[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 5]
[Senate]
[Pages 7364-7365]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




  NATO ACTION INVOLVING UNITED STATES AGAINST FEDERATION OF YUGOSLAVIA

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, now that NATO has celebrated its 50th 
anniversary with unity, I believe it is important that the Congress of 
the United States should now carefully assess what action is next to be 
taken by NATO involving the United States against the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia.
  It is critical that Congress discharge its constitutional 
responsibility where the Constitution specifies that only the Congress 
of the United States has the authority to declare war and to involve 
the United States in war. The black-letter pronouncement of the 
Constitution is sufficient reason in and of itself for meticulous 
observance, but the public policy reasons behind that constitutional 
provision are very sound. Unless there is public support for war, shown 
first through the action of the Congress of the United States, it is 
not realistic or possible to successfully prosecute the war. We learned 
that from the bitter experience of Vietnam.
  When the Congress of the United States makes a declaration, either 
formally or through a resolution, it happens after deliberation, after 
analysis, after an interchange of ideas and after a debate. In so many 
instances now, we have seen erosion of the congressional authority to 
declare war. Korea was a war without a declaration by Congress. Vietnam 
was a war without a declaration by Congress. Only the Gulf of Tonkin 
resolution has been held up by some as a thinly veiled authorization 
for the military action taken by the United States in Vietnam.
  I believe that we must be very, very cautious not to repeat the 
mistake of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution and not to endorse hastily a 
resolution proposed by some of our colleagues in the United States 
Senate to authorize the President to use whatever force the President 
may determine to be necessary in the military action against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
  I am not prepared to give the President a blank check. I believe that 
the constitutional responsibility of a Senator and the entire Senate, 
both Houses of Congress of the United States, involves a deliberate 
judgment as to what ought to be undertaken before we involve the United 
States in war and before we, in effect, have a declaration of war. And 
there are many, many very important questions which have to be answered 
before this Senator is prepared to authorize the executive branch--the 
President--to use whatever force the President deems necessary.
  First of all, we need to know what the U.S. commitment will be. We 
need to know what the plan is. We need to know the strength of the 
Serbian Army, the military forces of the Republic of Yugoslavia. We 
need to know to what extent the airstrikes so far have degraded or 
weakened the military forces of the Serbs or the Republic of 
Yugoslavia. We need to know what the other commitments will be from the 
other NATO nations. We need to know how long our commitment will be, or 
at least some reasonable estimate as to how long we may be expected to 
be in Kosovo.
  We know that the initial deployment in Bosnia was accompanied by a 
Presidential promise to be out within a year. That was extended by a 
period of time. That extension was re-extended, and now we don't even 
have an outer limit as to how long we are to be in Bosnia.

[[Page 7365]]

  We know that the President has come forward with a request for $5.9 
billion in additional funding. I believe the Congress of the United 
States will support our fighting men and women. But that is a large 
bill; about $5.5 billion is for military machinery, operations and 
equipment. It was a surprise to many that in the course of that 
military operation, we were on the verge of running out of missiles; 
that our munitions supply was questionable; that our supply of spare 
parts was questionable. Many of us on this floor, including this 
Senator, have argued that our military has been reduced too much. And 
now there is a debate underway as to whether the President's request 
for $5.9 billion ought to be supplemented to take care of many items 
that have been overlooked in the past--issues of military pay, issues 
of munitions, the overall readiness of the United States.
  When the distinguished Prime Minister Tony Blair was in the United 
States last week, I had occasion to talk to him personally and get his 
views as to what ought to be done in our military action, the NATO 
military action, against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Prime 
Minister Blair talks about ground forces. I asked the obvious questions 
as to how many the United Kingdom is prepared to commit, how many the 
U.S. will be called upon to undertake, and what we have done by way of 
degrading the Yugoslav forces by air attacks. To his credit, Prime 
Minister Blair responded that those were all unanswered questions.
  Well, before I am prepared to vote for the use of force, I think 
there ought to be some very concrete answers to those questions. The 
President of the United States was quoted as saying that he was 
prepared to reevaluate the question of the use of ground troops because 
that request had been made by the Secretary General of NATO. Frankly, I 
am just a little bit surprised that the Commander in Chief of the U.S. 
military forces is looking to the leadership of the Secretary General 
of NATO when the United States is playing the dominant role and 
supplying the overwhelming majority of air power and materiel in our 
military action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
  It seems to me the leadership ought to be coming from the President. 
The leadership ought to be coming from the United States. We certainly 
are footing the bill, and we certainly are the major actor. So if, in 
fact, there is a justification for a greater authorization by the 
Congress, that word ought to come from the President, through the 
leadership of the President, telling us in a very concrete way the 
answers to the important questions that I have enumerated.
  This Senator understands there are no absolute answers to the 
questions, but we ought to have best estimates, and we ought to have a 
very candid assessment from the United States military, who, so far, 
have been less than unequivocal in their responses as to whether the 
airstrikes alone can bring President Milosevic to his knees. The answer 
that is given by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
Shelton, is that the military will be degraded. But there is a more 
fundamental question which needs to be answered--whether the airstrikes 
will be successful, or whether the airstrikes will sufficiently weaken 
the Republic of Yugoslavia so that we at least have an idea, if there 
are to be ground forces, what the results will be.
  But I believe very strongly that we should not pass a resolution 
analogous to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing the President 
to use whatever force the President deems necessary. I believe there 
should be no blank check for this President, or for any President. But 
I am prepared to listen to a concrete, specific plan that evaluates the 
risks, that evaluates the costs in terms of potential U.S. lives. I am 
not prepared to commit ground forces without having a specific idea as 
to what the realistic prognosis will be.
  The Senate of the United States passed a resolution on March 23 
authorizing airstrikes, but strictly guarding against ground forces. 
The airstrikes constitute a clear-cut act of war, and the resolution of 
the Senate of the United States is not sufficient under the 
Constitution. There has to be a joinder with the House of 
Representatives. So it is my thought that before any further action is 
taken, before there is any suggestion of a commitment of ground forces, 
that matter ought to come before the Congress and ought to receive 
prior congressional authorization before any such force is used, and 
that the entire Congress of the United States ought to review the 
military action that is undertaken at the present time, and that it is 
in fact beyond the prerogative of the President under his 
constitutional authority as Commander in Chief, but it is realistically 
a matter that is decided by the Congress.
  Make no mistake. There are very vital interests involved in the 
action now being undertaken against the Republic of Yugoslavia. NATO's 
credibility is squarely on the line. The credibility of the United 
States is squarely on the line. The activities of the Serbs, the 
Republic of Yugoslavia, in what is called ethnic cleansing, which is a 
polite name for ``barbaric massacres,'' is unparalleled since World War 
II. And there are very major humanitarian interests which are currently 
being served.
  This body has never come to grips, in my opinion, with the square 
determination as to whether vital U.S. national security interests are 
involved, and that is the traditional test of the use of force. But we 
are on the line; our country is on the line. NATO, a very important 
international organization, has its credibility on the line. And we 
must act in a very thoughtful, very careful way after important 
information is presented to the Congress by the President, because only 
the President is in a position to answer the critical questions. Then 
the deliberation of the Congress ought to take shape, and we ought to 
make a determination in accordance with the Constitution whether the 
Congress will authorize the executive branch to use force, to send in 
ground troops, or what the parameters of that declaration would be.
  Mr. President, how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania has 2 minutes 20 
seconds remaining.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I might 
speak for an additional 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.

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