[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 20]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 29612-29613]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



             THE U.S. COAST GUARD: MAY THEY ALWAYS BE READY

                                 ______
                                 

                         HON. DAVID M. McINTOSH

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, November 9, 1999

  Mr. McINTOSH. Mr. Speaker, I submit for the Record, the following 
article about the U.S. Coast Guard's Deepwater Mission Project. 
``Moving Into the Next Century: Recapitalization Will Ensure That the 
Coast Guard Remains Semper Paratus'' was written by Ernest Blazar of 
the Lexington Institute and appeared in the August 1999 edition of Sea 
Power magazine. I call this article to your attention because I feel it 
is one of the best articles about the Coast Guard's need to modernize 
their fleet of cutters and aircraft for the 21st century.

                      [From Sea Power, Aug. 1999]

                      Moving Into the Next Century

                           (By Ernest Blazar)

       In 1969, the Coast Guard's high-endurance Hamilton-class 
     cutter USCGC Dallas sailed the waters of South Vietnam, 
     executing seven combat patrols. She provided naval gunfire 
     support more than 150 times, firing over 7,500 rounds of 
     five-inch ammunition. She destroyed 58 sampans and attacked 
     29 enemy supply routes, base camps, or rest areas.
       On 22 June 1999, the same 378-foot-long ship--which was 
     commissioned in 1967--left her homeport (Charleston, S.C.) 
     for yet another overseas patrol. Assigned to the Navy's Sixth 
     Fleet for three months, Dallas is helping to patrol the 
     Adriatic Sea after NATO's successful air campaign against 
     Yugoslavia.
       The durable cutter's three decades of service clearly 
     demonstrate the Coast Guard's ability to wring the last ounce 
     of usefulness from its aging ships--but it also underscores 
     the fact that the Coast Guard has been forced, primarily for 
     budget reasons, to carry out its military, maritime-safety, 
     law-enforcement, and other missions with outdated resources 
     that are badly in need of replacement and repair. Some Coast 
     Guard ships were in active service during World War II.
       It is not just ships, though. The Coast Guard's 190 fixed-
     wing aircraft and helicopters also need replacement, and 
     often need repairs to sustain acceptable readiness and safety 
     levels. Exacerbating the problem is the fact that these air 
     and surface platforms were purchased piecemeal over decades, 
     so they were never properly integrated with the right 
     communication and data links or fitted with proper sensors. 
     (One problem afflicting today's fleet is that the Coast 
     Guard's HH-60J Jayhawk helicopters are too large to land on 
     any but the largest of the service's cutters.)


                    Casualties Up, Availability Down

       The overall situation has caused numerous problems for the 
     Coast Guard, and also has degraded the service's ``ability to 
     manage the tactical picture,'' said Rear Adm. Ernest Riutta, 
     assistant commandant for operations.
       The end result is a steady decline in readiness and in the 
     availability of Coast Guard ships and aircraft to perform 
     their missions. Machinery and electronics casualties have 
     increased 45 percent in 10 years, for example, and the 
     nonavailability rate for HU-25 Falcon medium-range search 
     aircraft has doubled since 1996.
       To remedy these problems the Coast Guard has developed a 
     plan to replace and modernize its current ships, aircraft, 
     and command, control, and communications (C3) network. That 
     plan is called ``Deepwater.'' One of its main aims is to 
     ensure that the new ships, aircraft, and C3 equipment the 
     Coast Guard will be buying in the future are fully 
     interoperable from the start, instead of knitted together 
     haphazardly, as has been the case in the past.
       To ensure that the proposed fleet recapitalization is well-
     planned and can be carried out in a cost-effective manner the 
     Coast Guard has issued contracts to three industry teams:
       Avondale Industries--Newport News Shipbuilding--Boeing--
     Raytheon.
       Science Applications International--Bath Iron Works--
     Marinette Marine--Sikorsky.
       Lockheed Martin--Ingalls Shipbuidling--Litton--Bollinger 
     Shipyards--Bell Helicopter Textron.
       Each member of each team possesses expertise in areas of 
     operational importance to the Coast Guard. Lockheed Martin's 
     Government and Electronic Systems Division in Moorestown, 
     N.J., for example, has long supplied the Navy with such 
     important systems as the highly successful Aegis SPY-1 radar 
     system, the Mk92 fire-control radar carried on Perry-class 
     guided-missile frigates, and the Mk41 vertical-launch system. 
     The company also has a strong reputation for successfully 
     integrating varied naval communications and combat systems.


                       Shortfalls and Statistics

       To fully understand Deepwater, one must first examine the 
     shortfalls in platforms and equipment currently affecting the 
     Coast Guard. One telling statistic: Seven of the service's 
     nine classes of ships and aircraft will reach the end of 
     their originally projected service lives within the next 15 
     years.
       The Coast Guard relies upon three classes of cutters for 
     its long-and medium-range surface missions: the 378-foot 
     Hamilton-class high-endurance cutters (WHECs); the 270-foot 
     Famous-class medium-endurance cutters (WMECs); and the 210-
     foot Reliance-class WMECs.
       All of these ships are aging--some were built as long ago 
     as the late 1960s--and are becoming increasingly difficult to 
     maintain. They also are technologically obsolescent. The 
     diesel engines of the Reliance-class cutters are so old, in 
     fact, that they are used elsewhere only on the locomotives in 
     South Africa.
       These ships also impose a heavy personnel burden on the 
     Coast Guard. The Dallas, for example, normally carries a crew 
     of 19 officers and 152 enlisted personnel, more than twice 
     the number required to operate highly automated modern 
     cutters of similar size. The Danish Thetis-class offshore 
     patrol vessel is 369 feet long, displaces 3,500 tons, and has 
     a 90-day endurance--but operates with a crew of only 90 
     personnel. A larger crew

[[Page 29613]]

     means a higher payroll of course. What this mans is that the 
     Coast Guard has been forced, in essence, to pay a sizable 
     surcharge simply because it has not been provided the funds 
     needed to buy new advanced-technology ships.


                     Operational Incompatibilities

       There are several operational factors to consider, 
     moreover. The Reliance class cutters are equipped with 
     surface-search radars, for example, but have no sonars and no 
     electronic countermeasures systems. They are capable of 
     landing helicopters, but have no hangar facilities.
       Even the somewhat less antiquated Famous-class WMEC, built 
     in the 1980s, lack the ability to maintain real-time voice, 
     video, or data links with other Coast Guard assets; they also 
     have no Link-11 or Link-16 capability, essential for the 
     exchange of tactical data with other U.S. military forces.
       There also are shortfalls in speed. None of the Coast 
     guard's cutters can match the so-called ````go-fast'' boats--
     drug smuggling craft that can achieve high rates of speed. 
     Smugglers often are also armed with night-vision goggles, 
     satellite phones, and digital precision-location equipment, 
     widely available commercial gear that Coast Guard vessels do 
     not have.
       The Coast Guard's aviation assets suffer from similar 
     limitations. The HH-65A Dolphin helicopters, for example, are 
     operationally compatible with the Reliance, Hamilton, and 
     Famous cutters, but the Dolphin's sensor payload is less than 
     it could be because of weight handling limitations on the 
     cutters.
       The service's HH-60J Jayhawk helicopters are capable of 
     long-range operations, and have significant endurance, but 
     these helicopters are compatible only with the Famous-class 
     WMECs--which can give them only limited on board maintenance 
     and logistics support, unfortunately.
       Among the Coast Guard's fixed-wing aviation assets are 20 
     HU-25 Falcon medium-range search jets, all of which are over 
     14 years old and suffer from engine supportability problems. 
     Their APG-66 radar provides a good intercept capability--but 
     only eight of the HU-25s are equipped with that radar. The 
     remaining 12 Falcons simply lack the modern sensor packages 
     they need to carry out their missions. One indication of the 
     limited utility of the Falcon fleet is the fact that the 
     Coast Guard put 17 others Falcons into storage in 1998.


                        Deep, Dark Deficiencies

       The deficiency in sensors puts Coast Guard ships and 
     aircraft at a severe disadvantage against maritime 
     lawbreakers, according to Capt. Craig Schnappinger, the Coast 
     Guard's Deepwater program manager. ``They can see us before 
     we can see them.''
       The Coast Guard's 23 HC-130 fixed-wing aircraft, which are 
     used for long-range aerial-search missions, are being fitted 
     with new FLIR and electro-optical sensor packages and Global 
     Positioning System receivers. This is one of the few bright 
     spots in Coast Guard aviation today. Otherwise, the picture 
     is dark. ``Scrutiny of individual platform capabilities,'' 
     according to the Coast Guard's ``21st Century Hemispheric 
     Maritime Security` document, reveals an unintegrated system 
     that falls well short of optimum tactical requirements.''
       One of the more promising hardware solutions to its 
     aviation problems that the Coast Guard is considering is the 
     HV-609, a commercial tilrotor craft that can take off and 
     land like a helicopter but fly like a fixed-wing aircraft. 
     Now under development by Bell Helicopter Textron, the HV-609 
     will have a speed of 275 knots and a range of 750 nautical 
     miles, and will be able to carry a significant payload. 
     Because of its versatility the Coast Guard might possibly use 
     the `609 to replace several different types of aviation 
     platforms now in the inventory--thereby helping to streamline 
     logistics and maintenance costs in the future.
       The Coast Guard protects the nation's maritime borders and 
     carriers out numerous missions of importance to all 
     Americans. But continuing to operate aging platforms that are 
     not equipped with modern sensors guarantees a future filled 
     with hazard and difficulty not only for the Coast Guard 
     itself but for all whose lives are touched by the sea.
       By recapitalizing the force, the Coast Guard believes, it 
     will be able to operate more safety and efficiency--and more 
     cost-effectively as well. ``I think we are moving in the 
     right direction,'' said Riutta. Congressional approval of the 
     Deepwater program, he said, will ``more u into the next 
     century and equip our people with the resources [needed] to 
     do their jobs properly.''

     

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