[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 5]
[Senate]
[Pages 6243-6253]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]





                    Patients' Telephone Privacy Act

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, today I introduce a bill to protect 
the medical privacy rights of patients when they talk to their health 
care insurers or providers. The bill requires health care insurers and 
providers to obtain patients' ``express consent'' before tape-recording 
or monitoring conversations.
  Today, the health insurance industry routinely tape-records and 
monitors incoming telephone calls of patients with questions about 
their health insurance coverage. This bill halts that common practice 
with two simple rules.
  First, health insurance companies and health care providers must 
obtain the patient's ``express consent'' before tape-recording or 
monitoring a conversation. Second, health insurance companies and 
health care providers must give patients the option not to be tape-
recorded or monitored.
  The bill puts control of medical privacy back where it belongs--in 
the hands of patients who have no choice but to share personal 
information with their health insurance and health care providers.
  The bill protects all patients--
  Whether covered by private or public health plans,
  Whether covered by group, individual, or self-insured health plans,
  Whether covered by Medicare or Medicaid,
  Whether covered by Federal health plans, or
  Whether covered by the Children's Health Insurance Plan.
  Let me emphasize again who would be subject to the bill--the health 
insurance and health care industry--a huge industry that necessarily 
affects all of us. First, the bill would cover communications between 
patients and health

[[Page 6244]]

insurers. Second, the bill would cover communications between patients 
and ``health care providers,'' which includes physicians and other 
health care professionals.
  Federal law now requires that only one party must consent to the 
tape-recording or monitoring of a telephone conversation. In 
California, state law provides that all parties must consent before a 
telephone conversation may be tape-recorded. Nearly a dozen other 
states have adopted similar two-party consent laws. They include 
Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Montana, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Washington.
  Even two-party consent laws, however, do not adequately address this 
problem. Health insurance companies tape-record or monitor patients' 
calls based on the patient's implied consent. Implied consent arises 
from the patient talking after hearing the health insurer's recording 
that the call may be tape-recorded or monitored. In this case, courts 
have held that consent is given implicitly.
  Consequently, merely changing federal law to a two-party consent rule 
would not solve the problem. The key requirement must be that the 
health insurer or health care provider obtains the patient's express 
consent. Only this change will protect individuals when they call their 
health insurance provider with questions about their health care 
coverage. When my office contacted the top 100 health insurance 
providers in this country, we learned from nearly all who responded 
that they routinely monitor or tape-record calls received from 
patients.
  Let me share with my colleagues some responses that we received. 
Kaiser Permanente operates in nineteen states and the District of 
Columbia, and provides care to more than nine million members. Their 
practice varies from state to state, depending on applicable state 
laws.
  Kaiser Permanente may: Monitor randomly selected calls, in which case 
it may, or may not, notify patients in advance; or tape-record all or 
randomly selected calls, in which case it may, or may not, notify 
patients in advance.
  United HealthCare wrote to me that they did not believe that tape-
recording or monitoring calls even presents a privacy issue. Their 
rationale was that they only randomly tape-record calls and only after 
advising the caller that they may record the call.
  Great-West responded that a patient has the option of communicating 
in writing if the patient does not want a telephone call to be tape-
recorded. Let me say simply--that is not good enough for me. Imagine 
the undue burden the task of writing a letter may place on elderly or 
seriously ill patients.
  Despite the two-party consent rule in California, New York Life Care 
Health Plans, Inc., asserted that no violation of California law occurs 
without a ``confidential communication.'' Under California state law, 
the definition of a ``confidential communication'' does not include 
communications where the parties may expect that the may be recorded. 
New York Life asserted that, since they told patients that their calls 
could be monitored, their calls were not confidential calls.
  New York Life's display of legal bootstrapping shows little, if any, 
regard for medical privacy rights. Their interpretation of the word 
``confidential'' turns its commonly understood meaning on its head! In 
the minds of most people, what could be more confidential than matters 
about one's personal health problems? Surely little, if anything. How 
many of my colleagues in the Senate would say that communications about 
their health problems with health insurance or health care providers 
are not confidential?
  Blue Cross Blue Shield of the National Capital Area does not give 
patients any notice that their calls may be monitored. Their Associate 
General Counsel responded that, in both Maryland and the District of 
Columbia, telephone communications in the normal course of business do 
not meet the definition of an ``interception.'' Thus, consent is not 
required. Although Virginia law considers a telephone to be an 
``intercepting device,'' Virginia follows the one-party consent rule.
  Finger Lakes Blue Cross Blue Shield randomly tape-records calls from 
patients and only now is setting up a front-end recording to inform 
patients of that practice. New York requires only one party to consent.
  None of the health insurance providers who responded to my office 
gave me a valid reason for tape-recording or monitoring patients' 
calls. The standard response from health insurers was that they tape-
record or monitor patients' calls for so-called ``quality control,'' an 
ambiguous term at best. Indeed, no one explained what that term means, 
how tape-recording calls benefits patients, or why tape-recording calls 
was necessary.
  Of course, health insurance providers are not the only business 
entities that tape-record telephone conversations. How many of us 
realize that when we call for airline tickets, bank account 
information, mutual fund transfers, or any myriad of other daily 
concerns, the other party on the telephone line will be tape-recording 
the conversation? Yet, personal health information is far more personal 
in nature and, accordingly, entitled to greater protection. It stands 
alone as uniquely different from other commercial transactions.
  This bill does not attempt to change the consent rule for other 
business entities. It would apply only to health insurance and health 
care providers. Most patients today have almost no choice about their 
health insurer provider or, increasingly, about their health care 
provider. In turn, the health insurer may give the patient no option 
except to submit to tape-recording the conversation. An elderly, or 
seriously ill patient, is simply not going to object.
  Admittedly, much disclosure of medical information occurs both with 
patient consent and for valid medical reasons. For instance, insurance 
companies receive information from physicians based upon a written 
consent form signed by the patient at the physician's request. Yet, 
increasingly, threats to medical health privacy have become less 
visible and, in that sense, more alarming. Many individuals are left 
with a false sense of privacy. The potential for misuse of personal 
health information is real and growing.
  A fundamental right to medical privacy is embedded in American 
society. Most Americans presume that telephone conversations about 
their health problems are confidential. Sadly, they are wrong.
  Conversations with our health insurance and health care providers 
often contain deeply personal information, including prescription 
drugs, psychiatric care, alcohol dependency--the list goes on and on. 
Surely they deserve protection. Traditionally, Americans have relied 
upon a confidential relationship with their doctors.
  Let's restore at least some measure of protection to telephone 
conversations about our personal health problems. This bill allows 
health insurance and health care providers to continue their routine 
practice of tape-recording or monitoring patients' calls--but only with 
the patient's express consent.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows;

                                 S. 782

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Patients' Telephone Privacy 
     Act of 1999''.

     SEC. 2. MODIFICATION OF EXCEPTION TO PROHIBITION ON 
                   INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS.

       (a) Modification.--Section 2511(2)(d) of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking ``It shall not be unlawful'' and inserting 
     ``(i) Subject to clause (ii), it shall not be unlawful''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(ii)(I) With respect to a wire, oral, or electronic 
     communication between a health insurance issuer or health 
     plan and an enrollee of such health insurance issuer or 
     health plan, or between a health care provider and a patient, 
     it shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a health 
     insurance issuer, health plan, or health care provider to 
     intercept such communication only if the patient has given 
     prior express consent to such interception.

[[Page 6245]]

       ``(II) In this paragraph--
       ``(A) the term `health insurance issuer' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 733 of the Employee Retirement 
     Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1191b);
       ``(B) the term `health plan' means a group health plan, as 
     defined in section 733 of the Employee Retirement Income 
     Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1191b), an individual or 
     self-insured health plan, the medicare program under title 
     XVIII of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395 et seq.), 
     the medicaid program under title XIX of such Act (42 U.S.C. 
     1396 et seq.), the State children's health insurance program 
     under title XXI of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1397aa et seq.), the 
     Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services 
     under chapter 55 of title 10, and a health plan offered under 
     chapter 89 of title 5; and
       ``(C) the term `health care provider' means a physician or 
     other health care professional.''.
       (b) Recording and Monitoring of Communications with Health 
     Insurers.--
       (1) Communication without recording or monitoring.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a health 
     insurance issuer, health plan, or health care provider that 
     notifies any customer of its intent to record or monitor any 
     communication with such customer shall provide the customer 
     the option to conduct the communication without being 
     recorded or monitored by the health insurance issuer, health 
     plan, or health care provider.
       (2) Definitions.--In this subsection:
       (A) Health care provider.--The term ``health care 
     provider'' means a physician or other health care 
     professional.
       (B) Health insurance issuer.--The term ``health insurance 
     issuer'' has the meaning given that term in section 733 of 
     the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 
     U.S.C. 1191b).
       (C) Health plan.--The term ``health plan'' means--
       (i) a group health plan, as defined in section 733 of the 
     Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 
     1191b);
       (ii) an individual or self-insured health plan;
       (iii) the medicare program under title XVIII of the Social 
     Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395 et seq.);
       (iv) the medicaid program under title XIX of such Act (42 
     U.S.C. 1396 et seq.);
       (v) the State children's health insurance program under 
     title XXI of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1397aa et seq.);
       (vi) the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the 
     Uniformed Services under chapter 55 of title 10, United 
     States Code; and
       (vii) a health plan offered under chapter 89 of title 5, 
     United States Code.
       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this Act shall 
     take effect on the date that is 60 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself, and Mr. Sessions):
  S. 783. A bill to limit access to body armor by violent felons and to 
facilitate the donation of Federal surplus body armor to State and 
local law enforcement agencies; to the Committee on the Judiciary.


                  James Guelff Body Armor Act of 1999

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I am pleased today to introduce the 
James Guelff Body Armor Act of 1999.
  Currently, Federal law does not limit access to body armor for 
individuals with even the grimmest history of criminal violence. 
However, it is unquestionable that criminals with violent intentions 
are more dangerous when they are wearing body armor.
  Many will recall the violent and horrific shootout in North 
Hollywood, California, just two years ago. In that incident, two 
suspects wearing body armor and armed to the teeth, terrorized a 
community. Police officers on the scene had to borrow rifles from a 
nearby gunshop to counteract the firepower and protective equipment of 
these suspects.
  Another tragic incident involves San Francisco Police Officer James 
Guelff, for whom this act is named. On November 13, Officer Guelff 
responded to a distress call. Upon reaching the crime scene, he was 
fired upon by a heavily armed suspect who was shielded by a kevlar vest 
and bulletproof helmet. Officer Guelff died in the ensuing gun-fight.
  Lee Guelff, James Gueff's brother, recently wrote a letter to me 
about the need to revise the laws relating to body armor. He wrote:

       It's bad enough when officers have to face gunmen in 
     possession of superior firepower . . . But to have to 
     confront suspects shielded by equal or better defensive 
     protection as well goes beyond the bounds of acceptable risk 
     for officers and citizens alike. No officer should have to 
     face the same set of deadly circumstances again.

  I couldn't agree with Lee more. Our laws need to recognize that body 
armor in the possession of a criminal is an offensive weapon. We need 
to make sure that our police officers on the streets are adequately 
supplied with body armor, and that hardened-criminals are deterred from 
using body armor.
  The James Guelff Body Armor Act of 1999 has three key provisions to 
achieve these goals. First, it increases the penalties criminals 
receive if they commit a crime wearing body armor. Specifically, a 
violation will lead to an increase of two levels under the Federal 
sentencing guidelines. Second, it makes it unlawful for violent felons 
to purchase, use, or possess body armor. Third, this bill enables 
Federal law enforcement agencies to directly donate surplus body armor 
to local police.
  I will address each of these three provisions.
  Enhancing criminal penalties for individuals who wear body armor 
during the commission of a crime: Criminals who wear body armor during 
the commission of a crime should face enhanced penalties because they 
pose an enhanced threat to police and civilians alike. Assailants 
shielded by body armor can shoot at the police and civilians with less 
fear than individuals not so well protected.
  In the North Hollywood shoot-out, for example, the gunmen were able 
to hold dozens of officers at bay because of their body armor. This 
provision will deter the criminal use of body armor, and thus deter the 
escalation of violence in our communities
  Making it unlawful for violent felons to wear body armor: This bill 
makes it a crime for individuals with a violent criminal record to wear 
body armor. It is unconscionable that criminals can obtain and wear 
body armor without restriction when so many of our police lack 
comparable protection.
  The bill recognizes that there may be exceptional circumstances where 
an individual with a brutal history legitimately needs body armor to 
protect himself or herself. Therefore, it provides a mechanism for 
violent felons to obtain specific permission from the Secretary of the 
Treasury to wear body armor.
  This provision has already been codified into law in California. 
Several other states are also actively considering legislation to 
restrict violent felons access to body armor.
  California police applied the law for the first time earlier this 
year. Police arrested an individual for wearing body armor who had a 
violent criminal record. Besides a conviction for second-degree assault 
in 1993, the suspect is independently facing charges for threatening to 
kill his ex-girlfriend. He also is facing trial for issuing death 
threats against security guards at a West Hollywood Nightclub.
  Direct donation of body armor: The James Guelff Body Armor Act of 
1999 speeds up the procedures by which Federal agencies can donate 
surplus body armor to local police.
  It is disturbing that so many of our local police officers do not 
have access to bullet-proof vests. The United States Department of 
Justice estimates that 25% of State, local, and tribal law enforcement 
officers, approximately 150,000 officers, are not issued body armor.
  Getting our officers more body armor will save lives. According to 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, greater than 30% of the 1,182 
officers killed by guns in the line of duty since 1980 could have been 
saved by body armor, and the risk of dying from gunfire is 14 times 
higher for an officer without a bulletproof vest.
  Last year, Congress made some inroads into this shortage of body 
armor by enacting the ``Bulletproof Vest Partnership Grant Act of 
1998.'' This act established a $25 million annual fund to help local 
and State police purchase body armor. The James Guelff Body Armor Act 
of 1999 will provide a further boost to the body armor resources of 
local and State police departments.
  This legislation has attracted the support of a broad cross-section 
of the law enforcement community. The Fraternal Order of Police, the 
National Association of Police Organizations, the National Sheriffs' 
Association, the National Troopers Coalition, the International 
Association of Police Chiefs,

[[Page 6246]]

the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association (FLEOA), the Police 
Executive Research Forum, the International Brother of Police Officers, 
and the National Association of Black Law Enforcement Executives, have 
all endorsed the legislation.
  Richard J. Gallo, President of the Federal Law Enforcement Officers 
Association notes:

       In the past, FLEOA members have confronted individuals, 
     with prior criminal convictions, wearing body armor and 
     violently resisting arrest. Federal, state and local law 
     enforcement officers, and the public, deserve protection from 
     this, and at the very least, will now know theses felons will 
     receive enhanced sentences for using body armor during the 
     commission of a criminal act.

  Robert Stewart, Executive Director of the National Organization of 
Black Law Enforcement Executives, writes:

       There is a societal obligation to assure the men and women 
     in blue are afforded all the protection they need to maintain 
     public order. Very real fiscal constraints can, however, 
     compromise the ability of local governments to accomplish 
     that critical goal. Hence, NOBLE heartily endorses the James 
     Guelff Body Armor Act of 1999.

  I look forward to working with my fellow Senators from both sides of 
the aisle in turning this bill into law.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                 S. 783

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``James Guelff Body Armor Act 
     of 1999''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds that--
       (1) nationally, police officers and ordinary citizens are 
     facing increased danger as criminals use more deadly 
     weaponry, body armor, and other sophisticated assault gear;
       (2) crime at the local level is exacerbated by the 
     interstate movement of body armor and other assault gear;
       (3) there is a traffic in body armor moving in or otherwise 
     affecting interstate commerce, and existing Federal controls 
     over such traffic do not adequately enable the States to 
     control this traffic within their own borders through the 
     exercise of their police power;
       (4) recent incidents, such as the murder of San Francisco 
     Police Officer James Guelff by an assailant wearing 2 layers 
     of body armor and a 1997 bank shoot out in north Hollywood, 
     California, between police and 2 heavily armed suspects 
     outfitted in body armor, demonstrate the serious threat to 
     community safety posed by criminals who wear body armor 
     during the commission of a violent crime;
       (5) of the approximately 1,200 officers killed in the line 
     of duty since 1980, more than 30 percent could have been 
     saved by body armor, and the risk of dying from gunfire is 14 
     times higher for an officer without a bulletproof vest;
       (6) the Department of Justice has estimated that 25 percent 
     of State and local police are not issued body armor;
       (7) the Federal Government is well-equipped to grant local 
     police departments access to body armor that is no longer 
     needed by Federal agencies; and
       (8) Congress has the power, under the interstate commerce 
     clause and other provisions of the Constitution of the United 
     States, to enact legislation to regulate interstate commerce 
     that affects the integrity and safety of our communities.

     SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Body armor.--The term ``body armor'' means any product 
     sold or offered for sale, in interstate or foreign commerce, 
     as personal protective body covering intended to protect 
     against gunfire, regardless of whether the product is to be 
     worn alone or is sold as a complement to another product or 
     garment.
       (2) Law enforcement agency.--The term ``law enforcement 
     agency'' means an agency of the United States, a State, or a 
     political subdivision of a State, authorized by law or by a 
     government agency to engage in or supervise the prevention, 
     detection, investigation, or prosecution of any violation of 
     criminal law.
       (3) Law enforcement officer.--The term ``law enforcement 
     officer'' means any officer, agent, or employee of the United 
     States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State, 
     authorized by law or by a government agency to engage in or 
     supervise the prevention, detection, investigation, or 
     prosecution of any violation of criminal law.

     SEC. 4. AMENDMENT OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES WITH RESPECT TO 
                   BODY ARMOR.

       (a) Sentencing Enhancement.--The United States Sentencing 
     Commission shall amend the Federal sentencing guidelines to 
     provide an appropriate sentencing enhancement, increasing the 
     offense level not less than 2 levels, for any offense in 
     which the defendant used body armor.
       (b) Applicability.--No amendment made to the Federal 
     Sentencing Guidelines pursuant to this section shall apply if 
     the Federal offense in which the body armor is used 
     constitutes a violation of, attempted violation of, or 
     conspiracy to violate the civil rights of any person by a law 
     enforcement officer acting under color of the authority of 
     such law enforcement officer.

     SEC. 5. PROHIBITION OF PURCHASE, USE, OR POSSESSION OF BODY 
                   ARMOR BY VIOLENT FELONS.

       (a) Definition of Body Armor.--Section 921 of title 18, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(35) The term `body armor' means any product sold or 
     offered for sale, in interstate or foreign commerce, as 
     personal protective body covering intended to protect against 
     gunfire, regardless of whether the product is to be worn 
     alone or is sold as a complement to another product or 
     garment.''.
       (b) Prohibition.--
       (1) In general.--Chapter 44 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 931. Prohibition on purchase, ownership, or possession 
       of body armor by violent felons

       ``(a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), it 
     shall be unlawful for a person to purchase, own, or possess 
     body armor, if that person has been convicted of a felony 
     that is--
       ``(1) a crime of violence (as defined in section 16); or
       ``(2) an offense under State law that would constitute a 
     crime of violence if it occurred within the special maritime 
     and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
       ``(b) Exception.--
       ``(1) Application.--A person who is subject to the 
     prohibition of subsection (a) whose employment, livelihood, 
     or safety is dependent on the ability to possess and use body 
     armor, may file a petition with the Secretary for an 
     exception to the prohibition of subsection (a).
       ``(2) Action by secretary.--Upon receipt of a petition 
     under paragraph (1), the Secretary may reduce or eliminate 
     the prohibition of subsection (a), impose conditions on 
     reduction or elimination of the prohibition, or otherwise 
     grant relief from the prohibition, as the Secretary 
     determines to be appropriate, based on a determination that 
     the petitioner--
       ``(A) is likely to use body armor in a safe and lawful 
     manner; and
       ``(B) has a reasonable need for such protection under the 
     circumstances.
       ``(3) Factors for consideration.--In making a determination 
     under paragraph (2) with respect to a petitioner, the 
     Secretary shall consider--
       ``(A) any continued employment of the petitioner;
       ``(B) the interests of justice;
       ``(C) any relevant evidence; and
       ``(D) the totality of the circumstances.
       ``(4) Certified copy of permission.--The Secretary shall 
     require, as a condition of granting any exception to a 
     petitioner under this subsection, that the petitioner agree 
     to maintain on his or her person a certified copy of the 
     Secretary's permission to possess and use body armor, 
     including any conditions or limitations.
       ``(5) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection may 
     be construed to--
       ``(A) require the Secretary to grant relief to any 
     particular petitioner; or
       ``(B) imply that any relief granted by the Secretary under 
     this subsection relieves any other person from any liability 
     that may otherwise be imposed.
       ``(c) Immunity From Liability.--
       ``(1) In general.--An officer or employee of a law 
     enforcement agency who enforces the prohibition specified in 
     subsection (a) against a person who has been granted relief 
     pursuant to subsection (b), shall be immune from any 
     liability for false arrest arising from the enforcement of 
     this section unless the person has in his or her possession a 
     certified copy of the permission granting the person relief 
     from the prohibition, as required by subsection (b)(4).
       ``(2) Rule of construction.--The immunity from liability 
     described in paragraph (1) shall not relieve any person or 
     entity from any other liability that may otherwise be 
     imposed.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The analysis for chapter 44 of 
     title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:

``931. Prohibition on purchase, ownership, or possession of body armor 
              by violent felons.''.
       (c) Penalties.--Section 924(a) of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(7) Whoever knowingly violates section 931 shall be fined 
     under this title, imprisoned not more than 3 years, or 
     both.''.

     SEC. 6. DONATION OF FEDERAL SURPLUS BODY ARMOR TO STATE AND 
                   LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section, the terms ``Federal 
     agency'' and ``surplus property'' have the meanings given 
     such terms under section 3 of the Federal Property and 
     Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 472).
       (b) Donation of Body Armor.--Notwithstanding section 203 of 
     the Federal Property

[[Page 6247]]

     and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 484), the 
     head of a Federal agency may donate body armor directly to 
     any State or local law enforcement agency, if such body armor 
     is--
       (1) in serviceable condition; and
       (2) surplus property.
       (c) Notice to Administrator.--The head of a Federal agency 
     who donates body armor under this section shall submit to the 
     Administrator of General Services a written notice 
     identifying the amount of body armor donated and each State 
     or local law enforcement agency that received the body armor.
       (d) Donation by Certain Officers.--
       (1) Department of justice.--In the administration of this 
     section with respect to the Department of Justice, in 
     addition to any other officer of the Department of Justice 
     designated by the Attorney General, the following officers 
     may act as the head of a Federal agency:
       (A) The Administrator of the Drug Enforcement 
     Administration.
       (B) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (C) The Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization 
     Service.
       (D) The Director of the United States Marshals Service.
       (2) Department of the treasury.--In the administration of 
     this section with respect to the Department of the Treasury, 
     in addition to any other officer of the Department of the 
     Treasury designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
     following officers may act as the head of a Federal agency:
       (A) The Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
     Firearms.
       (B) The Commissioner of Customs.
       (C) The Director of the United States Secret Service.
                                  ____

      By Mr. ROCKEFELLER (for himself, Mr. Mack, Mr. Frist, Mrs. 
        Feinstein, Ms. Mikulski, Mr. Sarbanes, Mr. Conrad, Mr. Johnson, 
        Mr. Wellstone, Mr. Smith of Oregon, Ms. Collins, Mr. Jeffords, 
        Mr. Moynihan, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Craig, Mr. Graham, 
        Mr. Kerry, Mr. Harkin, and Mr. Leahy):
  S. 784 A bill to establish a demonstration project to study and 
provide coverage of routine patient care costs for medicare 
beneficiaries with cancer who are enrolled in an approved clinical 
trial program; to the Committee on Finance.


              Medicare Cancer Clinical Trials Coverage Act

  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I am pleased to be introducing the 
``Medicare Cancer Clinical Trials Coverage Act of 1999'' with my 
colleague from Florida, Senator Mack. This legislation would establish 
a demonstration project to assure Medicare beneficiaries with cancer 
that Medicare will cover their routine patient costs when part of a 
clinical trial.
  I would like to thank Senator Mack for his leadership and dedication 
on this issue. It has been a pleasure to work with Senator Mack, a 
tireless champion for cancer patients throughout his years of service 
in the Senate.
  With 1,500 deaths due to cancer each day and 1.3 million new cancer 
diagnoses this year, there is a clear and urgent need for this 
legislation. Our senior population is especially at risk--Medicare 
beneficiaries make up half of all cancer diagnoses and 60% of all 
cancer deaths. Yet, Medicare's policy toward covering quality cancer 
care is ambiguous and its enforcement practices are unpredictable.
  Our legislation represents a significant step forward in the fight to 
prevent, detect and treat cancer quickly and effectively. It is based 
on a very simple premise: given the disproportionate impact that cancer 
has on older Americans, Medicare should be responsible for the routine 
patient care costs associated with approved clinical trials.
  Cancer clinical trials often represent a cancer patient's best hope 
for survival, especially when their cancer fails to respond to 
traditional therapies. Yet, under current law, Medicare beneficiaries 
can be denied coverage for the routine patient care costs associated 
with clinical trials. However, if the same care is provided outside of 
a clinical trial setting, it is covered by Medicare.
  It is a tragedy that the costs of participating in a clinical trial 
are discouraging patients from using what might be their best weapon in 
a battle with cancer. Medicare beneficiaries who are cancer patients 
are left with only two choices: pay the costs out of their own pocket, 
or forgo treatment all together. It is unfair, and unconscionable, that 
we force cancer patient to make this decision.
  There are other compelling reasons to cover these costs. By paying 
for these routine costs, we provide incentives for researchers to 
include more Medicare beneficiaries in cancer clinical trials. 
Researchers know that patients who are at different stages physically, 
mentally, and emotionally will react very differently to treatments--
even if they are fighting the same cancer. But what they don't know is 
how age and health interact with the safety and effectiveness of new 
drugs and treatments. Our bill helps them find the answers to those 
critical questions.
  Our bill saves money in the long-run by ensuring the Medicare program 
pays for treatments that work. Clinical studies can determine which 
interventions work the best, and when they are the most effective.
  Finally, in establishing a demonstration project, this bill will also 
provide valuable information about the costs and benefits of providing 
coverage for clinical trials for other life-threatening diseases. We 
started with cancer first because cancer is a major affliction of 
Medicare beneficiaries. In addition there is a well-established 
national clinical cancer trial system to deliver this patient care.
  Mr. President, our legislation does not create a new benefit. It 
merely ensures that patients enrolled in clinical studies receive 
Medicare coverage for the same type of routine patient care costs, such 
as hospital and physician fees, that would be covered outside of a 
trial setting. We are not asking Medicare to pay for the cost of 
research. These expenses will still be covered by trial sponsors, 
including pharmaceutical companies.
  The ``Medicare Cancer Clinical Trials Coverage Act'' is a modest 
proposal, but it has the potential to become a new weapon in the fight 
against cancer. But we must act now. We have fought for this proposal 
in previous sessions of Congress, and I believe the momentum is 
building to get the legislation passed this year. I look forward to 
working with Senator Mack and others to take an important step forward 
for cancer patients.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                 S. 784

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Medicare Cancer Clinical 
     Trial Coverage Act of 1999''.

     SEC. 2. MEDICARE CANCER PATIENT DEMONSTRATION PROJECT.

       (a) Establishment.--Not later than January 1, 2000, the 
     Secretary of Health and Human Services (in this Act referred 
     to as the ``Secretary'') shall establish a demonstration 
     project that provides for payment under the medicare program 
     under title XVIII of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395 
     et seq.) of routine patient care costs--
       (1) that are provided to an individual diagnosed with 
     cancer and enrolled in the medicare program under such title 
     as part of the individual's participation in an approved 
     clinical trial program; and
       (2) that are not otherwise eligible for payment under such 
     title for individuals who are entitled to benefits under such 
     title.
       (b) Application.--The beneficiary cost-sharing provisions 
     under the medicare program, such as deductibles, coinsurance, 
     and copayment amounts, shall apply to any individual 
     participating in a demonstration project conducted under this 
     Act.
       (c) Approved Clinical Trial Program.--For purposes of this 
     Act, the term ``approved clinical trial program'' means a 
     clinical trial program that is approved by--
       (1) the National Institutes of Health;
       (2) a National Institutes of Health cooperative group or a 
     National Institutes of Health center;
       (3) the Food and Drug Administration (in the form of an 
     investigational new drug or device exemption);
       (4) the Department of Veterans Affairs;
       (5) the Department of Defense; or
       (6) a qualified nongovernmental research entity identified 
     in the guidelines issued by the National Institutes of Health 
     for center support grants.
       (d) Routine Patient Care Costs.--
       (1) In general.--For purposes of this Act, ``routine 
     patient care costs'' shall include the costs associated with 
     the provision of items and services that--

[[Page 6248]]

       (A) would otherwise be covered under the medicare program 
     if such items and services were not provided in connection 
     with an approved clinical trial program; and
       (B) are furnished according to the design of an approved 
     clinical trial program.
       (2) Exclusion.--For purposes of this Act, ``routine patient 
     care costs'' shall not include the costs associated with the 
     provision of--
       (A) an investigational drug or device, unless the Secretary 
     has authorized the manufacturer of such drug or device to 
     charge for such drug or device; or
       (B) any item or service supplied without charge by the 
     sponsor of the approved clinical trial program.

     SEC. 3. STUDY, REPORT, AND TERMINATION.

       (a) Study.--The Secretary shall study the impact on the 
     medicare program under title XVIII of the Social Security Act 
     of covering routine patient care costs for individuals with a 
     diagnosis of cancer and other diagnoses, who are entitled to 
     benefits under such title and who are enrolled in an approved 
     clinical trial program.
       (b) Report to Congress.--Not later than January 1, 2004, 
     the Secretary shall submit a report to Congress that contains 
     a statement regarding--
       (1) any incremental cost to the medicare program under 
     title XVIII of the Social Security Act resulting from the 
     provisions of this Act; and
       (2) a projection of expenditures under the medicare program 
     if coverage of routine patient care costs in an approved 
     clinical trial program were extended to individuals entitled 
     to benefits under the medicare program who have a diagnosis 
     other than cancer.
       (c) Termination.--The provisions of this Act shall not 
     apply after December 31, 2004.

  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I am pleased to join today with my 
colleagues, Senators Rockefeller and Mack to introduce legislation that 
will provide Medicare patients who are battling cancer with coverage of 
their health care costs when they participate in approved clinical 
trials. For patients suffering from life-threatening illness such as 
cancer, the opportunity to participate in clinical trials often offers 
them their best hope for access to the latest and most advanced 
treatment modalities.
  Medicare currently does not pay the costs of patient care associated 
with clinical trials because they are experimental therapies. Our bill 
proposes that we begin a demonstration project through Medicare--the 
nation's largest third party payor--to provide coverage of routine 
patient costs associated with approved cancer clinical trials. It is a 
demonstration program because there has been much debate over the costs 
associated with clinical trials and a clear need exists to gather 
better cost data. Unfortunately, dispute still exists over how to 
distinguish between routine patient costs and those associated with the 
trial. The full impact on health care costs is not yet known.
  Thus our bill requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to 
conduct this demonstration project to study the feasibility of covering 
patient costs for beneficiaries diagnosed with cancer and enrolled in 
clinical trials approved by the National Institutes of Health, the Food 
and Drug Administration, Department of Defense, and the Department of 
Veteran Affairs. The Secretary is required to report to Congress 
concerning the incremental costs attributed to the trial and the 
advisability of covering other diseases. Once Congress has these data 
in hand, we will be able to make the determination to enact legislation 
to make the coverage of routine care costs in clinical trials a 
permanent part of the Medicare program.
  We have spent many years debating this bill and urging the 
Administration to begin this demonstration project. As a research 
investigator involved in clinical trials, as a thoracic cancer surgeon, 
and as co-director of the Thoracic Oncology Clinic at Vanderbilt 
University Medical Center, I know first-hand the critical importance of 
clinical trials in determining the very best therapies in our battles 
against cancer. Only through participation in clinical trials can we 
advance quality care for patients with cancer.
  Since I have come to the United States Senate, I have urged my 
colleagues to make federal funding for both basic and clinical research 
a national priority by doubling the budget of the National Institutes 
of Health over the next five years. Last year we witnessed an historic 
increase of $2 billion that brought us closer to this goal. But we 
cannot stop there. If we do not capitalize on this investment by 
further supporting our clinical research infrastructure and the conduct 
of clinical trials, we will not reap the full benefits of our 
investment.
  Clinical trials are scientific studies that allow us to investigate 
how new medicines and clinical treatments work in patients. Patients 
should recognize that clinical trials are by their nature 
investigational and therefore are not a magic bullet or without risk. 
Patients should be fully informed of the potential benefits and, 
equally important, the potential risks of participating in a clinical 
investigation. With this in mind, patients should be given the 
opportunity to participate in clinical investigations which may allow 
them to receive cutting-edge treatments that may improve their chances 
of survival. Clinical investigations advance our scientific knowledge 
and help bring about medical innovations to find better treatments for 
patients.
  We must continue to foster both public and private efforts to support 
clinical trials. I believe our foremost federal responsibility is to 
address access to clinical trials in our publicly-financed programs 
such as Medicare. We must first determine the criteria the Medicare 
program will use to evaluate which clinical trials are eligible for 
coverage and which costs will be covered. This has not been an easy 
task.
  We have also been reviewing the proposal to require private health 
plans and insurers to cover routine costs associated with standard 
patient care while participating in a clinical trial. The Senate Health 
and Education Committee, on which I serve, had an informative debate 
last month on the issue of clinical trials coverage during our 
consideration of S. 326, ``The Patients' Bill of Rights.'' The 
amendment we were considering went beyond the Medicare demonstration 
project by requiring private sector health plans to cover costs 
associated with clinical trials for patients with any life-threatening 
or serious illness. Several members of our committee, including myself, 
expressed concern that before mandating such broad requirements on the 
private sector, we should first determine what costs would be incurred. 
In a time of rising health care costs, we must be cautious in our 
efforts to provide patient protections that do not drive up costs 
further or we will not be serving patients well.
  Therefore, I offered an amendment to have a comprehensive study 
conducted by the Institute of Medicine to assess patient access to 
clinical trials and the coverage of routine patient care costs by 
private health plans and insurers. Our efforts should not end there. 
That is just the beginning. I am encouraged by recent collaborative 
efforts between the National Institutes of Health and the American 
Association of Health Plans to increase participation of patients in 
clinical trials and to encourage health plans to cover routine patient 
costs. We need to monitor this effort closely and explore other ways to 
promote public-private collaboration and to gather the necessary data 
that will reveal the true impact on health care costs. I will continue 
to pursue this effort in a systematic way with my colleagues.
  We must not wait any longer to launch the Medicare demonstration 
project that our bill today addresses. The longer we wait, the longer 
patients are denied access to potentially life-saving therapies and the 
longer it will take for new therapies to become standard therapy. And 
we must continue to address the issue of clinical trial coverage by the 
private sector to bring about patients' access to new clinical 
therapies while being mindful of the costs we are imposing. Patients 
and their families deserve that we give thoughtful consideration to 
both of these legislative proposals this year.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Ms. MIKULSKI (for herself, Ms. Snowe, Mr. Sarbanes, Ms. 
        Collins, and Mr. Lott):
  S. 786. A bill to amend title II of the Social Security Act to 
provide that a monthly insurance benefit thereunder shall be paid for 
the month in which the recipient dies, subject to a reduction of 50 
percent if the recipient dies

[[Page 6249]]

during the first 15 days of such month, and for other purposes; to the 
Committee on Finance.


                 social security family protection act

  Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, today, I rise to talk about an issue 
that is very important to me, very important to my constituents in 
Maryland and very important to the people of the United States of 
America.
  For the third Congress in a row, I am joining in a bipartisan effort 
with my friend and colleague, Senator Olympia Snowe, to end an unfair 
policy of the Social Security System.
  Senator Snowe and I are introducing the Social Security Family 
Protection Act. This bill addresses retirement security and family 
security. We want the middle class of this Nation to know that we are 
going to give help to those who practice self-help.
  What is it I am talking about? We have found that Social Security 
does not pay benefits for the last month of life. If a Social Security 
retiree dies on the 18th of the month or even on the 30th of the month, 
the surviving spouse or family members must send back the Social 
Security check for that month.
  I think that is a harsh and heartless rule. That individual worked 
for Social Security benefits, earned those benefits, and paid into the 
Social Security trust fund. The system should allow the surviving 
spouse or the estate of the family to use that Social Security check 
for the last month of life.
  This legislation has an urgency, Mr. President. When a loved one 
dies, there are expenses that the family must take care of. People have 
called my office in tears. Very often it is a son or a daughter that is 
grieving the death of a parent. They are clearing up the paperwork for 
their mom or dad, and there is the Social Security check. And they say, 
``Senator, the check says for the month of May. Mom died on May 28. Why 
do we have to send the Social Security check back? We have bills to 
pay. We have utility coverage that we need to wrap up, mom's rent, or 
her mortgage, or health expenses. Why is Social Security telling me, 
`Send the check back or we're going to come and get you'?''
  With all the problems in our country today, we ought to be going 
after drug dealers and tax dodgers, not honest people who have paid 
into Social Security, and not the surviving spouse or the family who 
have been left with the bills for the last month of their loved one's 
life. They are absolutely right when they call me and say that Social 
Security was supposed to be there for them.
  That is what our bill is going to do. That is why Senator Snowe and I 
are introducing the Family Social Security Protection Act. When we talk 
about retirement security, the most important part of that is income 
security. And the safety net for most Americans is Social Security.
  We know that as Senators we have to make sure that Social Security 
remains solvent, and we are working to do that. We also don't want to 
create an undue administrative burden at the Social Security 
Administration--a burden that might affect today's retirees. But it is 
absolutely crucial that we provide a Social Security check for the last 
month of life.
  How do we propose to do that? We have a very simple, straightforward 
way of dealing with this problem. Our legislation says that if you die 
before the 15th of the month, you will get a check for half the month. 
If you die after the 15th of the month, your surviving spouse or the 
family estate would get a check for the full month.
  We think this bill is fundamentally fair. Senator Snowe and I are 
old-fashioned in our belief in family values. We believe you honor your 
father and your mother. We believe that it is not only a good religious 
and moral principle, but it is good public policy as well.
  The way to honor your father and mother is to have a strong Social 
Security System and to make sure the system is fair in every way. That 
means fair for the retiree and fair for the spouse and family. That is 
why we support making sure that the surviving spouse or family can keep 
the Social Security check for the last month of life.
  Mr. President, we urge our colleagues to join us in this effort and 
support the Social Security Family Protection Act.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. BURNS (for himself, Mr. Enzi and Mr. Craig):
  S. 788. A bill to amend the Federal Meat Inspection Act to provide 
that a quality grade label issued by the Secretary of Agriculture may 
not be used for imported meat and meat food products; to the Committee 
on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.


                   usda grade rescission act of 1999

  Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, I rise today to sponsor a bill on an issue 
of great importance to my state and the agricultural industry. The 
issue is that of rescinding the USDA Grade Stamp on foreign meat 
products coming into America from other countries and unfairly 
receiving the USDA Grade Stamp.
  This language offered today will insure that all meat products 
imported from a foreign country will not be graded USDA. For years 
other countries have used the USDA Grade Stamp to their advantage. 
Particularly, Canada and Mexico ship livestock into the United States 
and reap the benefits of the premium given for USDA Prime, USDA Choice 
or USDA Select.
  USDA Prime and USDA Choice grades are given a premium price. 
Competition from foreign countries effectively prevents that same 
number of American livestock producers from receiving a premium. USDA 
should mean just that the meat was raised and slaughtered in the United 
States, and given the stamp by the United States Department of 
Agriculture.
  Currently, boxed beef is not eligible to receive the USDA Grade 
Stamp. However, agricultural producers across the border ship livestock 
to the United States and feed them for a short period of time in order 
to bypass that restriction. The animals are then slaughtered here as 
United States product. This is not only unfair, it is a betrayal of 
trust. It is one that we will no longer tolerate. My bill provides for 
a 90 day feeding period to prevent this from happening, yet maintain 
the profits light-weight cattle from foreign countries bring to 
American feeders.
  The huge influx of imports from both Canada and Mexico that American 
agricultural producers are currently faced with has provided an added 
hardship to the agricultural economy. Additionally, when consumers see 
the USDA Grade Stamp on a meat product they are under the assumption 
they are buying U.S. made product. In fact, this is usually not the 
case. Even though carcasses are required to have a ``foreign origin 
marking'', it is trimmed off for marketing purposes.
  Essentially, this bill will protect both the American producer and 
the American consumer. The USDA Grade Stamp on foreign product is a 
detriment to both. It is a detriment to the producer because foreign 
countries get the benefit of the grade stamp, without having to pay for 
it. America's producers need the assurance that the USDA label really 
means just that--produced in the U.S. It is a detriment to the consumer 
because they deserve to know that they are buying American. I've said 
it before and I'll say it again. U.S. consumers deserve to know that 
they are buying absolutely the safest food supply in the world, which 
is grown by American farmers and ranchers. With this in mind we then 
should be informing the American consumer that they really are 
purchasing American product.
  I am proud and very pleased to serve as sponsor of this bill and I 
look forward to moving it through the legislative process so we may 
give our consumers and producers the information and advantage of 
knowing their meat was produced in the USA.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. McCAIN:
  S. 789. A bill to amend title 10, United States Code, to authorize 
payment of special compensation to certain severely disabled uniformed 
services retirees; to the Committee on Armed Services.


  Legislation to Authorize Special Pay For Severely Disabled Retired 
                                Veterans

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I am introducing legislation today to 
authorize special compensation for severely

[[Page 6250]]

disabled military retirees who suffer under an existing law regarding 
``concurrent receipt.'' As many of my colleagues know, current law 
requires military retirees who are rated as disabled to offset their 
military retired pay by the amount they receive in veterans' disability 
compensation. This requirement is discriminatory and wrong.
  Today, America's disabled military retirees--those individuals who 
dedicated their careers to military service, and who suffered disabling 
injuries in the course of that service--cannot receive concurrently 
their military retirement pay, which they have earned through at least 
20 years of service in the Armed Forces, and their veterans' disability 
compensation, which they are owed due to pain and suffering incurred 
from military service. In other words, the law penalizes the very men 
and women who have sacrificed their physical or psychological well-
being in uniformed service to their country.
  The legislation I am introducing today does not provide for full 
payment to eligible veterans of both the disability compensation and 
the retired pay they have earned. I regret that such a proposal, which 
I support in principle, would be far more expensive than many of my 
colleagues could accept. I learned that lesson the hard way in the 
course of sponsoring more ambitious concurrent receipt proposals in 
previous Congresses.
  My current legislation would instead authorize special compensation 
for the most severely disabled retired veterans--those who have served 
for at least 20 years, and who have disability ratings of between 70 
and 100 percent. More specifically, it would authorize monthly payments 
of $300 for totally disabled retired veterans; $200 for retirees rated 
as 90 percent disabled; and $100 for retirees with disability ratings 
of 70-80 percent.
  These men and women suffer from disabilities that have kept them from 
pursuing second careers. If we cannot muster the votes to provide them 
with their disability pay and retired pay concurrently, the least we 
can do is authorize a modest special compensation package to 
demonstrate that we have not forgotten their sacrifices. At $42 million 
per year, this legislation comes nowhere near approaching the price tag 
of more expansive concurrent receipt proposals. Moreover, it involves 
only discretionary, not mandatory, spending.
  In short, it is affordable. And it is the right thing to do. But 
don't take my word for it. The Military Coalition, an organization of 
30 prominent veterans' and retirees' advocacy groups, supports my 
legislation, as do many other veterans' service organizations, 
including the American Legion and Disabled American Veterans. These 
highly respected organizations recognize, as I do, that severely 
disabled military retirees deserve, at a minimum, special compensation 
for the honorable service they have rendered the United States.
  My interest in actively resolving the concurrent receipt issue dates 
to 1993, when I included a provision in the Fiscal Year 1994 Defense 
Authorization bill directing the Department of Defense (DoD) to submit 
a concurrent receipt legislative proposal to the House and Senate Armed 
Services Committees. When that deadline was not met, I took the 
opportunity at a Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee hearing 
to ask the then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military 
Manpower and Personnel Policy about the status of the concurrent 
receipt report. Although he replied that Congress would receive it in 
June 1993, the report arrived seven months late. Clearly, the 
concurrent receipt issue was not then a DoD priority, nor is it today.
  I also worked with the Armed Services Committee to include 
legislation in the FY 1994 Defense Authorization bill to exempt 
military retirees who are rated as 100 percent disabled from the 
requirement to offset their military pay by the amount they receive in 
veterans' disability pay. Although I had assumed that no one could deny 
a military retiree with 100 percent disability from receiving both his 
retirement and his disability pay, my legislation was never enacted 
into law.
  Undeterred, in 1994 I introduced legislation, which was included in 
the Senate version of the Defense Appropriations bill for FY 1995, 
directing the Secretary of Defense to authorize the concurrent payment 
of military retired pay and veterans' disability compensation. Although 
my amendment had 16 cosponsors and received bipartisan support in the 
Senate, it was regrettably reduced to just a study by the House of 
Representatives during conference negotiations on the bill.
  This amendment was heralded by more than 30 separate veterans' 
associations as a means of redressing the unjust offset of retirement 
pay with disability compensation. It provided for concurrent payment of 
retirement and disability compensation if the following criteria were 
met:
  (1) the veteran had completed 20 years of military service;
  (2) the disability was incurred or aggravated in the performance of 
duty in military service; and
  (3) the disability was rated as 100 percent at the time of retirement 
or within four years of the veteran's retirement date.
  I introduced these concurrent receipt amendments because the existing 
requirement that military retired pay be offset dollar-for-dollar by 
veterans' disability compensation is inequitable. I firmly believe that 
non-disability military retired pay is post-service compensation for 
services rendered in the United States military. Veterans' disability 
pay, on the other hand, is compensation for a physical or mental 
disability incurred from the performance of such service. In my view, 
the two pays are for very different purposes: one for service rendered 
and the other for physical or mental ``pain and suffering.'' This is an 
important distinction evident to any military retiree currently forced 
to offset his retirement pay with disability compensation.
  Concurrent receipt is, at its core, a fairness issue, and present law 
simply discriminates against career military people. Retired veterans 
are the only group of federal retirees who are required to waive their 
retirement pay in order to receive VA disability. This inequity needs 
to be corrected.
  In the 105th Congress, I was proud to have co-sponsored S. 657, a 
bill sponsored by Senator Daschle that would eliminate the offset on a 
graduated scale based on the inverse of the retiree's disability 
rating. For instance, a veteran who is 90 percent disabled would have 
to offset his retirement pay by an amount equal to 10 percent of his 
total VA disability. This compromise would establish the right of a 
disabled military retiree to receive at least a portion of his earned 
military retirement. Unfortunately, the full Congress did not act on 
this legislation before adjourning in October 1998.
  In the past, Congressional attempts to rectify discrimination against 
disabled career service members have been accompanied by staggering 
cost estimates, dooming to failure again and again proposed remedies to 
the concurrent receipt dilemma. The concurrent receipt legislation I 
supported in the 105th Congress reflected an attempt to ease the offset 
burden on retired disabled service members while avoiding significant 
deficit expansion. My current legislation in the 106th Congress is even 
more conscious of the costs associated with properly compensating 
disabled military retirees.
  Unfortunately, cost concerns must remain a consideration as we seek 
to promote a system of concurrent receipt that is both equitable and 
consistent with our balanced budget objective. While I would prefer to 
implement a system aimed first and foremost at severely disabled 
veterans, as my earlier legislation proposed, I believe S. 657 
represented a step in the right direction and was worthy of Congress' 
support. Similarly, I believe the special compensation authorized by my 
current legislation makes progress by targeting the most severely 
disabled veterans, even if it does not revoke the discriminatory 
concurrent receipt restrictions that remain in place today.
  I continue to hope that the Pentagon, once it finally understands our

[[Page 6251]]

message that it cannot continue to unfairly penalize disabled military 
retirees, will provide Congress with a fair and equitable plan to 
properly compensate retired service members with disabilities. It is 
hard to disagree with the simple logic that disabled veterans both need 
and deserve our full support after the untold sacrifices they made in 
defense of this country.
  I look forward to the day when our disabled retirees are no longer 
unduly penalized by existing limitations on concurrent receipt of the 
benefits they deserve. In the meantime, I urge my colleagues to support 
this legislation.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                 S. 789

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SPECIAL COMPENSATION FOR SEVERELY DISABLED 
                   UNIFORMED SERVICES RETIREES.

       (a) Authority.--(1) Chapter 71 of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:

     ``Sec. 1413. Special compensation for certain severely 
       disabled uniformed services retirees

       ``(a) Authority.--The Secretary concerned shall, subject to 
     the availability of appropriations for such purpose, pay to 
     each eligible disabled uniformed services retiree a monthly 
     amount determined under subsection (b).
       ``(b) Amount.--The amount to be paid to an eligible 
     disabled uniformed services retiree in accordance with 
     subsection (a) is the following:
       ``(1) For any month for which the retiree has a qualifying 
     service-connected disability rated as total, $300.
       ``(2) For any month for which the retiree has a qualifying 
     service-connected disability rated as 90 percent, $200.
       ``(3) For any month for which the retiree has a qualifying 
     service-connected disability rated as 80 percent or 70 
     percent, $100.
       ``(c) Eligible Members.--An eligible disabled uniformed 
     services retiree referred to in subsection (a) is a member of 
     the uniformed services in a retired status (other than a 
     member who is retired under chapter 61 of this title) who--
       ``(1) completed at least 20 years of service in the 
     uniformed services that are creditable for purposes of 
     computing the amount of retired pay to which the member is 
     entitled; and
       ``(2) has a qualifying service-connected disability.
       ``(d) Qualifying Service-Connected Disability Defined.--In 
     this section, the term `qualifying service-connected 
     disability' means a service-connected disability that--
       ``(1) was incurred or aggravated in the performance of duty 
     as a member of a uniformed service, as determined by the 
     Secretary concerned; and
       ``(2) is rated as not less than 70 percent disabling--
       ``(A) by the Secretary concerned as of the date on which 
     the member is retired from the uniformed services; or
       ``(B) by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs within four 
     years following the date on which the member is retired from 
     the uniformed services.
       ``(e) Status of Payments.--Payments under this section are 
     not retired pay.
       ``(f) Source of Funds.--Payments under this section for any 
     fiscal year shall be paid out of funds appropriated for pay 
     and allowances payable by the Secretary concerned for that 
     fiscal year.
       ``(g) Other Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) The term `service-connected' has the meaning give 
     that term in section 101 of title 38.
       ``(2) The term `disability rated as total' means--
       ``(A) a disability that is rated as total under the 
     standard schedule of rating disabilities in use by the 
     Department of Veterans Affairs; or
       ``(B) a disability for which the scheduled rating is less 
     than total but for which a rating of total is assigned by 
     reason of inability of the disabled person concerned to 
     secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation as a 
     result of service-connected disabilities.
       ``(3) The term `retired pay' includes retainer pay, 
     emergency officers' retirement pay, and naval pension.''.
       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``1413. Special compensation for certain severely disabled uniformed 
              services retirees.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--Section 1413 of title 10, United 
     States Code, as added by subsection (a), shall take effect on 
     October 1, 1999, and shall apply to months that begin on or 
     after that date. No benefit may be paid to any person by 
     reason of that section for any period before that date.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. LAUTENBERG:
  S. 790. A bill to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to 
require manufacturers of bottled water to submit annual reports, and 
for other purposes; to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.


         the bottled water safety and right-to-know act of 1999

  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I am introducing today the Bottled 
Water Safety and Right-to-Know Act of 1999. This legislation is 
designed to ensure that bottled water safety standards protect public 
health, and to give consumers the right to know about contaminants in 
their bottled water.
  Mr. President, I have been interested in bottled water for several 
years. Bottled water consumption has doubled in the U.S. since 1987, 
largely due to the public perception that bottled water is cleaner and 
safer than tap water. This is especially true in my state, where we 
hear so often about contamination of tap water. Unfortunately, bottled 
water today does not have to meet all the same safety standards met by 
tap water. Nor do consumers have the right to know about the 
contaminats found in bottled water. Let me discuss each of these issues 
in more detail.
  There is an important disparity between contaminant standards for 
bottled water and those for tap water. Bottled water is regulated as a 
food by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) under the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act, while tap water is regulated by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). Unfortunately, several contaminants are 
regulated less stringently in bottled water by the FDA than in tap 
water by the EPA. In particular, the FDA has no standard for phthalate, 
a probable human carcinogen which leaches out of some plastic bottles, 
no ban on fecal coliform of E. Coli, and weaker standards for several 
other contaminants. In addition, the infrastructure guaranteeing the 
safety of bottled water is far weaker than the regulatory programs the 
EPA and its state and local partners have established for tap water.
  There is, in addition, a disparity in the transparency of information 
about the two types of water. Public water systems have long been 
required to monitor contaminant levels and allow no more than a maximum 
amount of contamination in their water. Facing only these regulatory 
requirements, however, water companies had little incentive to provide 
more than the minimum-required level of drinking water protection. The 
Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 changed that by adding 
consumer Right-to-Know requirements to the existing regulatory 
programs. The purpose of the Right to Know requirements is to increase 
public understanding of drinking water threats, foster public demand 
for prevention of those threats, and thereby lead water companies and 
state and local agencies to go beyond the minimum requirements in 
preventing the threats.
  Unfortunately, no equivalent Right to Know exists for bottled water. 
Customers have no way to know whether the bottled product--hundreds of 
times more expensive than what comes out of the tap--is the safer, 
cleaner product. In other words, Mr. President, bottled water is the 
snake oil of the 1990's--it is sold as a cleaner product purely on the 
basis of claims and perception, not facts.
  The Bottled Water Safety and Right-to-Know Act of 1999 would correct 
these deficiencies, establishing contaminant standards and Right-to-
Know requirements for bottled water at least as stringent as those 
placed on tap water.
  First, the bill would give the FDA two years to make all standards 
for contaminants in bottled water as protective of public health as the 
tap water standards established by the EPA, the State of California, 
the World Health Organization, and the European Union. If the FDA 
failed to implement this requirement, the bill would transfer 
regulatory authority over bottled water to the EPA.
  Second, the bill would require that bottled water companies list, on 
their products' labels, the concentration of any regulated contaminant 
found at levels high enough to cause adverse

[[Page 6252]]

health effects, and of any other contaminants whose presence in tap 
water would be disclosed to the public under federal law. Bottled water 
without contamination would require no such contaminant labelling. In 
addition, labels would name the source of the water, the type of 
treatment applied, and whether the treatment meets the EPA's criteria 
of full protection of immuno-compromised individuals from 
Cryptosporidium and other microbial pathogens.
  Finally, the bill would require bottled water companies to send the 
FDA information on the contaminants in the water, the source of the 
water, and type of treatment applied. The FDA would then make the 
reported information, information on the recent inspection and 
enforcement history of the relevant bottled water facilities, and other 
background information available to the public through the Internet and 
in paper form through a 1-800 number, both of which would be printed on 
bottle labels.
  Mr. President, bottled water consumers have the right to bottled 
water that is as safe as tap water, and they have the right to know 
about the contaminants in their bottled water.
  I urge my colleagues to co-sponsor this legislation, and ask 
unanimous consent that the bill be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                 S. 790

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Bottled Water Safety and 
     Right to Know Act of 1999''.

     SEC. 2. CONSUMER CONFIDENCE REPORTS.

       Section 410 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 
     U.S.C. 349) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b), by adding at the end the following:
       ``(5) The Secretary shall--
       ``(A) not later than 6 months after the date of enactment 
     of this paragraph identify contaminants for which--
       ``(i) the Administrator has established a national primary 
     drinking water regulation under section 1412 of the Safe 
     Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. 300g-1) and the Secretary has 
     not established a standard of quality regulation for such 
     contaminant or has established a standard of quality 
     regulation or monitoring requirement that may be less 
     protective of public health than the national primary 
     drinking water regulation; or
       ``(ii) the Secretary has established a standard of quality 
     regulation for such contaminant that may be less protective 
     of public health than the standard for such a contaminant 
     issued by the World Health Organization, the European Union, 
     or the State of California; and
       ``(B) not later than 12 months after that date of 
     enactment, propose an interim standard of quality regulation, 
     for each contaminant identified under subparagraph (A), that 
     contains a standard or monitoring requirement that is at 
     least as protective of public health as the more protective 
     of--
       ``(i) the national primary drinking water regulation 
     described in subparagraph (A); or
       ``(ii) a standard issued by the World Health Organization, 
     European Union, or the State of California; and
       ``(C) not later than 24 months after that date of 
     enactment, issue a final regulation of the standard described 
     in subparagraph (B), for each identified contaminant.
       ``(6) The Secretary is authorized to award grants to the 
     States for the enforcement of the regulations described in 
     paragraph (5).
       ``(7)(A) Not later than 24 months after the date of 
     enactment of this paragraph, the Secretary shall publish 
     final regulations as described in paragraph (5) in the 
     Federal Register.
       ``(B) If the Secretary fails to publish the regulations 
     described in subparagraph (A), then--
       ``(i) all functions that the Secretary of Health and Human 
     Services exercised before the effective date of this 
     subparagraph (including all related functions of any officer 
     or employee of the Department of Health and Human Services) 
     relating to inspections and enforcement concerning bottled 
     water shall be transferred to the Environmental Protection 
     Agency;
       ``(ii) all references to the Secretary in paragraph (5), 
     notwithstanding the references in clause (i) and (ii) of 
     subparagraph (A), and all references in paragraph (6) and 
     subsections (c), (d), and (e) shall instead be to the 
     Administrator;
       ``(iii) except as otherwise provided in this subparagraph, 
     the assets, liabilities, grants, contracts, property, 
     records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, 
     authorizations, allocations, and other funds employed, used, 
     held, arising from, available to, or to be made available in 
     connection with the functions transferred under clause (i), 
     subject to section 1531 of title 31, United States Code, 
     shall be transferred to the Environmental Protection Agency, 
     and unexpended funds transferred pursuant to this 
     subparagraph shall be used only for the purposes for which 
     the funds were originally authorized and appropriated;
       ``(iv) all orders, determinations, rules, regulations, 
     permits, agreements, grants, contracts, certificates, 
     licenses, registrations, privileges, and other administrative 
     actions--
       ``(I) that have been issued, made, granted, or allowed to 
     become effective by the President, any Federal agency or 
     official of a Federal agency, or by a court of competent 
     jurisdiction, in the performance of functions that are 
     transferred under this subparagraph; and
       ``(II) that were in effect before the effective date of 
     this subparagraph, or were final before the effective date of 
     this subparagraph and are to become effective on or after the 
     effective date of this subparagraph;

     shall continue in effect according to their terms until 
     modified, terminated, superseded, set aside, or revoked in 
     accordance with law by the President, the Administrator or 
     other authorized official, a court of competent jurisdiction, 
     or by operation of law;
       ``(v) this subparagraph shall not affect any proceedings, 
     including notices of proposed rulemaking, or any application 
     for any license, permit, certificate, or financial assistance 
     pending before the Secretary on the effective date of this 
     subparagraph, with respect to functions transferred by this 
     subparagraph;
       ``(vi) such proceedings and applications described in 
     clause (v) shall be continued and orders shall be issued in 
     such proceedings and appeals taken from the orders, and 
     payments shall be made pursuant to the orders, as if this 
     subparagraph had not been enacted, and orders issued in any 
     such proceedings shall continue in effect until modified, 
     terminated, superseded, set aside, or revoked by a duly 
     authorized official, by a court of competent jurisdiction, or 
     by operation of law;
       ``(vii) nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to 
     prohibit the discontinuance or modification of any such 
     proceeding described in clause (v) under the same terms and 
     conditions and to the same extent that such proceeding could 
     have been discontinued or modified if this subparagraph had 
     not been enacted;
       ``(viii) this subparagraph shall not affect suits commenced 
     before the effective date of this subparagraph, and in all 
     such suits, proceedings shall be had, appeals taken, and 
     judgments rendered in the same manner and with the same 
     effect as if this subparagraph had not been enacted;
       ``(ix) no suit, action, or other proceeding commenced by or 
     against the Secretary, or by or against any individual in the 
     official capacity of such individual as an officer of the 
     Secretary, shall abate by reason of the enactment of this 
     subparagraph;
       ``(x) any administrative action relating to the preparation 
     or promulgation of a regulation by the Secretary relating to 
     a function transferred under this subparagraph may be 
     continued by the Administrator with the same effect as if 
     this subparagraph had not been enacted; and
       ``(xi) a reference in any other Federal law, Executive 
     order, rule, regulation, or delegation of authority, or any 
     document of or relating to--
       ``(I) the Secretary with regard to functions transferred 
     under this subparagraph, shall be deemed to refer to the 
     Administrator; and
       ``(II) the Department of Health and Human Services with 
     regard to functions transferred under this subparagraph, 
     shall be deemed to refer to the Environmental Protection 
     Agency.
       ``(C) As used in subparagraph (B), the term `Federal 
     agency' has the meaning given the term `agency' by section 
     551(1) of title 5, United States Code.''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(c)(1) Not later than 18 months after the date of 
     enactment of this subsection, the Secretary shall issue 
     regulations that require each manufacturer of bottled water 
     to submit reports and display information as required under 
     paragraph (2).
       ``(2) The regulations issued under paragraph (1) shall 
     require that each manufacturer of bottled water shall--
       ``(A) not later than 36 months after the date of enactment 
     of this subsection and annually thereafter, prepare and 
     submit in electronic form, on a form provided by the 
     Secretary, an annual report to the Secretary that describes, 
     at a minimum--
       ``(i) the source of the water purveyed;
       ``(ii) the type of treatment to which the water has been 
     subjected and whether such treatment meets the Secretary's 
     criteria for full protection of immuno-compromised 
     individuals from cryptosporidium and other microbial 
     pathogens;
       ``(iii) the amount and range of any regulated contaminant 
     detected in the water during the reporting year, the maximum 
     contaminant level goal for the contaminant, if any, and 
     whether the goal was exceeded during the reporting year; and

[[Page 6253]]

       ``(iv) the amount and range of any unregulated contaminant 
     detected in the water during the reporting year that is 
     subject to unregulated contaminant monitoring or notification 
     requirements under sections 1445 or 1414, respectively, of 
     the Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. 300j-4; 300g-3), or 
     that the Secretary determines may present a threat to public 
     health; and
       ``(B) for the second and each subsequent reporting year, 
     display on the labels of the bottled water--
       ``(i) if the maximum contaminant level goal or lowest 
     health advisory level under the Safe Drinking Water Act 
     (whichever is lower) for a regulated contaminant is exceeded 
     during the preceding reporting year--
       ``(I) the amount and range of the regulated contaminant in 
     the bottled water;
       ``(II) the maximum contaminant level goal for the 
     contaminant; and
       ``(III) a plain definition of `maximum contaminant level 
     goal' as determined by the Administrator;
       ``(ii) the amount and range of any unregulated contaminant 
     detected in the water during the preceding reporting year 
     that is subject to unregulated contaminant monitoring or 
     notification requirements under sections 1445 or 1414, 
     respectively, of the Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. 300j-
     4; 300g-3) or that the Secretary has determined may present a 
     threat to public health;
       ``(iii) the source of the water;
       ``(iv) the type of treatment, if any, to which the water 
     has been subjected and whether such treatment meets the 
     Secretary's criteria for full protection of immuno-
     compromised individuals for cryptosporidium and other 
     mircobial pathogens;
       ``(v) the address for the Internet website described in 
     paragraph (3)(A); and
       ``(vi) the toll-free telephone number described in 
     paragraph (3)(B).
       ``(3) Not later than 6 months after the date on which an 
     annual report referred to in paragraph (2) is submitted to 
     the Secretary, the Secretary shall make the report available 
     to the public--
       ``(A) on an Internet website maintained by the Secretary; 
     and
       ``(B) in paper form, in English, Spanish, and in any other 
     language determined to be appropriate by the Secretary, upon 
     request made through use of a toll-free telephone number 
     maintained by the Secretary.
       ``(4) In addition to submitting an annual report under 
     paragraph (2), the manufacturer may also submit a supplement 
     to the Secretary that contains additional information that 
     the manufacturer determines to be appropriate for public 
     education. The Secretary may make the supplement available to 
     the public in the same manner as the annual report is made 
     available to the public under paragraph (3).
       ``(5) In the same manner as the annual report is made 
     available to the public under paragraph (3), the Secretary 
     shall make the following information available to the public:
       ``(A) The definitions of the terms `maximum contaminant 
     level goal' and `maximum contaminant level'.
       ``(B) For any regulated contaminant described in paragraph 
     (2)(A), a statement setting forth--
       ``(i) the maximum contaminant level goal;
       ``(ii) the maximum contaminant level; and
       ``(iii) if a violation of the maximum contaminant level has 
     occurred during the reporting year, the potential health 
     concerns associated with such a violation.
       ``(C) For any unregulated contaminant described in 
     paragraph (2)(A), a statement describing the health advisory 
     or explaining the reasons for determination by the Secretary 
     that the contaminant may present a threat to public health.
       ``(D) A statement explaining that the presence of 
     contaminants in bottled drinking water does not necessarily 
     create a health risk.
       ``(E) The date of the last Federal and State inspections of 
     the bottled water facilities relating to the safety of the 
     water.
       ``(F) A statement describing any violations discovered at 
     the facilities during the inspections described in 
     subparagraph (E) and any enforcement actions that were taken 
     as a consequence of the violations.
       ``(G) The date of recall of any bottled water and the 
     reasons for the recall.
       ``(d) Every manufacturer of bottled water who is subject to 
     any requirement of this section shall maintain such records, 
     make such reports, conduct such monitoring, and provide such 
     information as the Secretary may reasonably require by 
     regulation in order to assist the Secretary in establishing 
     regulations under this section, in determining whether the 
     manufacturer has acted or is acting in compliance with this 
     section, in evaluating the health risks of unregulated 
     contaminants, or in advising the public of such risks.
       ``(e) Not later than 12 months after the date of enactment 
     of this subsection, and annually thereafter, the Secretary 
     shall make available to the public, in the same manner as the 
     annual report is made available under subsection (c)(3), 
     information regarding violations of bottled water regulations 
     relating to inspections, and any enforcement actions taken in 
     regards to such violations. The Secretary shall establish and 
     administer a grant program to fund the gathering of such 
     information.
       ``(f) In this section:
       ``(1) The term `bottled water' means all water sold in the 
     United States that--
       ``(A) is intended for human consumption;
       ``(B) is sealed in bottles or other containers; and
       ``(C) may be still or carbonated, but has no sweeteners or 
     juices added to the water, except for trace levels of 
     flavorings.
       ``(2) The term `contaminant' means any physical, chemical, 
     biological, or radiological substance or matter in water.
       ``(3) The term `maximum contaminant level' has the meaning 
     given the term in section 1401 of the Safe Drinking Water Act 
     (42 U.S.C. 300f).
       ``(4) The term `maximum contaminant level goal' means a 
     goal established by the Administrator under section 1412 of 
     the Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. 300g-1).
       ``(5) The term `regulated contaminant' means a contaminant 
     that is regulated under section 1412 of the Safe Drinking 
     Water Act (42 U.S.C. 300g-1).
       ``(6) The term `unregulated contaminant' means a 
     contaminant that is not regulated under section 1412 of the 
     Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. 300g-1).''.

     SEC. 3. PROHIBITED ACTS.

       Section 301 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 
     U.S.C. 331) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(aa) The failure by a manufacturer of bottled water to 
     submit an annual report or display the required information 
     on labels of bottled water in accordance with section 
     410(c).''.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. SHELBY (for himself and Mr. Sessions):
  S.J. Res. 18. A joint resolution honoring World War II crewmembers of 
the USS Alabama on the occasion of the 1999 annual reunion of the USS 
Alabama Crewmen's Association; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.


     Joint Resolution for the Sailors of the Battleship USS Alabama

  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today to honor a number of American 
heroes. During World War Two, over 6,300 sailors and Marines were 
members of the crew of the Battleship USS Alabama. The ship and crew 
were instrumental in the defeat of both Germany and Japan. The crew was 
credited with the downing of 22 enemy aircraft and was awarded numerous 
citations and medals including the European-African-Middle Eastern 
Medal and the Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal with nine battle stars.
  This week, the USS Alabama Crewman's Association is holding its 
annual reunion at Battleship Memorial Park in Mobile, Alabama. I ask 
the Senate to pass this Joint Resolution which commends and recognizes 
the gallant crewmen of the USS Alabama. To those men I say 
congratulations and thank you for a job well done.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the joint 
resolution be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the joint resolution was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                              S.J. Res. 18

       Whereas the members of the crew of the battleship U.S.S. 
     Alabama (BB-60) during World War II were a courageous group 
     who braved both Arctic chill and Pacific heat to help defend 
     our great country against enemy oppression;
       Whereas the U.S.S. Alabama crewed by those men was awarded 
     nine battle stars and shot down 22 enemy aircraft; and
       Whereas the U.S.S. Alabama Crewmen's Association is holding 
     its annual reunion on April 15 to 18, 1999: Now, therefore, 
     be it
       Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. COMMENDATION AND RECOGNITION OF CREWMEN OF THE 
                   U.S.S. ALABAMA.

       The United States honors the 6,300 persons who were members 
     of the U.S.S. Alabama's crew during World War II, commends 
     and thanks them for their sacrifice and service in the 
     defense of the United States, and recognizes those among them 
     who are assembling April 15 to 18, 1999, as the U.S.S. 
     Alabama Crewmen's Association on the occasion of the 
     association's 1999 annual reunion.

                          ____________________