[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 5]
[Senate]
[Pages 6685-6688]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                             KOSOVO POLICY

  Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, it is my privilege to speak on the 
question of Kosovo and our military and political goals there. In 
working with my staff to put together some background and understand 
the history of that region, I came across an interesting fact, because 
I value history. What is it Winston Churchill once said? How do you 
know where you are going unless you know where you have been?
  I find it fascinating, after 146 B.C., the Roman Republic was the 
world's only superpower--that sounds familiar--following the 
destruction of its long-time superpower rival, Carthage. This Roman 
triumph created a tremendous expansion of Roman territory, wealth, and 
influence and, not coincidentally, an expansion of Roman involvement in 
local conflicts far removed from Italy.
  One such intervention involved the Northern African kingdom of 
Numidia, where Rome became entangled in a seccession struggle in 112 
B.C., with the Roman Senate declaring actually war against Jugurtha, 
the leading contender for the Numidian throne. What followed is 
fascinating. It is described in a book called the ``Anatomy of Error: 
Ancient Military Disasters and Their Lessons for Modern Strategists.''
  I think there are some lessons here for us, particularly as we view 
Kosovo today.
  Viewed from a modern perspective, North Africa in the age of Jugurtha 
was in many ways Rome's Vietnam. The Jugurthine War is the story of the 
failure of the Romans to find a strategy that would determine the 
appropriate level of force needed to maintain sound and stable foreign 
policy.

       The Romans should have learned to operate according to the 
     rules that Clausewitz later laid out in his book ``On War'': 
     that war is always to be regarded as the pursuit of policy by 
     other means and that strategy is the art of using exactly the 
     appropriate amount of force to accomplish the ends of the 
     policy. The Romans never had a clear policy in Numidia.

  This is something we have to avoid in Kosovo. We need a clear policy.

       Thus the Romans never had a rational strategy for winning 
     the war.

  Another mistake we have to avoid.

       As a result, they poured a massive amount of military force 
     into the region and accomplished worse than nothing.

  Mr. President, we can't accomplish worse than nothing in Kosovo. We 
have to accomplish something of which we can be proud. The horrifying 
scenes unfolding in and around Kosovo today are indeed a sad recap of 
many of the worst images of our 20th century: Massive refugee flight to 
uncertain futures, civilian casualties, large numbers of destroyed 
homes and shops and communities, ethnic intolerance, and hostilities 
fanned by demagogic political leaders.
  The hearts of Americans and people around the world have been truly 
touched by the incredible tragic plight of the Kosovar Albanians who 
have been the primary victims of the incredible, reprehensible, so-
called ethnic cleansing policies of Milosevic.
  This is also a difficult situation. There are no easy answers, and 
any choice the President makes and, indeed, any choice the Congress 
makes is fraught with danger. Part of this, I think, is the world in 
which we live, not a new world order but a new world disorder.
  The post-cold-war order is one of disorder. The two administrations 
which have confronted the post-Soviet Union world, the Bush and Clinton 
administrations, have grappled mightily with the complexities of this 
new age in foreign places, much like the Roman Empire, foreign places 
like Iraq, Croatia,

[[Page 6686]]

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Haiti, and now Kosovo. Almost every step 
in these areas has been subjected to questioning and controversy 
before, during, and even after the operation in question.
  The decision to authorize the use of airstrikes against Serbia was 
one of the most difficult decisions I have ever had to make. I have 
felt in the weeks since much like President Kennedy described himself. 
He said he was an optimist with no illusions. I am an optimist. I am an 
idealist. I want to take the high ground. I thought that NATO and 
America needed to act, and act then, and airstrikes was our best 
option. Maximum impact on Milosevic, minimum impact on us. But it was a 
tough decision to make, and I am under no illusion that this is going 
to automatically get us to where we want to go in terms of our policies 
in the Balkans.
  May I say that we have a major humanitarian interest in providing 
effective relief for the refugees and preventing further atrocities 
against civilians by the Milosevic regime. We certainly have a strong 
interest in stopping the spread of this conflict to the surrounding 
countries in this historically unstable region.
  I find it interesting that the century opened in 1914 with a Serb 
nationalist assassinating Archduke Ferdinand and that led to the guns 
of August in 1914. We have to make sure that the current Milosevic-
misled nationalism does not lead to the guns of 1999.
  Unfortunately, I think that no real military, or so far diplomatic, 
approach we have come up with can really fully guarantee our goals in 
the Balkans. Despite my concern about our long-term policy in Kosovo 
and the Balkans, the Senate was asked to vote at a point when NATO had 
already united in favor of airstrikes. American troops were poised to 
embark on their mission and the credibility of American commitments was 
on the line.
  Under these circumstances, I felt that we must not send a signal of 
disunity to Milosevic, to our NATO allies, to the President, to our own 
people.
  While these circumstances dictated my vote for airstrikes, by no 
means--and I have made this clear--by no means does this indicate my 
giving a green light for an open-ended, ill-defined, deeper commitment 
of American military force in Kosovo, especially the introduction of 
American ground troops.
  Mr. President, I was on the ground in Vietnam 31 years ago. I don't 
want this generation to repeat that experience. We do not need an open-
ended, ill-defined commitment of American ground forces in the Balkans. 
I hope and pray that we can avoid that.
  I hope and expect that any such future expansion of military might 
there would be thoroughly discussed and debated in our country and 
within NATO before it is undertaken, not after the decision has been 
already made. I oppose American ground troops in Kosovo. I think this 
would represent further intervention in that civil war within 
internationally recognized borders, Yugoslavia. I think it would be in 
pursuit of objectives which are not vital to the United States or NATO 
and would do little, frankly, to secure the long-term interests that we 
do have in the Balkans--stability and economic prosperity.
  The distinguished Senator from Kansas, Mr. Roberts, has often cited 
the following quotation from one of my personal heroes, Senator Richard 
Russell. It is an honor I cherish that I hold his seat in the Senate 
and his seat on the Senate Armed Services Committee. Senator Russell 30 
years ago in this Chamber, while I was in Vietnam, said this:

       While it is a sound policy to have limited objectives, we 
     should not expose our men to unnecessary hazards of life and 
     limb in pursuing them. As for me, my fellow Americans, I 
     shall never knowingly support a policy of sending even a 
     single American boy overseas to risk his life in combat 
     unless the entire civilian population and wealth of our 
     country--all that we have and all that we are--is to bear a 
     commensurate responsibility in giving him the fullest support 
     and protection of which we are capable.

  Mr. President, it has been my honor to visit some of the troops and 
facilities in Georgia that are supporting our efforts in Kosovo and the 
Balkans and in western Europe, some of the troops in Fort Stewart, 
troops at Robins Air Force Base. I know what it means to be a troop out 
there committed on behalf of this country and to have this country 
divided. It is not fun. It is not what we want to repeat. And with air 
operations now ongoing, with Americans soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 
marines in harm's way, our thoughts must turn to them as they tackle a 
very complicated and very risky mission. Our prayers are with them, and 
we pray for their safe return in every way.
  As with every American military deployment, there are risks. That is 
why I have chosen to visit some of the places in Georgia that have sent 
young men and women into harm's way, including the 93rd Air Control 
Wing of JSTARS Aircraft out of Robins Air Force Base; the 19th Air 
Refueling Group of KC135R Aircraft--which participated, by the way, in 
the rescue of our downed stealth fighter pilot--also out of Robins; and 
the 94th Airlift Wing of the C-130 transports out of Dobbins Air 
Reserve Base, not to mention the numerous other Georgia citizens 
serving in our deployed forces in the Balkans.
  My primary purpose today is to look beyond the military phase at our 
Balkans policy and ahead to the elements which I believe we must 
consider if we are to have a truly successful exit strategy. I said 
today in our hearings that there is one thing a Vietnam veteran does 
not like to hear and that is ``no win.'' There is another thing and 
that is ``no exit.'' Put those together and that becomes a tragedy: 
``no win, no exit.'' We can't have that situation in the Balkans. We 
need a successful exit strategy which produces a long-term, stable, and 
humane outcome, one which also will allow our service men and women to 
come home safely from the Balkans without having to return again. I 
believe we ought to have a full debate on our exit strategies now, and 
not just on exit strategies, but on what constitutes victory. I think 
we still have to nail that down. But certainly we ought to talk about 
not just how we get in and what we do there, but how do we get out.
  Even while military operations are still underway, we must not repeat 
the mistakes the Romans made in the Jugurthine war, or the mistakes we 
made in the Vietnam war--pursuing both ``no win" and ``no exit'' at the 
same time.
  In spite of substantial disagreements about the appropriate ways to 
go about our goals in the Balkans, I think there is some consensus in 
this country and in NATO regarding our ultimate goals:
  1. An end to atrocities in Kosovo.
  2. Effective relief for refugees.
  3. A negotiated political settlement, in terms of the status of 
Kosovo.
  4. Stability throughout the Balkans, including Kosovo, Bosnia, 
Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro.
  Another important goal, it seems to me, is an end to the U.S. and 
other NATO country force deployments in the Balkans, in other than a 
legitimate peacekeeping rather than warmaking role.
  Any effective exit strategy must indicate how we can achieve these 
ends, including the costs for doing so and also the costs for not doing 
so. Our involvement in Bosnia has cost us $10 billion already. I 
understand that the price tag, through October, for our involvement now 
in Kosovo will cost some $8 billion. We owe it to both the people in 
the region, as well as to our own service men and women, to determine 
what price we are prepared to pay in order to make their sacrifices in 
the military operations they are involved in worthwhile in the long 
run. Otherwise, we may actually ``win the war,'' but ``lose a peace'' 
by failure to pursue the nonmilitary policies necessary to attain our 
key objectives.
  I think it is important for me to quote one of my heroes, Walter 
Whitman, who said about the Vietnam experience that the battles we 
fight we may win, but the battles we fight can't win the war. One of 
the things I fear most about Kosovo and further military action in the 
Balkans is that we win those battles, but those battles can't help us 
bring about the ultimate goals

[[Page 6687]]

we seek. I am afraid there is a massive disconnect there between the 
two, and I am afraid that is going to pull us into a deeper and more 
prolonged war.
  In that spirit, I want to offer some preliminary ideas, some key 
elements that I believe must be part of an exit strategy.
  First of all, we must develop a comprehensive, long-term plan for 
refugee relief and resettlement. I am not sure if I were a Kosovar 
Albanian that I would ever want to go back to that part of the world. I 
would certainly probably not want to go back as long as Milosevic was 
in power. It is one thing to announce the appropriate goal of the 
return of all the Kosovar refugees to their homes, but how many will 
really want to go back? Is it really possible to put Humpty-Dumpty back 
together again? Is it possible to put together Kosovo as it was before 
the war? It may not be possible. It is another thing to realize reality 
and put together a set of policies necessary to deal with the real life 
situation in which many--perhaps most--of the Kosovar Albanians exist 
today:
  1. They don't have homes.
  2. In many ways, they are dispossessed and don't have a country.
  3. They don't have jobs.
  4. They don't have functioning communities to return to.
  While the European members of NATO and other nearby nations have a 
great stake in the refugee population resettlement, it is the greatest 
obligation we have here in the United States, too. We have a 
significant responsibility. I believe the administration and Congress 
must develop a substantial aid package now to demonstrate clearly that 
we are fully committed to successfully working on the refugee crisis. 
It may be years before that crisis is resolved. The sooner we get to 
work on it, the better.
  Secondly, in terms of a successful exit strategy out of the Balkans, 
we must be prepared to address, as part of any lasting solution to the 
problems in Kosovo and the Balkans, the economic devastation which 
exists in much of the entire Balkan region, much of which has been 
brought about by Milosevic himself in making war on the Slovenians, the 
Croats, the Muslims, and now on the Kosovars. Much of this devastation 
has been at his hands and under the barrel of his guns. This 
devastation is not something that can be overcome overnight. It is my 
view that there is little prospect for lasting reconciliation between 
the peoples and nations of the Balkans until there is some degree of 
economic recovery. People aren't going to return to homes that exist in 
communities that don't function. They are not going to return to places 
where there are no jobs, no schools, no education, and no hope. So much 
of the Balkans now is in that condition.
  Given the depth of the problem, we are looking at a project which is 
almost certainly to be far more lengthy than the financially costly 
refugee problem. Again, Europe must take the lead, but the United 
States has to play a part as the international community leader, which 
it is. We have a stake in the stability of the Balkans, and this is one 
of the areas that we need to address. We need to begin now considering 
under which conditions we will offer economic reconstruction aid to the 
Balkans.
  Third, in terms of a successful exit strategy, we have to begin 
laying the groundwork for an international conference to determine a 
mechanism for a final settlement not just of the Kosovo problem and 
allowing the will of the people in the Balkans to determine their fate, 
but we have to do that for Bosnia as well. I think the only way out of 
our dilemma in the Balkans is negotiating a settlement acceptable to as 
many parties as possible. It is the only outcome I can see that would 
help us achieve some lasting peace in the region.
  Fourth, in terms of a successful exit strategy, all of these efforts 
that, as I mentioned, revolve around Kosovo have to be applied to 
Bosnia as well. American forces have been enforcing an uneasy peace in 
Bosnia since 1996. Many of those refugees displaced in the Bosnia war 
have not returned to their homes. The costs continue to mount to this 
country and NATO, and no clear end is in sight.
  I find it fascinating that the great powers of Europe, after World 
War I, in 1918, help set up the Balkans, help structure it as it is 
today. As a matter of fact, in terms of Kosovo, the Russians helped 
prevail upon the great powers of Europe to take Kosovo away from 
Albania and give it to Serbia. It is now part of Serbia. I think we 
need an international conference to resolve some of these dilemmas that 
have resulted from a century-old set of solutions that may not any 
longer apply.
  Fifth, for any successful exit strategy, and for any settlement or 
resettlement to stick, Serbia must be reconciled to its neighbors and 
to the NATO countries. Clearly, the chief source of the most immediate 
problems in the Balkans, the massive human rights violation in Kosovo, 
is the Serbian regime led by Milosevic. He stands condemned before 
history and humanity.
  I am confident that he will ultimately be held accountable for his 
actions--not just by an international tribunal but by the civilized 
world. However, we must be very careful that, in painting Milosevic as 
the enemy, we not demonize the Serbian people. After all, Serbia is the 
only part of the former Yugoslavia which fought as our allies in both 
of the world wars of this century. We must make a concerted effort to 
reach out to the Serbians to make it clear that our quarrel is not with 
them; it is with Milosevic and his actions.
  Sixth, as a vital part, a key part of an exit strategy, we must thank 
those who fought the war. We must redeem our pledges to the men and 
women in our Armed Forces who are, once again, being asked to put their 
lives on the line to implement American foreign policy. Our service men 
and women, and their families, are, once again, the ones paying the 
price for the policies we make here in Washington. They are on the 
point of the sphere. If we policymakers are going to continue to put 
them in harm's way, surely we can appropriately provide for the men and 
women and their families who depend on them.
  This body passed overwhelmingly S. 4, a marvelous measure to increase 
pay and improve pension benefits under the G.I. bill. I was proud to be 
part of that effort, and we need to make sure that the effort passes 
the House and is signed into law.
  It is interesting, as we find ourselves exiting the 20th century and 
going into the 21st with another situation in the Balkans. Hopefully, 
we can a avoid the guns of 1999 and move towards a more peaceful 
resolution of our problems. Hopefully, we have learned some things 
through the years. But, interestingly enough, we have a new role going 
into the 21st century and will face very few self-imposed restraints on 
our actions. Therefore, perhaps more than at any time in our Nation's 
history, it is imperative that both Congress and the executive branch 
focus clearly on defining our national interest and developing policies 
to effectively and appropriately protect and promote those interests. 
Even with our current unparalleled power and influence, I think it 
would be wise to heed the words of President Kennedy in 1961. He said 
about us in this country:

       And we must face the fact that the United States is neither 
     omnipotent or omniscient, that we are only 6 percent of the 
     world's population, that we cannot impose our will upon the 
     other 94 percent of mankind, that we cannot right every wrong 
     or reverse every adversity, and that therefore there cannot 
     be an American solution to every world problem.

  Mr. President, I was laying on a beach in Miami getting ready to go 
to basic training at Fort Benning in the summer of 1963 and heard a 
marvelous speech on my little transistor radio. I can remember the 
technology in those days. That was high tech in those days.
  I remember that President Kennedy spoke at American University on 
June 10, 1963, in a marvelous address. And he said, ``We don't want a 
Pax Americana.'' That is not what we want to look for as we enter the 
21st century. We don't want a Pax Americana. We don't want America to 
keep the peace all over the world. It is not our role. It

[[Page 6688]]

is not our job. And we have to realize that it is not necessarily an 
American solution to every problem in the world.
  But the challenge for the post-cold war world for us is to learn from 
the Jugurthine War that, consistent with our national interests and our 
values, we ``find a strategy that would determine the appropriate level 
of force needed to maintain sound and stable foreign policy.''
  The post-cold-war world of disorder makes the development of a 
bipartisan national security consensus especially relevant. We have 
often said, and really meant, I think, that politics must stop at the 
water's edge. But we need more now. I believe we need to redouble our 
efforts to open real dialog here within the Congress and with the 
administration and with the American people to discuss the fundamental 
role of America's power in the world as we begin the 21st century. 
Kosovo challenges us to define that policy now. For the dialog to be 
meaningful, we must be sure that policymakers, including Members of 
Congress, have timely and sufficient information to actually allow us 
to make informed decisions before we get so deeply committed in a 
military excursion that challenges American credibility.
  I had a hand last year in working with the wonderful Senator Olympia 
Snowe and Pat Roberts in some efforts to enact in the last Congress and 
to seek to require the administration, the President whenever the 
President committed some 500 troops abroad, or asked for money for a 
contingency force to be sent somewhere in the world, this requirement 
that Senator Snowe and I put together and Senator Roberts put together 
in the appropriations bill and in the authorization bill, requires the 
administration, when they do those kinds of things, when they make 
those kinds of commitments, to come before the Congress up front and 
early and explain why we are committing our forces abroad, what the 
military application is, and what the exit strategy is.
  Unfortunately, I am afraid these amendments went by the wayside and 
we don't have the kind of information up front and early that we need. 
I will be working with Senator Snowe and Senator Roberts to strengthen 
our legislation so that the Congress can get in, in terms of military 
commitment, on the take off as well as a potential crash landing.
  Let me just say that we need to adhere to the basic dictum of 
Clausewitz that we must know in terms of military commitment, the last 
step we are going to take before we take the first step. If I had any 
one red-letter piece of advice to give our policymakers here in 
Washington, that will be it. Let's make sure we fully understand the 
last step we are going to take before we take the first step. It is so 
easy to get into war; it is so difficult to get out.
  There is, obviously, much more to be done in formulating an effective 
approach to defining the proper guidelines, objectives, and policies 
for American foreign policy in today's world. We must successfully 
resolve the debate about NATO's mission statement: Is it going to 
participate in more offensive operations, or is it going to continue to 
be a defensive alliance primarily? Are we going to admit more members? 
Is this a good idea, or a bad idea?
  The members of NATO are coming to Washington in a few days. I think 
we ought to engage in that discussion with NATO, because we have to 
figure in the relationship with our friends and our allies, because 
those relationships affect our relationship with other countries.
  Our relationship with Russia, for instance--Russia, for all of its 
troubles, is still the only nation possessing the means to really 
threaten our physical security. And China? What about China? China, I 
think, might pose perhaps the greatest policy challenge to us as we 
enter the 21st century.
  Clearly, there is much work to do. But it all starts with the correct 
articulation of national interests--what is vital to our national 
interest and what is not, and particularly in terms of the commitment 
of American young men and women abroad.
  For all the challenges and difficulties facing us today, I would like 
for us to consider the other words spoken by President Kennedy in that 
1963 address, on June 10, at American University. He spoke during the 
height of the cold war. President Kennedy put it this way:
       World peace, like community peace, does not require that 
     each man love his neighbor; it requires only that they live 
     together in mutual tolerance, submitting their disputes to a 
     just and peaceful settlement. And history teaches us that 
     enmities between nations, as between individuals, do not last 
     forever. However fixed our likes and dislikes may seem, the 
     tide of time and events will often bring surprising changes 
     in the relations between nations and neighbors. So let us 
     persevere. Peace need not be impracticable and war need not 
     be inevitable. By defining our goal more clearly, by making 
     it seem more manageable and less remote, we can help all 
     peoples to see it, to draw hope from it, and to move 
     irresistibly toward it.

  I yield the floor.
  Mrs. LINCOLN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Roberts). The distinguished Senator from 
Arkansas is recognized.
  Mrs. LINCOLN. I thank the Chair.

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