[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 4]
[Senate]
[Pages 5147-5158]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




     EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will now resume consideration of S. 
544, which the clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 544) making emergency supplemental 
     appropriations and rescissions for recovery from natural 
     disasters, and foreign assistance, for the fiscal year ending 
     September 30, 1999, and for other purposes.

  The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.
  Pending:

       Hutchison amendment No. 81, to set forth restrictions on 
     deployment of the United States Armed Forces in Kosovo.
       Lott amendment No. 124 (to amendment No. 81), to prohibit 
     the use of funds for military operations in the Federal 
     Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) unless 
     Congress enacts specific authorization in law for the conduct 
     of those operations.


                           Amendment No. 124

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time until 12:30 p.m. shall be equally 
divided between the two leaders or their designees on the Lott 
amendment No. 124.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska is recognized.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, it appears that we are on the verge of 
sending American warplanes to bomb Serbian installations in and around 
Kosovo in an effort to force Yugoslav President Milosevic to accept the 
terms of a peace agreement that he has, so far, rejected. I stand on 
the floor of the Senate to express my strong opposition to this policy 
and warn the Administration that the United States may be blindly 
heading into a war whose outcome is far from pre-determined.
  Mr. President, I believe the President has failed to articulate a 
rationale to the American people that can justify an act of war by NATO 
against Serbia. Nor do I believe that the Administration has 
demonstrated what vital interest justifies armed intervention.
  When the President originally announced his plan to send 4,000 
American soldiers to Kosovo as part of a larger NATO force, it was 
premised on the idea that the troops would be deployed, as in Bosnia, 
as a peacekeeping force. I had serious concerns about this commitment 
because it was not clear to me whether American troops would be 
stationed in Kosovo for a month, for a year, or for a decade. Nor did I 
believe that it was in our national interest to participate in this 
operation because I do not believe there is any vital interest of the 
United States that is at stake in this civil war. And I emphasize 
``civil war.''
  Mr. President, the peacekeeping commitment was made several weeks 
ago. In the intervening period, one thing has happened. There is no 
peace to keep.
  Although the rebels in Kosovo have agreed to the terms of a peace 
agreement, the Yugoslavian government has rejected the terms of the 
agreement in part because it rejects the idea of having NATO troops 
police its sovereign territory in Kosovo.
  Having failed to negotiate a peace agreement, the Administration has 
now changed its strategy. We are fueling up our warplanes, targeting 
our cruise missiles, and planning to launch air strikes against the 
Serbs in an effort to force Milosevic to accept the peace agreement. 
Never mind that the peace agreement he is being asked, or forced, to 
accept--could allow for the independent future of a province within his 
country.
  Yes, Mr. President, this is an intervention by the United States in a 
civil war where rebels in one province seek independence. And by 
choosing to bomb the Serbians, we have directly taken the side of the 
Kosovo rebels.
  Make no mistake, our air strikes against Serbian forces are strongly 
supported by the Kosovo rebels who have been fighting for independence. 
And by backing the rebels, the bombing will encourage the independence 
movement with the prospect that the borders of Kosovo and Albania 
ultimately will be redrawn along ethnic lines. Is that what our goal 
is? To break up a country?
  Mr. President, American airstrikes are not going to be a cakewalk by 
any means. We have already been advised of this by our military.

[[Page 5148]]

  The terrain in this area is heavily fortified with anti-aircraft 
emplacements. What will happen if American airmen are shot down by 
surface to air missiles? What happens if our bombing campaign does not 
force Milosevic to change his posture, just as our near-daily air 
strikes have done nothing to Saddam Hussein.
  Are we willing to send in ground combat troops to convince Milosevic 
to accept the terms of the peace agreement? How many? 50,000? 100,000? 
200,000? If we are unwilling to commit ground troops to force the terms 
of this so-called peace agreement, then I believe we should not commit 
a single American pilot.
  Mr. President, I am sympathetic to the people in Kosovo who have been 
brutalized by Milosovic, just as my sympathy has run deep for the 
people throughout Yugoslavia who have known nothing but war for over a 
generation. But is our opposition to Milosevic reason enough to 
sacrifice American lives to an undefined cause? Milosovic is a 
terrorist; he is a killer. We should bring him to justice for crimes 
against humanity; but we should not engage in a war which will cost 
American lives and continue indefinitely.
  Finally, Mr. President, I would simply remind my colleagues that from 
the outset I have been concerned that American involvement in Kosovo 
would become another Bosnia. I take it back. Knowing what I know now 
about the region, about the opposition, I am concerned that it will not 
be like Bosnia--and that many American lives will be lost in the 
process of enforcing an undefined objective.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I am pleased to yield to my 
friend from Idaho.
  Mr. CRAIG addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho is recognized.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, are we in morning business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is considering S. 544, and the Lott 
amendment, No. 124, is under consideration at this point in time.
  Mr. CRAIG. Is also the Smith-Craig amendment to the Lott amendment in 
order, or is the appropriate order at this time the Lott-Hutchison 
amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair is under the impression that the 
Senator's language is incorporated into the Lott amendment, and, 
therefore, it would be prudent to debate that language at this time.
  Mr. CRAIG. Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. President, I am here to join my colleague from Alaska and others 
who have spoken with great concern about the situation in Kosovo, and 
as it transpires, some of our feelings and concerns about what this 
country might do, and most importantly, what this country should not 
do.
  The Presiding Officer and I, on a weekly basis, engage ourselves in a 
telephone/radio conversation with a news program in Boise, ID. I was 
involved in that program yesterday morning, speaking about the 
atrocities in Kosovo, when I used the expression ``human hatred.'' This 
is not a difference in policy. This is not even a difference between 
Serbia and Kosovo in territory. This is a difference spelled out by 300 
years of hatred, hatred that had boiled up out of differences of 
religious beliefs, and it is a hatred that has prevailed in the region 
so long and had cost so many lives that it is almost incalculable. 
Certainly in this American's mind it is. I have never known hatred of 
that kind.
  After that radio conversation was over, the emcee of that program 
asked if I would stay on the line and we visited privately. He 
reflected to me about how he and his wife had in their home an exchange 
student from Serbia. He said, ``You know, Senator Craig, you were 
absolutely right to use the term `hate.' '' He said, ``When we broached 
this subject with this young exchange student,'' I believe a junior in 
high school, he said, ``we were astounded by the hatred that rolled up 
out of this young man. Because he believed that the only solution to 
the problem in Kosovo was to kill the Kosovars or to simply run them 
out of the country, and that if his forefathers had done that, they 
would have a peaceful nation today, and the only solution for peace in 
greater Serbia was just that.''
  That is exactly what Milosevic is doing as we speak. The term, for 
diplomatic reasons, is ``ethnic cleansing.'' It is quite simple, what 
it is. It is: Either get out of my way or I'll kill you; or get out of 
my country or I'll kill you, even though the country you are being 
asked to leave has been your country for 4, 5, 6, 10--20 generations 
before you.
  I think the current Presiding Officer and I would be hard put if 
somebody said: Idaho is not your home and you have to leave or we will 
kill you. That is what we are caught up in, those kinds of human 
dynamics. I must tell you, as an American I am drawn to the 
humanitarian arguments. It makes it very simple if you are drawn 
totally to those arguments to justify putting our men and women in 
uniform at risk.
  But I am not totally drawn to those arguments because, if I am, then 
what the President is proposing to do at this moment might be 
justifiable if he would follow certain procedures. It is those 
procedures I think we must talk this morning. It is those procedures 
the Senate will vote on, or about, within a few hours. We are talking 
about U.S. military activity over and on the soil of Serbia, an 
independent, autonomous nation. That nation is at war at this moment. 
It is a civil strife over the province of Kosovo, which would be like 
the State of Idaho within the United States of America. We would not 
call that a world interest, if Idahoans were fighting the rest of the 
United States for Idaho's independence. I think the country would react 
violently if Great Britain or NATO or Russia, for that matter, sided 
with Idahoans against the United States if we were attempting to break 
loose from the United States of America.
  Is that a reasonable parallel? Yes, I think it is, because that is 
the character of the political profile and the international structure 
in which we are about to engage ourselves. Kosovo is a place that most 
Americans could not find on a map, a place in which there is no direct 
American interest. I have defined its structure from a legal point of 
view, international point of view--a state sovereignty point of view. 
President Clinton has made it clear for some months that he will 
intervene there with an open-ended occupation force, perhaps preceded 
by airstrikes. That has been the context of the debate for the last 
good many months. Now we are associating ourselves with NATO as a 
partner of NATO. It appears that airstrikes may be imminent.
  He has made it clear that he does not think he needs congressional 
authorization for such a mission. Why? The treaty relationship; our 
presence in NATO. That is the argument that he makes. I will have to 
tell you, though, I think we should not make the mistake of simply 
arguing that is how you justify a certain approach of the kind that 
this President is taking. The U.S. airstrikes would be an attack on a 
sovereign nation. The administration has, in fact, admitted that. The 
State Department Under Secretary Thomas Pickering confirmed that Kosovo 
is sovereign territory of Serbia, and that attacking the Serbs because 
they will not consent to foreign occupation of a part of their 
territory would be an act of war. Again, hearkening back to the 
relationship: If Idaho were attempting to break away as an independent 
State from the United States, that would be called a civil war within 
the boundaries of the greater United States and this country would look 
with great concern if a foreign nation were attempting to involve 
themselves on the side of Idahoans.
  I have to think this administration's policy is inconsistent with 
constitutional government and the rule of law. Let us not forget the 
Constitution of the United States gives the sole power to declare war 
to the Congress, article I, section 8--not to the President, but to the 
Congress. Nothing in the laws or the Constitution of the United States 
suggests that a determination by the United Nations Security Council or 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a substitute.

[[Page 5149]]

  The proposed mission in Kosovo is contrary to the principle of 
national sovereignty and is a major step toward global authority. Just 
last year we debated the expansion of NATO. I opposed that expansion. I 
opposed it for the simple reason it did not begin to disengage the 
United States from an ever-increasing, larger presence in the European 
Continent. Quite the opposite, it seemed to be expanding our presence. 
Russia, at that time, was quite concerned that they saw an 
international organization growing on their border. Now, they were 
appeased by us saying: Remember, by treaty NATO is a defensive 
organization. Only if the nations of NATO were attacked would NATO 
respond. Yet, today, NATO is proposing a major offensive effort against 
the nation of Serbia, a longstanding friend and once a part of the 
greater Soviet Union. It is not by accident that the armaments that we 
would go up against are largely Russian armaments.
  Now what are we to say to the Russians, ``What we said about NATO 
last year is not true; NATO has become an offensive force, driven by a 
certain set of politics or international attitudes as to how the rest 
of the world ought to look''?
  Can we justify an American national interest because this war might 
spread beyond the boundaries of Serbia? I am not sure we yet can do 
that. I am not sure this President has yet justified that or clearly 
explained to the American people, as he must, the role that the men and 
women of our armed services might play and the role that they would 
play in risking their lives. That is the issue at hand.
  So, what kind of a precedent are we going to set with this action? 
All actions establish precedents, especially if they appear to be 
outside established law or proven law.
  What country are we going to claim the right to attack next, if we 
determine that its behavior within its own boundaries, its own 
territory, is not up to some kind of international test or 
international standard? Should we attack Turkey to protect the Kurds, 
China to protect Tibet or Taiwan, India to protect the Muslims in 
Kashmir? It is reasonable for me to ask those questions on the floor, 
because today the President is contemplating participating in an attack 
on Serbia in behalf of the Kosovars.
  Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and now Kosovo, these missions are profoundly 
damaging to our legitimate defense needs. This is not just a question 
of money or stretching defense dollars too far, although that factor 
will be considered as we debate defense budgets in the near future. 
Worse, it is an insult to the personnel in our Armed Forces who 
volunteer to defend America, not to go off on every globalist, nation-
building adventure that our President appears to be willing to send 
them to. No wonder America's best are frustrated by the ever increasing 
changes in the role of our Armed Forces.
  Putting American troops in a quagmire is something I know a little 
bit about. The Presiding Officer and I grew up in a period of American 
history where Americans were bogged in a quagmire in Southeast Asia, a 
quagmire that we finally simply had to drop our hands and walk away 
from, because we could no longer sustain it politically as a nation and 
we could no longer justify that another 1, 2, or 3 American lives 
should be lost, added to the list of over 60,000 young men and women of 
our age who lost their lives there.
  I am not suggesting that Kosovo is that kind of fight, but I am 
suggesting that any long-term effort in the greater Yugoslavia that 
dramatically increases the role of the American soldier could put us at 
that risk.
  Mr. President, I have asked some profound questions today and, I 
think, reasonable questions as to the role of this country in foreign 
policy and as to the role of the President as the Commander in Chief of 
our country.
  Today we are debating and today we will vote on the right of the 
Congress to express its will to work with the President in shaping 
foreign policy. I understand how the Constitution works. I understand 
that our President is the chief foreign policy officer of our country. 
But when his foreign policy is questioned in the way that it is now 
being questioned, I think he has the responsibility not only to argue 
it clearly before the American people but to be willing to argue it 
here on the floor of the Senate.
  Some of our leadership are at the White House as I speak, and they 
are listening to a President who is trying to convince them not to have 
the vote today here in the Senate. Quite the opposite should be 
happening. The President should be saying, let us debate this issue, 
let us vote this issue, and, more importantly, I will go to the 
American people and sell to them why America ought to be involved in 
Serbia or in Bosnia, that there are American interests there. He, the 
President, should lay them out, define them, clarify them and, 
therefore, justify the potential taking of American life that military 
adventure can always result in.
  That is the responsibility of the Presidency, not to simply negotiate 
with NATO as a treaty organization and then come home to America and 
say: But we have already debated this, we are already involved in this, 
we can't back up now or it would implode NATO. Maybe NATO ought to be 
imploded, if it is becoming an offensive organization. Maybe it ought 
to step back and say: Wait a moment, we are by treaty only defensive. 
We should not become adventurists for the sake of a greater 
international philosophy on how greater Europe ought to be operated.
  Having said all of that, let me close where I began. There are human 
atrocities. They are real, and they are horrible. We should engage 
ourselves in every way possible to help stop that kind of human 
atrocity, but then again, we didn't do that in Africa on many 
occasions, all just within the last 4 or 5 years. I am not sure why 
this is now so important when others were not. Is it because our allies 
have convinced us?
  By the way, if we fly aircraft over Serbia, 58 percent, or a very 
large portion, the majority, of those aircraft will be ours. Is it 
because we are the ones who have the power and our European allies have 
convinced us to use that power in their behalf to stabilize their 
backyard? I am not sure.
  I, like most Americans, am reasonably confused. I, like most 
Americans, have had to study to try to understand where Serbia is, 
where Kosovo is, what the politics of this region are. Those are the 
issues at hand.
  This is not a vote that should be taken lightly. This could be the 
beginning of a very lengthy process, a very costly process, costly in 
human lives, American lives, and certainly in tax dollars.
  Those are the issues at hand, Mr. President. Why should you shy from 
your responsibility as Commander in Chief of going to the American 
people to debate this and causing your people to come here to debate 
this, instead of in a close-door session at the White House, pleading 
with us not to take a vote on this issue?
  Nobody should be embarrassed by an up-or-down vote. Nobody should be 
embarrassed by this kind of debate. It is our responsibility as a 
country. We cannot walk away from it.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that time under the 
quorum call be equally divided.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I note the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.

[[Page 5150]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may consume on 
the pending resolution.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, we have been discussing for several days in 
this Chamber a variety of legislative proposals concerning what we will 
and will not authorize the President of the United States to do with 
respect to the tragic situation that is unfolding, as we speak and 
gather in this Chamber, in Kosovo.
  This is a very important debate. It is more important, in my view, 
however, to remind ourselves at the outset of any discussion of this 
issue of what has happened to the innocent people of Kosovo over the 
last year, in the absence of clear and convincing steps to signal the 
end of international inaction in the face of gross and continuing 
violations of human rights by the Milosevic regime.
  For just a moment I want to focus, if I may, the hearts and minds of 
this country and those in this Chamber on the very desperate situation 
of the people who find themselves trapped in the province of Kosovo.
  Today, ethnic Albanian villages across Kosovo are quite literally in 
flames. Heavy smoke from the homes of innocent civilians fills the 
skies of Srbica, Prekaz, Gornja Klina, and others.
  As we debate these issues, a massive force of 40,000 Serb soldiers 
and paramilitary police are moving slowly, deliberately, and 
methodically from village to village to village, taking lives, burning 
homes, and forcing tens of thousands of innocent civilians to flee 
without food or shelter.
  Can anyone doubt in the face of such continuing atrocities that the 
American people would oppose participation by the United States in NATO 
authorized air strikes. I hope not, and I don't believe so.
  Each day we have delayed has meant the difference between life and 
death and between shelter and homelessness for tens of thousands of 
people. In just the last two days, since the ethnic-Albanians signed 
the peace agreement on Friday, Serb soldiers have forced another twenty 
to twenty-five thousand civilians from their homes, according to United 
Nations officials. Over the past week, the Serbs forced a total of 
40,000 to run for their lives. The totals for the past year are almost 
incomprehensible: at the very least 2,000 are dead and 300,000 to 
400,000 have been forced to leave their homes and seek refuge.
  Mr. President, we were all shocked by the horrific discoveries last 
January, just two weeks apart, in the towns of Racak, where Serbs 
murdered 45 ethnic Albanians and Rogovo where they slaughtered 23 
ethnic Albanians.
  The first of these attacks came on Friday January 15th when, 
according to witnesses, Serbian soldiers and policemen, backed by 
armored personnel carriers, surrounded the village of Racak, rounded up 
the men and drove them up a hillside. On that hillside, the Serbs 
tortured and murdered 45 people, including a young woman and a 12-year-
old boy. Many of the victims were older men, including one who was 70. 
All were dressed in civilian clothes. None were armed.
  When international observers arrived in Racak the following day, the 
sight that awaited them was beyond comprehension--dozens of bodies lay 
where they fell at the bottom of a muddy gulch. Most had been shot at 
close range. Many bore the signs of unspeakable torture. Although the 
Serbs claimed that the victims were rebels, not one wore a uniform nor 
carried a weapon. Those who survived the attack on Racak fled into the 
hills where two infants soon died of the cold.
  While it is sometimes difficult to assign blame for such horrors, 
this killing field, Mr. President, left no doubt as to the killers' 
identities. Western military forces intercepted radio transmissions in 
which Serbian officials acknowledge their culpability and international 
pathologists blamed the Serbs.
  It was hard to believe at the time that Milosevic's genocide could 
become more heinous or more calculated. Yet the past week proved our 
nightmares true.
  It is at times like these, Mr. President, that we are forced to 
reexamine the founding premises of this great Nation. When faced with 
massive and wholesale human rights abuses, we must bow to our 
conscience and to our founding fathers' recognition of the right of all 
people to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and act to 
preserve those rights wherever possible. Kosovo, Mr. President, is just 
such a case. We have the power, the responsibility, and the opportunity 
to act.
  That is not always available to us. We have been told in recent days 
that we did not take similar actions on the Horn of Africa or in other 
places around the world where there were massive human rights abuses. 
That analysis is correct. The difference here is that we have the 
opportunity, we have the ability, and we have the structure with the 
NATO organization to respond to this situation. That opportunity was 
not available in every other place that we have seen similar, or even 
more severe human rights abuses. Here we have the opportunity and the 
chance to do something about it. The issue is whether we in this body 
will signal to the administration, to Mr. Milosevic, to ethnic 
Albanians, and to the rest of the world that we understand the 
difficult choices and we will step up and join with others to try to 
bring an end to the incredible abuse that is occurring at this very 
hour.
  Thousands of refugees have already fled into Macedonia. As history 
has shown, instability in the Balkans can destabilize all of Europe, a 
region highly critical to American interests. I respectfully disagree 
with our colleague from New Hampshire, Mr. Smith, who has offered this 
underlying resolution, when he states in his amendment that our 
national security interests in Kosovo do not rise to a level that 
warrants military operations by the United States and our NATO Allies.
  The challenge to the United States in Kosovo is not merely 
humanitarian. It is also a question of regional peace and stability. 
Finally, it is a test of the relevancy of NATO in the post Cold War 
era. All of these bear directly on the national security of the United 
States.
  We have yet to hear whether the last effort by Ambassador Holbrooke 
to convince the Serbs to relent will bear fruit. Although, in the next 
5 or 6 minutes, we may have the final word on that. His success would, 
of course, be welcomed. If he doesn't, then the time has come to act in 
a manner consistent with that agreed to by NATO members--the United 
States being a full party to that action.
  Following military action, I believe that Yugoslav President 
Milosevic may be prepared to reflect more soberly on the proposed peace 
agreement that remains on the table. That agreement, proposed by the 
United States and our allies and signed by Kosovo's ethnic-Albanians, 
is fair and even handed. It will rid Kosovo of the fear, death and 
destruction of Milosevic's forces while maintaining Yugoslav 
sovereignty over the province.
  As part of the agreement, NATO has pledged to send a sizeable force 
to ensure that its precepts are carried out. Such a force is critically 
important as evidenced by the Serbs unwillingness to abide by the 
cease-fire agreement they signed last fall. While Milosevic pledged to 
withdraw his soldiers from Kosovo's villages and end his campaign of 
ethnic cleansing against the ethnic Albanians who live there, he 
clearly did neither. Milosevic's signature lacks credibility when it 
comes to Kosovo.
  Congress must not constrain the President's ability to respond in the 
face of such atrocities, nor can it allow a pariah such as Milosevic to 
destabilize an entire region. The outrage at Milosevic's ethnic 
cleansing and disregard for international will should be viewed as a 
challenge to our nation as a whole, not simply to a President of 
another party.
  Last year, our former colleague and Majority Leader, Bob Dole, 
traveled to Kosovo and Belgrade to assess the situation. Upon his 
return, he spoke of the atrocities perpetrated against civilians and 
the ``major, systematic attacks on the people and territory of 
Kosovo.''

[[Page 5151]]

We know now that the situation has only deteriorated.
  One year ago, I was proud to join with my colleagues in crafting a 
bipartisan resolution calling on the United States to condemn 
Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Today, I ask my colleagues, on 
both sides of the aisle, to join me once again in seeking to put an end 
to the bloodshed in Kosovo which will only happen when Milosevic 
understands that we truly mean business.
  While we may not be entirely satisfied with all the exit strategies, 
we must send the message that this Nation can speak with one voice when 
we leave our shores to conduct foreign policy and make a difference in 
the lives of the people of Kosovo.
  As I said last October, there is a time for words and a time for 
force.
  We tried words in Dayton and we tried words last October. The cease-
fire monitors tried words for five months and we tried words for weeks 
on end in Rambouillet, France. I am a great believer in negotiation and 
diplomacy, Mr. Milosevic has shown the world that he understands only 
one language. It is time we spoke to him in his native tongue.
  The United States must demonstrate that it will carry forward with 
military action in the face of Serbian defiance. Congress should not 
weaken the projection of American power by suggesting that we do not 
stand behind the President. NATO's plans for air strikes, designed to 
stop the fighting and enforce the proposed peace agreement, have been 
complete for months. The United States has assumed leadership in this 
matter for the sake of the ethnic-Albanians facing Milosevic's 
genocidal plan and for the sake of regional stability.
  If we play partisan politics with an issue as significant as this, we 
should also be prepared to accept that the consequences of our actions 
may be grave and irreversible.
  I urge my colleagues to support the President and vote against the 
Smith amendment, an amendment that seeks to tie the President's hands 
and sends the wrong message to war criminals like Slobodan Milosevic.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum, and I ask unanimous consent that 
the time be allocated to both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the United States is about to begin what 
very well might prove to be our most challenging and perilous military 
action since President Clinton took office. Many of our colleagues have 
come to the floor to express their grave and well-founded concern that 
we are embarking on a very dangerous mission without a clear sense of 
what will be required of us to achieve our objectives of autonomy for 
Kosovo and peace and stability in the Balkans.
  Further, many of us cannot escape the nagging feeling that the United 
States and NATO credibility has been badly squandered by the 
Administration's many previous failures to impress upon Milosevic and 
the war criminals that make up his army that we are prepared to back up 
our rhetoric with action. Our threats of force have apparently lost 
their power to restrain the remorseless and blood-thirsty Serbian 
Government and military from giving full expression to their limitless 
brutality. Consequently, the level of force required to coerce Serbia 
into accepting a peace agreement has become all the greater, so great, 
in fact, that no one is entirely confident that Serbia can be coerced 
by the use of air power alone.
  As the violence of an air campaign increases, so too does the risk to 
our pilots and to innocent people in Kosovo and Serbia. This will not, 
in all probability, be a casualty-free operation for the United States 
and our allies. And we must prepare ourselves and the American people 
for the likelihood that we will witness some heartbreaking moments at 
Dover Air Force Base. I hope I am wrong, but it would be irresponsible 
to pretend that the danger to our pilots in this operation is no 
greater than the danger we have encountered during our periodic cruise 
missile attacks on Iraq.
  The President himself must deliver this message to the American 
people. He has not done so, and that, I agree, is a terrible derogation 
of his responsibilities as Commander in Chief. However, Members of 
Congress cannot evade our own responsibilities to speak plainly to our 
constituents about the great risks involved in this operation, We, too, 
must shoulder a share of the responsibility for the loss of American 
lives in a conflict that most Americans do not believe is relevant to 
our own security. That is why so many Senators are so reluctant to 
support this action and have spoken so passionately against it.
  However, we also have a responsibility to speak plainly about the 
risks to America's security interests we incur by continuing to ignore 
Serbia's challenge to the will of NATO and the values of the civilized 
world. It is those risks that have brought me reluctantly to the floor 
to oppose those of my colleagues who would strip the President of his 
authority to take military action to defend our interests in Europe.
  Two American Presidents have warned Serbia that the United States and 
NATO would not tolerate the violent repression of the movement by 
Kosovars to reclaim their autonomy. We have, time and again, threatened 
the direst consequences should Milosevic and his henchmen undertake the 
wanton slaughter of innocent life in Kosovo as they did in Bosnia.
  President Clinton set two deadlines for Serbia to agree to the fair 
terms of a settlement in Kosovo or else face the direst consequences. I 
have been involved, one way or another, with U.S. national security 
policies for over 40 years. I cannot remember a single instance when an 
American President allowed two ultimatums to be ignored by an inferior 
power without responding as we threatened we would respond.
  The emptiness of our threats is evident in the administration's more 
recent threshold for military action. In his press conference last 
week, President Clinton, acknowledging Serbia's scorched earth campaign 
in Kosovo, stated that the threshold for NATO military action had been 
crossed. Subsequent statements by administration officials, as quoted 
in the Washington Post, conceded that military action was unlikely 
``unless Yugoslav troops committed an atrocity.''
  Atrocities are the signature of the Serbian Army. There has been an 
uninterrupted pattern of atrocities since 1992, alternating with U.S. 
threats of force that were either not carried out or carried out so 
ineffectually that they encouraged greater bloodshed. The one occasion 
when force was applied convincingly, the result was the Dayton Accord.
  We have dug ourselves a deep hole in which the world's only 
superpower can no longer manage a credible threat of force in a 
situation where our interests and our values are clearly threatened. As 
has been pointed out by many Senators, there is a realistic danger of 
this conflict destabilizing southern Europe, and threatening the future 
of NATO. And no one disputes the threat Serbia poses to the most 
fundamental Western motions of human rights. Our interests and values 
converge clearly here. We must not permit the genocide that Milosevic 
has in mind for Kosovo to continue. We must take action.
  But I understand, all too well, the reluctance and outright 
opposition shared by many of my colleagues not only to air strikes but 
to the deployment of American troops in Kosovo as part of a peace 
agreement should we ever coerce Serbia into accepting the terms of that 
agreement.
  Typically, the administration has not convincingly explained to us or 
to the public what is at stake in Kosovo; what we intend to do about 
it; and what we will do if the level of force anticipated fails to 
persuade the Serbs.
  Should the Serbs acquiesce, and United States troops are deployed in 
Kosovo, the administration has not, to

[[Page 5152]]

the best of my knowledge, answered the most fundamental questions about 
that deployment. What is the mission?; how will we know when it is 
accomplished?; what are the rules of engagement for our forces should 
Serbs or any force challenge their authority?
  Thus, Congress and the American people have good reason to fear that 
we are heading toward another permanent garrison of Americans in a 
Balkan country where our mission is confused, and our exit strategy a 
complete mystery.
  It is right and responsible for Congress to demand that the 
administration answer fully these elemental questions. It is right and 
responsible for Congress to debate this matter even at this time when 
we are trying to convince a skeptical adversary that this time we are 
serious about enforcing our will. I believe the administration should 
come to Congress and ask for an authorization of force. I believe that 
they would receive one.
  Surely we are entitled to complete answers to the many questions 
about our eventual deployment of American peacekeepers to Kosovo in 
advance of that deployment.
  But if the President determines that he must use force in the next 
hour, or the next day or within the week, I think it would be 
extraordinarily dangerous for Congress to deny him that authority or to 
constitutionally challenge his prerogatives as Commander in Chief. It 
seems clear to me that Milosevic knows no limits to his inhumanity and 
will keep slaughtering until even the most determined opponent of 
American involvement in this conflict is convinced to drop that 
opposition. But if we once again allow Milosevic to escape unharmed yet 
another American ultimatum, our mission will be made all the more 
difficult and dangerous.
  Moreover, our adversaries around the globe will take heart from our 
inability to act in concert to defend our interests and values, and 
threats to our interests, from North Korea to Iraq, will increase 
accordingly.
  Even the War Powers Resolution, legislation that I have always 
opposed, would allow the President to undertake military action for 
some time before he would be forced to secure Congress' agreement. I 
have long called on leaders from both parties to authorize Members to 
work together to repeal or rewrite this constitutionally suspect 
infringement of both the President's and Congress' authority.
  But that, Mr. President, is a debate for another time. We are at the 
critical hour. American troops will soon be ordered into harm's way to 
defend against what I believe is a clear and present danger to our 
interests. That the President has so frequently and so utterly failed 
to preserve one of our most important strategic assets--our 
credibility, is not a reason to deny him his authority to lead NATO in 
this action. On the contrary, it is a reason for Congress to do what it 
can to restore our credibility. It is a reason for us to help convince 
Mr. Milosevic that the United States, the greatest force for good in 
history, will no longer stand by while he makes a mockery of the values 
for which so many Americans have willingly given their lives.
  No, Mr. President, we must not compound the administration's mistakes 
by committing our own. We must do what we can to repair the damage 
already done to our interests. We must do what we can to restore our 
allies' confidence in American leadership and our enemies' dread of our 
opposition. We must do what we can to ensure that force is used 
appropriately and successfully. And we must do what we can to define an 
achievable mission for our forces, and to bring them home the moment it 
is achieved.
  That should be our purpose today, Mr. President. Therefore, with an 
appreciation for the good intentions that support this resolution, I 
must without hesitation oppose it, and ask my colleagues to do 
likewise.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, the possible deployment of United States 
troops to Kosovo demands the Senate's full attention and debate. I 
applaud the House of Representatives for addressing this issue in a 
timely manner, even though I do not support the House resolution 
authorizing the deployment of United States troops to Kosovo.
  The pending deployment of United States troops to Kosovo is 
particularly ill-advised in light of the challenges and difficulties 
associated with our current mission in Bosnia. Now 2 years past the 
original deadline with no end in sight, the Bosnia operation has cost 
the United States over $8 billion in real dollars since 1992. 
Administration officials cannot identify an end-date for the Bosnia 
mission and have not been able to transfer the operation to our 
European allies. Progress in Bosnia has been painfully slow. In many 
ways the country remains just as divided as it was when the Dayton 
Accords were signed. Although Bosnia should be a poignant reminder of 
the limits of nation-building, the administration is considering 
another open-ended commitment of United States ground forces to the 
Balkans.
  The violence and instability that has plagued the Balkans troubles me 
as it does every other Member of this body. Every Member of the Senate 
would like to see an end to the violence in Kosovo and a sustainable 
peace in Bosnia. But in addressing these difficult issues, the 
President and the Congress owe it to the American people to define a 
consistent policy for when their sons and daughters will be placed in 
harm's way. We have to define the American interests important enough 
to justify risking American lives. Unfortunately, the President has not 
done so in this case.
  United States military deployments in the Balkans are not being 
driven by vital security interests, but humanitarian concerns that have 
not been defined clearly. As Henry Kissinger states, ``The proposed 
deployment in Kosovo does not deal with any threat to United States 
security as this concept has traditionally been conceived.''
  U.S. humanitarian interests are important elements of America's 
foreign policy, but should not be considered alone as the basis for 
risking the lives of American soldiers. The violence in Kosovo is 
atrocious, but half a dozen other civil conflicts around the world 
offer more compelling humanitarian reasons for United States 
intervention. If United States troops are deployed to Kosovo where 
2,000 people have died, why not to Sudan where a civil war has claimed 
2 million casualties? Why not to Afghanistan or Rwanda or Angola where 
hundreds of thousands of people have died in civil wars that continue 
to this day?
  Such questions underscore the need for a consistent policy which 
links the deployment of American troops to the defense of vital 
national security interests. The United States can and should provide 
indispensable diplomatic leadership to help resolve foreign crises, but 
we have to recognize the purposes and limits of American military 
power. The blood and treasure of this country could be spent many times 
over in fruitless efforts to reconstruct shattered nation states.
  From Somalia to Haiti to Bosnia and now to Kosovo, I cannot discern a 
consistent policy for the deployment of United States troops. In a 
world full of civil war and humanitarian suffering, will American 
ground forces be deployed only to those conflicts that get the most 
media attention? The media cycle is no basis for a consistent foreign 
policy. The American people deserve better leadership from Washington 
for the prudent and effective use of U.S. military power.
  The administration has not provided that leadership. The U.S. Armed 
Forces have been deployed repeatedly to compensate for a lack of 
foresight and discipline in our foreign policy. United States policy in 
the Balkans, for example, has dealt with symptoms of instability rather 
than the root of the problem. The administration has deployed 
peacekeeping forces to suppress ethnic conflict inflamed by President 
Milosevic but has missed opportunities to undermine Milosevic himself. 
A lack of diligence and resolve also can be seen in United States 
policy toward Iraq. Saddam is stronger today than at the end of the 
gulf war because the administration has not seized opportunities to 
undermine his regime.
  The ill-defined deployment of United States troops to Kosovo only 
reinforces

[[Page 5153]]

 my concerns about the misuse of American military resources. We have 
been asking our military personnel to do more with less, and the strain 
is showing in troubling recruiting, retention, and readiness 
statistics. The dramatic increase in the pace of military activity has 
been accompanied--not with an increase in defense funding--but with a 
27-percent cut in real terms since 1990. In this decade, operational 
missions increased 300 percent while the force structure for the Army 
and Air Force was reduced by 45 percent each, the Navy by approximately 
40 percent, and the Marines by over 10 percent. Contingency operations 
during this administration have exacted a heavy cost (in real terms): 
$8.1 billion in Bosnia; $1.1 billion in Haiti; $6.1 billion in Iraq.
  The Kosovo agreement pursued by the administration is laying the 
groundwork for another open-ended United States military presence in 
the Balkans. The administration's strategy for resolving the conflict 
in Kosovo could very well lead to the worst-case scenario of a broader 
regional conflict now being used to justify United States intervention. 
The Kovoso Albanians see the proposed settlement as a 3-year waiting 
period leading to an eventual referendum for independence. The Serbians 
strongly oppose such a step. That will guarantee United States troops 
will be in Kosovo for at least 3 years and most likely much longer when 
the inevitable fighting resumes over the question of Kosovo's status.
  Mr. President, the credibility of the United States is on the line 
when we commit our military personnel overseas. When United States 
soldiers were killed in Somalia, the President could not justify the 
mission to the American people. The hasty U.S. withdrawal from that 
African nation cost America dearly in terms of international stature. 
As we consider a possible deployment to Kosovo, the lessons learned 6 
years ago in Somalia should not be forgotten. The American people will 
not support a Kosovo deployment that costs American lives when 
America's vital security interests are not at stake. Yet American 
casualties are a very real prospect in Kosovo, as potentially both the 
Kosovo revels and Serbians will be firing on United States military 
personnel.
  Not only is United States credibility at risk in Kosovo, the 
credibility of the NATO Alliance is in jeopardy as well. NATOs success 
in the past has been based on the clearly defined mission of the NATO 
Treaty: collective defense of a carefully defined territory. Now, the 
administration is transforming the alliance into a downsized United 
Nations with a standing army for peacekeeping operations. NATO's 
membership has been expanded this year, but the real expansion has 
occurred in the alliance mission to include operations never envisioned 
in the NATO Treaty.
  Managing Europe's ethnic conflicts was not the reason NATO was 
established and not a basis on which it can remain a vital organization 
in the future. The American people have not understood our commitment 
to NATO--a military alliance for fighting wars--to be another arm of 
the United Nations for peacekeeping operations. Ill-defined missions 
for NATO will lead to more misguided U.S. military deployments, the 
erosion of U.S. support for NATO, and the speedy demise of the alliance 
itself.
  The U.S. Armed Forces should be deployed only to defend the vital 
national security interests of the United States. The American people 
understand that we live in a dangerous world where U.S. interests must 
be defended. But they also have a strong aversion to fruitless nation-
building exercises to resolve the world's ancient hatreds, and rightly 
so.
  Our country has learned through painful sacrifice the high cost of 
nation-building. In spite of the difficulties surrounding the Bosnia 
mission, however, we are on the verge of taking on our second nation-
building exercise in a region of the world that has been wracked by war 
for centuries.
  In the post-cold-war world, there will be no lack of civil war and 
ethnic conflict with serious humanitarian implications. The United 
States should continue to work to alleviate suffering and facilitate 
peace in other countries, but deploying American forces to quell 
centuries-old ethnic conflicts is often the least effective and most 
unsustainable way to address these problems. I am opposed to the 
deployment of United States forces to Kosovo and urge my colleagues to 
vote for cloture on the Lott second-degree amendment prohibiting the 
use of funds for a Kosovo operation unless previously authorized by 
Congress.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, the situation in Kosovo is cause for 
grave concern to all of us. One cannot read the press reports flooding 
out of Kosovo for the past many months and not be moved. The suffering 
of the people of Kosovo is tragic, and the potential for this conflict 
to spread and to destabilize the entire region is very real. Something 
must be done.
  But before we commit ourselves to military action, we must be sure 
that any action we undertake has a good chance of achieving our primary 
objectives. I am concerned about the current course of action as 
outlined by the President and Secretary of Defense Cohen. I agree that 
we need to be part of a NATO effort to resolve the current impasse and 
put an end to the fighting. But we should not be contributing ground 
troops to that effort. Our European allies must take the lead on the 
ground, and we should support that effort with our superior air power 
and intelligence operations. Just as we take the lead on problems in 
this hemisphere, it is important that Europe take the lead in Kosovo.
  The airwaves are now heavy with the talk of impending air strikes 
against Serbia following Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic's final 
rejection of the proposed peace plan. Milosevic refuses to allow NATO 
troops on Yugoslav soil, even though NATO has agreed that Kosovo should 
remain a province of Yugoslav and the Kosovar Albanians have signed on 
to the peace deal. The United States has put a great deal of effort 
into trying to achieve a political settlement in Kosovo. We have taken 
the lead in the negotiations, and the personal intervention of 
Secretary Albright, Ambassador Holbrooke and Former Senator Bob Dole 
has done much to advance the cause. But Milosovic remains intransigent 
and the violence continues to escalate. Both sides are now poised for 
an all-out military offensive. And United States-led air strikes 
against targets in Serbia are imminent.
  I am uncomfortable with the tactic of launching a major military 
bombing campaign in order to force someone to the peace table. For two 
reasons, one, it rarely works; and two, real peace will only come when 
both sides realize they have more to gain by setting aside the military 
option. If they do not really want peace, there is little we can do to 
force them into it. Targeted air strikes without a synchronized 
campaign on the ground are unlikely to make a serious change in the 
strategic situation in Kosovo. Stopping a large-scale Serbian offensive 
for anything more than a short period of time is extremely difficult if 
one's only tool is a stand-off air campaign.
  However, we must do something and do it soon. But our action must be 
with the equal participation of our European allies, with each partner 
contributing what they do best. In our case, that is aerial control and 
intelligence collection and analysis. I would not oppose that kind of 
American participation in a closely coordinated operation led by our 
European allies where the objectives, duration and methodology were 
clearly explained to Congress and the American people. I believe this 
is the only operation likely to meet with success in the long run. And 
we have no time to waste.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent 
that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, how much time is remaining 
on this side?

[[Page 5154]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Eight minutes 40 seconds on your side; 37 
minutes on the other side.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, the legislation before 
us--which Senator Lott has introduced--is an amendment which I drafted 
several weeks ago when I saw the administration lurching toward war in 
Yugoslavia. I believe that Congress should determine whether or not 
America should commit an act of war against a sovereign nation inside 
its own borders.
  Regardless of what your view is on the conflict in Kosovo, I sense 
that most of my colleagues agree that Congress should take a position 
on any action in Kosovo. We simply cannot turn this or any other 
administration loose to commit acts of war around the world without the 
demonstrated support of the American people. We did that once in 
Vietnam. We know the results. Politicians stood here and debated it, 
and men and women died every day.
  The purpose of my amendment is very simple. It simply requires 
Congress to debate, and then approve or deny, the use of military force 
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That is it, pure and simple. If 
you want the Congress to have a say in this, you should vote for my 
amendment. If you think the President should be able to go to war 
against a sovereign nation without the support of Congress, you should 
vote against my amendment.
  This raises constitutional issues for some of my colleagues. I want 
to dispense with them right away. It is clear that the President has 
the power to commit U.S. forces to battle--this President or any other 
President--and he has the power to command them once they are 
committed. I interpret this authority as allowing the President to 
respond swiftly and unencumbered to an immediate threat to U.S. lives, 
liberty, or property.
  We have seen in history, some of it recent, that a President can 
interpret this authority very loosely. But we also have seen that when 
Presidents use force in a way that they do not or cannot explain to the 
American people, and for a cause the American people do not in their 
gut support, that policy collapses. We saw it by the end of the war in 
Vietnam. We saw it in Somalia, in 1994. We saw it in Beirut in 1983. 
Republican and Democrat Presidents alike have learned this lesson.
  It is entirely constitutional for the Congress to withhold funds from 
any activity of the Federal Government. It is the Constitution itself, 
Article I, Section 8, which gives us that power. This so-called power 
of the purse is a blunt instrument--there is no question about that--
and one we should use sparingly, but it is sometimes the only 
instrument we in Congress have. It is why the administration must seek 
consensus, or at least some majority, in support of military 
hostilities.
  So we should undertake an examination of this proposed action and 
then speak for the American people. We must consider our interests, the 
question of sovereignty, the nature of the conflict and the risks, and 
what we are trying to accomplish.
  What are our interests? The administration has a hard time explaining 
why U.S. interests are at stake in Kosovo. This is not surprising. 
There are certainly no American lives at risk--not yet, at least. 
American liberty and American property are not threatened. It is not a 
humanitarian mission like the assistance we have given to Central 
America in the wake of Hurricane Mitch.
  Nor is loss of life the administration's standard. Two thousand 
people have been killed in the fighting in Kosovo in the past year. 
That is a lot of people. However, in just 6 weeks in 1994, half a 
million Rwandans died. We didn't launch any cruise missiles in Rwanda, 
Mr. President. There, we did not launch any cruise missiles when half a 
million people died.
  If anything, the administration's statements have added confusion to 
a very complex issue. During a recent Armed Services Committee hearing, 
I asked Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering whether or not an 
attack on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would be an act of war. 
His response goes right to the heart of the problem I have with the 
actions of this administration. Here is what Mr. Pickering said:

       Well, an act of war, as you know, and I have recently found 
     out, is a highly technical term. My lawyers tell me . . . 
     that an act of war, the term is an obsolete term in anything 
     but a broad generic sense. If you would say that Milosevic, 
     in attacking and chasing Albanians, harassing, torturing, 
     killing Albanians and sending them to the hills is anything 
     but an act of war, I would certainly agree with you on that 
     particular judgement. If, in fact, we need to use force to 
     stop that kind of behavior and also to bring about a 
     settlement which recognizes the rights of those people which 
     have been denied, I would tell you that it might well be a 
     war-like act, although the technical term ``act of war'' is 
     something we ought to be careful to avoid in terms of some of 
     its former meanings that have consequences beyond merely the 
     use of the term.

  That sounds like a pretty bureaucratic explanation to me, Mr. 
President, but I will tell you one thing: To the young men and women 
who are going to be asked to put their lives on the line in Kosovo, 
there can be no bureaucratic explanation about what a declaration of 
war is or is not. It is not the lawyers Mr. Pickering is referring to 
who are going to fight. It is not the lawyers who are going to be 
manning the aircraft. It is not the lawyers who are going to be 
captured as POWs. It is not the lawyers who have to go in and get those 
POWs if they are shot down. It is the young men and women of our Armed 
Forces. I was then, and I continue to be, absolutely astounded by Mr. 
Pickering's response.
  The administration tells us that we must become involved in the 
internal affairs of Yugoslavia to prevent the spread of this conflict 
into neighboring nations, including perhaps NATO members. This is a 
bogeyman argument, and it is meant to scare us into resolving this 
conflict by using American military forces. It obscures the real issue: 
should American troops be placed at risk in an area of the world where 
we have no real interests which justify direct intervention? Risking 
U.S. troops in a war in Kosovo is far more dangerous to American 
interests than the small risk that the conflict would spread.
  The argument is also made that the conflict in Kosovo threatens NATO 
and threatens American leadership of NATO. There is nothing in the 
North Atlantic Treaty that authorizes NATO to commit the kinds of 
actions we are talking about here. NATO is not an offensive alliance, 
it is a defensive alliance. As a matter of fact, it was created to 
prevent aggression against the sovereign nations of Europe. By using 
NATO to attack a sovereign nation, we are about to turn the alliance on 
its head.
  We are only weakening the alliance by using its forces offensively in 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The core of the alliance has always 
been to protect members from attack, not to be peace enforcers, not to 
meddle in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation--no matter how 
despicable the acts that are being committed are--and certainly not to 
dictate a peace agreement under the threat of violence. By intervening 
in this civil war, I fear the alliance is not showing strength to the 
world, but weakness and confusion.
  Mr. President, NATO expansion has already diluted NATO's strength. By 
becoming enmeshed in the internal affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, the alliance is distancing itself further from its core 
mission, which is to ensure the protection of its members. Although I 
opposed and continue to oppose expansion of NATO, I am a supporter of 
NATO and its core mission. But if this is what NATO has become--a means 
of dragging the United States into every minor conflict around Europe's 
edges--then maybe we should get out of NATO.
  We are about to begin a high-risk military operation--a war--against 
a sovereign nation. Not because Americans have been attacked, not 
because our allies have been attacked, but because we disapprove of the 
internal policy of the Federal Republic Yugoslavia. That policy is easy 
to disapprove, but that is a very low standard to apply the use of 
force. If we applied that standard around the world, we would be 
launching cruise missiles around the world.

[[Page 5155]]

  The fundamental question is whether the lives of American soldiers 
are worth interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation 
where there are no vital U.S. interests at risk. This is not Iraq in 
1990, where a ruthless tyrant invaded a peaceful neighboring country. 
This is a case of a disaffected population revolting against its 
government. Is Milosevic a tyrant? Yes, absolutely. But his tyranny is 
happening inside his own nation.
  We are dictating, under the threat of military action, the internal 
policy of Yugoslavia. We may not like that policy, but is that reason 
to go to war? Moreover, is it reason to let the President of the United 
States go to war without an act of Congress? That is the question 
before us today. It is a very serious question, and our actions in this 
body will have ramifications for many years to come. This very well may 
be one of the most important votes we make on the Senate floor this 
year.
  The conflict in Kosovo is a civil war. Neither side wants to be 
involved in the peace agreement that we are trying to impose. It took 
weeks of arm twisting and coercion just to get the Kosovo Liberation 
Army to agree to the deal. The administration had to send our 
distinguished former leader, Bob Dole, to persuade them to accept the 
agreement.
  Both the KLA and the Serbs still want to fight, and they will fight 
until they do not want to fight anymore. We will be using U.S. troops, 
not as peacekeepers, but as peace enforcers. There is a difference. 
Peacekeepers are there to assist the transition to stability. Peace 
enforcers are there as policemen to separate two parties who want to do 
nothing but fight. They are not interested in an agreement. They still 
want to fight. By jamming the agreement down their throats, the 
administration is not solving the problem. At best, it is delaying it.
  Many proponents of military intervention in Kosovo cite World War I 
as a lesson as to the ultimate danger of a crisis in the Balkans. They 
have it exactly backwards. A Balkan war became a world war in 1914 not 
because there was strife, but because the great powers of that day 
allowed themselves to become entangled in that strife. We need to heed 
this lesson. We did not fight and win the Cold War just to be dragged 
into marginal conflicts like this one.
  Why are the Balkans so prone to conflict? The main reason is that 
this is where Christianity and Islam collide. Strife along these lines 
has gone on virtually uninterrupted for a millennium. This is no place 
for America to get bogged down. I believe in America and American 
power, but these are conflicts that America cannot solve.
  The administration is prepared to send our pilots into combat against 
a combat-hardened nation that is well equipped to defend itself from 
attack. Let there be no doubt--I will say it here now in this Chamber--
let there be no doubt, American lives will be in danger. This act will 
result in the deaths of American servicemen. The Joint Chiefs testified 
before the Armed Services Committee last week. They tried to tell us, 
as carefully as they could.
  General Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff, said:

       There is a distinct possibility we will lose aircraft in 
     trying to penetrate those defenses.

  General Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps, said:

       It is going to be tremendously dangerous.

  He went on to ask the same questions I have: What is the end game? 
How long will the strikes go on? Will our allies stay with us?
  In the coming days, if air strikes do go forward, we need to be ready 
to answer the questions of the families of those young men and women 
who will not be returning from Yugoslavia. We have to be prepared to 
answer those questions. We can begin to answer them today: Are we 
prepared to fight in Yugoslavia month after month, slugging it out with 
the Serb forces in those mountains, losing Americans day after day? Are 
we prepared for that?
  I want to say one thing about the troops. If we go in tonight or 
tomorrow, they will have my support. That is the way it should be. But 
I have an obligation to the Constitution, and under the Constitution, 
the U.S. Congress must decide whether or not we go to war. That is the 
purpose of my resolution.
  Mr. President, I abhor the bloodshed in Kosovo. But as much sympathy 
as I have for those victims, we must remember that the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia is a sovereign nation. We can provide safe haven for 
those refugees as they exit Kosovo. We don't need to go to war.
  Throughout the cold war, we fought to protect the rights of sovereign 
nations, and in 1991 we sent American soldiers to war to turn back the 
unlawful and immoral invasion of the sovereign nation of Kuwait. George 
Bush sought to defend a sovereign nation after it had been attacked, 
and he came before Congress to seek that authorization. He came before 
the Congress. And he barely got our approval.
  George Bush risked losing a vote in Congress because he believed that 
the American people should comment on whether or not we would go to 
war. In that case, the nation of Iraq had attacked and conquered the 
sovereign nation of Kuwait. What a change in just eight years; here we 
are today, preparing ourselves to attack a sovereign nation, and the 
administration at this very minute is trying to avoid this vote.
  This is a terribly difficult time for all of us. Having been in the 
Vietnam war, watching politicians who could not decide whether they 
wanted to support the troops or not, day after day, month after month, 
year after year, I don't want to see us get embroiled in another 
conflict the American people are going to lose their taste for after we 
start losing young men and women.
  I just came back from a 4-day trip around the country--Louisiana, 
Alabama, and Colorado--talking to the troops. They are the best. They 
can handle anything we ask them to do. But they should not be asked to 
die in a conflict where the national security of this country is not at 
risk. This is exactly what they will be asked to do it if we go into 
Kosovo.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to carefully think about the 
implications of what we are about to do at 2 o'clock or so this 
afternoon. I urge my colleagues to support the Smith amendment.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  Mr. President, I note the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak up to 5 
minutes from the time of the Democratic side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, I rise today to address my thoughts on the 
situation in Kosovo. This is a very complicated and dangerous issue. 
There are no good alternatives, there are no good options, there are no 
good solutions. I have listened with great interest and great respect 
to my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, on both sides of the 
issue. Their perspectives have been important, they have been 
enlightening. The threads of who we are as human beings--in America's 
case, as leaders of the world, as leaders of NATO--are intertwined in 
this very complicated morass that we call the Kosovo issue.
  With that said, I don't believe America can stand by and not be part 
of a unified NATO response to the continued slaughter in the Balkans. I 
say that mainly for three reasons.
  First, the very real potential for this crisis widening and deepening 
is immediate and there will be consequences. If this goes unchecked and 
unstopped there is the real risk of pulling in other nations into an 
already very dangerous and complicated situation. I believe if this 
goes unchecked and unstopped we run the very real risk of the southern

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flank of NATO coming unhinged. We are on the border now of Macedonia, 
Macedonia being on the border of Greece.
  Second, the humanitarian disaster that would result if NATO stood by 
and did nothing would be immense. The consequences of that humanitarian 
disaster would move up into Western Europe; nations will take issue and 
sides against one another in Europe. This would have consequences in 
the Muslim world. The humanitarian element of this, as much as the 
geopolitical strategic elements involved in this equation, are real. 
There would be tens of thousands of refugees pouring into nations all 
over Western Europe. This would further exaggerate the ethnic and the 
religious tensions that exist today.
  The third reason I believe that the United States cannot stand aside 
and not be part of any NATO activity to stop the butchery in Kosovo is 
because if the United States is the only NATO member who refuses to 
deal with this problem--all other NATO members are committed to deal 
with this problem-- if we are the only NATO member not part of this 
effort, it surely will be the beginning of the unraveling of NATO. If 
NATO does not deal with this crisis in the middle of Europe, then what 
is the purpose of NATO? What is the relevancy of NATO?
  I have heard the questions, arguments, the debate, the issues raised 
about NATO being a defensive organization, the very legitimate 
questions regarding acts of war, invading sovereign nations. These are 
all important and relevant questions. However, I think there is a more 
relevant question: What do we use the forces of good for, the forces 
that represent the best of mankind, if we are going to be held captive 
to a definition that was written 50 years ago?
  Every individual, every organization, every effort in life must be 
relevant to the challenge at hand. The consequences of the United 
States not being part of NATO in this particular effort would be 
disastrous. America and NATO's credibility are on the line here. I 
suggest to some of my colleagues who are engaged in this debate, where 
were they last fall? Where were they when Ambassador Holbrooke reached 
an agreement with President Milosevic in October? At that time, the 
United States and all nations in NATO gave their commitment that there 
would be a NATO military response if Milosevic did not comply with the 
agreement that he made on behalf of NATO with Ambassador Holbrooke.
  Part of the debate we are having now--if not all of it--should have 
been done last fall. To come in now after the administration and our 
NATO partners are trying to bring together some peaceful resolution 
using the leverage of NATO firepower and the leverage of military 
intervention, for the Congress now to come in and undermine that is not 
the right way to have the Congress participate in its constitutional 
responsibility to help form foreign policy.
  However, the President of the United States must take the lead here. 
I, too, have been disappointed in the President not coming forward to 
explain, to educate, on this issue. If the President feels this is 
relevant and important to America's interests, the President must come 
forward and explain that to the American people. He has thus far not 
done that. I understand that may be done today or tomorrow. I talked to 
Secretary Albright Sunday night and encouraged Secretary Albright, as I 
have others, to encourage the President to do that. Only the President 
can lead. Only the President can make the case as to why this is 
important for our country and explain the consequences of the United 
States doing nothing. The President must come before the Nation and 
explain why this military intervention in Kosovo is relevant and 
important, and why the very significant risk of life is worth it, why 
the significant risk of life is worth it.
  I also want to point out that I have heard an awful lot of debate and 
conversation that we, the United States, would take on Milosevic. It is 
not just the United States. It is our 15--actually 18--other partners 
in NATO. I might add, too, that the Europeans have stepped into this 
with rather direct action and a call for arms in using and committing 
their ground troops and other military assets. So it is not the United 
States against Milosevic. It is NATO; it is the forces of good. We must 
not be confused by that difference.
  The President has to explain all of this to the American public. Yes, 
there are great uncertainties and great risks at stake. But to do 
nothing would create a far worse risk for Europe, the United States, 
NATO, and I believe all over the world, because the United States' 
commitment and work and credibility is being watched very carefully by 
Saddam Hussein, the North Koreans, and others who would wish the United 
States and our allies ill. Actions have consequences. Nonactions have 
consequences.
  Mr. President, history will judge us harshly if we do not take action 
to stop this rolling genocide. As complicated as this is, I hope that 
as we debate this through today, my colleagues will support the 
President on his course of action.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, before my colleague departs the floor, I 
wish to commend him for his final set of remarks. I listened very 
carefully. Those precise steps of reasoning were discussed in great 
detail beginning at 9:30 this morning up through 11:30 with the 
President and the Senate and House leadership. The very points that our 
colleague makes were reviewed and responded to by the President.
  Time and time again--and I am sure you share this with me --I want to 
accord the highest credit to our colleague from Texas, Senator 
Hutchison, and our colleague from New Hampshire, Bob Smith, and others, 
who have repeatedly over the past week or 10 days, through filing 
amendments and otherwise, brought to the attention of the Senate the 
urgency of this situation and the need to address it.
  Today's meeting with the President was the second one, the previous 
one being last Friday of similar duration. Senator Lott has tried his 
best to reconcile a rather complicated procedural situation together 
with Senator Daschle, and they are still conferring. We are going to 
address that in our respective caucuses here starting momentarily. I 
see--and I am speaking for myself now--a clear movement within the 
Senate to address this within the framework of a resolution. There are 
several working now whereby the American public can follow with much 
greater clarity exactly what is the issue before the Congress and how 
this body will respond to the challenge. It is an extraordinary one. 
The case--as you laid out--of inaction is just unacceptable to the 
world. We are about to witness a continuation, taking place at the 
moment, of ethnic cleansing of a proportion reaching those that we 
experienced in Bosnia.
  A very courageous diplomat, Mr. Holbrooke, has made several 
excursions--I think the most recent completed within the hour --and all 
indications are that the situation, diplomatically, as much as it was, 
say, 72 hours ago, despite the best efforts of the United States, Mr. 
Holbrooke representing this country, but indeed he spoke for 18 other 
nations--the important consideration here is that there are 19 
nations--16 in NATO and several others--who are locked with the 
determination not to let this tragedy continue. As the Senator said, 
the consequences of no action are far more understandable than the 
consequences of action. Now, the military action proposed is largely, I 
say largely, but almost exclusively, an air type of operation. Those 
pilots are taking tremendous risks.
  The Senate Armed Services Committee, last Thursday, had all the 
Chiefs present. As the first indications of the concern in the Senate 
were beginning to grow through questioning by myself and other members 
of the committee, we had each Chief give their appraisal of the risk, 
and General Ryan, speaking for the air arms of our country, was 
unequivocal in saying

[[Page 5157]]

this is dangerous, that these air defenses are far superior to what we 
encountered in Bosnia and what we are today encountering in Iraq, and 
this country runs the risk of casualties. What more could he say? He 
was joined by General Krulak, Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Chief 
of Naval Operations. All of them very clearly outlined the risks that 
their respective personnel would take--that, together with our allies.
  Numerically speaking, about 58 percent of the aircraft involved will 
be U.S. Why? It is very simple. Fortunately, through the support of the 
Congress and the American people, we have put in place a military that 
can handle a complication such as this. I say ``complication'' because 
going in at high altitudes and trying to suppress ground-to-air 
munitions is difficult. It requires precision-bombing types of 
instruments, precision missiles, and many of the other nations simply 
do not have that equipment. But it is interesting, if we get a peace 
accord--and I have long supported the United States being an element of 
a ground force under the prior scenario where we had reason to believe 
that there would be a peace accord--and maybe there is a flicker of 
hope that it can be reached before force is used in this instance--but 
there the European allies would have about 80 percent of the 
responsibility, and the United States, I think by necessity, as leader 
of NATO, should have an element.
  So another message that we have to tell the people is that the 
countries of the world--indeed NATO--are united. It is just not to be 
perceived as a U.S. operation. It is a consolidated operation by 19 
nations. Milosevic should be getting the message now, if he hasn't 
already, that this is not just a U.S. operation. It is a combined 
operation of 19 nations.
  Now, the proposed air operation is the best that our Joint Chiefs, in 
consultation with the North Atlantic Council and the respective chiefs 
of the NATO, can devise given that air assets are to be used. It is 
spelled out, I think, in a convincing way.
  The President, again, went over this very carefully with the 
Secretaries of State and Defense, the National Security Adviser, and 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs present this morning. This operation, 
in stages, unequivocally I think, will bring severe damage to, first, 
the ground-to-air capabilities; and then if Milosevic doesn't recognize 
the sincerity of these 19 nations, then there will be successive air 
operations on other targets designed to degrade substantially his 
military capability to wage the war of genocide and ethnic cleansing 
taking place at this very minute throughout Kosovo.
  In addition, as I am sure the Senator is aware, there are many 
collateral ramifications to this situation, which leads this Senator to 
think it is in our national security interest to propose action. I 
shall be supporting as a cosponsor the joint resolution as it comes to 
the floor this afternoon.
  Right on the line I will sign and take that responsibility.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time be extended for 
about 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it is very important that this air 
operation degrade his capability to do further damage in Kosovo. But 
the instability in the region, as stated by the President this morning, 
in many ways parallels Bosnia, but could be considered more serious 
because of Greece, Turkey, and the spillover of the refugees into 
Macedonia and Montenegro. It is just not an isolated situation of 
repression and oppression by Milosevic against Kosovo civilians. They 
are now flowing in and causing great problems in these nations who are 
trying to do the best they can from a humanitarian standpoint to accept 
them.
  So I always come back to the fact that this Congress went along with 
the President as it related to Bosnia. History will show that we were 
misled in certain instances by the President hoping we could be out by 
yearend. It had not been the case. But we are there, and the killing 
has stopped. How soon the economic stability of that country can create 
the jobs to give it some permanence we know not. But we could lose an 
investment of up to $8 billion or $9 billion that this Congress has 
authorized and appropriated through the years to bring about the degree 
of achievement of the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia if Kosovo 
erupts and spills over the borders in such a way as to undo what has 
been done over these years since basically 1991.
  So there are many ramifications. It is difficult for the American 
people to understand all the complexities about the credibility of NATO 
and the credibility of the United States as a working partner, not in 
just this opposition, but future operations with our European nations. 
But they do understand quite clearly that genocide and ethnic 
cleansing, murdering, rape, and pillaging cannot go on. And we have in 
place uniquely in this geographic area the political organization in 
NATO, together with such military assets as are necessary to address 
this situation.
  So it is my hope that the leaders will be able to resolve a very 
complex situation as it relates to the procedural matter before the 
desk and that we can have before the Senate this afternoon a resolution 
with clarity of purpose and clarity of how each Senator decides for 
themselves and speaking for the constituents about what the country 
should do.
  I am convinced that the President has to go forward within 24 or 48 
hours with the other NATO nations.
  So I sort of put myself in the cockpit with those brave aviators, 
where you have been in a combat situation, Senator, many times, and you 
know that situation better than most of us. And you know how it is 
important to that soldier, sailor, or airman that has the feeling--or 
she in some cases--that this country is behind them and stands with 
them as they and their families take these risks.
  I thank the Senator for the opportunity to have a colloquy with him 
on this important question. I commend him for his leadership on this 
and many other issues.
  I thank the Chair.
  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from North 
Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. Helms pertaining to the introduction of S. 682 
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills 
and Joint Resolutions.'')
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I will take just about 3 minutes now and I 
will speak longer than this later in the day.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, it seems we are moving irrevocably towards 
war in the Balkans. It appears that the U.S. forces along with NATO 
forces will soon be engaged in open warlike activity against Serbian 
forces. This Senator took the floor in January of 1991, prior to the 
engagement of our forces in the Persian Gulf, to state my feelings that 
before any President commits our troops to a military action of this 
nature, that President should seek the advice, consent, and approval of 
Congress.
  Only Congress has the power to declare war; it is quite clear in the 
Constitution. It is this Senator's strong feeling that this President 
would be remiss, and we would be shirking our duties, if in fact we did 
not, today, set aside whatever other business this Senate has, to 
debate fully a resolution supporting or not supporting the use of our 
military force in Kosovo. That debate should be held today and the vote 
should be held today, or tomorrow, but as soon as possible, so we 
fulfill our constitutional obligations.
  I said, in 1991, if the President were to engage in war in the 
Persian Gulf without Congress first acting, not only would it be a 
violation of the War Powers Act but I think it would be a violation of 
the Constitution of the United States. I still feel that way, 
regardless of whether it is President George Bush or President Bill 
Clinton.

[[Page 5158]]

  So the sounds of war are about us. I am hearing the rumblings that 
our planes and our pilots might start flying soon, that bombs might 
start dropping soon. Our military people will be engaged in military 
activities of a warlike nature. Now is the time and here is the place 
to debate that. We cannot shirk our constitutional responsibilities. 
The debate should be held this afternoon. The vote should be held, no 
later than tonight or early tomorrow, on whether or not this Congress 
will support that kind of activity in Kosovo.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
  Mr. HARKIN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. GRASSLEY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I would ask if you will notify me when I 
have talked 6 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the Senator requesting unanimous consent to 
extend the time?
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Yes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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