[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 3]
[Senate]
[Pages 3871-3874]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                         ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

                                 ______
                                 

             MAINTAINING THE FIGHT AGAINST ``LOOSE NUKES''

 Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, with the end of the Cold War, the 
threat of a nuclear holocaust between the United States and Russia has 
largely receded. There remains a real risk, however, that former Soviet 
weapons of mass destruction or the technology needed to build them will 
find their way to rogue states, terrorist groups, or even criminal 
organizations. If such weapons should ever be used, their impact will 
be catastrophic. It will hardly matter that ``only'' one or two cities 
have been so hideously slaughtered.
  The war against these so-called ``loose nukes'' is as important as 
any war we have fought. It is a war fought with assistance to states of 
the former Soviet Union, rather than with armed force. Its battles are 
the battles against unemployment and lax security. Its fronts are an 
array of firms and institutes and so-called ``nuclear cities,'' as well 
as the international frontiers where smugglers try to move sensitive 
materials to states like Iran, Iraq or Libya.
  This is a war that we dare not lose. The Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace reports that in December, the chief of Russia's 
Federal Security Service in the Chelyabinsk region said that employees 
at one sensitive plant had tried to steal 40 pounds of weapons-usable 
nuclear material. A month earlier, 3,000 workers at Chelyabinsk-70, a 
``nuclear city'' similar to our nuclear weapons design laboratories, 
had held a protest over unpaid wages. In 1996, the head of that city 
committed suicide in despair over his inability to pay his personnel.

[[Page 3872]]




                The Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative

  The Clinton Administration recently announced an Expanded Threat 
Reduction Initiative that will enlarge existing Nunn-Lugar programs by 
60 percent for the next five years. The Carnegie Endowment notes 
correctly that ``this new funding commitment still does not match the 
threat.'' But the Administration's request for extra funding in the 
Fiscal Year 2000 budget is desperately needed and merits wholehearted 
support.
  One especially important aspect of the President's package is a major 
effort to find alternative employment for Russia's biological weapons 
experts. The microbiologists and other scientists who built the Soviet 
Union's massive biological warfare establishment are highly expert. 
They are quite capable of doing research and development that would 
improve public health in Russia and around the world. But they would be 
equally capable of assisting rogue states to wreak massive destruction, 
if we and other countries did not enable them to survive in non-
military pursuits.
  The United States is taking steps, in other programs, to better 
prepare for the awful possibility of a terrorist attack with chemical 
or biological weapons. The Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative will 
help give us the time we so desperately need, in which to improve our 
capability to combat those threats.


          The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program

  Two weeks ago, the General Accounting Office issued a report on 
another of our non-proliferation assistance efforts, the Energy 
Department's Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention--or IPP--program, 
that was critical of program management. Newspapers quoted a statement 
by my friend from North Carolina, Senator Helms, who chairs the Foreign 
Relations Committee and commissioned the GAO study. He said that Energy 
Department failure to implement reforms recommended by the GAO would 
``jeopardize continued support'' for the program and also ``cast 
doubt'' on the wisdom of the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative.
  Those stories made it sound as though threat reduction efforts were 
in danger. In my view, however, what we are actually witnessing are the 
normal growing pains of a basically successful program. I believe that 
the IPP program and other Nunn-Lugar efforts both deserve and will 
obtain the Senate's continued support.
  The IPP program is only five years old. Its objective is to foster 
non-military employment for weapons scientists in the former Soviet 
Union by assisting them to develop marketable ideas that can then be 
produced in joint commercial ventures with Western companies. The GAO 
report notes that over 400 projects have been funded by IPP--over 200 
projects in its first year alone--at about 170 institutes and 
organizations.
  Thousands of Russian scientists have found at least part-time 
employment through IPP projects, and the result has been to lessen the 
temptation to sell their goods and expertise to rogue states. The GAO 
report discusses those results as follows:

       Officials from three institutes told us that the IPP 
     program had prevented their laboratory or institute from 
     shutting down and reduced the likelihood that scientists 
     would be forced to seek other employment. A representative 
     from Sarov [the new name for Arzamas-16, Russia's equivalent 
     of Los Alamos] told us that without the IPP program, the 
     situation at the institute would be a disaster.
       Some institute officials told us that the benefits of the 
     IPP program went beyond financial support. . . .[and 
     included] how to do business with the United States.

  The GAO noted that the Energy Department's National Laboratories 
``have made great strides in helping to `open up' NIS [former Soviet] 
institutes,'' stated that ``the program has been successful in 
employing weapons scientists through research and development 
programs,'' and concluded that the overall effort is ``in our national 
security interests.''
  Why, then, was the GAO critical of the IPP program? First, it found 
administrative lapses in the Department of Energy, such as not knowing 
how many scientists were engaged in particular projects, spending too 
much money in the United States and too little in the former Soviet 
Union, and allowing Russia to charge taxes on the assistance we 
provided. Secondly, it found many projects that had little or no chance 
of ever becoming commercially viable. Given that the IPP program is 
supposed to find Western investors for the projects it funds, the GAO's 
point was that the program was not achieving its long-term goals.
  The GAO is right. But what they found was actually the tail end of 
the success story. They found a program that, in five short years, 
successfully reached into 170 former Soviet institutes and helped 
employ thousands of scientists. The IPP program made those crucial 
contacts and brought a message of hope that resonated throughout the 
community of Russian experts in weapons of mass destruction. It told 
them that we understood their need to survive economically and also 
their need to retain self-respect as skilled professionals.
  After five years, it is time to tighten the administration of the IPP 
program. The good news is that the Energy Department is already working 
to do that. Indeed, of the GAO's 11 recommendations, the Energy 
Department accepted 10 completely and the 11th in part.
  That 11th recommendation was to move more slowly in expanding the 
``Nuclear Cities Initiative'' that will help Russia to downsize its 
nuclear complex without throwing weapons scientists out on the street. 
The Energy Department agrees on the need to move carefully, but 
reserves the right to take advantage of opportunities to expand the 
program beyond the three ``nuclear cities'' where it will begin.
  When Chairman Helms warns that the GAO recommendations must be 
implemented, he is sending a stern message to which the Energy 
Department should pay attention. But as I read the GAO report and the 
Energy Department's response, that Department is indeed paying 
attention. I have every hope, therefore, that even conservatives like 
my friend from North Carolina will conclude that the IPP program and 
the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative deserve our support.
  On February 26, the New York Times published a very perceptive 
editorial regarding U.S.-Russian nuclear relationships. The last 
paragraph of that editorial spoke directly to the last GAO 
recommendation:

       The G.A.O. report calls for closing down the nuclear-cities 
     program until the problems in the institutes program have 
     been resolved. That would be a mistake. The nuclear-cities 
     agreement is more carefully drawn than its predecessor and 
     already provides for exemption from Russian taxation. 
     Tightened project review procedures are in place to make sure 
     that Washington is not inadvertently subsidizing new Russian 
     weapons development. These programs, along with Washington's 
     contributions to Russia's plutonium and uranium conversion 
     and security programs, should go forward as part of a 
     coordinated drive to substantially eliminate Russia s cold-
     war nuclear infrastructure before the Clinton Administration 
     leaves office.

  The New York Times is right. Wars are not cheap. We cannot win the 
war against ``loose nukes,'' ``loose chemicals'' and ``loose 
pathogens,'' unless we give our government the means to fight. Given 
the terrible stakes in this war, we must move forward.
  I ask that the New York Times editorial of February 26 and the Energy 
Department's response to the GAO report be printed in the Record at 
this point.
  The material follows:

                [From the New York Times, Feb. 26, 1999]

                      Unfinished Cold-War Business

       History will judge the Clinton Administration's foreign 
     policy record partly by its success in helping Russia reduce 
     the nuclear remnants of the cold war. Nothing would do more 
     to protect American security in the decades ahead than 
     insuring that Russia's immense stockpile of nuclear weapons 
     and materials is diminished and adequately controlled. The 
     modest amount of money needed to achieve these goals now 
     could save Washington many billions of dollars in the future 
     to deal with the Russian nuclear threat if it is not reduced.
       Moscow still has 6,000 nuclear warheads poised for long-
     distance delivery. Weapons-grade plutonium from dismantled 
     warheads is stored in poorly secured buildings, vulnerable to 
     theft. Russia also has tens of thousands of underpaid weapons 
     scientists and

[[Page 3873]]

     workers in 170 scientific institutes and 10 closed cities 
     that house the Russian nuclear weapons complex. If President 
     Clinton hopes to leave an enduring mark in international 
     affairs, he will work on these problems in the remaining 23 
     months of his term. Specifically, he should look for 
     innovative ways to further reduce nuclear weapons and speed 
     the conversion of Russia's nuclear establishment to civilian 
     activities.
       The last nuclear arms reduction treaty, negotiated more 
     than six years ago, has yet to be ratified by Russia's 
     Parliament. That treaty alone would cut nuclear weapons 
     totals nearly in half. Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov 
     recognizes the treaty's value for Russia, both in foreign 
     policy and budget savings terms. Mr. Clinton should work 
     closely with President Boris Yeltsin and Mr. Primakov to 
     achieve ratification.
       But hopes for deep nuclear cuts need not depend on Russia's 
     Communist-dominated Parliament. In coordination with Russia's 
     leaders, Mr. Clinton should initiate steps that go beyond the 
     treaty, including parallel nuclear reductions and taking more 
     weapons off hair-trigger alert. Such methods proved effective 
     when tried by Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev a 
     decade ago.
       Shrinking Russia's nuclear infrastructure also requires 
     expanding the cooperative programs developed under 
     legislation originally sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and 
     Richard Lugar. These efforts have already supported the 
     dismantling of 5,000 Russian warheads. Additional work is 
     needed now to safely convert as much of the plutonium and 
     enriched uranium from these bombs into less dangerous forms 
     and to store what remains under much more secure conditions. 
     The Administration rightly seeks large spending increases in 
     these programs in next year's budget. It is essential that 
     Congress approve these requests.
       Washington should also press ahead with its efforts to re-
     employ Russian weapons scientists in civilian work. Two 
     American programs managed by the Energy Department are 
     designed to achieve that goal. One, begun in 1994, is aimed 
     at Russia's scientific institutes. A newer program deals with 
     the closed nuclear cities. The scientific institutes program 
     has succeeded in re-employing thousands of Russian scientists 
     at home and keeping them out of the reach of terrorists or 
     countries eager to make nuclear, biological or chemical 
     weapons. But a report prepared for Congress this week by the 
     General Accounting Office called attention to some problems, 
     including taxation by Russia of some of the aid money and 
     allegations that some assistance went to institutes and 
     scientists still engaged in weapons work. However cash-
     starved the Russian Government is, taxation of American aid 
     money is unacceptable. Nor should American subsidies support 
     Russian weapons development.
       The G.A.O. report calls for slowing down the nuclear-cities 
     program until the problems in the institutes program have 
     been resolved. That would be a mistake. The nuclear-cities 
     agreement is more carefully drawn than its predecessor and 
     already provides for exemption from Russian taxation. 
     Tightened project review procedures are in place to make sure 
     that Washington is not inadvertently subsidizing new Russian 
     weapons development. These programs, along with Washington's 
     contributions to Russia's plutonium and uranium conversion 
     and security programs, should go forward as part of a 
     coordinated drive to substantially eliminate Russia's cold-
     war nuclear infrastructure before the Clinton Administration 
     leaves office.
                                  ____



                                         Department of Energy,

                                Washington, DC, February 10, 1999.
     Mr. Victor S. Rezendes,
     Director, Energy, Resources and Science Issues, U.S. General 
         Accounting Office, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Rezendes: The Department of Energy appreciates the 
     opportunity to review the draft General Accounting Office 
     report, GAO/RCED-99-54, ``Nuclear Proliferation: Concerns 
     With DOE's Efforts to Reduce the Risks Posted by Russia's 
     Unemployed Weapons Scientists.'' The report, as written, 
     provides valuable insight into our Initiatives for 
     Proliferation Prevention Program and will assist the 
     Department to better manage this valuable program. Technical 
     comments to this report have been provided separately. Our 
     comments on the report's recommendations are attached.
           Sincerely,
                                        Leonard Spector, Director,
                      Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation.

       Attachment.

      Comments on Draft General Accounting Office Report--Nuclear 
Nonproliferation: Concerns With DOE's Efforts To Reduce the Risks Posed 
       by Russia's Unemployed Weapons Scientists, February, 1999


                            general comments

       The Department of Energy appreciates the effort that the 
     General Accounting Office put into this report. We agree with 
     the vast majority of its recommendations, and the IPP Program 
     will be significantly strengthened as the result of this 
     independent, in-depth evaluation. There are, however, a 
     number of issues that we believe need further clarification.
       First, the report expresses concern that certain IPP 
     projects may have supported the development of dual-use 
     technology that could inadvertently strengthen Russian 
     military capabilities. We note that the specific projects 
     identified in the report date from an earlier period of the 
     program and, at worst, might have provided only incidental 
     military benefits to Russia--and not to its weapon of mass 
     destruction or missile programs. We are firmly committed to 
     ensuring that IPP projects do not support dual-use 
     technologies and are directed exclusively to peaceful 
     objectives. This is an explicit project requirement as noted 
     in guidance. Over the past eighteen months, the new 
     management of the IPP Program has intensified project reviews 
     to reinforce implementation of this standard.
       We have been particularly sensitive to the dual-use 
     potential of projects in the NIS chemical and biological 
     institutes. The Department recognized from the onset of the 
     program that the dividing line between commercial and weapons 
     technologies was subtle in this area of technology. As a 
     result, DOE instituted a special review process, which 
     included the U.S. interagency, the U.S. chemical and 
     biological community, and the DOE National Laboratories. 
     Although the GAO report states that some reviewers may have 
     provided only cursory analysis of particular projects, we 
     believe that every IPP project with a chemical and biological 
     institute received extensive scrutiny from numerous 
     participants in the review process and that this process 
     deliberately erred on the side of disapproval when questions 
     on potential dual-use applications were raised. Nonetheless, 
     we recognize that improvements are needed to make the review 
     process more consistent and, as noted below, we accept the 
     GAO's recommendation on this issue.
       The GAO report also raised the concern that some Russian 
     weapon scientists are being paid by the IPP Program even 
     though they remain employed at their respective weapons-
     related institutes. The implicit criticism of the program is 
     that this practice is subsidizing Russian weapon-of-mass 
     destruction activities. We believe this implication is 
     misplaced. The fundamental goal of the IPP Program is to keep 
     weapons specialists working in their home countries--in the 
     face of grim domestic employment prospects--rather than 
     selling their services to foreign states or organizations of 
     proliferation concern. At virtually all Russian weapons 
     institutes, salaries are going unpaid for months, even for 
     those who are nominally ``employed'' there. These scientists, 
     and those who have been dismissed, are the proper targets of 
     the IPP Program, because these are the individuals who are 
     most likely to be tempted to sell their services abroad. IPP 
     policy clearly states that the Program does not pay 
     scientists to perform weapons work, and we match the scale of 
     payments to those of deliverables required by our contracts, 
     so that we are not inadvertently subsidizing other work at 
     the host institute. Moreover, time spent on IPP activities is 
     time scientists cannot spend working on Russian military 
     programs.
       Finally, GAO notes that only two of the IPP projects have 
     progressed to Thrust III. Commercialization of science and 
     engineering requires time, and the IPP program has only 
     recently shifted its emphasis to commercialization. In the 
     United States, commercialization efforts normally take five 
     to seven years. In just the past year, the IPP Program has 
     placed increased emphasis on projects cost-shared with U.S. 
     industry (Thrust II) and on moving such projects towards 
     commercial viability (Thrust III). This progression is 
     important, we believe, to create viable long-term employment 
     opportunities for Russian scientists who are leaving weapons 
     work. We recognize, however, that IPP cannot by itself create 
     commercial entities; it can only set measures and procedures 
     in place to maximize the likelihood of their creation by U.S. 
     industry. If Russian economic conditions stabilize, we 
     believe the coming eighteen months will see the fruits of 
     these and earlier efforts.
       Fortunately, as the GAO notes, even if IPP 
     commercialization success remains limited, the fundamental 
     objective of the IPP Program--keeping former Soviet weapon-
     of-mass-destruction scientists at home--is succeeding.


                    responses to GAO Recommendations

                 A. Recommendations on the IPP Program

     Recommendation 1
       Re-examine the role and the costs of the national 
     laboratories with a view towards maximizing the amount of 
     program funds going to the NIS institutes.
     DOE management position
       Concur.
       The Department will continue its examination of laboratory 
     roles to utilize their expertise more efficiently. In coming 
     months, we expect to increase significantly the proportion of 
     project dollars going to the NIS and to correspondingly 
     reduce the proportion of funds spent at the national 
     laboratories. An increased emphasis on Thrust II and Thrust 
     III projects will help to promote this shift in funding. The 
     Department notes that the enabling legislation for IPP calls 
     for a ``. . . program of cooperation between scientific and 
     engineering institutes in the New Independent States of the 
     former Soviet

[[Page 3874]]

     Union and national laboratories and other qualified academic 
     institutions in the United States designed to stabilize the 
     technology base in the cooperating states as each strives to 
     convert defense industries to civilian applications . . .''
     Recommendation 2
       Obtain information on how program money is being spent by 
     the NIS recipients of program funds.
     Management position
       Concur.
       The IPP Program office will issue guidance to participating 
     laboratories to ensure more complete tracking of the 
     expenditure of funds by the NIS recipients. The program will 
     establish quarterly reporting on funds spent in the NIS.
     Recommendation 3
       Seek assurances from the Russian government, either through 
     a government-to-government agreement or through other means, 
     that program funds are exempt from Russian taxes.
     Management position
       Concur.
       The Department of Energy agrees with this recommendation 
     and will work with the Department of State to facilitate a 
     government-to-government agreement. In the meantime, the 
     Department will continue its efforts within the U.S. 
     interagency structure to resolve this issue. This effort has 
     led to discussions by the Vice President with his Russian 
     counterparts on taxation issues and to the renewal of the 
     Panskov-Pickering agreement as the basis for seeking case-by-
     case tax exemptions for IPP funds expended in Russia.
     Recommendation 4
       Require that program officials, to the extent possible, 
     obtain accurate data on the number and backgrounds of 
     scientists participating in program projects, and eliminate 
     funding for institutes that did not formerly work on weapons 
     of mass destruction.
     Management position
       Concur.
       The IPP Program has issued, and will reemphasize, program 
     guidance instructing principal investigators to obtain 
     accurate data regarding the number and backgrounds of 
     scientists participating in program projects. Scientists with 
     weapons knowledge now employed at nonweapons institutes will 
     continue to be eligible to participate in the IPP Program, as 
     they represent a continuing potential proliferation concern.
     Recommendation 5
       Clarify program guidance as to whether scientists currently 
     employed in weapons of mass destruction programs are eligible 
     for program funding.
     Management position
       Concur.
       The basic goal of the program is to retain former Soviet 
     WMD scientists in their home countries; the key question is 
     the expertise they possess and might offer to others, not 
     whether they are currently on the roster of an NIS WMD 
     institute. Through its increasing emphasis on 
     commercialization, IPP will continue to develop long-term 
     opportunities for scientists to leave WMD institutes. 
     Explicit program guidance regarding scientists currently 
     employed in weapons of mass destruction programs will be 
     issued within 90 days.
     Recommendation 6
       Require that project reviewers consider all military 
     applications of projects to ensure that useful defense 
     related information is not unintentionally transferred.
     Management position
       Concur.
       The IPP Program has always been sensitive to the question 
     of transfer of weapons-sensitive technology to the NIS. Based 
     on the GAO's report, however, we recognize that our review 
     process was not as complete as it should be. Accordingly, the 
     program has revised its procedures to request a direct review 
     of projects by the Department of Defense instead of 
     forwarding projects through the Department of State.
     Recommendation 7
       Strengthen and formalize DOE's process for reviewing 
     proposed chemical and biological projects by:
       (1) providing complete project information to all reviewing 
     U.S. Government agencies and organizations.
     Management Position
       Concur.
       Based on the GAO's report, the program has revised its 
     procedures to ensure that all appropriate government agencies 
     and organizations have complete project information.
       (2) developing criteria to help frame the evaluation 
     process.
     Management Position
       Concur.
       This recommendation was completed during the course of the 
     GAO's audit.
       (3) providing feedback to all of the reviewing agencies 
     about the final disposition of the projects.
     Management Position
       Concur.
       The Department will provide feedback to all reviewers 
     regarding the status of final approval of IPP projects.
     Recommendation 8
       Re-evaluate the large number of Thrust 1 projects, 
     particularly those that have been funded for several years, 
     and eliminate those that do not have commercial potential.
     Management Position
       Concur.
       The Department has implemented a reevaluation of Thrust 1 
     projects based on GAO's review.
     Recommendation 9
       Develop criteria and time frames for determining when 
     Thrust 1 projects should be terminated if they do not meet 
     the criteria of graduation to the program's next phase.
     Management Position
       Concur.
       Based on GAO's review, this recommendation will be 
     accomplished within 120 days.

            B. Recommendations on Nuclear Cities Initiative

       Because DOE plans to implement the Nuclear Cities 
     Initiative in a relatively short amount of time (5 to 7 
     years) at a potential cost of up to $600 million during 
     uncertain economic times in Russia, we believe it is critical 
     that program implementation be based on solid thinking and 
     planning which considers the problems experienced under the 
     IPP Program. Therefore, we recommend that DOE:
     Recommendation 10
       Develop a strategic plan for the Initiative before large 
     scale funding begins and include in the plan-program goals, 
     costs, time frames, performance measures, and expected 
     outcomes, such as the number of jobs created for each city.
     Management Position
       Concur.
       The Department is preparing a strategic plan that will be 
     published within 90 days.
     Recommendation 11
       Not expand the Initiative beyond the three nuclear cities 
     until DOE has demonstrated that its efforts are achieving 
     program objectives, that is, that jobs are being created in 
     the civilian sector for displaced weapons scientists, 
     engineers, and technicians.
     Management Position
       Concur, with qualification.
       Some existing IPP projects in other closed cities may 
     naturally transition to work under the Nuclear Cities 
     Initiative. Similarly, the Department does not want to 
     preclude the possibility of accomplishing significant 
     reductions in nuclear weapons related activities in another 
     closed nuclear city should the opportunity arise to assist in 
     the shutdown of facilities there. It is also the intent of 
     the Department to structure the second year of the Nuclear 
     Cities Initiative based upon lessons learned the first year. 
     The Department has a process for reviewing program objectives 
     to determine lessons learned and next steps.

                          ____________________