[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 5]
[House]
[Pages 7570-7571]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                               ON KOSOVO

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kasich) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. KASICH. Mr. Speaker, it seems clear that the crisis in Kosovo is 
nearing a decision point. It is obvious that last weekend's NATO summit 
in Washington was a watershed. Now the administration and other NATO 
governments are talking openly of at least planning for the 
introduction of ground troops to secure Kosovo, something that the 
administration had until then denied it was even planning. Officials 
are using euphemisms like ``troops in a nonpermissive environment,'' 
but the meaning ought to be plain.
  At the same time, however, there have been high-level meetings 
between U.S. and Russian officials about the substance of Russian Envoy 
Viktor Chernomyrdin's mission to Belgrade over the weekend. There are 
contradictory reports coming out of Belgrade and Moscow about exactly 
what constitutes a basis for negotiation. The Russians are saying that 
a UN-authorized force that included elements from NATO would be 
acceptable to Milosevic, but Milosevic later denied he had agreed to 
that. But yesterday the Yugoslavian Deputy Prime Minister insisted that 
such an international force was acceptable.
  NATO governments have downplayed the significance of the Russian 
peace proposal. But before we consider the step of introducing ground 
forces into a conflict that I believe was unwise for America to have 
become militarily involved in to begin with, we ought to test such 
peace proposals before we think about military escalation. Likewise, 
the UN Secretary General, Koffi Annan, is scheduled to travel to Moscow 
on Thursday for discussions on Kosovo. Such visits should not be 
spurned or belittled if they are constructive steps, however halting 
and uncertain, on the path to peace.
  I strongly believe that America should seize opportunities for peace 
rather than to seek opportunities to escalate the violence. We have to 
honestly ask ourselves whether we would pursue the same policy if we 
could turn the calendar back to March 24. Our bombing did not initiate 
ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, but we have to be candid in 
recognizing that it aggravated what was already a humanitarian tragedy. 
An important element of the Hippocratic oath in medicine is, first, do 
no harm. If U.S. policy was based on humanitarian considerations, it 
has clearly failed on that score.
  Having embarked on this policy, the United States has now assumed a 
moral obligation to get Milosevic to withdraw his forces from Kosovo. 
He should help return the refugees in an orderly manner and work with 
us to generally assist in reconstruction, along with all of our allies 
and friends throughout the world. Just as surely, we need to help 
Albania and Macedonia economically, for they are bearing the brunt of 
the refugee crisis. But we must ask ourselves whether military 
escalation is the best means of achieving that. I have come to the 
conclusion that military escalation is neither in the national interest 
nor can it achieve a stable, long-term peace in the region.

                              {time}  1700

  Those who have called for ground troops usually do not specify the 
goal. Is it to take Kosovo and occupy it for years, perhaps decades, 
against the threat of Serbian guerrilla warfare; or should the goal be 
to conquer Serbia with unforeseen consequences to wider Balkan 
instability, our relationship with Russia and our ability to respond to 
other regional flash points around the world? Do those who advocate 
such a course understand that it may take

[[Page 7571]]

months to properly build up such an invasion and force? How much more 
misery and devastation will have occurred by then, and does that serve 
the interests of refugees and innocent civilians?
  I am not impressed by foreign leaders who take it upon themselves to 
lecture the American people about where our duty lies or how we must 
not be so misguided as to slip into isolationism. This argument is 
simply not warranted in light of the history of the last 50 years or in 
reference to the present situation. Responsible internationalism does 
not mean we must be stampeded into using force when our national 
interest is not well defined and other means short of force have not 
been exhausted.
  I plan to offer a resolution with my colleagues, the gentlewoman from 
Florida (Mrs. Fowler) and the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. 
Goodling), a resolution that would neither mandate withdrawal on the 
one hand nor escalate the war and do a ground invasion on the other. 
This resolution would bar the introduction of ground forces from Kosovo 
and the rest of Yugoslavia. Why is such a course preferable? Because 
once having initiated hostilities, even if it was a policy based on 
flawed premises, we cannot simply walk away and wash our hands of the 
problem. The bombing has created certain facts: for our own policy, the 
perception of Yugoslavian government, and not least for the refugees. 
At the same time, however, we should avoid military escalation in a 
region where the only rational and durable solutions are political in 
nature.
  I use the term ``escalation'' with good reason, because the parallels 
with Vietnam are striking. For that very reason this resolution would 
prohibit ground combat operations in Yugoslavia without specific 
authorization in law because the mission creep in Kosovo is similar to 
U.S. force deployments in the early stages of Vietnam. Viewed through 
the lens of history, our force buildup in the region and our edging 
towards ground combat operations could be the prelude to another Gulf 
of Tonkin incident. Members also should be aware that this resolution 
specifically exempts search-and-rescue missions.
  But drawing a legislative bright line between bombing and boots on 
the ground is only one element of the solution. The problem is now 
bigger than Kosovo, and I believe America should actively encourage the 
mediation of a settlement before this crisis becomes a wider conflict. 
To the objection that mediation will not work, I say we will never know 
unless we, the United States, throw greater weight behind such efforts.
  I do not underestimate the difficulties that are involved, but should 
Milosevic balk, we will retain the ability to apply military pressure 
from the air. Once a settlement is reached, an international force may 
be necessary to assist the refugee return and oversee reconstruction. 
We should be more flexible about the makeup of this force than we have 
been in the past. Rather than making its composition a nonnegotiable 
end in itself, we should bear in mind that the international force is 
the means to an end; that means to an end, peace and stability in 
Kosovo where ethnic Albanians can live in safety and with autonomy.
  Last week I urged the President to call for a special meeting of the 
G-8 countries to begin a formal effort to achieve a peaceful 
settlement. This G-8 meeting could help initiate a framework for a 
diplomatic solution of the crisis and begin to put in place the 
foundation for economic assistance to the region. Delegations from the 
Ukraine and other affected regional countries could also be invited. 
Such a meeting is only the beginning of a long and difficult process, 
but it is a step our country should not be afraid to take.
  I am pleased that the President appears to be responding positively. 
This week Strobe Talbott, the Deputy Secretary of State, was dispatched 
to Moscow for discussions on Kosovo, and I hope that these talks are a 
prelude to the heads of governments of the affected countries making a 
concerted effort at a political settlement.
  The United States can and should remain strongly engaged 
internationally because regional instability will not solve itself. But 
we must choose our tools very carefully, for the stakes do not allow 
for failure. I believe America needs to draw a careful balance between 
our military and diplomatic efforts. Right now there is an imbalance in 
favor of military means. While maintaining the option of military 
pressure from the air, we should avoid boots on the ground or rather 
boots in a Balkan quagmire. That is why the Fowler-Kasich-Goodling 
resolution is the right approach and deserves the support of this 
House. In the longer term, however, we should seek opportunities for a 
lasting and enforceable political settlement.

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