[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 5]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 7621-7622]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                     WE NEED TO DEFEND OUR FREEDOM

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. BOB SCHAFFER

                              of colorado

                    in the house of representatives

                        Tuesday, April 27, 1999

  Mr. SCHAFFER. Mr. Speaker, I have addressed this Congress a number of 
times regarding the very real and serious threat our country faces from 
ballistic missile attack. Very few citizens realize our nation, the 
world's only superpower, could not stop one single ballistic missile 
from striking American soil today. This is not due to a lack of 
technological capability, but rather, is a direct result of President 
Clinton's deliberate policy of vulnerability.
  I have frequently and consistently engaged the President and his 
administration on this issue because I believe it is one of the most 
important ones facing our nation. No other issue deals so directly with 
the security and future of our democracy than one which concerns the 
very defense of our territory and our citizenry.
  Today, I responded rather directly to a letter I received from 
Lieutenant General Lester L. Lyles, Director of the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Organization (BMDO), on March 12, 1999. In his letter, General 
Lyles acknowledged the clear and present threat to our nation, but 
failed to contradict, even once, the policy of assured volunerability 
established by the Clinton administration.
  In composing this response, I consulted many colleagues who share my 
concerns. They have asked that the final draft be distributed to all 
Members.
  Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I hereby submit for the Record, the full text 
of the letter I have today posted to General Lyles.

                                    Congress of the United States,


                                     House of Representatives,

                                                   April 15, 1999.
     Lt. Gen. Lester L. Lyles,
     Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization,
     Washington, DC
       Dear General Lyles: Your letter of March 12, 1999, and 
     Defense Secretary Cohen's January 20, 1999 remarks regarding 
     our ballistic missile defense program have made clear to the 
     Congress the reluctance of the Clinton administration to 
     defend the American people from the growing threat of long-
     range ballistic missile attack. Despite the clear and growing 
     threat posed by long-range ballistic missiles, Secretary 
     Cohen cannot even admit the need to deploy a ballistic 
     missile defense.
       The threats are obvious and commanding. On August 31, 1998, 
     North Korea successfully tested a ballistic missile capable 
     of striking the United States. In July 1998, the Rumsfeld 
     Commission issued an alarming and erudite warning on the 
     threat and proliferation of ballistic missiles. In April 
     1998, Pakistan's test of an intermediate range ballistic 
     missile set off the May 1998 nuclear arms testing race 
     between India and Pakistan. In July 1998, Iran tested an 
     intermediate range ballistic missile, a step in its program 
     for building long-range ballistic missiles to attack the 
     United States.
       During 1998, we learned China has 13 long-range ballistic 
     missiles aimed at various American cities. We also learned 
     China is building two new models of ICBMS which are road-
     mobile and capable of striking the United States. In February 
     1999, reports revealed China's active build-up of 
     intermediate and short-range ballistic missiles threatening 
     Taiwan, following in the footsteps of China's use of 
     ballistic missiles to intimidate Taiwan in 1995 and 1996.
       In 1998, in spite of grace economic problems, Russia 
     continued construction on its new, road-mobile, long-range 
     ballistic missile designed to pierce ballistic missile 
     defenses, the Topol-M. In addition, Russia, operating under a 
     decaying command and control structure, still possesses 
     hundreds of ballistic missiles and thousands of nuclear 
     warheads capable of destroying the United States.
       The deployment of a ballistic missile defense is thoroughly 
     warranted. The Clinton administration's policy to delay the 
     deployment of a ballistic missile defense until the year 
     2005, or later, is incompatible with the purpose of the 
     federal government's responsibility to provide for the 
     common defense. I fear it will take a nuclear missile 
     strike on American soil before this administration and the 
     Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) admits to 
     the need to deploy a ballistic missile defense.


                                 RECORD

       In 1993, the Clinton administration inherited a balanced 
     and sophisticated ballistic missile defense program utilizing 
     space-based interceptors, high-energy lasers, and theater 
     missile defenses such as Navy Theater Wide (Navy Upper Tier). 
     These space-based programs were in an advanced state of 
     development. For example, Brilliant Pebbles was ready to move 
     into the acquisition stage, having acquired approval by the 
     Defense Acquisition Board. The time-frame for Brilliant 
     Pebbles deployment, assuming a program of modest acquisition 
     streamlining, would have led to deployment before the year 
     2000, or perhaps sooner, according to former Strategic 
     Defense Initiative Organization director, Ambassador Henry F. 
     Cooper:
       ``In both the Space-Based Interceptor [Brilliant Pebbles] 
     and other follow-on R&D areas, the pace at which system 
     concepts can be fully developed and fielded is set by the 
     available funding--not the state of technology [emphasis 
     added]. Present schedules could be considerably shortened, 
     perhaps up to half, if technology limited development 
     programs were funded.'' [Ambassador Henry F. Cooper, Summary 
     of SDI Programs and Plans for Theater and National Ballistic 
     Missile Defense, January 4, 1993, p. 12.]
       Furthermore, a March 15, 1995 letter from Dr. Edward T. 
     Gerry to Senator Strom Thurmond confirmed the Space Based 
     Laser program was entering a ten-year development and 
     acquisition phase in a program using modest streamlining, as 
     pointed out in Dr. Gerry's letter, signed by representatives 
     of Lockheed Martin and TRW, which included a summary of the 
     Space Based Laser program status and a ten-page attachment.
       Had the Clinton administration vigorously funded and 
     pursued these ballistic missile defense programs, including 
     Space Based Interceptors, Space Based Lasers, and Navy Upper 
     Tier, we would already have ballistic missile defenses 
     deployed. Instead, in the nearly eight years of its tenure, 
     this administration has gone out of its way to block 
     deployment of a ballistic missile defense, fighting the will 
     of Congress in the mistaken belief it is better to leave the 
     United States vulnerable to attack than to defend our freedom 
     and our lives.
       The record is clear. After two full terms in office, Mr. 
     Clinton will have failed to deploy any defense against long-
     range ballistic missile attack.
       Moreover, his administration plans to delay the deployment 
     of any National Missile Defense system until the year 2005 
     (this particular system would exclude much of our territory 
     and assets), and plans not to deploy the Navy Theater Wide 
     missile defense program until the year 2007.
       President Clinton, through his actions, will ensure the 
     American people remain undefended against the threat of long-
     range ballistic missile attack for five years or more after 
     the end of his administration. This record deserves emphasis 
     and understanding by every American. Despite a clear and 
     growing threat from ballistic missile attack, this 
     administration has ensured no defense in the short term, and 
     a lasting legacy of little or no defense for years to come.


                              ARCHITECTURE

       The only ballistic missile program even contemplated is 
     limited in scope and intrinsically limited in effectiveness. 
     Rather than vigorously pursuing a variety of ballistic 
     missile defense technologies and basing modes to provide 
     multiple opportunities for intercepting long-range ballistic 
     missiles over the full course of their flight, the Clinton 
     administration has instead limited our ballistic missile 
     defense program to a single mid-course defense, foregoing the 
     advantage of a boost phase defense.
       The proposal for a mid-course defense consists of ground-
     based interceptors deployed at two sites, one in Alaska, and 
     one in North Dakota, along with their associated radar. This 
     defense, while situated for ballistic missiles coming over 
     the North Pole, is misplaced to deal with the threat of 
     ballistic missiles launched from sea, as in the case of 
     Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles.
       The basic architecture of the Clinton administration's 
     ballistic missile defense program forgoes the advantages of 
     space-based defenses. Such a defense would provide global 
     coverage and a boost phase defense capability ground-based 
     interceptors do not possess. The administration's proposal 
     also limits its effectiveness against countermeasures such as 
     submunitions, which even the Director of the BMDO admits is 
     an advantage in favor of a boost phase defense.
       The Clinton administration is intentionally rejecting the 
     advantages of space-based defenses under various guises, 
     claiming either adherence to the ABM Treaty, a desire not to 
     ``weaponize'' space (as if long-range ballistic missiles 
     armed with nuclear warheads traveling through space are not 
     weapons), or denial of the technological maturity, cost 
     effectiveness, and quick deployability of space-based 
     defenses.
       To fortify its policy of non-deployment in space, the 
     administration in early 1993 canceled the Brilliant Pebbles 
     program to build and deploy Space Based Interceptors and 
     reduced funding for the Space Based Laser program to a token. 
     Even today's Space Based

[[Page 7622]]

     Laser program is operating at a budget 10% or less than what 
     is necessary to build a constellation of Space Based Lasers.
       Furthermore, in overseeing the Space Based Laser program, 
     the administration has delayed the necessary development 
     steps, under the guise of waiting for new technology, rather 
     than advancing it today using current technology. By 
     consistently confusing management teams and contractors by 
     transitioning from competition to a ``community'' team, and 
     by de-emphasizing the goal of testing a Space Based Laser in 
     space, the Clinton administration has greatly weakened the 
     program. By placing the Space Based Laser in competition with 
     the AirBorne Laser, rather than recognizing the unique and 
     separate applications of each program, the administration 
     will even further delay the development of Space Based 
     Lasers.
       In summary, the Clinton administration, despite inheriting 
     over forty years of research and analysis into ballistic 
     defense architecture, has yet to present or pursue the basic 
     principles of an effective ballistic missile defense 
     architecture, which includes multiple opportunities for 
     intercepting a ballistic missile; continuous, global coverage 
     to protect the entire United States; and a boost phase 
     defense capability.


                                PROGRAM

       It is no small matter the Clinton administration believes 
     and maintains space-based defenses are less technologically 
     mature than ground-based defenses. Certainly the 
     administration is aware of America's space superiority over 
     the past 40 years, particularly in the realm of payload 
     transport and positioning. It is much easier to position in 
     advance an interceptor in space than to booster launch one 
     under extreme reactionary duress and severe time-constraints.
       The deployment of interceptors or high-energy lasers in 
     space provides continuous, global coverage--an advantage not 
     shared by the BMDO's ground-based ballistic missile defense 
     architecture. The BMDO is pursuing an architecture inherently 
     limited in its capability and guaranteed to provide a 
     suboptimal defense.
       According to prior cost estimates by the Strategic Defense 
     Initiative Organization, the BMDO's proposed ground-based 
     interceptor system, consisting of approximately 100 
     interceptors, can be expected to cost between $20-$30 
     billion. Yet, for $10-$20 billion, we could build a system of 
     Space Based Interceptors, such as Brilliant Pebbles, which 
     would consist of approximately 1,000 interceptors and include 
     10-year life cycle replacement. For an additional $20-$30 
     billion, we could build a constellation of Space Based Lasers 
     providing a boost phase defense. But rather than endorse a 
     cost-effective and technologically-feasible system of space-
     based defenses, President Clinton fervently argues against 
     them.
       The administration's method of relying on only one 
     contractor team to develop its ballistic missile defense 
     program, and postponing a deployment decision until after a 
     2000 test, virtually guarantees the only option America will 
     have is a limited system at a later time. Should this one 
     test fail, the United States would remain undefended and 
     without further options to field a ballistic missile defense. 
     Such a situation, wherein the very security and future of our 
     nation could hinge upon a single, limited system of defense, 
     is entirely unacceptable.


                          BOOST PHASE DEFENSE

       The advantages of a boost phase defense, largely 
     unrecognized by the BMDO's plan for a national missile 
     defense program, are worthy of mention. These advantages 
     include:
       (1) Simplified target detection and identification, aided 
     by the boosting missile's burning rocket and hot exhaust 
     plume;
       (2) Simplified identification and targeting due to the 
     larger size of a boosting rocket over a hardened reentry 
     vehicle traveling through the cold of space;
       (3) Simplified target destruction because a boosting 
     missile is under aerodynamic stress and is unarmored compared 
     to a hardened reentry vehicle.
       To these inherent advantages of a Boost Phase Defense is 
     added the ability to intercept a ballistic missile before 
     releasing its payload of multiple warheads, decoys, and/or 
     clustered submunitions. A boost defense will greatly mitigate 
     the difficulties encountered by an integrated ballistic 
     missile defense downstream from the boost phase.
       Yet, the administration has chosen not to pursue the 
     development of a boost phase defense capability for a 
     national missile defense.


                                SUMMARY

       The Clinton administration opposes the deployment of a 
     national missile defense. Whether cloaking its opposition in 
     a limited, ineffective defense program, rejecting the 
     advantages of space-based defenses by claiming technological 
     infeasibility, restricting our ballistic missile defense 
     program to ground-based interceptors, or adhering to an 
     outdated and ineffective Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 
     the record of this administration is clear--no ballistic 
     missile defense for the American people.
       The Clinton administration claims the ABM Treaty is the 
     cornerstone of our ``arms control'' policy, even though the 
     Soviet Union freely violated the ABM Treaty in its pursuit of 
     a national missile defense and through its massive buildup of 
     offensive nuclear missiles. The ABM Treaty is outdated, a 
     fact which even its author, Henry Kissinger, has admitted. 
     Yet, President Clinton, through the BMDO Congressional 
     liaison, Commander John M. Pollin, is parading the ABM Treaty 
     and its unratified amendments as a reason to delay the 
     development of space-based defenses. [Commander John M. 
     Pollin, There Are Limits on Sea-Based NMD, Naval Institute 
     Proceedings, April 1999, pp. 44-47.]
       The Clinton administration's policy of leaving the American 
     people undefended from long-range ballistic missiles is 
     dangerous, unconscionable, and indeed, an embarrassing 
     chapter in our nation's history. We need to defend our 
     freedom.
           Very truly yours,

                                                 Bob Schaffer,

                                               Member of Congress.