[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 5]
[Senate]
[Pages 6854-6857]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                 KOSOVO

  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I will address what is obviously the issue 
most pressing on us as a nation and certainly on the Western World. 
That is, of course, the issue of Kosovo and the war that is being 
pursued there.
  First, I think it is important to understand that we as a nation are 
obviously the sole major superpower in the world and that we have, as a 
nation, a significant obligation to use our strength in order to 
promote the betterment of the world and to promote interests around the 
world which assist our national policy. We should not disengage from 
the world, we should not

[[Page 6855]]

be isolationist--just the opposite; we have an obligation to reach out 
and use our great wealth and our great good luck and our great good 
fortune to benefit as many people around the world as we can.
  But I think we must also be sensitive to the fact that we can't be 
everywhere all the time and that when we ask American troops, men and 
women, to put their lives on the line, we have to be very specific as 
to why we are doing it and what the purpose of that effort is, because 
that, of course, is the most extreme request we can place on any 
American.
  We should have a process of putting forward a plan, a test, if you 
will accept it, as to why we engage with American force. I have always 
felt that test should have three elements. I have spoken about it 
before.
  The first is, is there a definable American interest? In many 
instances this could be international interests which impact us 
significantly, such as the gulf war, where European oil was at risk. 
But is there a definable American interest which is specific enough and 
which can be justified and which can be explained, quite honestly, in 
these terms: If an American service person loses his or her life, could 
you go to the parent of that person, could you go to the wife of that 
person, could you go to the child of that person, and tell them why the 
loss of their life was important to America? Could you explain our 
purpose in terms that would satisfy a grieving parent, wife, or child 
that their son or daughter had died in a cause which assisted America? 
That is the first and most important test.
  The second test is, is the engagement of American troops going to be 
able to resolve the situation, or is the situation so complex, so 
convoluted, and so historically intertwined that it probably can never 
be resolved or never even be, for any extended period, pacified?
  The third is, is there a plan for getting out? Before you get into 
something, you ought to know how you are going to get out of it or at 
least have some concept of how you are going to get out of it. That is 
absolutely critical.
  Those are the tests for our engagement.
  We are now engaged in a war in Kosovo. Unfortunately, in my opinion, 
none of those tests was met before we made the decision to go forward. 
This administration could not explain, and has certainly not explained 
very well, why we decided to step off on this route of military action.
  The initial statement was that we were doing it in order to bring 
Milosevic into negotiations, in order to bring the Yugoslav Government 
into negotiations to try to settle the situation in Kosovo, because a 
number of people had been killed in Kosovo, hundreds maybe, although 
the number that had actually been reported was somewhat less than that, 
and because we were concerned that there would be a great dislocation 
of population in the Kosovo--or the administration was concerned that 
there would be a great dislocation of population in the Kosovo province 
of Serbia if we did not take action to try to force Milosevic to agree 
to the settlement as had been outlined at Rambouillet.
  That was the initial purpose of the use of air power against Serbia, 
and against Yugoslavia, or Yugoslavia and Kosovo and Serbia. The 
purpose, therefore, was never to go in to occupy and to win a war 
against Yugoslavia. That was never the original purpose as presented by 
this administration.
  One has to wonder, what was our national interest in that region in 
Kosovo? A legitimate case could be made that humanitarian interests are 
a national interest. But actually what was happening in Kosovo, 
although severe and brutal and being shown on TV, was nothing--
absolutely nothing--compared to what was happening in Ethiopia, 
Somalia, Sudan, Sri Lanka, and a number of former republics, in fact, 
of the former Soviet Union, where literally millions of people died in 
Africa as a result of internal civil war.
  Remember, this was a civil war situation. Kosovo was a province of 
Yugoslavia, which was an independent state, and is an independent 
state.
  So there is the issue of humanitarian interests, although they hardly 
raised it to the level that justified use of American force when we 
weren't using American force to settle matters in Ethiopia, in Somalia, 
in Sudan, in Sri Lanka, or Azerbaijan, or Georgia.
  So you had to ask, what was in the national interest? Quite honestly, 
prior to this process--this is all prior to the actual air campaign--I 
never believed, and I don't think the President ever made clear, 
because he really couldn't, that there was a dramatic American national 
interest in Kosovo. In fact, the irony of this situation is that NATO 
is now using all its force against a region--Albania and Kosovo--and 
claiming that that region is strategically important, when throughout 
the cold war when NATO was at its peak--at its absolute peak--of 
deterrence and purpose, when it had specific purpose, which was to 
deter East European and Soviet aggression in Albania, which was behind 
the Iron Curtain, which was an Eastern European country, it was never 
even considered a factor of threat. Other nations were--East Germany, 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Russia, Soviet Russia--during the 
cold war.
  But Albania was never a factor, because it was such a poor and 
desperate nation; it had no strategic impact at all. But suddenly it 
becomes a nation of strategic impact to us. Suddenly Kosovo, a 
subprovince of Yugoslavia, becomes a nation of strategic impact to us. 
It is hardly explainable to the American people. It must be found 
against other strategic events which precipitated the bombing. And what 
impact do those have? And what is the significance? I think the answer 
to that is yes, the unintended consequence of this bombing is that we 
have created significant strategic and national concerns which weren't 
there before we started the bombing but are certainly there now.
  Let's name three of them.
  First, of course, is the humanitarian issue. The huge number of 
refugees, to whom our heart goes out, and to whom we obviously have 
some responsibility for carrying forward--and I will get back to that 
in a second--clearly we now have a strategic and national concern about 
doing something to care for those refugees. That should have been 
anticipated before we started the bombing. But it obviously was not by 
this administration. So we created an event there.
  The second event, which is maybe even more significant, which 
absolutely is more significant, was an unintended consequence which 
this administration clearly didn't expect and can't even represent that 
it marginally expected, and which has occurred; that is, that we have 
managed, through this bombing activity and this military action of NATO 
against the Kosovo region, potentially to be expanded to a greater 
Serbia--we have managed to dramatically undermine and, in my opinion, 
destabilize the process of evolution towards democracy in Russia, and 
certainly the process that Russia was moving towards engaging with the 
Western nations in a constructive way, including being a partner for 
peace ancillary to NATO. We have as an unintended consequence managed 
to invigorate the nationalist spirit within the political system of 
Russia, which was already under great strain, and a fledgling democracy 
which is absolutely critical to the future peace of this world and to 
the prospective activities of us as a nation as we move into the next 
century. A democracy in which we had invested a great deal has been 
placed at some jeopardy as to its relationship with us in the West, and 
we have clearly undermined much of the goodwill that we built in 
Russia.
  Unfortunately, it could get worse, significantly worse. If we were to 
pursue a course of invasion of Yugoslavia, it would put Russia in an 
almost untenable position because of the relationship which has gone 
back for hundreds of years where the Russians consider the Slavic 
people and the Serbian people to be their brothers. An invasion would 
clearly make it very difficult for the forces of moderation and reason 
within Russian society to overcome the forces of nationalism and 
jingoism. Even worse than that, were we

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to declare war--which has been proposed by some, because we are at war, 
but if we were to formally declare war, we would even see a more 
difficult position placed on the Russian moderates and voices of 
reason.
  Let me say this: Our relationship to Russia, our ability to nurture 
and build that nation as a democracy and a capitalist-oriented, 
marketplace-oriented society is exponentially more important than what 
happens in the Balkans. The Balkans are important to Europe. Russia is 
important to the United States.
  So that unintended consequence has occurred. We have started the 
destabilization of our relationship with Russia, and we have 
dramatically encouraged the forces of nationalism.
  The third unintended consequence which this administration has 
created by its actions in Kosovo is that we have dramatically weakened 
our military capability to fulfill our legitimate obligations in many 
places around the globe.
  As a result of this administration's continuous reduction in defense 
activity and its basic antipathy towards the Defense Department for the 
first 4 to 5 years of this Presidency, we no longer have the capability 
to fight effectively in an extensive engagement on two fronts, as was 
our traditional approach to our military defense. And we know--now 
publicly reported--that our ordnances are being drawn down and our 
capacity to support our men and women in military action is at risk. 
That is a consequence of this event and could lead to serious 
ramifications, which I have no desire to go into but which are logical.
  So that is one of the reasons I have called this undertaking by our 
administration to be one of the--probably the most significant--
blunders of the post-world-war period, because we have created a huge 
refugee population in large part, in good part--obviously not 
entirely--because Milosevic is a thug--because of the function of our 
bombing.
  We have undermined our relationship with Russia and we have degraded 
our own military capability, all in the name of intervening in a region 
of the world where our interests were there, obviously, because we are 
a humanitarian nation concerned about humanitarian needs, but in 
relationship to other points around the world, whether it be African 
genocide that is occurring today at a rate--well, it wasn't until the 
refugee situation anyway--at a rate dramatically greater than what was 
occurring in Kosovo, or whether it be in our strategic relationship 
with areas such as North Korea or Iraq, where we have dramatic national 
interests. Our interests in this part of the world were limited, yet we 
have rolled the dice there at a level that is extraordinary.
  So what do we do now? That is of course the question. We have been 
drawn into this action, and almost on the back of an envelope, it 
seems. You have watched the administration's different justifications 
for being there. And they change with the regularity of the weather, it 
seems, in that part of the world. There is no consistency to their 
position. One day it is that we are there to help the Kosovars have 
some form of autonomy within the Yugoslavian system and to avoid 
refugees.
  And then there is a huge refugee event, in part because of our--in 
part, I say, only in part--because of our bombing. And now it is no 
longer that we are there in order to maintain autonomy. We appear to be 
moving there, being there, for purposes of obtaining independence, or 
some greater autonomy than certainly a state relationship, and it is to 
put the refugees back in a region which has been decimated.
  The target moves constantly. It is one day that we are trying to 
bring Milosevic into negotiations. It is another day that we are trying 
to replace the Milosevic regime. And, of course, we don't even know 
what it would be replaced with.
  So it is a policy that has gone arbitrary and, in my opinion, on the 
back of an envelope process without any definitive purpose that can be 
subscribed to in a way that we can be assured we can get there in any 
course or pattern.
  So what do we do now?
  One other point that should be made is the cost. One hates to talk 
about costs when American troops are at risk. Clearly, we will do 
whatever we need in this Congress to support those troops with whatever 
dollars are appropriate and whatever dollars we can put towards their 
efforts. But the fact is, the cost of this is going to be astronomical. 
This $6 billion request from this White House, which is such an 
understated and inaccurate figure--it is frustrating to deal with a 
White House that won't be forthcoming with the American people on this 
issue, which it has been, clearly, on others.
  But clearly, on this issue, that cost nowhere near reflects what it 
will cost in the long run to pursue this policy that they have 
undertaken, simply because we are going to have to replace all of the 
ordnance they have used, for one thing, which is accounted for. And, 
No. 2, we are going to have to rebuild what we have blown up in order 
to put the refugees back, if it is the purpose of this administration 
to put the refugees back. Obviously, you can't put them back without 
housing, without electricity, without water, and without jobs. So the 
potential of reconstruction costs exceeds the military costs probably 
by a factor of 2, 3, or 4.
  The absurdity of this administration coming to us and claiming that 
$6 billion will get them through the rest of the year just from the 
standpoint of executing this war is, on the face of it, something the 
American people should question seriously. So the cost is dramatic.
  So what should we do? I don't know the answer. If I had the answer, 
obviously it would be wonderful. But I don't. But let me suggest a 
couple of options.
  No. 1, we have the responsibility to the refugees. We have a 
responsibility to make sure they are adequately housed and fed. I think 
that is going to mean getting them out of where they are today. We 
cannot let them sit there as chips at the bargaining table for months, 
or years, as the Palestinians were left in limbo. Rather, we are going 
to have to move them someplace where they can survive the winter and 
where possibly they can be resettled. It may be political asylum for 
them in many parts of Europe or in the United States, but there has to 
be a thoughtful, long-range plan for how you handle these refugees.
  Second, it is going to cost a lot of money, and we are going to have 
to spend it. Instead of pushing Russia to the brink, instead of 
engaging Russia in a way that basically undermines the moderate and 
reasoned forces and accelerates and raises the nationalist forces, 
let's engage Russia in a constructive way. Let's use the German 
proposals. Let's use their support and use our contacts with Russia, 
which has the contact with Serbia, in order to try to negotiate a 
resolution of this, a resolution which would probably involve some sort 
of multifinanced force, not NATO related, in the Kosovo region. But, 
rather than pushing Russia away, let us try to draw them in and let us 
not put ground troops into this region. How disastrous would that be. 
This is an area of the world where the people fight, where they 
believe. We have taken a nation which was a little bit fractured, 
actually, Yugoslavia, greater Serbia, and united those people. And they 
will fight.
  Unless we go in there in a noncombative way, there will be a 
significant loss of life. And again the question will have to be asked, 
for what cause? And I cannot answer that question. So I do not see it 
as being constructive to put ground forces into that region. To 
authorize this administration to have that flexibility, after this 
administration has so completely mismanaged the issue to begin with, 
is, to me, foolhardy. So this is a complex and difficult issue, but it 
is the issue of the time and we need to address it and that is why I 
have taken this time.
  Mr. President, I make a point of order a quorum is not present.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I wonder if I might ask the Senator a 
question?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator withhold his point of order?
  Mr. GREGG. I yield solely for the purpose of a question.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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  Mr. DOMENICI. I was here for most of your remarks. First I want to 
commend you. In my recollection of the discussions we had with those 
who were in the administration prior to this involvement, with 
reference to Russia, there was almost kind of a trite answer--don't 
worry, they will not do anything.
  I want to ask you if there is not a serious problem coming about now. 
They are going to have elections next year. We have always wondered how 
long will it be before their nationalist temperaments come back to the 
surface and they move in the wrong direction politically. I wonder if 
you might speculate or reason with me about that.
  My evaluation, based upon a number of people who have talked about 
Russia and an analysis that has been given to me, is that they are now 
so anti-American and so antiwest that they are apt to move in a rather 
concerted manner by large numbers of votes in a direction that is not 
moving toward a marketplace economy and democracy. Is that your concern 
also?
  Mr. GREGG. I think the Senator from New Mexico, as usual, has hit the 
nail on the head. That is the most significant strategic concern we 
have on the issue of Kosovo, which is where does Russia end up? Do we 
end up forcing it down the road towards a nationalist state with maybe 
irresponsible leadership? Or do we continue it on the path of democracy 
and marketplace economy?
  I think that ever since the end of the cold war period everyone has 
analyzed the Russian situation as being tentative. The biggest concern 
of everyone who has analyzed it is that they may go the course of a 
nationalist leader who might use the West as the purpose for uniting a 
militaristic response, a militaristic nation approach. That is the 
concern. The Senator's point is absolutely on target.
  Our biggest strategic interest today is what happens with Russia.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I make a point of order a quorum is not 
present.
  Mr. DURBIN. Will the Senator withhold?
  Mr. GREGG. Yes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois is recognized.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 15 
minutes in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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