[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 21]
[Senate]
[Pages 30546-30549]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                  THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE BALKANS

  Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, as the first session of the 106th 
Congress

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comes to a close, I want to remind my colleagues that the aftermath of 
our nation's largest foreign policy initiative this year and a 78-day 
air war, will be our nation's biggest foreign policy concern next year.
  As my colleagues are aware, I opposed our nation's ``sign or we'll 
bomb'' diplomacy that ultimately led to the decision to conduct the air 
war over Kosovo and Serbia earlier this year. Instead, I believed that 
we should have done all that we could to negotiate a real diplomatic 
solution. Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the conflict, I came to 
the Senate floor and commented that ``some good always blows in an ill 
wind.''
  The ``good'' that I saw in the ill wind of the bombing campaign was 
the opportunity for NATO and the United States to provide the impetus 
for a lasting peace throughout Southeastern Europe. Since that time, my 
staff and I have spent hours working hard to ensure that some good does 
blow in and that we do not lose this opportunity to promote peace, 
stability and prosperity in that region of our world.
  To ensure the future of Southeast Europe, it is important to 
understand its past. Every student of history is well aware that this 
century's two most horrific wars had deep roots in the Balkans, but few 
people are aware of the level of violence, bloodshed, hatred and 
destruction that has been commonplace in the region for centuries. 
Indeed, the Balkans have been the site of numerous wars and countless 
battles, and have been fought over by every major regional power since 
the days of the Roman legions.
  Over the last 10 years, regional ethnic tensions have resulted in yet 
another nightmare for the people of the Balkans. And for the third time 
this century, Europe, reluctantly, has turned its attention to their 
southern neighbors.
  Their concern can be attributed to self-interest; an attempt to get 
Southeast Europe to settle down so as to avoid any possible spillover 
that could bring unrest to their nations, and a genuine concern over 
the ethnic cleansing and human rights violations in the region. To do 
this, Europe has involved the international community, and in 
particular, the United States, which, for the first time in our 
history, has immersed itself politically and militarily in the region.
  Our willingness to get involved and lead should have come earlier. 
Indeed, when conflicts began in Bosnia in the early 1990's, it was 
reported that a key foreign policy official of the Bush Administration 
made the statement that ``we have no dog in this fight.'' History 
records that nothing could have been further from the truth. According 
to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke in his book, ``To End A War'':

       Europe believed it could solve Yugoslavia without the 
     United States; Washington believed that, with the Cold War 
     over, it could leave Yugoslavia to Europe. Europe's hour had 
     not dawned in Yugoslavia; Washington had a dog in this 
     particular fight.

  The overconfidence of Europe and the disengagement of the United 
States contributed greatly to the tragedy of Slavonia, Krijna and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. When we finally realized it was important for the 
U.S. to get involved, we dealt with, and thus, legitimatized three war 
criminals--Slobodan Milosevic, Franco Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic--at 
the Dayton Peace Accords.
  Unfortunately, the legitimitization of Milosevic caused us to 
continue to have a relationship with him at a time when we should have 
been working with opposition leaders to get rid of him. Then, when he 
showed his true colors, we were reluctant to be as aggressive as we 
should have been. We misjudged him, we underestimated him, and now 
we're paying the price for our mistake.
  As a result, we have spent at least $18 billion in operations in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia and elsewhere. We will, no 
doubt, spend billions more. In addition, we have placed a tremendous 
strain on the equipment and personnel of our Armed Forces due to our 
past and present involvement in peacekeeping missions in Southeast 
Europe. Also, the State Department has paid an incredible amount of 
attention to the Balkans. And finally, we have complicated our 
relations with other nations on the international scene--primarily, 
Russia and China.
  A November 1 article written by Elizabeth Sullivan, foreign-affairs 
correspondent for the Cleveland Plain Dealer, indicates that the 
Russians harbor resentment and incredulity towards the United States 
over our assuming an air of moral superiority regarding their actions 
in Chechnya. They see our attitude as a double standard, which affects 
our ability to appeal to their better instincts. She writes:

       The Kremlin is resolutely turning a deaf ear to U.S. 
     admonitions for restraint in Chechnya. The criticisms have 
     inflamed anti-U.S. feelings in Russia where it's bitterly 
     recalled that NATO's unpopular bombing killed hundreds of 
     Yugoslav civilians. It is the first big display of lost U.S. 
     influence after Kosovo.

  It is clear that instability in Southeast Europe has the potential to 
threaten America's overall interests throughout the rest of Europe. 
However, a full-fledged integration of Southeast Europe into the whole 
European community would remove the burden and expense of maintaining a 
constant peacekeeping force, end years of diplomatic wrangling and 
political posturing, and more important, end the death and destruction 
that has plagued the region.
  Recently, I met with a number of Ambassadors from the Balkans region 
in the LBJ room here in the Capitol. They made it very clear to me that 
they are ready to work together. I was pleased that they realized they 
have a symbiotic relationship--a relationship that must be cultivated 
in order to bring about peace and implement a modern, free-market 
economy. The Holy Spirit was definitely present in that room. There was 
an aura of enlightenment among those leaders, and we must capitalize on 
the momentum of this cooperative spirit if we are to successfully bring 
the region into the broader European fold.
  Consider that not so many years ago, no one would have thought that 
European political and economic cooperation, let alone union, was 
possible. After all, two world wars had been fought in the trenches and 
on the fields of Europe, fostering tremendous ill-will among many 
nationalities.
  Today, those feelings have largely dissipated. Germans, French, 
Italians--all share the same currency. They cross national boundaries 
freely. They work cooperatively to solve economic problems because it 
is in their collective best interest. We are seeing that in terms of 
competition right now. The Ambassadors I met with see this cooperation 
and wish it for their nations, but, they are also quite frustrated with 
the lack of speed by the international community in responding to the 
humanitarian and economic needs of the region.
  The NATO air war triggered immense human suffering which has not yet 
been fully remedied. Here are some facts:
  The refugee exodus from Kosovo decimated the economies of surrounding 
nations, especially in Macedonia. Macedonia's reaching out to help 
their fellow man was done at a great sacrifice to their economy and the 
quality of life of their people.
  In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), there are still 500,000 
refugees from Slavonia, Krijna, and Bosnia. Another 150,000 were 
displaced during the Kosovo bombing.
  In Kosovo, the international community has had to deal with 700,000 
refugees who have returned after the conflict. 500,000 of these 
refugees are still officially considered ``internally displaced 
persons,'' without any place to call their own.
  Kosovo has turned into an armed camp where soldiers from numerous 
countries are forced to keep the peace and prevent further bloodshed.
  The lack of an effective internal police force has led to virtual 
chaos, where organized crime and illegal drug trafficking is said to be 
rampant and a cause of great concern among its citizens.
  On this last point, a senior official from the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, told me that the reason there 
is no effective police force in Kosovo is because there

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aren't enough qualified or even interested individuals willing to join 
the force. The official told me that if the crime problem in Kosovo 
isn't checked, it will spread to the entire region and into the rest of 
Europe.
  Indeed, this point was illustrated again in the November 1 Elizabeth 
Sullivan article for the Cleveland Plain Dealer. She wrote:

       The scope of the gun, drug and prostitute trade fanned by 
     the Kosovo conflict is also becoming clear. [Last week] 
     Italian and Swiss police busted a ring that allegedly 
     smuggled millions of dollars in Swiss weapons to Kosovo, and 
     Albanian prostitutes out to Italy, using humanitarian aid as 
     a cover.

  The growing crime problem was definitely a topic of concern for the 
Ambassadors I met with. I was amazed that they considered organized 
crime and drugs their No. 1 or No. 2 concern to be addressed. Think of 
that, organized crime and drugs as their No. 1 or No. 2 concern in the 
region.
  The fact of the matter is, the bombing has had a terribly 
destabilizing effect on the region, and a very real impact on the 
humanitarian situation and basic human existence as well, one that has 
not been widely reported to the American people. The T.V. cameras are 
gone now. You know how it is: out of sight, out of mind, and we have 
moved on to other issues.
  Although it's hard to grasp the extent of the problem, for the last 
several months, the U.S. has been working through the United Nations 
and the International Committee for the Red Cross to deal with the 
needs of the region. Both the UN and the Red Cross claim that they will 
be able to keep people fed, clothed and sheltered through the upcoming 
winter. Yet, I have received a number of credible reports in recent 
weeks which indicate that in fact we will witness a humanitarian 
catastrophe in the region in the months ahead because of a lack of 
shelter, heat, food and medical care.
  I am aware that there are individuals in the foreign policy community 
who are opposed to providing significant assistance to the people of 
Serbia. They believe that humanitarian suffering will lead to political 
discontent which will, in turn, lead to a popular movement that will 
bring about the removal of Slobodan Milosevic. I disagree.
  With the exception of South Africa, crippling sanctions have not 
successfully brought about a change in political leadership. Just look 
at Saddam Hussein in Iraq. We don't know what is going on there 
anymore.
  To emphasize this point, Professor Julie Mertus of the Ohio Northern 
University wrote an excellent piece which was recently published in the 
Washington Post. Professor Mertus specializes in international law. 
Here is what she has to say:

       How does a freezing and hungry Yugoslavia advance U.S. 
     policy goals? Certainly Milosevic will not be hungry this 
     winter. The idea is that the pain and suffering among the 
     lowest strata of society will ``trickle up'' to the higher 
     echelons. Protests by discontented citizens will lead to 
     policy changes and perhaps even the removal of Milosevic. The 
     problem is that humans do not behave this way. Cold, 
     dispirited citizens do not take to the streets. Rather, they 
     draw up inside their own homes and try to survive. If the 
     going gets tough, they try to exit, often leaving the 
     country. Only the few with hope continue to fight, and even 
     they cannot persist for long when they are isolated from 
     supportive networks.

  Our sanctions policy has allowed Milosevic to blame Serbia's 
faltering economy, declining humanitarian situation and international 
isolation on the West. He has been able to deflect the ire of the 
Serbian people who have little access to independent media.
  We must pursue specific courses of action that will help us get rid 
of Milosevic once and for all.
  No. 1, we must continue to squeeze Milosevic so that his allies 
inside and outside the Serbian government will see that he is 
vulnerable and his hold on power is tenuous. Milosevic is an indicted 
war criminal, and we have to make his allies understand that his fate 
is their fate. In other words, leave now, or pay later.
  No. 2, we should work with our allies to announce a detailed 
humanitarian and economic aid package that would be available to the 
people of Serbia once Milosevic is removed. The importance of this kind 
of package to the success of democratization was underscored recently 
when several of us met with the leaders of the anti-Milosevic force 
right here in the Capitol.
  They talked about how important it was we have a clear, defined 
package that says, if he goes, here is what we are willing to do.
  No. 3, we should provide as much assistance as we can, including such 
things as heating oil, food, clothing and direct financial assistance, 
as soon as possible to the Serbian opposition groups, particularly the 
mayors, who are struggling to bring about democratic change.
  No. 4, we should continue to support President Djukanovic of 
Montenegro with whom I met two weeks ago. He is a bright and energetic 
leader and a key ally for peace and prosperity in Southeast Europe.
  No. 5, we must undertake a massive effort to overrun Milosevic's 
monopoly control on Serbia's mass media. Milosevic's distorted 
information must be countered with the truth; a commodity we must get 
to the Serb people whatever way possible.
  As I mentioned earlier, I held a meeting recently with a number of 
ambassadors and senior embassy staff from the nations of Southeast 
Europe to get their reaction to the Stability Pact initiative. And they 
were honest; they said things were not going well. They were very clear 
that it was essential that the United States be at the table to provide 
leadership and contribute our fair share.
  Without our presence, they are not confident that our NATO allies 
will make good on the promises they made at the end of the war. And, 
quite frankly, I think it is up to us to make it clear to our European 
allies that we expect them to adhere to their commitment.
  We are going to be at the table. We are going to have leadership. We 
are anteing up, and it is time for you to ante up and make good on your 
promises.
  The best way I can summarize the attitude at the meeting I had with 
the ambassadors, and the meeting I had with the Serbian opposition 
leaders is a word in Serbo-Croatian--``edemo''--which means, ``let's 
get going!''
  On balance, I believe there has been some real progress made on a 
number of fronts in our policy towards Southeast Europe in recent 
months. The Stability Pact is moving ahead--albeit slowly and indeed 
need of some additional leadership, particularly ours. The policy 
toward sanctions seems to be finessed a bit and real work finally is 
being done on the ground in the region to deal with humanitarian 
concerns. I am pleased the administration is starting to soften up on 
this a little bit.
  The administration is meeting with Serbian opposition leaders and 
financial support is beginning to trickle into the movement. 
Southeastern European nations are beginning to think regionally with 
the understanding they have a symbiotic relationship in their efforts 
to promote and develop their economies. That is wonderful.
  Although in many respects, things are much better off today than they 
were after the war, the momentum has to be increased significantly, and 
that is the challenge of this Congress and this administration.
  The administration, working through the State Department, bears the 
responsibility of bringing about real change in Serbia and honoring the 
commitments the United States has made to friendly governments in 
Southeast Europe. Congress has an obligation to provide oversight and 
support to the administration's policies towards the restoration of 
peace and stability in the region.
  To that end, I look forward to working with my colleagues in the next 
session of Congress to loosen some of the restrictive language that was 
placed in the Foreign Operations appropriations bill, language that the 
State Department claims has made it difficult, and continues to make it 
difficult, for them to do the kinds of things they would like to be 
doing in Southeast Europe.
  The Senate has already made a positive start with the recent 
unanimous passage of the Serbia Democratization

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Act. I believe we need to build on that progress.
  Southeast Europe is strategic to our national interests and key to 
our efforts to maintain peace in the world. Until the nations of 
Southeast Europe are welcomed into the broader European community, 
those efforts will remain unfulfilled. The United States must provide 
the leadership because we do ``have a dog in this fight.''
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Voinovich). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

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