[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 4]
[Senate]
[Pages 5113-5125]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                        THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I rise today to talk about the 
situation in Kosovo. We have been watching this situation unfold for 
days, actually months--actually, you could say thousands of years. But 
it is coming to a head in the very near future, perhaps in hours. As I 
speak today, Richard Holbrooke is talking to Slobodan Milosevic and 
trying to encourage him to come to the peace table. I hope he is 
successful, and I know every American hopes that he is successful. But 
what I think we must talk about today is what happens if he is not.
  What happens if Mr. Milosevic says, ``No, I am not going to allow 
foreign troops in my country,'' and if he says he is going to move 
forward with whatever he intends to do in the governance of that 
country? I think we have to step back and look at the situation and the 
dilemma which we face, because there is no question, this is not an 
easy decision. What comes next?
  Basically, the President has committed the United States to a policy 
in NATO to which he really does not have the authority to commit. The 
consequences are that we have to make a decision that would appear to 
walk away from the commitment he made without coming to Congress, and 
that is not a good situation. I do not like having to make such a 
choice, because I want our word to be good. When the United States 
speaks, I want our word to be good. Whether it is to our ally or to our 
enemy, they need to know what we say we will do.
  But the problem here is, the President has gone out with a commitment 
before he talked to Congress about it, and now we have really changed 
the whole nature of NATO without congressional approval. We are saying 
that we are going to bomb a sovereign country because of their 
mistreatment of people within their country, the province of Kosovo, 
and we are going to take this action, basically declaring war on a 
country that should not be an enemy of the United States and in fact 
was a partner at the peace table in the Dayton accords on Bosnia.
  So now we are taking sides. We are turning NATO, which was a defense 
alliance--is a defense alliance--into an

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aggressive, perhaps, declarer-of-war on a country that is not in NATO. 
Mr. President, I just do not think we can take a step like that without 
the Congress and the American people understanding what we are doing 
and, furthermore, approving of it.
  There is no question that Mr. Milosevic is not our kind of person. We 
have seen atrocities that he has committed in Kosovo. But, in fact, 
there have been other atrocities committed by the parties with whom we 
are purporting to be taking sides. The Albanians have committed 
atrocities as well, the Kosovar Albanians. So we are now picking sides 
in a civil war where I think the U.S. security interest is not clear.
  I think it is incumbent on the President to come to Congress, before 
he takes any military action in Kosovo, to lay out the case and to get 
congressional approval. What would he tell Congress? First of all, 
before we put one American in harm's way, I want to know: What is the 
intention here? What is the commitment? What happens in the eventuality 
that Mr. Milosevic does not respond to bombing, that he declares he is 
going to go forward without responding to an intervention in his 
country? What do we do then? Do we send ground troops in to force him 
to come to the peace table? And if we did, could we consider that is 
really a peace? What if NATO decides to strike and an American plane is 
shot down? What if there is an American POW? What then? What is our 
commitment then?
  My concern here is that the administration has not looked at the 
third, fourth, and fifth steps in a plan. They have only addressed step 
1, which is, we are going to bomb because they will not come to the 
peace table and accept the agreement that we have hammered out. I just 
say, before we go bombing sovereign nations, we ought to have a plan. 
We ought to know what steps 3, 4, and 5 are, because I believe Congress 
has a right to know what this commitment is. How many people from the 
United States of America are going to be put in harm's way? What is it 
going to cost and where is the money going to come from? Is it going to 
come from other defense accounts, so other places in the world where we 
have troops are put at risk? Is it going to come at the risk of our 
Strategic Defense Initiative? Just where is the money going to come 
from? Most of all, most important of all, what is the mission? How much 
are we going to be required to do and what is the timetable?
  Mr. President, I would support a plan that would say when the two 
parties come to a real peace agreement, we would put our troops, along 
with our European allies in NATO, together in a peacekeeping mission of 
a short duration which would make sure that things settle down until we 
could have others rotate in and take our place. I would support a plan 
that went that far.
  I would also support a plan of helping the Kosovars, but without 
putting American troops in harm's way. You know, the difference between 
the Clinton doctrine and the Reagan doctrine is that President Reagan 
would support freedom fighters with arms, with monetary contributions, 
with intelligence--many, many forms of support for freedom fighters--
but he would never put a U.S. military person in the middle of a civil 
war. He would help, but he would not make that commitment.
  Under the Reagan doctrine, therefore, we could help Afghan rebels and 
Nicaraguan freedom fighters. At the same time, we could also continue 
to remain strong in Europe and Asia because we could allocate our 
resources and we would not drain our resources in small civil conflicts 
in chosen places around the world.
  What bothers me about what has been happening in the last 3 or 4 
years is that we have been putting troops into civil conflicts in 
certain parts of the world but not all parts of the world. So every 
time we do it, it makes the decision not to do it somewhere else a 
little harder. We practically invaded Haiti and we still have 500 
troops in Haiti today. We had 18 Army Rangers killed in Somalia in a 
mission that was ill-defined and was actually mission creep. The 
original mission of feeding starving people had been accomplished, but 
we didn't leave. We decided to capture a warlord, something our 
military is not trained to do and, therefore, the miscalculation cost 
us the lives of 18 great young Americans.
  We have inserted ourselves into places like Haiti, Somalia and 
Bosnia, but we have not inserted ourselves into Algeria, where there 
are just as many atrocities as there have been in any place in the 
Balkans. We have not inserted ourselves into Turkey, where there is 
mistreatment of the Kurds. We aren't getting involved in the Basque 
separatist movement in Spain. We didn't step into Iran when the 
Ayatollah took over from the Shah and was assassinating almost every 
military leader that couldn't get out of the country, plus the 
religious minorities that were still there and their leadership. It is 
very difficult, when you start choosing where you are going to involve 
yourselves, to extricate yourself when there is no clear policy.
  That is why so many of us in Congress are concerned and why we 
realize the dilemma. We understand that this is not an easy black and 
white decision. We are talking about a commitment that the President 
has made. I do not like stepping in and saying that we shouldn't keep a 
commitment the President has made. Overriding that great concern is the 
consequence of not requiring the President to have a plan and a policy 
that will set a precedent for the future. I think we could explain it 
by sitting down with our European allies and saying, first of all, if 
we are going to change the mission of NATO, this must be fully debated 
and fully accepted by every member of NATO within their own 
constitutional framework. If we are going to turn NATO from a defense 
alliance into an affirmative war-making machine, I think we need to 
talk about it.
  I will support some affirmative action on the part of NATO, if we are 
able to determine exactly what would trigger that and not go off on one 
mission without having a precedent for a different mission and, 
therefore, creating expectations among more and more people that we 
will step in to defend the autonomy of a country such as Kosovo or 
Bosnia. We must not allow the expectations to be such that we are drawn 
into every conflict, because we will not be able to survive with the 
strength that we must have when only the United States will be the one 
standing between a real attack from a ballistic missile or a nuclear 
warhead or an invasion of another country where we do have a strategic 
interest. We cannot allow there to be so many questions because there 
is so little policy. That is the responsibility of Congress, to work 
with the President.
  We will work together. Congress will work with the President to 
hammer out a new mission for NATO. We will always do our fair share in 
the world. We will never walk away from that. We have to determine what 
is our fair share, what is our allocation. I submit that the United 
States will always be the leader in technology, and we will create a 
ballistic missile defense that will shield not only the United States 
and our troops wherever they may be in any theater in the world, but we 
also will protect our allies, if we have the strength to go forward. We 
will not have the strength to go forward if we continue to spend $3 and 
$4 billion a year on conflicts that do not rise to the level of a U.S. 
security interest.
  We must be able to choose where we spend our defense dollars so that 
we will all be protected, ourselves and our allies, from a rogue nation 
with a ballistic missile capability that can put a chemical or 
biological or nuclear warhead on it and undermine the integrity of 
people living in our country.
  Mr. President, the consequences are too great for us to sit back and 
let the President commit U.S. forces in a situation that I can't 
remember us ever having before; that is, to take an affirmative 
military action against a sovereign nation that has not committed a 
security threat to the United States. Before we would sit back and let 
the President do that, I cannot in good conscience say, well, he has 
made the commitment, even though he

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didn't have the right to do it, so we have got to let him go forward. 
Perhaps if we aren't lucky and if Milosevic does not come to the table, 
we would have more and more and more responsibilities because of the 
potential consequences that could occur if he does not come to the 
table.
  We must know what those consequences are and what we are prepared to 
do in the eventuality that an American plane is shot down, that we have 
an American prisoner on the ground or that we bomb and bomb and bomb 
and bomb and he still does not do what we have asked him to do. We have 
to determine what we do in that eventuality. I certainly hope that we 
will consult with the Russians so that this war does not escalate into 
something that we haven't thought about. If Russia decides to step in 
on the side of Serbia, we could have grief beyond what anyone is saying 
right now.
  I hope the President will work with Congress to fashion a new mission 
for NATO that will have the full support of Congress and the American 
people. I believe we could do that, because I don't think we are far 
apart at all. We cannot do it on an ad hoc basis. We cannot all of a 
sudden attack another country on an ad hoc basis and call that a 
policy.
  I hope the President will come together with Congress and have 
hearings. Let's hear from the American people on just what they believe 
is the role of the United States. Let's hear from Congress about what 
our commitments should be and what is a ready division of 
responsibility for keeping the world as safe as we can make it, given 
that 30 countries have ballistic missile technology, some of whom are 
rogue nations. Let us step back with our European allies and determine 
if this is the right decision to make, or are there other ways that we 
could be helpful to the Kosovar Albanians.
  I remember hour after hour after hour, over a 2-year period, talking 
about letting the Muslims have a fair fight in Bosnia, because they 
didn't have arms when two of their adversaries did. We never took that 
step. Now there is a cease-fire in Bosnia, but there are also many 
years to go before we will know what the cost is and if it can be 
lasting, because today, Bosnia is still as ethnically divided as it 
ever was because it is not safe for the refugees to move back in.
  One can say there is disagreement on just how successful was the 
Bosnian mission. We do not see fighting, but NATO has just toppled a 
duly elected president of one of the provinces. It is pretty hard to 
understand. I think it is tenuous that we would go in and forcibly 
remove an elected president while we are touting democratic ideals.
  There was a way to go into Bosnia, but Kosovo is very different. 
Kosovo is a civil war in a sovereign nation. There are atrocities. 
There have been atrocities on both sides. We are picking one side, and 
we are doing it without a vote of Congress. I do not think we can do 
it. I do not think the President has the right to declare war, and 
under the Constitution, he certainly does not. And under the War Powers 
Act, it takes an emergency. This is not an emergency. We are not being 
attacked. United States troops are not in harm's way at this point.
  We can take the time to talk about it, and the consequences are so 
great I think it is worth the time to set a policy that allows us to 
have some continuity for the next 25 years, so that our enemies and our 
allies will know what the greatest superpower in the world is going to 
do and they will not have to guess.
  Mr. President, it is a dilemma, and I realize it is. I do not feel 
comfortable with the choice. I do not feel comfortable at a time when 
we have gone out on a limb, through our President who made a commitment 
for us, even though we were not part of it. Nevertheless, I would like 
to give the President that support, but it is worth it to take the time 
and do it right and ask the President to come forward to give us his 
plan, to tell us what happens when American troops are prisoners of war 
or on the ground or shot down. We need to know what we would do in that 
eventuality before we send them there. That is the least that we can 
expect.
  I hope we can debate this resolution. I hope people will give their 
views. I have heard great debates already on it, not on the Senate 
floor, though. The time has come for us to have this debate, and let's 
vote up or down. There will be people voting on both sides in good 
conscience, seeing it a different way but with the same goal. So let's 
have that debate. Let's do it right. Let's don't haul off bombing an 
independent nation before the Senate and the House of Representatives 
has a plan and approves it or disapproves it. That is what our Founding 
Fathers intended when they wrote the Constitution, and it is more 
appropriate today than ever.
  I hope we will do that, because then the American people will know 
what is going on and they will support it or not support it. If we are 
going to have a long-term commitment, which I hope we do not, but if we 
do, at least it will be with the support of Congress as Desert Storm 
was. That was a tough debate. People spoke from the heart on both 
sides. They took a vote, and Congress supported the President going 
into Desert Storm. That is the way it should be, Mr. President. That is 
the way it should be under our Constitution, under our democracy. That 
is the way our Government works. I hope it will again as we face the 
crisis today that could have very long-term consequences for our 
country and for every one of our young men and women in the field 
wearing the uniform of the United States of America. Their lives are 
worth a debate and a policy, and that is what we are going to try to 
give them in the next 24 hours.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I listened to the Senator from Texas and, 
I must say, there are many Members of the Senate who have concerns 
about a range of these issues. But I will also say that one of my 
concerns is that as sensitive negotiations occur in Belgrade today with 
Mr. Holbrooke and others, a resolution that says ``The United States 
national security interests in Kosovo do not rise to a level that 
warrants military operations'' seems not to be the best of timing.
  I understand all the points the Senator made. As she knows, we have 
had some discussions about NATO in the past. I am someone who voted 
against expanding NATO for a number of reasons. But NATO does exist. 
This country is a part of NATO, and NATO has indicated to Mr. Milosevic 
that there are consequences to his actions. The actions he has taken 
obviously include the slaughter of innocent civilians.
  I am troubled, I guess, by having a resolution on the floor of the 
Senate at this moment. There will be a time and should be a time for a 
robust and aggressive discussion about what exactly is in our national 
security interest.
  I was someone who was nervous about Bosnia. I would characterize the 
circumstances in Bosnia differently than the Senator from Texas did. 
There is not just a cease-fire there, there is a peace agreement in 
Bosnia, and this country went to Bosnia as a peacekeeper, not a 
peacemaker. We did not send American troops into Bosnia to create a 
peace that did not exist. We sent American troops in as part of a NATO 
contingent in Bosnia to keep a peace that already existed. Those of us 
who were watching what happened in Bosnia understood genocide was 
occurring in that area. We got involved through NATO. Frankly, it has 
worked to this point in a manner that has undoubtedly saved the lives 
of many in that region.
  The Kosovo issue is, in many ways, as difficult and perhaps more 
difficult, and I do not know that airstrikes will have any impact at 
all. I honestly do not know. The Senator from Texas indicates that the 
President should consult with Congress, and she is absolutely correct 
about that. I know that there was a meeting on Friday. I was invited to 
a meeting at the White House on Friday, as were a number of my 
colleagues. I believe a bipartisan group of Members of Congress were at 
the White House on Friday when the President discussed the 
circumstances in Kosovo.

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  I, too, think consultation on these matters is required. Also 
required is a significant and robust debate about exactly what is in 
this country's national interest. The Senator from Texas has been very 
consistent on raising these questions over a long period of time.
  However, it bothers me some that the timing of this particular 
amendment comes at exactly the moment that there are these discussions 
today in Belgrade with President Milosevic about the consequences of 
continuing to do what he is doing. Obviously, anybody has a right to 
offer any amendment. But I was, frankly, surprised to see the amendment 
that has been offered as a second-degree amendment. I understand that 
there will be a vote on a cloture motion tomorrow at 2:15 on this 
second-degree amendment. And this is a very difficult time for us to be 
essentially sending this message to Mr. Milosevic.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. DORGAN. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I just say to the Senator from North Dakota that I 
understand the concern about timing. And I could not agree with him 
more about the timing. But I will just point out that the amendment I 
offered was actually offered early last week as an amendment that I 
thought should be considered in a supplemental appropriations bill 
because, of course, it will require a supplemental appropriation. As 
you know, after the bill was laid down and other amendments were 
considered, this second-degree amendment was put on Friday. And now so 
much has happened in the last 48 hours that the timing is not perfect; 
there is no question about it.
  I just say to the Senator from North Dakota that we have been trying 
to talk about this for quite a while. And the House took up an 
amendment 2 weeks ago that now is totally obsolete, because the Serbs 
have refused to come to the table. So I concede that the timing is bad, 
but I do not know when it gets better. We certainly are not going to 
influence Mr. Milosevic right this minute in that Mr. Holbrooke is 
talking to him right this minute.
  But I do think that we have to have this debate, because if we do 
start an action before we have had this debate, and before the American 
people fully understand what the issues are and can weigh in, I do not 
think that would be acceptable, particularly if it is a long-term 
commitment. So I do not disagree at all with what seems to be very bad 
timing. I just do not know when it gets better.
  Mr. DORGAN. If I might reclaim my time, the timing here is more than 
``less than perfect,'' as the Senator suggested. If I were involved in 
negotiations this afternoon in Belgrade with Mr. Milosevic, the Lott 
amendment would be of great concern to me, because I would expect that 
someone sitting across the table from me would say, ``Well, you are 
offering threats of airstrikes, but I can tell you that at this moment 
there is legislation pending in the U.S. Senate to prohibit those very 
strikes you're suggesting represent the threat to me.''
  I only say that I wish at this point we could have found a way--or 
could still find a way--to have the kind of debate about what is in the 
national security interest, what is the role of NATO, all of the kinds 
of discussions that the Senator suggests. Clearly, those are 
discussions we should and will have. But I rose simply to say I think 
the timing of this amendment detracts from the ability of our 
negotiators to express the threat of NATO action.
  If I were negotiating for our side, debating this amendment is 
probably the last sort of thing I would want to see happen, because I 
don't think it serves our negotiating interests.
  I do not say that personally in terms of anybody who offered this. 
The Senator from Texas indicated that she introduced this discussion in 
the Appropriations Committee, of which I am a member. She is correct 
about that. But this most recent amendment was laid down, I believe, 
Friday, and a cloture motion filed on Friday; and that is what I am 
concerned about.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. The Senator is correct, it was laid down Friday. But 
this amendment does not prohibit the airstrikes. It just says that we 
must come to Congress first, that the President must come to Congress 
and present a full plan first. And I think that is warranted before 
this type of action would be taken in this very unusual circumstance.
  But as the Senator said, it is coming to a head very quickly. This 
amendment was offered last week. The second-degree was also offered 
last week. So we are trying to have a clear plan, certainly, before we 
get into a situation which could be very long term, with very dire 
consequences. And I think the full debate is what we are looking for, 
not necessarily a cutoff, but certainly having all the facts before us 
before we make such an important decision.
  Mr. DORGAN. I would just point out, sending American men and women 
into harm's way is something I think no President wants to do. We've 
had ill-fated incursions and actions taken by Republican Presidents and 
Democratic Presidents alike. The perfection of foreign policy is not 
the province of any one party.
  I was sitting here--the Senator from Texas was talking about 
President Reagan--and I was recalling that I was in Congress when 
Americans in Beirut were killed by a truck bomb. There have been a lot 
of circumstances where we had to learn exactly how and when we involve 
ourselves. It is a lesson that is very hard to learn.
  The folks who feel very strongly about American and NATO involvement 
in Kosovo will make the case that if the situation is not contained 
there, it will spread very quickly and we will have a very substantial, 
broader problem on our hands in Europe. My colleague from Delaware is 
waiting to speak. He knows a lot more about these issues and has been 
involved with them much longer than the combined service of myself and 
the Senator from Texas.
  But I think all of us are probably nervous about these issues. We do 
not know exactly what the right approach might be. I only rose today to 
say that I am concerned about the timing of this debate. Just this 
afternoon sensitive negotiations are occurring in Belgrade with Mr. 
Milosevic. I hope Mr. Milosevic will hear at least one voice coming 
from this Congress, perhaps many voices, saying that the slaughter in 
that region of the world must stop--one way or the other.
  With that point, let me yield the floor. I know my colleague, Senator 
Biden, is waiting to speak.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. I thank my friend.
  I want to begin by saying to Senator Hutchison, I think she is 
performing a valuable service. This debate needs to be undertaken. She 
and I have had very different views on the Balkans from the very 
outset. She, along with a majority of my colleagues, 3, 4, 5, 6 years 
ago, told me that bombing would not work in Bosnia and we should not be 
involved in Bosnia and they asked, ``Why are we getting involved?'' 
They were legitimate, real questions. And she could have turned out to 
be as right, though I think she and others have proved to be wrong.
  No one knew then. I could not answer some of those questions then. I 
could not answer in 1992, when I came back from Bosnia and there was 
the report about what was happening in death camps, about the support 
of Milosevic across the Drina, with the VJ involved with the Serbs in 
Bosnia. I could not prove or convince people that there were massive 
massacres that had taken place and would be taking place. I could not 
convince anyone--either NATO or the President initially--that the 
longer we waited, the more the situation would deteriorate, and the 
harder it would be to put back together.
  But the question I was always asked then is the one I am asked now as 
a vocal supporter of using force, along with NATO, to bomb Milosevic; 
and that is, people say to me now, ``Well, Biden, tell me what the last 
step is. You tell me the first step now. Tell me what the last step is. 
You've got to

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have an end game here, Biden. If you're talking to the President of 
committing to a lift-and-strike policy in Bosnia''--that was 6 years 
ago, or more than that now, 7 years ago--``you've got to be able to 
tell us, if you lift the embargo and you engage in airstrikes, what 
happens?'' The following are the contingencies--if you list them, they 
are all reasonable questions.
  I say to my friend, the Presiding Officer and former Governor of 
Ohio, the truth of the matter is the world has changed so fundamentally 
that this calculus of what the last step will be is no longer relevant, 
especially if we try to answer it before the first step is taken. It 
leads to a policy of paralysis.
  I remember arguing then with a man I had great admiration for then 
and do now, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin 
Powell. I remember him making the argument that unless we could submit 
front-end to put 300,000 troops in Bosnia, then we shouldn't put 
anybody in there. My argument was then and it is now that that thinking 
is an absolute policy for paralysis. I guarantee you that the world we 
are entering in the 21st century doesn't lend itself to that kind of 
calculus.
  When there were two superpowers and we decided whether or not to go 
into Czechoslovakia when the Prague Spring was crushed, or when we 
decided whether or not we were going to invade the counteroffensive in 
Hungary when the Russian tanks rolled in, the calculus then was pretty 
clear. We could say if we responded, then there was a likely 
probability the Soviet Union would respond to our response, and there 
would be a likely possibility this would lead to World War III.
  It was a reasonable calculus. We could do a cost-benefit analysis and 
ask if the cost of involvement was worth the possible payoff. And we do 
this balance, this calculus. We did this under Democrats and 
Republicans for 50 years and did it pretty darn well. Indeed, we won 
the cold war.
  We are dealing with a different world now. We are not dealing with a 
group of people who are essentially cautious, who are part of a great 
empire, and who had scores of divisions along the Fulda Gap ready to 
roll into Western Europe if, in fact, war broke out. We are dealing now 
with a group of tin-armed dictators--malevolent, dangerous dictators.
  In Iraq we are dealing with a man named Saddam Hussein. I heard when 
I urged, along with others, that we should bomb Saddam Hussein, ``If 
you bomb Saddam Hussein, what is the second, third, fourth and fifth 
step you are likely to take?'' We couldn't say then because these guys 
don't operate under the same rational basis that we do. They are 
cunning. They are smart. But they have fewer cards to play, and their 
cards are less obvious.
  I approach things a little differently these days. I have been a 
Senator for 27 years, and I have been involved in foreign policy, 
deeply involved, for the bulk of that time here. I approach it this way 
now: Do we know what will happen if there is inaction? What happens if 
we don't act?
  In Iraq, if we don't act, we know for certain Saddam Hussein acquires 
weapons of mass destruction. We know this because he has used poison 
gas before. We know he has used chemical weapons. We know he has 
invaded other countries. We know that he has been willing to sacrifice 
tens of thousands of his people in a war with Iran. So we know where 
this guy is likely to go if we do nothing.
  We have a different calculus now. In a superpower world, the calculus 
involved fairly cautious actors. We did not have Russian troops 
invading Latin America. We did not have Russian troops, in the wake of 
the Cuban missile crisis, storming into Cuba. We did not have Russians 
looking for opportunities to have a Russian soldier confronting an 
American soldier. It was a pretty cautious group of folks we dealt 
with. Dangerous, bad, an evil empire, but pretty cautious.
  How about today? What is the downside of not acting? I will argue in 
a moment that it is immense. It is immense and it is clear, as clear as 
anything you can prognosticate in international affairs.
  We must remember that we are a European power. Whenever I am asked 
why we would consider keeping 4,000-7,000 troops in Bosnia to protect 
100,000 people from being massacred, I respond by saying that for 54 
years we have kept as many as 365,000 troops in Europe to prevent the 
subjugation of people. We now have 100,000 soldiers currently deployed 
in that theater. Why is the idea of using 2,000-4,000 of them to keep 
people of Kosovo from being subjugated and massacred such a radical 
intellectual breakthrough?
  Were the United States of America not deeply involved in the affairs 
of Europe, how many in this Chamber think Europe would be able to avoid 
the instability that has characterized it for 300 years? Who is going 
to step to the fore? France? England? Germany? They are all great 
nations, all great allies, but they suffer from disabilities we do not. 
They have lived on the continent for an eternity. They have old and 
deep animosities and differences and allegiances. All of Europe has a 
history of dealing with Serbs and Moslems, Albanians, Kosovars, 
Bosniacs, Croats, and it affects significantly their latitude.
  What might happen were America to leave? Ask the French whether they 
would like to see us pull up stakes and leave Europe, bring the boys 
and the women home. Ask anyone who has spent a lot of time dealing with 
European affairs what happens if the United States disengages.
  As a student of history and a participant in history, I ask whether 
America has ever been able to keep its distance from an unstable 
Europe. Lucky Lindbergh thought it was a good idea. A lot of other 
people who were more deeply involved in the conduct of foreign affairs 
thought it was a good idea. This questions represents an historic 
isolationism versus internationalism debate we have had in this country 
for over 200 years. Internationalists are characterized as 
adventuresome by their critics, and isolationists are characterized as 
narrow and self-interested by their critics. But it is a healthy, long-
term debate.
  My friend asks whether or not I would be happy to yield for 
questions. I am always happy to yield for questions from the Senator 
from Pennsylvania. I am not always able to answer them, but if he has a 
question, I am happy to yield.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I broach this subject gingerly, as we 
have shared many hours together on the train ride from Washington to 
Wilmington, where he departs. He should go to Philadelphia, but he gets 
off at Wilmington. I sent the Senator a note, as he was in the middle 
of his discourse and I would not want to interrupt him if he chose to 
proceed with the line he had. However, there are a number of subjects 
that I think would be useful to discuss with the distinguished Senator 
from Delaware because he and I have discussed foreign policy, as well 
as many other subjects, on many occasions. We have agreed on many 
subjects--not always--and on many of our judgments.
  The first subject that is on my mind is on the use of force in 
Kosovo. Specifically, the level of public understanding and support 
which is present at the moment. Senator Biden and I, along with 29 
others, attended a meeting in the Oval Office on Friday to discuss the 
situation in Kosovo. The general concern uniformly present, was the 
level of public understanding of this issue and the level of public 
support, and the question of how much public support we needed in order 
to undertake these airstrikes. That would be the first subject on which 
I would be very interested in the views of the Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be happy to respond.
  I think the Senator and I agree that there has hardly been any public 
knowledge or discussion of Kosovo. One of the reasons I am speaking on 
this matter is that I feel obliged to lay out the background on this 
issue: what is going on, what is at stake, why we must act, and the 
consequences of our action. I agree with what is implicit in the 
Senator's question: The American public has not been given sufficient

[[Page 5118]]

facts to allow them to be informed as to whether or not the course of 
action the President wants to take is, in fact, wise.
  I was telling my staff as I walked over here that, this weekend, I 
came out of a 5 o'clock mass, and a friend of mine--a very informed 
fellow, who is, I think, a supporter--pulled me aside on the steps of 
the church and said, ``Joe, look, you may be right, and I tend to trust 
your judgment in foreign policy; but I have tried my best to read 
everything I could.'' I listened, and he used this phrase: ``I listen 
to MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour every night, and I am waiting to hear 
somebody explain to me this deal in Kosovo. I know you spent a lot of 
time, Joe, on the Bosnia thing, but isn't this different? Explain it to 
me.''
  Then, the Wednesday before, I was at a St. Patrick's Day function 
where we raised money for a fund in the name of a deceased mayor, and a 
very intelligent fellow, a graduate of Annapolis named Healy, a 
premiere builder in our State, said, ``Joe, I'm a Republican''--I hope 
I am not going to get him in trouble--``but I've been liking you for a 
while. Joe, for God's sake, don't go down this bombing route.'' Then I 
started to explain some things to him and didn't change his mind, but 
he said, ``I didn't know that.''
  These are two illustrations, and I think you could probably canvas 
the gallery here and ask them how much they have heard about Kosovo and 
what do they know, and whether they believe what we are apparently 
about to undertake makes any sense. The very sure answer to your short 
question is that, no, the public is not sufficiently informed.
  At our recent meeting at the White House, you will recall that I, and 
I think the Senator from Pennsylvania and others, stood up repeatedly 
and said, ``Mr. President, ultimately, you must educate the public.'' 
The President told us that in his first news conference he was going to 
lead with Kosovo.
  But I have said to him and to the national security adviser, as well, 
that I believe the President has to address the Nation. I think the 
President should go on television at prime time, and take a half hour 
and literally, with a map and a pointer, sit there and say: This is 
Kosovo, this is why it is important, this is what happens if we don't 
act. When we act, if we do, we think we will bring about the following 
result. American forces probably will be killed, but possibly not. None 
were in Bosnia, but this is a much more sophisticated air defense 
system in possession of the VJ. They are much more sophisticated 
militarily than we faced anywhere with a bombing campaign in Bosnia, 
and it is possible that American forces will be hurt.
  Mr. SPECTER. If the Senator would yield for a follow-up question, 
when the Senator from Delaware spoke at the meeting last Friday, he 
referred to the issue of the likelihood of casualties. When I had an 
opportunity to speak, I did, too. We both made the same point, although 
you made yours with more emphasis, which is not uncharacteristic.
  I suggested to the President----
  Mr. BIDEN. I will take that as a compliment.
  Mr. SPECTER. It is a compliment.
  I suggested to the President that he be very direct on the problems 
and the risks, because if there is to be public understanding, the 
public ought to be informed about the risks.
  When the Senator from Delaware spoke, and he has repeated it today so 
it is not something I am telling out of a quasi-private meeting, he 
used the word ``probably,'' as opposed to the word ``possibly.'' The 
Senator and others including myself all emphasized the point that there 
had to be public awareness as to what was going on in Kosovo.
  The President has made a start. He led off his news conference with 
the topic, but he did not give a 30-minute speech in detail. That would 
be a short speech considering the complexity of this subject. This 
which raises the question as to what is the level of public 
understanding, which I think is a very important factor in letting me 
go to a second subject, if I may.
  The first part of this is hypothetical. If the President knew he 
would get an affirmative vote in a resolution from Congress on the use 
of force in Kosovo would he be wise to seek it? Would it strengthen his 
hand to have an affirmative vote? I, as the Senator from Delaware, do 
not like to deal with hypotheticals, but we have to on some occasions. 
So I ask my colleague about his view as to whether the President would 
welcome an affirmative vote if he knew he would get one, and would his 
hand be strengthened if he had congressional authorization before he 
took military action.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will respond by saying two things. I will 
answer the second part of his question first, which is very easy. 
Clearly, his hand would be strengthened if he had one.
  Second, the first part of the question: Would President support it?
  I also said in my statement to the President and our colleagues that 
I believe the Congress should--should--be confronted with a specific 
piece of legislation authorizing the use of force. I think it is 
constitutionally wise and politically necessary that be done.
  Mr. President, such a congressional vote will spark the very debate 
on this floor that I think is needed to further inform the American 
public about what is at stake.
  By the way, I called the White House after we had our meeting with 
the President and reiterated that I hoped he would send up a 
resolution. He did not. So I wrote one. I was prepared to attempt to 
amend Senator Hutchison's amendment. But, in the meantime, as is his 
prerogative, the majority leader came in and offered a second-degree 
amendment to Senator Hutchison's. So I now have no ability to amend her 
amendment.
  I am told that we are going to vote on cloture. If we get cloture--
and I hope we will get cloture--then there will be an up-or-down vote 
on the Lott-Smith amendment. That amendment says that the President 
can't take any action in Yugoslavia until funds are authorized. I would 
prefer having an up-or-down vote on that notion.
  My resolution says, ``The President is authorized to use the United 
States Armed Forces for the purposes of conducting air operations and 
missile strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and 
Montenegro, pursuant to a decision of the North Atlantic Council Treaty 
Organization in order to achieve the objectives in section 2.''
  Through my resolution, I want us to step right up to our 
constitutional task of deciding whether or not to authorize the use of 
force.
  I am the guy, by the way, who, in a very contentious meeting with 
President Bush, insisted that we have hearings in the Foreign Relations 
Committee on a resolution for the use of force in the Persian Gulf war. 
I believe that is a congressional prerogative.
  One might argue that the President doesn't need congressional 
authorization. I think he does. In my view, a President is always 
better equipped and better advised to go into a risky operation if the 
American people know what is at stake.
  My experience, Mr. President, is that Senators and Congressmen do not 
like to be counted. Keep in mind that I have been here for six 
Presidents. We in Congress don't like to be counted on issues of war 
and peace--Democrats or Republicans--because if, in fact, the risky 
business the President wishes to undertake succeeds, we all want to be 
able to say, ``Good idea, Mr. President. I was with you.'' If it fails, 
Congress wants the luxury of saying, ``I told him. He never should have 
done that. Bad idea.''
  I came out of the so-called Vietnam war generation. The only thing 
most everybody in my generation can agree on is that a foreign policy 
of this great nation cannot be sustained very long without the informed 
consent of the American people.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield again, first, I 
can confirm the contentious meeting. In fact, I can confirm that the 
Senator from Delaware was present in many contentious meetings, not 
only with President Bush but others. Those were

[[Page 5119]]

the meetings where some light was shed.
  I was interested to note the generational difference by the Senator 
from Delaware, and he indeed associated himself with the Vietnam war. I 
would choose to associate myself with the Persian Gulf war.
  Mr. BIDEN. I think that is appropriate.
  Mr. SPECTER. I don't want to move to a generation older. I would like 
to move to a generation younger.
  When my colleague talked about submitting a resolution, he was very 
artful, as he always is. He said it will be constitutionally wise and 
politically necessary. Then he moved on to say that he believes the 
President has a constitutional duty, although an argument could be made 
on the other side. As usual, the Senator from Delaware anticipated the 
next line of inquiry as to whether this military action is an act of 
war. I believe this is a subject which really could use some 
elaboration and some discussion between not only the Senator from 
Delaware and myself but others in this not totally filled Chamber.
  When the Senator from Delaware refers to the pending amendment 
offered by the Senator from Texas, Mrs. Hutchison, and the second-
degree amendment offered by the Senator from New Hampshire, Senator 
Smith, I believe the Senator from Delaware will be interested to know 
that the majority leader had looked for an approach where a substitute 
might be offered by the leader of the Democrats and where a substitute 
might be offered by Senator Lott.
  It may well be that Senator Lott would be interested and perhaps 
agreeable--obviously, I cannot speak for Senator Lott--to having the 
Biden amendment proposed as he has articulated. There might be an 
agreement by the majority leader, which I would certainly endorse, to 
have an up-down vote without a two-stage procedure and without having 
to go to a cloture vote.
  For the people who are watching on C-SPAN II, a cloture vote means 
that there would be a vote to try and limit the debate. It requires a 
supermajority of 60. This would enable us to vote on the resolution, 
however it is articulated.
  There are three items on which I would like the response of the 
Senator from Delaware. Let me name them and then come back to the one. 
Let me name them in inverse order.
  Should we have the vote strictly on a resolution without a two-step 
procedure, as the Senator from Delaware articulates it?
  Question No. 2: What are the considerations?
  What is the argument that he doesn't have to come to Congress, that 
we are not implicating a constitutional requirement for congressional 
authorization to undertake this military action, if it is an act of 
war?
  Let me deal with the most immediate question; that is this business 
of a cloture vote. I am, frankly, a little surprised to see the 
necessity to go to a cloture vote, although I do not question anybody 
who seeks to. I really do question this particular cloture vote. It 
might be something that is worth discussing, whether it is appropriate 
to have a filibuster over the issue of the use of force. A matter of 
this magnitude which involves a Constitutional authority, separation of 
powers, a provision of the Constitution of which there is none any more 
important.
  So let me specify the question for the consideration of the Senator. 
Is it appropriate for a filibuster to be staged to bar the Senate from 
voting on whether to authorize or deny the President authority to use 
force?
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me be precise. It is legally 
permissible but unwise. Let me explain what I mean.
  I think the reason for the cloture vote is not because the majority 
leader expects anyone to filibuster. It is a tool that he has learned 
and has sharpened and honed very well to gain control and maintain 
control of the agenda and provide for the inability of anyone to amend 
whatever he wishes us to vote on. That is what this is about.
  This has nothing to do with anyone filibustering. Indeed, I have not 
heard a single person suggest a filibuster. It has to do with the 
leader using, skillfully, as he does, the tools to be able to control 
the agenda of the Senate and determine what we will vote on, how long 
we will debate, and if we will debate.
  If the Lott-Smith amendment prevails and is attached to the 
supplemental, I predict that the entire supplemental will fail. If that 
happens we will never have any action on Kosovo or the supplemental for 
the near term. That is my guess.
  There is some confusion in the House, because they thought, as the 
President thought, that there would be an agreement between the 
Kosovars and the Serbs as a consequence of the meetings in France. They 
concluded that they should debate whether or not we would place 
American forces on the ground, as offered by the President, if there 
was a peace agreement.
  But there is no peace agreement. So someone introduced an amendment--
a freestanding bill on the House side--thinking they could pass a 
prohibition on the use of any American forces to implement any peace 
agreement signed. That was voted down.
  Again, the public and a lot of our colleagues are not adequately 
informed on this. The headlines when the House voted were: House 
Supports Use of American Forces In Kosovo. That is not quite true. The 
House said it would permit a deployment in a permissive environment.
  Now we are going to vote in the Senate on something completely 
different, something that may produce a very ambiguous result. The 
Lott-Smith amendment bars all funding for the purpose of conducting 
military operations by Armed Forces of the United States in Serbia and 
Montenegro.
  What does that mean? Does that mean that, under our Constitution, if 
this passes with the supermajority necessary to overcome a sure 
presidential veto, that airstrikes are not permissible because bombs 
cost money and they are going to be dropped on parts of Serbia? I 
suspect it does. Rather than take such an ambiguous vote, we should not 
shirk our responsibility here.
  Mr. SPECTER. Will the Senator yield for an additional question?
  Mr. BIDEN. I sure will.
  Mr. SPECTER. The Senator has gone through a discussion as to what 
Senator Lott may have intended by the cloture motion, by the amendments 
pending, and by--as the Senator from Delaware characterizes it--our 
arcane procedure.
  Mr. BIDEN. I could be wrong, but that is my reading of it.
  Mr. SPECTER. It may be we can move ahead and structure a freestanding 
resolution which has been discussed, maybe two resolutions, one by 
Senator Daschle on behalf of the Democrats, one by Senator Lott on 
behalf of the Republicans, and vote.
  But let me come to the question that I think is by far the most 
important, which the Senator from Delaware had broached. That is the 
question about whether there is a constitutional requirement for 
congressional authorization.
  As I look at the proposed military action, what has been described 
constitutes an act of war. The Constitution gives the President 
extensive authority, as Commander in Chief, but gives the Congress the 
sole authority to involve the United States of America in war--to have 
a declaration of war. That constitutional authority by Congress has 
been very, very significantly eroded.
  Korea is perhaps the best example. I had occasion recently to pick up 
Margaret Truman's biography on President Truman and, seeing at least 
her version as to what President Truman faced in 1950, I wondered if 
the positions I have taken have been correct. But I stand by them, that 
there ought not to be the use of force without congressional 
authorization. The use of force was authorized prior to the Gulf war in 
a historic debate which occurred on this floor back on January 10, 11 
and 12 of 1991.
  I agree with the distinguished Senator from Delaware when he says the 
Members of Congress like to avoid votes on these issues. We faced an 
imminent airstrike last February in Iraq,

[[Page 5120]]

February of 1998, and we chose not to decide the issue. At that time 
airstrikes were not made. In December of 1998, the Congress had ample 
opportunity to decide the question about airstrikes which did occur in 
mid-December over Iraq. Again, the Congress decided not to take up the 
issue. When we took up the issue of use of force in 1991, it came in a 
very unusual procedure, where the Senator from Iowa, Senator Harkin, 
raised a procedural point the day we swore in Senators who were elected 
or reelected in November of 1990, so we took up the question.
  So my view--and I have expressed it a number of times on this 
subject--is that however the matter is resolved, it ought to be 
resolved by the Congress. This subject has not really had the 
appropriate kind of discussion and debate.
  So, I now ask the question in a specific form to the Senator from 
Delaware. What are the arguments in favor of the President's position 
not to require congressional authority? Does the Senator from Delaware 
agree with the proposition that I have articulated, that the 
Constitution does require Congressional authority before military force 
is used in bombing in Kosovo?
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, you can tell the Senator from Pennsylvania 
and I are friends because I am happy to have his extended questions, 
because his questions always shed light on the subject.
  I agree with everything he said so far. Let me be specific. When 
there is a Republican President, the Republicans argue the President 
doesn't need congressional authority. When there is a Democratic 
President, all of a sudden the Democrats support the President's 
unilateral war-making power.
  Let me give you the argument that could be made by scholars as to why 
the President has the constitutional authority to act absent our 
approval.
  They would argue that our actions in Kosovo are not an act of war. 
But as the Senator knows, the war clause does not require an act of 
war; it requires a use of force, a use of force that constitutes an 
offensive action. They would argue that this is defensive in nature. 
Presidents do that all the time. Remember why President Reagan invaded 
Grenada. To save medical students. That was the reason. That was the 
thin reed upon which he held his entire rationale, because everyone 
acknowledges that if it is an emergency or it is to defend American 
citizens and their property, it could be done.
  In Kosovo, the argument could be made that there are U.S. personnel 
on the ground who would be in harm's way. If we do not take action, the 
roughly 40,000 Serbian troops near Pristina could threaten the small 
number of American forces in Macedonia. I can picture the argument 
being put together by the President's legal counsel. Because the 
American forces in Macedonia are now in jeopardy, there was a 
requirement to act to save them.
  There also could be an argument made that airpower would be used for 
the purpose of protecting American personnel in Belgrade. The President 
could argue that Milosevic, with a long history of genocidal acts and 
acts of brutality, is about to move on American personnel. That is the 
nature of the argument that could be made.
  There is also an argument, which I think is totally specious, that 
this qualifies as an emergency. The Founding Fathers, in this Senator's 
view, clearly contemplated emergency situations where the President 
would have to use force. That is why they gave Congress the power to 
``declare'' war rather than ``make'' war. They did not want to tie the 
President's hands in the context of an emergency.
  Another argument being made, which is not accurate but is made all 
the time by people justifying Presidential action in an area of making 
war or using force, is that there are 200 years of precedent. They will 
list hundreds of times where American forces were used without prior 
congressional authorization. It is a specious argument, in my view, but 
it is one that has credibility only as a consequence of its repetition. 
That is the other argument that will be used.
  People will cite Libya. Did the President have a right to go in? I 
found Senator Hutchison's rendition of history fascinating, because her 
memory of Reagan and my memory of Reagan were fundamentally different. 
I don't mean it critically. I mean it factually. She said Reagan never 
put American forces in harm's way. Well, hell, they flew all the way 
from England, all the way across the Iberian Peninsula, and bombed the 
living devil out of Libya. Was that a declaration of war? Most Senators 
said it basically worked. It cowed the Libyan dictator for a while, and 
no American got hurt.
  I cite that not to be critical of anything President Reagan did, but 
to point out that we often hear the precedence argument used. They say 
the Congress didn't do anything then. Therefore, that makes it 
constitutional. Yet there is a seamless fabric to the Constitution. 
Action, no matter how often repeated, cannot make an unconstitutional 
undertaking constitutional. That argument has been put forward by this 
administration and at least six other Presidents.
  I might point out that the Lott proposal, the very thing we are going 
to vote on, may also be unconstitutional. It bars Defense Department 
funds for the purpose of conducting military operations by the Armed 
Forces of the United States. The only exceptions to the funding 
restrictions are (1) intelligence activities, including surveillance; 
(2) the provision of logistics support; and (3) any measure necessary 
to defend U.S. Armed Forces against immediate threat. Note that this 
third exception would give the President the excuse I just mentioned.
  So the Lott proposal is flawed in two respects. First, as a 
constitutional matter, it is unnecessary. The Constitution already bars 
offensive military action by the President unless it is congressionally 
authorized. If Congress adopts the Lott amendment, it would imply that 
the President has carte blanche to take offensive action anywhere 
unless Congress makes a specific statement to the contrary.
  We are telling the President he can't do something that the 
Constitution already says he can't do. Then we build in exceptions, 
exceptions that give him authority beyond what, in my view and the view 
of most constitutional scholars, he is entitled to as a matter of 
constitutional law.
  Let me repeat the exceptions he builds. The amendment provides for 
providing intelligence activities. As the Senator knows, that can 
involve U.S. personnel. They may be all sitting up in Rhein-Main Air 
Force Base, or sitting in Italy. They may be on AWACS aircraft at a 
distance that can't be shot down. I do not know. It also could include 
spotters. It can include people on the ground. It could include U.S. 
military aircraft flying in Kosovo airspace, but not participating in 
the actual strikes.
  Secondly, it provides for a provision of logistical support. That 
could include logistical support in the theater. If I were the 
President's lawyer on this one, I would say, Mr. President, don't worry 
about this sucker passing. You are OK. You can work this one out. You 
don't have to fight Congress on whether using force is constitutional. 
With this amendment, you can do what you want.
  Thirdly, it excludes any measure necessary to defend forces against 
an immediate threat. Well, I guarantee you the argument will be made 
that once NATO decides to move, all those forces in Macedonia are in 
harm's way. Not only there, but American forces a little bit across the 
Drina River in Bosnia would also be in harm's way.
  I guarantee you that the argument will be made, if this were to 
become law, that the Lott amendment gives the President the authority 
to bomb and use force.
  Mr. SPECTER. If the Senator will yield on this point.
  Mr. BIDEN. Sure.
  Mr. SPECTER. When the Senator goes over the sections, they are so 
comprehensive as to make any prohibition meaningless.
  Mr. BIDEN. I think so.
  Mr. SPECTER. Which is one of the grave difficulties of having a 
resolution which prohibits Presidential action, but tries to 
accommodate to some special circumstance. In the articulation

[[Page 5121]]

of the circumstances, it renders it absolutely meaningless and gives 
such latitude to the President, which may well be more latitude than he 
has under the Constitution.
  I come back for purposes of a question, which I am about to ask, what 
the Senator from Delaware has had to say about the many occasions where 
force has been used, where acts of war have been undertaken. I agree 
totally that simply a recitation of those occasions does not establish 
a constitutional norm. One of the grave difficulties is that as the 
Congress sits silent, the Senate sits silent again and again and again. 
There has been such a total erosion of the constitutional requirement 
that the Congress has the authority to declare war. The situation as to 
emergency, which is used so frequently to justify Presidential action, 
is totally absent here.
  This may be the clearest kind of case which we have seen where there 
has been time for a Congress to deliberate, to consider, and to act. I 
believe that the missile strikes in December of 1998 against Iraq 
should have required prior congressional authorization. But an argument 
can be made, tenuous as it is, that we are still operating under the 
resolution for the use of force from January of 1991. I think it is 
wrong, but one can make that argument.
  When you talk about Libya, you may talk about the element of 
surprise, injecting some element of emergency. I do not want to get 
involved as to whether that is justifiable or not. But if you take the 
present circumstance, where the situation of Kosovo has been building 
up for days, weeks, and months, and where there has been ample 
opportunity for the issue to be considered by the Congress and where 
the President has not taken the case to the American people, and where 
debate in the Senate only draws three Senators--we are honored the 
Senator from Virginia, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, 
has joined us.
  I join what the Senator from Delaware has had to say about the debate 
we had on the War Powers Act in 1983, where I asked then-chairman of 
the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Percy, a series of questions 
as to whether Korea was an act of war, or Vietnam was an act of war, 
developing at that time a requirement for constitutional authorization.
  We then had a very spirited debate with the Senator from Virginia, 
the Senator from Delaware, the then-Senator from Georgia, Senator Nunn, 
and many others on January 10 and 11 in 1991. That is the kind of 
consideration we ought to have now.
  I believe it is possible we can articulate a resolution like the 
resolution of the distinguished Senator from Delaware so you do not 
have the prohibition and all these exceptions clauses where we do not 
know what we are talking about. If you have a resolution denying the 
use of funds and then exceptions, it is totally unintelligible.
  If we have to delay the budget resolution, this matter is of 
sufficient importance that we can do the budget resolution next week. 
We might impede upon the recess. We can get that done and have the kind 
of debate we need.
  I thank my colleague from Delaware for yielding and for the erudition 
which he has brought to this subject, as he teaches constitutional law 
and talks about this substantive matter to acquaint the American people 
as to what the constitutional law requires. I yield back to him so he 
can go on with his speech. I want to hear the substance as to why he 
thinks we ought to be undertaking these military strikes as a matter of 
national security, as a matter of national policy, as a matter of vital 
national interest, especially in the context where he says that the 
American people are not really informed, they are not really in a 
position to be supportive of this matter at this time.
  Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Senator. I will respond----
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wonder if I can interpose a question to 
both my colleagues.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I would be delighted to do that, but I want 
to warn anybody who comes to the floor, I came to the floor to deliver 
what I thought to be, if not enlightened, a comprehensive rationale for 
why I think we should act. I am happy to stay here as long as possible, 
and I am happy to delay giving that speech, but as long as the Senator 
realizes that when we finish our discussion, it is going to take me 20 
to 25 minutes to deliver this speech.
  One of the arguments here that no one has laid out sufficiently--I am 
not sure I am capable of it--is why we should do what the President is 
seeking to do, why we should do what NATO has voted to do, and why we 
should be either for or against doing that.
  We did discuss here a very important subject about whether or not it 
is constitutionally permissible to use force absent congressional 
consent.
  All I am suggesting is that the President and those of us who support 
the use of airpower in conjunction with NATO should lay out why that 
action is in America's interest. What are the costs, what are the 
risks, what are the benefits, and why should we do it? Those who 
disagree with our position should lay out in one place, where people 
can go to the record, why they think we should not do that. There are 
legitimate arguments in opposition beyond the constitutional arguments 
in opposition to the use of force in Kosovo.
  As long as the Senator understands that, I am happy to yield for 
questions. I do not want to keep him here to have to listen to my 
speech. When we conclude this colloquy, if I do not lose the floor, I 
will be delivering that speech.
  I am happy to yield for a question.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am going to take 1\1/2\ minutes to pose 
a question.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Senator should take as much time as the 
Senator wants.
  Mr. WARNER. Again, we all draw on our experiences in life. I served 
overseas in Korea with an air unit, as a combat officer, I might say. 
Right now, I am trying to put myself--and I hope my colleagues put 
themselves--into a cockpit and we are strapped in, as these young 
Americans are right now, strapped in waiting for an order, which could 
come in the next hour.
  Having met with the President the other day with my two colleagues 
here on the floor, I am convinced that he is going to join other NATO 
leaders and give that order at an appropriate time if the current 
mission of diplomacy by another courageous man, Mr. Holbrooke, is not 
successful.
  I hope we can start to focus pretty quickly, not so much on all the 
historical parts of this important issue, like sovereignty and 
constitutionality, but on what we are going to do to support our 
military. It seems to me that this body at this time has to look itself 
in the eye and say these men and women are about to fly, about to take 
risks with our allies, and I think it is essential that the Congress of 
the United States be on record as supporting them. I will address that 
in such opportunity as I may have following my distinguished 
colleague's speech.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, in response to the Senator's question, for 
technical purposes, I agree with him 100 percent. I am an admirer of 
the Senator from Virginia, in no small part because he was in combat, 
because he was in the military and because he knows, I suspect, what it 
feels like sitting there, figuratively speaking, strapped in waiting 
for an order.
  I am always very reluctant to argue a position that may get somebody 
killed, may get somebody maimed, may get someone put in a prison camp. 
And men like Senator Kerrey, a Congressional Medal of Honor winner, and 
Senator McCain, who argued against my position for years on Bosnia--not 
Kosovo; Bosnia--when men who are brave like that, men like Danny 
Inouye, Senator Chafee, and Senator Hollings, my seatmate, when they 
have questions about this, I take it very, very seriously.
  Mr. WARNER. If the Senator would allow me to make one clarification 
to your statement. I want to make it clear I said I served with others 
who were in combat. I was a ground officer who helped strap them in, 
who checked their radios and their communications.

[[Page 5122]]

Occasionally, I did get to ride along with them in a back seat, but I 
never put myself in the combat category with those brave men who, day 
after day, were strapped in to fly combat. But I lived with them, slept 
there in the same tents, ate in the same mess, used to go up and 
observe what they had to do.
  But let me tell you, I think we have to put ourselves in that cockpit 
right now as if we were qualified to be in combat and show that the 
Congress of the United States wants to support them. I think that is 
absolutely essential.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I did not mean to misrepresent. I have 
great respect for the Senator. I know he was Secretary of the Navy. He 
also is more informed in a personal sense about this--not, I am 
reluctant to say, not the issue; I think I am as informed as he is, or 
quite frankly, as anybody on the floor--but in terms of all that goes 
into a young man's or woman's head as they are about to take off the 
deck of that carrier or off that piece of concrete, or whatever the 
mission.
  But let me suggest that I will lay out for you why I personally am 
willing to do something that I am not happy about doing; and that is, 
vote to support asking the brave young women and men of our military, 
in this case the fliers--Navy, Marine, Air Force--to risk their lives. 
And it is a real risk. There is a probability someone is going to get 
hurt.
  Mr. WARNER. I look forward to listening very attentatively to 
hopefully most of it. I think it is important we do lay out the case. I 
will allude to, I think, much the same case that you do. But I do 
believe it is essential to this Senate to pass on the Smith amendment, 
if that is what is before us at this time; and then it seems to me that 
someone could possibly come on with a resolution like, as I understand, 
the Senator from Delaware, which clearly focuses on the issue: Do we or 
do we not support the use of force by the U.S. military together with 
our allies in this frightful situation in Kosovo?
  Mr. BIDEN. Thank you.
  Mr. President, let me begin my more formal remarks by referring to 
the concluding remarks I made on this floor on October 14, 1998, 
immediately after the agreement between Ambassador Holbrooke and the 
President of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, was made public.
  I said at that time:

       [W]e must never again allow racist thugs like Milosevic to 
     carry out their outrages while the alliance dawdles.

  Referring to the just concluded agreement, I further stated:

       [W]e must brook no more opposition from Milosevic on its 
     implementation. To use a domestic American term, we must 
     adopt a policy of ``zero tolerance'' with [this] Yugoslav 
     bully.
       Many of us had hoped that the mistakes that enabled the 
     Bosnian horrors to take place would teach us a lesson.
       Unfortunately, we have repeated many of those errors and 
     have thereby allowed Milosevic and his storm troopers to 
     repeat their atrocities in Kosovo.
       Twice is enough. There must not be a third time.

  I do not cite that to suggest any air of erudition, Mr. President. I 
cite that to say my position--right or wrong--has been consistent since 
the day this agreement has been signed.
  Mr. President, from the bottom of my heart, I regret to report that 
there has been a third time. There have been more massacres, have been 
violations of the agreement, and both the massacres and the violations 
are continuing as we speak; indeed, as I speak at this moment. Let's 
look at the disgraceful record.
  Everybody forgets that we are operating in the context of Holbrooke-
Milosevic agreement, an agreement that has been signed on by our allies 
and our friends. The President has been saying for the last month and a 
half that if Milosevic does not sign on to an agreement, assuming that 
the Kosovars do sign on, we will bomb. For an unusual thing, NATO 
already acted. NATO got together and debated this issue. And NATO 
members all voted unanimously to use airpower if in fact one side or 
the other did not--did not--agree. So what happened here is, there is 
an agreement. The context of this whole debate is that agreement in 
1998.
  Immediately following the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, machinery 
was set in place to prevent a recurrence of massacres that had already 
occurred in Kosovo and in Bosnia the previous years and to move toward 
an interim agreement on the future status of Kosovo.
  On October 25, 1998, the Yugoslav Government and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization fleshed out the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, 
authorizing exact numbers--exact numbers--of troops, the so-called VJ, 
and Serbian Interior Police, so-called MUPs, who are a bunch of thugs, 
would be able to be in Kosovo province. The agreement also specified 
the garrisons to which they were to be restricted.
  That was signed by NATO and Milosevic, and a cease-fire took effect, 
monitored by unarmed NATO aircraft, and international compliance 
verifiers were allowed into Kosovo.
  Like his ideological model earlier in this century, Milosevic has 
treated most of this agreement as a ``scrap of paper.'' The Yugoslav 
Government has flagrantly violated the limits stipulated in the October 
agreement. Rather than the 12,500 regular army troops and the 6,500 
special police called for--a total of 19,000--there are presently 
40,000 Yugoslav soldiers and Serbian special police forces in the 
province of Kosovo, in clear violation of the agreement.
  As for the cease-fire called for--it is a total joke. Milosevic was 
afraid to refuse entry of the international verifiers or to shoot down 
NATO planes. So as a result, we have a documented ongoing pattern of 
warfare, both against units of the Kosovo Liberation Army, but 
especially against Kosovar civilians.
  There have been countless massacres, but the most widely publicized 
one was perpetrated by the Serbs on January 15, 1999, in the village of 
Racak. There 45 Kosovar Albanian civilians--women and children--were 
slaughtered. The Serbs, of course, asserted that they all had been KLA 
fighters who had either been killed in combat or shot while fleeing.
  Unfortunately for the Serbs, a Finnish-led team of forensic experts 
that examined the bodies reported unequivocally that the victims had 
been forced to kneel and had been executed by being riddled with small-
arms fire.
  They got down on their knees. These bullet wounds were in the back of 
their heads. They were executed, just like they did in Bosnia, just 
like Hitler did in World War II.
  Just yesterday, Mr. President, 10 Kosovars were massacred by Serbs in 
the village of Srbica. During the past 10 days, the Yugoslav Army and 
the Serbian special forces have gone on the offensive, seizing the high 
ground above roads and railroads, moving in their most modern weaponry, 
including M-72 and M-84 tanks, and conducting a search and destroy 
mission against Kosovar villages suspected of harboring KLA 
sympathizers.
  The net result is a new flood of refugees so great that their number 
is now approaching 450,000--450,000 the number reached last fall.
  I might remind my colleagues, the only difference was, last fall when 
it reached that number, folks were able to flee to the mountains 
because they were not full of snow, they were able to hide. One of the 
reasons for the urgency that was being argued in the negotiations by 
Mr. Holbrooke was--and we all seem to agree--was that winter was coming 
and all these folks would die. Well, it is winter there now.
  Mr. President, the tragic events of Kosovo have a clear historical 
causality which I will summarize now. Kosovo is considered by Serbs to 
be the heartland of their civilization. There, in the year 1389, on the 
so-called Blackbirds Field near present-day Pristina, the medieval 
Serbian knights were defeated by the Ottoman Turks, which led to more 
than five centuries of Turkish domination of the Balkans.
  It was a courageous fight. They saved Christianity and the rest of 
Europe, but the bottom line was, they lost. And the bottom line was 
that the Balkans for 500 years were dominated by Turkey and many parts 
became Moslem.
  The Albanians, however, also claim Kosovo as their own and, in fact, 
can

[[Page 5123]]

trace their habitation there even further back than the south Slavs, 
the Serbs.
  As a result of the policies of the Communist dictator of the former 
Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito--whom I had the interesting pleasure of having 
lunch with in his private residence in Split, Yugoslavia, with now 
deceased Ambassador Averell Harriman, one of the most interesting 
encounters I ever had in my career--the former Yugoslavian dictator, 
Marshal Tito.
  In 1974, the Kosovar Albanians were granted the status of an 
autonomous region within the Republic of Serbia because of this 
history. Basically, the Albanians were allowed local control, while 
border security and foreign relations remained under the control of 
Belgrade. In the next 15 years, the percentage of Serbs in the Kosovo 
population dropped from approximately one-quarter to less than one-
tenth. At the time this agreement was reached--this autonomy was 
granted by Tito in 1974--one out of four people living in the province 
of Kosovo were Serbs; three out of four were Albanians living within 
Serbia. They were basically Moslem, and the others were Orthodox 
Christians. Since that time, it has become 10-1; only 1 in 10 are 
Serbs.
  Now, this has occurred for several reasons: A much higher birth rate 
among the Kosovar Albanians than among local Serbs; ``buyouts'' of many 
Serbian homesteads by Kosovars, some of whom earned hard currency 
abroad; and some harassment of Serbs by Kosovars, although nothing 
approaching the ethnic cleansing that is now being carried out by the 
Serbs.
  Meanwhile, in Serbia proper, an ambitious young Communist politician 
named Slobodan Milosevic engineered a coup against the communist 
leadership of Serbia. He needed a vehicle to consolidate his power, and 
the time-honored vehicle used by most rogues is rabid nationalism. He 
needed to be able to spread his newly consolidated power to the Serb-
inhabited regions of Yugoslavia outside of Serbia. So in a famous 
speech in 1989--he would have done proud any demagogue who has ever 
arrived on the political scene, and I am not referring to anyone here, 
I am referring to those folks who don't make it usually--in 1989, on 
the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Blackbirds Field, to which I 
earlier referred, Milosevic traveled to Kosovo and delivered a rabble-
rousing speech in which he promised that no Serb would ever be pushed 
around by anyone again anywhere in the world, notwithstanding the fact 
that it was a hard case to make that that was happening.
  On March 23, 1989, without the consent of the people of Kosovo, 
Milosevic amended the Constitution of Yugoslavia, revoking the 
autonomous status that they had had for roughly the past 15 years.
  The following year, the parliament and the government of Kosovo were 
abolished by further unlawful amendments to the Constitution of 
Yugoslavia.
  A thoroughgoing purge of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo followed. 
Thousands of hard-working citizens were summarily fired from their 
civil service positions, and the Serbian Government denied funding to 
basic institutions of Kosovo society.
  It is absolutely necessary to note the reaction of the Kosovars to 
these massive violations of their human and civil rights. What was that 
reaction initially? Under the leadership of Dr. Rugova, the Kosovars--
and he is a Kosovar--the Kosovars set up a parallel, unofficial system 
of governance. They set up schools, hospitals, and other institutions 
that make society run. Mr. President, under Dr. Rugova's leadership, 
the Kosovars held to a policy of nonviolence for nearly seven years. I 
do not know any other example elsewhere of such self-restraint anywhere 
in recent years.
  The United States recognized that Kosovo was a tinderbox that could 
explode at any time. For that reason, former President George Bush sent 
a warning to Mr. Milosevic at Christmas 1992, the so-called Christmas 
warning. Keep in mind, the Kosovars had not used violence; they were 
still peacefully trying to piece together their society. On Christmas 
of 1992, the three Senators in this Chamber at the moment were all here 
at the time--not in the Chamber--and President Bush, a Republican 
President, issued the Christmas warning that said the United States was 
prepared to intervene militarily if Serbia attacked the ethnic 
Albanians in Kosovo.
  Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BIDEN. Yes.
  Mr. STEVENS. Is that the quote from President Bush's statement?
  Mr. BIDEN. No; it is not a quote; it is a paraphrase.
  Mr. STEVENS. I urge the Senator to quote.
  Mr. BIDEN. As a matter of fact, I am about to come to that quote.
  President Bush's warning was contained in a letter delivered to 
Milosevic and General Panic, the commander of the Yugoslavian Army. The 
New York Times and the Associated Press quoted Bush's letter as saying: 
``In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the 
United States will be prepared to employ military force against the 
Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper.
  Let me read it again: ``In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by 
Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military 
force against the Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper.''
  Perhaps because of this Christmas warning, Milosevic refrained from 
an all-out military assault on the Kosovars, contenting himself with 
the legal repression that I described earlier.
  The Kosovars waited in vain for the West to help. They hoped that 
their plight would be placed on the agenda of the Dayton peace 
negotiations in November of 1995, but having been warned by Milosevic 
that he would walk out if Kosovo were brought up, the West, under this 
President, President Clinton, and our NATO allies, restricted the talks 
to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  So, finally, in late 1996, armed Kosovar resistance began on a small 
scale under the loosely organized Kosovo Liberation Army, abbreviated 
UCK in Albanian, but as KLA in the West. Gradually, the KLA escalated 
to larger attacks by February of 1998. Let me review the bidding again 
here, and I will get the letter, or the news accounts quoting the 
letter, if I can, for my friend from Alaska, and I will enter it into 
the Record.
  Now, what happened? In 1989, this genocidal leader of Yugoslavia, 
named Milosevic, had seized power and attempted to consolidate Serbs 
throughout the former Yugoslavia. He made a speech on the 600th 
anniversary of Blackbirds Field near Pristina to enrage and bring up 
the blood of every Serbian living in the region. It worked very well in 
Bosnia. It got them going in Bosnia and, as well, in Kosovo. Then he, 
under the Serb Constitution, by most accounts, unconstitutionally 
amended the Constitution, taking away the autonomy that Tito had 
granted to Kosovo in 1974. But even when that was done, the Albanian 
Serbs did not use force or violence. They were headed by a guy named 
Dr. Rugova, who said they would, by nonviolent means, attempt to 
reestablish their societal institutions, allowing them their dignity 
and their right to work.
  In the meantime, Milosevic comes in and he heads down from Belgrade 
and the orders are essentially: fire them all. Fire them all. All of 
the civil service jobs were eliminated, all of the schools were shut 
down, the language was not allowed, and so on. Still, the Kosovars did 
not use force. Still, they attempted, through peaceful means, to regain 
their autonomy. And with the help of President Bush--I can only surmise 
this, I can't read Milosevic's mind, but knowing what a coward he is, 
based on what he has done in the past, I expect that the Christmas 
warning by President Bush kept him from using the force he wanted to.
  Dr. Rugova came to me and others and said, ``Get us into Dayton. 
While this is being discussed, get us on the agenda.'' We made a 
mistake, in my view. We said, ``No; you are not on the agenda; this is 
just about Bosnia. This is about Bosnia and nothing else.'' And so when 
peaceful means began to fail,

[[Page 5124]]

and had clearly failed in late 1996, seven years later, the Kosovar 
resistance called the Kosovo Liberation Army--the UCK or the KLA, 
whatever you would like to call it--began to engage in larger attacks, 
a la the IRA.
  Milosevic then saw an opportunity. Having been humiliated in his 
aggressive wars against Slovenia in the spring of 1991, and Croatia in 
the summer of 1995, and having seen the Bosnian Serb puppets routed in 
the fall of 1995 and forced to accept a compromise settlement in 
Dayton, the Yugoslav dictator needed another crisis to divert the 
Serbian people's attention from the massive failure of his 
authoritarian, Communist economic and political policies.
  So what did he do? He did what is often done. He found a common 
enemy. He appealed to this naked, rabid nationalism and used the 
suppression of the KLA as a justification, as his vehicle, attempting 
in the process to drive the ethnic Albanian population out of large 
areas of Kosovo. What have been the results?
  To date, approximately 2,000 Kosovar Albanians and Serbian civilians 
have been killed. More than 400,000 Kosovar Albanians have been driven 
from their homes, including tens of thousands during the past 10 days. 
Thousands of homes in hundreds of villages in Kosovo have been razed to 
the ground. One-quarter of Kosovo's livestock has been slaughtered and 
10 percent of its arable land burned. A food blockade has been imposed 
upon large segments of the Kosovar population.
  The world has taken note of this. The United Nations Security Council 
has passed two important resolutions--Nos. 1160 and 1199--in 1998, 
decrying the repression and calling for an end to it. Milosevic 
publicly agreed to the U.N. demands and has cynically continued his 
state terrorism.
  Mr. President, why should we be surprised by this? We saw it repeated 
and repeated in Bosnia, until we had the nerve to act.
  What is at stake for the United States in all of this? In the 
interest of time, I will come back to the floor at a more appropriate 
time to enlarge upon this. But I will say that our entire policy in 
Europe since the end of World War II has been to promote stability 
through the spread of democracy. In order to create the security 
conditions for this development in Western Europe, we created NATO in 
1949, and for 50 years this alliance has provided an umbrella under 
which our allies have survived and prospered.
  Since the end of the Cold War, it has been our policy to extend this 
zone of stability eastward in Europe by three methods.
  First, we have agreed to a well-conceived, measured enlargement of 
NATO, which has already brought Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
into the alliance.
  Second, NATO has entered into partnerships with many countries in the 
region, which in time will probably yield additional alliance members, 
which also in the short run has created productive relationships with a 
great power like Russia.
  Third--and here is where Kosovo comes in--we have determined to 
oppose directly the aggressive policies of demagogues like Milosevic 
who are trying to foment ethnic and religious hatred.
  We know, as NATO knows, that its credibility is on the line in 
Kosovo. We have warned Milosevic countless times to halt his fascist 
aggression. We have cooperated with our NATO allies, and with Russia, 
in fashioning a fair interim settlement for Kosovo.
  We know that if Milosevic's scorched-earth policy of ``ethnic 
cleansing'' is allowed to continue, the inevitable result will be a 
massive tide of refugees, which would destabilize fragile democracies 
in Macedonia and Albania. We also know that Milosevic is itching for 
the excuse to overthrow the democratic and reformist government of 
Montenegro, which is a direct challenge to his authoritarian communist 
rule in Yugoslavia.
  We also know that the ultimate nightmare--which is not impossible by 
any means--is a widening of the hostilities to include NATO members 
Greece and Turkey, who have different interests in this outcome.
  Mr. President, the national interests of the United States are 
directly threatened by the continued aggressive actions of the Yugoslav 
Government in Kosovo.
  For that reason, Mr. President, I think we should do what I said 
earlier, which is, introduce a resolution authorizing air operations, 
in conjunction with the Activation Order voted on by the North Atlantic 
Council of NATO.
  I urge my colleagues to support that resolution.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I commend the majority leader and Senators 
Hutchison and Smith for bringing this matter to the Senate floor today. 
With fighting escalating in Kosovo, with the Serbs refusing to sign a 
peace agreement, and with U.S. military air units, together with those 
of our allies, poised to strike, it is important, if there is time, for 
the Senate to address this situation.
  Under most contingencies, the U.S. military should not be sent into 
harm's way without the support of the American people and the Congress. 
Our nation has learned, from recent contingencies that, without such 
support, when casualties occur, a clamor could begin to ``bring our 
troops home.'' We witnessed that in Somalia; we could see that again in 
Kosovo. Our military deserves our support. I say to my fellow Senators, 
if you were sitting in a cockpit, ordered to carry out strikes against 
the Serbian military, you would like to know that the Congress, the 
elected representatives of the people, is with you, supporting your 
mission and concerned for the risks you are taking.
  I first visited Kosovo in August of 1990 on a delegation headed by 
Senator Robert Dole. I commend this brave veteran for his mission to 
the Balkan region in the past few weeks in the cause of peace. His 
efforts contributed to the securing of signatures by the Kosovar 
Albanian delegation on a peace agreement.
  During my visit to Kosovo in 1990, I saw first-hand the oppression of 
the Kosovar Albanians by the Serb authorities. I returned to the region 
most recently in September of 1998, traveling through Kosovo with 
Ambassador Christopher Hill and elements of a courageous international 
observer group called KDOM.
  Since last March we have all closely followed developments--indeed 
the humanitarian tragedy--in this troubled region. And since last 
September, when NATO first threatened the use of force against 
Milosevic, NATO credibility has been on the line. We are now at a 
defining moment in this crisis.
  Since September, I have been outspoken in my support for the use of 
U.S. ground troops as part of a NATO-led force to implement a peace 
agreement that is in place relative to Kosovo. In my view, such a 
military force is necessary--once a peace agreement is reached--if the 
parties to the agreement are to have the confidence necessary to be 
bound by the provisions of such a peace agreement. And I believe U.S. 
participation in such a force is necessary if we are to maintain our 
status as the leader of the NATO Alliance.
  My greatest concern has been and continues to be that a deterioration 
of the situation in Kosovo could undermine the modest gains we have 
achieved in Bosnia--at a cost of over $8 billion to date to the 
American taxpayer; and could lead to problems in neighboring Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Albania, and perhaps Greece and Turkey.
  In addition, I share with all Americans concern for the humanitarian 
tragedy we have witnessed--are now witnessing--in that troubled land.
  But what happens if a peace agreement remains elusive, which is now 
the situation with which we are faced. It is one thing to deploy troops 
into a permissive environment for the purpose of overseeing the 
implementation of a peace agreement. It is quite another to use 
military power--air--to compel a sovereign nation to sign an agreement 
to end what is essentially an internal civil war.
  There are many questions that must be addressed. The most important

[[Page 5125]]

question is, what happens if bombing does not succeed? There are very 
few operations, historic examples, where air power alone has succeeded 
in meeting our military objectives. Some have made the argument here 
today that air strikes were the key to bringing the Bosnian Serbs to 
the peace table in Dayton. I had the opportunity to visit with two 
people last week who were intimately involved in the Bosnia crisis--
former British Defence Secretary Michael Portillo and former U.N. High 
Representative in Bosnia, Carl Bildt. Both of these men told me that 
air strikes were an important part, but not the decisive factor in 
ending the fighting in Bosnia. History records that the Croatian 
offensive against the Serbs, and the fact that the parties were all 
exhausted from fighting were of equal significance to the important air 
campaign by the United States and our allies. Today, that is not the 
case in Kosovo--the parties there are, regrettably, ready to fight.
  My point is,--there is risk in relying on air strikes, alone, to stop 
the fighting in this crisis. We must know what our next steps will be 
and how far we are ready to go with other initiatives to stop the 
fighting in Kosovo. If this first military action is taken--which in my 
view this contingency is tantamount to an act of war--what comes next 
and how far we are willing to go? We must have in mind not simply our 
first step, but our second, third or fourth steps before we commit U.S. 
troops.
  While one of my main concerns in this is the credibility of NATO now 
that we have threatened military action for many months, we must ask 
ourselves what happens to NATO credibility if the air strikes fail to 
accomplish their objectives? That would be a devastating blow to the 
Alliance if we take the drastic step of attacking a sovereign nation, 
and are not successful in the ultimate objective.
  What of the credibility of the United States and our leadership on 
the continent of Europe, in military as well as economic or diplomatic 
partnerships? What of the credibility of the U.S. military as a partner 
in other actions? There are important issues that can be debated in the 
context of the pending amendment.
  The Smith amendment provides that the Congress must be on record as 
supporting this operation before we commit the U.S. military to the 
crisis in Kosovo. I agree. We owe it to the men and women of the Armed 
Forces to act on this issue. For that reason, I will support the Smith 
amendment and vote for cloture on this amendment.

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