[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 5]
[House]
[Pages 7595-7602]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



        ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR SOLVING THE CONFLICT IN KOSOVO

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of 
January 6, 1999, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) is 
recognized for 60 minutes.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Madam Speaker, I rise this evening to 
continue the discussion on the situation that we face in Kosovo, and 
what I think is an historic opportunity that hopefully we have not yet 
missed to solve that crisis without putting our troops into further 
harm's way.
  In fact, today, Madam Speaker, the President called up 2,116 military 
reserve troops to active duty and authorized 33,000 reservists to be 
called up in the near future. The air war continues, the bombing and 
the destruction continues, yet the resolve of the Serbs seems to also 
continue with no end in sight.
  Many of us are concerned that we do not have a solid plan to end the 
conflict and that we do not have a strategy to win the conflict. 
Therefore, this continuing escalation of the aerial assault on the 
former Yugoslavia causes a great deal of concern for our colleagues on 
both sides of the aisle.
  Tomorrow, Madam Speaker, we are going to be asked to vote on one of 
several alternatives, including the War Powers Act resolution to 
withdraw our troops from the former Yugoslavia. A second alternative is 
to declare war against Yugoslavia, and a third option is an alternative 
that would have us say to the administration that no dollars can be 
expended for the insertion of ground troops unless the Congress has 
given its approval.
  Now, we all know, Madam Speaker, that these resolutions may or may 
not pass, but this administration will continue on its course. They 
have not consulted with the Congress in the past; I do not think that 
is going to change. I think we are going to continue to see a movement 
that is aggressively pursuing the aerial campaign and eventually, 
perhaps, the insertion of ground troops. If that time comes, Madam 
Speaker, we face some very dangerous prospects.
  One only has to look at history to understand how the Serbs stood up 
against Hitler from the period of 1941 to 1945. Even though the Germans 
had not only their 22 divisions but the help of 200,000 Croatians, 
Slovenian and Bosnian Muslim volunteer auxiliaries, they were able to 
repel Hitler, they were able to retain the control of their land and, 
in fact, in the end, they won a victory.
  Now, I am not saying that if we get involved in a direct 
confrontation with Serbia that we cannot win. Make no mistake about it, 
we can. We have the finest fighting force in the world, and with the 
help of our NATO allies, I am sure we could prevail, but it would not 
be without cost. Furthermore, Madam Speaker, what really concerns me is 
the position that perhaps we will put the Russians in.
  Russia has already indicated it will not honor our naval blockade 
that is designed to prevent additional oil supplies from getting into 
Serbia to resupply the military and the economy. Russia could be put 
into a position where it is asked to protect the resupply efforts to 
get food and necessary materials into Serbia. In either of those cases, 
we set up a situation where the United States and Russia could come 
into direct conflict, perhaps even hostile action, our troops against 
theirs, the NATO troops against the Russians and the Serbs. That would 
be catastrophic. Again, not because I do not think we would win that 
battle, because I think we would. But the toll that it would take in 
loss of life and the ending result of us then having to control the 
former Yugoslavia and partition it and the extensive amount of 
investment that we would have to make leads me to believe that that is 
not the right course for us to be taking.
  Madam Speaker, there is an alternative. Almost one month ago I first 
proposed that alternative. In fact, in the first week of April I sent 
out ``Dear Colleague'' letters and a press release calling for this 
administration to involve the leadership in Russia in a more direct 
way, to get the Russian government and the Russian officials to help us 
bring Milosevic to the table. I felt very simply that Russia owed us 
that, partly because we are putting almost $1 billion a year into 
Russia's economy, all of which I support. We are providing food 
supplies to the Russian people. But I also think with that aid comes a 
responsibility for Russia to assist us in bringing Milosevic and the 
Serbian leadership to the table so that we can try to find a way to end 
this conflict short of an all-out ground war.
  Interestingly enough, Madam Speaker, the Russians agree with us. In 
fact, Madam Speaker, Russia has made overtures to us that they would 
like to provide the assistance of both the government and the 
parliamentarians to help bring Milosevic to understand that this 
conflict must end and that he must agree to world opinion and the NATO 
guidelines that have been established to allow the Kosovar people to 
return to their homelands, to withdraw his troops, to agree to the 
ability of the Kosovar people to live without fear and intimidation and 
without the ethnic cleansing that has occurred, and to allow the 
establishment of a multinational ground force to monitor compliance 
with the peace agreement.
  In fact, Madam Speaker, I did two special orders on April 12 and 13 
where I outlined in great detail my concerns about the conflict and the 
need to get Russia involved. Well, Madam Speaker, we have had that 
opportunity and I want to outline that in detail tonight.
  Over three weeks ago I was contacted by my friends in the Russian 
Duma. As my colleagues know, five years ago I asked for the support of 
then Speaker Gingrich to approach the Russian Speaker, Seleznyov on the 
day that he was sworn into the Speaker's position to propose the 
establishment of a new direct relationship between the parliaments of 
our two nations, the Russian Duma and the American Congress. The 
Russian side accepted and Speaker Gingrich and Minority Leader Gephardt 
also accepted, and for one year, working with my counterpart in the 
Russian Duma Vladimir Luhkin, the chairman of the International Affairs 
Committee and former Ambassador from the Soviet Union and Russia to the 
U.S., we met and established the parameters for our meetings. I made it 
crystal-clear that in all of our discussions with the Russians, all the 
factions, all of the political factions in Russia must be involved. Not 
just the mainstream factions like the Our Home Russia party, the 
Yabloko party, and the People's Power party, but also the Communists 
who in fact control the majority or the largest sector of the Duma in 
terms of votes. The regional coalition, the Agrarian faction and even 
the LDPR faction, which is the Liberal Democratic party of Vladimir 
Zhirinovskii. The Russians agreed to that.
  Over the past five years, we have had numerous face-to-face meetings 
with our Russian counterparts in Moscow and in Washington. Time and 
again we have discussed difficult issues, trying to find common ground. 
Many times we have found areas where we can agree. Sometimes we found 
areas that we cannot agree. But we have developed a friendship and 
relationships that allow us to discuss difficult issues with a feeling 
of mutual respect and admiration.
  So it was not surprising to me, Madam Speaker, that over three weeks 
ago senior leaders from the Russian Duma would approach me as they did, 
ask me to begin a dialogue of possible ways to avoid the escalation of 
the Kosovo conflict and to also find ways to try to bring an end to the 
situation on the terms established by our country and NATO.
  Now, I was surprised, Madam Speaker, because I said to my Russian

[[Page 7596]]

friends, send something to me in writing, over three weeks ago. These 
are the three foundations that they said they thought could be the 
basis of further discussion to resolve the conflict in Kosovo. Number 
one, that Russia would guarantee that there would be no more ethnic 
cleansing in Kosovo or the former Yugoslavia. Number two, that Serbia 
must agree to all NATO conditions, including the presence of 
international troops in the former Yugoslavia. Russia, however, 
suggested that the force be comprised primarily of countries not 
directly involved in the bombing of the former Yugoslavia, a point that 
I do not disagree with. The troops would agree to stay in Kosovo for at 
least a period of 10 years. And number three, the Russians proposed the 
establishment of an interparliamentary group that would include the 
United States, Russia, and NATO countries to be formed to help monitor 
compliance with all agreements. And, working together, this group would 
cooperate with the offices of the United Nations.
  Madam Speaker, these initiatives and these ideas were proposed over 
three weeks ago by senior Russian parliamentarians. Immediately after I 
received this overture, so as not to convey the impression that I was 
somehow operating out of the bounds of the Government of the United 
States, I called the Vice President's top National Security Adviser, 
Leon Fuerth. I briefed him on what the Russians had proposed. In 
discussions with him, it was agreed that I should call Carlos Pascual 
from the National Security Council at the White House. I did that. I 
sent each of these men letters outlining what the Russians had said, 
what I responded, and the fact that I was going to engage the Russians 
to try to find some way to bring us together, to try to find a common 
conclusion and a successful conclusion to the hostilities in Kosovo.
  In fact, Madam Speaker, the following week I called the Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency, George Tenet, and in a phone 
conversation I briefed him about the offer made by the Russians that we 
begin serious discussions. Also that week, Madam Speaker, I talked to 
Ambassador Steve Sestanovich who works directly for Deputy Secretary of 
State Strobe Talbott. Sistanovic has been a friend of mine for some 
time involved in Russian issues, and he was someone who now has the 
responsibility for affairs in the former Soviet States.
  I said to Dr. Sestanovich, I told him about our discussions between 
the Russians and myself, the exchange of communications, the telephone 
conversations we had, and I had further discussions on an ongoing basis 
that weekend with one of his top assistants, Andre Lewis. The whole 
purpose, Madam Speaker, was to let the administration know that my 
discussions with the Russians were meant to provide a constructive role 
in trying to find a way out of this conflict, a way that would allow 
the Russians to use their significant leverage to allow us to find a 
solution in terms of the Kosovo crisis.
  Also that week, Madam Speaker, I approached two Members of Congress. 
Neither of them were Republicans. They were both Democrats, and they 
are good friends of mine, people who I trust and admire, and people who 
I know are also trusted by the administration: The gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) and the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha).

                              {time}  2115

  The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Steny Hoyer) is my counterpart and 
colleague in the Russian Duma-Congress initiative. He and I travel to 
Russia together. He and I host the meetings with the Duma deputies when 
they come to Washington.
  I went into the discussion with each of them about my efforts, and 
asked them to make contact with the administration to let the 
administration know my purpose. The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) 
said he would talk to Secretary Talbott, and the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha) said he would try to talk to the President 
and/or Sandy Berger.
  I took each of them at their words, and I am sure they did that, even 
though I heard nothing from either Sandy Berger nor from Deputy 
Secretary Strobe Talbott.
  The discussions with the Russians continued, however, Madam Speaker, 
throughout that week and the weekend until finally the first Deputy 
Speaker of the Russian Duma, a good friend of mine, Vladimir Ryshkov, 
contacted me by telephone and made a verbal offer.
  He said, Congressman, I think through our discussions that we may 
have an opportunity to find common ground. He said, I would like you to 
bring a delegation of Republicans and Democrats to meet with a 
delegation of Russian leaders in a neutral country. He suggested that 
we meet in Hungary, in Budapest.
  He said, in having one day of discussions, that that could be 
followed, assuming we were in agreement, with a prearranged trip to 
Belgrade, where we would meet firsthand, directly, face-to-face with 
Milosevic to try to convince Milosevic that Republicans and Democrats 
and Russians across the spectrum were united in the understanding that 
Milosevic must agree to NATO's terms, and that it was in Serbia's best 
interests to come to the table and agree with the position taken by our 
governments and the NATO governments.
  I said to first Deputy Speaker Ryshkov, I said, Vladimir, I want to 
you to do five things for me before I will even raise this issue with 
the leadership in the country and in the Congress.
  I said, number one, I want to you to put that request in writing. 
Give me a letter from you, as the First Deputy Speaker, asking me to 
arrange such a meeting.
  Number two, give me a list of the Russian delegates, the Duma 
deputies and party leaders who would be a part of the Russian side of 
this effort.
  Number three, give me a date certain and an exact time when we would 
meet as a delegation face-to-face with Milosevic in Belgrade.
  Number four, get me a meeting with our POWs, so that we can tell 
whether or not they are safe and whether or not they are in good 
health.
  And number 5, travel with me, the entire Russian delegation, and the 
American delegation to a refugee camp of our choice in Macedonia, under 
the supervision of our military, so that you can see with us the horror 
and the terrible atrocities that have been committed by Milosevic and 
the Serbs on the people of Kosovo.
  On Wednesday of last week, Madam Speaker, Ryshkov wrote back to me 
and agreed to all five requests that I made. He put the request in 
writing. He identified the Duma deputies that would be involved in 
these discussions.
  It was an historic group: Ryshkov himself, a member of the Nash Dom 
faction, the party leader for Chernomyrdin's own party.
  The second member was Luhkin, a leader in the Yablako faction, a 
mainstream pro-west faction. In fact, Luhkin said it would have been 
the first time ever that the Yablako faction would insert itself into 
the issue of Yugoslavia, but they thought it was so important that they 
engaged with us in the Congress on this issue that he would come 
himself for these meetings, both in Budapest as well as in Belgrade.
  The third member of the delegation would be sharp an off, a senior 
Communist leader who would have the ear and would have the support of 
the Speaker of the Duma, Gennady Seleznyov, the Communist party leader 
who has the largest number of votes in the Duma, and he would in fact 
be able to represent that faction.
  The fourth member of the delegation was Mr. Greshin, a member of the 
Peoples' Power faction, a very respected member of the Duma.
  The fifth member would have been Sergei Konovalenko, the chief 
protocol officer of the Russian Duma and a good friend of mine.
  That was the delegation, Madam Speaker, a solid group of progressive 
Russian leaders, not the hardline people that we have heard so much 
about in the past; not the people that Yeltsin referred to in the Duma 
as thugs and rogues, and not the people that we have heard in the West 
have been trivialized as nonplayers.

[[Page 7597]]

  These are the future of Russia, good, solid leaders that want the 
same thing that we want in America: a stable country, stable economic 
growth, free democracy, and a closer, stronger relationship with the 
U.S.
  The third request was for the date and time certain for the meeting 
with Milosevic. The Russians got that assurance from Milosevic's top 
aide. We were to have met face-to-face with Milosevic yesterday, 
Monday, at 1 p.m. in Belgrade. The Russians told me that they would not 
go into Belgrade, did they not have that commitment to meet face-to-
face with Milosevic.
  The fourth request was to meet with our POWs. The Russians certified 
to me that Milosevic had agreed with that request. We would have been 
the first body, even prior to the Red Cross, to meet with our POWs to 
make sure they were okay and to let them know that we had not forgotten 
them.
  The last request was also agreed to. That was to have the five 
Russian leaders travel with us to a Macedonian refugee camp of our 
choice. In fact, I consulted with the State Department to obtain the 
location of the two most dramatic refugee camps, to let the Russians 
see the terrible problems that Milosevic has brought to bear on the 
people of Kosovo.
  The Russians agreed to all of those issues. In fact, we were set up 
to do this this past weekend. We would have left the theater by going 
back to Sofia, Bulgaria. The American side would have come back to 
Washington. The Russians would have gone to Moscow. The following week 
we would have met in Washington to continue our discussions, a good-
faith effort on the part of the Russians to find common ground.
  Madam Speaker, all last week I could not get an answer from the 
administration. I called Sandy Berger three times. I told his staff 
what I wanted. I said I had briefed the administration, I had briefed 
the CIA, I had briefed the intelligence community, I had briefed the 
State Department, I had briefed the White House. I have not told any 
Republicans. This is a good-faith effort that I have gone to Democrats 
with to try to find a way to reach common ground.
  Sandy Berger never returned my phone calls, and neither did Strobe 
Talbott, until I went to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) again 
and I said to my good friend and colleague, can you help us get a face-
to-face meeting with Strobe Talbott? He said, I have talked to him. You 
need to call him.
  On Thursday, after I had briefed the gentleman from Illinois (Speaker 
Denny Hastert) in the morning and asked for his cooperation, the 
response of the gentleman from Illinois (Speaker Hastert) was that he 
was supportive, but that I should keep working with the administration, 
and I told him that I was.
  About 12:30 on Thursday, I finally reached Strobe Talbott, and Deputy 
Secretary Talbott said, I will meet with you today. I said that I 
wanted to bring the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) with me.
  About 1 o'clock we traveled down to the State Department and had a 
sandwich with the Deputy Secretary of State, and for about 1\1/2\, 
Madam Speaker, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Steny Hoyer) and I met 
with Strobe Talbott and three of his senior staff experts on Russia to 
discuss the initiative in detail.
  I went through all the background. I talked about the purpose, that 
we were not going to Belgrade to negotiate because we were not 
representatives of the administration, we are not Secretaries of State. 
That was never our intent, and that would never be our desire.
  We were there to present a common, unified front, Russian elected 
officials, American elected officials, in solidarity to Milosevic 
saying that this must end, and he must understand that as individuals 
who both supported the President and opposed the President, we now felt 
it important to give him one last chance to find a way to peacefully 
resolve this situation, or we would go back to America and use our 
collective voices to bring every ounce of energy we had in finding ways 
to solve this situation militarily.
  After the briefing, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott responded that 
he did not think it was a good idea, and he gave us two reasons. He 
said, first of all, I am concerned for your safety. I responded, Mr. 
Secretary, I am concerned for my safety, as well. I would not do 
something that I felt inside of me was going to endanger my own life, 
let alone the lives of my colleagues.
  I felt confident, I told him, that the Russians, in going with us, 
along with one of the senior advisers to Milosevic on the bus ride from 
Hungary, from Budapest down to Belgrade, would in fact make sure we 
were protected. And by having the U.S. Army as our escort, we knew full 
well that our military would be briefed as to our whereabouts.
  The second issue that was raised by Deputy Secretary of State Talbott 
was, well, we think Milosevic may try to use you in this very laudable 
effort.
  I said to Deputy Secretary Talbott, well, how would he use us? He 
said, well, he may try to say things that really are not your intent. 
My response was, Mr. Secretary, I have been in politics for 20 years. I 
understand that people try to use other people in politics. We were not 
naive.
  And in fact, Milosevic only had one TV station operating. I said, how 
much spin can Milosevic create on our visit to Belgrade, when we were 
going to follow that visit by taking five of the senior leaders of the 
Russian political parties to a refugee camp where hundreds of western 
media, cameras, and reporters could photograph an interview, senior 
Russian officials holding the children of Kosovo refugees, speaking to 
the wives and daughters of husbands, fathers, sons and brothers who 
have been massacred by Milosevic?
  Far better would we have had the western media report on our effort 
by that visit of the senior Russian officials than to worry about 
somehow Milosevic misinterpreting our attempt in going to Belgrade.
  In fact, Madam Speaker, because Strobe Talbott saw that he could not 
convince me of his position, we ended our conversation after 1\1/2\ 
hours with him telling me that he would take the request of support to 
both Sandy Berger and to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright; that he 
was about to go into a meeting with the President, and he would meet 
with them prior to that meeting, and would call us back Thursday 
evening.
  I had to move on this issue, Madam Speaker, because we were scheduled 
to leave on Saturday, if it was to come about. On Thursday night we got 
the word back from the State Department that it was the feeling of 
Secretary Albright and Strobe Talbott and Sandy Berger that we should 
not go to meet with the Russians, that we should not seize the 
opportunity to find a peaceful way to resolve this crisis.
  I was extremely upset and frustrated. On Friday morning I held a 
press conference and announced the fact that I had called the Russians 
and told them that we were postponing our trip, much to our dismay. The 
Russians were devastated.
  In fact, Ryshkov had a press conference, Luhkin had a press 
conference and talked about the initiative, and talked about the 
willingness of the Congress, Democrats and Republicans, to try to find 
common ground to end this conflict without additional American 
bloodshed, as well as bloodshed from other nations.
  It was interesting, Madam Speaker, that I was scheduled at noon on 
Friday in advance to host the President of Ukraine for lunch. President 
Kuchma was in town, and as a leader of the Ukrainian American 
initiative, I had agreed with eight of my colleagues to host him in the 
lunchroom downstairs.
  We did that, and following the luncheon we went to an adjacent room 
for a press conference. Several members of the President's party stood 
up and praised president Kuchma for coming to Washington for the NATO 
summit, to be a part of the partnership for peace effort.
  One of my colleagues praised president Kuchma and said this, that 
President Kuchma and Ukraine are to be commended because they 
understand the role that America is taking, and they support the effort 
to try to find a solution to this crisis.

[[Page 7598]]

  It is interesting, Madam Speaker, that when President Kuchma spoke, 
he gave his vision for a solution to the Kosovo crisis, which I will 
include in the Record.
  The material referred to is as follows:

                   Remarks by President Leonid Kuchma

       Congressman Oberstar, Congressman Lantos and members of the 
     press: I am delighted to be here with you today and honored 
     to receive the distinguished leadership award from the 
     International Management and Development Institute. Since my 
     election I have made it my goal to ensure that Ukraine 
     becomes and is recognized as an important partner in the 
     global community in all facets including security, trade and 
     cooperation. Our close relations with the United States and 
     Europe are particularly important during this difficult time.
       I have recently put forth a peace plan that calls for all 
     sides to cease military action, a withdrawal of all Serbe 
     security forces and a return of displaced persons under 
     international supervision and protection. I am committed to 
     working with all parties involved in the Balkan crisis 
     including the United States and Russia to ensure a speedy and 
     just resolution. I would like to express my confidence that 
     we will continue to be partners in peace.
       Thank you.

  President Kuchma from the Ukraine had exactly the same solution 
proposed by the Russians 3\1/2\ weeks ago that was praised by members 
of the President's own party at the press conference on Friday 
afternoon.
  Very upset by the fact that we had to cancel or postpone the trip to 
meet with the Russians, over the weekend I continued to have a dialogue 
with my Russian colleagues.

                              {time}  2130

  Deputy Ryshkov came back and said he still had a desire to meet. I 
said that I thought that was something we should do, and on Monday 
morning of this week, yesterday morning, I proposed that this week we 
meet again; that this time we meet in a European capital, perhaps 
Vienna, perhaps Sofia, but a capital that is from a nonaligned area 
where both our Russian friends and Americans, of both Republican and 
Democrat persuasions, can come together and see if we cannot find 
common ground.
  Madam Speaker, that meeting will take place on Friday, and at this 
point in time I believe it will be held in Vienna. We will meet in a 
frank and candid manner, informally. We are not representing the U.S. 
Government. We are not negotiating on behalf of this President. We are 
not negotiating on behalf of Secretary Albright. In fact, we are doing 
what Strobe Talbott suggested in our meeting on Thursday was proper and 
appropriate, and that is continuing a dialogue with our Russian 
colleagues in the Duma.
  The dialogue will focus on whether or not we, as Americans, Democrats 
and Republicans, and Russians of the seven major factions in the Duma, 
can come together in a common solution that Russia can live with and 
that Russia feels they can convince Milosevic to accept and, at the 
same time, an agreement that retains the dignity and the respect of 
NATO and our government.
  Madam Speaker, I think that is possible. I see the real difficult 
issue right now not in getting the Russians to agree that NATO's 
initiatives, its 5-point plan, should be agreed to. The Russians have 
already said that they understand the need for NATO to play that key 
role.
  The key issue for the Russians and for Milosevic and the Serbs is 
their contention that the multinational ground force that is put into 
place to enforce the agreement should not include any ground troops 
from those countries that are currently bombing Serbia. Obviously, that 
includes the U.S. and Great Britain, because our two nations are flying 
almost 90 percent of the bombing sorties in the former Yugoslavia.
  Now, Madam Speaker, personally, I do not have a problem with that. In 
fact, I think it is the right thing to do. If Britain and America are 
completing 90 percent of the bombing sorties, I think it only fair that 
the multinational force on the ground should be made up primarily of 
European countries, and, in this case, NATO countries.
  Now, the Russians have even gone so far as to suggested where some of 
those troops might come from. They suggested Greece, the Netherlands, 
Poland, and Albania. They even suggested Russia itself would put troops 
in, if that be our desire. The key issue for us is convincing the 
Russians and having them convince the Serbs and Milosevic that the 
oversight of that international peacekeeping effort must involve NATO 
and must involve the U.S.
  Madam Speaker, we have an opportunity to resolve this crisis without 
further bloodshed. I was hoping, Madam Speaker, that we would not have 
to vote tomorrow on these resolutions, because they are not the kind of 
resolutions that are constructive in this debate. I was hoping, and I 
proposed to our leadership and I am going to propose to the Committee 
on Rules, as I did to the Committee on International Relations today, 
that tomorrow we postpone the actual vote on these resolutions until 
next week, to give a delegation of this body a chance to reach out with 
our Russian colleagues to see whether or not we can come to agreement 
on a common agenda for peace that maintains and retains the dignity of 
NATO and the United States, and also allows Russia to play that 
critical role in leveraging Milosevic and the Serbs to come to the 
table.
  I am confident that we can do that, Madam Speaker, because I 
understand the intensity of the Russians in their conversations with 
me. And I understand the fact that they are talking to some of 
Milosevic's most senior advisers, people who are helping to fund his 
regime in Belgrade, people who are supporting him politically. They now 
have come to the belief that we have to find some common way out of 
this situation, short of a continuation of this massive aerial assault 
and, eventually, the insertion of American and allied troops in what 
will be a costly and bloody ground war.
  Madam Speaker, we should not lose this opportunity. The Russians have 
come to the table. I think we should take them up on this initiative.
  Now, some would say, wait a minute; on Saturday Chernomyrdin was sent 
to Belgrade to discuss with Milosevic the terms of a possible 
settlement. We welcomed that, Madam Speaker. That was critically 
important. And, in fact, when I talked to Ryshkov I asked about that, 
and he said that Chernomyrdin was entirely supportive of the efforts of 
the Duma to work with us to continue to explore common ground. In fact, 
he also said that not only was Chernomyrdin supportive, but also 
supportive of the leader of the Communist faction Seleznyov; an 
unbelievable opportunity to bring all the factions together to try to 
find a common solution.
  Those who follow Russia understand that Yeltsin right now is very 
unpopular. His popularity in Russia is below 10 percent. He only hangs 
onto his title but does not enjoy the broad-based support of the 
Russian people. Our administration, Madam Speaker, has been working for 
the last 7 years and up until this day with the Yeltsin government, 
with Chernomyrdin. Our initiative does not just stop with the Yeltsin 
government. We bring in all the other factions: the Communist faction, 
the Yablako faction, the Nosh Dom faction, the People's Power faction, 
the agrarians, the regional faction, and even the LDPR, and we present 
a broad-based coalition of the future of Russia. Not the past of 
Russia, not the Yeltsin government, which is on its way out this year, 
but the future of Russian government, those parties from where the 
leadership of Russia will come in the elections to be held later this 
year.
  Our goal is to engage that new group of leaders to find a way that we 
can come together that retains the dignity of NATO and the dignity of 
our government. This was not, in any stretch of the imagination, an 
attempt to undermine the hard work being done by this administration. 
And I applaud the efforts that are now underway and the recent visit, 
after our meeting on Thursday with Strobe Talbott, the deployment of 
Strobe Talbott to Moscow over the weekend, where he has held meetings 
with Chernomyrdin.
  What I am saying, Madam Speaker, is that this Congress can play and

[[Page 7599]]

should play a legitimate role. We have an opportunity that we must not 
let pass by, and I would ask our colleagues to rise up with one voice 
to both Democrat leaders and Republican leaders and say the time for 
partisanship is over. We have a bipartisan opportunity, with Democrats 
and Republicans working together, to reach out to our colleagues in the 
Duma of all factions and find common ground to let the Russians exert 
their leverage over Milosevic to end this crisis in a peaceful way.
  I see my good friend and colleague has arrived. He was one of those 
that I first went to last week after I went to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) and the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha). 
The third Democrat that I approached was the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. 
Neil Abercrombie). He had just returned from Kosovo. He knew the 
situation firsthand. I value his judgment and his respect among his 
colleagues, not just on his side but in the entire Congress.
  I wanted the gentleman from Hawaii involved. Along with the gentleman 
from Hawaii, I approached the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Rod 
Blagojevich), and I did so because the Chicago Democrat is the only one 
I know of with an ethnic Serbian heritage. I felt it was critically 
important to have him involved in this effort as well. And I also 
approached the gentleman from New York (Mr. Maurice Hinchey) because he 
had accompanied me on a trip to Russia in December and I was impressed 
with his willingness to work with the Russians.
  These were the five Democrats I approached, Madam Speaker, before I 
approached even one Republican. This was an attempt at bipartisanship, 
and I hope that we can continue to build momentum, to show the world 
that we do not want this to end up in war but we do want to resolve 
this conflict peacefully.
  Madam Speaker, I yield to my good friend and colleague from Hawaii.
  Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman very much, and 
I particularly want to at this time commend the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon), although I know he never looks for that kind 
of approbation because he is devoted to his duty here in the Congress 
of the United States, but, nonetheless, I want to indicate the great 
affection and personal regard I have for him, not only on the basis of 
his commitment to his duties but on the basis of his commitment to us 
here in the Congress and trying to resolve this issue in a manner that 
can be seen as honorable by all parties concerned.
  I would like to enter, Madam Speaker, into a little bit of a dialogue 
with the gentleman from Pennsylvania on the basis that all of us who 
are consumed by this issue virtually daily now may be very familiar 
with the terms of our discussion, the terms of our dialogue, perhaps 
even the context within which we hope a dialogue will be taking place 
not only in the Congress but perhaps internationally as well; but not 
all of our colleagues necessarily may be familiar with all the terms 
and the individuals, all the particular contexts, and certainly those 
who may review the record and hear us speaking may not be entirely 
familiar. So what I would like to do, if it is all right with the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania, is perhaps engage him in a bit of 
discussion that will, hopefully, illuminate some of the details.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Absolutely.
  Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I think it is crucial for us to understand that this 
is not some kind of, even if it is bipartisan, it is not some kind of a 
bipartisan rump group that may have suddenly come together in an ad hoc 
way, attempting to substitute itself for either the State Department or 
the administration or, for that matter, the will of the Congress.
  I think that is an accurate statement, and we need to flesh it out a 
little bit in order to make clear that that kind of an accusation or 
that kind of a conclusion that someone might draw superficially is 
inaccurate.
  The reason I say that it is inaccurate is there not a Duma-Congress 
working group formally established between the Congress of the United 
States, the House of Representatives for certain, and members of the 
Duma that actually has a working relationship which, in fact, has been 
taking place over some period of time now, not only in Russia but in 
the very halls of the Congress.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. In fact, the gentleman is absolutely 
correct. As I mentioned at the outset, this initiative was supported 
initially by both Speaker Gingrich and the minority leader, the 
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt), and has had the highest support 
of the senior leadership of the Russian Duma, Speaker Seleznyov. There 
was an exchange of letters and a formal process established.
  The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), is the Democrat co-chair; I 
am the Republican co-chair. We have met on a regular basis, twice a 
year, once in Russia, once in this country, and we have discussed 
serious issues that in some cases are really issues involving our two 
foreign affairs agencies in operations or issues involving the 
presidents.
  Our role has never been to try to give the impression that we were 
speaking for anyone other than ourselves in that relationship.
  Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So the individuals involved here have been those who 
have expressed an interest in trying to take up the challenge that has 
been presented to us with the ending of the Cold War in order to 
establish relations between Russia, not the former Soviet Union, but 
Russia and the Newly Independent States with the United States of 
America in a manner and in a context which will help to establish not 
only peaceful relations but relations which will help to bring 
stability.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. In fact, I would say to the gentleman 
that not only is that the case and that that has been our mission, I 
can provide for the record to any Member who would so choose, 
statements from former Secretary of Defense Perry, current Secretary of 
Defense Cohen, current Ambassador for the U.S. in Moscow, Jim Collins, 
and a whole host of other people who have issued praise for the work 
that we have undertaken in building long-term, more stable 
relationships because of our efforts.
  In fact, when the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) and I met with 
Strobe Talbott, he spent 10 minutes of that discussion praising us for 
the work that we have been doing, telling us how important that work is 
for his job at the State Department in negotiating with Russia, telling 
us how important it is for the President to have a supporting 
congressional group.
  In fact, during the Gore-Chernomyridin Commission of 5 years ago, 
when we established this, it was Vice President Gore and Victor 
Chernomyrdin who had us stand alongside them, and said we are proud to 
see the formation of a formal working relationship because it is so 
critically important for solving the long-term problems we face.
  And a further example of our efforts in the area of relations 
involving foreign affairs was when the Russian Duma did not support 
President Clinton's bombing of Baghdad and the bombing of Saddam 
Hussein.

                              {time}  2145

  I agreed on behalf of the administration to travel to Moscow and to 
meet with Duma deputies as a citizen and as a parliamentarian to 
convince them of why I was supporting the President. I was not there to 
negotiate. I was there to convince them of the President's position.
  And when they came over to America, Luhkin chaired a six-member 
delegation from the Duma from all factions. The first stop he made 
after he landed at Dulles Airport was in my office. They spent 2 hours 
one night, where I dialogued with them, I showed them evidence, and I 
tried to convince them of the reason why I, as a Republican, supported 
the President and his position in dealing with Saddam Hussein.
  So anyone that would somehow misconstrue what we are doing can be 
totally refuted by the facts.

[[Page 7600]]


  Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So this is not, in fact, a paper organization or 
merely something that was signed for the pro forma effect, but rather a 
working relationship that, if I remember correctly, just this year had 
over in the Rayburn Building a formal meeting complete with 
simultaneous translators and minutes being kept of exchanges between 
the Duma and Members of the United States Congress.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Madam Speaker, in fact, I would tell my 
colleague not only is he true and correct, but when I led a delegation 
in December to Moscow for our part of the exchange, we were the first 
western Democratic parliament to be taken into the Duma chambers while 
they were in session, not something that would never happen in this 
body because of our House rules.
  The Speaker of the Duma who was conducting this session with the Duma 
members in attendance, and they seat 450 in that auditorium, saw us up 
in the balcony, stopped the proceedings, and announced that up in the 
balcony were the Democrat and Republican Members of the American 
Congress who were working together with the Duma deputies to find 
common solutions to common problems.
  The Duma then gave us a standing ovation and stopping their 
proceedings in acknowledging our presence and the importance of our 
work.
  Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And is not one of the reasons, then, that we are 
trying to pursue this particular course, regardless of the individual 
items right now which may not make up an agenda that we might want to 
present, is it not the case, then, that what we are trying to do here 
with what might be called a Balkan working group is to try to take 
advantage then of the good relations that have been built up, to try to 
take advantage of the opportunity that exists as parliamentarians, 
fellow parliamentarians, reaching out to them to ask for them to 
utilize their good offices in this instance?
  It is not us dictating a particular set of terms or acting as some 
kind of front men for any particular stands or positions that have been 
concocted in one venue or another, but rather that we are making a 
good-faith effort to reach out to in this instance particularly members 
of the Duma, to ask them to utilize a diplomatic effort which has a 
long history, a long and honorable history, that is to say the 
utilization of good offices and in this instance with the Government of 
Yugoslavia?
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Absolutely. In fact, my good friend and 
colleague knows my reputation. I am one of Russia's strongest critics. 
In fact, it was not too long ago I was on this floor offering a bill 
strongly opposed by the administration that would in fact require us to 
deploy a national missile defense.
  Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. I had to explain myself ever since for 
supporting it.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Many of our colleagues felt that this 
would endanger our relationship with Russia.
  I am at one and the same time Russia's strongest critic on 
proliferation, on transparency, on strategic relationships. But I also 
consider myself their best friend.
  The Russians believe in strength, consistency, and candor. When we 
are strong with them, when we are consistent, and when we are candid 
they want to work with us. Our relationship with the Russians has been 
built on that. And the reason why this is so critically important gets 
back to that first series of phone calls that were made to me.
  Our Russian friends, the pro-Western leaders, were pleading with me 
saying, ``Curt, you have to understand what is happening here. We have 
not seen the hostility toward America this bad since pre-1991. We are 
hearing people in the Duma who have been our friends say nasty things 
about America and are driving us to support the nationalists who are 
calling for more aggressive action on Russia's part.''
  They said, ``You have to understand America. We are going to have our 
parliamentary elections this year. If this continues, you may well 
drive Russia into electing an entirely communist Duma and perhaps a 
reactionary leader of our country. That is the worst thing you want in 
America.''
  What they said is, ``You have to assist us, help us find a way as 
supporters of our western involvement, as people who want to have 
stronger ties with your country, help us find a way to find that middle 
ground that lets you have the dignity you need and comes out with the 
kind of effort that you want to come out of this through NATO's 
negotiations but also lets us have a plan that we can convince 
Milosevic that he must accept.''
  That was the kind of message that was given to me by the Duma 
deputies who pleaded 3\1/2\ weeks ago for us to reach out with them and 
try to find this common solution.
  Mr. ABERCROMBIE. In terms of our motivation, which I think is really 
sufficient just in the explanation that we have been giving right now 
on the basis of this dialog, I think that is more than sufficient to 
justify the effort being made.
  But there may be some who are somewhat skeptical of the idea that 
this is a bipartisan situation or that, regardless of the sincerity 
that my colleague and I may have or others may have in association with 
this, that perhaps there is going to end up a situation in which blame 
will be cast and accusations will be made, fingers will be pointed.
  But I think it would be fair to say, and I would be interested in the 
comments of my colleague or observations on my remarks, I think it is 
fair to say that we are concerned about whether or not this is going to 
work both from a practical military standpoint and from the idea also 
very, very important as to the future of NATO, the future of defense 
alliances, the future of the United States in terms of its credibility.
  The initial premises upon which the military activity was instigated 
included the prevention of ethnic cleansing, or certainly its 
alleviation, the easing of tensions in the Balkan region, and the 
extension of the credibility of NATO as a defensive alliance.
  And I think it is fair to say for many of us in the Congress, those 
premises are not only not being met but we believe that unless and 
until an alternative resolution can be found, those premises are being 
undermined if not actually thwarted or contradicted. And if this 
situation is not resolved, if we just continue on with the bombing so 
that the bombing becomes its own reason for being, then we will find 
ourselves in a situation in which the Congress, at a minimum, let alone 
the people of the United States, will find themselves in a position of 
having to passively stand by and let events get in the saddle and ride 
us.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Absolutely. To get to the first point of 
the gentleman, the blame game has got to end. This should not be a 
time, with American troops in harm's way, that we pick partisan fights 
back and forth over who can blame the other side the most. We are where 
we are.
  And I would say to the gentleman, I would say that probably 99, if 
not all of our colleagues, 99 percent of them agree with us that the 
end game is the same for all of us. We all think that Milosevic's 
activities have been outrageous. In fact, many of us think he should be 
held for war crimes that are being committed by the Serbs.
  We all feel that this conflict must be ended while keeping the 
dignity and the coordination of NATO intact. We all want to have the 
reputation of the U.S. intact. Our end results that all of us want are 
the same. The question is, how do we get there?
  Do we continue this massive aerial bombing campaign? Do we allow 
ourselves to slide into a ground war which could pose a direct 
confrontation between NATO and the U.S. and Russia, which would be 
dangerous, or do we try to find out using whatever means we have to 
figure if there is an alternative?
  We have a means that no one else has, and that means was established 
5 years ago. We did not approach the Russians. The Russians came to me 
3\1/2\ weeks ago and they pleaded with me to reach out to see if we 
could find a new way. And in doing this, and I want to repeat this, I 
talked to no Member of

[[Page 7601]]

the Republican party. Every contact I had for the 3 weeks that I was 
talking to the Russians in over 20 conversations and exchanges of 
information were with leaders from the administration, the intelligence 
community, the Security Council, or Members of the other side.
  It was not until last week that I spent 5 minutes briefing the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman) and then I briefed the Speaker of 
the House. They were the only two Republicans.
  Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I was smiling a bit, because the Members of the 
other side, of course, are the Democrats, not the Russians.
  That does highlight the point we are trying to make here that this is 
an effort being made by American parliamentarians with counterparts in 
the Russian Duma on the basis that we have a vehicle for discussion 
that is formally established and institutionalized between the Congress 
and the Russian parliament, known as the Duma, and that we want to take 
full advantage of that in the interest of peace.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Absolutely, totally correct. Nothing else 
can be inferred from what we are doing. No one should raise the issue 
of armchair secretaries of State because that is not what we are about.
  If we reach a conclusion in our discussions over the weekend with our 
Russian colleagues that they feel Milosevic will accept, we then have 
to come back and convince our Government that this is, in fact, 
something that they too can live with. That is not our call as to 
whether or not they will accept it. That is up to our Government to 
decide the ultimate position of the U.S.
  But we do have the right as parliamentarians to negotiate with our 
counterparts along the lines of what we think will work but also what 
we think our administration would accept. If they do not accept it, 
that is their choice. If they do, all of us are better.
  In fact, when I had originally planned to go over there, I had 
offered to take an employee of the State Department with me. Andre 
Lewis works with Steve Sestanovich and he was going to go with us so we 
would have a State Department spokesperson there.
  I even went as far to say this to Strobe Talbott. I said, ``If we go 
ahead with this, you script out what you want us to say and we will 
read your words.'' There was never an attempt to try to usurp the 
authority of the executive branch to do its job. We are simply using 
contacts that we have to go a different route.
  And the reason why this is so important: For the past 7 years, the 
relationship between Russia and the U.S. has been primarily based on 
two people, the two presidents, Clinton and Yeltsin. And that was great 
when Yeltsin was strong. Yeltsin is no longer strong. And yet we did 
not pursue the other power centers in Russia the way we should have.
  We did in our relationship. And our strength is in those other power 
centers, in those other factions who will provide the future leadership 
of Russia. And that is why what we are doing is so important because it 
complements the discussions that are being held between the White House 
and the Yeltsin, Primakov, Chernomyrdin effort in Moscow.
  Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So while we expect the administration to do its job, 
we in the Congress have a job also, we in the Congress have a 
constitutional duty to perform, particularly when it comes to issues of 
war and peace, when it comes to deciding budgets and deciding 
directions and policies with respect to war and peace. That is, in 
fact, our obligation and our duty.
  So it is important I think, then, as we move towards, hopefully, some 
opportunity to pursue the initiative that my colleague has outlined so 
well I think it is important that we then have as the bottom-line 
motivation to be understood, not only by our colleagues but by the 
American people, we have as the bottom-line motivation that we want the 
interests of the United States to be protected by all means, and there 
is no question about that, but that the interest of the United States 
of America in terms of not being an Imperial power, not being a 21st 
century version of old Rome, in terms of attempting to make a good-
faith effort to secure the universal declaration of human rights in a 
meaningful way, to see to it that, as American power is exercised, it 
is exercised on behalf of peace and the poor and the helpless.

                              {time}  2200

  Those are not abstract philosophical elements as we see it, I 
believe. I think I am speaking for you as well as myself under these 
circumstances.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Absolutely.
  Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And those who are wanting to join with us in this 
effort with the Russians. We are not engaged in an academic exercise. 
What this is is carrying out our fundamental duty as Members of 
Congress, working together on behalf of the interests of the United 
States and the peace of the world, and to the degree, to any degree 
that we can advance that cause, I think then that it is our solemn and 
serious duty to carry forward with it. Now, I know that is acceptable 
to you. I hope it is acceptable to our colleagues. That is in fact our 
motivation, that is our interest, that is our intention. I trust that 
at the conclusion of tonight's special order and as we moved to the 
days ahead that we will be able to carry through on the task that we 
have set before us. My hope is that others will join us, that this is 
by no means an exclusive group or any kind of self-appointed points on 
any diplomatic spear or anything of that kind. We are just reaching out 
to one another in an open way with a working group based on the Duma-
Congressional relationship that we hope will succeed in at least 
helping to form a foundation for a peaceful resolution of the current 
situation.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. The gentleman is absolutely correct. In 
fact, as he well knows, we had our first kind of like organizational 
meeting this evening at 7 o'clock or 8 o'clock down in the HC-6 room. 
We agreed that tomorrow night, we would have a second meeting and we 
would welcome any of our colleagues from either party to come in and 
sit down with us as we strategize the way to move forward. In fact, I 
would ask, Madam Speaker, to insert in the Congressional Record this 
Dear Colleague memo that I sent to every one of the 435 House Members 
today which outlines in detail exactly what we have done up until now.
  The text of the memo is as follows:
                                                   April 27, 1999.

   Duma-Congress Peace Plan on Kosovo Rebuffed by Administration; Bi-
                      lateral Discussions Continue

       Dear Colleague. As you may know, late last week I was 
     forced to cancel a proposed joint mission to Belgrade by 
     Russian and American members of the Duma-Congress Working 
     Group. This trip would have been the culmination of a 
     proactive effort by many of the top leaders in Russia to 
     solve the Kosovo without resorting to ground combat. At the 
     eleventh hour, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott 
     informed me that the Administration did not support the trip. 
     Without the support of my own government, I decided to cancel 
     the trip.
       I want to give the House a full accounting of the genesis 
     of this proposed trip, and the painstaking efforts that were 
     made to make it a success. I firmly believe that the Clinton 
     Administration missed a potentially historic opportunity to 
     bring this conflict to an end without further bloodshed.


                          The Duma's proposal

       The idea of a joint U.S.-Russian delegation to Belgrade was 
     first broached in an e-mail to me from Sergei Konovalenko, 
     the secretary of the Russian Duma, on April 8. He suggested 
     the following be used as the basis for a joint U.S.-Russian 
     peace proposal for Kosovo. I think you will agree that it is 
     especially forthcoming:
       1. Russia guarantees that there will be no more ethnic 
     cleansing in Kosovo.
       2. Serbia agree to all NATO conditions, including 
     international troops in Kosovo. (Russia suggested, however, 
     that the force be comprised primarily of countries not 
     involved in the NATO bombing campaign.) The troops would 
     agree to stay in Kosovo for at least ten years.
       3. An interparliamentary group from Russia, the U.S. and 
     NATO countries be formed to monitor all agreements. The group 
     would be under the auspices of the U.N.
       Amazingly, the Russians had proposed a peace agreement that 
     complied with all the NATO demands.
       The Russian parliamentarians, representing all the factions 
     of the Duma, had

[[Page 7602]]

     just returned from a delegation trip to Belgrade. This 
     delegation met with the entire Serbian high command, 
     including extensive meetings with Milosevic himself. The Duma 
     leaders felt confident that they (as friends of Milosevic) 
     could get him to agree with these conditions.
       The following week, I wrote to my Duma counterpart, 
     Vladimir Ryzhkov (Deputy Speaker of the Duma, who would lead 
     the Duma delegation) and made four requests of him. First, 
     that an official invitation be extended in writing from the 
     Duma, including the names of the entire Duma delegation. 
     Second, that the trip to Belgrade include a face to face 
     meeting with Milosevic himself. Third, that the Duma set up a 
     meeting with the American POWs. Lastly, that the Duma 
     delegation agree to accompany our delegation to a Kosovar 
     refugee camp of our choosing.
       On April 21, Deputy Ryzhkov wrote to me, with agreement on 
     all issues.


                           The Duma viewpoint

       There are many reasons why the Russians were so proactive 
     and engaging on such a crucial issue. First, these Duma 
     leaders, many of whom are young, well-informed and realistic 
     about the U.S. and the west, represent the future of Russia. 
     The tottering, unpopular and reactive Yeltsin regime 
     represents the past. Unfortunately, this Administration has 
     embraced Yeltsin with all the misplaced fervor with which its 
     predecessor embraced Gorbachev. Then as now, we cling to the 
     current regime to the detriment of our relations with other 
     emerging power centers in Russia.
       In addition, these Duma leaders are extremely wary of the 
     rising nationalist fervor that the conflict in Kosovo has 
     triggered in Russia. The perception that Russia is 
     unimportant to the Kosovo operation does not sit well with 
     Russians accustomed to superpower status. The Duma leadership 
     is worried that Yeltsin will respond to this nationalism by 
     taking drastic actions that could further isolate Russia from 
     the west.
       It is therefore in Russia's interest to have this conflict 
     over quickly. The Duma leaders are realists, however. They 
     understand that NATO has the upper hand and will only end the 
     conflict on terms of its own choosing. That is why they are 
     willing to support an end to the conflict largely on NATO's 
     terms.


               attempting to work with the administration

       Given this major breakthrough in the official Russian 
     position, I immediately attempted to win Administration 
     support for the joint effort. During that same week, I spoke 
     with Leon Feurth of the Vice President's staff and NSC staff 
     member Carlos Pascual.
       During that same week, I briefed by phone CIA Director 
     George Tenet and Ambassador Steve Sestanovich, the State 
     Department official in charge of Russia and the Newly 
     Independent States.
       With this agreement in hand, I began to brief key Democrats 
     to urge that they enlist the Administration's support. After 
     several calls to National Security Adviser Sandy Berger went 
     unreturned, Congressman Hoyer set up a face to face meeting 
     with Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott on April 22. 
     That meeting lasted more than two hours. At that meeting 
     Congressman Hoyer and I made clear that our goal and the 
     Administration's goal was the same--to get Milosevic to agree 
     to NATO's conditions. Period. We would not be there to 
     negotiate. Our presence was critical only to demonstrate to 
     Milosevic that Russia and the U.S. were united on this 
     critical issue.
       That same day, I briefed Speaker Hastert and Majority 
     Leader Armey. The Speaker agreed to authorize the trip if the 
     Administration did not object.
       That evening, Deputy Secretary Talbott called to inform me 
     that after discussions with the Secretary of State and the 
     Secretary of Defense, the Administration would not support 
     the joint delegation. I feel strongly that the Clinton-Gore 
     team allowed a tremendous opportunity to slip through its 
     fingers.


           next steps for u.s.-russian cooperation on kosovo

       I cannot understand why the Administration would reject out 
     of hand an offer by the Russians to help NATO achieve its 
     goals. After spending the better part of a week urging the 
     Russians to act constructively, our government rebuffed a 
     good-faith effort by some of the top leaders in Russia to 
     help end the crisis on NATO's terms. To say that I am puzzled 
     would be an understatement.
       Many Republicans and Democrats want to stay the course with 
     the Russians. In fact, the Administration itself supported 
     the idea of the two delegations meeting in a neutral country 
     to work out a joint agreement which could then be presented 
     to Milosevic.
       I am inclined to pursue this option--and so are our Russian 
     counterparts. To that end, I would like to form a special 
     House Working Group on U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Kosovo to 
     pursue specific initiatives to help us resolve the Kosovo 
     crisis without a ground campaign. If you would like to join 
     me in this effort, please contact me or Erin Coyle in my 
     office at 5-2011.
           Sincerely,
                                                      Curt Weldon,
                                               Member of Congress.

  I would encourage my good friend to invite those from his side and I 
will invite those from my side to join us in this effort. I think not 
only can we play a role in engaging the Duma to show them that we 
appreciate their good work, but hopefully to find a commonality between 
us. But I think by doing this, we send the signal to both the 
administration and other nations that we want to find a way to resolve 
this conflict that leaves respect for all of us and for NATO.
  I called some of the NATO governments today, Greece, Italy, Germany. 
I told you about the Ukraine statement of President Kuchma, trying to 
ascertain what their feelings are. Surprisingly, many of our allies 
also want to retain the strength and dignity of NATO but also want to 
see the kind of efforts that we are doing succeed. They do not want to 
see this under any circumstance result in a ground war that causes 
significant loss of life and could well lead to a world conflict 
because of the potential confrontation of the U.S. with Russia. I think 
we are on the right track. We know where we are going. This is not some 
radical effort. I could have gone over to Belgrade on Sunday. I did not 
have to have the permission of our government.

                          ____________________