[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 3]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 3790-3791]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                  REPORT ON THE OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING

                                 ______
                                 

                      HON. JAMES A. TRAFICANT, JR.

                                of ohio

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, March 4, 1999

  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, for the past 6 years I have been 
examining the issue of security in Federal buildings. In the last two 
Congresses I have introduced legislation to reform and improve the 
Federal Protective Service. As part of this effort, I have closely 
examined the April 19, 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
  For the past 2 years my efforts have been assisted by a private 
citizen, Mr. John Culbertson. Mr. Culbertson recently completed a 
detailed report for my office on the physical security deficiencies of 
the Murrah Building. Mr. Culbertson also prepared an excellent report 
summary which I would like to insert in the Record. I want to emphasize 
that Mr. Culbertson is a private citizen and that he prepared the 
report at his own expense.
  Mr. Speaker, Mr. Culbertson's report includes some disturbing 
revelations about security lapses in Oklahoma City on the day of the 
bombing. I am deeply concerned that unless swift action is taken to 
reform and upgrade the Federal Protective Service, there will be 
another tragic bombing of a federal building.
  I urge my colleagues to read the report and to cosponsor my 
legislation, H.R. 809, the Federal Protective Service Reform Act.

Deadly Failures--Physical Security Deficiencies of the Alfred P. Murrah 
   Federal Building, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma--Special Report Summary

       This report has been prepared by John Culbertson for the 
     Honorable James A. Traficant Jr. as a follow up report to the 
     ``Background Briefing, Building Specific Security 
     Deficiencies'' white paper prepared at the request of the 
     office of the Honorable James A. Traficant Jr. and dated June 
     3, 1998.
       This report will detail specific failures in the security 
     review and operations of the Murrah Federal Building (MFB) 
     that could have led to it's selection as a target and 
     subsequent bombing on April 19, 1995. Further details of the 
     analysis regarding the bombing and the MFB will be the 
     subject of other reports.
       A February 21, 1995 Physical Security Survey incorrectly 
     classified the building as a level III building. The correct 
     classification was level IV based upon United States 
     Department of Justice Criteria. The Oklahoma City Fire 
     Department has published data which would have classified the 
     building as a level IV building. The Federal Protective 
     Service in a post bombing publication listed the building as 
     a security level IV building.
       Because the building had been the target of previous 
     bombing attempts, and Richard Wayne Snell, a person involved 
     in the planning of one of these plots was scheduled for 
     execution on the day of the bombing. Richard Wayne Snell is 
     an Aryan National figurehead who was executed in the state of 
     Arkansas on April 19, 1995 for the murder of Lewis Bryant, an 
     Arkansas State Trooper of African American descent. Snell had 
     with James Ellison the leader of the group known as the 
     Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord, planned to bomb the MFB 
     in 1983.

[[Page 3791]]

       The March, 1995 issue of ``Taking Aim'' the monthly 
     newsletter published by the Militia of Montana (MOM) was 
     heavily devoted to Richard Wayne Snell. The newsletter called 
     Snell a ``Patriot to be executed by the Beast''. MOM linked 
     the execution date to the 1993 burning of the Branch Davidian 
     Complex in Waco, to the British attack on Lexington and 
     Concord in 1776 and in typical fashion of ignoring important 
     facts to the shoot-out and subsequent standoff with Randy 
     Weaver at Ruby Ridge, Idaho which actually began on August 
     21, 1992. MOM promoted the idea of April 19th as being 
     declared within the movement as ``Militia Day''. The 
     newsletter also made the appeal that Snell would be executed 
     unless some action was taken.
       Compounding the Snell execution scheduled for the same day 
     as the bombing was the fact that just two years earlier the 
     standoff at the Branch Davidian Complex in Waco, Texas ended 
     in a deadly fire on April 19, 1993. This fire had become a 
     rallying point for groups opposed to the Federal government. 
     The FBI issued an advisory to the FPS on February 7, 1995 
     regarding a planned demonstration on February 28, 1995 by the 
     DC committee for Waco Justice, the date of the initial BATF 
     raid that precipitated the standoff. The GSA has stated no 
     warning of potential threats was received from the FBI 
     although the FBI was cognizant of the Snell execution.
       Certain events that took place in the week prior to the 
     bombing were either left not investigated or occurred because 
     there was no mechanism in place to investigate or prevent 
     them. These events are highly suspicious and could have a 
     connection to the bombing itself.
       Numerous witnesses have reported seeing three individuals 
     in the parking garage of the MFB on Friday April 14, 1995, 
     acting in a suspicious manner with suspicious objects in 
     their possession. A significant item is that they had a set 
     of ``E'' sized sheets which is consistent with the size of 
     the building plans for the MFB.
       A witness who was employed in the building reported 
     encountering a male subject on April 18, 1995 wearing a GSA 
     uniform. The witness noticed the subject because he was not 
     one of the building regulars and seemed out of place. A May 
     24, 1997 story in the Rocky Mountain News by Kevin Flynn 
     recounts how a guard who happened to be at the MFB on the 
     afternoon of April 18, 1995 witnesses what may have been a 
     test run for the bombing, a large truck pulled up in front of 
     the MFB in the area that McVeigh parked his truck. Three 
     individuals exited the truck in a hasty fashion and ran 
     across the street. Several minutes later they returned to the 
     truck and left.
       On the morning of April 19, 1995 a witness entering the 
     building encountered the same subject as the day before on 
     his way out of the building in a hurried manner. Once again 
     the subject had a GSA uniform shirt on but in this case was 
     accompanied by another individual.


                              CONCLUSIONS

       1. In the context of events leading up to the bombing of 
     the MFB, it appears that Federal officials should have been 
     at a higher state of alert for a potential threat, however it 
     also appears that there was no mechanism clearly defined to 
     disseminate important information.
       2. Given the precautions taken by Arkansas officials with 
     respect to the execution of Richard Wayne Snell, and his 
     particular history of violence, Federal Agencies should have 
     been more aware of a potential threat against the MFB. 
     Certainly the fact that the militia community was highly 
     involved in the opposition of the execution of Snell, and 
     given his specific history of planning an attack on the MFB 
     in 1983 more attention should have been given to a scenario 
     of a possible attack against the building on April 19, 1995.
       3. Further indications to a potential threat against the 
     MFB should have been realized due to the fact the James 
     Ellison, a coconspirator with Snell in the 1983 plot had 
     taken up residence at Elohim City with which Snell has 
     considerable linkage. Because the raid on Ellison's compound 
     had occurred on April 19, 1985, ten years later, and Snell 
     had been predicting a bombing, attention was warranted by 
     Federal authorities regarding the possibility of an attack. 
     There was a failure in the mechanism for timely and 
     functional communications between Federal agencies.
       4. Strangers in GSA uniforms in the building on April 18 
     and 19, 1995 would have had a higher probability of detection 
     had there been a sufficient security force present in the 
     building in 1995. These occurrences while not totally 
     remedied by human presence can be significantly reduced if 
     the subjects in question were part of an operation to 
     plant explosives within the building or provide 
     reconnaissance, it is highly likely that such an operation 
     would not be attempted if sufficient human security 
     presence were maintained.
       5. Proper classification of the building itself may have 
     resulted in increased security measures such as video 
     surveillance and increased human presence that could have 
     detected the possibility of a plot against the building. 
     Certainly enhanced security measures would have made the 
     building a less attractive soft target for terrorism.
       6. Proper classification of the building may have resulted 
     in better protective features particularly in the case of 
     retrofit items. Protective features including glass 
     protection, internal security measures and traffic management 
     certainly could have been a mitigating factor in the 
     reduction of fatalities, injuries and damage resulting from 
     the attack on April 19, 1995.


                            RECOMMENDATIONS

       1. Existing classification criteria seems adequate but is 
     unevenly applied, most likely to poor management and 
     budgetary considerations. The FPS should have the lead in 
     investigating and identifying building security level using 
     existing criteria. Classification efforts should be free of 
     constraints such as budgetary concerns when an investigation 
     and determination effort is being conducted. If after 
     determinations are made budgetary concerns are warranted, 
     solutions should sought such as locating high risk tenant 
     agencies together or the exploration of site specific cost 
     effective technological solutions. In order to carry out this 
     mission the FPS should have stand alone status within the GSA 
     framework and should be a full fledged law enforcement agency 
     with investigative capabilities.
       2. The value of a human presence should not be discounted, 
     the addition of dedicated security personnel employed by the 
     Federal government as opposed to contract guards should be 
     implemented as quickly as possible. The ability to 
     investigate and make quick determinations is of supreme 
     importance in the protection of Federal Employees.
       3. Security personnel should have clear lines of authority 
     and adequate training for the task of providing security to 
     Federal facilities without infringing on the rights of the 
     citizens they are charged with protecting.
       4. Attention should be placed on developing methodologies 
     for security personnel to provide protective services without 
     giving a fortress like appearance to Federal facilities. 
     Federal facilities are the property of the American people 
     and they should be as open and accessible as possible to 
     them.
       5. Methods of intelligence sharing should be strengthened 
     between Federal agencies, state agencies and local officials 
     with respect to data that may be important to the security of 
     a Federal facility. Because threats against federal 
     facilities will in most all cases involve peripheral threats 
     and risk to local jurisdictions, there should be a mechanism 
     to share intelligence data and other cooperative efforts with 
     these officials in a timely manner.

     

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