[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 4]
[Senate]
[Pages 5176-5186]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                          THE KOSOVO QUAGMIRE

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, it seems we are about to go to war with 
Yugoslavia. Our stated purpose is to stop the humanitarian disaster 
there caused by a civil war. If we do not act, we are

[[Page 5177]]

told, innocent people will be killed, will be wounded, will be 
displaced from their homes. Indeed, over 2,000 have already been killed 
in the Kosovo civil war in just the last year. Many more have been 
uprooted. There are serious problems there. No one disputes that.
  My question is, Where is the vital U.S. national interest?
  The National Defense Council Foundation recently reported that there 
are at least 60 conflicts going on in the world involving humanitarian 
suffering of one kind or another. There are 30 wars being waged--civil 
wars, guerrilla wars, major terrorist campaigns. Many are driven by 
ethnic quarrels and religious disputes which have raged for decades, if 
not for centuries.
  Just consider a partial list from recent years: 800,000 to 1 million 
people have been brutally murdered in Rwanda alone; tens of thousands 
killed in civil wars in Sudan, Algeria and Angola; thousands killed in 
civil war in Ethiopia; in January, 140 civilians killed by paramilitary 
squads in Colombia; including 27 worshipers slain during a village 
church service.
  Why is there no outcry for these millions of people who are being 
brutally murdered in other places in the world, but we are all 
concerned about the humanitarian problems in Kosovo?
  I have to say this, and I know it is very unpopular to say it, but I 
am going to quote a guy whose name is Roger Wilkins. He is a professor 
of history and American culture at George Mason University:

       I think it is pretty clear. U.S. foreign policy is geared 
     to the European-American sensibility which takes the lives of 
     white people much more seriously than the lives of people who 
     aren't white.

  Let me read a couple paragraphs from an article in the Minneapolis-
St. Paul Star Tribune on January 31, 1999:

       But no one mobilized on behalf of perhaps 500 people who 
     were shot, hacked and burned to death in a village in eastern 
     Congo, in central Africa, around the same time. No outrage 
     was expressed on behalf of many other innocents who had the 
     misfortune to be slain just off the world's stage over the 
     past few weeks.
       Why do 45 white Europeans rate an all-out response while 
     several hundred black Africans are barely worth notice?

  And this is all in that same timeframe.
  Further quoting the Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune:

       While U.S. officials struggled to provide an answer, 
     analysts said the uneven U.S. responses to a spurt of 
     violence in the past month illuminates not just an immoral or 
     perhaps racist foreign policy, but one that fails on 
     pragmatic and strategic grounds as well.

  So now the President wants us to send the U.S. military into Kosovo, 
not to enforce a peace agreement--we do not have a peace agreement, as 
we were told 2 weeks ago--but to inject ourselves into the middle of an 
ongoing civil war, with no clearly defined military objective, no 
assurance of success, no exit strategy and great, great risk to our 
pilots and men and women in uniform.
  We know that the Yugoslav leader, Mr. Milosevic, is a bad guy. No one 
disputes that. But are we absolutely sure that there are some good 
guys, too? Are there any good guys in the fight that stretches back 
over 500 years?
  When I was in Kosovo recently, I was horrified as I was going through 
the main road--Kosovo is only 75 miles wide and 75 miles long, and 
there is one road going all the way through it. I was only able to see 
two dead people at the time. They turned them over and both of them 
were Serbs. They had been executed at pointblank range. And they were 
Serbs, not Kosovars, not Albanians. So the national interest here is 
not at all clear.
  Let me quote Dr. Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State and 
National Security Adviser. In an op-ed piece in the Washington Post on 
February 24, Kissinger said he was opposed to U.S. military involvement 
in Kosovo. He is not unaware of the humanitarian concerns that the 
President and others talk about. Here are just a few of the highlights 
of what he said:

       The proposed deployment in Kosovo does not deal with any 
     threat to American security as traditionally conceived.
       Kosovo is no more a threat to America than Haiti was to 
     Europe.
       If Kosovo, why not East Africa or Central Asia?
       We must take care not to stretch ourselves too thin in the 
     face of far less ambiguous threats in the Middle East and 
     Northeast Asia.
       Each incremental deployment into the Balkans is bound to 
     weaken our ability to deal with Saddam Hussein and North 
     Korea.

  I think this is very, very significant, the last two points.
  First of all, I have asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
I have asked the Chiefs, I have asked the CINCs, the commanders in 
chief, this question: If we have to send troops into Kosovo--keep in 
mind that people may lie to you and say this is going to be an 
airstrike. Anybody who knows anything about military strategy and 
warfare knows you can't do it all from the air. You have to ultimately 
send in ground troops. So we are talking about sending in ground 
troops. That is in a theater where the logistics support for ground 
troops is handled out of the 21st TACOM in Germany. I was over in the 
21st TACOM. Right now, they are at 110 percent capacity just supporting 
Bosnia. They don't have any more capacity. The commander in chief there 
said, if we send ground troops into Iraq or Kosovo, we are going to be 
100 percent dependent upon Guard and Reserve to support those troops. 
And look what has happened to the Guard and Reserve now because of the 
decimation of our military through its budget, finding ourselves only 
half the size we were in 1991.
  Right now, we don't have the capacity. We have to depend on Guard and 
Reserves, and in doing this we don't have the critical MOSs. You can't 
expect doctors in the Guard to be deployed for 270 days and maintain 
their practice, so we now have ourselves faced with a problem, a 
serious problem, and that is we cannot carry out the national military 
strategy, which is to be able to defend America on two regional fronts. 
We don't have the capacity to do it. If we could do it on nearly 
simultaneous fronts within 45 days between each conflict, then we go up 
from low-medium risk to a medium-high risk, which is translated in 
lives of Americans.
  Going into Kosovo for an unlimited duration at who knows what cost, 
who knows the amount of risk, the risk will be higher.
  I chair the readiness subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, Mr. President, and I can tell you right now that we are in 
the same situation we were in in the late 1970s with the hollow force. 
We can't afford to dilute our military strength anymore. And that is 
not even mentioning the immediate risk to our forces that they will 
face in Yugoslavia where the Serbs have sophisticated Russian-made air 
defense and thousands of well-trained and equipped troops motivated to 
fight and die for their country.
  In recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, some 
of our top military leaders were very frank about what they expected 
for any U.S. military operation in Kosovo.
  Air Force Chief of Staff General Ryan said, ``There stands a very 
good chance that we will lose aircraft against Yugoslavian air 
defense.''
  Navy Chief of Staff, Admiral Johnson, said, ``We must be prepared to 
take losses.''
  Marine Commandant, General Krulak, said it will be ``tremendously 
dangerous.''
  And then George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, said 
this is not Bosnia we are talking about, this is Kosovo where they are 
not tired, they are not worn out, and they are ready to fight and kill 
Americans.
  So we are faced with that serious problem, Mr. President. We should 
not under any circumstances go into Kosovo. Our vital security 
interests are not at stake, where we don't have a clear military 
objective or an exit strategy, or where our policy doesn't fit into any 
coherent broader foreign policy vision.
  So let me go back to my opening statement. Since we have no national 
security risks at stake, there must be another reason for our 
involvement. It is not humanitarian because of the following:

[[Page 5178]]

  800,000 to 1 million killed in ethnic strife in Rwanda;
  tens of thousands killed in civil wars in Sudan, Algeria, and Angola;
  thousands killed in civil war in Ethiopia;
  in January, 140 civilians killed by paramilitary squads in Colombia, 
including 27 worshipers slain during a village church service.
  Why is there no outcry for U.S. involvement in these obvious 
humanitarian situations?
  ``I think it's pretty clear,'' said Roger Wilkins, professor of 
history and American culture at George Mason University. ``U.S. foreign 
policy is geared to the European-American sensibility which takes the 
lives of white people much more seriously than the lives of people who 
aren't white.''
  Anyone who supports our sending American troops into Kosovo must be 
aware this will come back and haunt them. Mr. President, I suggest the 
absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Smith of Oregon). The clerk will call the 
roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, for the information of our colleagues, 
the majority leader will soon be coming over to make a unanimous 
consent request concerning the vote on a resolution dealing with 
Kosovo. I have been involved in the negotiations of the resolution. I 
might read it for my colleagues, for the information of my colleagues, 
and then I am going to state my opposition to it. But for the 
information of all of our colleagues, it is our hope and our 
expectation we would have a vote on this resolution in the not too 
distant future, possibly as early as 6 or 6:30 or 7 o'clock. So I 
wanted my colleagues to be aware of that.
  Mr. President, this resolution authorizes the President of the United 
States to conduct military air operations and missile strikes against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia, and Montenegro.
  The resolution reads,

       Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America and Congress assembled, That the 
     President of the United States is authorized to conduct 
     military air operations and missile strikes in cooperation 
     with our NATO allies against the Federal Republic of 
     Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro.

  It is very simple. It is very short. There are not a long list of 
``whereases,'' not a lot of confusion. It says we authorize the 
President of the United States to conduct airstrikes against Serbia.
  I oppose this resolution. I will take a couple of minutes to explain 
my opposition. I understand and I have great respect for many of our 
colleagues who are supportive. I have joined with colleagues who went 
to the White House on Friday and also earlier today to talk to the 
President and hear his side of the issue. He tried to make a very 
strong case for airstrikes and for military intervention. He didn't 
convince me. I respect his opinion. I just happen to disagree with him.
  Time and time again I ask, If we are going to war, why are we going 
to war? Make no mistake, if we conduct airstrikes against Serbia, we 
are going to war. I don't think we should do that lightly.
  I tell my colleagues, the resolution that we are voting on, in my 
opinion, is a very important resolution. It is probably one of the most 
important votes we will conduct, certainly this session of Congress. 
Maybe Members will look back over their Senate career and it may be one 
of the most important votes Members will cast in their Senate career.
  I urge my colleagues to vote no on this resolution. That means I 
think that we are making a mistake by conducting a bombing campaign in 
Serbia. A bombing campaign will also lead to ground campaigns. A lot of 
people have the false assumption that if we have airstrikes, that is 
it. Many times there has been a tendency by this administration--and 
maybe previous administrations as well--that we can do things by air 
and that will do it.
  We had an air campaign, we had military strikes in the air against 
Iraq in December--I believe December 18, 19, and 20. It was a 
significant military operation. Why? Because we wanted to get the arms 
control inspectors back into Iraq. We bombed them like crazy. Guess 
what. We don't have any arms control inspectors in Iraq today, so air 
didn't do it. Saddam Hussein is now able to build weapons of mass 
destruction. The air campaign didn't change his policies one iota.
  What about in Serbia? The whole purpose of this--I will read from 
yesterday's New York Times, an interview with Madeleine Albright, 
Secretary of State,

       Two days after President Clinton warned that the Serbs had 
     gone beyond ``the threshold'' of violence in their southern 
     province, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright said she 
     was sending Mr. Holbrooke to present Mr. Milosevic with a 
     ``stark choice.''
       That choice, she said, was for him to agree to the 
     settlement signed in Paris last week by the ethnic Albanians 
     . . . or face NATO air strikes.

  In other words, if the Serbs don't sign on to the agreement that was 
negotiated in France, they are going to face airstrikes. In other 
words, we are going to be attacking a foreign country because they 
refused to allow an international force to be stationed in their 
country. That is what the Paris agreement is.
  Some of our colleagues say they will vote for airstrikes but they 
won't vote for ground forces. The Secretary of State says we are going 
to bomb them until they agree to sign up to a peace agreement, a peace 
agreement that calls for stationing 28,000 international troops into 
Kosovo.
  I just disagree. I don't think you can bomb a country into submitting 
to a peace agreement. That is more than coercion, and I don't think you 
get real peace by coercing somebody. Maybe cajoling people, maybe a 
little leverage here and there, but to say we will bomb your country 
until you sign a peace agreement is probably very shortsighted and not 
real peace, and to station the 28,000 troops into hostile territory I 
think would be a very serious mistake.
  I have heard the President's arguments. I haven't made the argument 
this is not in our national interest, but I will say there is--I 
started to say a civil war is going on in Kosovo, but it is not even to 
the point of a civil war. There is certainly an armed conflict. There 
is guerrilla warfare going on. There has been sniping going on. There 
have been people killed on both sides. I think that is unfortunate, but 
it has been happening. But this is not the only civil conflict that is 
going on around the world. Yet in this conflict, we will take sides. 
Maybe if you declare it is a civil war going on, a total civil war 
going on in Kosovo--why should we be taking sides? Should we be the air 
force for the KLA, the Kosovo Liberation Army? Should we be trying to 
help them fulfill their goals?
  Their goal is not autonomy; their goal is independence. They were 
somewhat reluctant to sign on to the France so-called peace agreement 
because they didn't want autonomy; they wanted independence. They will 
never be satisfied until they have independence. The French peace 
accords say we will insert this peacekeeping force of 28,000 troops for 
3 years, we will have autonomy at that time, and then we are somewhat 
silent on what happens at the end of 3 years. If anyone has talked to 
the KLA, they know that the KLA wants independence. Should we be 
intervening to the extent of taking that side?
  Some of my colleagues say if Serbia is really massing and having 
military actions against the KLA, instead of us just bombing, why don't 
we just give them some support? Why don't we give them some munitions 
and help them defend themselves? It is similar to the argument many of 
us made in Bosnia: Instead of sending troops, we wanted to take the 
arms embargo off and allow them to defend themselves. Senator Dole 
stood on the floor many times and said let's allow them to defend 
themselves.
  Some people made that same argument today, dealing with the Kosovars. 
The problem is, the peace agreement

[[Page 5179]]

 that has been negotiated says we will disarm the KLA. I think the 
chances of that happening are slim, if nonexistent. They will hide the 
arms. We will not be successful in disarming, nor do I really think 
that we should. We will be very much involved in a civil war. We are 
taking the side of the Kosovars. Many of the Kosovars are great people 
and I love them and some are very peace loving, but there are some 
people on the other side, on the KLA side, who have assassinated and 
murdered as well.
  I have serious, serious reservations about getting involved in a 
civil war. I have very strong reservations about the ability to be able 
to bomb somebody to the peace table and making them agree to a peace 
agreement that they were not a signatory to.
  I am reminded by some of our friends and colleagues that this is a 
continuation of President Bush's policy. As a matter of fact, in 
December of 1992 President Bush--and he was a lame duck President at 
the time--issued a very stern warning to Mr. Milosevic: If he made a 
military move in Kosovo, there would be significant and serious 
consequences. Mr. Milosevic rightfully respected President Bush, and he 
didn't make that move. I supported President Bush in making that 
statement. I think he was right in doing so.
  However, there is a big difference between that statement and saying 
we will move militarily if he moves aggressively against the Kosovars. 
There is a big difference between that and saying we will bomb you 
until you agree to a peace agreement, and part of that peace agreement 
is stationing 28,000 troops in Kosovo. There is a big difference. I 
hope our colleagues will understand that difference. That is one of the 
reasons I am vigorously opposed to this resolution. I don't think you 
can bomb a sovereign nation into submission of a peace agreement.
  Let me mention a couple of other reservations that I have. Somebody 
said, What about the credibility of NATO? NATO, for 50 years, has 
helped sustain peace and stability throughout Europe. It has been a 
great alliance. That is true. NATO has been a great alliance. It has 
been a defensive alliance. NATO has never taken military action against 
a non-NATO member when other NATO countries weren't threatened. Now we 
are breaking new ground and we are moving into areas which I believe 
greatly expand NATO's mission far beyond the defensive alliance that it 
was created under.
  Another reservation I have: The Constitution says that Congress shall 
declare war; it doesn't say the President can initiate war. The 
President started at least consulting Congress on Friday. He also 
consulted with Congress today, Tuesday. We understand that war is 
imminent. I don't consider that consultation. I remember about 4 weeks 
ago when Secretary of State Albright and Secretary of Defense Cohen 
briefed a few of us on the Paris negotiations, or the negotiations in 
France. They basically said: We are trying to get both sides to sign; 
we think maybe the Kosovars will sign, but the Serbs and Mr. Milosevic 
are not inclined to. But if we can get the Kosovars to sign, we will 
bomb the Serbs until they do sign.
  I left there thinking, you have to be kidding. That is their policy? 
I want peace. I want peace as much as President Clinton. I want peace 
as much as Secretary Albright, throughout Yugoslavia, but I don't think 
by initiating bombing we will bring about peace. I am afraid, instead 
of increasing stability, it might increase violence.
  There might be adverse reactions that this administration hasn't 
thought about. Instead of bringing about stability, it may well be that 
the Serbian forces are going to move more aggressively. In the last 24 
hours, it looks like that may be the case. So instead of convincing Mr. 
Milosevic to take the Serbs out of Kosovo, they may be moving in more 
aggressively. It looks as if that is happening now. Instead of 
dissuading him from oppression on the Kosovars, he may be more 
oppressive, more aggressive, and he may run more people away from their 
homes and burn more villages. Instead of bringing stability, it may be 
bringing instability, and it may be forcing, as a result of this 
bombing, Mr. Milosevic--instead of his response being to move back into 
greater Serbia and away from Kosovo, he may be more assertive and 
aggressive and he may want to strike out against the United States. If 
airplanes are flying, he might find that is unsuccessful. I hope he has 
no success against our pilots and our planes, but if he is not 
successful against our planes, what can he be successful against? Maybe 
the KLA, or maybe he would be more aggressive in striking out where he 
can have results on the ground.
  So by initiating the bombing, instead of bringing stability, we may 
be bringing instability. We may be igniting a tinderbox that has been 
very, very explosive for a long time. I hope that doesn't happen, but I 
can easily see how it could happen. I have heard my colleague, Senator 
Inhofe, allude to the fact that former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger alluded to that.
  I will read this one sentence: `` The threatening escalation sketched 
by the President to Macedonia, Greece and Turkey are, in the long run, 
more likely to result from the emergence of a Kosovo State.'' Well, the 
President, in this so-called peace accord, is supporting autonomy for 
Kosovo. I have already stated that the Kosovo Liberation Army doesn't 
want autonomy, they want independence. If they are an independent 
state, many people see that usually aligned with Albania and may be 
including the Albanians in Macedonia. So you have a greater Albania 
which would be very destabilizing, certainly, toward the Greeks and 
maybe other European allies. So the peace accord says we don't want 
independence for Kosovo, we just want autonomy.
  Former Secretary of State Kissinger says maybe that makes it more 
dangerous and maybe violence would be escalated in that process. 
Instead of being a stabilizing factor, it may be an escalating factor. 
That is not just me saying that. That is Henry Kissinger and other 
people I respect a great deal saying that, also.
  I am glad we are going to be voting on this resolution. We are going 
to have this vote--at least that is our expectation. I know the leader 
is going to propound a request before too long. It is important that we 
vote on this. It would be easy for this Senator, or any other Senator, 
to say we are never going to vote on this; we can stop this, and 
frankly, if you stop it long enough, maybe the President will be 
bombing and then you can say, hey, it doesn't make any difference, he 
already started bombing. I think that would be a mistake. We ought to 
have an up-or-down vote. Is this the right thing to do or not?
  So I urge my colleagues to support the leader in his efforts to come 
to an agreement on a vote on this resolution. I, for one--I say ``for 
one'' because even though I am assistant majority leader, I have not 
asked one colleague to vote one way or another on this resolution. Some 
issues are too important to play partisan politics on. I am not playing 
partisan politics. I refuse to do so. These are tough votes.
  I remember the vote we had on the Persian Gulf war in 1991, 
authorizing the use of force. We already had 550,000 troops stationed 
in the Persian Gulf ready to fulfill our obligations as outlined by 
President Bush to remove Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis from Kuwait. We 
had a good debate on the floor. It wasn't easy. It was a close debate 
and a close vote--52-47. I thought it was a good vote the way it turned 
out.
  I am going to vote against this resolution because I think it is a 
mistake. Maybe I am wrong, and if bombing commences, I hope and pray 
that every single pilot will be returned safely, and that there will be 
peace and harmony and stability throughout Kosovo. But I am concerned 
that we are making a mistake. I don't believe you can bomb a country 
into submission and force them into a peace agreement that they 
determine is against their interest. I don't think you can bomb a 
country and say we are going to bomb you until you agree to have 
stationed 28,000 troops in your homeland. And this is Serbian homeland, 
and if you go back centuries, fighting has been going on in this 
country for centuries.

[[Page 5180]]

  One other comment. Somebody said, ``What about the atrocities?'' I am 
concerned about the atrocities, but we have to look at what is in our 
national interest. There were 96 people killed in Borneo last weekend. 
In Turkey, something like 37,000 Kurds have lost their lives. They want 
independence. The Kurds in Iraq want independence; they want their own 
homeland. What about in Sudan where there have been over a million 
lives lost? What about Burundi, where 200,000 lives have been lost. Or 
Rwanda, where 700,000 lives have been lost?
  We have to be very careful. We had a Civil War in this country 130-
some years ago, and 600,000 Americans lost their lives. I am glad we 
didn't have foreign powers intervene in our Civil War. I think that 
would have been a mistake. I am afraid that we are making a mistake by 
intervening in the war now going on in Kosovo. I hope this resolution 
that we are getting ready to vote on is not agreed to. I urge 
colleagues to vote no on the resolution.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. GORTON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington.
  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, the Senate is about to be presented with a 
resolution authorizing the President of the United States to intervene 
in a civil war in the Republic of Yugoslavia--one of many civil wars 
taking place around the world, in which one dominant group is 
repressing, killing, and displacing a minority group within their 
borders.
  Mr. President, the cause of this civil war is Mr. Milosevic, the 
dictator of Serbia and of the Yugoslav Republic. But nowhere in any of 
the administration's stated goals justifying this intervention is 
included the removal of Mr. Milosevic from his position of power. The 
goal is neither a stated nor an unstated goal. Therefore, we are about 
to engage in a civil war in which we do not go after the cause of the 
war.
  Just a few years ago, the last occasion on which we debated 
authorizing the President of the United States to engage the Armed 
Forces of our country far from the borders of the United States, in 
Iraq, after its invasion of Kuwait, we made the determination, and 
after successfully removing the symptom, the invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait, that we would not remove the cause--Saddam Hussein. As a 
consequence of not going after the cause, we have been involved in 
either a cold or a hot war with Iraq ever since, at great cost in money 
to the United States, and at a considerable cost to our support for 
that cause around the world.
  Mr. President, once burned, twice shot. Why, having learned during 
the war and its aftermath with Iraq that if you are going to use your 
Armed Forces, you ought to go after the cause, are we failing to do 
that in this case? Here, as far as I can determine from what I hear 
from the administration, our goals are as follows:
  We hope by the use of our Armed Forces to be permitted to send ground 
troops to Kosovo for a period of a minimum of 3 years to enforce a 
peace that neither side in this civil war wishes. We will be there to 
enforce an autonomy for the Kosovars. That is not their ultimate goal, 
that ultimate goal being independence.
  Is there the slightest chance that this will be a peaceable, 
casualty-free, 3-year occupation, at the end of which, having settled 
all of the problems of the Kosovars, we will come home? That certainly 
has not happened in Bosnia, even after all sides were totally exhausted 
by a civil war.
  Those goals of being allowed to occupy Kosovo and enforce an autonomy 
that neither side wants are not goals justifying or warranting our 
American military involvement. They are not goals involving the vital 
security interests of the United States. In fact, if simply stopping a 
slaughter is a primary goal--and I believe that it is--there are far 
greater slaughters taking place in Sudan, in several countries in 
Africa, and in a number of other places around the world in which there 
has been no request on the part of the administration to intervene. No, 
Mr. President. This is an intervention that is highly unwise, highly 
unlikely to be successful, and not worth the investment of our money 
and lives, if it is successful, with the intermediate goals that the 
administration uses to justify it.
  Mr. President, this Senate Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, this Senate 
first step into getting into a situation, the consequences of which we 
simply cannot envisage, and getting into it perhaps with less 
justification than there was in Vietnam in the midst of a cold war, 
getting into it to involve ourselves in a civil war that for all 
practical purposes has already gone on for 600 years, is not--I repeat, 
not--going to be settled by the United States of America in its 
intervention in a period of 2 or 3 years antiseptically cost free and 
casualty free.
  With my colleague from Oklahoma, I believe it more than appropriate 
that we should be debating this resolution here tonight. I believe it 
more than appropriate that we should vote yes or no on whether or not 
we agree with the President. That President has finally grudgingly sent 
us a letter not asking for our authorization but for our support. This 
is an authorization. It is an authorization that the Senate of the 
United States, in its wisdom, should reject out of hand. This is not a 
matter for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States. This is 
not a matter demanded by our national security. This is not a way that 
we would even settle the civil war taking place in Kosovo today.
  I hope my colleagues will vote with me and will reject this 
resolution of authorization.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I get confused by this because I think the 
analyses, although clearly heartfelt and searching, are totally out of 
proportion. This is Europe, not Asia. This is a place where we fought 
two world wars, where we got involved in the circumstances based upon 
the legitimate concern of the spread of communism. This is part of an 
industrialized world, not where we were in Vietnam. This is not a 
Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which was clearly open ended. This is closed 
ended. This is the circumstance. I find it fascinating--all these bad 
lessons we learned. What is the bad lesson we learned in Bosnia? We 
stopped bloodshed. We have 7,300 troops there. We have had as many as 
365,000 troops in Europe to preserve stability and democracy in Europe 
for the past 54 years. We have 100,000 troops in Europe right now. We 
have 100,000 troops who sit there.
  If, in fact, it is a bad idea, and it is an open-ended commitment to 
keep troops in Bosnia, to keep the peace with not a single American 
life having been lost, without the destabilization of the region, 
without Croatia and Serbia being at war, without a flood of refugees 
into Germany and into the rest of the area--if that is a bad idea--then 
we shouldn't even have anybody in all of Europe. This is about 
stability in Europe.
  The idea of comparing this to Somalia--a life in Somalia is equally 
as valuable as a life in Kosovo. But the loss of a life in Somalia and 
the loss of a life in Kosovo have totally different consequences, in a 
Machiavellian sense, for the United States interests. If there is chaos 
in Europe, we have a problem. We are a European power. If, as a 
consequence of this, there is a flood of refugees into any of the 
surrounding--let's take Albania. Albania has a Greek population that is 
a minority population, where there is already a problem. If radicalized 
Albanian Kosovars are thrown out of Kosovo into Albania radicalizing 
that society--because, by the way, when they burn down your home, when 
they kill your mother, when they kneel your child on the ground and put 
a gun to the back of his head and blow it off, it tends to radicalize 
you. It tends to have that impact. We are talking about 400,000 to 
800,000 refugees. What happens if, in fact, the flood of refugees goes 
rolling into Macedonia, where you have two-thirds of the population 
that is Slav, one-third Albanian? Just play out that

[[Page 5181]]

little scenario for me. What happens in that region?
  I will not take the time of the Senate to go through the litany of 
why this clearly is in our interest. But at least let's agree that this 
isn't anything like Vietnam in terms of our interests--like Africa, or 
like a whole lot of other places. We have an alliance called NATO. All 
19 members of NATO are in agreement that this is necessary. All of 
Europe is united. All of Europe is united in that we have no choice but 
to deal with this genocidal maniac.
  With regard to this notion of a peace agreement that this is 
designed--my friend from the State of Washington, I respectfully 
suggest, misstated the objectives of the administration. The objectives 
of the administration are the objectives of the rest of Europe--all 19 
other nations as well as the contact group, I might add--and the 
objectives are these: To stop the genocide, stop the ethnic cleansing, 
stop the routing, stop the elimination of entire villages in Kosovo, to 
have some guarantee that the civil rights, civil liberties, life and 
liberty of the people living in that region, 2 million people, are 
somewhat secure.
  Why do we do that? Beyond the humanitarian reasons, why we do that 
is, we know what happens if it spins out of kilter. We know what the 
downside is if the entire area is engulfed in this chaos. We also know 
from experience what happened in Bosnia. When we acted, when we put 
ourselves on the line, when we demonstrated that we would not allow it 
to ``happen'' again, it worked.
  My friends say it isn't working in Bosnia, because, if we move 
through, all of a sudden everything will fly apart.
  That was the case in most of Europe for 30 years. If we removed the 
troops in Europe in 1954, or 1958, the concern was all of Germany would 
go. The concern was all of Europe would go. So we held out. We decided 
that democracy tends to bring stability. I, for the life of me, do not 
understand why you can just cut out an entire--I wish I had a map 
here--segment of Europe and say it can be in flames and chaos, and it 
has no impact on us; it will have no impact on the alliance; it will 
have no impact on our national security. That I do not understand.
  I do agree that this is not an easy choice. I do agree that to know 
exactly what to do is debatable, legitimately debatable. But I do not 
agree that the purpose of the administration is, as was stated, to hope 
to be permitted to send ground troops.
  The only reason why the proposal that was put forward by 19 NATO 
nations in Europe was put forward was not because we want to put in 
ground troops. It was because we wanted a commitment that the genocide 
and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo would stop. I remind everybody, by the 
way, in 1989 and 1990 their rights were taken away. Their autonomy was 
stripped. During that first 7-year period, there was a policy of 
nonviolence on the part of the Kosovars led by a doctor named Rugova. 
And what happened was what some of us predicted: By failing to stop any 
of the actions of Milosevic and the ultranationalists in Serbia, one 
thing was bound to happen. Maybe it is because I am Irish I understand 
it. I watched it. We watched it historically for 80 years in Ireland. 
That is, when peaceful means fail and people continue to be cleansed, 
denied their civil rights and their civil liberties, denied the ability 
to work, denied the ability to worship, denied the ability to speak 
their language, they become radicalized. So all of a sudden Rugova 
found himself odd man out, as the KLA gained credibility and momentum, 
basically saying: You are not getting it done for us so we are going to 
use the violent means.
  What do we think is going to happen if we walk away? The objective is 
to stop the oppression of men, women and children who are a minority in 
Serbia, but make up the majority in Kosovo; to say it will stop. The 
only way it will stop is one of two: Either Mr. Milosevic is denied the 
means to continue his oppression, or he comes to the table, agrees to 
stop it, and allows international forces in there to guarantee that he 
will stop it.
  That is what this is about. You may not think that is a worthwhile 
goal. I understand that. I understand that. But this is not about the 
desire to send troops. It is about the desire to keep that part of the 
world from spinning out of control. I see two of my colleagues wish to 
speak so I will cease with the following comment.
  Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator yield to me for just a question?
  Mr. BIDEN. I sure will.
  Mr. STEVENS. I am constrained to go back to the time when we had the 
Persian Gulf crisis and we had Iraq in Kuwait, threatening to go into 
Saudi Arabia. What is the difference between that situation, where it 
actually had taken place, and this threat the Senator is describing in 
Serbia and in Kosovo now?
  Mr. BIDEN. There is a big difference. The difference is it is in the 
center of Europe, No. 1. No. 2, if Europe in fact becomes destabilized, 
we are deeply involved in matters far beyond what is existing now.
  I acknowledge to my friend, though, what was at stake in the Middle 
East was oil, was economic security, and was a lot of other things at 
the time. So it is, in fact, a legitimate point to make that that was a 
critical vote. I voted against that involvement--I am sure the next 
point my friend was going to make. I voted against that involvement. I 
insisted, along with others, there be a resolution to authorize the use 
of force.
  But the argument I would make is, although you can argue it made 
sense to do what we did, it is a different reason why we moved; a 
different reason why it occurred; a different reason why it was 
necessary. It seems to me, comparing what we did in the gulf, comparing 
that to what we do here either for purposes of justifying action here 
or not justifying action here, is an inappropriate analogy. It stands 
on its own. It either made sense or it didn't make sense. It turns out 
it made sense to move in the gulf and I argue it makes sense for us to 
take this action now in the Balkans.
  So, if I can conclude so my friend from Kentucky, who has been 
seeking the floor, can get the floor, Senator Nickles started off a few 
moments ago pointing out that seven of us, assigned by the leadership, 
met to see whether we could work out a compromise resolution. Senator 
Nickles pointed out that the resolution that we agreed to move with, 
assuming the procedural circumstances allowed it to be done, was one 
that was a straight-up authorization for the use of airpower in 
conjunction with NATO against Serbia and Mr. Milosevic. That was the 
language as to how to proceed that was agreed to.
  Senator Nickles indicated he would vote against that, notwithstanding 
the fact that he helped craft what the language would be. And that 
makes sense, by the way. He was trying to figure out what is the best, 
simplest, most straightforward way to get an up-or-down vote on what 
the President wants to do.
  In the meantime, the President has sent us a letter asking for 
legislation to be able to do this. He has asked us whether or not we 
would support the use of airpower in conjunction with NATO. I think we 
should get, at the appropriate point, an up-or-down vote on that. I 
understand my friend from Alaska may have an amendment to that 
resolution, if it ever comes up freestanding, dealing with a 
prohibition of ground troops, but we should get to the business of 
dealing with that which we are getting at now. I hope through the 
leadership of the majority leader we can somehow clear the decks and 
get to a vote on the resolution.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield?
  Mr. BIDEN. I will be happy to yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I worked with the Senator from Delaware 
and others you mentioned. You used the phrase, ``we agreed to it.'' 
Yes, the group of six or seven did, but it was a recommendation to our 
respective leadership.
  Mr. BIDEN. That is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. I have, since that time, worked with Senator Lott and

[[Page 5182]]

we pretty well, I think, have this thing ready to be presented to the 
Senate. As you mentioned, our distinguished colleague from Alaska has 
possibly some thoughts on it that have not been completed yet--that are 
to be incorporated--but I want to be sure nothing has been agreed to. 
It is just a recommendation to the leadership. Our group did, I think, 
a very fine job in consolidating the thoughts of a number of us who 
have been working on this for several days. I am hopeful we can bring 
it up very shortly.
  I know the Senator is looking for one Senator who was a part of that 
group to give his blessing to certain phraseology.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I appreciate the intervention by the 
Senator from Virginia. He is absolutely correct. Let me be even more 
precise. Seven of us agreed on the vehicle that we recommend to the 
leadership that we should be voting on. We agreed to that language. I 
came back with one of my Democratic colleagues, Senator Levin, spoke 
with the minority leader, and indicated that this is what we had agreed 
to. He indicated he thought that was an appropriate vehicle, 
appropriate way to proceed and I might add, some of the Senators in the 
room, although they agreed to the language, I want to make clear, were 
not agreeing to the substance of the language. They agreed that this is 
an appropriate test vote. This is an appropriate vote to determine 
whether or not the Senate agrees or disagrees with the President. 
Several of them--one of them at least--said, ``I will not vote for 
it''; two of them said, ``I will not vote for it but I agree this is 
how we should decide the issue.''
  I understand that the majority leader has to make a judgment as to 
what vehicle we use, when we use it, how we will use it, but I hope we 
can get an up-or-down vote on some direct vote.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator is correct. I think very 
shortly we will have a document to present to the Senate.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator.
  Mr. BUNNING addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BUNNING. I am more than happy to yield.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I would like to have some parameter on 
these discussions so that we might get back to the bill and finish it 
this evening. Could I inquire of the Senator from Kentucky how long he 
intends to speak?
  Mr. BUNNING. Not very long, Mr. President.
  Mr. STEVENS. More than 10 minutes?
  Mr. BUNNING. No.
  Mr. STEVENS. I see Senator Brownback. Does he wish to speak on this 
subject?
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I would like to speak on Kosovo about 7 
minutes.
  Mr. STEVENS. I see that Senator Warner's hand is up.
  Does the Senator intend to speak also?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I intend to address the remarks of my two 
colleagues. I am a cosponsor, with Senator Biden, and I have some very 
definite statements to make.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, with due deference to my friend from 
Virginia, that matter is not pending before the Senate and the 
supplemental is. I wonder if the Senators would agree to some time 
limit so we can tell Members when we will get back to the bill.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we want to accommodate the distinguished 
chairman. It is important that this colloquy ensues. The distinguished 
Senator from Kentucky is in opposition to me. I presume my colleague 
likewise is in opposition to the Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that these 
Senators have 30 minutes to continue this discussion and at that time 
we return to the pending business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Reserving the right to object, Mr. President, could we 
establish a discussion order?
  Mr. STEVENS. He has 10 minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to have the opportunity to, 
on occasion, interject, have a colloquy with both of you, not to exceed 
10 minutes.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. I agree to 10 minutes, as will the Senator from 
Kentucky.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator from Kentucky is recognized.
  Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, this resolution which is about to come 
before the Senate will be something we should have voted on maybe 2 
weeks ago. Unfortunately, we are voting on it under an extreme 
timeframe, and I think that is unfortunate for all of us.
  If there are negotiations that have really gone on, it has been one-
sided. The Serbs have never sat down and really negotiated in good 
faith with anyone. Only because they were asked to show up at the 
table, they showed up for a short time and left immediately. Now the 
debate has shifted and is not about peacekeeping, not about deploying 
peacekeepers anymore; it is about going to war with a foreign 
government. NATO, the United Nations, have never gone to war in a civil 
war situation. That is what we are about to do, and we have been 
consulted to the point of being told exactly what the President intends 
to do, whether or not--whether or not--we agree or disagree.
  In 1991, President Bush came to the House and to the Senate and asked 
for specific resolutions to go to war to defend Kuwait against Iraqi 
invasion. It was a major vote to go to war in the House. It was a very 
narrow vote in the Senate. I think by five votes they voted to support 
President Bush.
  I read on the Internet today what was supposed to be a private 
briefing that we all had at lunch by the Secretary of Defense and by 
the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That private personal briefing 
was totally on the Internet this afternoon.
  Let me tell my colleagues what it said so everybody in the United 
States can understand exactly what is going to happen. There will be 
two different types of airstrikes. There will be a preliminary 
airstrike--and this is on the Internet; all you have to do is look it 
up--two kinds of airstrikes to force Belgrade into accepting NATO 
ground troops.
  The first strike would be a demonstration strike by air- and sea-
launched cruise missiles to soften up Milosevic to know that we are 
really serious about this. Then there would be a pause to give the 
Serbian leadership a chance to realize that we are serious. If the 
Serbs do not comply, there would be a second wave of strikes that would 
be targeted to air defense and missile installations by the same type 
of military hardware. In fact, 55 percent, or a little less, of all of 
the airstrikes done will be 70 percent by U.S. hardware and, if we use 
aircraft, 54 percent of it exactly will be by U.S. aircraft.
  This is in the middle of Europe. This is not at our borders in Mexico 
or Canada.
  Mr. DOMENICI. May we have order, Mr. President?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.
  Mr. BUNNING. The second wave would be to take down the missile 
defenses.
  Let me give you a little background. In 1991, we had a briefing in 
the House of Representatives by Dick Cheney, who was Secretary of 
Defense, and by Colin Powell, who was the head of the Joint Chiefs. 
They both said the same thing: The worst thing we can do is to send 
ground troops into Bosnia and Kosovo or any of that area, because of 
the logistics, because of the terrain, because of the weather. One of 
the things that they also said was that airstrikes would be very 
questionable. The reason they were going to be questionable was that 
the sophistication of the missile defenses and of the air defenses of 
the Serbs was much better than many other places. The terrain is much 
more difficult.
  What we are doing is wrong. What the President asked us to do at the 
11th hour is wrong. We should not be going

[[Page 5183]]

into an independent nation's civil war and imposing our will, no matter 
what the situation is.
  Now, the Senator from Oklahoma brought up many other places we could 
be intervening that we could save more lives--many places in Africa. If 
we expend the same amount of dollars like we are going to expend in 
Kosovo, we could save many more lives. This attack is premeditated and 
the Congress is an afterthought. They want us to agree to it after they 
have already decided to go.
  This is a great institution, the Senate. I have come to love it in a 
very short time. These debates should be before the fact, not after the 
administration has already made up their mind to bomb. The same is true 
about sending ground troops.
  I want to ask President Clinton these questions: What vital American 
security interests are at stake? What is the long-term strategy for the 
region? Not only do we bomb one wave and a second wave, and a third 
request is to send in 4,000 additional men and women from the United 
States in ground troops. What is the long-term strategy for the region? 
How do we get in and how do we get out? How long will the troops be 
deployed? What is their mission?
  What is the mission they are supposed to accomplish?
  Will we be forced to deploy more ground troops if the 4,000 are not 
sufficient?
  Will foreign commanders be commanding our troops under NATO?
  What are the rules of engagement?
  How will the mission be paid for?
  What valuable dollars will be taken away from military readiness 
accounts to pay for this?
  What is our exit strategy?
  President Clinton, you have not answered these questions. You have 
not come before the Congress of the United States and asked for our 
help. I think it is essential that you do so before you send one 
American into harm's way when you have not proven the need to do it.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wonder if I might use my 5 minutes and 
engage the Senator in a colloquy and then yield the floor.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I have to preside at 6.
  Mr. WARNER. At some point, we have to have some rebuttal to the 
strong arguments on this side. I yield to the Senator.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Virginia very 
much. I am sorry to assert myself at this point, but I have to preside 
shortly.
  Mr. President, I think the Senate and the American people, hopefully, 
heard a number of strong arguments questioning whether or not we should 
start this bombing campaign at this point in time.
  Let me say categorically, I am concerned about the carnage that is 
taking place in Kosovo and in Europe and the number of people who are 
displaced that the newspapers put at 45,000, the number of people who 
have been killed, and the possibility of refugees in the surrounding 
area.
  Let me also say that if our troops are engaged and are starting to 
bomb or are put there, I will support the troops. If they go to battle, 
I will support them. But this action at this point in time seems to me 
to be ill-advised. If the Senate has not been properly consulted, the 
American people have not been properly consulted and brought along, and 
we should back up and rethink what we are about to do in this area. We 
are making an act of war against a sovereign nation, with likely loss 
of U.S. life, and neither the Senate nor this Nation has been 
adequately consulted.
  The Senator from Delaware previously spoke and talked about the 
objective is to stop oppression that is occurring. I am supportive of 
stopping oppression, but if we are looking at oppression, that occurs a 
number of places around the world.
  If we want to stop oppression, I have a better suggestion. Let's 
engage in the Sudan, not with troops, not with bombing, but let's 
support the southern Sudanese. They have 4 million people displaced at 
the present time. Two million have had a loss of life, and there you 
have a government in Khartoum that is supporting terrorism in the 
surrounding region in Uganda, Eritrea, and Congo, that is expanding, 
that is a militant fundamentalist regime that seeks to do us harm. 
There you have a vital strategic United States interest.
  If we want to stop oppression, let's supply and support the southern 
Sudanese. If that is what the objective is, then let's do something 
there where we can help save more lives, help more people, and also a 
vital and strategic U.S. interest.
  I do not see us doing that. The situation taking place in Europe is a 
sad situation, but one where I really question whether we should put 
forth the loss of U.S. lives which is contemplated at this point in 
time.
  Perhaps this can be explained over some period of time. Perhaps the 
administration can engage the American public and the Congress to get 
that kind of support. But I cannot give that at this point in time on 
the basis of the information I have to date.
  Plus, what is the plan? The Senator from Kentucky just asked a number 
of very simple and very basic questions. Here is a Member of the Senate 
asking these sorts of simple and basic questions, saying, ``I don't 
know the answers to these things.'' Nor do I.
  Have we been sufficiently brought along and engaged and had 
discussions on these items that we can have such basic questions and 
not even know the answers to them? We have been told there is going to 
be a bombing campaign, maybe several ways of bombing. What if Mr. 
Milosevic does not blink at that point in time and says, ``OK, we are 
going to support some kind of autonomy in Kosovo''? What then? What is 
the plan at that point in time? Are we engaging ground troops not in a 
peacekeeping but aggressive fashion? I do not think people will support 
that.
  After Kosovo, is it Montenegro next where we will be going in and 
supporting, supplying people who want a separatist movement, if that 
were to happen in that region of the former Yugoslavia? What next? And 
what is the full plan?
  We just do not have the answers to these questions, and we are about 
to take an act against a sovereign nation that is likely to result in 
the loss of U.S. lives.
  Now is the time to debate and discuss and to back up and slow down on 
this, have the administration engage the American public, engage the 
Congress in answering the simple questions that my colleagues have put 
forward. Now is the time to do that.
  I ask the President, please, let's have that sort of discussion on 
those sorts of specifics with the American public before we move in to 
what I think could be a very ill-fated, ill-timed, and inappropriate 
action at this point in time by the United States.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.
  It is my hope to engage, through some questioning, my colleagues. The 
distinguished Senator from Kentucky left. I did not want an impression 
left with the Senate that nothing has been done on the complicated 
issues of Kosovo as related to Bosnia, as related to the region.
  The Armed Services Committee has had a series of hearings, a series 
of briefings. The distinguished chairman of the Appropriations 
Committee knows of an amendment that the bill contained last year by 
Senator Roberts which outlined considerable work in this area. So I 
believe the Senate has addressed this issue off and on for some time.
  The Armed Services Committee last week, when we had all four of the 
Service Chiefs up, we asked each one specifically, regarding the risk 
of this operation, what opposition they were going to meet in terms of 
air defense alone, and they replied it was significant, it was 
multiples of two or three of what had been experienced in Bosnia, which 
is being experienced almost

[[Page 5184]]

every day in Iraq. We have had a considerable deliberation, I think, in 
various areas of the Senate. This is, of course, the first action.
  It is my hope that very shortly, with the concurrence of the two 
leaders, Mr. Lott and Mr. Daschle, we can send to the desk a relatively 
short resolution which will provide Senators with a clear up-or-down 
vote. I will just read a draft. It as yet has not been finally 
approved. It is submitted by Mr. Biden, myself, Mr. Warner, Mr. Levin, 
Mr. Byrd, and Mr. McConnell. Those are the sponsors to date.
  It reads:

       Concurrent resolution--Authorizing the President of the 
     United States to conduct military air operations and missile 
     strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 
     and Montenegro).
       Resolved by the Senate . . .
       That the President of the United States is authorized to 
     conduct military air operations and missile strikes in 
     cooperation with our NATO allies against the Federal Republic 
     of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

  That clarity was achieved by a group of six of us. The distinguished 
majority whip, Mr. Nickles, sort of had the unofficial job of presiding 
over the group. He made it clear from the beginning his opposition to 
this, but, nevertheless, I think we succeeded in devising what the 
Senate desired, and hope will be concurred in, in terms of bringing it 
up for further debate of this resolution.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, are we under some time agreement?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brownback). The time agreements have 
expired.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Thirty minutes has expired?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 30 minutes has expired.
  Mr. DOMENICI. May I have 3 minutes? I ask unanimous consent that I 
have 3 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no time limit now. The Senator can 
speak as he wishes.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Then I will speak to my heart's content.
  Mr. STEVENS. No. No. No.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I say to the Senator, you don't think that should be 
the case? Who knows. My heart's content may be only 3 or 4 minutes on 
this issue.
  Mr. President, I believe under the guise of the Constitution, which 
gives the President, as Commander in Chief, some very, very strong 
powers over what he does, where he places, and what he asks our 
military to do, that we are beginning now, in this President's 
administration, to go down the slippery path that the President can 
engage our military almost anywhere, any time, so long as it pleases 
him and he decides it is in our national interest.
  I say, shame on the President. If this is such an important matter, 
why could he not trust the Senate and the House to ask us whether we 
concur?
  Let me say, Mr. President--not the President who occupies the Chair, 
but our President down on Pennsylvania Avenue--with your last budget, 
we will have spent $12.3 billion in Bosnia--$12.3 billion. There was 
not even enough money in the defense budget. At one point we had to 
declare it an emergency, after 3 years of being involved, to pay for 
it, because to pay for it would have stripped our military of other 
things that they desperately need to be our strong military force.
  What are we up to? We are going to take up the budget on the floor, 
and I predict that if we authorize, or do not authorize the President, 
he is going to do it anyway. And there will be Senators from the other 
side of the aisle who will stand up and want to take money out of the 
Defense Department to spend on domestic programs. But they will vote 
here tonight to send our men and women off to this war and claim they 
will never go in there.
  But let me tell you, this is a very, very unintelligible plan. You 
cannot rationally accept the President's reasoning unless you conclude 
that they do not want to tell you where it is going to end up. It does 
not take a lot of sense to say airstrike No. 1 may not work, airstrike 
No. 2 may not work. We have been told by military experts years ago 
that airstrikes would not work in this area of the world.
  So what then happens? That is the extent of our plan? Who believes 
that? I ask those who believe in the great United States of America, 
with its President leading the way, who sent the bombers in, sent in 
the stealth fighters, sent in the Tomahawk missiles--and the big leader 
who has caused all the trouble is not dead yet and will not quit, what 
are we going to do?
  I asked the question already of the leaders representing the 
President, and they say there is no plan. Wait a minute. No plan? Well, 
NATO may have a plan, but America does not have a plan for the third 
phase, which is probably putting military men and women in harm's way.
  What is NATO without America? They have just described, NATO without 
America in these airstrikes probably could not get the job done. The 
whole of NATO without us probably would not undertake it. So do you 
believe the third phase, which we do not want to talk about, is going 
to get done without America, if there is a third phase?
  And will there be a third phase? I do not know. I have a hunch that 
phase 1, of airstrikes from a distance through Tomahawk missiles, and 
phase 2, with actual airplanes of one sort or another, may not work. I 
would think it would be fair for the President of the United States, 
since we have been at this issue for months--as it got worse they 
threatened and then pulled the threat--to ask the Senate, as George 
Bush did, and get concurrence. And if we did not concur, wouldn't it be 
a pretty good signal that we do not think it is right? What is wrong 
with that?
  As I understand it, there will be an amendment, there will be a 
proposal, freestanding perhaps, asking that we concur with the 
President of the United States in airstrikes. I am not going to vote 
for it, because I do not think that is the end of it.
  I ask one simple question: Is this not a declaration of war without 
asking us, who, under the Constitution, were given authority to declare 
war? Isn't it an invasion of a sovereign country by a military that is 
more than half American? I believe it is. You can make all kinds of 
rationalizations that it is not an invasion, but it is. Is it not a 
civil war? Yes, it is. Is it not a civil war of long lasting? It did 
not start last week.
  These people have been at civil war for God knows how long. And they 
are going to be there after the airstrikes unless there is a large 
contingent of soldiers to keep the peace. Is that what we are going to 
do? Are we going to have soldiers in there under the third phase or the 
fourth phase? What if they just do not agree to a peace treaty after 
all these bombs? Do we walk away? I do not believe we will. From my 
standpoint, we never should have gone in.
  So, Mr. President, I believe the President of the United States, once 
again, has waited so long that he has us right in a spot. He does it 
all the time. He has us in the spot that a terrible tragedy is going to 
occur unless we agree with him in the next 24 hours, or perhaps he even 
thinks unless you have already agreed with me today. But who knows, the 
Tomahawks may be flying tonight. At this point it is dark over there. 
And that is when they will start. Everybody knows that.
  So I say to the President of the United States, since you like us to 
consider your prerogatives under the U.S. Constitution--and we do it 
all the time--why don't you consider ours? Why don't you ask us? And 
why don't you wait until we give you an answer? That seems fair to me. 
What we are doing is not fair to the Congress. And if it isn't fair to 
us, it is not fair to our people.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Would the Senator yield for a moment of colloquy here?
  Mr. DOMENICI. Sure.
  Mr. WARNER. A group of us met this morning with the President. We had 
a very thorough exchange of views. Senator Byrd raised the issue of the 
President asking the Senate. I followed Senator Byrd and repeated the 
question. And he said orally: ``Yes, I do want the support of the 
Senate, indeed, the Congress.'' And he has now sent a letter to the 
leadership of the Congress.

[[Page 5185]]


  Mr. DOMENICI. What does it say?
  Mr. WARNER. I say to the Senator, I will be happy to read it.

       Dear Mr. Leader: I appreciate the opportunity to consult 
     closely with the Congress regarding events in Kosovo.
       The United States' national interests are clear and 
     significant. The ongoing effort by President Milosevic to 
     attack and repress the people of Kosovo could ignite a wider 
     European war with dangerous consequences to the United 
     States. This is a conflict with no natural boundaries. If it 
     continues it will push refugees across borders and draw in 
     neighboring countries.
       NATO has authorized air strikes against the Former 
     Yugoslavia to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and to 
     address the threat to peace and security in the Balkan region 
     and Europe. Mr. Milosevic should not doubt our resolve. 
     Therefore, without regard to our differing views on the 
     Constitution about the use of force, I ask for your 
     legislative support as we address the crisis in Kosovo.
       We all can be proud of our armed forces as they stand ready 
     to answer the call of duty in the Balkans.
       Sincerely,
                                                     Bill Clinton.

  I say to my colleague, what is the consequence if we do nothing, if 
we do nothing, if we stand there? Here we are, the leader of NATO. Here 
we are, the leader of so many agreements throughout Europe that have 
provided for the greater security of Europe in the past, throughout the 
history of NATO.
  What do we say to the men and women of the Armed Forces who will be 
in the airplanes, perhaps as early as tomorrow some time? I am not 
predicting the hour, but it could be. What do we say to them? That the 
people of the United States, through their elected Representatives, are 
not supportive?
  I know the strong arguments against going in. And I respect my 
colleague. But I say to my colleague, it has not been spoken, with 
clarity, as to what the consequences are if we do nothing. I predict it 
would be an absolutely disastrous situation in that region, that it 
could grow in proportion far beyond the crisis of the moment, and that 
at that juncture, if military action were required, it would require 
greater military force than envisioned by the limited airstrike, 
limited in the sense that that component of our arsenal and that of 18 
other nations--this is a 19-nation operation--be required to stamp out 
a literal implosion of that whole Balkan region. I say to my good 
friend, I respect his views, but I think we also have to address what 
happens if we do nothing.
  I recognize we are intruding on the time of the distinguished 
chairman of the Appropriations Committee and others. I know of no more 
significant issue than to send our people into harm's way, which 
requires the debate of the Senate. I shall stand here at every 
opportunity I can to give my views on why I think it is essential that 
we approve the actions as recommended.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I don't believe Senator Warner, with all 
the respect that we hold for him, should stand on the floor of the 
Senate and say that anyone who votes that we should not go in there 
will not be in support of the military people who happen to go in there 
because the President prevailed.
  As a matter of fact, most of the Senators who have supported the 
military of the United States to the highest extent over the years will 
probably be voting against sending them in, but will be right there 
supporting them, and the Senator knows that and they should know that.
  I do my share in my little role as a budgeteer to see that the 
military gets sufficient money, and I will do that again this year. I 
hope you all come down here when people want to take the money away 
from them. Just because I don't like what they are doing doesn't mean I 
don't love the military and the men and women out there doing it. We 
will support them, but we have a right to warn the American people and 
tell them what this is all about.
  If you say, What is going to happen if we don't? I ask you, what 
happened in the other countries of the world that had revolutions where 
hundreds of thousands of people were killed and we didn't go in because 
it wasn't in our national interest?
  I happen to think that is the case here. It is not in our national 
interest.
  Mr. WARNER. If I could reply, nothing in the remarks by the Senator 
from Virginia in this moment or earlier today from this period infer 
that a Senator voting against this proposed resolution in its draft 
form in any way does not support the men and women of the Armed Forces.
  I simply say at this hour when we are trying to debate this, it would 
seem to me that those who can come and support this resolution--it is 
clearly in support of what they are about to do; they are likely to go.
  I am convinced that the President has a resolve with the other 
leaders of NATO to go forth with this military mission. It is important 
that debate here in the Senate take place. Every Senator will vote his 
or her conscience, and I know that there will be 100 votes in support 
of the troops if they are called upon to take on this high risk 
together with their families.
  Mr. REID addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I have been waiting here for an hour. I 
was supposed to get the floor at 6:10.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, that is why I asked permission to get the 
floor. I am happy to yield to the Appropriations chairman. In fact, I 
will direct the question to the chairman of the Appropriations 
Committee.
  I wanted to make an inquiry through the Chair to the manager of this 
bill and the chairman of the Appropriations Committee as to how we are 
coming on the supplemental emergency appropriations bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska is recognized.
  Mr. STEVENS. I think the Senator from New Mexico still has the floor.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I will use only 1 minute.
  Let me say, I had no reluctance to ask the distinguished chairman of 
the Armed Services Committee to read the President's letter. Without 
having seen it, I know it would not contain words saying ``and if you 
do not vote in support I will not send them in.'' It merely said, ``I 
sure would like to have you joining me.''
  President Bush didn't do that. He said, ``Concur or we don't have a 
war.'' There is a big difference.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I yield to my friend for a comment or 
question or whatever he wants, but I want to get back to this bill.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, directing a question through the Chair to 
the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, could the Senator bring 
us up to date as to how we are doing on the underlying legislation; 
namely, the supplemental appropriations bill?
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am delighted to do that. I hope to get 
involved in this statement about Kosovo sometime tonight, and I think 
it will be a late night. Everybody ought to be on notice. I am going to 
try to finish the supplemental bill tonight.
  We have the managers' package coming and it is being brought to me. I 
hope the people are listening right now. I am prepared to outline that. 
We do have an amendment that is pending, the Murkowski amendment. I 
understand the Senator from Montana will make a motion to table that 
and that will require a vote. We also have an amendment that I have 
been requested by the leader to offer concerning the question of rule 
XVI. I understand that may be objected to. We will have to see how to 
handle that when it occurs. I do believe we will have to handle it 
tonight. I have the managers' package of about 10 amendments that have 
been cleared on both sides and are being analyzed from the point of 
view of the budget. It would be my hope we could proceed with that 
matter now.
  Mr. WARNER. Would the Senator allow me to make a unanimous consent 
request?
  Mr. STEVENS. Yes. I am not saying I might not object to it, though.
  Mr. WARNER. I am trying to put a record together for the benefit of 
all Senators. I simply ask unanimous consent to have printed in the 
Record the letter that President Bush sent the Senate in 1991, so each 
Senator can compare them.
  Mr. STEVENS. Reserving the right to object, so long as the Senator 
also

[[Page 5186]]

has printed at the same time for the Record the joint resolution that 
was adopted by a vote of 52-47, following President Bush's letter.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. WARNER. I shall not object because I drew up the resolution, if 
the Senator will look at the first name on it.
  There being no objection, the letter and joint resolution were 
ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

       [Letter dated January 8, 1991 from President George Bush to 
     Hon. Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives, requesting that the House of Representatives 
     and the Senate adopt a resolution stating that Congress 
     supports the use of all necessary means to implement U.N. 
     Security Council Resolution 678]

                                              The White House,

                                      Washington, January 8, 1991.
     Hon. Thomas S. Foley,
     Speaker of the House,
     House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Speaker: The current situation in the Persian 
     Gulf, brought about by Iraq's unprovoked invasion and 
     subsequent brutal occupation of Kuwait, threatens vital U.S. 
     interests. The situation also threatens the peace. It would, 
     however, greatly enhance the chances for peace if Congress 
     were now to go on record supporting the position adopted by 
     the UN Security Council on twelve separate occasions. Such an 
     action would underline that the United States stands with the 
     international community and on the side of law and decency; 
     it also would help dispel any belief that may exist in the 
     minds of Iraq's leaders that the United States lacks the 
     necessary unity to act decisively in response to Iraq's 
     continued aggression against Kuwait.
       Secretary of State Baker is meeting with Iraq's Foreign 
     Minister on January 9. It would have been most constructive 
     if he could have presented the Iraqi government a Resolution 
     passed by both houses of Congress supporting the UN position 
     and in particular Security Council Resolution 678. As you 
     know, I have frequently stated my desire for such a 
     Resolution. Nevertheless, there is still opportunity for 
     Congress to act to strengthen the prospects for peace and 
     safeguard this country's vital interests.
       I therefore request that the House of Representatives and 
     the Senate adopt a Resolution stating that Congress supports 
     the use of all necessary means to implement UN Security 
     Council Resolution 678. Such action would send the clearest 
     possible message to Saddam Hussein that he must withdraw 
     without condition or delay from Kuwait. Anything less would 
     only encourage Iraqi intransigence; anything less would risk 
     detracting from the international coalition arrayed against 
     Iraq's aggression.
       Mr. Speaker, I am determined to do whatever is necessary to 
     protect America's security. I ask Congress to join me in this 
     task. I can think of no better way than for Congress to 
     express its support for the President at this critical time. 
     This truly is the last best chance for peace.
           Sincerely,
     George Bush.
                                  ____


                            Joint Resolution

       Whereas the Government of Iraq without provocation invaded 
     and occupied the territory of Kuwait on August 2, 1990;
       Whereas both the House of Representatives (in H.J. Res. 658 
     of the 101st Congress) and the Senate (in S. Con. Res. 147 of 
     the 101st Congress) have condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait 
     and declared their support for international action to 
     reverse Iraq's aggression;
       Whereas, Iraq's conventional, chemical, biological, and 
     nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and its 
     demonstrated willingness to use weapons of mass destruction 
     pose a grave threat to world peace;
       Whereas the international community has demanded that Iraq 
     withdraw unconditionally and immediately from Kuwait and that 
     Kuwait's independence and legitimate government be restored;
       Whereas the United Nations Security Council repeatedly 
     affirmed the inherent right of individual or collective self-
     defense in response to the armed attack by Iraq against 
     Kuwait in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations 
     Charter;
       Whereas, in the absence of full compliance by Iraq with its 
     resolutions, the United Nations Security Council in 
     Resolution 678 has authorized member states of the United 
     Nations to use all necessary means, after January 15, 1991, 
     to uphold and implement all relevant Security Council 
     resolutions and to restore international peace and security 
     in the area; and
       Whereas Iraq has persisted in its illegal occupation of, 
     and brutal aggression against Kuwait: Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This joint resolution may be cited as the ``Authorization 
     for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution''.

     SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

       (a) Authorization.--The President is authorized, subject to 
     subsection (b), to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to 
     United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in 
     order to achieve implementation of Security Council 
     Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, 
     and 677.
       (b) Requirement for Determination That Use of Military 
     Force Is Necessary.--Before exercising the authority granted 
     in subsection (a), the President shall make available to the 
     Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro 
     tempore of the Senate his determination that--
       (1) the United States has used all appropriate diplomatic 
     and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with 
     the United Nations Security Council resolutions cited in 
     subsection (a); and
       (2) that those efforts have not been and would not be 
     successful in obtaining such compliance.
       (c) War Powers Resolution Requirements.--
       (1) Specific statutory authorization.--Consistent with 
     section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress 
     declares that this section is intended to constitute specific 
     statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of 
     the War Powers Resolution.
       (2) Applicability of other requirements.--nothing in this 
     resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers 
     Resolution.

     SEC. 3. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

       At least once every 60 days, the President shall submit to 
     the Congress a summary on the status of efforts to obtain 
     compliance by Iraq with the resolutions adopted by the United 
     Nations Security Council in response to Iraq's aggression.
       Approved January 14, 1991.

                          ____________________