[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 21]
[Senate]
[Pages 30897-30900]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                            SUDAN PEACE ACT

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the Senate 
proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 410, S. 1453.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 1453) to facilitate famine relief efforts and a 
     comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan,

  There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, 
which had been reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations, with 
an amendment to strike all after the enacting clause and inserting in 
lieu thereof the following:

                                S. 1453

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Sudan Peace Act''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) With clear indications that the Government of Sudan 
     intends to intensify its prosecution of the war against areas 
     outside of its control, which has already cost nearly 
     2,000,000 lives and has displaced more than 4,000,000, a 
     sustained and coordinated international effort to pressure 
     combatants to end hostilities and to address the roots of the 
     conflict offers the best opportunity for a comprehensive 
     solution to the continuing war in Sudan.
       (2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally sponsored 
     peace process, protected from manipulation, presents the best 
     chance for a permanent resolution of the war, protection of 
     human rights, and a self-sustaining Sudan.
       (3) Continued strengthening of humanitarian relief 
     operations in Sudan is an essential element in the effort to 
     bring an end to the war.
       (4) Continued leadership by the United States is critical.
       (5) Regardless of the future political status of the areas 
     of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan, 
     the absence of credible civil authority and institutions is a 
     major impediment to achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese 
     people and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace 
     process.
       (6) Through manipulation of traditional rivalries among 
     peoples in areas outside their full control, the Government 
     of Sudan has effectively used divide and conquer techniques 
     to subjugate their population, and Congress finds that 
     internationally sponsored reconciliation efforts have played 
     a critical role in reducing the tactic's effectiveness and 
     human suffering.
       (7) The Government of Sudan is increasingly utilizing and 
     organizing militias, Popular Defense Forces, and other 
     irregular troops for raiding and slaving parties in areas 
     outside of the control of the Government of Sudan in an 
     effort to severely disrupt the ability of those populations 
     to sustain themselves. The tactic is in addition to the overt 
     use of bans on air transport relief flights in prosecuting 
     the war through selective starvation and to minimize the 
     Government of Sudan's accountability internationally.
       (8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated that it 
     intends to use the expected proceeds from future oil sales to 
     increase the tempo and lethality of the war against the areas 
     outside its control.
       (9) Through its power to veto plans for air transport 
     flights under the United Nations relief operation, Operation 
     Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Government of Sudan has been able 
     to manipulate the receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people 
     from the United States and other donor countries as a 
     devastating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the 
     Government of Sudan to subdue areas of Sudan outside of the 
     Government's control.
       (10) The efforts of the United States and other donors in 
     delivering relief and assistance through means outside OLS 
     have played a critical role in addressing the deficiencies in 
     OLS and offset the Government of Sudan's manipulation of food 
     donations to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.
       (11) While the immediate needs of selected areas in Sudan 
     facing starvation have been addressed in the near term, the 
     population in areas of Sudan outside of the control of the 
     Government of Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption 
     of their ability to sustain themselves.
       (12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al Ghazal, 
     Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions have been excluded 
     completely from relief distribution by OLS, consequently 
     placing their populations at increased risk of famine.
       (13) At a cost which can exceed $1,000,000 per day, and 
     with a primary focus on providing only for the immediate food 
     needs of the recipients, the current international relief 
     operations are neither sustainable nor desirable in the long 
     term.
       (14) The ability of populations to defend themselves 
     against attack in areas outside the Government of Sudan's 
     control has been severely compromised by the disengagement of 
     the front-line sponsor states, fostering the belief within 
     officials of the Government of Sudan that success on the 
     battlefield can be achieved.
       (15) The United States should use all means of pressure 
     available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the war, 
     including--
       (A) the maintenance and multilateralization of sanctions 
     against the Government of Sudan with explicit linkage of 
     those sanctions to peace;
       (B) the support or creation of viable democratic civil 
     authority and institutions in areas of Sudan outside 
     government control;
       (C) continued active support of people-to-people 
     reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in areas outside of 
     government control;
       (D) the strengthening of the mechanisms to provide 
     humanitarian relief to those areas;
       (E) cooperation among the trading partners of the United 
     States and within multilateral institutions toward those 
     ends; and
       (F) the use of any and all possible unilateral and 
     multilateral economic and diplomatic tools to compel Ethiopia 
     and Eritrea to end their hostilities and again assume a 
     constructive stance toward facilitating a comprehensive 
     solution to the ongoing war in Sudan.

     SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Government of sudan.--The term ``Government of Sudan'' 
     means the National Islamic Front government in Khartoum, 
     Sudan.
       (2) IGAD.--The term ``IGAD'' means the Inter-Governmental 
     Authority on Development.
       (3) OLS.--The term ``OLS'' means the United Nations relief 
     operation carried out by UNICEF, the World Food Program, and 
     participating relief organizations known as ``Operation 
     Lifeline Sudan''.

     SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, 
                   AND NEW TACTICS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.

       Congress hereby--
       (1) condemns--
       (A) violations of human rights on all sides of the conflict 
     in Sudan;
       (B) the Government of Sudan's overall human rights record, 
     with regard to both the prosecution of the war and the denial 
     of basic human and political rights to all Sudanese;
       (C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and the role of the 
     Government of Sudan in abetting and tolerating the practice; 
     and
       (D) the Government of Sudan's increasing use and 
     organization of ``murahalliin'' or ``mujahadeen'', Popular 
     Defense Forces (PDF), and regular Sudanese Army units into 
     organized and coordinated raiding and slaving parties in Bahr 
     al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile 
     regions; and
       (2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on air 
     transport relief flights by the Government of Sudan, the use 
     of raiding and slaving parties is a tool for creating food 
     shortages and is used as a systematic means to destroy the 
     societies, culture, and economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and 
     Nuba peoples in a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.

     SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR THE IGAD PEACE PROCESS.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--Congress hereby--
       (1) declares its support for the efforts by executive 
     branch officials of the United States and the President's 
     Special Envoy for Sudan to lead in a reinvigoration of the 
     IGAD-sponsored peace process;
       (2) calls on IGAD member states, the European Union, the 
     Organization of African Unity, Egypt, and other key states to 
     support the peace process; and
       (3) urges Kenya's leadership in the implementation of the 
     process.
       (b) Relation to United States Diplomacy.--It is the sense 
     of Congress that any such diplomatic efforts toward 
     resolution of the conflict in Sudan are best made through a 
     peace process based on the Declaration of Principles reached 
     in Nairobi, Kenya, on July 20, 1994, and that the President 
     should not create any process or diplomatic facility or 
     office which could be viewed as a parallel or competing 
     diplomatic track.
       (c) United States Diplomatic Support.--The Secretary of 
     State is authorized to utilize the personnel of the 
     Department of State for the support of--
       (1) the secretariat of IGAD;
       (2) the ongoing negotiations between the Government of 
     Sudan and opposition forces;
       (3) any peace settlement planning to be carried out by the 
     National Democratic Alliance and IGAD Partners' Forum (IPF); 
     and
       (4) other United States diplomatic efforts supporting a 
     peace process in Sudan.

     SEC. 6. INCREASED PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.

       It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting 
     through the United States Permanent Representative to the 
     United Nations, should--
       (1) sponsor a resolution in the United Nations Security 
     Council to investigate the practice of

[[Page 30898]]

     slavery in Sudan and provide recommendations on measures for 
     its eventual elimination;
       (2) sponsor a condemnation of the human rights practices of 
     the Government of Sudan at the United Nations conference on 
     human rights in Geneva in 2000;
       (3) press for implementation of the recommendations of the 
     United Nations Special Rapporteur for Sudan with respect to 
     human rights monitors in areas of conflict in Sudan;
       (4) press for UNICEF, International Committee of the Red 
     Cross, or the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
     Crescent Societies, or other appropriate international 
     organizations or agencies to maintain a registry of those 
     individuals who have been abducted or are otherwise held in 
     bondage or servitude in Sudan;
       (5) sponsor a condemnation of the Government of Sudan each 
     time it subjects civilian populations to aerial bombardment; 
     and
       (6) sponsor a resolution in the United Nations General 
     Assembly condemning the human rights practices of the 
     Government of Sudan.

     SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

       Beginning 3 months after the date of enactment of this Act, 
     and every 3 months thereafter, the President shall submit a 
     report to Congress on--
       (1) the specific sources and current status of Sudan's 
     financing and construction of oil exploitation infrastructure 
     and pipelines;
       (2) the extent to which that financing was secured in the 
     United States or with involvement of United States citizens;
       (3) such financing's relation to the sanctions described in 
     subsection (a) and the Executive Order of November 3, 1997;
       (4) the extent of aerial bombardment by the Government of 
     Sudan forces in areas outside its control, including targets, 
     frequency, and best estimates of damage;
       (5) the number, duration, and locations of air strips or 
     other humanitarian relief facilities to which access is 
     denied by any party to the conflict; and
       (6) the status of the IGAD-sponsored peace process and any 
     other ongoing effort to end the conflict, including the 
     specific and verifiable steps taken by parties to the 
     conflict, the members of the IGAD Partners Forum, and the 
     members of IGAD toward a comprehensive solution to the war.

     SEC. 8. REFORM OF OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN (OLS).

       It is the sense of Congress that the President should 
     organize and maintain a formal consultative process with the 
     European Union, its member states, the members of the United 
     Nations Security Council, and other relevant parties on 
     coordinating an effort within the United Nations to revise 
     the terms of OLS to end the veto power of the Government of 
     Sudan over the plans by OLS for air transport relief flights.

     SEC. 9. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR RELIEF 
                   EFFORTS.

       (a) Finding.--Congress recognizes the progress made by 
     officials of the executive branch of Government toward 
     greater utilization of non-OLS agencies for more effective 
     distribution of United States relief contributions.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the President should continue to increase the use of non-OLS 
     agencies in the distribution of relief supplies in southern 
     Sudan.
       (c) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a detailed 
     report to Congress describing the progress made toward 
     carrying out subsection (b).

     SEC. 10. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF 
                   FLIGHTS.

       (a) Plan.--The President shall develop a detailed and 
     implementable contingency plan to provide, outside United 
     Nations auspices, the greatest possible amount of United 
     States Government and privately donated relief to all 
     affected areas in Sudan, including the Nuba Mountains, Upper 
     Nile, and Blue Nile, in the event the Government of Sudan 
     imposes a total, partial, or incremental ban on OLS air 
     transport relief flights.
       (b) Element of Plan.--The plan developed under subsection 
     (a) shall include coordination of other donors in addition to 
     the United States Government and private institutions.
       (c) Report.--Not later than 2 months after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a 
     classified report to Congress on the costs and startup time 
     such a plan would require in the event of a total ban on air 
     transport relief flights or in the event of a partial or 
     incremental ban on such flights if the President has made the 
     determination required by subsection (a)(2).
       (d) Reprogramming Authority.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, in carrying out the plan developed under 
     subsection (a), the President may reprogram up to 100 percent 
     of the funds available for support of OLS operations (but for 
     this subsection) for the purposes of the plan.

     SEC. 11. NEW AUTHORITY FOR USAID'S SUDAN TRANSITION 
                   ASSISTANCE FOR REHABILITATION (STAR) PROGRAM.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--Congress hereby expresses its 
     support for the President's ongoing efforts to diversify and 
     increase effectiveness of United States assistance to 
     populations in areas of Sudan outside of the control of the 
     Government of Sudan, especially the long-term focus shown in 
     the Sudan Transition Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR) 
     program with its emphasis on promoting future democratic 
     governance, rule of law, building indigenous institutional 
     capacity, promoting and enhancing self-reliance, and actively 
     supporting people-to-people reconciliation efforts.
       (b) Allocation of Funds.--Of the amounts made available to 
     carry out chapter 1 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act 
     of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq:, relating to development 
     assistance) for the period beginning on October 1, 2000, and 
     ending on September 30, 2003, $16,000,000 shall be available 
     for development of a viable civil authority, and civil and 
     commercial institutions, in Sudan, including the provision of 
     technical assistance, and for people-to-people reconciliation 
     efforts.
       (c) Additional Authorities.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, the President is granted authority to 
     undertake any appropriate programs using Federal agencies, 
     contractual arrangements, or direct support of indigenous 
     groups, agencies, or organizations in areas outside of 
     control of the Government of Sudan in an effort to provide 
     emergency relief, promote economic self-sufficiency, build 
     civil authority, provide education, enhance rule of law and 
     the development of judicial and legal frameworks, support 
     people-to-people reconciliation efforts, or implementation of 
     any programs in support of any viable peace agreement at the 
     local, regional, or national level.
       (d) Implementation.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
     President should immediately and to the fullest extent 
     possible utilize the Office of Transition Initiatives at the 
     Agency for International Development in an effort to pursue 
     the type of programs described in subsection (c).
       (e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     enhancing and supporting education and the development of 
     rule of law are critical elements in the long-term success of 
     United States efforts to promote a viable economic, 
     political, social, and legal basis for development in Sudan. 
     Congress recognizes that the gap of 13-16 years without 
     secondary educational opportunities in southern Sudan is an 
     especially important problem to address with respect to 
     rebuilding and sustaining leaders and educators for the next 
     generation of Sudanese. Congress recognizes the unusually 
     important role the secondary school in Rumbek has played in 
     producing the current generation of leaders in southern 
     Sudan, and that priority should be given in current and 
     future development or transition programs undertaken by the 
     United States Government to rebuilding and supporting the 
     Rumbek Secondary School.
       (f) Programs in Areas Outside Government Control.--Congress 
     also intends that such programs include cooperation and work 
     with indigenous groups in areas outside of government control 
     in all of Sudan, to include northern, southern, and eastern 
     regions of Sudan.

     SEC. 12. ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING FOR NUBA MOUNTAINS AND OTHER 
                   AREAS SUBJECT TO BANS ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF 
                   FLIGHTS.

       (a) Finding.--Congress recognizes that civilians in the 
     Nuba Mountains, Red Sea Hills, and Blue Nile regions of Sudan 
     are not receiving assistance through OLS due to restrictions 
     by the Government of Sudan.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the President should--
       (1) conduct comprehensive assessment of the humanitarian 
     needs in the Nuba Mountains, Red Sea Hills, and Blue Nile 
     regions of Sudan;
       (2) respond appropriately to those needs based on such 
     assessment; and
       (3) report to Congress on an annual basis on efforts made 
     under paragraph (2).

     SEC. 13. OPTIONS OR PLANS FOR NONLETHAL ASSISTANCE FOR 
                   NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE PARTICIPANTS.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report, in classified 
     form if necessary, detailing possible options or plans of the 
     United States Government for the provision of nonlethal 
     assistance to participants of the National Democratic 
     Alliance.
       (b) Consultations.--Not later than 30 days after submission 
     of the report required by subsection (a), the President 
     should begin formal consultations with the appropriate 
     congressional committees regarding the findings of the 
     report.
       (c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
     congressional committees'' means the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and the Committee on International Relations and the 
     Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

  Ms. COLLINS. I ask unanimous consent the committee substitute 
amendment be agreed to, the bill be read the third time and passed, the 
motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and any statements related 
to the bill be printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to.
  The bill (S. 1453), as amended, was read the third time and passed, 
as follows:

                                S. 1453

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Sudan Peace Act''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:

[[Page 30899]]

       (1) With clear indications that the Government of Sudan 
     intends to intensify its prosecution of the war against areas 
     outside of its control, which has already cost nearly 
     2,000,000 lives and has displaced more than 4,000,000, a 
     sustained and coordinated international effort to pressure 
     combatants to end hostilities and to address the roots of the 
     conflict offers the best opportunity for a comprehensive 
     solution to the continuing war in Sudan.
       (2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally sponsored 
     peace process, protected from manipulation, presents the best 
     chance for a permanent resolution of the war, protection of 
     human rights, and a self-sustaining Sudan.
       (3) Continued strengthening of humanitarian relief 
     operations in Sudan is an essential element in the effort to 
     bring an end to the war.
       (4) Continued leadership by the United States is critical.
       (5) Regardless of the future political status of the areas 
     of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan, 
     the absence of credible civil authority and institutions is a 
     major impediment to achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese 
     people and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace 
     process.
       (6) Through manipulation of traditional rivalries among 
     peoples in areas outside their full control, the Government 
     of Sudan has effectively used divide and conquer techniques 
     to subjugate their population, and Congress finds that 
     internationally sponsored reconciliation efforts have played 
     a critical role in reducing the tactic's effectiveness and 
     human suffering.
       (7) The Government of Sudan is increasingly utilizing and 
     organizing militias, Popular Defense Forces, and other 
     irregular troops for raiding and slaving parties in areas 
     outside of the control of the Government of Sudan in an 
     effort to severely disrupt the ability of those populations 
     to sustain themselves. The tactic is in addition to the overt 
     use of bans on air transport relief flights in prosecuting 
     the war through selective starvation and to minimize the 
     Government of Sudan's accountability internationally.
       (8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated that it 
     intends to use the expected proceeds from future oil sales to 
     increase the tempo and lethality of the war against the areas 
     outside its control.
       (9) Through its power to veto plans for air transport 
     flights under the United Nations relief operation, Operation 
     Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Government of Sudan has been able 
     to manipulate the receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people 
     from the United States and other donor countries as a 
     devastating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the 
     Government of Sudan to subdue areas of Sudan outside of the 
     Government's control.
       (10) The efforts of the United States and other donors in 
     delivering relief and assistance through means outside OLS 
     have played a critical role in addressing the deficiencies in 
     OLS and offset the Government of Sudan's manipulation of food 
     donations to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.
       (11) While the immediate needs of selected areas in Sudan 
     facing starvation have been addressed in the near term, the 
     population in areas of Sudan outside of the control of the 
     Government of Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption 
     of their ability to sustain themselves.
       (12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al Ghazal, 
     Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions have been excluded 
     completely from relief distribution by OLS, consequently 
     placing their populations at increased risk of famine.
       (13) At a cost which can exceed $1,000,000 per day, and 
     with a primary focus on providing only for the immediate food 
     needs of the recipients, the current international relief 
     operations are neither sustainable nor desirable in the long 
     term.
       (14) The ability of populations to defend themselves 
     against attack in areas outside the Government of Sudan's 
     control has been severely compromised by the disengagement of 
     the front-line sponsor states, fostering the belief within 
     officials of the Government of Sudan that success on the 
     battlefield can be achieved.
       (15) The United States should use all means of pressure 
     available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the war, 
     including--
       (A) the maintenance and multilateralization of sanctions 
     against the Government of Sudan with explicit linkage of 
     those sanctions to peace;
       (B) the support or creation of viable democratic civil 
     authority and institutions in areas of Sudan outside 
     government control;
       (C) continued active support of people-to-people 
     reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in areas outside of 
     government control;
       (D) the strengthening of the mechanisms to provide 
     humanitarian relief to those areas;
       (E) cooperation among the trading partners of the United 
     States and within multilateral institutions toward those 
     ends; and
       (F) the use of any and all possible unilateral and 
     multilateral economic and diplomatic tools to compel Ethiopia 
     and Eritrea to end their hostilities and again assume a 
     constructive stance toward facilitating a comprehensive 
     solution to the ongoing war in Sudan.

     SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Government of sudan.--The term ``Government of Sudan'' 
     means the National Islamic Front government in Khartoum, 
     Sudan.
       (2) IGAD.--The term ``IGAD'' means the Inter-Governmental 
     Authority on Development.
       (3) OLS.--The term ``OLS'' means the United Nations relief 
     operation carried out by UNICEF, the World Food Program, and 
     participating relief organizations known as ``Operation 
     Lifeline Sudan''.

     SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, 
                   AND NEW TACTICS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.

       Congress hereby--
       (1) condemns--
       (A) violations of human rights on all sides of the conflict 
     in Sudan;
       (B) the Government of Sudan's overall human rights record, 
     with regard to both the prosecution of the war and the denial 
     of basic human and political rights to all Sudanese;
       (C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and the role of the 
     Government of Sudan in abetting and tolerating the practice; 
     and
       (D) the Government of Sudan's increasing use and 
     organization of ``murahalliin'' or ``mujahadeen'', Popular 
     Defense Forces (PDF), and regular Sudanese Army units into 
     organized and coordinated raiding and slaving parties in Bahr 
     al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile 
     regions; and
       (2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on air 
     transport relief flights by the Government of Sudan, the use 
     of raiding and slaving parties is a tool for creating food 
     shortages and is used as a systematic means to destroy the 
     societies, culture, and economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and 
     Nuba peoples in a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.

     SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR THE IGAD PEACE PROCESS.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--Congress hereby--
       (1) declares its support for the efforts by executive 
     branch officials of the United States and the President's 
     Special Envoy for Sudan to lead in a reinvigoration of the 
     IGAD-sponsored peace process;
       (2) calls on IGAD member states, the European Union, the 
     Organization of African Unity, Egypt, and other key states to 
     support the peace process; and
       (3) urges Kenya's leadership in the implementation of the 
     process.
       (b) Relation to United States Diplomacy.--It is the sense 
     of Congress that any such diplomatic efforts toward 
     resolution of the conflict in Sudan are best made through a 
     peace process based on the Declaration of Principles reached 
     in Nairobi, Kenya, on July 20, 1994, and that the President 
     should not create any process or diplomatic facility or 
     office which could be viewed as a parallel or competing 
     diplomatic track.
       (c) United States Diplomatic Support.--The Secretary of 
     State is authorized to utilize the personnel of the 
     Department of State for the support of--
       (1) the secretariat of IGAD;
       (2) the ongoing negotiations between the Government of 
     Sudan and opposition forces;
       (3) any peace settlement planning to be carried out by the 
     National Democratic Alliance and IGAD Partners' Forum (IPF); 
     and
       (4) other United States diplomatic efforts supporting a 
     peace process in Sudan.

     SEC. 6. INCREASED PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.

       It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting 
     through the United States Permanent Representative to the 
     United Nations, should--
       (1) sponsor a resolution in the United Nations Security 
     Council to investigate the practice of slavery in Sudan and 
     provide recommendations on measures for its eventual 
     elimination;
       (2) sponsor a condemnation of the human rights practices of 
     the Government of Sudan at the United Nations conference on 
     human rights in Geneva in 2000;
       (3) press for implementation of the recommendations of the 
     United Nations Special Rapporteur for Sudan with respect to 
     human rights monitors in areas of conflict in Sudan;
       (4) press for UNICEF, International Committee of the Red 
     Cross, or the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
     Crescent Societies, or other appropriate international 
     organizations or agencies to maintain a registry of those 
     individuals who have been abducted or are otherwise held in 
     bondage or servitude in Sudan;
       (5) sponsor a condemnation of the Government of Sudan each 
     time it subjects civilian populations to aerial bombardment; 
     and
       (6) sponsor a resolution in the United Nations General 
     Assembly condemning the human rights practices of the 
     Government of Sudan.

     SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

       Beginning 3 months after the date of enactment of this Act, 
     and every 3 months thereafter, the President shall submit a 
     report to Congress on--
       (1) the specific sources and current status of Sudan's 
     financing and construction of oil exploitation infrastructure 
     and pipelines;
       (2) the extent to which that financing was secured in the 
     United States or with involvement of United States citizens;

[[Page 30900]]

       (3) such financing's relation to the sanctions described in 
     subsection (a) and the Executive Order of November 3, 1997;
       (4) the extent of aerial bombardment by the Government of 
     Sudan forces in areas outside its control, including targets, 
     frequency, and best estimates of damage;
       (5) the number, duration, and locations of air strips or 
     other humanitarian relief facilities to which access is 
     denied by any party to the conflict; and
       (6) the status of the IGAD-sponsored peace process and any 
     other ongoing effort to end the conflict, including the 
     specific and verifiable steps taken by parties to the 
     conflict, the members of the IGAD Partners Forum, and the 
     members of IGAD toward a comprehensive solution to the war.

     SEC. 8. REFORM OF OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN (OLS).

       It is the sense of Congress that the President should 
     organize and maintain a formal consultative process with the 
     European Union, its member states, the members of the United 
     Nations Security Council, and other relevant parties on 
     coordinating an effort within the United Nations to revise 
     the terms of OLS to end the veto power of the Government of 
     Sudan over the plans by OLS for air transport relief flights.

     SEC. 9. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR RELIEF 
                   EFFORTS.

       (a) Finding.--Congress recognizes the progress made by 
     officials of the executive branch of Government toward 
     greater utilization of non-OLS agencies for more effective 
     distribution of United States relief contributions.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the President should continue to increase the use of non-OLS 
     agencies in the distribution of relief supplies in southern 
     Sudan.
       (c) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a detailed 
     report to Congress describing the progress made toward 
     carrying out subsection (b).

     SEC. 10. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF 
                   FLIGHTS.

       (a) Plan.--The President shall develop a detailed and 
     implementable contingency plan to provide, outside United 
     Nations auspices, the greatest possible amount of United 
     States Government and privately donated relief to all 
     affected areas in Sudan, including the Nuba Mountains, Upper 
     Nile, and Blue Nile, in the event the Government of Sudan 
     imposes a total, partial, or incremental ban on OLS air 
     transport relief flights.
       (b) Element of Plan.--The plan developed under subsection 
     (a) shall include coordination of other donors in addition to 
     the United States Government and private institutions.
       (c) Report.--Not later than 2 months after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a 
     classified report to Congress on the costs and startup time 
     such a plan would require in the event of a total ban on air 
     transport relief flights or in the event of a partial or 
     incremental ban on such flights if the President has made the 
     determination required by subsection (a)(2).
       (d) Reprogramming Authority.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, in carrying out the plan developed under 
     subsection (a), the President may reprogram up to 100 percent 
     of the funds available for support of OLS operations (but for 
     this subsection) for the purposes of the plan.

     SEC. 11. NEW AUTHORITY FOR USAID'S SUDAN TRANSITION 
                   ASSISTANCE FOR REHABILITATION (STAR) PROGRAM.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--Congress hereby expresses its 
     support for the President's ongoing efforts to diversify and 
     increase effectiveness of United States assistance to 
     populations in areas of Sudan outside of the control of the 
     Government of Sudan, especially the long-term focus shown in 
     the Sudan Transition Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR) 
     program with its emphasis on promoting future democratic 
     governance, rule of law, building indigenous institutional 
     capacity, promoting and enhancing self-reliance, and actively 
     supporting people-to-people reconciliation efforts.
       (b) Allocation of Funds.--Of the amounts made available to 
     carry out chapter 1 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act 
     of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq:, relating to development 
     assistance) for the period beginning on October 1, 2000, and 
     ending on September 30, 2003, $16,000,000 shall be available 
     for development of a viable civil authority, and civil and 
     commercial institutions, in Sudan, including the provision of 
     technical assistance, and for people-to-people reconciliation 
     efforts.
       (c) Additional Authorities.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, the President is granted authority to 
     undertake any appropriate programs using Federal agencies, 
     contractual arrangements, or direct support of indigenous 
     groups, agencies, or organizations in areas outside of 
     control of the Government of Sudan in an effort to provide 
     emergency relief, promote economic self-sufficiency, build 
     civil authority, provide education, enhance rule of law and 
     the development of judicial and legal frameworks, support 
     people-to-people reconciliation efforts, or implementation of 
     any programs in support of any viable peace agreement at the 
     local, regional, or national level.
       (d) Implementation.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
     President should immediately and to the fullest extent 
     possible utilize the Office of Transition Initiatives at the 
     Agency for International Development in an effort to pursue 
     the type of programs described in subsection (c).
       (e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     enhancing and supporting education and the development of 
     rule of law are critical elements in the long-term success of 
     United States efforts to promote a viable economic, 
     political, social, and legal basis for development in Sudan. 
     Congress recognizes that the gap of 13-16 years without 
     secondary educational opportunities in southern Sudan is an 
     especially important problem to address with respect to 
     rebuilding and sustaining leaders and educators for the next 
     generation of Sudanese. Congress recognizes the unusually 
     important role the secondary school in Rumbek has played in 
     producing the current generation of leaders in southern 
     Sudan, and that priority should be given in current and 
     future development or transition programs undertaken by the 
     United States Government to rebuilding and supporting the 
     Rumbek Secondary School.
       (f) Programs in Areas Outside Government Control.--Congress 
     also intends that such programs include cooperation and work 
     with indigenous groups in areas outside of government control 
     in all of Sudan, to include northern, southern, and eastern 
     regions of Sudan.

     SEC. 12. ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING FOR NUBA MOUNTAINS AND OTHER 
                   AREAS SUBJECT TO BANS ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF 
                   FLIGHTS.

       (a) Finding.--Congress recognizes that civilians in the 
     Nuba Mountains, Red Sea Hills, and Blue Nile regions of Sudan 
     are not receiving assistance through OLS due to restrictions 
     by the Government of Sudan.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the President should--
       (1) conduct comprehensive assessment of the humanitarian 
     needs in the Nuba Mountains, Red Sea Hills, and Blue Nile 
     regions of Sudan;
       (2) respond appropriately to those needs based on such 
     assessment; and
       (3) report to Congress on an annual basis on efforts made 
     under paragraph (2).

     SEC. 13. OPTIONS OR PLANS FOR NONLETHAL ASSISTANCE FOR 
                   NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE PARTICIPANTS.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report, in classified 
     form if necessary, detailing possible options or plans of the 
     United States Government for the provision of nonlethal 
     assistance to participants of the National Democratic 
     Alliance.
       (b) Consultations.--Not later than 30 days after submission 
     of the report required by subsection (a), the President 
     should begin formal consultations with the appropriate 
     congressional committees regarding the findings of the 
     report.
       (c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
     congressional committees'' means the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and the Committee on International Relations and the 
     Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

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