[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 4]
[Senate]
[Pages 4734-4764]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                  NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE ACT OF 1999

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
resume consideration of S. 257, which the clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 257) to state the policy of the United States 
     regarding the deployment of a missile defense system capable 
     of defending the territory of the United States against 
     limited ballistic missile attack.

  The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.
  Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota--North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I am from one of those Dakotas.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, thank you very much for your generous 
description.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. DORGAN. I ask unanimous consent, on behalf of a colleague, that 
the privileges of the floor be granted to the following member of 
Senator Biden's staff: Ms. Joan Wadelton, during the pendency of the 
National Missile Defense Act, S. 257. And the request is for each day 
the measure is pending and for rollcall votes thereon.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, thank you.
  Mr. President we are now returning to the National Missile Defense 
Act of 1999, which is a very important policy issue before the Senate. 
My expectation is we will complete work today. I had noticed two 
amendments; and I shall not offer the amendments today, to the relief 
of those who are counting the amendments that are ahead of us.
  But I did want to take the floor to at least describe especially the 
substitute amendment, because while I will not offer it to this bill, 
this is really a debate about policy. This policy will not mean 
anything until it is funded.
  The real debate will be on the appropriations, it seems to me. What 
is it we want to buy and pay for? We can talk until we are blue in the 
face, but if we are not willing in an appropriations process to pay for 
a policy, it is not going to be deployed.
  Let me talk a bit about that. My substitute amendment will be 
something that I will likely offer during an appropriations debate and 
will wait until that day for a vote.
  The proposition before the Senate offered by my colleague, Senator 
Cochran, is very simple. Yesterday, I was holding something from 
Senator Lott and when I was referring to Senator Cochran I called him 
Senator Lott, for which I apologized. I certainly know the difference, 
and I respect both of them immensely. Senator Cochran has offered a 
proposal on the floor of the Senate that says it shall be the policy of 
this country to deploy a national missile defense system as soon as 
technologically feasible. In other words, notwithstanding other issues, 
as soon as it is technologically feasible to put a national missile 
defense system in place, we should do so.
  What is this national missile defense system? We had one once, 24 
years ago, in my home State. This country built the only antiballistic 
missile system that was ever built in the free world. Members ought to 
see the concrete that was poured, this huge concrete building in 
northeastern North Dakota, a sparsely populated region of our State, 
where the ABM, antiballistic missile, system was built. In today's 
dollars it costs about $20 billion. It was declared operational 1 day 
and mothballed the very next day. It produced a lot of good jobs in 
northeastern North Dakota as a result, a lot of construction, a lot of 
building.
  But what did we get for our money? And was a national ballistic 
missile defense system feasible 24 years ago? The answer, I suppose, is 
yes. We had a national ballistic missile site built and declared 
operational 24 years ago, so it was feasible. It used a different 
technology. The proposition was if we were attacked by some incoming 
missile from some hostile power, we would send up these antiballistic 
missiles with nuclear warheads on our missiles and we would shoot off a 
nuclear warhead somewhere in the heavens and we would destroy all the 
incoming missiles. That was the technology then, and we built it--paid 
a lot of money for it--and it was declared mothballed the day after it 
was operational.
  Now the proposition is that the national missile defense is a 
different kind of technology. It has the ability to hit a bullet, a 
speeding bullet, with another bullet. That is the proposition. We have 
had a lot of tests--a few successful, most unsuccessful. It is a very 
difficult proposition.
  The experts in the Department of Defense tell us that they have spent 
as much money as they can spend to pursue the technology to build a 
national missile defense system, but the technology does not yet exist. 
Now, when the technology does exist, what kind of consideration should 
exist in terms of its deployment?
  Russia has a lot of weaponry; Russia, of course, is the dominant 
country in what was the old Soviet Union. Their weaponry consists of a 
great many nuclear warheads on top of intercontinental ballistic 
missiles and bombers. We need to be concerned about those. As a result 
of that, we have engaged with the old Soviet Union and now Russia in a 
regime of arms reductions. Arms control talks resulted in START I and 
START II. The Russians, we hope, are prepared very soon to adopt START 
II. We have already done so.
  As a result of all of that, yesterday I held up part of the wing of a 
Russian bomber. Last year, I held up a metal flange from the door of, I 
believe, an SS-19, an intercontinental ballistic missile that held a 
nuclear warhead, a missile aimed at the United States. Yesterday, I 
held up at this desk a wing strut from a Russian bomber; one would have 
expected in the cold war that the only way you would hold a piece of a 
Russian bomber in your hand is if somebody shot it down in hostile

[[Page 4735]]

action. That wasn't the case. I held up a piece of a wing from a bomber 
from Russia that used to carry nuclear weapons that would threaten our 
country because the wing was sawed off that bomber.
  Who sawed the wing off of the bomber? Was a wing shot off in hostile 
aerial combat? No, not at all. It was sawed off as the bomber was on 
the ground, because part of the agreement between us and the Soviet 
Union is that they would reduce the number of missiles, reduce the 
number of warheads, reduce the number of bombers, and so would we. The 
result is these arms reductions have resulted in significant reductions 
in the number of nuclear warheads, the number of missiles, the number 
of bombers, the number of delivery systems. That is a success.
  I also talked last fall about the Russian launch of a number of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles early in the morning, and as those 
Russian missiles lifted off in the early morning and pierced into the 
sky, one could have wondered what on Earth was happening in our world--
a launch of significant numbers of ICBMs by the Russians. But it didn't 
worry the United States because those missiles were launched and 
destroyed in the area by prior agreement--part of arms control, 
something we agreed upon--that they destroy their missiles.
  Isn't it much better to destroy their missiles by taking them apart, 
pinching the metal and putting them in a warehouse, or sawing the wings 
off their bombers? Isn't it better to destroy a weapon before it is 
used? That is precisely what arms control is all about.
  The question I ask about this country's national missile defense 
policy is not whether we should have one--we likely will have a 
national missile defense system at some point, some day, when it is 
technologically feasible, when it is financially practical, when it 
will not injure our arms control agreements and not threaten future 
agreements. We will likely have some kind of national missile defense 
system. We will likely have it because many are worried that a rogue 
nation now--not Russia, but a rogue nation; Saddam Hussein or North 
Korea testing medium-range missiles--a rogue nation gets ahold of an 
ICBM and puts a nuclear weapon on top of an ICBM and aims it at this 
country and fires it. What kind of a catcher's mitt do we have to 
intercept it and prevent it from hitting our country? We do not have 
some sort of technological catcher's mitt that goes into the heavens 
and intercepts that missile. Therefore, we need to have it, we are 
told. We didn't have that kind of a catcher's mitt to intercept 
missiles all during the cold war.
  How did we avoid having a missile fired at us by the Soviet Union? By 
an arsenal in the cold war that assured anyone who attacked us with 
nuclear weapons would be vaporized and destroyed immediately. That 
convinced virtually anyone who would have thought about launching a 
nuclear attack against this country, that convinced them it was very 
unwise to do so. No one would launch a nuclear attack against this 
country.
  Some might say that might still be the case. But suppose a madman in 
charge of some rogue nation who gets one ICBM; ought we not have the 
capability of intercepting that? The answer is yes. That is one of the 
threats.
  If you take a look at the kind of threats, one of the threats is that 
a rogue nation will get ahold of an ICBM--it is not likely but it could 
happen. They are more likely to get ahold of a cruise missile, which is 
much more prevalent--of course, the national missile defense system 
will not intercept a cruise missile--that could be launched off the 
coast about 20 or 50 miles, fly a few hundred feet above the ground. 
That is not what this is designed to protect against.
  Another area of threat is a suitcase nuclear bomb stuck in the trunk 
of an old rusty car at a New York City dock to terrorize this country. 
It doesn't do much about that. Another threat of mass destruction is a 
vial of the deadliest biological threats put on a subway in a major 
city.
  We have a variety of threats, not the least of which is that a 
foreign ruler, of a bizarre nation will get ahold of an 
intercontinental ballistic missile, but if that happens will we have a 
mechanism to intercept it? The answer is yes, I believe, we will. But 
we must do what we are doing now with substantial research and 
development into developing a technology that works, and then deploying 
it in a sensible way that says we are deploying a technology that works 
in a manner that is cost effective--not a blank check, not a break-the-
bank approach--a technology that will work to offer real protection in 
a way that offers it at an affordable price and doing so in a way that 
will not jeopardize our arms control agreements that now reduce nuclear 
weapons.
  The amendment I had intended to offer says:

       (A) It is the policy of the United States to develop for 
     potential deployment an effective National Missile Defense 
     system capable of defending the territory of the United 
     States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether 
     accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).
       (b) It is the policy of the United States to deploy a 
     national missile defense system if that system--
       (1) is well managed, proven under rigorous and repeated 
     testing, and cost-effective when assessed within the context 
     of the other requirements relating to the national security 
     interest of the United States;
       (2) is deployed in concert with a variety of additional 
     measures to protect the United States against attack by 
     weapons of mass destruction, including efforts toward arms 
     reduction and weapons nonproliferation issues; and
       (3) is deployed in a manner that contributes to a 
     cooperative relationship between the United States and Russia 
     with respect to a reduction in the dangers to both countries 
     posed by weapons of mass destruction.

  A final point: I want everybody to understand that I have supported 
and will continue to support substantial research and development on 
the issue of protecting against a missile attack against this country. 
That has never been the issue. The issue here is, when shall it be 
deployed and with what confidence will the American people feel they 
are protected?
  Now, to make one point about the last issue, one Russian missile, an 
SS-18, with 10 reentry vehicles--or 10 warheads--will not be able to be 
blocked by this national missile defense system. One MIRVed SS-18 will 
be able to defeat this national missile defense system because this 
system is designed to provide some kind of technological catcher's mitt 
to go up and grab one, two, three, perhaps four or five incoming 
warheads--but not 10.
  And so, as we proceed, we need to understand what we are doing, what 
the limits are, and how we should proceed in a manner designed to 
protect the efforts that now exist to destroy the SS-18s that Russia 
has in their silos through massive reductions in delivery systems and 
nuclear warheads. Anything we do in this country to upset that 
capability, to upset arms control regimes, to upset the progress we 
have made under Nunn-Lugar, the kind of stability that exists when you 
bring down the number of arms between the two major superpowers, 
anything we do to upset that, I think, would not be in this country's 
interest.
  Let me end where I began and say I was intending to offer this 
amendment, but I don't think I will offer it today inasmuch as two 
amendments were accepted yesterday to the Cochran legislation. I don't 
necessarily view those amendments quite the same as others do. 
Nonetheless, the feeling is that some of those amendments offer the 
capability of saying, yes, deployment must also be consistent with our 
arms control issues with the Russians and others and must not injure 
those efforts. It must be consistent with something that relates to 
sensible costs. This cannot be a blank-check approach. So I understand 
that, and because of those two amendments, I think it is better to 
leave this issue at this point and come back another day on the 
appropriations side to further discuss this policy.
  Now that the Senator from Mississippi, Senator Cochran, is on the 
floor, let me again say to him, I don't quarrel with the question of 
whether we ought to be aggressively pursuing this issue about a 
national missile defense. We should. We have had robust

[[Page 4736]]

research and development. In fact, last fall, $1 billion was added--it 
wasn't asked for, but it was added--to DOD in the emergency legislation 
for national missile defense. I don't quarrel with a robust research 
and development effort. Nor would I quarrel with deployment. But 
deployment cannot stand alone. Deployment decisions by this country 
must be decisions made concurrent with issues about its impact on arms 
control, about not only the technological feasibility of being able to 
deploy a national missile defense system, but also the cost-
effectiveness of it and a range of other issues.
  So, Mr. President, I shall not offer the two amendments that I had 
protected. I thank the Senator from Michigan for his good work on this 
legislation. I thank the Senator from Mississippi for raising important 
questions and for his courtesy.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise with many in this Chamber who have 
risen and will rise to commend our distinguished colleague from 
Mississippi for his untiring leadership on this issue. It has been my 
privilege to work with him over these past months and to work with my 
distinguished colleague from Michigan, Mr. Levin, in having our 
committee address these issues and reporting the bill to the floor.
  Mr. President, I wish to convey to the Senate my strong support for 
S. 257, which was introduced again by Senators Cochran and Inouye. This 
is a very important and timely bill which deserves overwhelming support 
in the U.S. Senate. S. 257 was referred to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee early this year, and after consideration, the bill was 
reported out of committee favorably on a bipartisan basis.
  Mr. President, even once S. 257 is enacted, the administration and 
Congress will decide, on an annual basis, how much to spend on NMD, 
pursuant to the normal authorization and appropriations process. Such 
spending decisions will be informed by the best information available 
each year regarding technical progress in the program and the status of 
the threat.
  I also heard that S. 257 would make no contribution to the 
development or deployment of an NMD system. I do not agree, most 
respectfully. Commitment to the deployment of an NMD system will have 
two crucial impacts on the security of the United States.
  First, it will signal to the nations that aspire to possess ballistic 
missiles with which to coerce or attack the United States that to 
pursue such capability is a waste of both time and resources of that 
nation. In this sense, commitment to an NMD system would have a 
deterrent effect on proliferation.
  Second, if some aspiring states are not deterred and commit to deploy 
an NMD system, it would ensure that American citizens and their 
property are protected from limited missile attack, to the best of our 
capability. I use the word ``ensure'' the American citizens. We can 
only offer our best technical protection. I am not sure any ensurance 
absolutely can be devised.
  In addition to convincing the rest of the world that we are serious 
about defending the U.S. against rogue missile threats, S. 257 will 
make it clear to the American people that we are truly serious about 
this undertaking. This is important, in particular, for those in 
Government and industry who are now working so hard to make an NMD 
system a reality. Nothing could be more important to them than a clear 
signal that we are seriously behind them and that this is not just 
another false start.
  On August 31, 1998, North Korea tested the Taepo Dong 1 missile over 
Japan and demonstrated the capability to deliver a small payload to 
U.S. territory. Technically, that is feasible. This event demonstrated 
that the proliferation of technology expertise and hardware with which 
to build a long-range ballistic missile is accelerating rapidly.
  As the Rumsfeld Commission reported:

       The threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging capabilities 
     is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has 
     been reported in estimates and reports by the [greater] 
     Intelligence Community [of our country].

  To its credit, the administration has now acknowledged the existence 
of this threat and has taken significant steps to address it. I commend 
Secretary of Defense Cohen for his decision to increase funding for NMD 
by $6.6 billion over the Future Years Defense Program.
  In my view, however, these developments fundamentally change the 
rationale supporting the ``3+3'' policy. This policy has been based on 
a perceived need to gather more information on the ballistic missile 
threat, on NMD program affordability, and on technology maturity, 
before making a deployment decision. The administration has now 
indicated that the threat is all but here.
  It has also budgeted funds needed to implement the deployment 
decision, implicitly confirming that the program is affordable. The 
administration's only remaining decision criteria for which additional 
information is needed relates to technology development. S. 257 makes 
clear that the deployment would only proceed once the technology is 
mature. There is no apparent reason to further delay a deployment 
decision.
  Although the United States must engage Russia with caution and 
respect--and I underline ``with caution and respect''--I do not believe 
that postponing an NMD deployment decision will facilitate negotiations 
to change the ABM Treaty. Delay only perpetuates uncertainty about our 
position and creates the potential for misunderstanding. If Russia does 
not believe that we are serious about an NMD deployment, it will have 
no incentive to cooperate, in my judgment, in these talks. Once a firm 
commitment to NMD deployment has been announced, only then will Russia 
seriously engage in negotiations to modify the ABM Treaty.
  We must never forget that treaty was between the United States and 
the then-Soviet Union, the only superpowers that had intercontinental 
ballistic missile technology. And it is against that background that we 
must review the revisions of this treaty. It is in the national 
interest of the United States of America. There are many places today 
in the world where other capabilities to develop these missiles are 
rapidly progressing. It is in our national interest to modify that 
treaty at this time. I do not say abolish it. I say carefully modify 
it.
  The United States must make it clear that the decision to deploy an 
NMD decision is based on a threat not envisioned at the time the ABM 
Treaty was negotiated. I was then Secretary of the U.S. Navy, and I was 
in Moscow when the ABM Treaty was signed. I have a vivid recollection 
of that backdrop.
  The United States, however, must make it equally clear that it will 
proceed with deployment of an NMD system whether or not Russia agrees 
to modify the ABM Treaty. The only way to clearly send such a signal is 
by a change in U.S. policy. In my view, the best way to send that 
signal is by enacting S. 257.
  Mr. President, in summary, I believe the need for the deployment of 
NMD is compelling. I believe it is equally clear that we must modify 
our policies so everyone knows where we stand on NMD deployment. We 
must send this signal to our potential enemies, to Russia, and, indeed, 
to ourselves. And I do not put Russia in the context of a potential 
enemy; other nations I was referring to in that statement. The threat 
exists, and continues to grow. S. 257, which clearly indicates the 
commitment to deploy NMD, will ensure the United States is prepared to 
meet that threat.
  Mr. President, I am going to pose a question or two to my good friend 
and distinguished colleague from Michigan, Mr. Levin, who is the 
ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee on which we serve 
together. But over our 21 years in the Senate, it is interesting that 
Senator Levin, Senator Cochran, and I all came to the Senate at the 
sametime. Senator Cochran, however, is senior to me. I will always 
respect him for that, and he reminds

[[Page 4737]]

me on a daily basis. But nevertheless, we came together. We have many, 
many times in those 21 years debated on this glorious floor of the U.S. 
Senate the issues relating to arms control. All too often, regrettably, 
Senator Cochran and I are on one side and Senator Levin on the other.
  But I remember not so long ago in the context of the expansion of 
NATO that I tried as forcefully as I could to resist that expansion. 
That is history now. The decision was made by this body to go forward 
and accept three new nations. I stated from this very chair that I 
would support that. So the debate is over. But it is interesting to go 
back and look at some of the statements made in the context of NATO 
expansion and see how they relate to this very debate that we are 
having today.
  Many of those who stood on this floor defending expansion--my good 
friend from Michigan was among them--now argue that we must not declare 
our policy to deploy a national missile defense system. I ask the 
question, Should the Senate be more concerned about Russia's opposition 
to NMD than we were to Russia's opposition to NATO expansion? It is a 
fair question.
  I am reminded of the statements by Secretary of State Albright to the 
Foreign Relations Committee. And I happened to have been in the room at 
the time she made it. I quote:

       Russian opposition to NATO enlargement is real. But we 
     should see it for what it is:

  A very interesting statement, ``But we should see it for what it 
is.''

       a product of old misperceptions about NATO, and old ways of 
     thinking. . . . Instead of changing our policies to 
     accommodate Russia's outdated fears, we need to encourage 
     Russia's more modern aspirations.

  If we simply deleted Secretary Albright's reference to ``NATO 
enlargement,'' and substitute the term ``NMD,'' I think we would have 
an interesting quote. If I may, I respectfully revise the statement of 
my good friend, the Secretary of State, to read: ``Russian opposition 
to NMD is real. But we should see it for what it is: a product of old 
misconceptions about NMD and old ways of thinking. . . . Instead of 
changing our policies to accommodate Russia's outdated fears, we need 
to encourage Russia's more modern aspirations.''
  Secretary Albright also indicated to the Foreign Relations Committee 
that NATO enlargement would in no way jeopardize START II, as some of 
my colleagues have argued the National Missile Defense Act would do. 
Once again, if we substitute the term ``NMD'' for the term ``NATO 
enlargement,'' I think it would be about right. I quote:

       While I think this prospect [Duma ratification to START II] 
     is by no means certain, it would be far less so if we gave 
     the Duma any reason to think it would hold up [NMD] by 
     holding up START II.

  I just hope that at some point my good friend from Michigan might 
reply to the observations of his good friend, the Senator from 
Virginia.
  I say with respect to the President, Secretary of State, and others 
that this is an example of the difficulty that we are having with 
continuing confrontations between this administration and the Congress 
of the United States, most particularly the Senate, on very, very 
serious foreign policy concerns.
  Mr. President, today we are facing tremendous uncertainties in 
Kosovo, and trying to address major decisions as to whether to use 
force should the talks not be successful in Paris. The outcome of that 
situation could definitely relate to the future of our work and our 
commitment of over $9 billion in Bosnia.
  We have a serious problem with China today as to the degree that we 
continue or not continue our relations with China given this tragic 
case of espionage, the allegations of which are being studied by this 
body with great care, and, indeed, by the committee over which I am 
privileged to be Chair.
  I can count other serious foreign policy considerations. Here we are 
debating this missile defense legislation, and we are now seeing under 
the leadership of Senator Cochran, and, indeed, greater and greater 
bipartisanship which is evolving on the other side of the aisle, a 
consensus coming about to pass this critical piece of legislation.
  I say to the administration that they have to select more carefully 
the battles they wish to wage with the Congress for fear of losing them 
all. This is a battle which should have been recognized by the 
administration months ago as one not to be waged with the intensity 
that this one has experienced. That same fervor and intensity should be 
applied to the other major issues before us, whether it is Kosovo, 
Bosnia, or China, and not have the attention of the U.S. Senate so 
reflected to resolve this.
  But, nevertheless, I thank, again, the distinguished leader from 
Mississippi for his tireless work. I think that this bill will emerge 
with the strongest bipartisan support. To some extent I think the 
amendments have helped. But I have studied both of them carefully. Both 
of the votes were 99 to 0. I think that that tells a story in and of 
itself, but nevertheless I wish our managers well.
  I see my distinguished colleague from Michigan about to seek 
recognition. I just wonder if the Senator has a comment about my NATO 
observations, I say to my good friend from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, my good friend from Virginia is very wise 
and perceptive. Indeed, I do have a comment. He asked the question 
whether the Senate is more concerned about Russian reaction to national 
missile defense than about Russian reaction to NATO expansion. And, of 
course, there is a huge difference. In one case we have a treaty with 
Russia. It is called the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. And before we 
pull out of that treaty, or unilaterally act in a way that is in 
violation of that treaty, we ought to consider the ramifications.
  The point is we have a treaty with Russia that has made possible 
significant nuclear arms reduction. We had no such treaty with Russia 
relative to NATO; quite the opposite--our NATO treaty was against the 
former Soviet Union. Russia wasn't part of any NATO treaty. Its 
predecessor, the Soviet Union, was the problem against which that NATO 
treaty was created. So this is a day-and-night comparison. Surely, when 
you have a treaty with someone, before you unilaterally breach it or 
threaten to breach it, you should consider the consequences of that. We 
have such a treaty with Russia. The opposite was true with NATO. So the 
difference is a 180-degree difference.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to remind my colleague that we had, 
in the course of that debate on expansion in the same time period, led 
the way for Russia to begin to work with NATO, and while it wasn't a 
formalized treaty as such, it was a very interesting and unique 
arrangement between Russia and NATO whereby Russia would have a forum 
in which it could express its concerns and hopefully work 
cooperatively.
  Mr. LEVIN. The Senator is exactly correct. And that is precisely what 
we are now doing relative to our treaty with Russia, with the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty. We are sitting down with Russia now and 
seeing whether we can't negotiate a modification in that treaty which 
would permit two things to happen: 1, the deployment of a national 
missile defense should we decide to deploy it; and, 2, continuing 
nuclear arms reductions which have been provided for--in effect, 
permitted--under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. So that is exactly 
what we are trying to do now.
  But any comparison between the situation of having a treaty 
relationship with somebody and having a treaty which was aimed against 
that person, it seems to me, is an inapt comparison. I just wanted to 
briefly comment on it.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I may, did the Senator from Michigan 
have a chance to see a rather interesting comment by Mikhail Gorbachev 
and how he referred to the NATO expansion as being an act that was in 
contravention of his clearest of understandings with the leaders of 
this country, the United States, at that time?
  Mr. LEVIN. I did. I believe that our leaders have denied such an 
agreement with Mr. Gorbachev, and we would be happy to dig up the 
difference relative to that.

[[Page 4738]]


  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I could ask one other question of my 
distinguished colleague from Michigan, he refers to negotiations, and 
indeed I think those negotiations have been ably conducted by a former 
member of our Armed Services staff, Mr. Robert Bell, for whom the 
Senator from Michigan and I have respect, having worked with him 
through the years. But how many such negotiations have taken place over 
what period of time, I ask my friend?
  Mr. LEVIN. I think those negotiations began just a few weeks ago. And 
I was urging the administration in the middle of last year to begin 
those discussions and those negotiations. So the actual preliminary 
discussions I think began in February. As far as I am concerned, it 
would have been better to begin those discussions before that, and I 
had urged the administration last year to begin them. But as I 
understand it, there were informal discussions which had occurred 
before this recent visit that the Senator from Virginia, my good 
friend, has referred to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, my recollection is that this had been 
going on for at least 2 years. Whether you caption it as informal 
versus today being formal, we will have to look at the record, but this 
has been going on for 2 years without any real, I think, ``concrete''--
and that is the famous word that the old Soviet Union and now Russia 
use--results. And I believe the initiative by the Senator from 
Mississippi and what I anticipate will be the passage of this bill by 
the Senate will give the proper incentive to get those negotiations 
completed in a mutually satisfactory way.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. I would agree that the bill as it now stands, with an 
amendment which adopts as a policy of the United States to continue to 
negotiate arms reductions with Russia, is indeed going to be an 
incentive to those discussions because it no longer threatens to just 
unilaterally breach a treaty between ourselves and Russia.
  On the first point, however, I would disagree with my dear friend 
from Virginia. I believe the discussions with the Russians on our 
National Missile Defense program did not begin until last year, and the 
informal discussions relative to modifications in the ABM Treaty did 
not occur until February. I believe, in fact, I wrote the 
administration--and I think I shared my letter with my friend from 
Virginia--I wrote the administration I believe in August urging that 
these discussions and negotiations take place.
  Mr. President, in 1993 the administration, the Clinton 
administration, just as it came into office, terminated the defense and 
space talks which dealt precisely with modifications of the ABM Treaty. 
I think we can produce a record how this debate on the ABM Treaty has 
gone on for a very, very long time without any productive or concrete 
results.
  Mr. LEVIN. The debate on the ABM Treaty has gone on since before the 
treaty was up here for ratification.
  Mr. WARNER. I am talking about, Mr. President, the negotiations 
between the administration and Russia on such modifications as we felt 
were necessary for various aspects of our missile defense program.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. The discussions between us and the Russians relative to 
the demarcation line, for instance, between a theater missile defense 
and strategic defense, the defense against strategic missiles has, 
indeed, been going on a long time.
  Mr. WARNER. That is correct.
  Mr. LEVIN. That is not the issue, though, that we have been 
discussing here this morning. The issue we have been discussing here 
this morning is whether or not we can work out with the Russians a 
modification of the ABM Treaty such as to permit us to deploy what is 
admittedly covered now by the treaty, namely a limited National Missile 
Defense system.
  The discussions which have been referred to by my friend from 
Virginia had to do with the question of what is or is not covered by 
the treaty as it is currently written: What is the correct demarcation 
between those missile defenses which are covered by the treaty and 
those missile defenses which are not? And, indeed, he is correct; those 
demarcation discussions have been going on with the Russians, and 
indeed there was an agreement relative to the proper demarcation line. 
But the discussions relative to modifying the treaty so that we could 
deploy a limited national missile defense against what is admittedly 
covered by the treaty are discussions which have only begun in a 
preliminary manner in February of this year and informally began, I 
believe, last year.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I say to my good friend that is correct. 
An agreement was reached between Russia and the United States, and it 
is interesting that agreement has never been submitted to the Senate, 
although I and other Senators have repeatedly called for it. This is 
another example where I think the Senate needs to assert itself more 
strongly in areas of foreign policy, and this is one of those areas 
which is very clearly in need of a show of strength by the Congress, 
through the Senate, to assert its really coequal right under the 
Constitution to deal with issues of foreign policy. And that is why I 
so strongly support the legislation.
  Mr. LEVIN. What is intriguing--Mr. President, I do not know who has 
the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, what is intriguing is, in fact, we did 
assert our position relative to the correct demarcation line, and 
indeed we put it in law, and indeed the demarcation line which was 
adopted by this administration and Russia followed what we had put into 
law. So we had asserted what our position was as the U.S. Senate and, 
if my memory is correct, as a Congress, because I believe the language 
ended up in the final authorization bill as to where that demarcation 
line should be. The agreement which was reached indeed--my 
understanding is and my recollection is--followed the demarcation line 
which the Congress had set forth in that authorization bill.
  So it is nothing new for Congress to assert its involvement in these 
kinds of issues. We should. We have. We should be partners with the 
administration on this issue. I believe this bill as amended--I know it 
is now acceptable to the President with these amendments--represents 
the effort to come up with a more bipartisan approach to these critical 
national security issues.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I may, I say to my good friend, the 
Bush administration was close to changing the ABM Treaty pursuant to 
negotiations with Russia to deploy a limited NMD. I draw that to my 
colleague's attention. When the Clinton administration came in, it 
terminated these talks in 1993 and, indeed, downplayed significantly 
the need for an NMD system.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Burns). The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I wonder if my friend from Virginia would 
join in a colloquy, if possible, to try to flesh out a couple of 
issues.
  Mr. WARNER. I will be happy to.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, let me begin my question to him by saying 
I, with many others here, am cognizant of the threat that has now been 
more realistically defined and is more present. I think most people 
feel a safety measure with the capacity that might save Hawaii or some 
other sector of the United States from some accidental, rogue, or 
unauthorized launch, makes sense in theory. And I certainly support 
that. But many people have expressed concerns. I know the Senator from 
Virginia has long been a member of the Arms Control Observer Group, 
long been involved in these issues, and has a great sensitivity to the 
perceptions of other countries which often drive arms races and the 
building of weapons.
  I assume, based on that experience, the Senator from Virginia will 
acknowledge that if the United States proceeded in some way that 
altered the perception of another country--be it Russia or China or 
someone with whom

[[Page 4739]]

we are currently trying to cooperate--that could, indeed, have an 
impact on the weapons they might build or, ultimately, on the security 
of the United States itself.
  Is that a fair statement of how perceptions operate in arms races?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I readily concede that misconceptions can 
arise. But Russia today, while President Yeltsin still holds, let's 
say, the trappings of office, is largely guided by Mr. Primakov. I have 
had the opportunity to deal with him through the years, as has, I 
think, my good colleague from Massachusetts, likewise.
  Let me tell you, Mr. Primakov is not a man who doesn't fully 
understand exactly the nature of this debate and the need for the 
United States of America to prepare for its defense, not necessarily 
against Russia, but against other nations emerging with this threat. I 
do not think, in the context of this debate on this amendment, a 
misconception could arise, given Mr. Primakov's extensive experience. 
He will soon be visiting the Nation's Capital as a guest of our 
President. I am hopeful that I, and perhaps the Senator from 
Massachusetts and others, can have an opportunity to engage him, as we 
have in years past, in a colloquy on a wide range of issues. He is a 
very well informed and a very astute individual.
  So in this particular instance, I do not believe that is a serious 
problem, I say to the Senator.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, if I could further continue the colloquy--
and I thank the Senator for his answer--I concur with his judgment 
about Mr. Primakov. I have had the pleasure of having a discourse or 
two with him. He is a very thoughtful and articulate person who 
understands the nature of this. But that is not to say that other 
politicians, other wings of other various ideologies, do not try to use 
these kinds of issues to play politics within their countries. Nor is 
to it say that conceivably--and I am only talking about the 
possibilities here, because it is important for us to put any 
deployment issue or any future procurement issue in the context of 
these realities --China could also make certain determinations with 
respect to this. Is that not also a fair judgment?
  Mr. WARNER. Senator, as a generality, I think you speak with fairness 
on this issue. But, again, I wish to just try to limit my remarks as to 
this specific piece of legislation, although prior to coming on the 
floor I did make what I felt were some constructive criticisms. The 
administration should begin to pick its fights with the Congress on 
foreign policy issues. This is one that should have been reconciled 
some time back, quietly, and acknowledging that it was in the interests 
of the United States to proceed as we are now doing on this 
legislation, and save its full force and effect for other issues, 
whether they are Kosovo or China or Bosnia or whatever they may be.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, again, I appreciate the answer and I 
appreciate the sensitivity the Senator has shown, as to how we might 
have gotten here otherwise. I cannot disagree with him with respect to 
that. But, by the same token, there has been a push here to try to 
achieve certainty with respect to technology, technological feasibility 
governing an issue of deployment. There are a lot of questions about 
what kind of system we might or might not really be building.
  The early concepts that surrounded this entire debate envisioned a 
system that did more than simply address the question of a rogue 
missile or an accidental launch or even a few individual missiles. The 
best estimate of the threat from North Korea, in 15 or 20 years, is 
still dealing with minimalist numbers. Always, when we are debating in 
the context of Russia or in the context of China, we are dealing with 
multiple numbers, and the system you need to deal, with any reality, 
with those kinds of potential adversaries--I underscore ``potential''; 
we view neither of them that way today, as the Senator has said--but 
the kind of system that would be needed to deal with that is a system 
that most people make the judgment is technologically so expensive and 
so complicated--because it requires the SWIR intercept capacity at 
boost phase, it requires the capacity to go exoatmospheric for a 
certain phase, you have to hand off for the next phase for LWIR 
capacity for tracking, the capacity to distinguish between multiple 
decoys--all of this gets into such a zone of expense and of arms 
deterrence imbalance that a whole series of other questions have to be 
put on the table.
  So what we are talking about, in terms of a system, is really a 
critical, critical component of what we might be willing to deploy and 
what might ultimately work and what we might even be able to afford 
realistically.
  Mr. President, let me say also, if you developed a system that had 
all of the capacity I just defined--it could distinguish between 
decoys, it could actually hit at the level that gave you an assurance 
that you have the kind of protection you are trying to achieve--you 
have actually shifted the entire balance of power, because you have 
created a near first strike capacity, if not a perfect first strike 
capacity. If you can shoot down anything that comes at you, then 
clearly you have changed the balance of power. So we are not making 
ourselves more secure necessarily. Plus, everyone in the business knows 
that we are talking, in that case, about intercontinental ballistic; 
they will simply go cruise missile, go underneath or any other 
alternatives. The notion that we are making ourselves, in the long run, 
somehow very significantly safer by building this larger system, I 
think, is a debate we put aside some time ago.
  I come to the floor supportive of the notion that we are in a new 
world today. I appreciate what the Senator said about thinking about 
Madeleine Albright's language of how you perhaps change, together with 
other countries, to meet that new world. But that new world, to me, is 
quite delimited. It is a new world that seeks to protect us against a 
rogue, against accidental or unauthorized. That is a very limited kind 
of system. It is one that we ought to be able to negotiate, if we can 
develop it with China, with Russia, with other people, all of whom have 
a similar kind of threat to think about with respect to unauthorized or 
accidental or rogue launches.
  I simply want to make it part of the record of this debate that that 
is my understanding of the direction we ought to be going in--and I 
hope and think it is the understanding of the Senator from Virginia--
that we do not rush headlong into the building of a system that simply 
creates greater unrest, greater instability, greater question marks 
and, I might add, is measured against a $60 billion expenditure that to 
date, even in the THAAD program, has not shown success. There isn't 
anybody who won't tell you that when you are switching from THAAD into 
the intercontinental ballistic, you are moving into levels of 
complexity so much higher in terms of intercept and distinguishing 
capacity.
  It is my judgment that while we ought to proceed, I hope the Senate 
is going to contemplate this in the context of really building 
stability in our relationships and also in trying, as diligently as we 
can, to negotiate with these other countries the process by which we 
will move forward.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have listened carefully to my 
colleague's remarks. I wish to make very clear, at the end of this 
colloquy, page 2 of the bill:

       It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as 
     is technologically possible an effective National Missile 
     Defense system capable of defending the territory of the 
     United States against limited ballistic missile attack 
     (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).

  It is simply a system constrained to those particular threats. I 
think the Senator said those same threats face other nations, notably 
Russia and China. It seems to me in the common interest that this go 
forward.
  I thank the Chair, and I thank my colleague.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator.
  I think, again, that the clarification here is important because, 
obviously, we come to this through the experience of a very large 
expenditure and a very different kind of concept than was contemplated. 
I think it is vital, as we

[[Page 4740]]

proceed forward, that technological feasibility not be the only 
judgment which we will use as we proceed forward. I think the amendment 
which has thus far been accepted, the notion that the Senate now 
embraces the continued efforts to have negotiated reductions with 
Russia and that we do not want to upset that, is a very important 
statement that puts into context the down sides if we don't proceed 
with the sensitivity which most of us feel is so important here.
  I thank the President, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the privilege 
of the floor be granted to Jacob Bylund, an intern in my office, for 
consideration of S. 257 today.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent 
that a member of my staff, Clint Crosier, be granted the privilege of 
the floor for the remainder of this debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I rise today to express my 
wholehearted, overwhelming, passionate, and unwavering support of the 
National Missile Defense Act of 1999.
  Finally, after years of fighting to get this legislation to a point 
where we can pass it, we appear to have succeeded. I sincerely hope it 
is not too late. The President had promised to veto this bill if we 
passed it. I was glad to hear last night that he has now dropped his 
veto threat. Unfortunately, his pledge comes a little late and still 
falls far short of the full support that we need to truly protect our 
citizens.
  As Chairman of the Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on 
Strategic Forces, I have devoted myself wholeheartedly to the cause of 
missile defense for many years. It has always troubled me that the 
President of the United States has refused to engage us and help us to 
pass a bill to defend the United States of America and its citizens 
from ballistic missile attack. It has been especially troubling in 
recent days, with news that data on our most sophisticated nuclear 
warhead may have been stolen by China--which may have already used this 
information to perfect their own warheads on missiles aimed this very 
minute at the United States.
  The President seems to believe we need to let Russia have a vote on 
whether or not we choose to protect ourselves from blackmail and 
coercion from China, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. With all due respect, 
I am not interested in having the Russians determine whether or not we 
should protect ourselves. I am more interested in having us determine 
whether or not we should protect ourselves.
  The administration tells us that there are four critical criteria 
that must be met before we can decide whether to deploy a national 
missile defense: threat, technology, operational effectiveness, and 
cost. Let's look at these four issues; first, the threat. The 
Administration's national missile defense agenda is based upon, I 
believe, a false assumption that we will have plenty of warning to 
respond to the threat.
  We can't base the security of the United States of America on our 
ability to detect and predict existing or emerging threats around the 
world. And we do not have to--it is here even as we speak. The 
administration can no longer ignore the threat. It is real, it is 
dangerous, and it is here now, today, this moment.
  In May of 1998, India conducted three nuclear tests that shocked the 
world, and even worse, surprised our intelligence community. Ten days 
later, Pakistan conducted their own nuclear test.
  In July of 1998, a bipartisan commission headed by Don Rumsfeld, 
former Defense Secretary, came to some very startling assertions. Here 
is what he said:

       Hostile nations such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq are 
     making concerted efforts to acquire ballistic missiles with 
     biological or nuclear payloads that will be able to inflict 
     major destruction on the U.S. within five years of a decision 
     to acquire such capability. And further, the U.S. might not 
     even be aware if or when such a decision has been made.

  That is a pretty sobering analysis, Mr. President.
  He went on to say:

       The threat from rogue countries is evolving more rapidly 
     than U.S. intelligence has told us, and our ability to detect 
     a threat is eroding because nations are increasingly able to 
     conceal important elements of their missile programs. The 
     U.S. faces a missile threat from hostile states with little 
     or no warning.

  The Rumsfeld Commission was bipartisan, and its conclusions were 
unanimous. Yet the entire report was downplayed by the administration. 
It was dismissed as paranoid, alarmist, and out of touch with current 
intelligence estimates. But only 2 months later, 2 months after the 
Rumsfeld report, the North Koreans shocked the world with the launch of 
a three-staged Taepo Dong missile over Japan.
  This signaled their progress toward the Taepo Dong 2 that could hit 
the continental United States. Some in the Senate have been willing to 
write off Hawaii and Alaska because they are not continental. I notice 
that the Senators from Alaska and Hawaii were not willing to write 
themselves off, however. They were early advocates and supporters and 
cosponsors of this legislation in both political parties.
  Not to be outdone, after North Korea, Iran tested their own new 
generation missile within weeks of the Rumsfeld report. On February 2 
of this year, CIA Director George Tenet testified before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee:

       I see a real possibility that a power hostile to the United 
     States will acquire before too long the ability to strike the 
     U.S. homeland with weapons of mass destruction.

  In an interview with Defense Week on 23 February, Lieutenant General 
Lyles, Chief of the BMD organization, said:

       We now have indications that the threat is growing, and 
     certainly there is little doubt that this threat will be 
     there around the year 2000.

  The CIA recently reported that China has at least a dozen nuclear 
missiles aimed at U.S. cities right now.
  I say to my colleagues, the threat is here. How much more warning do 
we need?
  Let's go to the technology and the operational effectiveness issues 
that the President and some of this bill's critics have talked about. 
They say that this bill would require a deployment before the 
technology is ready. But technology and operational effectiveness are 
the cornerstones of this legislation. No one is suggesting we deploy a 
system before it is ready. How can we deploy something before it is 
ready? How can we deploy something that doesn't work? And yet we have 
had a big debate on this terminology. The Senator from Mississippi has 
done a good job, I think, in shooting holes in that false argument.
  I honestly do not understand what the debate between 
``technologically possible'' and ``operationally effective'' is all 
about. This is what the bill says:

       . . . to deploy as soon as technologically possible an 
     effective national missile defense. . . .

  It is pretty clear. When the technology allows us to build an 
effective system, we deploy it. Is that too much for the American 
people to expect from their elected leaders, who are sworn to protect 
and serve them? Are we going to build a system, know that it is 
effective, but then not deploy it? I do not think so. If we had 
something that was technologically possible and operationally effective 
and we didn't deploy it, I think our constituents would be a little 
upset with us.
  There are also those who claim it is simply too hard to, as they say, 
hit a bullet with a bullet. If we all had that attitude, we would still 
be using bows and arrows to defend ourselves. We certainly would not 
have the technology that we have today in stealth and missiles and 
lasers if we adopted that ``can't do'' attitude.

[[Page 4741]]

  Just 2 days ago at White Sands, we did successfully intercept a 
missile target with a Patriot-3 missile, proving we can hit a bullet 
with a bullet. The only problem is that when you hit the bullet with 
the Patriot, you are hitting it pretty close to you. What we want to do 
is hit that bullet long before it gets anywhere near us.
  The third issue the administration wants to base a deployment 
decision on is affordable cost. Boy, there is a bureaucratic attitude 
if I ever heard one. That statement is--frankly, with all due respect 
to those who made it--unconscionable. On February 2, Director Tenet 
told the Senate Armed Services Committee:

       North Korea's Taepo Dong 1 launch last August demonstrated 
     technology that, if further developed, could give Pyongyang 
     the ability to deliver a payload to the western edge of the 
     United States of America.

  To put it bluntly, North Korea will soon be able to strike San Diego, 
Los Angeles, San Francisco, Portland, and Seattle with nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons--and the President is telling us he is 
worried about the cost? He is worried about the cost? What is the cost 
of one of those missiles hitting one of those cities? What in the world 
is he talking about? I wish he had been as worried about having a spy 
continue to operate in one of our weapons labs for 3 years without 
doing anything about it.
  I note that the combined population of just the five cities I 
mentioned is 30 million people. The total population from San Diego to 
Seattle is 50 million people. What is the cost of losing 30 to 50 
million people to that kind of missile attack? With all due respect, is 
the President willing to go out there and look those 50 million people 
in the eye and say, ``We're going to check this out to see if it is 
affordable''? I say, if we are worried about money, then let's take 
money out of someplace else in the budget and protect 50 million people 
along the western coast of the United States of America.
  The President wants to tell U.S. citizens we cannot protect them from 
weapons of mass destruction until we figure out how much it might cost. 
I say it is the opposite. We have to defend our citizens, and worry 
later about the cost.
  This is not an imagined threat. The CIA recently reported that China 
now has a dozen missiles aimed at the United States. We have all heard 
the reports of the Chinese general who, in 1996, warned that if we 
chose to defend Taiwan, we had better be willing to sacrifice Los 
Angeles. This, from a nation that the administration says we must 
engage. Those are pretty tough words from a country that we are 
supposed to be engaging. Maybe we ought to disengage a little bit from 
China when it threatens us with nuclear attack and steals our nuclear 
secrets from our lab at Los Alamos.
  Cost is a matter of relative priorities, Mr. President. As Senator 
Sessions pointed out recently, the cost of a 3-year deployment to 
Kosovo could reach 50 percent of what this administration plans to 
spend on national missile defense. We have already spent as much in 
Bosnia in the past 3 years as an entire NMD program is estimated to 
cost. Priorities, I say to my colleagues, priorities. Kosovo, Bosnia or 
50 million people along the coast of the United States? We know what 
the President has chosen as his priority. What is the Senate going to 
choose for its priority?
  Let's go to the last issue, the ABM Treaty of 1972, the bible for 
some people in this body. The biggest fear is that we are going to 
undermine the ABM Treaty. What ABM Treaty? We signed the ABM Treaty 
with the U.S.S.R. The last time I looked, there was no U.S.S.R.
  On the 20th anniversary of the ratification of the treaty, President 
Nixon said:

       The ABM Treaty has been overtaken by the cold war's end.

  Dr. Kissinger, the primary architect of the treaty, said in 1995 in 
testimony before the Congress that the time had clearly come to:

       . . . consider either amending the ABM Treaty or finding 
     some other basis for regulating the U.S.-Russian strategic 
     relationship. The ABM Treaty now stands in the way of our 
     ability to respond in an effective manner to the 
     proliferation of ballistic missiles, one of the most 
     significant post cold war threats.

  That came from the architect of the treaty. He is saying that the 
treaty stands in the way of our ability to defend ourselves.
  Even Secretary of Defense Cohen recently said before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee that we may have to consider withdrawing from the 
ABM Treaty.
  I am not advocating withdrawing at this point. I am just insisting 
that we not let the treaty harm our national security.
  How absurd would it be for us to continue to honor the treaty with 
Russia, preventing us from protecting ourselves from weapons of mass 
destruction, while all other nuclear-capable countries of the world 
would be free to develop their own missile defense? What would that do 
to American security if we could not defend ourselves, but our enemies 
could? Does that make sense? Am I missing something here? I just do not 
understand the foreign policy of this administration.
  In conclusion, it would be indefensible to the American people to 
concede that the threat of rogue missile attacks is real and credible, 
but offer only a self-imposed weak defense against it. It is 
unconscionable. If the threat to the American people is real, then the 
defense against these attacks must be real; not only that, it must be 
aggressive, full-scale and monumental. Whatever resources are 
necessary, the American people deserve to be defended.
  Some in the minority claim that the passage of this bill might lead 
to a new arms race with the Russians. But everyone knows that any 
missile defense currently in development would not upset the balance of 
power between Russia and the United States. NMD will provide defense 
against only limited and rogue attacks, not against incoming Russian 
missiles.
  What about Russia's proliferation of missile technology to rogue 
states? Between technology transfers to Iran, India, and perhaps even 
China, Russia is a large part of the reason we are here debating this 
bill today, because they are selling their technology around the world. 
Proliferation is already a growing threat, independent of this bill.
  Mr. President, we must pass this bill. This is not a partisan issue. 
It is an issue of national security. And the defense of the American 
homeland against a real and growing threat of ballistic missiles and 
our national security depends on it.
  I urge my colleagues to pass this bill, and to do it today.
  Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, thank you.


                            Amendment No. 74

                    (Purpose: To modify the policy)

  Mr. BINGAMAN. I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its 
immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Bingaman] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 74.
       On page 2, strike lines 7 through 11 and insert the 
     following:
       It is the policy of the United States that a decision to 
     deploy a National Missile Defense system shall be made only 
     after the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 
     Director of Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department 
     of Defense, has determined that the system has demonstrated 
     operational effectiveness.

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, let me explain my amendment and then 
hopefully discuss with the two managers, the chief sponsor of the bill, 
my friend from Mississippi, and the manager on the Democratic side, my 
friend from Michigan, their understanding of what the underlying bill 
provides and the appropriateness of my amendment.
  We had a hearing the other day in the Armed Services Committee. Mr. 
Gansler was there, and he testified that the administration's plan, 
with regard to this national missile defense program, is to handle this 
as they would handle other major weapons programs, weapons systems; 
that is, they would proceed with development, but they

[[Page 4742]]

would not go the next step, they would not go into full production and 
deployment until they had done the necessary operations tests to 
determine the effectiveness of the system.
  I have had some concerns, frankly, about this legislation. I opposed 
this in the last Congress because of those concerns, concerns that we 
were, in this legislation, changing those ground rules on the 
Department of Defense and saying to them, ``No, you should not do the 
appropriate testing. In this case, you should go ahead and proceed to 
deploy the system regardless of how ready it is for prime time.''
  I guess that has been the concern that has prompted me to offer this 
amendment. In private discussions with the manager of the bill, the 
sponsor of the bill, he has assured me that he does not see it that 
way. I want to just ask, if I could, the Senator from Mississippi if he 
could just respond to a question sort of directly on this.
  I was encouraged, frankly, by the statements I just heard from the 
Senator from New Hampshire, where he said that it is his understanding 
and his intention, clearly, by this legislation, that we would not be 
requiring the Department of Defense to do anything by way of full 
production or deployment until they were convinced that this weapons 
system was operationally effective. Is that the understanding of the 
Senator from Mississippi also?
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, if the Senator would yield, it seems to 
me clear from the language in the bill that we contemplate the 
development of a system that is effective. We use that word--an 
``effective'' ballistic missile defense, and that the deployment would 
take place when it is technologically possible. So when the technology 
is matured, it is proven to work, and we know the missile system would 
be effective to defend against ballistic missile attack. That is what 
the sentiment is. That is the policy that is reflected in the language 
that is used in the bill.
  So that is consistent with the intent that this Senator has, as an 
author of the bill. And in discussing it with other cosponsors, I think 
that is the sentiment of the Senate and would be reflected in future 
authorization and appropriations measures. That is another part to this 
as well. And one of the concerns, I think, with the amendment that the 
Senator has sent to the desk is that it could be construed, with a 
delegation of authority to the executive branch, to remove Congress 
from the decisionmaking process. We think Congress has a very important 
role to play in oversight and also in the authorization of deployment 
and the funding of deployment decisions that will be made in this 
weapons system development and deployment.
  So those are my reactions, my sentiments. I hope that they are not 
inconsistent with the concerns of the Senator from New Mexico. And I 
really do not think they are.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. I thank the Senator from Mississippi very much for that 
explanation. I agree with him that clearly Congress needs to maintain 
its oversight of this program, as well as all other programs. And this 
is a very high priority for many of us here in Congress and everyone, I 
think, who is concerned about national security issues. So I would not 
want, by my amendment, to bring into question the ability of Congress 
to maintain that oversight. I do not believe the language of my 
amendment does that.
  I am encouraged to hear that the Senator believes that operational 
effectiveness is an essential part of what has to be established before 
we go ahead and actually deploy something.
  I want to just ask, in order to sort of complete the circle here, my 
good friend, the ranking member on the Armed Services Committee, which 
I have the privilege of serving on, Senator Levin, if he has any 
thoughts about the underlying bill.
  Again, I guess the question is, Is there, in the language of the 
underlying bill, essentially a requirement that the Department of 
Defense treat this weapons system and this program the way it treats 
other major programs; and that is, to put them through the appropriate 
operational tests before they go forward with any deployment?
  Mr. LEVIN. To my good friend from New Mexico, I say there is no 
prohibition in this bill against them using the regular procedures. So 
it is my assumption they would use those procedures given the absence 
of any prohibition.
  Secondly, the word ``effective'' that is in the bill, it seems to me, 
does include the critical operational effectiveness concept which the 
Senator has referred to. Indeed, the word ``effective'' could cover a 
number of elements of effectiveness, but surely one of them is, I 
believe--and the sponsor of the bill has just confirmed this, I 
believe--that ``operational effectiveness'' would be included in the 
concept of ``effectiveness.''
  Mr. BINGAMAN. I appreciate that explanation as well.
  The Senator from Mississippi, I see, is on the floor. If he has any 
additional comment, I would be anxious to hear it.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, if the Senator would yield, I appreciate 
his allowing me to comment further.
  So the Record is complete, I would like to read into the Record some 
comments that I wrote down after considering the amendment of the 
Senator from New Mexico.
  This bill is intended to establish a broad policy, stating the intent 
of the United States to defend itself against limited ballistic missile 
attack. It does not seek to micromanage the Defense Department's 
conduct of the program. It gives the Department of Defense flexibility 
in determining whether the national missile defense system is effective 
and technologically ready for deployment. That decision will be made 
with congressional involvement and oversight provided by the 
appropriate committees.
  The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology has 
stated in testimony before the Armed Services Committee that the 
criteria to be used by the Defense Department in making such 
determinations are tailored to the needs of individual programs and the 
urgency of the threat they are intended to address.
  So I think with those further statements we show what we consider to 
be the meaning of the bill, the effect of the bill, and its 
relationship between the Congress and the administration.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. I thank the Senator from Mississippi for that 
additional explanation.
  Mr. President, in order that I not delay or further confuse the 
Record, let me take those assurances that I have heard from the Senator 
from Mississippi and the Senator from Michigan and state that I do 
believe with those assurances the bill does provide for this 
requirement that operational effectiveness be demonstrated. That has 
been my primary concern as we considered this bill in the previous 
Congress, and I am glad to have that resolved.


                       Amendment No. 74 Withdrawn

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I will at this point withdraw the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 74) was withdrawn.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, let me just thank the Senator from New 
Mexico. He has raised a very important issue which was the subject of 
major discussion at the Armed Services Committee the other day; that 
is, the importance that any weapon system, before it is deployed, be 
shown to be operationally effective. I think his sensitivity to that 
issue has been longstanding, and I want to thank him for clarifying the 
Record relative to this bill.
  So that it is clear to Senator Bingaman and to all of the Members, 
the word ``effective'' in the bill includes the concept of operational 
effectiveness. There are other elements of effectiveness which could 
also be covered, but surely it includes the operational effectiveness 
concept which the Senator has championed for so long.
  I thank the Senator.
  Mr. HAGEL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, I rise today to support S. 257, the 
National Missile Defense Act, and to thank my

[[Page 4743]]

friend and colleague, the distinguished senior Senator from 
Mississippi, for his continued leadership on this issue--not today, not 
last year, but over a sustained period of time--to help educate America 
as to why this issue is so important to our future. I thank the 
cosponsor of this bill, Senator Inouye from Hawaii, who has joined over 
the years with Senator Cochran in leading the debate and, hopefully, 
moving this body to a decisive action today on passing the National 
Missile Defense Act.
  Mr. President, the security of the American people is the first and 
most important responsibility of the National Government. One of the 
primary threats facing our national security in the 21st century is the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced, 
sophisticated missile technology.
  Surveys show that many Americans think our Armed Forces can shoot 
down any missile fired at the United States today. As the debate has 
pointed out over the last few days, that, in fact, is not the case; it 
is a myth. We don't have a missile defense system today, we won't have 
a missile defense system tomorrow, and we won't have a missile defense 
system next year. Yet the nations who are developing their own weapons 
of mass destruction are not waiting. Last year, two new countries 
entered the nuclear club, India and Pakistan. Other nations whose 
motives are less than friendly toward the United States and our allies 
are aggressively pursuing these weapons and the ability to launch, the 
ability to deliver, a nuclear weapon.
  As technology spreads throughout the world, the threat increases not 
only from rogue states but also from terrorist organizations. For 
years, America was assured by our intelligence agencies that the 
ability to strike the U.S. mainland by any rogue state was years away 
and that we would easily have enough time to develop a new missile 
defense system before that possibility would occur.
  Last July, a bipartisan commission headed by the distinguished former 
Secretary of Defense, former Chief of Staff to the President, former 
Member of the House of Representatives, Don Rumsfeld, sounded an alarm: 
All was not quiet on the ballistic missile front. The Rumsfeld 
Commission examined the emerging and current ballistic missile threat 
to the United States. As Secretary Rumsfeld testified last October 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

       We concluded unanimously that we are now in an environment 
     of little or no warning.

  The Rumsfeld Commission report contains several alarming conclusions.
  One, Russia and China continue to pose threats. Both possess 
intercontinental ballistic missile capability of reaching the United 
States mainland. We must be prepared for the possibility of an 
accidental launch--an accidental launch. In addition, and even more 
deadly in terms of the threat it poses, both Russia and China have 
emerged as major suppliers of technology to a number of rogue nations 
and other countries.
  Two, the Rumsfeld Commission found that North Korea and Iran could 
each pose a threat to the United States within 5 years of a decision to 
do so.
  Three, Iraq was estimated to be certainly within 10 years of posing a 
threat. Whether we have been effective at limiting this development 
with our airstrikes is unknown in Iraq because Iraq is now able to 
continue its work without the oversight of UNSCOM inspectors. These 
nations are not isolated; they work together. As Secretary Rumsfeld 
stated with regard to North Korea:

       They are very, very active marketing ballistic missile 
     technologies.

  Iran alone received technology assistance from Russia, China, and 
North Korea, which gives it a wider array of options.
  And perhaps one of most striking comments made by Secretary Rumsfeld 
in his testimony in October was one that rang true with plain, 
straightforward common sense. Again I quote Secretary Rumsfeld:

       We have concluded that there will be surprises [deadly 
     surprises]. It is a big world, it is a complicated world, and 
     deception and denial are extensive. The surprise to me is not 
     that there are and will be surprises, but that we are 
     surprised that there are surprises.

  The Rumsfeld Commission report was greeted with some skepticism by 
the intelligence community. Then on October 31 of last year, the myth 
that technology was years away was shattered when North Korea launched 
a Taepo Dong I missile, a three-stage rocket, over Japan and into the 
Pacific. This is a missile that, with upgrades, could have delivered a 
small payload, a nuclear payload, to Hawaii or Alaska. We know that the 
North Koreans are in the advanced stage of developing a Taepo Dong I 
intercontinental missile with the capability of delivering a nuclear 
payload to the American interior.
  Finally, last month the CIA reversed itself saying the threat was 
real, imminent, and very dangerous. In testimony before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, CIA Director George Tenet stated:

       I can hardly overstate my concern about North Korea. In 
     nearly all respects, the situation there has become more 
     volatile and more unpredictable.

  Why has it taken us this long to wake up to the threats facing our 
Nation? How many more intelligence reports and missile test firings do 
we need? Vast oceans in time protected America at the beginning of 
World War II. Oceans in time will not protect America today. Time has 
run out.
  I was very pleased to see news reports this morning, Mr. President, 
that President Clinton has dropped his threat now to veto this bill. 
However, the administration continues to raise concerns about whether a 
national missile defense system fits within the framework of the 1972 
ABM Treaty with the old Soviet Union--the imploded Soviet Union, a 
country that no longer exists.
  Much has been made by the opponents of this bill on how Russia would 
perceive our development of a national missile defense. I visited 
Russia in December. I spent 10 days in Russia and met with leaders 
throughout Russia. I was in Siberia. I asked about this question. This 
question is about the relevancy of our national interest, as all 
questions of national security are about the relevancy of our national 
interest, as Russia's questions are about their national interest. The 
Foreign Relations Committee will hold a hearing on the ABM Treaty in 
April, and a continued set of hearings on into May, leading up to the 
June 1 deadline by which Chairman Helms has asked the administration to 
submit the ABM Treaty amendments.
  It is completely inconsistent for the administration to raise 
concerns about building a national missile defense system under this 
current 1972 treaty and then not submit the ABM Treaty amendments to 
the Senate. This administration has yet to send amendments to the ABM 
Treaty, nor has it given any indication that it will. The President 
should submit amendments and allow the Senate to debate this issue. We 
need to determine whether this 1972 treaty is still relevant to 
America's security in the 21st century. The security of our people 
cannot be held hostage to an outdated treaty with a country that no 
longer exists. The most fundamental responsibility of this Government, 
of each of us who have the privilege to serve in this body, is to 
assure the freedom and security of this Nation; to do less not only 
abrogates our responsibility, but makes us less than worthy of serving 
the people of this country.
  As Secretary Rumsfeld stated:

       The new reality makes threats such as terrorism, ballistic 
     missiles, and cruise missiles more attractive to dictators. 
     They are cheaper than armies and air forces and navies. They 
     are attainable. And ballistic missiles have the advantage of 
     being able to arrive at their destination undefended.

  We need an effective missile defense system, and we need to get at it 
now.
  I conclude with what President Reagan said in 1983. He said:

       If history teaches anything, it teaches simple-minded 
     appeasement or wishful thinking about our adversaries is 
     folly--it means the betrayal of our past, the squandering of 
     our future, and the squandering of our freedom.


[[Page 4744]]


  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the National Missile 
Defense Act, S. 257.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized.


                            Amendment No. 75

(Purpose: To require a comparative study of relevant national security 
                                threats)

  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I have an amendment that I will offer and 
then I will engage in a colloquy with the distinguished Senator from 
Mississippi. I send the amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Iowa [Mr. Harkin] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 75.

  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end, add the following:

     SEC. 4. COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RELEVANT NATIONAL SECURITY 
                   THREATS.

       (a) Requirement for Study.--Not later than January 1, 2001, 
     the President shall submit to Congress the comparative study 
     described in subsection (b).
       (b) Content of Study.--(1) The study required under 
     subsection (a) is a study that provides a quantitative 
     analysis of the relevant risks and likelihood of the full 
     range of current and emerging national security threats to 
     the territory of the United States. The study shall be 
     carried out in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and 
     the heads of all other departments and agencies of the 
     Federal Government that have responsibilities, expertise, and 
     interests that the President considers relevant to the 
     comparison.
       (2) The threats compared in the study shall include threats 
     by the following means:
       (A) Long-range ballistic missiles.
       (B) Bombers and other aircraft.
       (C) Cruise missiles.
       (D) Submarines.
       (E) Surface ships.
       (F) Biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.
       (G) Any other weapons of mass destruction that are 
     delivered by means other than missiles, including covert 
     means and commercial methods such as cargo aircraft, cargo 
     ships, and trucks.
       (H) Deliberate contamination or poisoning of food and water 
     supplies.
       (I) Any other means.
       (3) In addition to the comparison of the threats, the 
     report shall include the following:
       (A) The status of the developed and deployed responses and 
     preparations to meet the threats.
       (B) A comparison of the costs of developing and deploying 
     responses and preparations to meet the threats.

  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, again, for the information of Senators, I 
intend to withdraw this amendment after talking about it and engaging 
in somewhat of a colloquy with Senator Cochran, and I think Senator 
Levin also wanted to speak on this.
  Basically, let me describe what the amendment does. It requires that 
not later than January 1 of 2001, the President will submit to Congress 
a comparative study. It is a study that would provide a quantitative 
analysis of the relevant risks and the likelihood of the full range of 
current and emerging national security threats to the territory of the 
United States.
  This says:

       It shall be carried out in consultation with the Secretary 
     of Defense and the heads of all other departments and 
     agencies of the Federal Government that have 
     responsibilities, expertise, and interests that the President 
     considers relevant to the comparison.

  Then I listed a number of items, including long-range ballistic 
missiles; bombers and other aircraft; cruise missiles; submarines; 
surface ships; biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons; and any other 
weapons of mass destruction that are delivered by means other than 
missiles, including covert means and commercial methods, such as cargo 
aircraft, cargo ships, trucks, and any other means.
  I would like to describe what I am getting at here. As we look at the 
bill before us, S. 257, which is kind of narrowly drawn in terms of 
ballistic missile defense, we seem to be getting kind of overfocus on 
this, a focus that if only we build some kind of a ballistic missile 
defense system, it will secure us from the weapons of mass destruction 
that threaten us. But I am not so certain that is really the major 
threat that we face, and whether or not all of the money put into that, 
all of our eggs into that basket, so to speak, really would protect us 
from what I consider to be more viable and determinable threats to our 
national security.
  For example, what about some of the key threats we hear about every 
day? Well, I have a chart that lists some of the typical types of 
national security threats facing our Nation today.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to print the chart in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the chart was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

          NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE: NO SOLUTION TO KEY THREATS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     National missile   Theater missile
                                     defense solution   defense solution
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Truck bomb attack on U.S..........  Ineffective......  Ineffective.
Chemical weapons attack in U.S....  ......do.........    Do.
Biological weapons attack in U.S..  ......do.........    Do.
Cruise missile attack on U.S......  ......do.........    Do.
Bomber attack on U.S..............  ......do.........    Do.
Loose nukes in former Soviet Union  ......do.........    Do.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

  Mr. HARKIN. For example, a national missile defense system would be 
ineffective against a truck-bomb attack on the United States. Of 
course, we have had some experience, regrettably, in that area. It 
would not be effective against a chemical weapons attack in the United 
States. Now, we haven't had that, but Japan has. What about biological 
weapons that would be delivered by a terrorist? No small threat. It 
seems like there is an anthrax incident every week here in the country. 
Again, if there is an anthrax scare, the first line of defense is going 
to be the local police and firefighters struggling to deal with the 
threat, and our State and local public health officials, and other 
health care people.
  However, a national missile defense system is no solution to combat 
this very viable threat. The list goes on with a cruise missile attack. 
It is much cheaper for a country to engage in; it would be launched 
offshore. Yet, a national missile defense would be ineffective. Even a 
bomber attack, coming in under our radar screens, would be ineffective 
for missile defense; and even some of the ``loose nukes'' in the former 
Soviet Union, if in fact there were to be warheads smuggled out of the 
Soviet Union and enter the country by boat, plane, or truck across our 
borders. A missile defense is totally ineffective. Also listed is the 
theater missile defense, which would also be ineffective against those 
threats.
  General Shelton of the Joint Chiefs of Staff agrees and has said:

       There are other serious threats out there in addition to 
     that posed by ballistic missiles. We know, for example, that 
     there are adversaries with chemical and biological weapons 
     that can attack the United States today. They could do it 
     with a briefcase--by infiltrating our territory across our 
     shores or through our airports.

  I am just concerned that we are focusing so much on this national 
ballistic missile defense that we are forgetting about these other more 
determinable and viable threats.
  My amendment seeks to provide for a study, sort of a comparative 
study, and a quantitative analysis of these risks: What is the risk of 
a ballistic missile attack on the United States? What is that? And what 
is the risk of, say, a biological weapons attack on the United States? 
What do we have, either deployed or in development, to protect against 
each one of those?--thinking about the relative risk. I wanted this 
study to be done by January 1, 2001, before we go rushing down the road 
investing more billions of dollars into a ballistic missile defense 
that would prove absolutely defenseless against these other viable 
threats.
  That is what I was seeking to do with this amendment.
  I have had some conversations with the Senator from Mississippi about 
this. I yield for any colloquy that we might engage in on this.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, with respect to the amendment of the 
Senator from Iowa, I thank him for discussing the amendment with 
managers before offering it. As I understand the amendment, it calls 
for a report on a wide variety of threats facing the United States. S. 
257, the pending legislation, is intended to address one of

[[Page 4745]]

these threats--a limited ballistic missile attack against us for which 
we have no defense.
  While these other threats are important, they are not the subject of 
this bill. We have tried to keep this bill focused on a specific policy 
question--whether the United States will defend itself against 
ballistic missile attack. We have tried not to entangle this question 
in the details of other defense issues, however important they may be.
  If a report on the many other threats from weapons of mass 
destruction would be useful, the defense authorization or 
appropriations bills would be appropriate vehicles for directing such 
reporting requirements. As a matter of fact, it is our understanding 
that a similar requirement for a study is being conducted and is being 
complied with in response to a directive in the intelligence 
authorization bill for fiscal year 1999.
  In conclusion, just because there are some threats that we cannot 
defend against perfectly doesn't mean we should not defend against 
others.
  So, while being sympathetic with the suggestion that the Senator is 
making, we think this can be accomplished; the goal can be accomplished 
that he has pointed out by using the vehicles of the Intelligence 
Committee authorization, as is now being done to some extent, and the 
authorization and appropriations bills that will later be considered by 
the Senate this year.
  Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I appreciate the remarks of my friend from 
Mississippi. I understand that in the intelligence community that they 
only look at possible threats but they don't make a comparative 
analysis, nor do they deal with the status of how the United States 
counters the threats.
  Again, I am saying we need also to engage those agencies on the front 
line, not just the Pentagon. But I am talking about the Department of 
Justice, FBI, and HHS--all of these agencies that handle biological, 
chemical threats. We need to engage them in this comparative 
quantitative analysis.
  Again, I want to make it clear to my friend from Mississippi that I 
basically was not going to support the bill because I felt that the 
words ``technologically feasible'' in the bill and saying that we 
should deploy as soon as technologically possible--that that was kind 
of putting the cart before the horse.
  I was also concerned a little bit about what this might mean for 
further negotiations on arms control, our START II and possibly the 
START III, and the ABM Treaty. But with the adoption of the Landrieu 
amendment last night, I think that puts a balance here. I don't mind 
the research and stuff that goes into looking at a possible ballistic 
missile defense. I think we have to examine all of these. But it has to 
be done in a balanced way and in a way that sort of takes into account 
what those threats are to our national security on kind of a 
quantitative basis without putting everything in just sort of one 
basket, so to speak.
  But I think with the adoption of the Landrieu amendment that it is 
much more balanced. And I therefore support the bill. I wanted to offer 
this amendment to try to again put that balance in the bill while 
looking at these other possible threats. I understand what the Senator 
says--that perhaps this is more amenable, or a more likely prospect for 
the armed services authorization bill. I take that in good faith.
  I spoke with the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator 
Warner, and also ranking member, Senator Levin, about this. I think I 
can represent that Senator Warner was open to the idea, without knowing 
more about it and without having had an opportunity to really fully 
look at it.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. HARKIN. I am delighted to yield.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I would like to briefly make a statement 
before asking the question, so he doesn't lose his right to the floor.
  The Senator has put his finger on a very significant issue--and it is 
one that all of us should struggle with, and many of us have struggled 
with. His effort here is to focus the attention of this body on a range 
of threats that we face. And to attempt to see if we can't get a better 
handle on the likelihood of those threats actually emerging is a very 
important action on his part. The chart he has used demonstrates what 
the problem is. There are many threats which are much more likely than 
a ballistic missile attack against us for which we have no defense. 
Perhaps we should devote resources to those, and then what would be the 
relationship between the costs of defending against those more likely 
threats compared to the cost of defending against a missile attack of 
the kind that could come from North Korea, theoretically.
  General Shelton phrased the issue this way. This was on January 5. He 
said:

       . . . there are two aspects of the National Missile Defense 
     [issue] that we have to be concerned with. Number one is: is 
     the technology that allows us to deploy one that is an 
     effective system, and within the means of this country money-
     wise?

  This is General Shelton, Chairman of our Joint Chiefs saying this.

       Secondly is the threat and whether or not the threat, when 
     measured against all the other threats that we face, 
     justifies the expenditure of that type of money for that 
     particular system at the time when the technology will allow 
     us to field it?

  Those are the factors that the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs wants to 
consider, and those are some of the issues which the good Senator from 
Iowa is addressing our attention to.
  I asked General Shelton to give us what we call a ``threat spectrum'' 
and asked him to try to give us a continuum of threats in terms of the 
most likely and less likely.
  The least likely is in the upper right-hand corner, strategic missile 
attack, 6,000 Russian warheads. The next least likely is the rogue 
missile. The next least likely, major theater wars, such as in Korea. 
The next least likely is information wars, attacks on our satellites, 
or our power systems, or similar assets. The next least likely, but now 
becoming more and more likely, are terrorist attacks in the United 
States, some of which for instance the Senator from Iowa is talking 
about, and then terror attacks abroad, regional conflicts, and so 
forth.
  This is the issue which the Senator from Iowa is really focusing our 
attention on today. But his amendment goes significantly beyond this 
chart, which, by the way, was prepared by General Shelton. The 
amendment of the Senator from Iowa would get us into a greater element 
of comparative risk in terms of trying to get a range of likelihood of 
the risks, not just whether one risk is more likely than another. But 
his amendment, the way it is drafted, would consider how much more or 
how much less likely is one threat than another.
  That is very valuable information, and General Shelton is attempting 
to work on that issue now. But the amendment of the Senator from Iowa 
puts it in a very precise and useful form.
  In addition, it would be very helpful for us to know what would the 
range of costs be to defend against the various threats, if we can do 
so. And all I can do is assure my good friend from Iowa that we on the 
Armed Services Committee will take a good look at his amendment. It has 
my very strong support, and as he mentioned, the chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee said he would be open to such an amendment on the 
defense authorization bill.
  I think that is a very appropriate place for the amendment to go, and 
I think he would find, hopefully, bipartisan support on the committee 
for this kind of a study, because it really addresses an issue which I 
think every Member of this body would like to see addressed.
  I thank him for his effort and assure him of my support on the armed 
services bill. As a member of the Intelligence Committee, I would 
support an expansion of what we are doing to include the kind of 
factual analyses for which his amendment would call.
  I thank him for the amendment and just assure him, if he does not 
offer it here, there will be a major effort to get

[[Page 4746]]

it or something very close to it on the authorization bill.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Michigan, the 
ranking member on the Armed Services Committee, a leader in this area 
and, obviously, way ahead of me on this topic, who has done a lot of 
research and work on this. I appreciate that and the kind of 
information he has given out with this chart he has developed. In 
taking that assurance, I would withdraw my amendment.
  How much more time do I have, Mr. President?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 15 minutes.
  Mr. HARKIN. I will just take about 5 more minutes.
  I cannot resist the opportunity to talk a little bit about this 
concept of the ballistic missile defense system. I was just reading the 
history of what happened in France prior to World War II. I got to 
thinking; someone described this ballistic missile defense as sort of 
our new Maginot Line, so I said I want to find out about the Maginot 
Line, really what it was.
  Louis Snyder wrote the ``Historical Guide to World War II.'' It is a 
basic reference work for anyone studying the history of World War II. I 
recommend that my colleagues read through this volume of history, 
especially the story of the Maginot Line.
  In the late 1920s and 1930s, France constructed a huge series of 
fortifications on its border with Germany. It was named after Andre 
Maginot, French minister of war who started the project. A huge 
workforce constructed the fortifications that were considered 
impregnable by the French military. More than 26 million cubic feet of 
cement was used to build a series of giant pillboxes, gun turrets, and 
dragons teeth. Elevators led to underground passages that included 
living quarters, hospitals, cafeterias, and storehouses. It sounds like 
our missile silo bunkers.
  More than $1 billion was spent by the French military. That is in 
1930s dollars. Factored today that would be $12 billion they spent to 
build the Maginot Line, and from a nation much smaller than the United 
States. It was truly an awesome endeavor intended to thwart a great 
threat to France; that is, an invasion by Germany.
  Of course, there was just one problem. The German military high 
command were no fools. They developed an adequate counter. They simply 
went around the Maginot Line. By going through Belgium, the Maginot 
Line proved almost useless in defending the French homeland, and it did 
nothing to counter the blitzkrieg tactics used by the Germans to 
counter static defenses.
  I might also add here that Gen. Charles de Gaulle, who I believe was 
not a general at that time but a colonel, opposed the Maginot Line, but 
the French Government, I am sure, probably in sort of a working 
relationship with concrete people and builders and those who wanted to 
make a lot of money building this huge fortification, decided to go 
down that road. Charles de Gaulle warned of the blitzkrieg coming and 
that the Maginot Line would do nothing to protect them against it.
  I think the analogy of the Maginot Line to ballistic missile defense 
is startling. Are we going to spend tens of billions of dollars on a 
defense against a single threat? Will our enemies simply go around the 
ballistic missile defense, our Maginot Line? Of course, they will. The 
counter is simple. Truck bombs, weapons of mass destruction slipped 
into our country by plane, boat, or truck would all go around the 
ballistic missile defense.
  Perhaps some of my colleagues want a simple answer to real and 
potential threats from around the world. We want a simple silver bullet 
defense against a dangerous world. We may spend billions of dollars for 
this new Maginot Line, but the result will be the same as it was for 
the French 60 years ago. Life is just more complicated than what a 
national missile defense could counter.
  In fact, the Maginot Line analogy applies, I think, to the psychology 
of missile defense. As Louis Snyder wrote, ``The French public, too, 
had an almost mystical faith in the Maginot Line and believed its 
defense to be absolute and total.''
  Mr. President, I hope we don't fall in the same trap, but ever since 
star wars started under the Reagan administration, we have had this 
sort of concept that we could build some kind of a dome over the United 
States that would be impregnable, that would totally and fully protect 
all of our citizens. That is mythical. There is no such dome. A truck 
bomb, a terrorist attack by boat, a suitcase, anthrax poisoning, that 
missile shield would never protect us from anything such as that.
  So I hope and trust that the authorizing committee will take a look 
at all these other threats, I think much more real, much more 
determinable, and I believe much more effectively countered other 
systems than a national ballistic missile defense system.
  So that, again, was the purpose of my amendment. It was to try to 
bring balance. I appreciate the fact that this bill is focused on one 
area. But I still believe that this is the way we ought to go if we are 
going to make any rational decisions around here on how we spend our 
taxpayers' dollars on defense.
  I think we need this kind of study, and I appreciate what Senator 
Levin has said. I appreciate his leadership. In my conversation with 
Senator Warner from Virginia, the chairman, he was open to this, and I 
hope and trust that the Armed Services Committee will proceed down that 
line and provide us with the kind of balanced information we need on 
the Appropriations Committee before we go down this road of spending 
billions of dollars on a ballistic missile defense.


                       Amendment No. 75 Withdrawn

  Mr. President, with that, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is withdrawn.
  The amendment (No. 75) was withdrawn.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I start out by extending my appreciation 
and praise to the Senator from Mississippi, Senator Cochran, who has 
done an incredible job on this legislation. He has, for years, 
advocated a capability of this Nation to defend itself against missile 
attack. Without his dedication and hard work we would not be here 
today. The Senator from Mississippi has performed a signal service, not 
only for the people of Mississippi but the people of this Nation, 
including all 50 States rather than just 48. I thank him for the 
marvelous job he has done.
  I also think it is worthy of note that the persuasiveness of his 
arguments have caused the administration to significantly shift their 
position on this very important issue. So, again, my congratulations to 
the Senator from Mississippi and my sincere appreciation.
  Mr. President, the question of whether to deploy defenses against 
ballistic missiles has been a contentious and unresolved issue for over 
40 years. As a result, Americans today are vulnerable to destruction by 
a missile attack on our soil. The bill before us today, the National 
Missile Defense Act of 1999, resolves this national policy debate by 
calling for the deployment of an effective missile defense system when 
technologically possible to protect our citizens from the threat of a 
ballistic missile attack on the U.S.
  Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen announced in January that the Clinton 
Administration, after years of discounting the existence of a missile 
threat to the U.S., will now support and provide the necessary funding 
for development and deployment of a ballistic missile defense system. 
On the surface, this appears to be one of the President's more 
propitious policy reversals. Yet, the Clinton Administration threatened 
to veto this bill, which establishes in law the missile defense policy 
the Administration now claims to support.
  While I am pleased that the Administration has lifted its veto 
threat, I

[[Page 4747]]

question the interpretation of the passage of yesterday's amendment 
that reportedly provided the basis for this latest reversal of 
position. The United States should proceed with deployment of a missile 
defense system irrespective of whether Russia agrees to reduce its 
nuclear force levels in accordance with the START II agreement. How 
many times do we have to point out that the requirement for missile 
defenses is predicated upon a much broader threat that the 
Administration apparently still doesn't fully comprehend.
  Mr. President, since its inauguration, the Clinton Administration has 
demonstrated an approach to national defense that can only be described 
as disengaged and minimalist. Administration officials have sought not 
to maximize our military strength within reasonable fiscal constraints, 
but to find ways to minimize defense spending at the expense of 
military capability and readiness, and in so doing, they have 
endangered our future security.
  Our late colleague and a man I greatly admired, Senator John Tower, 
stressed time and again that the size and composition of our Armed 
Forces, and thus the amount of our budgetary resources that are devoted 
to defense, must be determined by the level and nature of the threat. 
The Clinton Administration's long-standing opposition to missile 
defenses, as well as its continued refusal to provide adequate levels 
of defense spending, are the complete antithesis of Senator Tower's 
sound advice. Consequently, our nation is vulnerable right now to the 
threat of an accidental or unauthorized missile launch from Russia or 
China, and will be vulnerable to additional threats in the near future 
from North Korea and other rogue nations implacably hostile to America 
and governed by unpredictable leaders.
  Mr. President, one of the principal reasons for our country's 
vulnerability to ballistic missile attack is not lack of money or 
technology. It is the 1972 ABM Treaty.
  In the 1960s, at the height of the Cold War, then-Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara developed the theory of Mutual Assured 
Destruction as a means of deterring nuclear war between the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union. This concept relied on the assumption that, so long 
as both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were confident of their ability 
to retaliate against each other with assurance of enormous destruction, 
nuclear war would be averted and there would be no incentive to build 
more offensive nuclear weapons.
  The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was an essential component of 
this ``balance of terror'' concept. It prohibits the deployment of 
effective defensive systems which were perceived as undermining the 
concept of mutually assured destruction. In effect, the ABM Treaty was 
designed to keep the citizenry of both the U.S. and the former Soviet 
Union equally vulnerable to destruction in a nuclear exchange.
  The ten years following ratification of the ABM Treaty, however, 
witnessed the greatest expansion of Soviet offensive strategic nuclear 
forces in history, destroying the basic premise of the MAD doctrine, 
and the ABM Treaty as well. Yet, the Treaty's proponents cling to it 
with an almost theological reverence.
  It was President Reagan who finally called into question the wisdom 
of continuing to deprive ourselves of missile defenses in the face of 
overwhelming evidence that the Soviet Union was pursuing the capability 
of launching a debilitating strike against the U.S. His March 1983 
speech set the stage for the first serious discussion of defensive 
systems in over a decade. If his vision of a global system was 
technologically and financially unrealistic, his dream of protecting 
the American public from the threat of foreign missiles was prescient, 
and the Strategic Defense Initiative--the butt of many a joke by arms 
control theorists--was instrumental in bringing down the Soviet Union 
without firing a shot.
  Since work began in earnest in the Reagan Administration to develop 
missile defenses for our nation, the threat has changed. The end of the 
Cold War and the emergent threat of ballistic missile proliferation 
have fundamentally altered the approach this country must take to the 
issue of missile defenses. In fact, the imperative to deploy effective 
systems is greater now because of the unpredictability of the potential 
threats.
  Throughout the Bush Administration, as our overall defense strategy 
and budget were being adjusted to reflect the changes in the world, so 
too was our plan for ballistic missile defenses revised to address the 
changed threat.
  Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration has retained allegiance to 
the outmoded ABM Treaty and, over the years, has significantly cut the 
funding and restricted the objectives of the ballistic missile defense 
program.
  Remember, back in 1994, when the President evoked considerable 
laughter from his audience at a campaign rally when he said:

       Here's what they [the Republicans] promise . . . we're 
     going to increase defense and we're going to bring back Star 
     Wars. And then we're going to balance the budget.

  The Clinton Administration's attitude for the past six years has been 
to ridicule efforts to develop and deploy a system to effectively 
defend our nation against a ballistic missile strike. The result has 
been a significant and dangerous delay in ending the ``terror'' of a 
nuclear strike.
  Now, the President has belatedly agreed, at least rhetorically, to 
the agenda he formerly ridiculed. While I applaud the President's 
words, I remain more than mildly skeptical about his true commitment to 
protecting our nation from the clear threat of missile attack.
  The President's budget proposal, which was submitted to the Congress 
on February 1, proves skeptics correct.
  While the President was pledging more funding for development of a 
national missile defense system on one hand, his other hand was taking 
$250 million out of the program to pay for the Wye River Agreement. At 
the same time, the Administration decided to push back the deployment 
date for missile defenses from 2003 to 2005, with no justifiable reason 
for doing so.
  If the President is truly getting serious about missile defense, why 
would he show us the money, and then snatch it back and slip the 
deployment date two additional years beyond its already much-delayed 
timetable?
  Another indication of the Administration's disingenuous embrace of 
missile defenses are the qualifications attached to its support in two 
areas: questions about the nature of the threat, and continued 
deference to the restrictions of the ABM Treaty.
  No fewer than 30 times over the last several years, President Clinton 
has gone before the public and boasted that, thanks to his policies, 
the American people, for the first time since the dawn of the Cold War, 
can go to sleep at night without the threat of missiles targeted 
against their country. Clearly, the Administration has been existing in 
a virtual state of denial about the expanding and diverse threat of 
ballistic missiles.
  I urge the President to take another look at the report of the 
Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 
known as the Rumsfeld Commission. It is a completely nonpartisan and 
very sobering look at the threats we face. The Commission concluded 
that the threat is here now, and that traditional methods of 
determining the nature and scale of the threat need to be examined.
  The Rumsfeld Commission's meticulous examination of the growing 
threat to the U.S. of ballistic missiles, with its emphasis on the 
difficulties inherent in determining when serious threats will appear 
and the tendency of such threats to materialize sooner than 
anticipated, should have shaken the White House out of its fatuous 
complacency. Apparently, that is not the case.
  A recent article in Inside the Pentagon pointed out that, even after 
the Rumsfeld Commission report was released in July 1998, the 
Administration predicted the absence of a rogue nation threat, 
excepting North Korea, before 2010. And in a February 3 letter to the 
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the President's 
National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger,

[[Page 4748]]

wrote that, prior to a decision to deploy a national missile defense 
system, ``the President and his senior advisers will need to confirm 
whether the rogue state ballistic missile threat to the United States 
has developed as quickly as we now expect. . . .''
  Apparently North Korea's launch last August of an intercontinental 
ballistic missile over Japan, Iran's ongoing efforts with Russian 
assistance to develop such a missile, and Iraq's continuing efforts in 
that regard do not constitute a threat.
  Equally disturbing is the Administration's view of the ABM Treaty. In 
his February 3 letter, Mr. Berger reiterated that ``the ABM Treaty 
remains a cornerstone of strategic stability''--a reminder that we are 
dealing with an Administration that is imbued with an unquestioned 
adherence to an outdated treaty. While I am mindful of arguments that 
deployment of national missile defenses may be perceived by some 
nations as a potentially hostile act, theories of nuclear deterrence 
that were of questionable value during the Cold War clearly do not 
apply today or in the foreseeable future and should not be permitted to 
stand in the way of going forward.
  If the Administration supports deployment of an effective national 
missile defense system, it cannot remain wedded to the ABM Treaty. Make 
no mistake, the ABM Treaty was intended to and does preclude our 
ability to deploy nation-wide missile defenses. Construction of a 
missile defense facility at the one treaty-permissible site cannot be 
expanded for national coverage without violating the terms of the 
treaty. While the original 1972 treaty permitted each country two 
sites, it stipulated that they had to be deployed so as to preclude 
even regional coverage.
  Deploying a national missile defense system, therefore, requires 
either unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty or an expeditiously 
negotiated revision of it. As the treaty clearly prohibits us from 
providing for the common defense--our most fundamental constitutional 
responsibility--I urge the Administration to proceed without delay to 
achieve the needed changes to the treaty, or move for its abrogation.
  Questionable in its utility even at the time it was negotiated, the 
ABM Treaty was signed with a totalitarian regime that no longer exists 
and which violated the treaty at every opportunity. Its day is past. If 
Russia will not agree to negotiate changes to the treaty that will 
permit deployment of national missile defenses, then we must exercise 
our authority to withdraw from the treaty to protect our national 
interests.
  Mr. President, let me take a moment to talk about the larger problem, 
of which the Administration's refusal to recognize the clear threat 
posed by proliferating ballistic missile development is but one aspect.
  I have long been critical of many aspects of the Clinton 
Administration's national security policies. This is an Administration 
that has never been comfortable with the conduct of foreign policy, and 
so has little grasp of the role of military force in guaranteeing our 
place in world affairs. Both our policies and the force structure 
needed to support them seem to be decided in this Administration on the 
basis of what we can afford after taking care of all other priorities, 
instead of what is necessary to protect our interests.
  We can honestly debate the merits of the numerous contingencies to 
which the Administration has deployed military force, but no one can 
deny that the combination of over 10 years of declining defense budgets 
and longer and more frequent force deployments has stretched the 
Services perilously close to the breaking point. What is at risk, 
without exaggeration, are the lives of our military personnel and the 
security of the United States.
  After years of denying the obvious, in the face of compelling 
testimony before Congress from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
Administration has finally begun to concede that we have serious 
readiness problems in our Armed Forces. Those of us who have been 
criticized for sounding alarm bells about military readiness now have 
the empty satisfaction of seeing the Administration admit there is more 
to maintaining a strong defense than their history of falsely promising 
to do so.
  After six years of short-changing the Armed Forces, the President 
proposed adding money to the defense budget--another stunning policy 
reversal--for readiness, modernization, and even national missile 
defense. Once again, though, his rhetoric far exceeds his actions.
  Last fall, the President asked for $1 billion in immediate, emergency 
funding to redress readiness problems--a mere drop in the bucket 
compared to what the Service Chiefs said was required. Congress added 
another $8 billion, but then wasted most of that on pork-barrel 
spending. The result--a band-aid solution to a serious readiness 
crisis.
  The same minimal approach is reflected in the President's budget 
submission for Fiscal Year 2000. After promising a budget increase of 
$12.6 billion, the President only asked for $4.1 billion in his budget 
request, and most of that will be needed to pay for ongoing 
contingencies in Bosnia and southwest Asia and desperately needed 
military pay raises and benefits. The rest of the so-called increase 
comes from ``smoke and mirrors'', like anticipated lower inflation and 
fuel costs, cuts in previously funded programs, and an economically 
unsound incremental funding plan for military construction projects. 
And even if everything works as planned, the Administration budget 
short-changes the military next year and every year thereafter.
  There is a pattern here, Mr. President, of promising everything and 
delivering very little. Whether it's protecting our citizens from a 
ballistic missile attack, or maintaining modern, prepared armed forces, 
this President seems incapable of following through on his commitments.
  Mr. President, I am uncomfortable with a conclusion that the 
President does not care about the common defense. I must assume, 
instead, that he simply fails to understand the imperative of 
establishing policies and providing needed resources to protect our 
nation's interests and our citizens.
  The National Missile Defense Act of 1999 establishes a national 
policy that we must protect Americans from a clear and present danger--
the threat of ballistic missile attack. The President was correct to 
withdraw his veto threat and join with the Congress to put in place 
both the policy and the resources that will make our citizens safe.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I rise in support of S. 257. Although this 
bill is not as comprehensive or detailed as I would prefer, I have come 
to the conclusion that S. 257, as amended, sends an important signal of 
our country's commitment to defending itself from ballistic missile 
attack from a rogue state.
  As my colleagues are aware, I am an advocate for national missile 
defense, and have authored legislation that has advanced the NMD 
program. I urge the Administration to include funding in the budget 
that would allow for NMD deployment, and am pleased that $6.6 billion 
was added to the future years defense plan for this purpose.
  Increasingly, I am convinced that we need NMD sooner rather than 
later. Last July, the Rumsfeld Commission reported that several rogue 
states could develop an ICBM capable of threatening our country before 
we expect it. Recent missile tests by North Korea and Iran have 
confirmed the essence of the Rumsfeld panel's findings. I was disturbed 
by these developments, but have long said that we should be prepared 
before we are surprised.
  Our country needs to move forward aggressively with NMD. But because 
our NMD program does not exist in a vacuum, it needs to be guided by 
what I call three common sense criteria: compatibility with arms 
control, affordability, and use of proven, tested technology.
  As introduced last year S. 257 did not address these concerns, and 
its authors were refusing to entertain amendments. For these reasons, 
in 1998 I opposed this measure.

[[Page 4749]]

  I am pleased that the bill's authors decided to support improving S. 
257 through the amendment process. With the addition of the amendments 
offered by Senators Cochran and Landrieu, today I am prepared to 
support S. 257. Allow me to briefly discuss the impact of these 
amendments.
  Yesterday the Senate, on a 99-0 vote, approved an amendment offered 
by Senator Cochran that will ensure that considerations of 
affordability and use of proven technology will not be neglected. By 
stating that funding the NMD will be subject to Congressional 
authorization and appropriations, the Cochran amendment indicates that 
no final decisions about deployment, funding levels, or the system's 
technological maturity have been made. I thank my esteemed colleague 
from Mississippi for his comments on this point during his colloquy 
with Senator Bingaman earlier today. Let me repeat: as amended, S. 257 
is not the final word on NMD cost and use of proven technology.
  Even more significant was the amendment offered by the distinguished 
ranking member of the Armed Services Committee's Strategic Forces 
Subcommittee, Senator Landrieu. In affirming that it is our nation's 
policy to pursue continued negotiated reductions to Russian nuclear 
forces, the Landrieu amendment makes unmistakably clear that as our NMD 
program moves forward we will take into account our arms control 
agreements and objectives. Because there can be little hope of Russian 
agreement to further nuclear reductions in the absence of continued 
United States support for the ABM Treaty, following through on the 
Landrieu amendment will require continued adherence to the ABM Treaty.
  I would also like to note that I have been assured by the President's 
advisors that in no way will S. 257 be interpreted by our nation's arms 
control negotiators as a repudiation of the ABM Treaty. Administration 
officials continue to make it clear that the ABM Treaty remains the 
``cornerstone of strategic stability,'' and that the Administration has 
a ``strong commitment to the ABM Treaty.''
  I cannot understate the importance of these amendments. Without them, 
I would again vote against S. 257.
  It is true that I would have preferred that the Senate would today be 
passing a more comprehensive NMD bill, one that is more explicit about 
the importance of our arms control agreements and offers specific 
guidance on affordability, system component selection, and technology 
development and deployment. It is my intention to introduce legislation 
which will describe in more detail how the NMD program should proceed.
  For the time being, however, I regard S. 257 as a constructive 
contribution to our NMD program. It will do no harm to our nation's 
security, and will put our nation's potential enemies on notice that we 
are working aggressively to establish a defense against ICBMs. As 
amended, S. 257 will also help ensure that concerns of arms control, 
cost, and use of proven technology will be carefully considered. This 
is a good bill, and will have my support.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, during the Cold War, the United States co-
existed with the Soviet Union in a strategic environment characterized 
by high-risk but low-probability of a ballistic missile exchange 
between the two countries involving nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons.
  Today, however, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end 
of the cold war, the opposite is the case--we live in a lower-risk but 
higher-probability environment with respect to ballistic missile 
exchanges. In other words, even as the probability of a large-scale 
nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia has mercifully 
declined, the probability that one or several weapons of mass 
destruction might be used to attack the American homeland or American 
forces at home or abroad has increased.
  Indeed, absent a U.S. response to the proliferation of ballistic 
missiles and weapons of mass destruction that is as focused, serious, 
and vigorous as America's cold war deterrent strategy to protect the 
American homeland and the West, Americans can anticipate the threatened 
as well as the actual use of diverse weapons delivery systems to attack 
the U.S. homeland in the future.
  Missile defense must be a part of that response. For that reason, I 
am pleased to be an original cosponsor of the legislation before us and 
commend Senator Cochran for his leadership on this issue.
  Let me explain my strong support for this bill.
  Missile defense is not a silver bullet that, by itself, can 
adequately protect the United States from the enhanced threats posed by 
ballistic missile proliferation and the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction. But it is an important component that gives added 
credibility to the other elements of our strategy.
  I approach the response to these threats to American security through 
the prism of ``defense in depth.'' There are three main lines of 
defense against emerging ballistic missile threats and weapons of mass 
destruction. Together, they help form the policy fabric of an 
integrated defense in depth.
  The first line of defense is preventing proliferation at potential 
sources abroad. The second is deterring and interdicting the flow of 
illicit trade in these weapons and materials. The third line of defense 
is ``homeland defense'' and involves programs that run the gamut from 
preparing domestically for WMD crises to protection against limited 
ballistic missile attacks.
  With respect to the initial line of defense, the United States is 
implementing programs that address the threat posed by weapons of mass 
destruction at the greatest distance possible from our borders and at 
the most prevalent source, the former Soviet Union. While much more 
remains to be done, the Nunn-Lugar Scorecard is impressive. Nunn-Lugar 
has facilitated the destruction of 344 ballistic missiles, 286 
ballistic missile launchers, 37 bombers, 96 submarine missile 
launchers, and 30 submarine launched ballistic missiles. It also has 
sealed 191 nuclear test tunnels. Most notably, 4,838 warheads that were 
on strategic systems aimed at the United States have been deactivated. 
All at a cost of less than one-third of one percent of the Department 
of Defense's annual budget. Without Nunn-Lugar, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and 
Belarus would still have thousands of nuclear weapons. Instead, all 
three countries are nuclear weapons-free.
  The second line of defense against these threats involves efforts to 
deter and interdict the transfer of such weapons and materials at far-
away borders. Nunn-Lugar and the U.S. Customs Service is working at the 
borders of former Soviet states to assist with the establishment of 
export control systems and customs services. In many cases these 
nations have borders that are thousands of miles long, but local 
governments do not have the infrastructure or ability to monitor, 
patrol, or secure them. These borders are particularly permeable, 
including points of entry into Iran on the Caspian Sea and other rogue 
nations.
  We must continue to plug these porous borders abroad. These nations 
are seeking our help and it is in our interests to supply it. Secure 
borders in this region of the world would strengthen our second line of 
defense and serve as another proliferation choke-point.
  The third line of defense involves the United States preparing 
domestically to respond to these threats. That is the purpose of the 
1996 Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Act. This law directs professionals from the Department of Defense, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Health and Human 
Services, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and others to join 
into partnerships with local emergency professionals in cities across 
the country. The Pentagon intends to supply training and equipment to 
120 cities across the country over the next four years. To date, 52 
metropolitan areas have received training to deal with these potential 
threats.
  We must take those steps necessary to protect the American people 
from these threats and Nunn-Lugar and Nunn-Lugar-Domenici make powerful

[[Page 4750]]

contributions to our efforts. We have made significant progress in 
reducing these threats and constructing a defense-in-depth. But a 
complete defense-in-depth must include protection from missile attack.
  I was pleased to see this common-sense, bipartisan approach to the 
missile defense issue embodied in the Cochran bill. The bill states: 
``It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as 
technologically possible a national missile defense system capable of 
defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic 
missile attack.''
  This bill offers a new approach to the missile defense policy debate. 
It does not specify a specific system architecture or deployment dates 
which have bogged down previous legislative proposals.
  The national missile defense system promoted both in this legislation 
would not be capable of defending against thousands of warheads being 
launched against the United States. Rather, we are planning a system 
capable of defending against the much smaller and relatively 
unsophisticated ICBM threat that a rogue nation or terrorist group 
could mount as well as one capable of shooting down an unauthorized or 
accidentally launched missile.
  At minimum, the recent revelations over Chinese nuclear espionage 
suggests that China is intent on building its military capabilities to 
a point that exceeds the projections and assessments of the U.S. 
military and intelligence community. The Cox committee findings have 
done for American appreciation of the potential Chinese nuclear threat 
what the Rumsfeld Commission did for our knowledge of North Korean and 
Iranian capabilities. And like the latter, the former may highlight the 
need to review the impact of such enhanced nuclear capabilities on our 
existing assumptions and requirements with respect to a limited 
ballistic missile defense system. Illicit acquisition and testing of 
the design for the W-88 nuclear warhead strongly suggests that the 
Chinese are modernizing their strategic force and using such tests to 
develop mobile missiles to possibly penetrate missile defense.
  Acquisition of United States nuclear warhead technology will give 
China a major boost in its strategic capability when added to other 
recent improvements to its long-range missiles. Indeed, possession of 
the design of the W-88 would have helped China advance toward key 
strategic goals. Equally important, China's possession of the design of 
advanced United States warheads poses a proliferation risk. Such 
warheads have features that could prove useful to aspiring nuclear 
weapons states. In brief, if China shared W-88 warhead design 
information with nations like North Korea, Pakistan, or Iran, they 
could develop and deploy a more potent nuclear force in a shorter 
period of time.
  Lastly, lighter, smaller warheads in the Chinese nuclear arsenal will 
increase the range of Chinese missiles and make it easier for 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles to hit the United States. And 
this, in turn, could make a strategic difference if the United States 
and China were once again to come to odds over Taiwan. Certainly, it 
could have an impact on the efficacy of any American plans to include 
Taiwan--or Japan for that matter--in any regional missile defense 
system.
  In short, these recent revelations should force us to reconsider a 
number of the assumptions and resulting requirements that underlie our 
thinking both on theater as well as national missile defense. The 
recent report by the Rumsfeld Commission raised serious doubts about 
the core assumptions that undergird administration policy for 
developing a national missile defense systems and for considering 
amendments to the ABM Treaty. The Cox committee report not only called 
into question other core assumptions but also the requirements for an 
effective, if limited, national missile defense system.
  The Rumsfeld Commission took an independent look at the critical 
question of warning time and not only dissented from the intelligence 
community's estimates but struck at the core of the administration's 
``3+3'' policy by finding that a ballistic missile threat to the United 
States could emerge with little or no warning over the next 5 years.
  Even before the Rumsfeld Commission issued its report, Senator 
Cochran, along with Senator Inouye, introduced the legislation before 
us. It directs the deployment of effective anti-missile defenses of the 
territory of the United States as soon as ``technologically feasible.'' 
By making a missile defense deployment decision dependent on technical 
readiness as opposed to intelligence estimates about emerging threats 
and warning time, this legislation appeared to many to take an approach 
to missile defense that is fundamentally different from the 
administration's policy. Indeed, critics of the Cochran bill have gone 
out of their way to try and paint major differences with the 
administration's policy.
  The Cochran bill attempts to determine whether and how our current 
policy on national missile defense should be changed in light of the 
growing disutility of warning time and intelligence estimates as 
triggers for deployment decisions. While critics may argue that the 
Cochran bill neither provides a clear answer to that question or a 
clear policy alternative to that of the administration, it does propose 
that a deployment decision rest on more than whether a national missile 
defense system simply is ``technologically feasible''. The Cochran bill 
also sensibly insists that the national missile defense system be 
effective ``against limited ballistic missile attacks (whether 
accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate)'' before it is deployed.
  The Cochran bill is a statement of intentions, not a policy map, and 
it represents not an escape from but rather a recognition of the 
difficult intelligence and policy problems with respect to the kinds of 
emerging ballistic missile threats, the time-frame for their emergence, 
and what we should do about them.
  So the Cochran bill recognizes that there will remain the tough 
policy and intelligence questions that cannot be ducked. The 1972 ABM 
Treaty was intended to preclude the kind of nationwide missile defenses 
that could undermine the credibility of a large second strike 
deterrent, using measures based on technology over 25 years ago. In 
1999, both the threats and the technology have changed. The threat 
posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles is clearest, ant the 
ABM Treaty should not be allowed to interfere with programs to deploy 
effective defenses.
  Equally important, there is nothing in the Cochran bill that would 
prevent us from engaging the Russians in discussions about modifying 
the ABM Treaty to permit effective national defenses against the kinds 
of missile attacks that should constitute the post-cold-war threat of 
concern to both countries. If these exchanges are not successful, then 
consideration can be given to withdrawing from the agreement.
  Finally, critics of the Cochran bill complain both about the timing 
of the bill as well as the message its sends to the Russians. Three 
points are worth making. First, for the critics there is never a good 
time to take up missile defense and in this they are joined by the 
Russians. And to the great surprise of absolutely no one, the Russians 
have announced that the Duma might be prepared to take up START II 
again. With Russian Prime Minister Primakov on his way to Washington, I 
would say that the timing is just about right.
  The administration must be more forthcoming with Russia on the issue 
of missile defense. It must explain to Moscow that this defense is not 
meant as a threat or an attempt to neutralize Russia. Rather, we are 
attempting to protect ourselves from the machinations of rogue states 
and terrorist groups. In my trips to Russia and in visits with Russian 
legislators and members of the Yeltsin Government, I have continued to 
inform them of a simple fact: America will protect itself.
  The Russians--and the world--need to understand that we will proceed

[[Page 4751]]

with non-proliferation, domestic preparedness, and missile defense to 
protect the American people against an attack from a rogue state or 
terrorist group or an accidental or unauthorized attack by another 
nation.
  Secondly, Russian nuclear reductions and eliminations are continuing 
and even accelerating with American help despite the absence of START 
II ratification. To the extent that those eliminations become 
constrained, it will be for reasons of resources, not lack of Duma 
approval of START II.
  Thirdly, critics of the Cochran bill would argue that the 
congressional expression of intent embodied in the legislation 
regarding deployment of a limited missile defense system will prejudice 
any chances of negotiating appropriate adjustments in the ABM Treaty 
with the Russians to accommodate such defenses. There I disagree! It is 
precisely because many Russians have doubted the serious intent of the 
Clinton administration in actually proceeding with a limited deployment 
under the ``3+3'' plan that we have been treated to dire predictions 
out of Moscow about the ``end of arms control'' were the United States 
to ultimately proceed with missile defense.
  Rather than prejudicing any opportunity to negotiate changes in the 
ABM Treaty, I believe that the statement of intent embodied in this 
legislation to ultimately defend ourselves against limited ballistic 
missile attacks is a prerequisite to successful ABM modification 
negotiations. It has never been our technological prowess nor our 
ability to amass and apply resources to a problem that the Russians 
have doubted; it has been our political will that has been suspect in 
Russian eyes when the choices to be made were difficult ones.
  In conclusion, the ballistic missile threat to our security interests 
is real. But it is also complex. The Cochran bill recognizes these 
realities. But the bill also recognizes that it is not the only threat 
we face nor can it be addressed in isolation from other major security 
issues and policies.
  As Senator Cochran said, this legislation represents not the end of 
the missile defense policy and program debate but rather the beginning. 
If I recall correctly where the two parties stood on the issue of 
missile defense even a year or two ago, I am struck by the efforts of a 
few dedicated Members on both sides to bridge the gap in our 
legislative approaches in the interest of addressing the growing 
vulnerability of the American homeland to ballistic missile attacks. We 
have come a considerable distance in the last year in narrowing our 
differences. Senate passage by a strong majority of this expression of 
policy intent with regard to the ultimate deployment of an effective 
limited missile defense system is a measured but essential first step.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the security of this nation in an 
increasingly insecure world remains the highest priority of the United 
States government. To that end, we support and finance the most 
powerful military in the world. Our troops have the most advanced 
weapons available. We have gifted and dedicated military strategists at 
the helm.
  And yet we remain vulnerable, in some ways perhaps more so today than 
we were at the height of the Cold War. The increased sophistication, 
radicalization, and financial acumen of terrorist organizations have 
escalated the threat of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. The increased 
interdependence and complexity of computer networks has intensified the 
threat of potentially devastating cyber attacks on critical defense and 
domestic communications systems. And despite the end of the Cold War, 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, particularly among 
rogue states, has brought with it a renewed threat of nuclear attack on 
our homeland.
  North Korea, Iraq, and Iran are all working furiously to produce 
nuclear weapons systems that could threaten the sovereign territory of 
the United States. To our dismay, we have discovered that North Korea, 
one of the most belligerent outlaw nations in the world, is much 
further along than previously thought in its efforts to produce a 
nuclear warhead capable of reaching our shores. The threat from North 
Korea is sooner rather than later; here rather than there. China, with 
whom our relations are increasingly strained, has boasted of its 
possession of a ballistic missile that could reach Los Angeles. Russia, 
with an arsenal of thousands of nuclear weapons left over from the Cold 
War, is faced with a crumbling military infrastructure and increasingly 
empty assurances regarding the security of its nuclear stockpile.
  In short, we are living in dangerous times. The Administration has 
taken a number of steps in recent months to accelerate its efforts to 
protect the U.S. mainland from attack. As part of that effort, the 
President has budgeted an additional $6.6 billion dollars to develop a 
National Missile Defense, or NMD. The legislation that we are 
considering today, S. 257, the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, 
puts the United States Senate firmly on record as endorsing the urgency 
of that program. As a result of several carefully crafted amendments 
that have been overwhelmingly adopted, this bill has gained strong 
bipartisan support. Senators Cochran, Levin, Landrieu, and the many 
others who have worked to reach consensus on this bill are to be 
commended.
  I support the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 as amended. But, 
from the vantage point of many years of experience, I also offer a few 
words of caution. Let us not allow the determination to press for a 
ballistic missile shield to blind us to other, perhaps greater, threats 
of sabotage. The technology exists, and is available to those same 
rogue nations, to develop and deploy chemical and biological weapons 
without the need for a ballistic missile delivery system. A few vials 
of anthrax, a test tube full of the smallpox virus, some innocuous 
canisters of sarin gas, could wreak chaos of unimaginable proportion in 
the United States. These threats are as real as the threat of a 
ballistic missile attack, and, if anything, more urgent.
  A second cautionary note: let us not allow our eagerness to develop a 
missile defense system blind us to the cost of developing such a 
system. In our zeal to erect a national missile shield, the danger 
exists of committing such a vast array of resources--money, people, 
research priorities--that we could shortchange other necessary 
initiatives to protect our national security. We need a balanced 
national security program, of which a missile defense is but one 
element.
  We have gone down the road of throwing money at this threat before, 
with the ABM system in the 1970's and SDI in the 1980's. Both efforts 
cost us billions of dollars, oceans of ink, years of wasted effort. 
Neither, in the end, made one iota of difference to our national 
security. Technological feasibility should be the starting point, not 
the defining element, of a missile defense system. Let us learn from 
the past. Invest wisely. Test carefully. Assess constantly. This is not 
the arena in which to allow partisan politics or political one-
upmanship to hold sway. This is a matter of far too great consequence 
to this and future generations. The bipartisan negotiations and the 
spirit of compromise that have marked the Senate debate over this bill 
give me cause to hope that this time, we will do it right. Let us 
continue to work together toward an effective, realistic, and prudent 
national defense system.
  Finally, let us not for a moment forget the importance of working 
actively and diligently to reduce the number of existing nuclear 
warheads and curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A national 
missile defense system that precipitates a global arms race is in no 
one's best interest.
  We cannot safely assume that today's geopolitical alliances will be 
the same tomorrow. A weak and politically chaotic Russia may be not 
seen as much of a threat to our security today--at least not 
intentionally--but as it has done before, the situation in Russia could 
change in the blink of an eye. We have at hand the means and the will 
and the opportunity to work with Russia to reduce nuclear warheads. 
Yes, we must take all necessary precautions to protect our security, 
but we must not be

[[Page 4752]]

so shortsighted as to let this opportunity for meaningful arms control 
be muscled aside through misguided belligerence.
  With care and planning, we can make progress in both arms control and 
missile defense. How well we will succeed on both fronts remains to be 
seen, but S. 257 as amended is a good first step.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, there is little doubt that the moment of 
truth regarding a missile defense of U.S. territory is fast 
approaching.
  The need for it was not unseen. Since 1983, there has been a steady 
flow of evidence that the post-cold-war era would not be the single 
superpower cakewalk that many expected. In place of the single 
adversary nuclear threat, we see a fragmented threat environment 
populated by mentalities more given to terrorism than the mass attack, 
direct confrontational strategies of the cold war.
  The cloudy grasp that we have of the true threat is not helped by the 
Clinton administration. They lack a strategic approach to a threat that 
they don't really know or understand.
  They rely on the prevention policies. Arms control and non-
proliferation agreements are of questionable value. Disarmament 
assistance to the former Soviet Union has not kept nuclear, missile, or 
warhead technology from slipping abroad and has had its most adverse 
impact on our own U.S. steel workers and the United States rocket 
launch industry. United States industry has been encouraged to purchase 
Russian launch vehicles, technologies, and services to keep them from 
slipping out of the country. The administration is reluctant to squelch 
illegal Russian steel imports into the United States for fear of 
causing civil strife among Russian steel workers. Multilateral export 
controls are not multilaterally enforced, and the framework agreement 
with North Korea is neither a framework for cooperation nor an 
agreement.
  Second, there is deterrence. However, there is sufficient doubt in 
the world today about this administration's resolve to use force.
  This leaves us with the third element of administration missile 
defense policy: the missile defense force itself. Supposedly, that is 
our fall back position when prevention and deterrence fail. But when 
the force structure depends on a strategy that does not address a 
threat because the threat is unknown, one seems forced toward the very 
disturbing conclusion that the easiest way to avoid the messier aspects 
of the problem, like tampering with the ABM Treaty, is simply to 
politicize the threat. For too long it has appeared that this 
administration underestimates the threat in order to preserve the 
sanctity of a treaty increasingly irrelevant to the contemporary threat 
environment.
  Let me say more about this last issue. In starker terms this means 
denial, even wishing the real threat away. One would think that it was 
embarrassing enough for the Clinton threat team to make the sudden and 
very recent admission that there is a missile threat to U.S. territory. 
And, by the way, this now includes Alaska and Hawaii, which the 
administration had chosen to place outside of U.S. territorial 
boundaries to give academic weight to its anti-development and 
deployment arguments. If they are seriously seeking the truth, they do 
not demonstrate it by re-examining the ABM Treaty restraints. Here the 
administration has a rare opportunity for leadership on a badly 
understood and very divisive issue. The President acknowledged just 
this January that, with the long-range missile threat to U.S. territory 
better understood, progress on developing our defenses would be pursued 
by renegotiating rather than abandoning the ABM
Treaty.
  I do not intend to await the outcome of administration negotiations 
on ABM modifications and amendments, which will take some time given 
traditional Russian Duma management of the treaty ratification process. 
In the meantime, I will urge the strongest possible pursuit of 
conceptual strategies, like the sea-based missile defense force, as 
well as land-force and space-based missile defense components.
  Inaction is eclipsing administration options. Since I join many 
colleagues as well as other experts outside of official circles in 
believing China, Russia, Iraq, Iran, India, Pakistan, and South Africa, 
among others, have real threat capabilities, I want something done by 
way of creating a viable defense of U.S. territory. For this very 
reason, I have joined my good friends, Senators Cochran and Inouye as a 
cosponsor of the National Missile Defense Act of 1999.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, on balance, I believe this legislation 
deserves bipartisan support. There is a clear need to do more to 
protect our country from the threat of missile attacks. This bill 
avoids most of the problems of previous versions and is consistent with 
our responsibility to continue working with Russia to reduce the 
immense threat from their nuclear arsenal.
  The bill declares that it is the policy of the United States to 
deploy a limited national missile defense system as soon as it is 
technologically possible, but it also stresses that it is the policy of 
the United States to continue to negotiate with Russia to reduce our 
nuclear arsenals.
  There is no doubt that the United States is facing a growing threat 
to our country and our interests from rogue nations that possess 
increasingly advanced missile technology. We must prepare for these 
threats more effectively by making greater investments in research and 
development to produce a missile defense system able to defeat these 
threats.
  But, before we decide to actually deploy such a system, we must ask 
ourselves the following questions:
  What is the specific threat we are countering with this system?
  Will the system be effective?
  What impact will the deployment of the system have on the nuclear 
arms reduction and arms control agreements we currently have with the 
Russians?
  What will be the cost of the system?
  The Rumsfeld Report in 1998 clearly demonstrated the growing missile 
threat from rogue nations. In spite of international agreements to 
control the spread of missile technology, these nations are resorting 
to whatever means it takes to acquire this capability. Because of this 
growing threat, we must do more to decide whether a defense is 
practical and can deliver the protection it promises.
  Many of us continue to be concerned that the step we are about to 
take could undermine the very successful nuclear arms reduction 
treaties and other arms control agreements that we have with Russia. 
Our purpose in developing a limited national missile defense system is 
not directed at Russia. It is intended to protect our country against 
the growing missile threat from rogue nations.
  Russia's strategic nuclear force would easily overpower the limited 
missile defense system that is currently proposed. But the fact remains 
that the United States and Russia are parties to the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty. Without changes to that treaty, our ability to fully 
test and deploy this defense system cannot occur.
  The ABM Treaty is also the foundation for the SALT I and SALT II 
nuclear arms reduction treaties, which paved the way for the START I 
and START II treaties. The Russian Duma is again preparing to debate 
the ratification of the START II treaty, and will do so when Russian 
Prime Minister Primakov returns from his visit to the United States. 
President Clinton has already sent a delegation to Russia to discuss 
changes in this treaty. We must work closely with the Russians to make 
mutually acceptable changes to the ABM Treaty in order to accommodate a 
missile defense system. The ABM Treaty is simply too important to 
abandon.
  We also need to work with Russia to develop a joint early warning 
system, so that false launch alarms can be avoided. We need to 
strengthen the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs at the Department 
of Defense. We need to strengthen the Nuclear Cities programs and the 
Initiaitve for Proliferation Prevention program at the Department of 
Energy so that we can reduce the danger that nuclear material

[[Page 4753]]

will end up on the hands of rogue nations or terrorists.
  Finally, we must continue to strengthen other counter-terrorism 
programs. It is far more likely that if terrorists use nuclear, 
chemical, or biological weapons against Americans at home or abroad, 
they will be delivered by conventional methods rather than by a 
ballistic missile launch from another country. These threats must weigh 
at least equally--if not more heavily--in our defense decisions.
  These are very important defense decisions that go to the heart of 
our national security. I look forward to working with my colleagues to 
ensure that we counter these threats in the most effective ways in the 
years ahead.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I am pleased to express my support for 
S. 257, the National Missile Defense Act of 1999. As an original 
cosponsor, I want to impress upon the Members of the Senate that now is 
the time for passage of this bill.
  For over 200 years, the United States has been fortunate to enjoy a 
high level of security provided by, among other things, our geographic 
location. In the past, the Atlantic and Pacific oceans have served well 
in preventing a direct attack on the United States. However, as we 
approach the twenty-first century and new technology, we find that the 
proliferation of missile technology has taken this geographic sanctuary 
away from us.
  S. 257 will establish that it is the policy of the United States to 
deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective national 
missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the United 
States against limited ballistic missile attack.
  This bill focuses on one important factor for conditioning 
deployment: technological capability. Other important factors exist 
including cost, threat, and treaty commitments. These factors, while 
important, should not be the final determining factor in deciding on 
national policy to deploy a missile defense.
  I am concerned about the cost of such a weapon system and will 
continue to carefully monitor the costs of a NMD system. However, with 
this bill, we are not just addressing concerns about protecting 
America's interests around the globe, but about protecting the American 
homeland itself. We are not talking about foreign lands and obscure 
interests, or about some distant, remote, or highly unlikely threat. We 
are talking about preventing ballistic missiles from shattering the 
communities in which we all live--we are talking about protecting our 
families, our cities, and our nation from potential destruction at the 
hands of a rogue regime anywhere around the world.
  The threat of a ballistic missile attack on the United States is 
real. We face a growing threat from rogue nations which have increased 
their capabilities due to increased access to missile technology; as 
demonstrated by the recent successful flight test demonstrations of 
North Korea, and the flow of technology from Russia to Iran. These 
countries are making investments to do one thing--intimidate their 
neighboring states, the U.S. and our allies.
  For example, North Korea is working hard on the Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) 
ballistic missile. Our national technical experts have determined this 
missile can reach major cities and military bases in Alaska. They 
further state that lightweight variations of this missile could reach 
6,200 miles; placing at risk western U.S. territory in an arc extending 
from Phoenix, Arizona, to Madison, Wisconsin. This includes my home 
state of Kansas.
  As if that weren't enough, North Korea poses an additionally even 
greater threat to the United States, because it is a major seller of 
ballistic missile technology to other countries of concern, such as 
Iran and Iraq, Syria and others.
  These countries have regional ambitions and do not welcome the U.S. 
presence or influence in their region. Acquisition of missile weapon 
systems is the most effective way of challenging the United States.
  Mr. President, we should not and must not wait for these weapons to 
be used against us, the stakes are too high. We must move forward with 
the development and deployment of a national missile defense to protect 
our shores from hostile attack.
  The bill will send a clear message that we are determined to defend 
ourselves and will not be deterred from our national and international 
commitments. An effective and dependable system must be in place before 
such a threat can be used against us, or the results could be 
disastrous. We will not get a second change.
  The Department of Defense has requested funding to develop a viable 
missile defense system. I encourage the administration not to back away 
from this critical defense issue. The world has changed; we must move 
ahead and change the way we think about the defense of our nation.
  It has been argued on this floor that the adoption of S. 257 will 
make reductions in nuclear weapons more difficult and would place the 
United States in breach of the ABM Treaty. I too am concerned about 
honoring our treaty commitments. However, this bill states our intent 
to protect our homeland. We will have ample time to continue to work 
with Russia on these treaty issues, and I am confident we will reach an 
equable position. We must be clear, the threat goes beyond our 
agreements with other countries.
  America has a leadership role in the world. We represent the hope for 
peace and opportunity. I believe this is one of the most important 
defense issues facing the United States. To vote against this bill 
would be to ignore the number one responsibility of the Federal 
government--the defense of our nation.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, the spectrum of emerging missile threats 
to our national security cannot be ignored. I am very concerned about 
the implications of the North Korean missile recently launched over 
Japan. Research and testing on similar missile systems likely continue 
in Iran, Iraq, China, and other countries. These circumstances suggest 
that the Senate should carefully consider our ability to appropriately 
counter these threats.
  I am concerned, however, that the existing national missile defense 
(NMD) technology has not yet proven to be effective, could be very 
expensive to deploy and has the potential to adversely affect Anti-
Ballistic Missile treaty negotiations with Russia. These concerns 
should serve to caution us against premature deployment of NMD systems. 
However, I am now satisfied that amendments to the bill address these 
concerns. One amendment makes funding for deployment subject to the 
annual appropriations process and therefore up to Congress to set the 
appropriate level each year. Another amendment provides that the United 
States will continue to seek reductions in Russian nuclear forces, and 
the Administration now states that it can move cautiously on deployment 
so as to stay within our commitments to the ABM treaty. The bill has 
consequently become a policy guiding deployment, rather than a decision 
to deploy.
  I have long supported a full program of research, testing and 
development and resisted a premature decision to deploy. I hope that 
research will lead to some technological breakthroughs or ways to 
counter ballistic missiles. Their proliferation, especially in the 
hands of irresponsible leaders such as North Korea's Kim Jung II, 
requires that we actively investigate possible defenses, but we must 
not rush to build, at great cost, the first system that passes a flight 
test. There is still a great deal of research and development work to 
be done.
  The fledgling NMD systems now being contemplated for deployment 
simply do not compare in priority to many of our other military needs, 
such as our need to immediately recruit, train and retain quality men 
and women for our military. This is why the Soldiers', Sailors', 
Airmen's and Marines' Bill of Rights, the military pay, education and 
benefits bill, was the first major legislation considered this session, 
and it swiftly passed the Senate with overwhelming support. Well-
educated Americans in uniform comprise the foundation upon which we 
maintain the strong defense of this

[[Page 4754]]

country. While the Senate unanimously agreed on the urgency of enacting 
this legislation, it still has found no way to pay for it. In my mind 
this takes priority over deployment of expensive and unproven NMD 
technology.
  Given the competing demands on our finite budget and the high costs 
to deploy a NMD system, we cannot afford to get it wrong. I hope that 
this vote will not be seen as endorsement of a rush to deployment, but 
rather a set of policy guidelines governing an eventual decision to 
deploy. I will do what I can to ensure this ultimate decision is not 
made in haste.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise to express my views on the National 
Missile Defense bill as it was amended yesterday. I am glad that 
Senator Cochran and Senator Levin were able to agree to changes in this 
bill. The unanimous votes on the amendments and nearly unanimous vote 
on final passage are tributes to Senator Cochran's and Senator Levin's 
resolve to seek common ground on this important issue that has long 
divided this body along party lines. Thankfully, instead of a partisan 
battle, the Senate produced a strong statement of this nation's resolve 
to develop and deploy a national missile defense system in the context 
of other budget priorities, national security concerns, and the U.S.-
Russian arms control process.
  The initial bill stated that the United States would deploy a 
national missile defense system as soon as technologically possible. I 
stood with the administration and this nation's military leaders in 
opposing that legislation because it did not consider other important 
factors such as cost, the specific missile threat, effectiveness of the 
system, and the impact on the arms control process.
  The amendments that were added address some of those other issues. 
The first amendment explicitly requires that the national missile 
defense program be subject to the annual authorization and 
appropriations process despite the bill's requirement to deploy a 
system ``as soon as technologically possible.'' The amendment stresses 
the fact that this nation is not committed to giving the missile 
defense program a blank check. In other words, notwithstanding the 
Senate's commitment to protect this nation against rogue state 
missiles, this body will balance the importance of national missile 
defense with other national security priorities. For example, we have 
an attack submarine fleet that continues to shrink as the result of a 
low build rate. That issue and many others need to be considered by our 
national defense leadership. Furthermore, the first amendment 
highlights the fact that this body will balance the need for a national 
missile defense system with the need to provide our citizens with 
strong and effective domestic programs.
  The second amendment, sponsored by Senator Landrieu, was absolutely 
necessary for the passage of this legislation. The amendment reminds us 
that the United States remains wholly committed to nuclear arms 
control. The ABM Treaty and START Treaties are basic elements of 
nuclear arms control, and this bill is not meant to impinge on the 
effectiveness of those treaties. This nation will not ignore, but 
instead seek modifications to, the ABM Treaty to allow for a limited 
national missile defense system. Also, this nation awaits ratification 
of START II by the Russian Duma and looks forward to agreement on the 
provisions of START III.
  In sum, this legislation does not alter the administration's present 
policy with respect to national missile defense. This nation will 
develop and deploy a national missile defense system, but the costs of 
the system, the specific rouge nation missile threat, the impact on 
arms control, and our technological ability to field such a system will 
all be carefully considered. For those reasons, I have decided to 
support this bill.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President: I rise to make a few remarks concerning 
S. 257, The National Missile Defense Act.
  S. 257 will establish that it is the policy of the United States to 
deploy as soon as it is technologically possible an effective National 
Missile Defense (NMD) system capable of defending the territory of the 
United States against limited ballistic missile attack whether 
accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate.
  Many have asked why would we want to do this as soon as 
technologically feasible. The answer finally came earlier this year 
when the Administration finally admitted that the Threat is here and 
now, not some indefinite number of years down the road.
  The Threat, is upon us. According to CIA Director George Tenet's 
testimony on February 2, page 6, ``theater-range missiles with 
increasing range pose an immediate and growing threat to US interests, 
military forces, and allies--and the threat is increasing. This threat 
is here and now.''
  If we look at what the Iraqi's have or will have in the near future, 
why would we delay given that we are conducting an aggressive air 
campaign against Iraqi air defense targets daily?
  If we look at the improvements the Chinese have made in their missile 
program at our expense, why would we delay waiting for the Chinese to 
prove in some scenario yet undefined that they have the capability to 
destroy an American city or two?
  If we look at the proliferation of technology leaving Russia to rogue 
states because they provide the hard currency to Russian scientists 
that the West cannot, why then would we wait?
  There are some who say that we should wait and work the ABM problem 
out with the Russians. They say that if we move forward with a 
deployment this will make the Russians angry. Mr. President, the 
Russians have strongly objected to any US deployment to Kosovo, yet I 
do not see the Administration holding back on its desire to send 
upwards of 4000 troops to the region. Isn't protection of the United 
States more important than Kosovo?
  Our goal in the effort to deploy a National Missile defense System 
has two crucial impacts on our security:

  First, it will signal to nations that aspire to possess ballistic 
missiles with which to coerce or attack the United States that pursuit 
of such capabilities is a waste of both time and resources.
  Second, if some aspiring states are not deterred, a commitment to 
deploy an NMD system will ensure that American citizens and their 
property are protected from a limited attack.
  The Rumsfeld Commission report stated that, ``the warning times the 
US can expect are being reduced. Under some plausible scenarios the US 
might have little or no warning before operational deployment.'' This 
is a statement from a very creditable commission. It suggests that 
America ought to move quickly to defend itself. A NMD system deployed 
now is the step in the right direction. We cannot afford to debate the 
``what could be's or should be's any longer.'' This Congress must act, 
and act now. I doubt if the American public would forgive this Congress 
if a situation arises for which we are not prepared.
  Lastly, I have a comment about the Chinese spying incident. I have 
been in two meetings with Secretary Richardson in the last two days. My 
feeling on this issue is:
  We have now learned of improved Chinese Missile guidance system 
capability due to US computers--sold to the Chinese by two US firms.
  Chinese spying has provided that nation with the instructions on how 
to fabricate compact warheads (MIRV's)
  Both of these acts should never have happened.
  Mr. President, America cannot tolerate continued slackness in 
security and we need to press forward with protecting our nation--not 
tomorrow, not next month, not five years from now. We need to move the 
NMD program forward as soon as technically feasible.
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I support a national missile defense. I have 
voted--repeatedly--to fund research and development that would make 
such a defense not just a theoretical hope but a reality. In the past, 
however, I have also opposed legislation identical to S. 257, the 
National Missile Defense Act of 1999 as it was introduced. I voted 
against it when it was reported from the Armed Services Committee. I 
did so, even though I unequivocally support providing our nation a real 
defense against missile attack, because I

[[Page 4755]]

believed that as introduced the bill would not advance that objective 
and could possibly move us in the opposite direction. While it is 
imperative for the United States to deploy a defense against missile 
attacks by North Korea and other rogue nations, it is equally 
imperative that we consider affordability, operational effectiveness, 
and treaty implications when determining how best to proceed on such a 
major acquisition program.
  Mr. President, the Department of Defense, in testimony before the 
Armed Services Committee, has made it very clear that we can't 
accelerate the national missile defense program beyond what we're doing 
right now even if we spend significantly more money on it. Yet the 
original legislation implied that money is no object, that we should 
forgo our basic responsibility of getting the best defense possible for 
the taxpayer's dollar. I am concerned--as are many of our colleagues--
about numerous, severe problems our military faces today, that can be 
resolved with proven technologies. Our forces are operating at OPTEMPOS 
unheard of even during the Cold War. Their equipment is often older 
than the operators, and spare parts are regularly in short supply. It 
is no wonder that we are facing one of the most pressing recruiting and 
retention challenges since the hollow force of the seventies. Passing 
blank check legislation is not, in my view, responsible, and not in the 
best interest of our military.
  Fortunately, changes were made to the original legislation that 
addressed some of my concerns. The Cochran amendment subjects national 
missile defense deployment to the normal authorizing and appropriating 
process, allowing us to retain fiscal control over the program. This 
reinforces the need to ensure that any system we approve be affordable 
and operationally effective before deployment.
  Mr. President, the bill in its original form was silent on arms 
controls. It is clear from hearing the comments of several Senators in 
support of this bill that they believe the ABM Treaty is of marginal 
consequence when compared to deploying a missile defense capability. 
The virtual certainty that the Russians will retain thousands of 
nuclear warheads if we undermine the ABM Treaty has been brushed aside 
as a minor annoyance. No matter that the existence of these thousands 
of additional weapons greatly increases the likelihood of the kind of 
accidental launch that a national missile defense would defend against. 
No matter that, by undermining the strategic arms control process, we 
prompt China and other nations--including so-called rogue regimes--to 
develop or expand their nuclear arsenals and create the very kind of 
threat that our limited missile defense is supposed to protect against.
  The Landrieu amendment, by reinforcing the need for continued arms 
reduction efforts with the Russians, addressed this short-coming in the 
original legislation.
  As a result of these modifications, I am now willing to support this 
bill. I caution, however, that this legislation really accomplishes 
nothing that will have a meaningful, positive impact on the pace and 
quality of our missile defense development efforts. While it is 
appealing to declare a policy, such a declaration doesn't move us 
closer to the goal, and may in fact cause the American people to gain a 
false sense of security. We should acknowledge the risk that we could 
be giving the American people the false impression that by passing this 
legislation we are somehow approving deployment of a protective shield 
to safeguard them from nuclear missile attack. At best we'll get a very 
limited defensive capability. At worst, we will have spent tens of 
billions on top of the $40 to $80 billion already spent on missile 
defense since 1983, our troops will continue to struggle with a high 
OPTEMPO and inadequate equipment due to inadequate funding, the 
Russians will not honor START II limits--even after ratification of the 
treaty, and we will have a system that is not operationally effective.
  Regardless of the outcome of the vote on this legislation, we will 
continue to develop a missile defense to protect our nation. The issue 
surrounding missile defense is not that we don't want such a system--
the problem is we don't yet know how to build one we can afford. I 
remind my colleagues of the Pentagon's dramatic claims of success by 
our Patriot missile batteries during the Gulf War. It was only after 
the war that we learned that there were very few if any effective 
intercepts of the Iraqi Scuds. The technology wasn't here then and it 
has a long way to go today--especially when it comes to ICBMs.
  And we should not let our focus on providing such a defense divert 
our attention away from the other crucial element in protecting America 
from missile attack: reducing the number of missiles aimed at our 
nation. A number of colleagues shared my concern about the effect of 
this legislation on our efforts to reduce the Russian arsenal through 
the START II process.
  Mr. President, I will support this legislation because we have 
addressed the largest potential down-sides and because I support the 
objective of providing our nation with an effective missile defense, 
but we still have a long way to go before we actually solve the 
challenges we face and we ought to be up front with the American people 
in describing where we are in this process.
  Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, none of us who sit here in the Senate today 
is unaware of the potential dangers that face this country from rogue 
nations with ballistic missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction. 
There are many nations around the world that are eagerly pursuing 
weapons that can reach the United States and deliver devastating 
damage. I, like many of my colleagues, was stunned when I heard the 
news that North Korea had launched a three stage rocket with technology 
that many in the intelligence community had said the North Koreans 
would not possess for many years. All this evidence leads me to agree 
with Secretary Cohen when he says that the threat to the United States 
is ``real and growing.'' Because of the danger we face, and our solemn 
vow to protect this nation, I will vote to support Senator Cochran's 
bill, S. 257, to deploy a missile defense as soon as technologically 
possible.
  With threats looming on the horizon it would be irresponsible not to 
pursue the development and deployment of a national missile defense. 
The Administration has responded to the threat by expanding the 
program. The President has increased funding by $6 billion over five 
years. They will make a decision next year whether an effective 
national missile defense can be deployed by 2005. Negotiations with the 
Russians have already begun in an effort to reach agreement on 
amendments to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The President has now 
reversed his previous opposition to this bill by withdrawing his veto 
threat. The United States is moving forward on missile defense, and 
this legislation will add momentum.
  However, I do have reservations about this bill. A national missile 
defense system is not a sure thing. Currently there is no technology 
capable of destroying an ICBM, and we don't know when the technology 
will be developed. But we do know that developing this technology will 
be costly. To date we have spent almost sixty-seven billion dollars on 
developing missile defenses since the early 1980's without anything to 
show for it. I am concerned that by making a decision to build a system 
as soon as technologically possible the Congress may commit itself to 
an expensive project that the General Accounting Office has deemed 
``high risk.'' The Pentagon is infamous for underestimating the cost of 
weapons systems. Right now the Administration plans on spending ten 
billion dollars over six years on NMD, but I expect that as the project 
moves forward the cost will rise. We must be careful not to let our 
commitment to missile defense blind us from our duty to oversee this 
program and guard against waste and profligate spending so common in 
the Department of Defense.
  While I am very concerned about the costs of the program and the 
impact on our relations with Russia, I believe we should build a 
national missile defense

[[Page 4756]]

to protect our nation in this dangerous and uncertain time. The United 
States should move swiftly, but with prudence, to safeguard our 
citizens from the threats of rogue nations and the fear of accidental 
launches.
  Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, was there a unanimous consent agreement 
that the Senator from Mississippi wanted to propound?
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, we were trying 
to nail down a time for a vote on final passage at 2. Why don't you go 
ahead and use whatever time you want to use.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank my colleague.
  Mr. President, I rise to speak today on the floor of the U.S. Senate 
to express my opposition to this resolution that is before us.
  I may be standing alone on this vote. I hope not. I appreciate the 
efforts of my colleague from Louisiana to offer an amendment that would 
ensure that this bill states, or this resolution, because that is 
really what it is, that it is still the policy of the United States to 
pursue arms reduction negotiations. I think that was an important 
statement. I do not honestly and truthfully believe that that amendment 
is enough. It does not directly tie a decision to deploy a national 
missile defense directly to its impact on arms reduction agreements. 
That is what I am worried about.
  I think my good friend, the Senator from Michigan, had it right in 
his substitute amendment--before a decision to deploy, the 
administration and the Congress should review the impact of that 
decision on nuclear arms reductions and on arms control agreements.
  I think this is right. The decision to deploy--and that is what this 
resolution instructs us to do--should be made carefully, at the right 
time, after we are sure of its impact on important arms control and 
arms reduction decisions. I know my colleague from Michigan, who I 
think is one of the truly great Senators, has concluded that the 
Landrieu language is sufficient, but I have to respectfully disagree.
  This resolution talks about deploying missile defense. I have 
supported in the past efforts to develop such a system to at least do 
research, but I have never voted for a resolution that says we go 
forward with deployment.
  I would not oppose, again, the research and the focus on the 
possibility of needing a missile defense system if this was done hand 
in hand with an emphasis on the importance of arms reduction 
agreements. But I do not believe that this resolution before us is at 
all evenhanded in this respect.
  Our colleague from Mississippi, a colleague for whom I also have a 
great deal of respect, Senator Cochran, was quoted in the Washington 
Times today saying that the Landrieu amendment was an important step--
and he meant this in very good faith; he means everything in good 
faith--of an important national security goal. But the inclusion of the 
national missile defense policy and arms reduction policy in the same 
bill ``does not imply that one is contingent on the other.''
  I think they should be, and that is why I do not think the language 
is sufficient. That is why I will vote against this bill.
  Actually, I do not know whether to call it a bill or a resolution. 
There is no money. It is just a statement. We say this will be the 
policy. It is a declaration by the Senate.
  We ought to be focusing on the reduction of existing missiles. We 
ought to be focusing on nonproliferation efforts to stop the spread of 
existing technology of weapons of mass destruction. We should not be 
saying that it is the policy of the United States to spend billions of 
dollars on unproven systems to defend ourselves against phantom 
missiles from hypothetical rogue states.
  We have spent already $120 billion on this antimissile defense 
system. I heard my colleague from Arizona, who is a colleague for whom 
I have tremendous respect, talking about some of the ways in which he 
thinks the administration has been a bit disingenuous about how we can 
balance the budget and spend money here or do this, that, and the 
other. I understand what my colleague was saying. In all due respect, I 
have to raise questions about this.
  First of all, I have to say that I believe that this vote today is a 
profound mistake. I think the vote today, if it is an overwhelmingly 
strong vote for this resolution, jeopardizes years of work toward 
achieving nuclear arms control and arms reduction, and that will not 
increase our security. That will not increase the security of my 
children or my grandchildren.
  I am very concerned about our national defense. I am very concerned 
about our security. I am very concerned about the security of my 
children and my grandchildren. I believe the best single thing we can 
do to assure that security is to maintain a commitment to arms control 
agreements.
  Some of my colleagues do not agree with what we did with the ABM 
Treaty. They are not so focused on where we need to go with the START 
agreements. I argue that these arms control agreements and everything 
and anything we can do to stop the proliferation of these weapons and 
to engage the former Soviet Union--Russia today--in arms control 
agreements, reducing the nuclear arsenals, less missiles, less 
warheads, less of a possibility of a launching of these weapons is what 
is most in our national security. I do not believe that this resolution 
takes us in that direction at all.
  There is a distinction between talking about the development of a 
missile defense system and actually the language in this resolution 
which talks about deploying. There is a distinction between saying we 
only go forward, but before a decision to deploy, the administration 
and the Congress should review the impact of this decision on nuclear 
arms reductions and arms control agreements.
  There is a distinction between such language, and I believe what the 
amendment that my colleague from Louisiana offered yesterday, which 
says that it is our policy to pursue arms reduction negotiations--oh, 
how I would like to see a connection. Oh, how I want to see a nexus. 
You cannot imagine how much I want to vote for a resolution like this, 
which is going to have such overwhelming support, and I would if I did 
not believe that what is only a resolution will be used next year when 
we come to authorization and appropriations to say that there was 
unanimous--no, there won't be unanimous support; there will be at least 
one vote against it--near unanimous support to go forward with missile 
defense. And then the request will come in for the money.
  What will the cost be? This resolution, or this piece of legislation, 
should be called the ``Blank Check Act,'' because that is what we are 
doing. We are authorizing a blank check for tens of billions, maybe 
hundreds of billions of dollars for all I know, for a missile defense 
system in the future. At what cost?
  Mr. President, $120 billion already, tens of billions of dollars a 
year, I don't know how long in the future, is going to go for a missile 
defense system, and this vote is going to be used as the rationale for 
doing so. Maybe not with this administration, because I think the 
administration has made it clear it is committed to an arms control 
agreement. But what about the next administration? I hope it will be a 
Democratic administration, but I do not know and I do not want to vote 
for a blank check for tens of billions of dollars for such a system 
which I think puts into jeopardy arms control negotiations and arms 
control reductions.
  Mr. President, for a senior citizen in the State of Minnesota who 
cannot afford to pay for a drug that has been prescribed by her 
doctor--this is a huge problem for elderly people in our country, many 
of whom are paying up to 30 percent of their annual monthly budget just 
for prescription drugs--for that senior citizen to not be able to 
afford a prescription drug that her doctor prescribes for her health is 
a lot bigger threat to her than that some missile is going to hit her 
in the near future or in the distant future.

[[Page 4757]]

  Yet, we are being told that we cannot afford to make sure we have 
prescription drug costs for elderly citizens in this country. But now 
what we are going to do, I fear, is adopt a resolution that will be 
used later on as a rationalization and justification for spending tens 
of billions of dollars on top of $120 billion for unproven systems to 
defend us against phantom missiles from hypothetical rogue states.
  Our focus should be on the arsenal of nuclear weapons that Russia has 
now and how we can have arms control agreements with Russia. We ought 
not to be putting ABM and START in jeopardy. We ought not to be putting 
arms control in jeopardy. We ought not to be putting our efforts at 
stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in jeopardy, 
and I believe that is what this resolution does. That is my honestly 
held view. The administration has apparently changed its position. I 
wish they had not.
  My colleague from Michigan, Senator Levin, has a different 
interpretation. I think he believes that this resolution puts the 
emphasis that needs to be there on arms control reductions. I hope and 
pray he is right. I think he believes this resolution has language, 
through the annual review process in appropriations bills, that makes 
it clear that this has to be technologically feasible to go forward. I 
hope he is right. But, quite frankly, I do not think that is really 
what this resolution says.
  I am not going to err on the side of voting for a resolution that now 
gives credibility to spending tens of billions of dollars, over the 
years to come, on a questionable missile defense system that puts arms 
control agreements in jeopardy and does not speak to the very real 
national security that we have in our own country.
  I would like to finish this way, Mr. President. Since I heard some of 
my colleagues on the other side talk about the President's budget, I 
would like to ask my colleagues, What exactly do you propose to do with 
your budget caps, your tax cuts, and wanting to increase the Pentagon 
budget $140 billion over the next 6 years?
  And that goes for far more than just increasing the salaries of our 
men and women in the armed services, who should have their salaries 
increased; and that is much more far-reaching than just dealing with 
quality-of-life issues for men and women in the armed services, who 
deserve all our support in that respect. Now we are talking about 
laying the groundwork, on top of $120 billion that has already been 
spent, for tens of billions of dollars. This could end up being $40 
billion-plus just for this missile defense system.
  So my question is, After we do this, what do you say to senior 
citizens in your State who say, ``Can't you make sure that we can 
afford prescription drug costs?'' I know what you are going to say. 
``We can't afford it.'' What are you going to say to people who say, 
``Can't you invest more in our children in education?'' We are going to 
say, ``We can't afford it.''
  What do you say to people in the disabilities community who were in 
my office yesterday, saying, ``Can't you invest in home-based health 
care so that we can live at home in as near as normal circumstances as 
possible with dignity?'' We are going to say, ``We can't afford it.'' 
What are we going to say to people who say, ``We can't afford 
affordable housing''? We are going to say, ``We can't afford it.''
  I will tell you something; the real national security of our country 
is not to vote for this resolution that could very well put arms 
control agreements in jeopardy. And I am not willing to err on that 
side. If we do that, it will be a tragic mistake. It will be a tragic 
mistake for all of our children.
  The real national security for our country is to not spend billions 
of dollars on unproven systems to defend us against phantom missiles 
from hypothetical rogue states. The real national security for our 
country will be the security of local communities, where there is 
affordable child care, there is affordable health care, there is 
affordable housing, people find jobs at decent wages, and we make a 
commitment to education second to none so that every boy and every girl 
can grow up dreaming to be President of the United States of America. 
That is the real national security of our country.
  Mr. President, I think this resolution is a profound mistake. And if 
I am the only vote against it, so be it, but I will not vote for the 
resolution.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. President, my colleague, Senator Stevens, had made the request he 
be able to speak right after I finished. I do not see him right now, 
but could I ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to speak next? I 
know he was anxious to do so. He should be here in a moment.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, if the Senator would yield, I think 
Senator Stevens is planning to speak. I was going to suggest the 
absence of a quorum. Here is our colleague from Michigan. He may want 
to use some time on the bill.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. I support the passage of this bill with the two amendments 
we have adopted. We have made a number of very important changes in the 
bill which now cause me to support the bill because, very specifically, 
we now have two policies that are set forth in the bill, no longer just 
one.
  The first amendment that we have adopted, which was an amendment 
saying that the funding for national missile defense is subject to the 
annual authorization and appropriation of funds for this system, makes 
it clear explicitly, specifically, that this bill does not authorize 
anything. This is not an authorization of anything. It is not an 
appropriation of funds.
  Perhaps somebody could argue before that amendment was adopted that 
this bill did authorize or did commit us to appropriate funds. But 
after the adoption of that first amendment yesterday, it cannot be 
argued that this authorizes anything or appropriates funds for any 
system.
  This bill now states two policies of the United States. That is very 
different from a bill which commits us to authorize funds or to 
appropriate funds for a particular system.
  So the first amendment made an important difference. It is an 
amendment which the Senator from Mississippi offered with a number of 
cosponsors on both sides of the aisle. It seems to me it made it very 
clear that we are not committing to deploy a national missile defense 
system in this bill. We are stating now two policies in this bill. The 
first amendment I referred to makes it clear that the authorization to 
deploy a national missile defense system would come only if and when we 
act on funding to deploy such a system through the normal authorization 
and appropriation process. We are not doing that in this bill.
  One of the things this bill says is, before a deployment decision is 
made, there must be an effective system. That word ``effective'' 
clearly means, in the view of the military--and I think reasonably--an 
operationally effective system. That is one of the clear meanings of 
the word ``effective'' in this bill. And there was a colloquy earlier 
today between the Senators from Mississippi and New Mexico relating to 
that issue. An effective national missile defense system means, among 
other elements of ``effectiveness,'' an operationally effective system.
  The second amendment that has made a major change and a major 
improvement in this bill is the Landrieu amendment. Until Senator 
Landrieu's amendment was adopted, this bill ignored the crucial 
importance to our national security of continuing reductions in Russian 
nuclear weapons. Without the Landrieu amendment, this bill would have 
put nuclear reductions at risk--reductions that have been negotiated 
before and are now being implemented, reductions that have been 
negotiated before and are hopefully about to be ratified in the Duma.
  Without the Landrieu amendment, this bill ignored those reductions. 
It would have put such reductions at risk and increased the threat of 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. That greater threat would 
have resulted from the larger number of nuclear weapons being on 
Russian soil,

[[Page 4758]]

with the greater likelihood, in turn, that there would be leakage of 
such weapons to a terrorist state or a terrorist group.
  The Landrieu amendment adds a second policy to this bill. It is a 
most crucial policy statement, that it is our policy to seek continued 
negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces. This critically 
important change in the bill states that we understand the value of 
continuing the nuclear arms reductions which have been negotiated 
before and that, hopefully, will continue to be negotiated in START 
III, and that those reductions improve our security by reducing the 
numbers of nuclear weapons on Russian soil.
  Mr. President, without those two amendments, I would not have 
supported this bill. As I stated in my opening statement, it is 
critically important, in my opinion, that we continue to see reductions 
in nuclear weapons in this world, and most specifically, reductions in 
nuclear weapons in Russia.
  I think many of our colleagues, if not all of us, see the importance 
of those reductions. Now we have a specific policy statement equal to 
the policy statement relative to deploying an effective limited 
national missile defense subject to authorization and appropriations. 
The second policy statement which is critically important says that it 
is the policy of the United States to continue to negotiate reductions 
in the number of nuclear weapons on Russian soil.
  Because of these amendments, the President's senior national security 
advisers will now recommend that the President not veto the bill if it 
comes to him in this form. That is an important measure of the 
significance of these changes in this bill. The White House has not 
changed its position on national missile defense anymore than I have.
  The bill has been changed in two significant ways. I think the bill 
has been vastly improved. It has been improved because of the efforts 
of many people. I want to thank the Senator from Mississippi, the 
author of this bill, for his cooperation in including both the Cochran 
amendment and the Landrieu amendment. And I particularly want to 
commend and thank the Senator from Louisiana, Senator Landrieu, who is 
now the ranking member on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the 
Armed Services Committee, for her hard work and her dedication in 
bringing about the adoption of an amendment which made such an 
important difference in this bill.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. STEVENS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Voinovich). The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am here today to join two of my closest 
friends, Senators Cochran and Inouye, to support this bill that is 
before the Senate. I believe that Senator Cochran and Senator Inouye 
have championed this measure for some time now in the face of very 
strong opposition. I am pleased to see that opposition is now fading 
away.
  I cannot fathom anyone being opposed to deploying the defenses that 
are necessary to protect this Nation. Recent events clearly warn that 
our Nation must prepare for the worst possible scenario. We have 
watched reports that India and Pakistan have detonated nuclear devices. 
Each of these countries have very solid, demonstrated capabilities in 
building ballistic missiles. Our U.S. intelligence community admitted 
surprise after those demonstrations.
  Unrest in Indonesia and turmoil in other Pacific nation economies 
demand the attention of the United States and the world. Those nations 
increasingly look to develop or acquire a range of ballistic missiles. 
The threat that troubles me the most is North Korea. North Korea's 
missiles can already reach parts of Alaska and Hawaii, and perhaps 
beyond.
  When I visited North Korea 2 years ago, I was struck by the contrast 
there. Their people live a life of sacrifice, but many of their limited 
resources are diverted to military investments. The United States 
should not underestimate the determination of the North Koreans nor the 
risks the threats pose to the United States and our Pacific allies.
  Now, new reports indicate that North Korea may launch another rocket, 
possibly a satellite or possibly a longer-range ballistic missile. The 
world's ability to monitor North Korea now is limited. We all know 
that. Certainly almost no one in the intelligence community anticipated 
the recent launch of the multistage booster that we saw.
  Just as in World War II, the first to be threatened in the Pacific 
will be the States of Hawaii and Alaska. My constituents, the residents 
of Alaska, ask me, Why should it not be the policy of the United States 
to deploy a national missile defense system as soon as it is 
technically feasible? I can state categorically that after my recent 
trip home I know Alaskans want these defenses now.
  Indeed, the Alaska Legislature has already passed a joint resolution 
calling on the President of the United States to deploy a national 
missile defense system. I know, as more Americans recognize that this 
threat is here today--and I believe the whole country will wonder what 
is wrong with us; I believe they are going to even wonder why we have 
to have this debate this long on this issue.
  I am confident that Members of the Senate should be familiar with the 
congressionally established commission of evaluating the ballistic 
missile threat to the United States, known as the Rumsfeld Commission, 
which completed a thorough review of the missile technologies existing 
in other countries. More importantly, that Commission recognizes the 
fact that missile technologies are increasingly available to any nation 
with money and determination to use them.
  Protecting our Nation requires building a national missile defense 
system that will protect every square inch of every State, including 
Alaska and Hawaii, and the 48 contiguous States. When this issue first 
came before the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, the administration 
projected a system that would defend almost all of the 48 States but 
did not include Alaska and Hawaii and the tips of Maine and Florida. At 
that time, I expressed concern about that. I am pleased to see we all 
are now considering a truly national missile defense system.
  In recent weeks, I was fully briefed on the Defense Department's 
efforts to develop a national missile defense, a defense which would 
provide our Nation's only capability against these missiles. I have 
been reassured of the commitment to protect all 50 States by Lieutenant 
General Lyles, the Director of the Ballistic Missile Organization. I 
can also tell the Senate that some of the best engineers in this Nation 
are working on the current national missile defense program under the 
direction of Brigadier General Nance, a very capable officer and 
knowledgeable program manager.
  I believe this team, and any of the ballistic missile defense 
organization program managers, would tell the Senate that building this 
defense system is technically feasible today. That is good news. We 
have it within our reach and our means to build a missile defense 
system to protect our entire Nation from ballistic missiles.
  Last year, we added $1 billion as emergency funds for the development 
of the missile defenses to protect the United States as well as its 
deployed forces. This Cochran-Inouye bill makes clear that these funds 
are available only for enhanced testing, accelerated development, 
construction, integration, and infrastructure efforts in support of 
ballistic missile defense systems.
  The taxpayers' money being made available on an emergency basis was 
put up for the purpose of encouraging the availability of this system 
and to reward success in the efforts. I believe we have to have the 
ability to defeat the threat that is posed by ballistic missiles as 
soon as possible. Many Senators will recall the criticisms made last 
year of our ballistic missile defense programs--too little testing, 
schedules that didn't ask for the dollars available, and many other 
concerns expressed.
  I am pleased to report to the Senate that the $1 billion emergency 
increase

[[Page 4759]]

has become a catalyst for the national missile defense program--
allowing this program to add testing, fully fund development, and to 
rebut the critics who say it is not possible for such a system to be 
deployed.
  The administration has stated that it will match these funds and 
budget the necessary additional funds to develop and deploy a national 
missile defense system. I am still concerned that the funds budgeted by 
the administration, however, will allow a missile defense system to be 
deployed about 2005.
  On March 14, 1995, Defense Secretary Perry testified before our 
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that:

       On the national missile defense system, that system would 
     be ready for deployment in 3 years on the basis of this 
     program projection, and then 3 years later than that it would 
     be operational.

  He said it would be operational in 3 years.

       So we are about 6 years away from deployment of national 
     missile defense systems.

  That was 1995. In responding to my question during a hearing in June 
of 1995, Lt. Gen. Malcolm O'Neill noted Secretary Perry's promise and 
went on to add:

       I think the timeframe (Secretary Perry) talked about was 3 
     years of development and then 3 years to deploy. So that 
     would mean a 2001 scenario, and that would get a system in 
     position before the Taepo Dong 2.

  Mr. President, that is the Korean missile that we are all so worried 
about now. The Taepo Dong 2 is ready now but we are still developing a 
system. The national missile defense system that should be in place by 
2001 will not be there in 2001, and we were promised an operational 
national missile defense system as early as 2001. As one who has 
watched this system now develop over a period of years, I have been 
frustrated that it has slipped now, apparently, to 2005. The track 
record is one of continual delays and slips as far as the deployment 
date is concerned.
  I believe that this Nation must get ahead of the threats. The risks 
are too great.
  Again, I basically come here to commend these two Senators for their 
very hard work on this bill.
  Senator Cochran and Senator Inouye deserve the entire support of the 
Senate. I am pleased that these matters which had previously looked 
like they might delay this bill might be resolved. I congratulate the 
managers of this bill and its author for their wisdom and 
determination. I hope the Senate will proceed rapidly to approve it.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of S. 257, the 
National Missile Defense Act of 1999. This is an extremely important 
initiative, which really goes to the heart of our national security 
policy. The bill simply declares that it is the policy of the United 
States to deploy, as soon as technologically possible, a national 
missile defense system which is capable of protecting the entire 
territory of the United States from a limited ballistic missile attack.
  Why is this important? For one, because most Americans mistakenly 
believe that we already have a system in place which can intercept and 
shoot down incoming missiles. We do not. While we can, in some 
instances, tell in advance if an adversary is likely to launch a 
ballistic missile strike at the United States, our ability to thwart 
the attack is limited to diplomatic efforts or, alternatively, to a 
quick strike military capability of our own.
  In the case of an unauthorized or accidental missile strike, we have 
no deterrent capability. Imagine the horror, Mr. President, of knowing 
a missile strike against an American city was underway and there was 
nothing we could do to stop it.
  This is the same bill that Senate Democrats filibustered twice during 
the 105th Congress. So, why the change of heart? I think that the main 
reason is that they can no longer sustain the argument that we do not 
face a threat credible enough to justify deployment of a national 
missile defense system. They now acknowledge that we face a number of 
real threats from many different parts of the globe. Most of these 
threats are the byproduct of 6 years of flawed administration foreign 
policy initiatives which have actually increased, not decreased, the 
likelihood of the post-cold-war threat.
  What are the threats that we currently face? China comes to mind. 
While I for one do not consider China an adversary, I am particularly 
concerned by the wide range of espionage allegations connected to 
China. First, our military experts believe that China's missile 
guidance capabilities were enhanced significantly by the Loral/Hughes 
incidents. And more recently, there are chilling allegations that China 
has stolen some of our most closely held secrets on miniaturizing 
warhead technology, thereby exponentially increasing the threat that 
China poses to the United States and many of our key allies in the 
Asia/Pacific theater.
  Last summer, it was widely reported that 13 of China's 18 long-range 
strategic missiles are armed with nuclear warheads and targeted at 
American cities. What's more Chinese officials have suggested that we 
would never support Taiwan in a crisis ``because the United States 
cares more about Los Angeles than it does Taipei.'' If this type of 
declaration, on its own, is not justification for deploying a national 
missile defense system, Mr. President, than nothing is.
  Let's examine the case of North Korea. This is a country which 
continues to defy rational behavior, and which seems to be encouraged 
by this administration's bankrupt North Korea policy. Just yesterday, 
Secretary Albright announced that the United States would pay North 
Korea hundreds of millions in food aid to gain access to an underground 
facility north of Pyong Yong which we believe is connected to their 
nuclear regime. Plain and simple bribery at it's best.
  Last year, North Korea fired a multi-stage missile over Japan. No 
warning and unprovoked. Why? Presumably to show that they have the 
capability.
  Iran and Iraq speak for themselves. Additional concerns are the 
inability of the former Soviet Republics to keep good track of the 
ICBM's which they inherited from the breakup of the Soviet Union. Be it 
accidental or deliberate, if these weapons fall into the wrong hands, 
we will have new foreign policy concerns the likes which none of us 
have ever seen or will care to address.
  We are vulnerable, Mr. President, and we need to act to prevent a 
catastrophe of horrific proportions. The best way to do this is to do 
what should have been done long ago--deploy a national missile defense 
system.
  There are a number of ballistic missile defense programs at various 
stages of development. Ideally, the United States would pursue a dual 
track system, namely a sea-based system which could be deployed to 
various theaters as the need arises. The aim here being to protect our 
troops and allies which may be at the front line of a confrontation. 
And a ground based system based in Alaska, which is the only place in 
all the United States from which true, 100 percent protection of all 
the United States and her territories can be achieved.
  By basing a system in Alaska, we will have the added advantage of 
being close to both the Asian and European theaters. Our aim should be 
not only to intercept a launched missile, but in being able to 
intercept it in the still early stages--preferably while it is still 
over the territory of the aggressor country.
  As many of my colleagues are aware, we have 80,000 American troops in 
the Asia/Pacific theater alone. Many of these troops are already well 
within the range of current North Korean missile capability. As their 
missile development program advances, we can expect American lives and 
American soil to be exponentially at risk. We simply cannot stand idly 
by and wait. We need to be prepared, so that we can protect the 
American people from such a strike, be it deliberate, unauthorized or 
accidental.
  Finally, Mr. President, there are those who argue that S. 257 should 
be rejected because it sends the wrong signal to Russia and raises 
flags about the future of the ABM Treaty. Let me say unequivocally that 
this is not about Russia, and the Russians know it! The ABM Treaty was 
a product of a different era, an age when the United

[[Page 4760]]

States and the Soviet Union were alone in their ability to launch 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. This age passed quickly with the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, and a much more unsettling world has been 
left in her place. Today, there are many, many threats and ignoring 
them will not make them go away.
  This is not about Russia. This is about the United States and our 
constitutional and moral duty to protect the people whom we have been 
elected to represent. Mr. President, I strongly support this measure 
and commend Senators Cochran and Inouye for their untiring efforts to 
see that this bill becomes law.
  Mr. DURBIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois is recognized.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the bill. Could 
the Chair inform me of the time limitations, if any on, debate?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are no time limits on debate.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I can recall this concept when it was 
first suggested by President Reagan. It was a concept that was 
alluring. The notion that we could somehow put a protective umbrella of 
defense over the United States against nuclear missiles would certainly 
be an effort that would allay the fears of many that a missile might be 
launched from some nation like Russia. This idea of a strategic defense 
initiative, Star Wars, or whatever you might characterize it as, has 
always had a certain appeal to me and I am sure to anyone who hears it. 
I have been skeptical from the start as to whether or not this was 
feasible. Now I think there are more fundamental policies that should 
be addressed.
  First, let us take a look at the history of the early part of the 
century.
  After World War I, the French--determined never to let the Germans 
invade their country again--set up a series of ``impregnable'' 
fortifications along their border from Switzerland to Belgium called 
the Maginot Line. When Hitler decided to invade France he passed north 
of the Maginot Line via Belgium, swept behind the line, and captured it 
from behind. France was totally defeated in 6 weeks.
  The national missile defense plan is our Maginot Line. It would give 
us a false sense of security and be completely ineffective in 
countering threats that simply go around it--like the terrorist with 
chemical, biological or nuclear weapons in his suitcase. It could be 
totally overwhelmed by intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) held 
by Russia, and its existence would encourage nuclear countries to 
defeat it with devastating force. The star wars Strategic Defense 
Initiative in the 1980's faced these same problems. The current plan is 
``star wars lite,'' a shrunken relic of the cold war.


                            the rogue states

  No one is underestimating the capacity for so-called rogue nations to 
act in ways that seem irrational to us. However, in deciding that we 
must spend billions of dollars to build a missile defense system to 
protect ourselves against these third-rate powers, we are making one of 
two assumptions. Either we are tacitly admitting that we would not 
respond to an attack by one of them against us with overwhelming 
force--whether nuclear or conventional--or else we are assuming that 
these leaders are so crazy that they would risk the destruction of 
their nations and the loss of their own power or lives for one shot at 
the United States.
  The leaders of the rogue nations, like Iraq and North Korea, may be 
isolated and seem irrational to us, but survival, not suicide, has been 
their overarching goal. It is much more likely that terrorists would do 
these nations' dirty work for them in a way that is difficult to link 
to a particular nation, to avoid a retaliatory strike. National missile 
defense would not help against terrorist attacks, which are far more 
likely to be delivered by truck than by missile.
  The danger of missile attacks from rogue nations is much more acute 
against our military forces in the Persian Gulf and Asia than against 
U.S. cities.
  During the gulf war we made it quite clear that if Saddam Hussein 
used his weapons of mass destruction against our forces, he would 
suffer an overwhelming response. He did not use those weapons. We have 
made it clear to the whole world that we will respond to any use of 
weapons of mass destruction against us, while leaving the type of 
weapon, nuclear or convention, ambiguous.
  Our massive arsenal should be as capable of deterring a rogue nation 
as it was to deter the Soviet Union for 50 years. Are thousands of 
weapons now ineffective against one or two or three or four or five 
missiles in North Korea or some other country?
  Nonetheless, the enormous cost in lives of even one missile strike 
against one U.S. city, no matter how unlikely, could lead us to decide 
to deploy a national missile defense system at some point in the 
future--if that would mean that our country would be more secure. That 
is why Congress has consistently supported research into missile 
defense technology for theater and national applications. We should 
continue to research with deliberate speed and reasonable funding, but 
we must not make the decision to deploy prematurely. We must not make 
the leap which this resolution would lead us to.


                       arms control implications

  Deciding to deploy a missile defense system without getting Russian 
agreement to changes in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty not 
only would in effect abrogate that treaty, it would also be the end of 
the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) process that is the basis 
for the strategic stability between the United States and Russia. 
Strategic stability means that neither side is willing to engage in a 
first strike against the other.
  If a missile defense system is deployed without regard to its effect 
on strategic stability with Russia, our own security will be imperiled. 
The United States and Russia still have thousands of nuclear warheads 
poised to launch at each other with just a few minutes between 
targeting and launch. If arms control breaks down because of our 
deployment of a missile defense system, we would be encouraging nuclear 
countries to use multi-warhead ICBMs to defeat it. It would seem a 
fairly irrational decision on our part to trade away a strategic 
balance that has kept the peace for 50 years in order to protect us 
against a hypothetical threat. The threat of 6,000 Russian and some 400 
Chinese missiles is not hypothetical.
  We are at peace with Russia and the cold war is over. A first strike 
seems quite unlikely at this time. The danger today is from an 
unauthorized launch from Russia, or, because parts of Russia's early 
warning system do not work, that Russian leaders could falsely think 
the United States had started a first strike and would launch a 
retaliatory strike. A national missile defense system could not stop 
those missiles.
  Since Russia is having difficulty maintaining its nuclear arsenal 
now, it is in our vital national interest to see reductions in the 
number of missiles on both sides--rather than pursuing a policy that 
would put the START process on ice and could lead to redeploying 
multiple warheads instead.
  Our broader nuclear nonproliferation goals could also be undermined 
by the demise of arms control. The grand bargain forged when the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was negotiated was that the 
nuclear countries would work toward nuclear disarmament, in return for 
the non-nuclear countries foregoing them.
  If we take a unilateral action that undermines the START process, 
there will be no grand bargain, and we will have no argument against 
any country, including the rogue states, acquiring nuclear weapons.
  The Maginot Line of national missile defense will not only encourage 
countries to go around it, or to overwhelm it, it could also become the 
Trojan Horse that lets our enemies into the nuclear club.


                                 costs

  While we must make this decision on its merits, we cannot ignore the 
costs of making it. We have spent over $40 billion on national missile 
defense since 1983 with virtually nothing to

[[Page 4761]]

show for it. That figure does not include the $52 billion spent before 
1983 on various missile defense systems, like the Nike and Safeguard 
systems of the 1960's and 1970's. Estimates vary greatly on how much a 
limited missile defense system would cost, and these estimates depend 
greatly on what system would be chosen. I think it is safe to say that 
no one really knows yet how much a system would cost.
  I listened to the debate earlier today from some of my colleagues. 
One of them raised the specter of vulnerability of nations on the west 
coast as well as Hawaii in terms of attack from new members of the 
missile nuclear club. One of the people speaking said if we know that 
threat is out there, and we know the damage that could take place, 
isn't it a given that we would spend any amount of money to protect our 
coast? Isn't that a responsibility? That is an interesting argument, 
and it certainly is one that would suggest that we would spend any 
amount of money on this national missile defense system, that there are 
no limits to spending.
  In fact, as I read it, the only limitation in this bill is that it 
has to be somehow technologically possible to have a national missile 
defense system. I would like to suggest that it is interesting that 
this would be the standard which we would use to determine defense 
spending.
  I wonder if I introduced a resolution into the Senate which asks if 
it would be the policy of the United States to spend as much money as 
necessary if we found that it was technologically possible to cure 
cancer, how many votes we would get on the floor of the U.S. Senate. We 
have made more progress in the war against cancer than we have on any 
national missile defense system. Yet, when it comes to that kind of 
courage with respect to virtually every American family, that is not 
considered really food for thought or even an issue for debate. The 
same question could be asked when it comes to education. If it is 
technologically possible to educate children in America better, should 
we make it our policy to spend whatever is necessary to achieve that? I 
doubt that I could muster a majority vote in the Senate for that 
suggestion. Or the elimination of drugs in America, if it is 
technologically possible to end the scourge of drugs in our country, 
should we spend whatever is necessary?
  I have given you three examples which come to mind, and many more 
could be produced. But it is interesting to me that when it comes to 
defense spending we apply standards which are totally different than 
the priorities which many Americans would identify as important to us 
and important to all families.
  In May 1996 the Congressional Budget Office estimated that it would 
cost $31-60 billion through 2010 to acquire a system outlined in the 
Defend America Act of 1996, plus an additional $2-4 billion per year to 
operate and maintain it. The National Security Council estimated that a 
two-site, ground-based system would cost $23 billion to deploy. The 
General Accounting Office reported that the Ballistic Missile Defense 
Office estimated that limited deployments in North Dakota and Alaska 
would cost between $18-28 billion. The Congressional Budget Office 
estimated that it would cost $60 billion to build a ``high end 
system,'' including space-based lasers. Given the history of defense 
cost over-runs, it is quite likely that these figures are the floor, 
not the ceiling of what these costs may be.
  No matter how many amendments are adopted--and some I have supported, 
and some are very good--the bottom line is the U.S. Senate with this 
vote is virtually giving a blank check to this project. There are no 
limitations on cost. As long as it meets the threshold requirement of 
being technologically possible, it can go forward.
  We must not forget that, if we push ahead with deploying a national 
missile defense system without seeking Russian agreement with changes 
to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the nuclear arms reduction 
process will be moribund.
  Let me salute my colleagues in the House.
  Senator Landrieu offered an important amendment that at least 
reiterates America's commitment to negotiating some type of 
disarmament. I support it. Virtually every Member did. I think that is 
a positive step. But to simply adopt that amendment and ignore the bill 
that is before us, I think, is folly. We have to be consistent. We have 
built into this bill an inconsistency. On the one hand, we are going to 
move forward with the national missile defense system, even if it 
violates existing treaties, and then an amendment which says we are 
going to continue to negotiate these START treaties. I don't know what 
the negotiating partner would believe, if they read this bill after 
this debate.
  That means we would also be bearing the costs of maintaining our 
current level of 6,000 nuclear weapons, instead of being able to reduce 
to START II levels of 3,500 warheads, or START III levels of 2,500 
warheads, or even 1,000 warheads. We now spend about $22 billion on 
maintaining and supporting our current nuclear force levels, including 
$8 billion per year maintaining nuclear warheads.
  Would it not be in the best interests of the United States of America 
and its future to continue the arms control negotiations to reduce the 
nuclear warheads not only in the United States but around the world? I 
think that is the best course of action. I am afraid this bill is 
inconsistent with that strategy.
  In March 1998, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that 
reducing warheads to START II levels by the end of 2007 would save $700 
million per year through 2008 and about $800 million a year in the long 
run (in constant dollars). Making these reductions by 2003 would yield 
an additional $700 million through 2008.
  Reducing warheads to START III levels would save $1.5 billion per 
year in the long run, provided weapons platforms are also retired. If 
warheads were reduced to 1,000, savings would increase to $2 billion 
per year in the long run. Talk about a peace dividend. This $2 billion 
per year savings--25 percent of the current costs of maintaining 
nuclear warheads--does not include huge savings that would result if 
nuclear platforms, such as submarines, were retired to reflect the 
reduced number of warheads.
  Thus, in considering the costs of deciding to deploy a national 
missile defense system, we must add not only the $35-60 billion or more 
that it would cost to deploy it, but also the opportunity cost of 
billions of dollars every year of foregone savings from not being able 
to reduce our nuclear arsenal.
  If Russia reverts to deploying multiple warhead missiles in response 
to our decision to deploy a national missile defense system, we may 
then feel that we must do the same--potentially creating a new arms 
race. The cost fighting the proliferation of nuclear weapons that could 
occur if the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is undermined is 
incalculable.
  Deciding today that it is our policy to deploy a national missile 
defense system is an expensive and bad idea that will lower, not 
improve our national security.
  I yield the remainder of my time.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of S. 257, the 
National Missile Defense Act of 1999. I am also honored to serve as an 
original cosponsor of this bill since it makes a straightforward but 
vital statement of policy regarding the core mission of the Defense 
Department to protect the United States from an accidental or 
deliberate ballistic missile attack.
  Our bill this year, introduced on a bipartisan basis once again by 
the distinguished Senators from Mississippi and Hawaii, establishes a 
guideline without dictating its implementation. The so-called Cochran-
Inouye measure simply urges the United States to deploy ``as soon as it 
is technologically possible'' a national missile defense system.
  Why should Congress pass a sentence-long policy endorsing the 
deployment of national missile defenses? We float in an ocean of 
evidence that documents the emerging threat of a multistage ballistic 
missile attack against the United States.
  Last summer, former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld led a 
distinguished bipartisan panel in finding

[[Page 4762]]

that North Korea and Iran, thanks to the support of Chinese and Russian 
technicians, could hit the far western territories of the United States 
with a multistage rocket by 2003. Iraq, the commission also informed 
us, could obtain this capability in a decade.
  Several months before the completion of the Rumsfeld Report, the Air 
Force released an updated ballistic missile threat assessment noting 
that the number of countries producing land-attack cruise missiles will 
increase from two to nine early in the next decade.
  A 1995 National Intelligence Estimate cautioned that about 25 
countries could threaten U.S. territory in less than 14 years if they 
acquired launch and satellite capabilities from the sky or seas.
  Two years later, the CIA Director testified that Iran could have a 
medium-range ballistic missile by 2007. The following year, India and 
Pakistan exploded more powerful nuclear devices, and a North Korean 
multistage rocket soared over Japan.
  The nonpartisan Congressional Research Service informs us that 21 
countries overall possess or have ready access to chemical warheads. 
Another 10 nations harbor or seek inventories of biological weapons.
  And among all of these states, only four lack the ballistic missiles 
to fire these terrifying munitions. Several more countries without 
weapons of mass destruction, such as Afghanistan, Algeria, Belarus, 
Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Yemen, nevertheless have the launchers to 
deliver them far beyond their borders.
  Senators Cochran and Inouye wisely recognize this real and expanding 
security threat while leaving the scientific and budgetary issues 
involved with the deployment of missile defensive hardware to the 
technicians of the Pentagon who have devoted their careers to this 
cause.
  But the Congress as a whole must take responsibility for framing 
priorities of policy, and no priority could loom larger than the 
protection of our homeland. And on this fundamental front, supporters 
of the Cochran-Inouye bill have extensive reinforcements.
  The first reinforcement comes from the President of the United 
States. A 1994 Executive order declared that nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons proliferation poses an ``unusual and extraordinary 
threat'' to our national security.
  Another reinforcement comes from the President's deputies. Echoing 
the main theme of a bill still opposed by the administration, General 
Joseph Ralston told the Senate Armed Services Committee last summer 
that the Pentagon would field a national missile defense system as soon 
as ``technologically practical.''
  In this fiscal year 2000 budget submission statement increasing 
missile defense accounts by $6.6 billion over 5 years, Secretary Cohen 
concluded that such programs remained ``critical to a broader strategy 
seeking to prevent, reduce, deter, and defend against weapons of mass 
destruction.''
  If the Secretary of Defense tells Congress that curbing the capacity 
of rogue governments to assault the United States is a ``broad'' 
security ``strategy,'' who can doubt that the administration already 
has a policy of making a missile defense system operational sooner 
rather than later?
  While this evidence of proliferation mounts by the month, our 
colleagues from the minority have blocked the Senate from exercising 
its majority will on the pending legislation because they believe that 
it would undermine the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between 
the United States and the Soviet Union.
  But this bill addresses the prospect of a destructive weapons attack 
at any time of any intensity from any source. It primarily reflects the 
Second and Third World missile launch capabilities of tomorrow, not 
just the cold war arsenals of yesterday.
  These capabilities also do not always discriminate on the basis of 
nationality. Russia, just as unpredictably as America, could one day 
fall under the threat of attack from a rogue state.
  So instead of rejecting a fundamental statement of national defense, 
we should modernize the ABM Treaty in partnership with Moscow to ensure 
that both countries enjoy adequate protection against an accidental or 
deliberate ballistic missile strike.
  As the President's Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control 
told a Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee nearly 2 years ago, 
``the determinant of our national missile defense program . . . is 
going to be what the threat requires.'' And the Threat, Mr. President, 
requires both the United States and Russia to prepare workable 
defensive networks.
  At the same time that we build safeguards against attack, we must 
support the thirty-year negotiating process, pursued by administrations 
of both parties, of reducing and eliminating the prime agents of 
attack: long-range nuclear weapons.
  For this reason, I was pleased to join Senator Landrieu in sponsoring 
an amendment to S. 257 reinforcing the United States arms control 
process with Russia. Despite Moscow's economic difficulties, a 
demoralized Russian Strategic Rocket Forces Command still maintains 
thousands of nuclear warheads subject to an accidental launch and the 
black markets of the Third World.
  Our amendment, endorsed on a rollcall vote by 99 Senators, simply 
reaffirms the ``policy of the United States to seek continued 
negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces.''
  As a result, S. 257 now provides America with the best defense: a 
twin policy to deflect a short-notice missile strike against our 
homeland and to redouble our efforts at reducing the size and lethality 
of the world's two largest nuclear arms inventories.
  Finally, Mr. President, I want to highlight the relationship between 
an affordable and robust national missile defense system and our 
military modernization agenda.
  We pursue modernization to harmonize technology development with 
anticipated security threats. Missile defense programs embody this 
process since the president and his experts have diagnosed an evolving 
but real threat in ballistic arms proliferation.
  Modernization objectives require us to build new systems against a 
new ballistic missile threat that is less graphic than the one posed by 
the Soviet Union, but just as menacing to our strategic interests and 
economic vitality.
  In this light, Mr. President, a national missile defense system will 
bring the United States to the threshold of defense modernization. The 
Cochran-Inouye bill fully acknowledges that the architecture, 
components, and the budget for this program, like any other one 
scrutinized by Congress, must pass the test of practicality without 
jeopardizing other important priorities such as the Pentagon's planned 
increase in procurement spending to $60 billion by 2001.
  Beyond this responsibility, however, we have the obligation to 
reconcile public policy with the evidence of arms proliferation.
  Let's listen to the president, his analysts, his Defense Secretary, 
and his scientists.
  Let's awaken to an uncertain world rumbling with launchers, warheads, 
and satellites whose range and power grow by the year.
  And let's understand that the treaties of yesterday fail to help us 
shield the country against the potential attacks of tomorrow.
  The statement of policy proposed by the Cochran-Inouye bill would 
represent a compelling step by Congress to counter the growing 
ballistic missile threat to America's most precious assets: her land 
and her people. I therefore urge all of my colleagues to vote in favor 
of the National Missile Defense Act of 1999.
  Ms. LANDRIEU. Mr. President, the need for a national missile defense 
system is real. The North Korean Taepo Dong tests, the Iranian Shahab 
III project and the uncertainty resulting from unexpected nuclear tests 
in India and Pakistan underscore the palpable threat that we now 
confront. Today, we signify that the United States has no intention to 
allow its foreign and national security policies to be held hostage to 
weapons of terror. In this sense,

[[Page 4763]]

this bill will provide a real incentive against nuclear proliferation. 
By embracing a system of counter-measures that will grow progressively 
stronger in the next century, we tell the North Koreans, the Iranians 
and any other country thinking of threatening this nation with 
ballistic missiles, that those efforts will fail. They may as well 
spend their modest resources on something constructive for their 
people, because the United States intends to commit whatever resources 
necessary to ensure our security. That we will be able to send this 
message with bipartisan resolve, makes it that much stronger.
  I would also like to thank my colleagues Senators Levin and Cochran 
for providing their leadership, guidance and wisdom on this issue. It 
was their flexibility and negotiation that made yesterday's amendment 
possible. The amendment that we adopted by a vote of 99 to nothing 
shows the consensus that this body shares regarding the importance of 
nuclear arms control. By setting deployment of a limited national 
missile defense and future reductions of nuclear stockpiles on equal 
footing, this legislation emphasizes the complimentary nature of those 
two key national security concerns. They are equally important, and we 
cannot lose site of one for the other.
  Finally, I think the compromise we have reached will signal to our 
Russian partners that we are serious about maintaining the progress 
that we have achieved. A limited national missile defense is not a 
threat to Russia, I would not support such an act. Instead this bill 
helps move both countries beyond cold war thinking. It should hearten 
the Russian Government to know that we will deploy a missile defense 
system which preserves the Russian nuclear deterrent. Again, it 
demonstrates how far our countries have come. It is concrete evidence 
that we have moved beyond a national security policy centered on 
containing Russian influence and countering every Russian capability.
  Mr. President, I am very proud of this legislation and proud of this 
institution. I hope that we will use the momentum gained here for 
further bipartisan efforts to address serious threats to our national 
security.
  Mr. President, I thank my ranking member, Senator Levin, and our 
sponsor, Senator Cochran, and my colleague, Senator Snowe for working 
through this important piece of legislation.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bunning). The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I understand from both sides that those 
who are listed under the order to permit them to offer amendments do 
not intend to offer the amendments, and I know of no other Senators who 
are seeking recognition. I would suggest that we have come to the time 
when we could have third reading of the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, and was 
read the third time.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ashcroft). The bill having been read the 
third time, the question is, Shall the bill pass? On this question, the 
yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  The result was announced--yeas 97, nays 3, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 51 Leg.]

                                YEAS--97

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bryan
     Bunning
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Edwards
     Enzi
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Torricelli
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wyden

                                NAYS--3

     Durbin
     Leahy
     Wellstone
  The bill (S. 257), as amended, was passed, as follows:

                                 S. 257

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``National Missile Defense Act 
     of 1999''.

     SEC. 2. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.

       It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as 
     is technologically possible an effective National Missile 
     Defense system capable of defending the territory of the 
     United States against limited ballistic missile attack 
     (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) with 
     funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations 
     and the annual appropriation of funds for National Missile 
     Defense.

     SEC. 3. POLICY ON REDUCTION OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES.

       It is the policy of the United States to seek continued 
     negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces.

  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which 
the bill was passed.
  Mr. STEVENS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I have an amendment at the desk to the 
title of the bill and I ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:
       Amend the title to read as follows: ``The Cochran-Inouye 
     National Missile Defense Act of 1999''.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question occurs on agreeing to the 
amendment to amend the title.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator for 
that kind gesture and express again my appreciation for his assistance 
in the development of the legislation and the passage of this bill.
  By this vote, the Senate has done what has never been done before. It 
has passed legislation making it the policy of the United States to 
deploy a national missile defense system capable against rogue-state 
threats as soon as the technology to do so is ready.
  By this action, the Senate has sent an unmistakable message around 
the world:
  To rogue states, that America will marshal its technological 
resources and refuse to be vulnerable to their ballistic missile 
threats of coercion;
  To our allies, that the United States will continue to be a reliable 
alliance partner;
  To other nations, that no country will have any form of veto over 
America protecting its security interests;
  To those working on the development of a national missile defense, 
that their work is valued and the system will be deployed just as soon 
as it is ready to protect America;
  And most of all, to the American people, who will no longer have 
cause to wonder if their Government intends to fulfill its most 
fundamental responsibility.
  In my opening statement I said we have heard many statements that 
have been made to reassure us about the willingness of the United 
States to defend itself. But there is always an ``if'' attached--if the 
threat appears, if we can afford it, if other nations give us their 
permission. By our actions today, we have removed what Winston 
Churchill called ``the terrible ifs.''
  Without doubt, there will be other challenges ahead for national 
missile

[[Page 4764]]

defense. There will be test failures as well as successes, but we will 
not be deterred from continuing to test until we develop a system that 
works.
  There will be discussions with other nations on arms control issues. 
But now these discussions will not begin with the question of whether 
America will protect itself. By this vote we have taken the necessary 
first step to protecting the United States from long-range ballistic 
missile attack.
  I thank the distinguished Senator from Michigan, Mr. Levin, the 
ranking minority member on the Armed Services Committee, for his 
cooperation as floor manager for the minority. I also thank all 
Senators who came to the floor to speak on the bill, and especially 
those Senators who cosponsored the bill. And finally, I thank my staff 
members, Mitch Kugler and Dennis Ward, whose excellent assistance to me 
and other supporters of this legislation has been very helpful indeed.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may speak out 
of order for 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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