[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 3]
[House]
[Pages 4342-4343]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




              RESOLUTION OF THE NAGORNO KARABAGH CONFLICT

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pallone) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I wanted to take this opportunity tonight 
to welcome the visiting President of the Nagorno Karabagh Republic, Mr. 
Arkady Ghoukasian. President Ghoukasian is visiting our Nation's 
capital this week as part of a trip that also includes stops in 
California and New York, and accompanying the President on his first 
visit to the United States is Ms. Naira Melkoumian, the Foreign 
Minister of the Nagorno Karabagh Republic.
  Yesterday I took part in a meeting with President Ghoukasian and 
Foreign Minister Melkoumian that was attended by several of my 
colleagues in the House from both parties. The President also held 
private meetings with several other Members of the House and the Senate 
and representatives of the Armenian Assembly of America and the 
Armenian National Committee of America also took part in those 
meetings. The President also had meetings with the State Department and 
met with some of Washington's leading think tanks and the media.
  Mr. Speaker, Nagorno Karabagh is a region in the Caucasus Mountains 
of the former Soviet Union that has now and always has historically 
been populated by Armenians. Unfortunately, Nagorno Karabagh's 
independence has not been given recognition by the United States or the 
international community. Neighboring Azerbaijan continues to claim 
Nagorno Karabagh's territory. A bloody war was fought over this region, 
and the Karabagh Armenians successfully defended their homeland. A 
cease-fire was declared in 1994, which has more or less held despite 
ongoing violations by Azerbaijan, but a final resolution of the 
conflict has been elusive.
  Mr. Speaker, the United States is a leader in the effort to help the 
parties to this conflict achieve a just and lasting resolution of the 
conflict. The U.S. is a co-chair along with France and Russia of the 
Minsk Group, of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
established to resolve this dispute.
  The United States and our Minsk Group partners last year put forward 
a new plan known as the Common-State proposal for resolving the 
conflict. Armenia and Nagorno Karabagh have both agreed to accept the 
proposal as a basis for negotiations despite serious reservations, but 
Azerbaijan's response to the constructive proposal by the United States 
and our partners has been a flat no.
  Mr. Speaker, the U.S. non-recognition of Nagorno Karabagh creates 
issues about who in the State Department should meet with President 
Ghoukasian or other representatives of Nagorno Karabagh, and last week 
I was joined by 19 of my colleagues on a bipartisan basis in writing to 
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott asking that in his capacity as 
the American co-chair of the Minsk Group he personally meet with Mr. 
Ghoukasian during his visit to our Nation's capital. Unfortunately, 
Secretary Talbott was not in Washington at the time of President 
Ghoukasian's visit, and President Ghoukasian met instead with Donald 
Keyser who is special negotiator for Nagorno Karabagh and the NIS 
regional conflicts. Mr. Keyser I should say is doing a fine job in 
trying to win the confidence of the parties to the conflict, but I 
believe it is important to stress the need for the highest level 
contacts possible which are appropriate and provide a sign of goodwill 
that would help encourage progress in the negotiations. President 
Ghoukasian's status as the elected leader of one of the parties to the 
conflict argues in of according him high-level recognition, and indeed 
our two Minsk Group partners, France and Russia, provide a

[[Page 4343]]

stronger degree of recognition for the Karabagh government than the 
United States does.
  Last month a bipartisan group of Members of Congress and our staffs 
met with Special Negotiator Keyser. At that meeting and in our follow-
up letter to Secretary Talbott we urged that the United States stay the 
course in terms of the compromise Common-State approach, and, as I 
mentioned, this approach has been accepted by Armenian Nagorno Karabagh 
as a basis for direct negotiations, but thus far Azerbaijan has 
rejected this approach. We hope that this rejection will not be the 
last word, and we urge the administration to take proactive steps to 
reverse Azerbaijan's rejection.
  Mr. Speaker, last week I testified before the Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations of the House Committee on Appropriations on the fiscal year 
2000 legislation, and I called for assistance to both the Republic of 
Armenia and the Republic of Nagorno Karabagh and to offer some 
proposals for how we can advance the peace process through this 
legislation. The subcommittee, I should say, has been extremely 
attentive to the concerns of Armenia, Nagorno Karabagh and the entire 
Caucasus region, and thanks to the subcommittee U.S. humanitarian 
assistance is flowing to Nagorno Karabagh. I urged the Subcommittee on 
Foreign Operations to express its strong support for the U.S. position 
in the Minsk Group negotiations on Nagorno Karabagh, and I hope the 
subcommittee will adopt language calling on the State Department to 
stay the course and to press Azerbaijan to come back to the negotiating 
table. There are strong indications that Azerbaijan believes that it 
can maintain its rejectionist policy by playing the oil card given the 
interest in developing petroleum resources in the Caspian Sea although 
recent test drilling indicates less than expected quantities of oil are 
causing some major American oil companies to pull out of Azerbaijan.
  And there have also been troubling statements from Azerbaijan's 
President Aliyev that he considers renewal of military conflict a 
viable option for settling the dispute.
  Mr. Speaker, if I could just submit the rest of my statement for the 
Record, I just want to say it is very important that we send a message 
to Azerbaijan that their intransigence in opposing the Minsk Group 
proposal is a matter of concern here in Washington.
  Finally, I am concerned about the aid numbers for Armenia and 
Azerbaijan that were included in the Administration's budget request, 
which provide for a decrease in aid to Armenia, and an increase in aid 
to Azerbaijan. This is strange, since Armenia (as well as Nagorno 
Karabagh) has accepted the compromise proposal supported by the U.S., 
while Azerbaijan has rejected it. But the Administration budget 
proposed cutting aid to Armenia while increasing aid to Azerbaijan. The 
unfortunate message to Azerbaijan is that their intransigence in 
opposing the Minsk Group proposal is not a matter of concern here in 
Washington. That is not the signal we should be sending.

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