[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 4]
[Senate]
[Page 5068]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                 KOSOVO

  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, for a short while today and on Monday and 
on Tuesday, we will debating a very short, clear, and concise proposal 
by the distinguished senior Senator from New Hampshire, Senator Smith, 
relating to the use of American Armed Forces in combat in Kosovo and 
Yugoslavia.
  Mr. President, I want to state as forcefully as I possibly can my 
support for that amendment. Senator Smith states, I think with total 
accuracy, that the U.S. national security interests in Kosovo do not 
rise to a level that warrants military operations by the United States. 
It goes on to point out that any intervention on our part would be to 
engage the Armed Forces of the United States in a civil war inside the 
truncated but still nation of Yugoslavia.
  Mr. President, there was an op-ed column in the Washington Post just 
3 days ago in which the author set out three principles that struck me 
as totally sound and logical. Rule 1 is, don't involve yourself in a 
civil war; rule 2, if you do involve yourself in a civil war, take a 
side; rule 3, if you do involve yourself in a civil war and take a 
side, make certain that your side wins.
  Mr. President, the proposed intervention in Kosovo on the part of the 
United States essentially violates all three of those rules. Clearly, 
it will involve us in a civil war. To a large extent, we will not have 
picked a side because we will not be promoting what those who are 
revolting against the Serbian authorities wish; that is to say, their 
independence. And we clearly aren't going in with the intention of 
winning in the sense of settling that conflict.
  So we will follow the sorry example of this administration's military 
adventures so far: The billions of dollars we have spent in Haiti with 
troops still in that country now simply defending themselves, without 
having any discernible positive impact on that society; the low caliber 
war in which we have been engaged on and off in Iraq without any 
discernible prospect of removing Saddam Hussein from office; and our 
multibillion-dollar adventure in Bosnia, an adventure that has no end, 
because we are attempting to force people to live together who have no 
intention and no willingness to do so; and, now here in Kosovo we 
propose to do exactly the same thing.
  Mr. President, I believe that the situation would be different and 
perhaps more justifiable if the President were to go all the way and to 
say that the service of freedom requires liberating people who no 
longer wish to be a part of Yugoslavia and helping them attain their 
freedom. But we are not doing that. We continue to promote the fiction 
that borders will not be changed.
  The Secretary of State has justified this intervention on three 
grounds: that it is vital to the survival of NATO, a strange 
proposition when we have gotten NATO into this position largely 
ourselves and largely by accident; second, that there are humanitarian 
reasons to save the victims of this civil war, a justification which 
will also require us to enter a civil war in Africa, and perhaps in 
Afghanistan, and in Lord knows how many other places around the world; 
and the ancient domino theory that if we don't stop this fighting here, 
it will next go over into Macedonia, into Greece, and into Turkey. But 
if we were to defend Macedonia, at least we would be defending a 
sovereign nation.
  Mr. President, I am convinced that before the President commits our 
Armed Forces to combat in Kosovo that he should be required to seek the 
advice and consent of both of the Houses of the Congress of the United 
States. I am convinced that this is a matter on which the views of this 
body should be known formally after a debate, and by a vote. I am 
convinced that the amendment sets the issues in this case in stark and 
appropriate context. And I am convinced, Mr. President, that we should 
vote in favor of that Smith amendment; that we should not risk the 
lives of members of our armed services and the prestige of the United 
States to an undefined cause for undefined and secondary ends in a way 
in which those ends are highly unlikely to be met, or at least highly 
unlikely to be met without a permanent investment in both our money and 
in our Armed Forces.

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