
require the President to come back to the Congress, convene the 
Congress, hold a debate in order to rescue people or to take emergency 
steps.
  I think that that is wrong, and I urge my colleagues, let us not 
decide on the necessity of ground troops until the President and the 
military commanders of NATO ask us for them. But let us not prevent the 
President and NATO now from using our ground forces, if necessary, only 
in the case of an emergency. That would be a wrong message for 
Milosevic; that would endanger our military men and women, and it is a 
step we should not take. I urge a ``no'' vote on this bill.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Kasich), the chairman of our Committee on the Budget.
  Mr. KASICH. Mr. Speaker, I guess some could debate the timing of this 
debate today, but let us not be confused. Our founders really did 
believe that one man should not have the authority to send our people 
to war. That is why the Constitution of the United States involves the 
Congress of the United States, because it is through the Congress of 
the United States that the people of this country are recognized, their 
opinions are recognized. So this idea that we are meddling is something 
our people do not understand if we take that position. The people 
deserve to be involved in terms of committing our men and women to an 
armed military conflict.
  In addition, one could make the case that we could intervene in a 
civil war if, in fact, we could be successful. The fact is, the civil 
war in Kosovo has been raging on since 1389, since the 14th century. 
That is six centuries' worth of internal fighting, ethnic conflict, 
religious strife.
  The fact is, our intervening in the middle of an ethnic religious 
civil war that has gone on for six centuries is not likely to be 
successful. We found this out when we intervened in Somalia. We 
furthermore found this out when we intervened in Lebanon, even under 
Ronald Reagan. Being in the middle of civil wars that are not 
resolvable is a mistake for a major power.
  The question is when, then, should we intervene militarily? Well, on 
three grounds. One, when it is in the direct national interests of the 
United States. Number two, when there is an absolute achievable goal. 
And number three, when there is a credible exit strategy. None of these 
criteria can be met in terms of Kosovo. There is no direct national 
interest, there is not an achievable goal, and finally, there is no 
credible exit strategy.
  If we continue down this road of open-ended military commitments, 
what we will do is diminish our power. Some people accuse those who are 
opposed to Kosovo of being isolationists. It is just the opposite. I am 
a robust internationalist, but what I do know is there must be a 
balance between military and diplomatic means when it comes to 
resolving these international problems. If the United States wants to 
be the policeman of the world, we will find that we will diminish 
ourselves over the long run and we will find when it is necessary to 
act against terrorism or to provide worldwide stability in some part of 
this world, we will be too spread out, we will be too thin, and we will 
not be able to be effective. That is the prescription for the eroding 
of a national power of a superpower status into the 21st century.
  So, what do we do now? Well, the first thing we do not do is to step 
on

[[Page 7749]]

the accelerator. We should not introduce ground troops; we should not 
escalate the violence. Dropping bombs in a region of the world where 
fighting has been going on for six centuries and thinking that by more 
violence we will impose a solution on people in that region is, I 
believe, false. In fact, to put troops on the ground reinforces a 
failed policy that is frankly a sign of arrogance.
  What should we do? Mediate. We ought to look for a third party that 
can help us to be able to restore stability, Democratic institutions, 
and build an economy in that region. We should not let ego or we should 
not let reputations stand in the way of reaching an agreement that will 
send the refugees home, stabilize the world, and be able to continue 
the superpower status of the United States by making good choices of 
when we should intervene and when we should not.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer).
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, as kindly as I can, let me say that Neville 
Chamberlain rose up and said, let us mediate.
  I believe we are doing the right thing with our allies, for the right 
reason, in the right way to minimize risks to our people. I rise in 
strong opposition to the two resolutions sponsored by the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Campbell) and to this bill sponsored by the 
gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler) and the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Goodling). Unlike the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. 
Fowler), I do not believe that this resolution or this bill has the 
limited effect that she argues that it does. That perhaps is a 
legitimate and honest difference of opinion.
  Mr. Speaker, we have seen an extraordinary event occur here in 
Washington last week. Not just 19 NATO nations, but 42 nations came to 
America and celebrated 50 years of commitment to keeping the peace. We 
are now confronting, in the midst of Europe, where NATO has pledged to 
keep the peace, the most egregious violation of human rights, the most 
egregious disruption of the security of the European region as we have 
seen since 1968.
  The bill that is presently before us says that we shall not use 
elements. I agree with the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton); I am 
not sure of what that definition is. But I do know and believe that our 
enemies will interpret that as a constriction on our maneuverability 
and ability to act. That is a dangerous policy. We should not be 
engaged in this conflict with that constriction on our troops. It is 
dangerous, in my opinion, for them. It gives to our enemy a false sense 
that he may act to the detriment of our people. We ought to reject this 
bill as not only premature, but as unwise policy.
  Mr. Speaker, to my colleagues on the Republican side, let me say that 
we bombed in the Persian Gulf for 44 days. There was no vote on this 
floor. We deployed over half a million troops in harm's way. There was 
no vote on this floor. Why? Because President Bush and Secretary Baker 
talked to Speaker Foley and said, if you have such a vote, it will 
undermine our position. So Speaker Foley did not allow a vote until 
yes, President Bush, as he agreed, came to this floor for the 
authorization of troops to go in to Kuwait. Not to be deployed, to go 
into Kuwait.
  Mr. Speaker, as the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Callahan) has said, 
and as our President said as late as this morning to an assembled group 
of Members of the House, Republicans and Democrats, Senators and House 
Members, the Speaker of the House and the minority leader, that he 
would not, without consulting the House, take this action. Let us be 
united with our President and with our fighting men and women in this 
important endeavor.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 1569.
  First, however, I am compelled to express my outrage that we are here 
today, in this House, engaging in debate about the most serious issues 
we are ever called upon to consider--the conduct of war and the making 
of peace--in such a desultory manner.
  The Gulf War Resolution was the subject of 16 hours of debate--16 
hours, Mr. Speaker. Today we are faced with four separate, conflicting, 
and mutually exclusive resolutions and we have been limited to 1 hour 
on each of them.
  It is absolutely unconscionable and irresponsible to be considering 
legislation which requires the arbitrary withdrawal of our forces 
participating in the NATO action against Serbia, as does House 
Concurrent Resolution 82. Such a course would hand Milosevic victory, 
confirm the genocide he has perpetrated against the Kosovar Albanians, 
and destroy NATO.
  As I have said before, Mr. Speaker, intervention to stop the 
aggression against civilians in Kosovo is both morally compelling and 
clearly in our country's national interest. Let us be very clear about 
what is happening in Kosovo. This is not a civil war.
  It is a continuation of the conflict Milosevic instigated in Croatia 
in 1991 and in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1991 to 1995. His aim all along 
has been the consolidation of his own political power within Serbia. 
Milosevic is a tyrant and a war criminal.
  Former President George Bush recognized this fact in 1992 when he 
warned Milosevic that aggression by his forces against the civilian 
population of Kosovo would be met by an immediate military response by 
the United States. President Clinton reiterated that warning in early 
1993.
  Having made the commitment to our NATO allies, to the people of 
Kosovo and, indeed, to the world, that we will not stand by and watch 
ethnic cleansing and butchery in the heart of Europe, it is my firm 
belief that we must see this action through to the end.
  Last week, in a speech before the National Fire and Emergency 
Services Caucus dinner which I cochair with my good friend Curt Weldon, 
Senator John McCain called for such a commitment, including the use of 
ground troops. Senator McCain stated that he did not recommend this 
course lightly and was prepared to bear responsibility for the outcome. 
He said:

       I would rather face that sad burden than hide from my 
     conscience because I sought an advantageous political 
     position to seek shelter behind. Nor could I endure the 
     dishonor of having known my country's interests demanded a 
     course of action, but avoided taking it because the costs of 
     defending them were substantial, as were its attendant 
     political risks.

  America must lead, Mr. Speaker; we must not equivocate. Such a course 
would encourage the enemies of peace, the bullies of the world, and 
would surely endanger our men and women in uniform. As we enter the 
21st century, America stands as the beacon of democracy, freedom, and 
human rights. People around the world look to our country's strength in 
their struggle for democracy and basic human rights. We must not, Mr. 
Speaker, stand now in the shadow of weakness and isolationism.
  Our cause is just. Let us act.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gutknecht). The Chair would advise 
Members that the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton) has 10 minutes 
remaining, and the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spence) has 5 
minutes remaining.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Scarborough).
  Mr. SCARBOROUGH. Mr. Speaker, I would just like to remind my good 
friend, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) that it was 4 years ago 
that the President of the United States also promised a group of 
assembled Congressmen and Senators over at the White House that the 
Bosnian operation would last 1 year. Today we find ourselves 4 years 
and $10 billion into a quagmire, still engaged in a Balkan civil war.
  It is all too clear that this administration does not understand what 
they are getting into. While the gentleman reminds us of lessons 
learned in 1938 with Chamberlain, I would recommend we also look at 
1948. That was the year that Tito told the Soviet Union to get out of 
the Balkans three short years after the beginning of Soviet control. 
The Soviet Union got out, because they understood better than us the 
six century civil war that continues to rage on.
  This administration does not understand the delicate dynamics of this 
Balkan civil war. We have a Secretary of State who had guaranteed on 
public television that this was going to be a short, clean war. We have 
a President, mirroring what LBJ did in the 1960s, actually selecting 
targets in this civil war. They do not understand what they are getting 
into, and before we accelerate, like the gentleman from Ohio

[[Page 7750]]

(Mr. Kasich) said, we better take a long, hard look at what we are 
doing.
  This is constitutionally and practically correct, and as a member of 
the Committee on Armed Services, I support it wholeheartedly.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Guam 
(Mr. Underwood).
  Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Speaker, I emphatically oppose H.R. 1569. This 
bill is a slap in the face of the commander's ability to use a combined 
armed force in battle. Conflicts are not won by air, land or sea forces 
alone. It is a joint nature of a combined arms campaign that provides 
the flexibility and firepower for a commander to accomplish his or her 
mission, responding to a changing environment.
  This bill is not well crafted or thought out. Passage of this bill 
would seriously degrade the operational commander's ability to respond 
to any and all contingencies. It would not allow us to pursue attacking 
enemy forces across international borders, thus giving Milosevic a safe 
area. It will not allow us to rapidly introduce ground troops even in a 
permissive environment. It will hamstring the operational commander's 
ability to adopt and adapt to the ever-changing situation in the 
Balkans.
  This is not a preemptive strike against the use of ground troops as 
it is advertised. It is a preemptive strike on the flexibility to 
respond to emergency conditions. It is a preemptive strike on the 
safety of our troops. It is a preemptive strike which will make Mr. 
Milosevic very happy.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from South 
Carolina (Mr. Graham).
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Speaker, it seems to me that there seems to be a 
consensus building along two lines: timing and trust. The gentleman 
from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt), the minority leader, took to the 
microphone and says that he agrees with the idea that this body, this 
Nation, should debate whether or not we send ground troops. It is a 
matter of timing. The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) that just 
spoke said that the President has given us his word. That is a matter 
of trust. I do not have the confidence he does to trust this President 
without having an engagement in this debate now.
  I want more rather than less debate on this issue. I want it sooner 
rather than later, because I see three big problems for ground troops. 
The coalition will not hang together; the political stomach is not 
there for a ground war. The dominance in the air that we have 
militarily will be lost, and the Russian instability that will come 
from a U.S.-led NATO invasion would start the Cold War all over again, 
potentially.
  If anybody criticizes this bill on drafting, then they have to look 
this operation in the face and see if they can find any flaws with it. 
This bill is properly drafted. Now is the time to speak. More rather 
than less, sooner rather than later, before we get a lot of people 
killed for no good reason.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Tierney).
  Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Speaker, I believe that Mr. Milosevic is wrong and 
that the War Crimes Tribunal will eventually have its course and way 
with him. I believe that whatever brought us into this situation, 
whether people agree or disagree with the events, we are not going to 
be able to undo the past.
  I believe that we should and must try to reach a diplomatic solution 
to this situation which resolves the refugee situation, which resettles 
people, which leaves Mr. Milosevic subject to the War Crimes Tribunal 
and which gets us back on track, and I believe that we have to do 
something about making sure Mr. Milosevic has encouragement to come to 
the table, which is why the war strikes will continue.
  With regard to ground troops, I ask the sponsors of this bill whether 
or not they might be willing to have a unanimous consent to change the 
word ``elements'' to ``troops'' and resolve whatever disagreement we 
have on that. I would hope to get an answer to that.

                              {time}  1445

  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Kucinich).
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I support the Goodling resolution. Some 
say we must listen to the President, some say we must listen to 
military leaders. I say we must listen to the now still voices of those 
Americans who made the ultimate sacrifice more than a generation ago in 
an undeclared war, in an unwinnable war, a bright, shining lie of a war 
where truth was the first casualty.
  Now we are engaged in a great humanitarian mission, or so we are 
told. But humanitarians do not excuse the bombing of Albanians and 
Serbian civilians. Humanitarians do not bomb passenger trains. 
Humanitarians do not bomb refugees fleeing the battle. Humanitarians do 
not bomb residential areas. Humanitarians do not blow up water systems, 
electric systems, sewage systems, and create an ecological catastrophe 
in the name of peace. Humanitarians do not leave thousands of bomblets 
in the ground so refugee children can lose their lives after the 
battle.
  No more bombing the villages to save the village, no more ground 
troops sacrificed to redeem our failure in the air. All we are saying 
is to give peace a chance. All we are saying is to give peace a chance 
through negotiation and mediation and through diplomacy. Give peace a 
chance.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Arkansas (Mr. Snyder).
  Mr. SNYDER. Mr. Speaker, I am voting against this bill today. Number 
one, I think it is poorly written. We have already had discussions 
about the phrase ``ground elements,'' but hey, I think we can get some 
lawyers to help us command.
  I think it is also rushed. We have had ever-changing language. First 
there was no language to deal with our own downed pilots. Then we had 
no language to deal with U.S. citizens and pilots. Now we have language 
to deal with allied crew members. Be wary of an ever-changing bill.
  Third, this is the wrong message to our allies. What if we have 
British or French troops kidnapped like our ground troops were 
kidnapped in Macedonia, and they come to us and ask us to help, and we 
say, are they a member of air crew, and they say, no, they are relief 
workers. We will say, we will file a bill next week and take care of 
that.
  Very poor language. That is what happens when we rush things on 
through. This is a poorly-worded bill at the wrong time. Please vote 
no.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Turner).
  Mr. TURNER. Mr. Speaker, this resolution has a noble purpose in that 
it attempts to assert the role of the Congress in any decision to 
commit American forces to a ground war in Kosovo. It does so, however, 
in the wrong way and at the wrong time. It prohibits deployment of 
ground elements unless Congress specifically authorizes deployment by 
law.
  I represent one of the soldiers who is held captive today in 
Yugoslavia, Stephen Gonzalez, of Huntsville. If this resolution had 
been the law on March 31 when those three were captured, this 
resolution would have prevented our forces from pursuing the captors of 
those three American soldiers. Mr. Speaker, line 24, page 2 of the bill 
makes it very clear, the only exception is to recover someone who is a 
member of an air crew.
  Mr. Speaker, this bill also approaches this issue not only in the 
wrong way, but at the wrong time. It prohibits deployment of ground 
elements in a way that sends a very bad signal to President Milosevic. 
The threat of the use of ground troops should be on the table, because 
it sends a message of NATO resolve to Milosevic, a message that he must 
hear.
  Contrary to promoting the congressional interest in bringing a just, 
diplomatic settlement to the Yugoslavian conflict, this resolution 
makes diplomatic settlement more difficult and strengthens the hand of 
President Milosevic. It increases the likelihood of the campaign of 
ethnic cleansing and suffering being waged against innocent people for 
a prolonged period of time.
  Mr. Speaker, the President said today that he will seek the support 
of

[[Page 7751]]

this Congress if he makes the decision to send ground troops into a 
major deployment in Kosovo. I believe that we need to take him at his 
word and we need to reject this resolution, which could do harm both to 
American troops and to our national interests.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Traficant).
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, I support this resolution. Europe should 
be providing the ground troops. We have been propping up Europe much 
too long.
  But I am more concerned about what we are not doing here today. We 
should be arming the KLA so they can help protect their own citizens. 
We should be supporting independence, because they will never coexist 
and there will never be a lasting peace. We should be going after 
Milosevic for war crimes.
  One thing for sure, now I know why the President of the United States 
has usurped the congressional power to declare war. Congress has no 
backbone for it. Today is a good debate. It will now separate the 
powers the way the Constitution determined it should be. Let us let 
Europe provide the ground troops.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt).
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, our problem is not with the idea of 
authorization. The President legally should seek our authorization 
before committing ground troops, and politically he would be well 
advised to get it.
  Our problem is with the text of this resolution, because it creates a 
potential legal quagmire for troops that we have deployed. It uses the 
word ``ground elements,'' not exactly a word of art, but instead of 
using ``ground troops'' or ``ground forces,'' it says ``ground 
elements,'' so as to include not just personnel but materiel, not just 
troops but equipment and weapons, as well.
  So the first casualty of this sweeping ban, this language in this 
resolution, is going to be foredeployed and prepositioned equipment. 
Why do we want to preposition? Because if we need M-1 tanks, if we need 
Bradleys in this theater, we will have to begin today prepositioning 
those tanks and Bradleys and the other heavy equipment, because we will 
not have time when the need arises.
  That does not mean we may need them for a ground force that will be 
conducting a ground war. We may need them for a multinational 
implementation force.
  If we have learned anything from Beirut to Mogadishu, it is that when 
we send in one of these peacekeeping forces, they had better be tough. 
They had better be imposing. They had better have the equipment, so 
that nobody dares take them on.
  If we read this resolution, it says, don't you dare spend a dime on 
anything like that for deployment of prepositioning that might be 
introduced into this theater. Keep on reading and we can come up with 
all sorts of scenarios that this would potentially prohibit or bar.
  Let us assume, for example, that our intelligence told us that Serb 
troops were massing just outside Macedonia or just outside Albania. 
This would prohibit us from taking a preemptive first strike.
  Let us assume that we did know in advance if they crossed the border 
of one of these countries and we counterattacked, drove them out of the 
country, and wanted to pursue them. We would have to stop at the 
border.
  Let us assume, and I hope we have, some on-the-ground military 
intelligence in Montenegro, in Kosovo. This would bar that, it would 
prohibit that. Let us assume we have some special forces operations 
covertly operating at night in one of those countries. This would bar 
that. It would deny us the kind of information we need to be 
intelligent.
  Mr. Speaker, the authors of the resolution have tried to solve this 
problem by rewording Subsection B and making an exception for air crews 
that are shot down. But that limited exception shows us just how strict 
the language is.
  When we go through this we understand, and it is complex for us to 
understand, and we can certainly conceive of many circumstances this 
would prohibit. This is going to create a legal quagmire for our troops 
in this theater. We should not do that to them.
  We have the President's assurance he will come and seek our authority 
before he goes on a ground war, if he does. We should not impose these 
additional complications.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Norwood).
  Mr. NORWOOD. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Speaker, I would like to simply point out that the right to start 
a war or declare a war is left to the American people. They get to do 
that through their elected representatives. The reason the Constitution 
gives that right to the American people is that we are going to ask 
them to sacrifice their sons and daughters and our Treasury on behalf 
of the war that they asked us to start.
  This amendment was mentioned earlier, that it takes a lot of the 
options off the table. It takes only one option off the table, and that 
is the option of the President to start a war with ground troops 
without the permission of the American people.
  Mr. Speaker, if we need to have a ground war, the President can come 
to Congress, where he should come, because this is what is known as the 
balance of power, when the legislative branch has some power and the 
executive branch does. When the Executive is wrong, and I think they 
are wrong, they should come to the Congress. I ask Members to support 
this amendment.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gutknecht). The gentleman from Missouri 
(Mr. Skelton) is recognized for 2 minutes.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I take this opportunity to close, and to 
mention briefly that the President sent a letter to the Speaker dated 
April 28, part of which reads as follows: ``However, were I to change 
my policy with regard to introduction of ground forces, I can assure 
you that I would fully consult with the Congress.'' That should put an 
end to that.
  Let me tell the Members what this legislation does. If this is 
passed, this legislation would prohibit any preemptive attack by 
American forces based on an intelligence assessment of an impending 
attack by enemy forces.
  It would prohibit American forces from pursuing attacking enemy 
forces following an enemy incursion across international borders. It 
would prohibit the rescue of any non-U.S. headquarters personnel. It 
would prohibit the rescue or support of any non-U.S. personnel from a 
nongovernmental agency. It would prohibit the rescue of any military 
personnel from Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, or Romania. It would also 
prohibit the rescue of peacekeeping forces in a peacekeeping role in a 
permissive environment.
  Again, I say, read this. This bill, with the language thereof, has 
been a moving target. We cannot allow this to pass. If a bill should 
come up at a time that is proper, based upon what the President says, 
that is what we should debate at that time. This is out of time. This 
improper bill is poorly written. I certainly urge a no vote thereof.


                    Amendment Offered by Mrs. Fowler

  Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment, and I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered and adopted.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mrs. Fowler: On page 2, Line 12, 
     strike ``elements'' and insert ``troops''.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from Florida?
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I wish to 
point out that my friend, the gentlewoman from Florida (Mrs. Fowler) a 
few moments ago stated that this was language inserted and written by 
the legislative counsel, and that they knew what they were doing.

[[Page 7752]]



                              {time}  1500

  The language in this bill, since it was first initiated, has been a 
moving target. We cannot allow it to go forward with the uncertainty of 
this language, the uncertainty of this bill, and I very, very sadly, 
because she is a friend, I very sadly have to object.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gutknecht). Objection is heard.
  Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Speaker, I am sorry, because this was at the request 
of several Members of the minority who wanted that word change. I was 
certainly willing to do that, but I still stand by my previous 
explanation of the intent of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. 
Spence) has 1 minute remaining.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, I apologize to the Members on my side for not being able 
to recognize them, but we do not have enough time. As a matter of fact, 
I am revising and extending my own remarks because I have not got the 
necessary time to deliver what I would like to deliver at this time.
  I rise in support of H.R. 1569 to prohibit the use of Department of 
Defense funds for the deployment of U.S. ground forces in Yugoslavia 
absent a specific Congressional authorization. Since the initial 1995 
deployment of U.S. forces to Bosnia, I have opposed the use of ground 
troops in the Balkans, and I continue to do so today.
  First and foremost, my opposition is based on the recognition that 
our military forces have been reduced so dramatically over the past 
decade that an enlarged, open-ended commitment in the Balkans will 
unquestionably jeopardize our ability to protect U.S. interests in 
other critical regions of the world where the threat is serious and 
imminent. Prior to the beginning of Operation ``Allied Force,'' the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff had assessed the ability of U.S. armed forces to 
execute our own national military strategy as entailing ``moderate to 
high risk.'' This risk has grown worse over the past several months as 
we have poured scarce military resources and assets into the Balkans. 
Just today I read an article in Jane's Defense Weekly indicating that 
the Joint Chiefs are on the verge of changing their assessment of this 
risk from ``high'' to ``very high.'' As General Shelton, the chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of staff, and every theater commander-in-chief have 
testified, ``risk'' in this context means longer wars and significantly 
higher casualties.
  Based on planning efforts last fall, defeating the Serb army on the 
ground in Yugoslavia would require a NATO force of 200,000 ground 
troops or more. While NATO plans have not specified what percentage of 
such a force would be Americans, precedent tells me that such a NATO 
force would include tens of thousands of U.S. ground troops--at least 
several divisions' worth.
  The implications of U.S. ground troops serving even as peacekeepers 
or as part of an international occupation force would have serious 
consequences for our broader global interest.
  Administration policy-makers are currently discussing a possible NATO 
occupation force in Kosovo that would be roughly the same size as the 
force initially deployed to Bosnia. That force included 60,000 NATO 
troops, about 20,000 of which were American. This size American ground 
contingent would, directly or indirectly, one way or another, involve 
much of the active Army. Rotating such a large ground force through 
Kosovo, with no near-term prospect of withdrawal, combined with the 
ongoing deployments in Bosnia, would make it all but impossible for the 
Army to play its essential role in fighting and winning two major 
regional conflicts in places like Korea and the Persian Gulf--in other 
words, to be able to execute the national military strategy.
  Tying down a large U.S. ground force in the Balkans will cause our 
friends--and our enemies--to legitimately question our ability to 
protect and promote our interests and to remain a force for stability 
in other critical regions of the world. How will Saddam Hussein gauge 
our ability to defend Kuwait if much of our Army is stuck in the 
Balkans? Will we be able to rapidly reinforce South Korea in the event 
of an attack by the North? Would we be able to effectively react to an 
escalating crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait? The answers to 
these questions are far from reassuring, and should concern us all.
  In anticipation of the inevitable and oversimplified response that we 
surely cannot abandon our commitment to NATO, let me just say that I am 
not suggesting that the United States would walk away from its 
responsibilities or should not play a critical role in any NATO 
combined air and ground campaign if the alliance heads down this 
controversial path.
  While I remain strongly opposed to the commitment of U.S. ground 
troops in the Balkans, we should not lose sight of the reality that the 
United States is leading the air war and would continue to do so in the 
event of a ground campaign. In addition, the United States is currently 
providing the vast majority of the operation's strategic lift, 
communications, logistics and intelligence support. Is this shirking 
our responsibilities to NATO? Can anyone honestly say we are failing to 
do our fair share? I do not think so.
  We simply cannot afford to ignore our interests and the growing 
threats around the world by allowing ourselves to fall into the trap 
set by our allies, as happened in Bosnia, that NATO military operations 
cannot succeed and the alliance will fall apart unless U.S. ground 
troops are leading the way. If we continue to view the Balkans in 
isolation from the rest of what is becoming an increasingly dangerous 
world, we do so at our own peril.
  Mr. Speaker, there's an old adage that says, ``When you're in a hole, 
stop digging.'' We've already dug ourselves a big hole in Bosnia and we 
ought to think twice before we dig that hole deeper in Kosovo. Unless 
some balance is restored between the nation's diplomatic and foreign 
policy commitments and the ability of U.S. armed forces to underwrite 
them, history is likely to look back on the post-Cold War world ``peace 
dividend'' as resulting in a more dangerous world in which America's 
credibility and resolve were put to the test with alarming frequency.
  Mr. Speaker, I would just like to say simply, in closing, that I 
support this resolution. I have been opposed to ground troops in Bosnia 
under any conditions. As a matter of fact, we should not even be in the 
Balkans. The national security of this country is not at stake. Even 
for those who think that it is, it does not rise to the level of 
importance that other areas of this world do, and we are unprepared to 
defend against the many serious threats we have in other parts of the 
world today. This further lessens our ability to defend against these 
threats. And for that reason, I oppose sending ground troops into this 
area.
  Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 1569, a bill 
to prohibit the funding of ground elements in Yugoslavia without prior 
Congressional authorization.
  Let me be clear. If at some point in the future our military 
commanders determine that ground troops are necessary to achieve our 
military objectives in Yugoslavia, I believe Congress ought to vote on 
their deployment. This bill, however, extends far beyond that simple 
objective and could seriously jeopardize the security of U.S. forces 
currently in the region.
  This bill does not just prohibit the funding of ground troops prior 
to Congressional authorization, but rather prohibits the funding of all 
U.S. ground ``elements'' in Yugoslavia. This ill-defined language would 
create a legal quagmire for the U.S. forces already deployed in the 
Balkans. For example, would this bill prohibit the funding of Apache 
maintenance crews in Albania because the Apache is as an air-to-ground 
weapon that is deployed in Yugoslavia? It is an open question. There is 
no question, however, that this bill would legally prohibit U.S. forces 
in the region from launching a preemptive strike against forces in 
Yugoslavia even if they received intelligence that they were about to 
be attacked. If Yugoslavia were to attack beyond its borders, this bill 
would legally prohibit U.S. forces from carrying the battle into 
Yugoslavia even if our military commanders considered such action vital 
to the protection of American troops.
  In the name of protecting U.S. troops, Mr. Speaker, this bill 
actually endangers the brave men and women who are already serving in 
the region. I support Congressional approval before ground troops are 
deployed in a hostile environment, but I cannot support legislation 
that ties the hands of our nation's military commanders. For this 
reason, I oppose H.R. 1569 and I urge my colleagues to do the same.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, the decision to go to war is one of the 
most important decisions that our country can make. As elected 
representatives, we have to consider our international and domestic 
obligations, as well as our individual and collective moral beliefs.
  There is no question that Slobodan Milosevic has committed horrible 
atrocities in Kosovo and I do not believe the international community 
should stand by idly. The votes today though, require us to look at the 
international context of this conflict and some of

[[Page 7753]]

the consequences of our response thus far. I believe the evidence leads 
us to the view that Congress should have a say before any kind of 
ground troops are deployed and that is why I will support H.R. 1569.
  The political process that gauges the appropriateness of humanitarian 
intervention needs to catch up with the military's ability and 
willingness to undertake those operations. In that respect, today's 
debate serves a useful purpose. Regardless of how you intend to vote on 
today's measures, an open and fair debate on real, credible options is 
democratically healthy and Constitutionally necessary. I opposed the 
rule earlier today because I do not think it rose to this standard. It 
imposed an absurdly small amount of time for debate and took the 
unprecedented step of precluding further House consideration of any 
resolutions under the War Powers Resolution dealing with Yugoslavia 
during the remainder of this Congress.
  I also must observe that my colleagues on the other side of the aisle 
have taken an excessively captious approach to the president's strategy 
in Yugoslavia and the administration's foreign policy generally. Yet I 
believe this Congress has been derelict in its own duties, happy to sit 
back and criticize the president. First it avoided action for the first 
month of the war, limiting itself to a vote on peacekeeping troops 
after hostilities have ended and a symbolic vote to support the troops. 
Now the House is voting on a group of four resolutions, none of which 
present real, credible alternatives to bombing.
  I think there are some very difficult questions that should inform a 
thorough debate on war in Yugoslavia, starting with how we define what 
we are trying to accomplish.


               Military Objectives and American Interests

  The military objectives in Kosovo have been variously described as 
(1) forcing Milosevic to make peace; (2) severely degrading his 
capacity to carry out military action in the future; (3) deterring an 
even bloodier offensive against civilians in Kosovo; and (4) allowing 
the return of refugees and ensuring their self-governance. What I'm 
wondering, is what thresholds have been established to determine when 
we have accomplished these goals? What role do we envision for Congress 
in determining when the mission objectives have been completed and what 
criteria will be used to make that determination? I am voting for H.R. 
1569 because I believe it will preserve those Congressional 
prerogatives.
  I also do not think we have adequate assurances from regional states 
such as Russia that they will refrain from participating in the war; we 
have boxed Mr. Yeltsin into a very tight corner domestically. I know 
that the Deputy Secretary of State has been working hard on that issue, 
but the public statements from Russia are nevertheless alarming. For 
example, earlier this week a high ranking Russian official noted that 
the NATO embargo on fuel does not apply to Russia, since it is not a 
member of NATO. And there is strong nationalist momentum in the Duma to 
supply the Serbs.
  I also wonder if the removal of the current regime in Belgrade a 
prerequisite for a negotiated settlement to the conflict in the 
Balkans. I've seen what happened with our Iraq policy and I'm afraid we 
may be headed down the same kind of path, where compliance is 
unilaterally defined and goals are arbitrarily shifted.


                    vigorous, multilateral diplomacy

  Regardless of how Congress votes today, I hope we will vigorously 
pursue diplomatic options. As Admiral Eugene Carroll (ret.) of the 
Center for Defense Information has suggested, we cannot have a solution 
to the Yugoslav conflict that is overly reliant on military force. The 
situation demands a political solution eventually, no matter how you 
feel about the ongoing bombing. There have been numerous attempts at 
diplomacy thus far.
  United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan's peace proposal on April 
9 demanded: ``First, an end immediately to the campaign of intimidation 
and expulsion of the civilian population; two, to cease all activities 
of military and paramilitary forces in Kosovo and to withdraw these 
forces; three, to accept unconditionally the return of refugees and 
displaced persons to their homes; four, to accept the deployment of an 
international military force to ensure a secure environment for the 
return of refugees and unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid; and 
finally, to permit the international community to verify compliance 
with these undertakings.'' In order to make this proposal work, Annan 
called for a cessation of hostilities as ``a prelude to a lasting 
political solution to the crisis, which can only be achieved through 
diplomacy.''
  The European Union made a peace proposal placing Kosovo under 
international protectorship if Yugoslavian forces agreed to withdraw. 
And of course Russia has been to the bargaining table a number of 
times. These efforts have gotten scant attention and minimal diplomatic 
support. Much of this is a result of the deliberate marginalization of 
the UN.


                     The role of the united nations

  It is inappropriate for NATO to be bombing without specific 
authorization from the United Nations Security Council. When the 
Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1199 on September 
23, it called on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to stop repression 
against civilians and withdraw forces from Kosovo. The Resolution 
specifically noted that should progress on this and other stated matter 
be inadequate that the Security Council would ``consider further action 
and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in 
the region'' and remained seized of the matter.
  Moreover, since Article 53 of the UN Charter specifically states that 
``no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or 
by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security 
Council'', I think it was inappropriate for NATO to proceed without 
specific Security Council authorization. Article 39 of the Charter 
clearly states that ``The Security Council shall determine the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression.'' The fact of the matter is that the Security Council 
should have made any determination regarding the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression in 
Kosovo. It is also not clear that the Security Council ever made any 
determination under Article 42 as to whether force could be employed by 
NATO. I am aware of the Secretary General's public statements, but I 
think these issues remain unresolved.
  The United States should address these issues before the UN Security 
Council along with the authority for and composition of a post-war 
peacekeeping force. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State 
told the Speaker today in a letter that the Administration is ``willing 
to consider a U.S. contribution to an international security 
presence,'' but they insist that it must have ``NATO at its core.'' 
This kind of inflexibility is not justified.
  One of the key stumbling blocks from the beginning has not been a 
restoration of autonomy for Kosovo or the withdrawal of troops, it has 
been whether the implementation force will be NATO-led or include more 
of our allies who have an interest in peace. I think the peacekeeping 
operation must have at its core an international institution broader 
than NATO, such as the United Nations or the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe. The fact of the matter is that NATO has a 
very limited mandate and limited membership.


                           the future of NATO

  The North Atlantic Treaty clearly limits NATO to acts of self 
defense. Article Five states that ``The Parties agree that an armed 
attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be 
considered an attack on them all. . . .'' NATO does not have any legal 
authority to engage in military action that is not self-defense such as 
humanitarian intervention; I'm saying this independent of whether this 
intervention is morally correct or not.
  The escalation of the conflict has had devastating consequences for 
non-combatants. On April 6, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) took the highly unusual step of asking NATO to take 
over relief coordination due to the extraordinary demands being placed 
on their resources. I do not think we have fully studied the propriety 
of a military alliance making decisions that greatly impact the care, 
maintenance and legal status of refugees--work that is ordinarily 
carried out by a non-political relief agency.
  There has also been a great many civilian deaths, partly as a 
consequence of NATO's decision to target non-military facilities such 
as TV stations. It is also an unintended consequence of flying at high 
altitudes in the interest of minimizing the risks to pilots. This 
happened on April 12, when NATO planes struck a civilian train on a 
bridge over the Juzna Morava River. The pilot fired his missiles before 
he even saw the target. The next day, 16 patients in a hospital in 
Banica were wounded by flying glass during a bombing raid. On April 6, 
dozens of people were hurt or killed in an attack on Aleksinac when 
bombs went 1500 yards astray. When the Pentagon admitted that a bomb 
went astray, the New York Times reported the next day that in fact more 
than one missile was used. The Washington Post reported on April 13 
that NATO had acknowledged bombing residential areas of Kosovo, 
Pristina and the Southern Serbian town of Aleksinac where at least 20 
people were killed. For exactly these reasons, the head of the 
International Red Cross, Cornelio Sommaruga, called this week for an 
end to bombing civilian targets by NATO.
  I know it is extremely difficult to avoid civilian casualties during 
war. I mention these incidents because I think we need to be cognizant

[[Page 7754]]

of the fact that the more frequently they occur, the more difficult it 
is going to be to build a political solution on the ground after the 
war.


                     exit strategy and war by proxy

  I do not think that I have adequate assurances that neither the U.S. 
nor any third party country will arm (or has armed) the KLA as part its 
war-fighting or exit strategy. We are all already aware of the 
atrocities that have been committed by Milosevic's forces but I was 
appalled by some information I received just today about the KLA. 
According to Human Rights Watch, the KLA began its first major 
offensive, an attack on the town of Orahovac on July 18, 1998. ``At 
least forty-two people were killed in the fighting, and on estimate, 
another forty remain unaccounted for. Reports of mass graves and 
summary executions surfaced, but remain unconfirmed.'' The press 
release also notes that on August 27, 1998, ``twenty-two civilians were 
reportedly executed by KLA members in the village of Kle ka'' and on 
September 9, 1998, ``the bodies of thirty-five people, including both 
ethnic Serbs and Albanians, were found in an artificial lake near the 
village of Glodjane. The evidence strongly suggests that they were 
killed by the KLA.'' The Associated Press notes that the KLA publicly 
claimed responsibility for bombing government targets in 1996.
  Some of my colleagues are in favor of arming the KLA. I think we need 
to be concerned about the KLA not just because they may be perpetrators 
of the same kind of violence that NATO is supposedly trying to stop but 
also because there is such strong potential for mission blowback.


            humanitarian intervention and international law

  Let me repeat that I do not think we should have looked the other 
way. There is an obvious tension in international law between the 
obligation to respect the sovereignty of nations versus the duty to 
intervene to stop genocide and crimes against humanity. The UN Charter 
begins by stating its purpose is to ``save succeeding generations from 
the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold 
sorrow to mankind.'' The Charter condemns violations of sovereignty and 
states that ``All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state. . . .'' At the same 
time, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees the rights 
of individuals against oppressive states, and the parties of the 
Genocide Convention are committed to prevent and punish the crime of 
genocide.
  The answer is that both U.S. and international law need to be a part 
of determining when atrocities warrant humanitarian intervention. This 
combination ensures multilateralism, helps to share the costs of 
operations and takes into consideration the opinions of our allies, 
which in this case should include countries who are not NATO members 
and who could contribute to a peaceful resolution of this crisis.
  When I learned that an F-117 had been shot down and that troops were 
being held in captivity, it brought home the horrors of war even sooner 
than I feared. Congressional oversight and involvement must stay in 
sync with this rapidly unfolding war. I urge my colleagues to vote for 
H.R. 1569 and to not abandon the path to peace.
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Speaker, I wish to share my remarks today on the 
current situation in Kosovo with my colleagues and the American public. 
The systematic campaign of brutality by Slobodan Milosevic has forced 
the United States and NATO to take forceful action. As the human 
tragedies mount--a growing number of refugees existing in desperate 
conditions, families being ripped apart, torture, rape and murder--the 
House considered important measures about how the United States should 
proceed.
  I joined my colleagues on both sides of the aisle in supporting H.R. 
1569 to assert the constitutional authority of Congress. We made it 
clear that the President cannot commit the United States military to a 
ground war without the explicit consent of Congress. The House today 
made it clear that the President must first receive the approval of 
Congress should the nature of the mission require a shift in military 
operations. At this time, the President and his military advisors have 
not signaled a change in the current strategy of air strikes, but if 
and when they do, I want the opportunity to vote on whether or not it 
is in fact necessary to deploy ground troops to end the genocide.
  I cast a vote in favor of Resolution 21 explicitly authorizing the 
President to conduct military air operations and missile strikes in 
Yugoslavia. By doing so, I put myself firmly on record in support of 
the United States and our NATO allies in this moral struggle to rescue 
the victims of ethnic cleansing and to put an end to such atrocities. 
As an American who believes in freedom and a Jew who remembers the 
lessons of the Holocaust, I could do no less.
  Even as we engage in these air strikes, the United States must place 
the highest priority on exploring and implementing all diplomatic 
options to end the conflict and to redouble our commitment to 
humanitarian relief.
  Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Speaker, at the outset, let me say this Congress is 
unified in its support for our military when involved in operations 
around the world. The men and women in uniform have our full and 
unequivocal support. With that said, I have deep reservations about the 
foreign policy of this administration that is now being conducted by 
the military in Operation Allied Force.
  Two weeks ago, Defense Secretary Bill Cohen and Joint Chiefs Chairman 
General Hugh Shelton testified before the House Armed Services 
Committee to try to explain the Clinton Administration's policy and 
objectives in Kosovo. Specifically, why this Balkan civil war is vital 
to America's national security interests and to define the end game. I 
regret to say they were not convincing. Moreover, it is very apparent 
that there is no end game--no exit strategy. I voted against sending 
our troops into this internal conflict, and unless a compelling case is 
made, I will continue to oppose sending in U.S. ground forces into 
Kosovo.
  It is clear that the President chose to ignore the professional 
advice of the military leadership, and sided with his foreign policy 
team who made this into a humanitarian plea. Frankly, I think the air 
campaign may have precipitated the ethnic cleansing and suffering in 
Kosovo.
  We have interjected ourselves into a centuries-old conflict, where 
both the Serbs and Albanians have each been the aggressor over Kosovo. 
By virtue of Operation Allied Force targeting Serbia assets, we are 
siding with the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) which has strong ties to 
organized crime, gun running, drug trafficking and international 
terrorist groups like Bin Laden. With the Administration's mishandling 
of the Balkan crisis, I can only think of the old saying that ``those 
who fail to remember the lessons of history, are destined to repeat its 
mistakes.''
  To compound matters, this is the first time in NATO's history, a 
defensive coalition by charter, that military action has been conducted 
against a sovereign nation over internal strife. While there is 
consensus among the 19 member nations of NATO for the Air Campaign, 
there is no consensus about a ground campaign. It's evident that 
Milosevic has not been deterred by only an air campaign. An assessment 
has been made that more than 200,000 troops would be needed to invade 
Serbia, yet no ground plan even exists. President Clinton is leading 
our nation down the path of ``mission creep'' that will suck our 
military into a quagmire that resembles Vietnam--a situation that 
America has vowed never to repeat.
  Mr. Speaker, we have an opportunity to prevent Operation Allied Force 
from becoming a full blown war if we act now. The European Union must 
step up to the plate and assert its responsibility for its own region. 
If the EU determines that the strife between the Serbs and Kosovar 
Albanians warrants military intervention, so be it; they can proved the 
forces.
  Diplomacy is still an option. Russian efforts to broker a settlement 
in Kosovo were never allowed to succeed; these effort should be 
vigorously pursued. We must re-examine all of these options before we 
go down this path of no return; support the resolution HR 1569.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this 
resolution. This resolution would prohibit funds to deploy ground 
elements without prior authorization. Mr. Speaker, this resolution goes 
far beyond the concerns of many who believe Congress should express its 
will before a ground invasion of Yugoslavia is contemplated.
  I do believe that Congress should express the views of our 
constituents as we proceed with action in the Balkan region. I however 
do not want to limit the flexibility of our military in their efforts 
to make Slobodan Milosevic comply with international norms. Mr. 
Speaker, I find it ironic that this body is even considering this 
resolution in light of past precedent. When President Bush asked this 
body to authorize action in Kuwait, this body had sufficient time to 
debate the matter. Secondly, this body did not attempt to block our 
commanders' flexibility and ability to respond to emergency situations.
  I believe that NATO's operations are making a difference in the 
region both militarily and in providing comfort to thousands and 
thousands of refugees. But it is important for us to remember that when 
conducting operations like this one that it is going to take time. I 
want to ensure that Milosevic pays a heavy price for his present policy 
of repression against the Kosovar Albanians, to alter his calculation

[[Page 7755]]

about continuing on this course, and to seriously diminish his military 
capacity to exert his will over Kosovo.
  In addition, Mr. Speaker there are thousands and thousands of ethnic 
Albanians who have received the full brunt of the Yugoslavian army and 
police force in Kosovo. These people have lost their homes and 
possessions. They have lost countless loved ones to unspeakable 
atrocities. We may never know the full extent of the horrors committed 
by the Yugoslavian army. We are left with the words of refugees fleeing 
this country. Their eyes have witnessed and their words speak of men 
and boys who have been led off to die.
  The 37,000 refugees in Montenegro, the 262,000 refugees in Albania, 
and the 120,000 in Macedonia; place the responsibility for the Kosovo 
tragedy squarely on the shoulders of Slobodan Milosevic. Mr. Speaker, 
we cannot deny the evidence of mass graves nor the humanitarian crisis 
ongoing in Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania.
  Mr. Speaker, we must be patient in this endeavor, for the stability 
of Europe is at risk. I believe that we must stay the course, for this 
is a battle that Milosevic cannot be allowed to win and that NATO must 
not lose.
  There is a great deal at stake in this operation including the 
stability of Europe. We cannot lose sight of the fact that on two 
occasions we have sent young men and women to fight and die in order to 
restore the stability of Europe. Mr. Speaker, if Milosevic is allowed 
to succeed then we will be establishing a dangerous precedent for the 
next century. NATO must succeed in its endeavor to restore order to 
Kosovo and to establish a lasting peace based on fairness and justice.
  Although I do not support the use of ground forces, I feel that this 
resolution goes too far. This sweeping resolution threatens to severely 
restrict the ability of our military commanders to conduct operations 
in the Balkans. There are situations, which could arise that require 
the deployment of ground troops. I cannot support H.R. 1569 because it 
imposes a risk to both our forces and those of our allies.
  Mr. Speaker, this effort is in our national interest, our current 
policy best represents our interests. We must prevail in this struggle 
because the interests and the values, which embody our nation and those 
of our allies, are at stake.
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to 
this resolution, which would prohibit funding for ground forces unless 
deployment is specifically authorized. The only narrow exception 
provided in this measure is for rescuing U.S. service personnel.
  This resolution would undermine our ability to achieve NATO 
objectives in Kosovo and, more importantly, would send the wrong signal 
to President Milosevic about our resolve in the Balkans.
  I encourage my colleagues to consider the ramifications of this 
resolution, which limits our country's military leaders. If we are to 
ensure a stable Europe and stop the atrocities, then we must destroy 
Milosevic's ability to wage his campaigns of ethnic cleansing.
  I believe that the United States should continue to support the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) efforts in the Balkans. NATO has 
been principally responsible for the relative stability and economic 
prosperity that Europe has enjoyed over the last fifty years. Our 
experience in two world wars clearly demonstrates that a stable Europe 
is in the national interest of the United States.
  By putting unwise restrictions on our armed forces, this resolution 
could ultimately jeopardize our involvement in the 19-nation NATO 
operation.
  In attempting to make a political statement, the Republican 
leadership hastily put this resolution together without involving the 
minority and has circumvented the committee process.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose this resolution, which could do more 
to harm our national security interests and jeopardize our men and 
women in uniform involved with this operation.
  Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1569, a bill 
that would prohibit the appropriated funds of the Department of Defense 
from being used to deploy ground troops to Yugoslavia without the 
consent of Congress.
  I still have grave concerns about NATO actions in Kosovo because I 
see no direct U.S. interests at stake, no clearly defined mission and 
no exit strategy. After five weeks of bombing, there is no evidence 
that our actions are either convincing Slobodan Milosevic to agree to a 
peace treaty or protecting the thousands of ethnic Albanians who are 
fleeing Kosovo. The recent deployment of Apache helicopters, tanks, 
artillery and armored personnel carriers to the Balkans, and the 
Monday's call up of 33,000 reservists, is clear evidence that President 
Clinton intends to introduce ground forces to Kosovo itself sometime in 
the near future. H.R. 1569 simply requires the President to consult 
Congress before he does so.
  While I abhor the ethnic violence and the forced eviction of ethnic 
Albanians from Kosovo, I am still not convinced that this situation 
merits sending in U.S. ground troops. With that said Mr. Speaker, I 
urge the passage of this bill because it sends a clear and concise 
message to President Clinton--that Congress has a constitutional role 
to play and that the President must get the authorization of the 
Congress before he can commit ground troops to Yugoslavia.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge passage of H.R. 1569.
  Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Speaker, if you don't believe we should send troops 
into the Balkans--then there is a clear pattern of how you should vote 
today.
  If you believe that the War Powers Resolution offers the best means 
for preventing the president from taking us to war--then you know the 
course to follow.
  What we are discussing today is the war in the Balkans. This region 
is a tapestry of overlapping ethnic rivalries where medieval and modern 
history are intertwined. As with the Middle East, the situation is very 
complicated. But where the Middle East resembles a game of checkers, 
the Balkan region is more like three dimensional chess.
  The central point is that the Balkans represent a process of history 
and memory which has created a multiplier effect for violence. It is 
not a phenomenon of ``modern hate,'' but a monstrous creation partially 
wrought by the collapse of the multinational Hapsburg and Ottoman 
empires. It is not a situation open to easy solutions. We are dealing 
with a primitive ferocity there.
  Today, we must decide if the President can take the United States 
further into the Balkan conflict without the approval of Congress. 
After all, the Constitution invests Congress with the power to make 
war.
  To my knowledge, no substantial war with the accompanying carnage has 
ever been fought solely on the basis of human rights. If they were, 
then surely we would be fighting around the globe in many countries. 
Yes, human rights are among the noblest of causes, but wars are fought 
over national interests.
  If the President had started this campaign in the right way, by using 
the full measure of our airpower, this conflict might have been 
resolved by now. However, this gradual approach has not worked. In 
fact, this approach has been a common strategic flaw in most of this 
Administration's military excursions.
  Who in America would willingly send their son or daughter to die in 
the Balkans based upon the President's explanation of the events? 
President Clinton has put our troops in precarious positions over and 
over again. We should say today that not one service man or woman 
should be placed in harm's way based upon the President's empty threats 
or hollow promises.
  Vote yes to prevent ground troops from being sent into the Balkans. 
Vote for the Goodling/Fowler Bill. When you find yourself in a hole, it 
makes sense to stop digging. We need a better policy in the Balkans 
than we now have, we need to stop digging.
  Mr. CAMP. Mr. Speaker, today, Congress is faced with one of its most 
important and difficult constitutional duties. Article I, Section 8 of 
the U.S. Constitution clearly states that Congress shall have the power 
to declare war and to raise and support armies. Today, our Armed Forces 
are engaged in a NATO-led bombing campaign designed to force Yugoslav 
President Slobodan Milosevic to the negotiating table. The choices we 
must make are what actions we must take, declaring war, continuing on 
our current course or removing our troops, and what are our 
international responsibilities in the region.
  We face a stark reality and a difficult decision. The reality is that 
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and the Serbian military forces 
are engaged in ethnic cleansing--attempting to systematically 
exterminate the Kosovar citizens. Reports have confirmed this and the 
atrocities have intensified since the NATO bombing campaign began on 
March 24, 1999.
  Since the bombing campaign began, hundreds of thousands of Kosovars 
have fled the fighting. The pictures and stories of their escape are 
both tragic and disturbing. The decision facing Congress today is how 
to put an end to Slobodan Milosevic's organized efforts to harm these 
innocent people, how to return the refugees to their homeland and how 
to restore stability to the region.
  President Clinton has put our Armed Forces on an unfamiliar and 
unclear path. His stated goals are to end the ethnic cleansing and to 
restore stability to the region. As news reports have shown, the 
bombing campaign is having little impact on the Serbian military's 
infrastructure. More importantly, it is doing little to prevent his 
systematic extermination of the

[[Page 7756]]

Kosovar people. It can be argued that far from restoring peace and 
stability to the region, the bombing campaign is causing further 
disruption and intensifying Milosevic's ethnic cleansing efforts.
  President Clinton has expressed concern about the introduction of 
ground troops into the region. I agree with his assessment. However, 
President Clinton recently authorized the mobilization of up to 33,000 
reservists for deployment to the region--an act that could be 
interpreted as the first move toward the introduction of ground troops.
  I question the efficacy of the bombing campaign and our current 
course of action. No military action can be won by limiting military 
options and creating a convoluted and confusing decisionmaking process. 
President Clinton's poll-driven policies ignore his military advisor's 
advice, endanger our servicemen and women and may involve the U.S. in a 
long-term military occupation with an ever increasing escalation 
reminiscent of Vietnam.
  Our decision today is among the most important votes I've cast. 
Declaring war should be the last act of the Congress and the 
Administration after all diplomatic efforts have been exhausted and 
every avenue possible to resolve the conflict has been pursued. I don't 
believe we've exhausted these options at this time and that's why I 
will vote against declaring war.
  The introduction of ground troops escalates our involvement to an 
unnecessary level at this time. I'm not prepared to put our servicemen 
and women in a hostile situation and will vote to remove our troops. 
The situation in Kosovo is the result of centuries of conflict and will 
not and cannot be quickly resolved using military force.
  Any military victory will be offset by the fact that U.S. troops will 
remain a part of a long-term occupation force. As any neighboring 
nation should, the European nations have a responsibility to take a 
leadership role in working toward a permanent solution instead of 
temporary answers to this regional dispute.
  Finally, the U.S. Constitution is clear that Congress has the ability 
to declare war and raise and provide funding for our nation's Armed 
Forces. That's why I will support the Fowler Resolution, which 
clarifies the role of Congress and which outlines that no U.S. ground 
troops will be deployed unless such deployment is authorized by law.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
  Pursuant to section 2 of House Resolution 151, the bill is considered 
read for amendment, and the previous question is ordered.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 249, 
noes 180, not voting 5, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 100]

                               AYES--249

     Abercrombie
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Baldwin
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bereuter
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Blagojevich
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Bonilla
     Brady (TX)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (IN)
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Hulshof
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jackson (IL)
     Jenkins
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kucinich
     Kuykendall
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lee
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     Markey
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McKinney
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, George
     Mink
     Moran (KS)
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ose
     Oxley
     Packard
     Paul
     Pease
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rivers
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Salmon
     Sanders
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Schakowsky
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Spence
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stump
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Tierney
     Toomey
     Traficant
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Young (AK)

                               NOES--180

     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Bateman
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop
     Blumenauer
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonior
     Bono
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Coyne
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Dreier
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Forbes
     Ford
     Frost
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gillmor
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green (TX)
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hunter
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     John
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kelly
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Klink
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Larson
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Martinez
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Minge
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Scott
     Shows
     Sisisky
     Skelton
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thurman
     Towns
     Turner
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Wise
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wu

                             NOT VOTING--5

     Aderholt
     Slaughter
     Tauzin
     Wynn
     Young (FL)

                              {time}  1521

  Ms. LOFGREN and Mr. DEUTSCH changed their vote from ``no'' to 
``aye.''
  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________