[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 5]
[House]
[Pages 6188-6189]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                     REGARDING THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). Without objection, the 
previous order for 5 minutes is vacated and the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Sherman) is recognized for not beyond midnight.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, like the gentleman before me who stood 
before this House, the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania, I 
rise to address this House regarding the crisis in Kosovo, and my 
speech will echo some of the themes that he addressed, particularly at 
the end of his presentation.
  Mr. Speaker, our actions in Kosovo are motivated by the highest level 
of idealism. We are willing to spend our treasure and, much more 
importantly, risk the lives of our men and women, to prevent atrocities 
and to assure that the Albanian Kosovars will be able to live in peace 
and with autonomy.
  In some foreign capitals, they simply cannot believe this level of 
idealism. They are scurrying to find some ulterior motive. But those 
who understand America know that we are in Kosovo motivated by that 
idealism and certainly not motivated out of a desire to have some 
interest in some mineral resources less valuable than a single B-2 
bomber. We who understand America and understand American idealism, 
know that that idealism will be expressed through our government.
  Yet even in such a great idealistic undertaking, we must establish a 
realistic strategy. We must make sure that our idealistic motivations 
do not cloud our judgment. And here, Mr. Speaker, I would like to 
contrast realism with blinding idealism.
  In a more ideal world, Kosovo would be the only place of tragedy and 
atrocity. But realistically we should note that the government of Sudan 
has killed 2 million of its African citizens, and that killing 
continues tonight; that 800,000 Tutsis were killed in Rwanda; and there 
are continuing mass murders on an enormous scale in the Congo, Myanmar 
and elsewhere.
  In an ideal world, we could hope to easily restore Kosovo as a 
multiethnic, semiautonomous region. Realistically it is unlikely that 
Albanians and Serbs will live in harmony in the absence of an outside 
force. And it is just as unlikely that the Kosovars will renounce their 
goal of independence.
  A blind idealist might see the world as pure good versus pure evil. 
Yet the Serbs, who we vilify today, were just a few years ago 
themselves victims of ethnic cleansing. Some 180,000 Serbs who had 
lived for centuries in Croatia were expelled from that country--while 
America said nothing, and did nothing. And the Kosovar Albanians, who 
are pictured today as the embodiment of all ideal virtue--we must 
remember that they are tragic victims of present circumstance--but they 
are represented in large part by the KLA, the Kosovo Liberation Army, 
an organization that the United States Government has described as 
terrorist, an organization that may have alliances with Iran, with 
Osama Bin Laden, and even with drug dealers.
  Blind idealism would cause us to demand the maximum possible 
objective and believe that we could achieve that objective with the 
minimum force. Yet realism requires us to adopt perhaps more limited 
objectives consistent with the future safety of the Albanian Kosovars. 
And realism demands that we marshal the substantial force which may be 
necessary to achieve any realistic objective.
  Mr. Speaker, I believe that we should take three steps.
  The first echoes the comments of the gentleman from Pennsylvania. I 
believe that we should involve Russia in the diplomatic efforts to the 
maximum possible degree. Russia may be able to pull the Serbs to a 
negotiating position that is more realistic, and more just, than the 
position that Milosevic insists upon taking at the present time.
  Russian involvement in both diplomacy and in peacekeeping offers a 
face-saving method for Milosevic to make major concessions.
  Now, I know that there are those who will stand before this House and 
who will say we should not be negotiating with Milosevic, we should be 
seeking to dispose of him. But I would point out that we are still 
waiting for someone to dispose of Saddam Hussein. And in a realistic 
world, we must try to bring an end to the mass murder as quickly as 
possible.
  Involving Russia is important beyond the events at hand. Ten years 
from now, Kosovo may be nearly forgotten if we are successful in 
bringing peace today, but Russia will continue to be a critical 
nuclear-armed state, and treating Russia with respect now will be 
important in our relationship with Russia in the future. And we should 
remember that 85 years ago, Russia mobilized its army in support of 
Serbia in events that led immediately to World War I.
  Tomorrow, Secretary Albright will meet with Igor Ivanov, the Foreign 
Minister of Russia. That meeting will take place in Oslo. Hopefully 
this is the first step toward the maximum possible involvement of 
Russia in bringing peace to Kosovo.
  Second, we should signal now that we are willing to reach peace on 
the basis that the Rambouillet agreement would apply to roughly 80 
percent of Kosovo territory rather than all of Kosovo.
  No one denies that the Serbs have rights in Kosovo. They represented 
over 10 percent of the Kosovo population even today. When I say 
``today,'' I mean before the tragic recent events. Kosovo has been part 
of Serbia for centuries, and Kosovo is the religious and cultural 
birthplace of the Serbian nation. In fact, the Rambouillet agreement 
itself seeks to recognize Serb rights by stating that Kosovo would 
remain part of Serbia.
  By leaving Serbs in control of the historically and religiously 
significant sites, including the original seat of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church, the most important of the monastery lands, and the battlefield 
of Kosovo Polje, on which the Serbs fought the Turks in the 14th 
century, we can make an offer that the Serbs can accept. Or, rather, 
Russia can make an offer that both sides can accept. In contrast, no 
Serb government, even one without Milosevic, even after 20 days of 
bombing, could accept the current Rambouillet agreement which the 
Serbs, and many other observers, believe would end all Serbian rights 
in all of Kosovo.
  Certainly the Kosovar Albanians who represent roughly 85 percent of 
the population before the recent tragedy could live far better in 
roughly 80 percent of Kosovo's territory, protected by NATO troops as 
compared to asking those same people to live in refugee camps.
  Third, we should begin training an army of Kosovar Albanians. This 
army should be independent of the KLA, and for now U.S. troops should 
control custody of the weapons while the training proceeds.
  Milosevic may not believe that bombing will compel his departure from 
Kosovo, and he may not believe that NATO troops are willing to risk 
casualties in ground combat. But if there is an Albanian army being 
trained, then even Milosevic will know that there will be a ground 
force willing to absorb combat casualties which could be deployed in a 
matter of months.

                              {time}  2310

  This will hopefully impel him to negotiate now.
  The administration asserts that bombing alone will bring Milosevic to 
his knees. If this is true, then we can cease the training operation 
and retain custody of the weapons without affecting the long term 
future of the Balkans.
  There are those who insist that we try to achieve the maximum 
objective, Rambouillet applied to all of Kosovo with the minimum 
involvement of the Kosovars themselves. They advise deploying NATO 
troops while not even

[[Page 6189]]

training the Kosovars. This approach is not only dangerous for our 
service men and women, it is also dangerous for our foreign policy. If 
we deploy NATO troops into hostilities, and if casualties rise to the 
point where the American public, or the German public, or the French 
public, or the British public demand the withdrawal of their Nation's 
soldiers, then the NATO alliance will be broken and Milosevic may 
prevail. If that occurs, then every tyrant and mass murderer in the 
world will feel that he can act with impunity. The Vietnam syndrome and 
the Somalia syndrome will return.
  Mr. Speaker, we need the option, sometime in the near future, of 
being able to deploy a well-trained, well-armed force of Albanians--a 
force willing to take casualties because they are fighting for their 
own homes. Hopefully, by negotiating from strength we can achieve an 
agreement that will eliminate the need to deploy any combatant ground 
troops, NATO or Kosovar.
  In conclusion, the American people have shown a willingness to commit 
their treasure, and more importantly the lives of their sons and 
daughters, to preventing atrocities and ameliorating tragedies. If we 
realistically define our objectives and if we prepare to use all of the 
tools at our disposal, we will secure a reasonable life for the 
Kosovars, and we will inspire the American people to support limited, 
realistic efforts to stopping atrocities in Sudan, Myanmar, the Congo 
and elsewhere. If instead we devote inadequate resources to an effort 
to achieve an absolute idealistic objective, we may fail, and that 
would be a tragedy for those service men and women who die in such an 
effort. It will be a tragedy for the Kosovars, and it would be a 
tragedy for the victims of atrocities around the world.

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