[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 3]
[Senate]
[Pages 3152-3156]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                         FAILED POLICY ON IRAQ

  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, the primary reason I came to the floor 
this afternoon is to speak about the administration's failed policy on 
Iraq. I say it is a failed policy. I wish that weren't the case, but it 
is. It is a failed policy.
  The administration, this administration, President Clinton, inherited 
a situation where President Bush and the Secretary of State had won the 
war with Iraq. We achieved our military objective, which was to get 
Iraq out of Kuwait. We stated that was our objective. We accomplished 
that objective. We came home. We implemented sanctions against Iraq for 
its invasion of Kuwait in the summer of 1990. We had a total embargo on 
Iraqi products, including oil. Oil was the No. 1 product, or commodity, 
that Iraq exported. It provided 95 percent, I believe, of its foreign 
currencies.
  We put that embargo on because they invaded a neighbor. And, frankly, 
they probably intended to invade other neighbors--maybe Saudi Arabia--
and really became the dominating power in the Persian Gulf. We didn't 
think that was right. We sent 550,000 troops. We stopped them. We 
kicked them out of Kuwait, and we imposed sanctions to make sure that 
we would get rid of their weapons of mass destruction, because we knew 
they were building chemical and biological weapons and possibly nuclear 
weapons.
  And so we set up an international regime called UNSCOM to inspect to 
make sure they wouldn't be doing this again, that they wouldn't be 
building these weapons of mass destruction to cause more problems for 
their neighbors and surrounding countries in the foreseeable future. 
The entire world community supported us, applauded us in that effort. I 
think we had 30 countries that were involved in the coalition aligned 
against Iraq in 1990, 1991, 1992. That is what President Clinton 
inherited.
  Well, what has happened since? Let me walk you through what has 
happened since.
  Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis and the Iraqi Government have really 
baffled the Clinton administration and, in my opinion, they have beaten 
the Clinton administration if you look at their objectives.
  I will show you. The war was in 1991. They were producing over 2 
million barrels of oil per day in 1990. After the embargo, they 
averaged--in 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, about 4- or 500,000-
barrels per day. We really curtailed their production. Basically, we 
had the implied reward that said, if you will allow arms control 
inspectors--if we know that you are not building weapons of mass 
destruction, we will allow you to produce more oil, there won't be an 
embargo, but we have to know that you are not building weapons to 
export throughout the world.
  What did this administration do? Well, we had a conflict. Actually it 
happened in 1994 and 1995; Iraq amassed about 80,000 troops near the 
Kuwaiti border. We started activating troops. We said, well, we 
wouldn't let this stand; we will respond militarily, if necessary, and 
then the problem went away. How did they go away? In April of 1995, the 
United Nations approved Resolution 986, and this resolution allowed 
Iraq to sell $2 billion worth of oil every 6 months, $4 billion of oil 
per year.
  Well, you might notice, all right, this happened in April of 1995. 
Their oil infrastructure took awhile to be rebuilt, but, as a result of 
the U.N. resolution, a couple of years later they doubled their oil 
production. And this was supposedly to get their cooperation. We didn't 
have to go to war at the time. We were able to, supposedly, have arms 
control inspectors, and so they had a little cooperation.
  In March of 1996, Iraq blocked inspections. In June of 1996, we 
passed U.N. Resolution 1060 that deplores the refusal of Iraqi 
authorities to allow access to sites designated by UNSCOM. In August, 
Iraq launched a campaign against the Kurds. The United States launched 
a few cruise missiles. The crisis continues. Our arms control 
inspectors are continually denied access.
  In June of 1997, Iraq demands that UNSCOM finish their business. In 
June, the United Nations passed a resolution that demands--demands--
Iraq comply fully with UNSCOM. In October of 1997, Iraq bars American 
inspectors totally. In October, the United Nations passed Resolution 
1134 which condemned Iraq's refusal to allow UNSCOM access to certain 
sites. Boy, the United Nations is standing tough.
  In November of 1997, we passed another resolution, Resolution 1137. 
We, again, condemned Iraq because they wouldn't allow these arms 
control inspectors to have access. We are getting close to finding 
their weapons of mass destruction.
  Now, this is only a year ago. A year ago in January this 
administration was sending 35,000 troops to the Persian Gulf. We are 
getting ready to go to war again. We are going to have a significant 
strike. We had significant debate in this body: Is this the right thing 
to do? Will this bring about compliance? The administration is getting 
close to going to war. And then what happened? The standoff continues. 
The inspectors are not allowed access to any of these sites. And then 
you might remember, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi 
Annan, well, he flies to Baghdad and they come to an agreement. Peace 
is at hand. Arms control inspectors will be allowed back in.
  Well, guess what. There was a little deal made that not too many 
people were aware of. I venture to say there weren't two colleagues in 
the Senate who were aware the administration already cut a deal with 
Iraq and on U.N. Resolution 1153, they allowed Iraq to sell $5.2 
billion worth of oil every 6 months; in other words, allowed Iraq to 
more than double its oil sales.
  This is in February of last year. One year ago, February of 1998, the 
administration signed a deal. We are getting ready to go to war with 
Iraq because they wouldn't let us have our arms control inspectors in, 
and all of a sudden we delegate the authority to the Secretary General. 
He runs to Baghdad. They signed a deal. Everybody is shaking hands. War 
is avoided. Everybody can be at ease--no real problems now. We have an 
agreement. We have Kofi Annan's signature. We have the Iraqis saying 
they are going to comply; they are going to let in arms control people. 
And, yes, there was a little deal that they could double oil sales, the 
Iraqis could double their oil exports to as much as $5.2 billion of oil 
every 6 months. That was February, a year ago, 12 months from this 
time.

[[Page 3153]]

  What happened last August? Let's see. Last August, the Iraqis stopped 
inspectors again. Now, they have done this repeatedly.
  What happened in September and October? They announced they would no 
longer cooperate. We withdrew the inspectors because they weren't doing 
anything. They were sitting in hotel rooms. They weren't allowed to 
have any inspections. And so we started saying this is not 
satisfactory.
  President Clinton, again, he is talking tough--we are going to go to 
war. We are going to bomb them. We have the international community on 
our side now because they kicked the arms control inspectors out. We 
have the international community on our side. We are ready to go.
  Well, the administration wasn't ready to go to war so we will give 
peace a little more of a chance. And we gave peace a little more of a 
chance, but they still didn't cooperate. We negotiated more. And so in 
September the United Nations passed another resolution demanding Iraq 
cooperate. That was in September.
  In November, we passed another resolution, U.N. Resolution 1205. We 
demanded that Iraq cooperate. And then in December we had 3 days of 
bombing, December 17, 18, and 19. Iraq didn't cooperate. We had 3 days 
of bombing. Some people called them the impeachment bombings. They 
happened to be on the day of impeachment. Maybe that is coincidence; 
maybe it isn't. I don't know.
  So we had 3 days of bombing. Boy, that taught them a lesson because 
they weren't complying, and we are going to make sure they are going to 
comply. So we bombed them for 3 days. And then what happened? And I 
don't know if anybody can read this or not, but then on December 23 
``U.S. Offers To Raise Crude Sales Cap.'' Just days after the bombing, 
Clinton administration officials are negotiating to lift the oil sales 
cap.
  My point is that we have rewarded Iraq three times in the past for 
noncompliance with arms control inspectors by raising the oil sales 
cap. In April of 1995, we allowed them to go from a total embargo to 
where they could sell $2 billion of oil every 6 months.
  That was in April of 1995. Why? Because they weren't allowing the 
inspectors. Then in February of 1998--again, we are ready to go to war, 
Kofi Annan, negotiates this deal that will allow them to double it 
again. So, yes, we had a promise that the inspectors would be allowed 
to have access. Maybe they had access for a few months. The inspectors 
start getting close to finding something and Saddam Hussein kicks them 
out again. We threatened to go to war again. This time we actually did 
bomb them for 3 days and then, guess what. Days later, we can't wait; 
we run back and say, hey, we are going to reward you for your 
noncompliance. That has been the administration's policy dealing with 
Iraq. Let's reward their noncompliance with arms control inspectors. 
Let's reward them; we will let them sell more oil. And that is exactly 
what has happened.
  This was the administration's statement days after the bombing. But 
it is interesting. And this was made by Tom Pickering.
  Incidentally, I might mention, Mr. President, we are trying to get 
the administration to testify at a hearing, and they have been very 
reluctant to do so. But I think we have a commitment from Secretary of 
Energy Richardson, and I hope we will have Secretary Albright, or at 
least Under Secretary Pickering to testify, to explain this position.
  His statement is interesting. It says:

       Outlining U.S. policy in the wake of last week's airstrikes 
     against Iraq, Undersecretary of State Thomas R. Pickering 
     said the United States would be prepared to review the 
     economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after the 1991 Persian 
     Gulf War if Iraqi President Saddam Hussein gives guaranteed 
     cooperation to U.N. weapons inspectors. If not, the sanctions 
     will remain in place in perpetuity and the United States will 
     use force as needed to block weapons development.

  In other words, if Iraq doesn't give cooperation, we are going to 
guarantee that those sanctions will remain in place forever. That was 
our administration's policy on December 23, just days after the 
bombing.
  Well, guess what. I am critical of this administration. Their policy 
here, 3 weeks later, on January 14--again in the Washington Post, it 
says, ``Gore Signals Flexibility on Iraq Sanctions; France Proposes 
Ending Oil Embargo, Changing Weapons Inspections.''
  But guess what. Vice President Gore proposed eliminating weapons 
sanctions. That is our own Vice President who said that. Three weeks 
after we said we would never lift sanctions unless we had total 
cooperation, we had the Vice President of the United States talking 
about--I will just quote part of the article:

       A ceiling on how much oil Iraq can sell to provide 
     humanitarian aid to its people should be lifted and the 
     approval process streamlined, Vice President Gore said 
     tonight. . . .

  ``The ceiling should be lifted.'' He didn't say in exchange for 
cooperation. He didn't say in exchange for having arms control 
inspectors in. He just said we should lift it. That is very 
inconsistent, totally overriding what the Under Secretary said 3 weeks 
before, but totally consistent with what this administration has done.
  What this administration has done--Saddam Hussein has tested them. He 
has pushed them up to the edge of going to war, defied arms control, 
defied the international community and the arms control community--by 
kicking the inspectors out. We would talk tough, and then at the last 
second we would say, ``Well, wait a minute, just give us a little 
inspection, let us have some inspections, let us do it, and you can 
sell more oil.''
  So what has happened? The Iraqis have done just that. Their oil sales 
have gone way up. Guess what. They have no inspections--none--zero. 
They are selling as much oil today as they were prior to the war. That 
is 95 percent of their currency that they earn for all sorts of things.
  The administration will say this is only used for food or 
humanitarian reasons. Hogwash. Money is fungible. If they are ready to 
take care of humanitarian needs with this money, that means with the 
other money they have, they can use that to buy arms and weapons and 
anything else they desire--maybe more castles that they happen to have.
  So the administration's policy has been a total disaster. Here is 
just the oil production charts. It shows for years, 1996 and so on, 
they were only producing 550,000 barrels a day. Then the administration 
policy where they allow more and more changes--and you notice now we 
are up to over 2\1/2\ million barrels per day, exactly 2 million 
barrels a day more than it was in 1996. That has also had the 
consequence of glutting an already flooded market and is driving a lot 
of producers totally out of business--totally out of business.
  We have a depression going on right now in the oil industry. You have 
111 oil rigs running today. Last year we had 372. You go from 370 rigs 
to 111 in 12 months, and part of the reason happens to be this 
administration's policy dealing with Iraq.
  So I have some concern on what is happening with the domestic oil 
industry. But my biggest concern is that the administration has had a 
habit of rewarding Iraqi noncompliance with more oil sales. Now the 
administration's policy, as stated by the Vice President of the United 
States, is we should not have a cap on oil sales.
  Incidentally, we do not need--or, they don't say this, but we do not 
have arms control inspectors in; so there is no connection. We are not 
saying, ``Hey, you can sell all the oil you want to; all you have to do 
is make sure we have access, have arms control inspection; then we'll 
take all the embargo off.'' That should be our policy. But until they 
do that, we should keep the embargo on. Let's put a little squeeze on.
  I said, ``What are we doing today?'' We are flying daily flights over 
the no-fly zones. They are shooting at our pilots. Thank goodness they 
haven't been successful yet. But how successful is our policy? We have 
already proven to Saddam Hussein, if he denies us, we will reward him. 
That is what we have done. This is what this administration has done 
throughout their policy.

[[Page 3154]]

  Our administration policy has been pretty poor in dealing with Iraq. 
We have continued to reward their noncompliance, going all the way back 
to April 1995, and I think it has made the world a lot more dangerous 
as a result. Saddam Hussein is able to produce all the oil he wants. He 
is able to generate the moneys he needs, able to build the weapons of 
mass destruction without anybody checking him whatsoever--not the 
United States, not the United Nations. As a result, the world is a much 
more dangerous place.
  The administration should be held accountable for their failed 
policies in Iraq. I also think it is important that we speak up now so 
we don't have failed policies in Kosovo.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the newspaper articles 
and tables to which I referred printed in the Record, and I yield the 
floor.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Dec. 23, 1998]

               U.S. Offers to Raise Iraqi Crude Sales Cap

                         (By Thomas W. Lippman)

       The Clinton administration offered yesterday to allow Iraq 
     to export more crude oil to raise money for food and 
     medicine, but held out little prospect that Iraq can escape 
     from other U.N. economic sanctions any time soon.
       Outlining U.S. policy in the wake of last week's airstrikes 
     against Iraq, Undersecretary of State Thomas R. Pickering 
     said the United States would be prepared to review the 
     economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after the 1991 Persian 
     Gulf War if Iraqi President Saddam Hussein gives guaranteed 
     cooperation to U.N. weapons inspectors. If not; the sanctions 
     will remain in place ``in perpetuity'' and the United States 
     will use force as needed to block weapons development, he 
     said.
       Given the administration's conviction that Saddam Hussein 
     will never give the inspection force known as UNSCOM the 
     unfettered access that the United States and Britain demand--
     a view supported by official Iraqi pronouncements this week--
     Pickering's statement amounted to a declaration that Russia, 
     France and other advocates of modifying the inspection system 
     and the economic sanctions will confront strong U.S. and 
     British opposition.
       Senior U.S. officials have made clear that they will not 
     return to the previous situation in which Iraq promised to 
     cooperate with inspectors and then obstructed their work, 
     controlling the agenda and forcing Washington to choose 
     between military force or breaking its word to defend the 
     inspections.
       Pickering's tone, however, was conciliatory toward the 
     Security Council. He welcomed Russia's announcement that its 
     ambassador to Washington, recalled last week for 
     ``consultations,'' will return this week.
       He also raised the possibility of U.S. assent to an 
     increase in the amount of crude oil Iraq is allowed to sell 
     through U.N.-supervised channels to buy food and medicine. 
     Now Iraq is permitted to sell $5.2 billion of oil every six 
     months.
       Administration officials described Pickering's remarks as 
     part of an effort to assuage anger in the Security Council 
     about the four days of U.S. and British airstrikes.
       Russia in particular has complained that the strikes 
     circumvented the will of the Security Council and violated 
     international law. Foreign ministry spokesman Vladimir 
     Rakhmanin said in Moscow yesterday that ``there is now a 
     chance to reaffirm the leading role of the Security 
     Council,'' an important objective for Russia because its veto 
     in the council is one of its few sources of diplomatic 
     leverage over Washington.
       France, which also opposed the strikes, has proposed a 
     modification of the inspection system to make it more 
     palatable to Iraq. Both countries have called for the 
     replacement of UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler, who is 
     anathema to the Iraqis.
       Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John W. Warner (R-
     Va.) said the president should ``seize the initiative'' to 
     make a deal with the Russians, French and other nations to 
     restructure UNSCOM.
       But Pickering said UNSCOM was created to be a technically 
     competent weapons inspection force and should not be replaced 
     by an alternate mechanism developed for political reasons.
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Post, Jan. 14, 1999]

Gore Signals Flexibility on Iraq Sanctions--France Proposes Ending Oil 
                 Embargo, Changing Weapons Inspections

                          (By John M. Goshko)

       United Nations, Jan. 13--A ceiling on how much oil Iraq can 
     sell to provide humanitarian aid to its people should be 
     lifted and the approval process streamlined, Vice President 
     Gore said tonight as Security Council members searched for 
     agreement on how to deal with Iraq in the aftermath of a 
     U.S.-led bombing campaign.
       France proposed ending the embargo on Iraqi oil sales and 
     replacing intrusive weapons searches by the United Nations 
     with a plan that would ensure that Iraq does not acquire more 
     of the weapons of mass destruction forbidden by the council 
     following Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Until 
     now, the focus of U.N. efforts has been on locating and 
     destroying any prohibited weapons in Iraq's existing arsenal.
       Iraqi resentment of that policy caused President Saddam 
     Hussein's government to defy the inspectors from the U.N. 
     Special Commission (UNSCOM) and led to American and British 
     air and missile strikes against Iraq from Dec. 16 to 19. 
     Since then, the defiant Iraq government has refused to permit 
     UNSCOM to return, and the U.N. council has been divided about 
     how to coax or force Iraq to resume cooperation.
       The division has been especially deep among the Security 
     Council's five permanent members, each with the power to veto 
     any decision. Gore's speech tonight to the Israel Policy 
     Forum in New York was designed to show U.S. openness to the 
     flexibility France, Russia and China have sought as a way to 
     ease the crippling economic sanctions.
       ``The United States is looking at ways to improve the 
     effectiveness of humanitarian programs in Iraq, including 
     lifting the current ceiling on funds which can be used to 
     purchase food and medicine,'' Gore said of the oil-for-food 
     program, now capped at slightly more than $5 billion a year.
       The goal is twofold: to keep the permanent Security Council 
     members, which also include Britain, united, and to 
     demonstrate that the fight is with President Saddam Hussein, 
     whom Gore called ``a ruthless dictator ruling unjustly,'' and 
     not with the Iraqi people themselves.
       ``It was Saddam's regime that for four long years, at great 
     cost and human suffering, refused to allow his people the 
     benefits of this program,'' Gore said. ``Saddam has 
     consistently shown he has cared more about developing weapons 
     of mass destruction than developing the welfare of his 
     people.''
       Gore's remarks reflected a position stated by other 
     administration officials soon after the bombings began last 
     month: The United States would agree to lift the ceiling on 
     oil exports for humanitarian needs but will not go as far as 
     lifting the sanction entirely. Gore added that U.N. approval 
     of what Iraq can purchase with its modest oil profits, which 
     can take weeks or months, should be revised to speed the 
     approvals.
       Earlier today, State Department spokesman James P. Rubin 
     said the French proposal contains ``some positive elements 
     that deal with the essential task of ensuring that Iraq does 
     not rearm and is disarmed.''
       The French plan calls for:
       Long-term weapons monitoring under a ``renewed control 
     commission'' that would either replace or substantially 
     modify UNSCOM ``so that its independence will be ensured and 
     its professionalism strengthened.'' Monitoring ``would no 
     longer be retrospective but would become preventive,'' 
     relying on sensors and television cameras to keep track of 
     what Iraq does in the future.
       Ending the embargo on Iraq's sales and exports of oil, its 
     principal commodity. Under present council resolutions, the 
     sanctions are supposed to remain in place until the council 
     determines that Iraq no longer has prohibited weapons.
       A program of strict economic and financial controls 
     allowing the United Nations to monitor Iraqi oil sales and 
     ensure that export revenue is not used to acquire new 
     military equipment or dual-use items. However, this 
     monitoring would not interfere with the purchase of 
     legitimate civilian goods and services.
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Post, Jan. 15, 1999]

           U.S. Seeks to Alter Iraq ``Oil for Food'' Program

                          (By John M. Goshko)

       United Nations, Jan. 14--The United States tried today to 
     defuse growing international criticism of American-backed 
     sanctions on Iraq by proposing eliminating the ceiling for 
     how much oil Iraq can sell abroad as long as the proceeds are 
     used to buy food and medicine.
       The proposal was presented by acting U.S. Ambassador A. 
     Peter Burleigh as the Security Council renewed its search for 
     agreement on how the United Nations should deal with Iraq in 
     the aftermath of last month's U.S.-led bombing campaign. The 
     U.S. plan followed a more far-reaching proposal by France 
     that would end the embargo on Iraq oil sales and replace 
     intrusive U.N. weapons searches with a program to monitor any 
     future attempts by Iraq to obtain weapons of mass 
     destruction.
       The 15-nation council's consensus on Iraq, intact through 
     most of the decade since Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion of 
     Kuwait was repelled by U.S.-led forces in the Persian Gulf 
     War, has crumbled in recent months because of differences 
     among the five permanent members with the power to veto any 
     decision. The divergences have pitted the United States and 
     Britain, both insistent on maintaining a hard line, against 
     Russia, France and China, which advocate a more flexible and 
     tolerant approach.
       Burleigh told reporters that Washington does not regard its 
     proposals as ``an alternative to the French plan'' because 
     the U.S.

[[Page 3155]]

     ideas deal only with humanitarian issues and do not address 
     the question of how best to pursue Iraqi disarmament. He said 
     the United States disagrees with France's approach to arms 
     inspections, which would shift the focus of U.N. efforts away 
     from locating and destroying prohibited weapons in Iraq's 
     existing arsenal.
       ``The U.S. government does not believe that it is 
     documented that the disarmament process for Iraq has been 
     completed,'' he said. ``It appears that the French proposal 
     makes that assumption--either that Iraq is disarmed or that 
     there is nothing further to be known.''
       The United States, he added, believes that overseeing Iraqi 
     disarmament should continue to be the responsibility of the 
     U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency (IAEA), the two organizations originally 
     assigned that job by the Security Council. The UNSCOM and 
     IAEA inspectors left Iraq before last month's bombing, and 
     Iraq has vowed that those from UNSCOM, which it charges are 
     American spies, will not be allowed to return.
       The U.S. proposals would overhaul aspects of the ``oil for 
     food'' program designed to allow Iraq to reduce suffering 
     caused by the broad U.N. sanctions on the economy. In 
     addition to liberalizing Iraq's opportunities for oil sales, 
     the U.S. proposals call for streamlining procedures for 
     approving Iraqi contracts to buy food and medicine, and 
     allowing Iraq to borrow money from an escrow account held by 
     the United Nations to finance such purchases on condition the 
     funds are repaid when Iraqi oil sales reach a higher level. 
     The plan also would expand U.N. programs for the health and 
     welfare of Iraqi children and make it easier for Iraqi 
     Muslims to make the pilgrimage to Mecca.
       But the most important U.S. proposal was to end 
     restrictions on how much oil Iraq can sell under the oil-for-
     food exemption. At present, Iraq may sell $5.25 billion worth 
     of oil every six months under tight U.N. controls. As a 
     practical matter, its oil industry, which is badly in need of 
     repair and modernization, has been barely able to produce and 
     sell about $3 billion worth of oil each six months.
       To help alleviate that problem, Burleigh said, the United 
     States is willing to relax the scrutiny it has applied to 
     contracts for spare parts and other equipment needed to get 
     the Iraqi industry working better. But he warned that 
     Washington opposes any equipment purchases that would 
     increase Iraq's ability to refine its oil domestically 
     because the refined product could be smuggled out of the 
     country, with the proceeds being pocketed by the regime 
     rather than put to humanitarian purposes.
       ``Our problem is with the Iraqi government; we have no 
     quarrel with the Iraqi people,'' Burleigh told reporters. He 
     repeated the frequent U.S. contention that Saddam Hussein's 
     government has failed to take advantage for the oil-for-food 
     program in order to use the propaganda value of the 
     populace's deprivation to win international support for 
     ending sanctions.
       The growing sense in many countries that the sanctions have 
     outlived their usefulness seemed a major factor in spurring 
     the U.S. proposals. It is an open secret that a growing 
     majority of countries on the Security Council favor or are 
     leaning toward lifting the sanctions. If the trend continues, 
     many diplomats here believe the United States soon may be so 
     isolated that it would be able to maintain the sanctions only 
     by using its veto. In that case, the same diplomats predict, 
     it would be only a matter of time before Arab countries and 
     possibly France and Russia, which are in line to win 
     concessions in the Iraqi oil industry, start to break the 
     embargo.
       By proposing measures that could relieve substantially the 
     shortages and hardships affecting the Iraqi people, the 
     United States hopes to turn aside the mounting pressure for 
     ending sanctions. And if the Iraqi government, which has 
     accepted the oil-for-food program with great reluctance, 
     fails to take advantage of any liberalized opportunities, 
     Washington, would be able to argue that the continued plight 
     of the people is the fault of Saddam Hussein.
       Whether the U.S. move will succeed was not immediately 
     clear. Delegates from other council nations said they would 
     have to study the U.S. proposals more closely and consult 
     with their governments before making any judgments. Iraq's 
     ambassador to the United Nations, Nizar Hamdoon, was quoted 
     by Reuters as saying the U.S. proposal was meaningless. ``It 
     is a cover up for their entire Iraq policy,'' he said.
       Most attention for the moment was on the French plan, whose 
     elements were made known to council members earlier in the 
     week and have been the subject of informal discussion among 
     various delegations. Delegates said privately that given the 
     strong U.S. opposition to ending sanctions outright and 
     Washington's continued insistence on tough inspections, there 
     seems little chance of the French plan being accepted in 
     anything like its present form.
       But as French diplomats said, the potential value of their 
     plan is as ``a catalyst'' that might stimulate fresh thinking 
     about Iraq and eventually lead to a narrowing of the 
     differences that recently have paralyzed the council.


                              IRAQ TIMELINE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Iraq                              US response
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990:
  Aug.--Iraq invades Kuwait...............  UN Resolution 661 bars the
                                             export of oil.
1994-1995:
  October--Iraq amasses 80,000 troops on    April 1995--approved UN
   the Iraq/Kuwait border.                   Resolution 986. This
                                             resolution allows Iraq to
                                             sell $2 billion in oil
                                             every six months.
1996:
  March--Iraq blocks inspections..........  June--UN Resolution 1060
                                             deplores the refusal of
                                             Iraqi authorities to allow
                                             access to sites designated
                                             by UNSCOM.
  Aug.--Iraq launches a campaign against    Sept.--U.S. launches cruise
   the Kurds.                                Missile attacks.
1997:
  June--Iraq demands UNSCOM finish........  June--UN Resolution 1115
                                             ``Demands that Iraq
                                             cooperate fully with
                                             UNSCOM.''
  Oct.--Iraq bars American inspector......  Oct.--UN Resolution 1134
                                             condemned Iraq's refusal to
                                             allow UNSCOM access to
                                             certain sites.
                                            Nov.--UN Resolution 1137,
                                             another condemnation of
                                             Iraq's action.
1998:
  Jan.--Iraq continues standoff...........  Feb.--UN Resolution 1153
                                             allows Iraq to sell $5.2
                                             billion in oil every six
                                             months.
  Aug.--Iraq stops inspections of new       Sept.--UN Resolution 1194
   facilities.                               demands Iraq cooperate.
  Oct.--Iraq announces it will no longer    Nov.--UN Resolution 1205
   cooperate with UNSCOM.                    demands Iraq cooperate.
                                            Dec.--Three day bombing
                                             campaign.
1999:
  No UNSCOM activity......................  Press reports possible
                                             removal of oil sale caps.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                                                 WORLD OIL PRODUCTION: PERSIAN GULF NATIONS, NON-OPEC AND WORLD
                                                                                  [In thousand barrels per day]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                            Selected Non-OPEC Producers
                                                               Persian  --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total Non-
                                                                 Gulf                                                             Former                United     United      OPEC      World
                                                               Nationsa    Canada     China      Egypt      Mexico     Norway    U.S.S.R.    Russia    Kingdom     States
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1973 average................................................     20,668      1,798      1,090        165        465         32      8,324         NA          2      9,208     25,050     55,679
1974 average................................................     21,282      1,551      1,315        150        571         35      8,912         NA          2      8,774     25,366     55,716
1975 average................................................     18,934      1,430      1,490        235        705        189      9,523         NA         12      8,375     26,058     52,828
1976 average................................................     21,514      1,314      1,670        330        831        279     10,060         NA        245      8,132     27,018     57,334
1977 average................................................     21,725      1,321      1,874        415        981        280     10,603         NA        768      8,245     28,814     59,707
1978 average................................................     20,606      1,316      2,082        485      1,209        356     11,105         NA      1,082      8,707     30,694     60,158
1979 average................................................     21,066      1,500      2,122        525      1,461        403     11,384         NA      1,568      8,552     32,094     62,674
1980 average................................................     17,961      1,435      2,114        595      1,936        528     11,706         NA      1,622      8,597     32,994     59,600
1981 average................................................     15,245      1,285      2,012        598      2,313        501     11,850         NA      1,811      8,572     33,595     56,076
1982 average................................................     12,156      1,271      2,045        670      2,748        520     11,912         NA      2,065      8,649     34,703     53,481
1983 average................................................     11,081      1,356      2,120        727      2,689        614     11,972         NA      2,291      8,688     35,759     53,256
1984 average................................................     10,784      1,438      2,296        822      2,780        697     11,861         NA      2,480      8,879     37,047     54,489
1985 average................................................      9,630      1,471      2,505        887      2,745        788     11,585         NA      2,530      8,971     37,801     53,982
1986 average................................................     11,696      1,474      2,620        813      2,435        870     11,895         NA      2,539      8,680     37,952     56,227
1987 average................................................     12,103      1,535      2,690        898      2,548      1,022     12,050         NA      2,406      8,349     38,149     56,666
1988 average................................................     13,457      1,616      2,730        848      2,512      1,158     12,053         NA      2,232      8,140     38,413     58,737
1989 average................................................     14,837      1,560      2,757        865      2,520      1,554     11,715         NA      1,802      7,613     37,792     59,863
1990 average................................................     15,278      1,553      2,774        873      2,553      1,704     10,975         NA      1,820      7,355     37,371     60,566
1991 average................................................     14,741      1,548      2,835        874      2,680      1,890      9,992         NA      1,797      7,417     36,932     60,207
1992 average................................................     15,970      1,605      2,845        881      2,669      2,229         --      7,632      1,825      7,171     35,814     60,212
1993 average................................................     16,715      1,679      2,890        890      2,673      2,350         --      6,730      1,915      6,847     35,119     60,238
1994 average................................................     16,964      1,746      2,939        896      2,685      2,521         --      6,135      2,375      6,662     35,482     60,992
1995 average................................................     17,208      1,805      2,990        920      2,618      2,768         --      5,995      2,489      6,560     36,327     62,331
1996:
    January.................................................     17,265      1,788      3,115        920      2,795      3,085         --      5,839      2,600      6,495     36,964     63,455
    February................................................     17,340      1,718      3,100        920      2,800      3,165         --      5,944      2,625      6,577     37,271     63,856
    March...................................................     17,390      1,814      3,050        920      2,870      2,990         --      5,830      2,570      6,571     37,019     63,704
    April...................................................     17,180      1,854      3,020        920      2,860      3,160         --      5,839      2,467      6,444     37,104     63,559
    May.....................................................     17,190      1,768      3,195        920      2,875      2,980         --      5,866      2,512      6,394     37,037     63,558
    June....................................................     17,305      1,829      3,205        920      2,880      3,150         --      5,839      2,457      6,458     37,225     63,885
    July....................................................     17,395      1,808      3,150        920      2,870      3,201         --      5,813      2,537      6,338     37,236     63,976
                                           
[[Page 3156]]                    ____

 
    August..................................................     17,325      1,872      3,130        920      2,830      3,022         --      5,857      2,385      6,360     36,886     63,646
    September...............................................     17,425      1,854      3,140        920      2,860      3,095         --      5,826      2,517      6,482     37,271     64,111
    October.................................................     17,385      1,936      3,165        920      2,860      3,005         --      5,813      2,642      6,481     37,528     64,468
    November................................................     17,355      1,889      3,190        930      2,860      3,210         --      5,909      2,743      6,476     37,966     64,926
    December................................................     17,842      1,905      3,115        930      2,900      3,198         --      5,830      2,760      6,506     37,989     65,501
    Average.................................................     17,367      1,837      3,131        922      2,855      3,104         --      5,850      2,568      6,465     37,290     64,054
1997:
    January.................................................     18,040      1,874      3,210        885      2,940      3,268         --    E 5,789      2,693      6,402     37,941     65,676
    February................................................     18,245      1,920      3,240        885      2,970      3,263         --    E 5,729      2,660      6,514     38,041     65,041
    March...................................................     18,460      1,900      3,215        890      2,970      3,063         --    E 5,772      2,638      6,452     37,883     66,018
    April...................................................     18,615      1,823      3,230        890      2,945      3,388         --    E 5,893      2,515      6,441     38,171     66,571
    May.....................................................     18,385      1,737      3,275        880      2,990      3,194         --    E 5,902      2,315      6,474     37,738     65,908
    June....................................................     17,980      1,835      3,220        870      3,005      3,025         --    E 5,902      2,135      6,442     37,343     65,128
    July....................................................     17,965      1,889      3,190        880      3,035      3,194         --    E 5,923      2,447      6,409     37,786     65,576
    August..................................................     18,975      1,895      3,190        870      3,080      2,890         --    E 5,945      2,407      6,347     37,534     66,474
    September...............................................     19,005      1,930      3,195        860      3,105      2,927         --    E 5,958      2,483      6,486     37,907     66,827
    October.................................................     19,045      1,956      3,195        860      3,087      3,209         --    E 5,954      2,610      6,467     38,301     67,361
    November................................................     18,810      1,970      3,158        860      3,085      3,192         --    E 5,945      2,602      6,459     38,342     67,207
    December................................................     18,416      1,985      3,090        860      3,056      3,229         --    E 5,893      2,700      6,531     38,536     67,007
    Average.................................................     18,496      1,893      3,200        874      3,023      3,153         --    E 5,884      2,517    E 6,452     37,955     66,317
1998:
    January.................................................     19,061      1,912      3,240        860      3,085      3,293         --    E 5,979      2,597    E 6,438     38,514     67,458
    February................................................     19,513      1,944      3,155        860      3,140      3,230         --    E 5,997      2,583    E 6,538     38,578     67,989
    March...................................................     19,380      1,952      3,170        860      3,160      3,123         --    E 5,962      2,600    E 6,465     38,468     67,863
    April...................................................     19,680      1,988      3,140        860      3,140      3,160         --    E 5,876      2,602    E 6,484     38,361     67,674
    May.....................................................     19,680      1,943      3,210        870      3,149      2,917         --    E 5,789      2,499    E 6,384     37,923     67,168
    June....................................................     19,225      1,932      3,260        870      3,050      3,140         --    E 5,928      2,495    E 6,290     38,188     66,888
    July....................................................     19,290      2,045      3,200        880      3,120      3,120         --   RE 5,923      2,525    E 6,322   R 38,290   R 66,855
    August..................................................     19,250    R 2,016    R 3,180      R 870      3,055      2,440         --    E 5,910    R 2,536    E 6,276   R 37,487   R 65,772
    September...............................................     19,385      2,033      3,160        870      2,906      2,896         --    E 5,902      2,632    E 6,069     37,567     65,932
    9-Mo. Avg...............................................     19,383      1,974      3,191        867      3,090      3,033         --    E 5,918      2,563    E 6,362     38,149     67,059
1997 9-Mo. Avg..............................................     18,408      1,866      3,218        879      3,005      3,133         --    E 5,869      2,476      6,440     37,808     66,022
1996 9-Mo. Avg..............................................     17,313      1,812      3,123        920      2,849      3,093         --      5,850      2,519      6,457     37,110     63,748
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a The Persian Gulf Nations are Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Production from the Neutral Zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia is included in
  ``Persian Gulf Nations.''
R=Revised. NA=Not available.--=Not applicable. E=Estimate.
Notes: (1) Crude oil includes lease condensate but excludes natural gas plant liquids. (2) Monthly data are often preliminary figures and may not average to the annual totals because of
  rounding or because updates to the preliminary monthly data are not available. (3) Data for countries may not sum to World totals due to independent rounding. (4) U.S. geographic coverage is
  the 50 States and the District of Columbia.


  Mr. ABRAHAM addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. ABRAHAM. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. Abraham pertaining to the introduction of S. 482 
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills 
and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.

                          ____________________