[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 5]
[Senate]
[Pages 6811-6815]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 27--ESTABLISHING THE POLICY OF THE UNITED 
                 STATES TOWARD NATO'S WASHINGTON SUMMIT

  Mr. LUGAR (for himself, Mr. Roth, Mr. Lott, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. 
DeWine, Mr. Voinovich, and Mr. Hagel) submitted the following 
concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations:

                            S. Con. Res. 27

       Whereas the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will 
     celebrate its fiftieth anniversary at a historic summit 
     meeting in Washington, D.C., commencing on April 23, 1999;
       Whereas NATO, the only military alliance with both real 
     defense capabilities and a transatlantic membership, has 
     successfully defended the territory and interest of its 
     members over the last 50 years, prevailed in the Cold War, 
     and contributed to the spread of freedom, democracy, 
     stability, and peace throughout Europe;
       Whereas NATO remains a vital national security interest of 
     the United States;
       Whereas NATO is currently conducting military operations 
     against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
     Montenegro) to further the objective of a lasting peace in 
     Kosovo;
       Whereas NATO enhances the security of the United States by 
     embedding European states in a process of cooperative 
     security planning, by preventing the destabilizing 
     renationalization of European military policies, and by 
     ensuring an ongoing and direct leadership role for the United 
     States in European security affairs;
       Whereas the enlargement of NATO, a defensive alliance, 
     threatens no nation and reinforces peace and stability in 
     Europe, and provides benefits to all nations;
       Whereas Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that 
     ``any other European state in a position to further the 
     principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security 
     of the North Atlantic area'' is eligible to be granted NATO 
     membership;
       Whereas the July 1998 communique of the NATO Summit in 
     Madrid reaffirmed that ``NATO remains open to new members 
     under Article X of the North Atlantic Treaty'' and stated 
     that ``the Alliance expects to extend further invitations in 
     coming years to nations willing and able to assume the 
     responsibilities and obligations of membership'';
       Whereas the accession to NATO by Poland, the Czech 
     Republic, and Hungary will strengthen the military 
     capabilities of NATO, enhance security and stability in 
     Central and Eastern Europe, and thereby advance the interests 
     of the United States and NATO;
       Whereas Congress has repeatedly endorsed the enlargement of 
     NATO with bipartisan majorities;
       Whereas the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, a multinational 
     body composed of delegations from the member states of the 
     North Atlantic Treaty, has called for NATO to welcome new 
     members through the adoption of Resolution 283 of 1998, 
     entitled ``Recasting Euro-Atlantic Security: Towards the 
     Washington Summit'';
       Whereas additional democracies of Central and Eastern 
     Europe have applied for NATO membership;
       Whereas the enlargement of NATO must be a careful, 
     deliberate process with consideration of all security 
     interests;
       Whereas the selection of new members should depend on 
     NATO's strategic interests, potential threats to security and 
     stability, and actions taken by prospective members to 
     complete the transition to democracy and to harmonize 
     policies with NATO's political, economic, and military 
     guidelines established by the 1995 NATO Study on Enlargement;
       Whereas NATO must consider and debate the qualifications 
     and potential ramifications of new members on a country-by-
     country basis;
       Whereas the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, and 
     Hungary to NATO is an important step in the post-Cold War era 
     toward a Europe that is truly whole, undivided, free, and at 
     peace and must be complemented by the extension of NATO 
     membership to other qualified democracies of Central and 
     Eastern Europe;
       Whereas extending NATO membership to other qualified 
     democracies will strengthen NATO, enhance security and 
     stability, deter potential aggressors, and thereby advance 
     the interests of the United States and its NATO allies;
       Whereas, because participation in missions under Article 4 
     of the North Atlantic Treaty

[[Page 6812]]

     is not obligatory and each NATO member is free to make an 
     independent decision regarding participation in those 
     missions, the United States and other NATO members are able 
     to decide on the basis of their interests and an independent 
     assessment of the situation whether to participate;
       Whereas NATO's continued success requires a credible 
     military capability to deter and respond to common threats;
       Whereas, building on its core capabilities for collective 
     self-defense of its members, NATO will ensure that its 
     military force structure, defense planning, command 
     structures, and force goals promote NATO's capacity to 
     project power when the security of a NATO member is 
     threatened, and provide a basis for ad hoc coalitions of 
     willing partners among NATO members;
       Whereas the members of NATO face new threats, including 
     conflict in the North Atlantic area stemming from historic, 
     ethnic, and religious enmities, the potential for the 
     reemergence of a hegemonic power confronting Europe, rogue 
     states and nonstate actors possessing weapons of mass 
     destruction, and threats to the wider interests of the NATO 
     members (including the disruption of the flow of vital 
     resources);
       Whereas this will require that NATO members possess 
     national military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over 
     long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of 
     time, and operate jointly with the United States in high 
     intensity conflicts; and
       Whereas the principal effect of upgraded capabilities for 
     NATO members to operate ``out of area'' with force 
     improvements for power projection will be to make NATO 
     members more effective American partners in supporting mutual 
     interests around the globe: Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 
     concurring), That (a) Congress--
       (1) regards the political independence and territorial 
     integrity of the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern 
     Europe as vital to European peace and security and, thus, to 
     the interests of the United States;
       (2) endorses the commitment of the North Atlantic Council 
     that NATO will remain open to the accession of further 
     members in accordance with Article 10 of the North Atlantic 
     Treaty;
       (3) believes all NATO members should commit to improving 
     their respective defense capabilities so that NATO can 
     project power decisively within and outside NATO borders in a 
     manner that achieves transatlantic parity in power projection 
     capabilities and facilitates equitable burdensharing among 
     NATO members; and
       (4) believes that NATO should prepare more vigorously to 
     defend itself against future threats and to expand its 
     primary defensive focus beyond its previous concentration on 
     threats to the east.
       (b) It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the North Atlantic Council should pace, not pause, the 
     process of NATO enlargement by extending the invitation of 
     membership to those states able to meet the guidelines 
     established by the 1995 NATO Study on Enlargement and should 
     do so on a country-by-country basis;
       (2) the North Atlantic Council in the course of the 1999 
     Washington Summit should initiate a formal review of all 
     pending applications for NATO membership in order to 
     establish the degree to which such applications conform to 
     the guidelines for membership established by the 1995 NATO 
     Study on Enlargement;
       (3) the results of this formal review should be presented 
     to the membership of the North Atlantic Council in May 2000 
     with recommendations concerning enlargement;
       (4) NATO should continue to assess potential applicants for 
     NATO membership on a continuous basis; and
       (5) the President, the Secretary of State, and the 
     Secretary of Defense should fully use their offices to 
     encourage the NATO allies of the United States to commit the 
     resources necessary to upgrade their capabilities to rapidly 
     deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for 
     extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United 
     States in high intensity conflicts, thus making them 
     effective American partners in supporting mutual interests.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       In this concurrent resolution:
       (1) Democracies of central and eastern europe.--The term 
     ``democracies of Central and Eastern Europe'' means those 
     nations that have applied or have registered their intent to 
     apply for membership in NATO, including Albania, Bulgaria, 
     Estonia, Macedonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and 
     Slovenia.
       (2) NATO.--The term ``NATO'' means those nations that are 
     parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.
       (3) NATO member.--The term ``NATO member'' means any 
     country that is a party to the North Atlantic Treaty.
       (4) North atlantic treaty.--The term ``North Atlantic 
     Treaty'' means the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at 
     Washington on April 4, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964).

 Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, later this week NATO will honor its 
50th anniversary at a Summit here in Washington, D.C. The leaders of 
the 19 NATO member nations and the heads of state of many Partnership-
for-Peace participants will participate in meetings to discuss the 
successes of the NATO Alliance and its future in the post-Cold War 
world.
  The more distant we become from the days of the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the collapse of communism, the clearer it becomes that we have 
entered a new era. But dangers still abound in post-Cold War Europe. 
The ongoing conflict in Kosovo is a stark reminder that threats to the 
security of NATO's members still exist. The revolutions of 1989 not 
only led to the collapse of communism but also to the end of the peace 
orders established after two world wars. What is at stake today is 
order and stability in Europe as a whole. And that is why American 
interests are involved.
  Mr. President, NATO cannot by itself solve all of Europe's problems. 
But without a stable security framework, we run the risk that reform 
and democracy in Eastern Europe will not persist but will instead be 
undercut by destructive forces of nationalism and insecurity. The 
failure of democracy in the East could not help but have profound 
consequences for democracy in the continent's western half as well.
  The resolution that I submit today on behalf of Senators Roth, Lott, 
Lieberman, DeWine, Voinovich, and Hagel sets forth three goals for the 
United States to achieve in discussions over the future of the NATO 
Alliance: (1) the enforcement of Article 10 of the Washington Treaty to 
remain open to the accession of additional members and a formal review 
of all applications for memberships; (2) expansion of the primary focus 
beyond threats from the east; and (3) the upgrading of our allies' 
ability to project power and to operate ``out of area.''
  NATO's ``open door'' policy toward new members established by Article 
10 of the Washington Treaty, has given countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe the incentive to accelerate reforms, to peacefully settle 
disputes with neighbors, and to increase regional cooperation. Hopes of 
future membership in NATO has been a tremendous driving force of 
democratization and peace in Eastern and Central Europe including 
former Warsaw Pact nations.
  To retract the ``open-door'' policy, as some have suggested, would 
risk undermining the tremendous gains that have been made across the 
region. The result of a ``closed-door'' policy would be the creation of 
new dividing lines across Europe. Those nations outside might become 
disillusioned and insecure and thus inclined to adopt the competitive 
and destabilizing security policies of Europe's past.
  NATO's decision to enlarge in stages recognizes that not all new 
democracies and applicants in Europe are equally ready or willing to be 
security allies. Some states may never be ready.
  The selection of future NATO members should depend on: (1) a 
determination by NATO members of their strategic interests; (2) NATO's 
perception of threats to security and stability; and (3) actions taken 
by prospective members to complete their democratic transitions and to 
harmonize their policies with NATO's political aims and security 
policies.
  To reinforce the benefits of Article X, I believe a comprehensive 
review of the qualifications of the nine current applicant countries 
should be conducted under the guidelines laid out in the 1995 NATO 
Study on Enlargement. A review of this type would further demonstrate 
that NATO is actively considering a continuation of the enlargement 
process. Some believe that the Alliance is not interested in further 
enlargement; a formal review of the type I am suggesting would go far 
in reassuring NATO and non-NATO states of the Alliance's plans. 
Furthermore, a review would provide NATO aspirants with additional 
incentive to continue democratic, economic and military reforms. This 
is in the national security interests of the United States and NATO and 
should be encouraged.
  These actions would also serve to clarify the security expectations 
of non-NATO members. It would make clear that it is the intention of 
the United States that NATO remain a serious defensive military 
alliance and

[[Page 6813]]

not slip into a loose collective security society. It would suggest 
that enlargement will be a careful, deliberate process, with 
consideration of all security interests. Finally, it would draw again 
on the principle of reciprocity, both to encourage prospective members 
to align themselves with NATO's values and policies and to signal that 
threats levied against would-be members will be counterproductive.
  A second goal enunciated in this resolution concerns the need to 
broaden NATO's focus. For nearly 50 years, NATO was oriented and 
organized to defend and respond to an attack from the East. An invasion 
by Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces was the primary threat facing the 
Alliance. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, new threats have 
replaced the nightmare of Soviet armored divisions crashing through the 
Fulda Gap. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rogue 
states, terrorism, ethnic strife, and other potentially destabilizing 
elements now threaten the Alliance.
  It is a basic American interest that the Alliance not only enlarge to 
help stabilize Eastern Europe but that enlargement be part and parcel 
of a broader transformation that turns Europe into an increasingly 
effective strategic partner of the United States in and beyond the 
continent.
  I believe this includes an improvement in the ability for NATO to 
operate outside the borders of its members. This is not a new mission. 
The potential for these types of endeavors has been present since 
NATO's inception. The true core of NATO has always been collective 
defense, but Article 4 of the Washington Treaty suggests that NATO will 
consult and can act if the security of any of the Parties is 
threatened. This interpretation was reinforced by John Foster Dulles in 
May 1949 during Senate consideration of the Washington Treaty. 
Secretary of State Dulles testified that the occasions for consultation 
under Article 4 are not merely attacks in the Atlantic area dealt with 
by Article 5, but threats anywhere to any of the parties since the 
parties have interests and possessions throughout the world. So we are 
not talking about new NATO responsibilities; these types of actions 
were considered by the members of the Alliance and are supported by 
language in the treaty ratified by the Senate in 1949.
  It is important to remember that participation in non-Article 5 
missions is not obligatory and each NATO member is free to make an 
independent decision regarding participation in those missions. The 
United States and other NATO members are able to decide on the basis of 
their interests and an independent assessment of the situation whether 
to participate. This is as it should be.
  A third goal set forth in this resolution deals with NATO members' 
capabilities. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have 
altered the strategic and military landscape in which NATO forces will 
operate in the future. The potential for massive tank battles over the 
plains of Central Europe has been reduced. Instead military strategists 
believe the conflicts of the 21st century will require NATO members to 
rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for 
extended periods of time and operate jointly with the United States in 
high intensity conflicts.
  NATO developed a truly credible capability to defend itself from 
threats emanating from Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. But 
our allies have not moved far enough or fast enough to improve their 
capabilities to defend against newly emerging threats. In many cases 
these threats cannot be readily distinguished as either Article 5 or 
Article 4.
  Today NATO faces threats to its southern borders and forces. For 
example, Turkey's borders are directly threatened by rogue states to 
its south. NATO has a credible plan to reinforce Turkey in the event of 
hostilities. Unfortunately, this plan relies heavily on U.S. forces. If 
the U.S. were unable to provide the military apparatus necessary to 
implement this plan because of its involvement in operations elsewhere, 
the reinforcement blueprint would be in jeopardy. European forces lack 
serious power projection capabilities for demanding Article 5 missions, 
in addition to the potential for meeting Article 4 contingencies.
  We must maintain and improve NATO's military force capability to 
respond to all conceivable missions. Our goal must be to enlarge NATO 
by enhancing NATO's strategic strength and military effectiveness. The 
need for improved European power projection capability becomes self-
evident when one considers that the U.S. currently contributes only 
about 20% of NATO's total conventional forces, but provides about 80% 
of NATO's usable military capability for power projection missions.
  We must reconfigure NATO to deal with the threats of the 21st century 
by requiring improved allied power projection forces for operating in a 
seamless web of situations including within NATO's enlarging borders, 
inside Europe including on its periphery, and outside Europe when the 
Alliance's vital interests are at stake.
  The U.S. Government must demand rough trans-Atlantic parity in power 
projection capabilities and we must not settle for less. NATO is the 
only institution capable of building these necessary force structures. 
NATO's 50th Anniversary provides an opportunity for the Administration 
to press our European allies on these issues and call for a more 
equitable burden-sharing arrangement in power projection capabilities.
  Mr. President, it is clear that the Summit cannot proceed with the 
agenda that was envisioned prior to the commencement of military 
operations in Kosovo. However, it does provide the United States with 
an opportunity to raise the key issues that will determine the ability 
of NATO to serve as the premiere U.S. and European security 
architecture for the 21st century. That is the primary reason we have 
set forth these major Alliance goals in our resolution.
  Some of my colleagues have suggested that, because of Kosovo, we 
should delay or postpone these important discussions. I do not agree. 
The Alliance must revise NATO's Strategic Concept and military 
structure to make NATO both more politically and militarily relevant to 
post-Cold War security issues. This is an outstanding opportunity to 
ensure that NATO continues to meet the security needs of all of its 
members states, including the U.S. A pause or delay will simply 
postpone necessary revisions to the current Strategic Concept, a 
concept that was adopted in 1990 while the Soviet Union was still in 
existence.
  We must move ahead. The Alliance must not allow Serbian President 
Milosevic to derail NATO's important work. It is my hope that the 
Administration will be able to work with our Allies to produce a 
Strategic Concept able to meet the security needs of the U.S. and our 
allies in the 21st century. That should be our primary objective of the 
Summit; that is the primary objective of this Resolution.
 Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I wish to briefly comment on the 
resolution that my colleague from Indiana and I, the majority leader, 
and others have just introduced.
  This weekend the NATO Alliance will hold a summit meeting here in 
Washington. That summit will be dominated by the conflict in Kosovo, 
and that is to be expected as so much is at stake.
  Should the Alliance emerge defeated from this conflict, it would 
signal that dictatorship and atrocity can lead to political survival in 
post-Cold War Europe. NATO's defeat by a bloody regime that controls no 
more territory than the state of Kentucky would signal NATO's 
irrelevance. It would mark the decay of the transatlantic order of 
democracy, human rights, and security that NATO spent the last five 
decades defending and promoting.
  For these grave reasons, the Kosovo crisis underscores how vital NATO 
is today to the values and interests we share with our European allies. 
At stake in this conflict is more than Balkan peace and stability, but 
also the prospects of a transatlantic partnership based on a Europe 
that is undivided, democratic, and secure.
  However significant and immediate the Kosovo issue may be, NATO's 
leaders cannot allow it to obscure two

[[Page 6814]]

other critical issues that will significantly shape NATO's future as 
the cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security. These are the revisions to 
NATO's Strategic Concept the Alliance intends to codify at this summit 
and the next phase of NATO enlargement.
  Mr. President, NATO's Strategic Concept is a public document that 
defines the threats and opportunities that lie before the Alliance's 
interests and values. It defines the political and military roles and 
missions the Alliance must undertake to protect and promote those 
interests and values. From this important document are derived the 
resources Alliance members commit to the implementation of this 
strategy. It is a critically important document, one whose revision 
must be taken with great care.
  Two Strategic Concept issues that right now appear unresolved prior 
to this summit and that should be of great concern to us are NATO's 
relationship with the United Nations and the future of the European 
Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).
  There are still today Allies who wish to require NATO to attain a UN 
or a OSCE mandate prior to undertaking out-of-area military actions. I 
cannot think of a more destructive poison pill for the Alliance. A UN 
mandate would give non-NATO countries, such as Russia and China, a veto 
over Alliance decisions. We must not forget that NATO was established 
in 1949 to overcome the inability of the United Nations to act 
decisively in the face of danger, threats, and conflagration. We need 
only to look back to the UN's role in the former Yugoslavia this decide 
to be reminded of the grave limitations of this institution. If there 
is one thing that new Strategic Concept must not do, it is to constrict 
NATO freedom to act by subjecting it to the decisions of other 
organizations. NATO must preserve its freedom to act.
  Second, the Alliance's new Strategic Concept must continue the 
process toward a viable ESDI within the framework of the Washington 
Treaty. Allied leaders should focus on developing better European 
military capabilities within NATO. The resolution we introduce today 
underscores this point by calling upon our European Allies to acquire 
better capability to ``rapidly deploy forces over long distances, 
sustain operations for extended periods of time and operate jointly 
with the United States in high intensity conflicts.'' The Alliance must 
not only be able to project power decisively within and outside NATO 
borders; it must be able to do so in a manner that features 
transatlantic parity in power projection capabilities.
  Mr. President, let me add one more point on this matter. Over the 
last half decade NATO has restructured its command structure to afford 
it greater operational flexibility. The establishment of Combined Joint 
Task Forces (CJTF), one of the most important reforms, will enable 
European Allies to utilize Alliance assets for operations of a 
distincity European character. Europe's key to maximizing the potential 
of these reforms is the development of better military capabilities. It 
is through capability--not rhetoric--that our Allies can put a final 
end to the often acrimonious debates over burden-sharing, and at the 
same time allow them to more effectively address security challenges of 
distincity European concern.
  Finally, Mr. President, the issue of NATO enlargement. How the 
Washington Summit manages the next phase of enlargement will determine 
whether this meeting strengthens or undermines the dream for a Europe 
that is free, secure, and undivided. If the process of NATO enlargement 
is clearly advanced, the summit will reinforce the prospects for 
enduring peace and stability in post-Cold War Europe.
  Article Ten of the Washington Treaty, which established the NATO 
Alliance in 1949, articulates the Alliance's vision of a united Europe. 
It states that NATO is open to ``any other European state in a position 
to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the 
security of the North Atlantic area.'' In 1995 the Alliance defined 
through its Study on Enlargement the political, military, and foreign 
policy guidelines to direct enlargement in the post-Cold War era. These 
include a commitment to democracy, the resolution of disputes with 
neighbors, and the ability to contribute to the Alliance's roles and 
missions, including collective defense.
  Based on these guidelines, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary 
were invited to join the Alliance. Their accession on March 12 
strengthened the Alliance and marked the first step in the elimination 
of the divisive and destablizing vestiges, not only of the Cold War, 
but of the era preceding World War II.
  The Washington Summit must not only celebrate the first round of NATO 
enlargement, it must decisively press the process forward. Toward that 
end, I believe that NATO should invite Solvenia and any other qualified 
NATO European applicant to accession negotiations. Recently, at my 
request, the Congressional Research Service examined the nine European 
states that have applied for NATO membership. This study clearly 
revealed that Slovenia not only meets NATO's own guidelines, it 
surpasses some of the economic and military standards set by the 
Alliance's three newest members.
  An invitation to Slovenia would demonstrate to the other democracies 
of Central Europe that NATO remains genuinely committed to its ``Open 
Door Policy''--proof that would reinforce their commitment to 
democratic and economic reform and the Alliance's Partnership for Peace 
program.
  Above all, it would help ensure that enlargement becomes a 
continuous, not a convulsive, process. The momentum generated by the 
first round of enlargement would be sustained. In contrast, if 
enlargement is subject to pauses of undefined and indefinite duration, 
each succeeding round will be more difficult to initiate and complete. 
Enlargement would less likely be seen and appreciated as a normal 
dynamic of post-Cold War Europe.
  In the absence of new invitations at the Summit, it will be a 
challenge for NATO to sustain the credibility of its Open Door Policy. 
The Alliance must not step back to the theme of its 1994 Summit in 
Brussels: ``NATO enlargement is not a matter of if, but when.'' This 
April, such an open-ended ``when'' would ring especially hollow.
  For this reason, NATO cannot simply retierate longstanding promises; 
it must yield a process. Herein lies an important recommendation 
presented by our resolution on the issue of NATO enlargement.
  It calls upon Alliance leaders to instruct the NATO International 
Staff to conduct a comprehensive and transparent review of the nine 
applicant countries in terms of the guidelines articulated in its 1995 
study. (Such a review should not be confused with discrete annual 
reviews currently being considered for each applicant.) This 
comprehensive review should be presented, with recommendations, to a 
North Atlantic Council meeting of ministers or heads of state no later 
than May 2000.
  While this review should complement new NATO invitations, even 
standing alone it offers the following advantages:
  The Alliance would demonstrate that it is actively engaged in an 
ongoing enlargement process. It would deflect suspicions that the 
Alliance is camouflaging its unwillingness for further enlargement 
behind the generosity of more financial and material assistance. A 
review is more than words, it is action.
  A review would not bind the Alliance to ``automaticity'' in that it 
does not commit the Alliance to issue new invitations in 2000. The 
review would, however, probably highlight the fact that one or more 
applicant countries have met the grade.
  It would underscore that NATO stands by the guidelines established in 
the 1995 Study on Enlargement. That would encourage the applicant 
states to continue, if not accelerate, the democratic, military, and 
economic reforms and regional cooperation requisite for NATO 
membership.
  NATO enlargement must also be a central component of NATO's new 
Strategic Concept, the document that will define the Alliance's roles 
and missions for the next century. It inclusion

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will not only communicate commitment, it will help institutionalize 
enlargement as a planning priority of the Alliance.
  NATO enlargement is not an act of altruism; it is an act of self-
interest. It is a process motivated by the dream of an undivided 
Europe, the stability that would come to the Euro-Atlantic community, 
and the capabilities new members would yield the Alliance. It is a 
policy guided by objective political, economic and military criteria.
  Each of these enlargement steps outlined above, an invitation to 
Slovenia, a comprehensive review process, and an emphasis in the 
Alliance's game plan for the future, will ensure that the Washington 
Summit is remembered for revitalizing the dream of a Europe, whole, 
free, and undivided.
  Mr. President, history will judge this week's NATO Summit not only 
for how it handles the crisis in Kovoso, but also for the strategy that 
it lays out for its future. Kosovo, the new Strategic Concept, and 
enlargement present a challenging agenda at a very trying time. Yet, I 
remain confident this Alliance has the potential to address each of 
these issues in a manner that will ensure that NATO becomes an even 
more capable and effective promoter of a transatlantic partnership that 
features a strong, undivided and democratic Europe. It is toward this 
vision that we introduce this resolution, and I urge my colleagues to 
lend their support.

                          ____________________