[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 20]
[Senate]
[Pages 29423-29427]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



 CONTINUATION OF THE EMERGENCY REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION--
                   MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT--PM 73

  The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message 
from the President of the United States, together with an accompanying 
report; which was referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs.

To the Congress of the United States:
  On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation of 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass 
destruction''--WMD) and of the means of delivering such weapons, I 
issued Executive Order 12938, and declared a national emergency under 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et 
seq.). Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of 
its declaration unless, within the 90-day period prior to each 
anniversary date, I publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the 
Congress a notice stating that such emergency is to continue in effect. 
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of 
delivery continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. I 
am, therefore, advising the Congress that the national emergency 
declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on November 14, 1995, 
November 12, 1996, November 13, 1997, and November 12, 1998, must 
continue in effect beyond November 14, 1999. Accordingly, I have 
extended the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938, as 
amended.
  The following report is made pursuant to section 204(a) of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)) and 
section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), 
regarding activities taken and money spent pursuant to the emergency 
declaration. Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or 
chemical and biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts is 
contained in the most recent annual Report on the Proliferation of 
Missiles and Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 
Weapons, provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 
(Public Law 102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation Report,'' 
and the most recent annual report provided to the Congress pursuant to 
section 308 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare 
Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182), also known as the ``CBW 
Report.''
  On July 28, 1998, in Executive Order 13094, I amended section 4 of 
Executive Order 12938 so that the United States Government could more 
effectively respond to the worldwide threat of weapons of mass 
destruction proliferation activities. The amendment of section 4 
strengthens Executive Order 12938 in several significant ways. The 
amendment broadens the type of proliferation activity that can subject 
entities to potential penalties under the Executive order. The original 
Executive order provided for penalties for contributions to the efforts 
of any foreign country, project or entity to use, acquire, design, 
produce, or stockpile chemical or biological weapons; the amended 
Executive order also covers contributions to foreign programs for 
nuclear weapons and for missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass 
destruction. Moreover, the amendment expands the original Executive 
order to include attempts to continue to foreign proliferation 
activities, as well as actual contributions, and broadens the range of 
potential penalties to expressly include the prohibition of U.S. 
Government assistance to foreign persons, and the prohibition of 
imports into the United States and U.S. Government procurement. In sum, 
the amendment gives the United States Government greater flexibility 
and discretion in deciding how and to what extent to impose measures 
against foreign persons that assist proliferation programs.


                            Nuclear Weapons

  In May 1998, India and Pakistan each conducted a series of nuclear 
tests. World reaction included nearly universal condemnation across a 
broad range of international fora and multilateral support for a broad 
range of sanctions, including new restrictions on lending by 
international financial institutions unrelated to basic human needs and 
on aid from the G-8 and other countries.
  Since the mandatory imposition of U.S. statutory sanctions, we have

[[Page 29424]]

worked unilaterally, with other P-5 and G-8 members, and through the 
United Nations, to dissuade India and Pakistan from taking further 
steps toward developing nuclear weapons. We have urged them to join 
multilateral arms control efforts and to conform to the standards of 
nonproliferation regimes, to prevent a regional arms race and build 
confidence by practicing restraint, and to resume efforts to resolve 
their differences through dialogue. The P-5, G-8, and U.N. Security 
Council have called on India and Pakistan to take a broad range of 
concrete actions. The United States has focused most intensely on 
several objectives that can be met over the short and medium term: an 
end to nuclear testing and prompt, unconditional ratification of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); engagement in productive 
negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) and, pending 
their conclusion, a moratorium on production of fissile material for 
nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; restraint in 
development and deployment of nuclear-capable missiles and aircraft; 
and adoption of controls meeting international standards on exports of 
sensitive materials and technology.
  Against this backdrop of international pressure on India and 
Pakistan, high-level U.S. dialogues with Indian and Pakistani officials 
have yielded little progress. In September 1998, Indian and Pakistani 
leaders had expressed a willingness to sign the CTBT. Both governments, 
having already declared testing moratoria, had indicated they were 
prepared to sign the CTBT by September 1999 under certain conditions. 
These declarations were made prior to the collapse of Prime Minister 
Vajpayee's Indian government in April 1999, a development that has 
delayed consideration of CTBT signature in India. The Indian election, 
the Kargil conflict, and the October political coup in Pakistan have 
further complicated the issue, although neither country has renounced 
its commitment. Pakistan has said that it will not sign the Treaty 
until India does. Additionally, Pakistan's Foreign Minister stated 
publicly on September 12, 1999, that Pakistan would not consider 
signing the CTBT until sanctions are removed.
  India and Pakistan both withdrew their opposition to negotiations on 
an FMCT in Geneva at the end of the 1998 Conference on Disarmament 
session. However, these negotiations were unable to resume in 1999 and 
we have no indications that India or Pakistan played helpful ``behind 
the scenes'' roles. They also pledged to institute strict controls that 
meet internationally accepted standards on sensitive exports, and have 
begun expert discussions with the United States and others on this 
subject. In addition, India and Pakistan resumed their bilateral 
dialogue on outstanding disputes, including Kashmir, at the Foreign 
Secretary level. The Kargil conflict this summer complicated efforts to 
continue this bilateral dialogue, although both sides have expressed 
interest in resuming the discussions at some future point. We will 
continue discussions with both governments at the senior and expert 
levels, and our diplomatic efforts in concert with the P-5, G-8, and in 
international fora. Efforts may be further complicated by India's 
release in August 1999 of a draft of its nuclear doctrine, which, 
although its timing may have been politically motivated, suggests that 
India intends to make nuclear weapons an integral part of the national 
defense.
  The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) 
continues to maintain a freeze on its nuclear facilities consistent 
with the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, which calls for the immediate 
freezing and eventual dismantling of the DPRK's graphite-moderated 
reactors and reprocessing plant at Yongbyon and Taechon. The United 
States has raised its concerns with the DPRK about a suspect 
underground site under construction, possibly intended to support 
nuclear activities contrary to the Agreed Framework. In March 1999, the 
United States reached agreement with the DPRK for visits by a team of 
U.S. experts to the facility. In May 1999, a Department of State team 
visited the underground facility at Kumchang-ni. The team was permitted 
to conduct all activities previously agreed to help remove suspicions 
about the site. Based on the data gathered by the U.S. delegation and 
the subsequent technical review, the United States has concluded that, 
at present, the underground site does not violate the 1994 U.S.-DPRK 
Agreed Framework.
  The Agreed Framework requires the DPRK to come into full compliance 
with its NPT and IAEA obligations as a part of a process that also 
includes the supply of two light water reactors to North Korea. United 
States experts remain on-site in North Korea working to complete clean-
up operations after largely finishing the canning of spent fuel from 
the North's 5-megawatt nuclear reactor.
  The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone on the 
global nuclear nonproliferation regime. In May 1999, NPT Parties met in 
New York to complete preparations for the 2000 NPT Review Conference. 
The United States is working with others to ensure that the 2000 NPT 
Review Conference is a success that reaffirms the NPT as a strong and 
viable part of the global security system.
  The United States signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty on 
September 24, 1996. So far, 154 countries have signed and 51 have 
ratified the CTBT. During 1999, CTBT signatories conducted numerous 
meetings of the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) in Vienna, seeking to 
promote rapid completion of the International Monitoring System (IMS) 
established by the Treaty. In October 1999, a conference was held 
pursuant to Article XIV of the CTBT, to discuss ways to accelerate the 
entry into force of the Treaty. The United States attended that 
conference as an observer.
  On September 22, 1997, I transmitted the CTBT to the Senate, 
requesting prompt advice and consent to ratification. I deeply regret 
the Senate's decision on October 13, 1999, to refuse its consent to 
     ratify the CTBT. The CTBT will serve several U.S. national 
     security interests by prohibiting all nuclear explosions. 
     It will constrain the development and qualitative 
     improvement of nuclear weapons; end the development of 
     advanced new types of weapons; contribute to the 
     prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of 
     nuclear disarmament; and strengthen international peace 
     and security. The CTBT marks a historic milestone in our 
     drive to reduce the nuclear threat and to build a safer 
     world. For these reasons, we hope that at an appropriate 
     time, the Senate will reconsider this treaty in a manner 
     that will ensure a fair and thorough hearing process and 
     will allow for more thoughtful debate.
  With 35 member states, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a widely 
accepted, mature, and effective export-control arrangement. At its May 
1999 Plenary and related meetings in Florence, Italy, the NSG 
considered new members (although none were accepted at that meeting), 
reviewed efforts to enhance transparency, and pursued efforts to 
streamline procedures and update control lists. The NSG created an 
Implementation Working Group, chaired by the UK, to consider changes to 
the guidelines, membership issues, the relationship with the NPT 
Exporters (Zangger) Committee, and controls on brokering. The 
Transparency Working Group was tasked with preparing a report on NSG 
activities for presentation at the 2000 NPT Review Conference by the 
Italian chair. The French will host the Plenary and assume the NSG 
Chair in 2000 and the United States will host and chair in 2001.
  The NSG is currently considering membership requests from Turkey and 
Belarus. Turkey's membership is pending only agreement by Russia to 
join the intercessional consensus of all other NSG members. The United 
States believes it would be appropriate to confirm intercessional 
consensus in support of Turkey's membership before considering other 
candidates. Belarus has been in consultation with the NSG Chair and 
other members including Russia and the United States regarding its 
interest in membership and the status of its implementation of export 
controls to meet NSG Guideline standards. The United States will not 
block intercessional consensus of NSG members in support of NSG 
membership for

[[Page 29425]]

Belarus, provided that consensus for Turkey's membership precedes it. 
Cyprus and Kazakhstan have also expressed interest in membership and 
are in consultation with the NSG Chair and other members regarding the 
status of their export control systems. China is the only major nuclear 
supplier that is not a member of the NSG, primarily because it has not 
accepted the NSG policy of requiring full-scope safeguards as a 
condition for supply of nuclear trigger list items to nonnuclear weapon 
states. However, China has taken major steps toward harmonization of 
its export control system with the NSG Guidelines by the implementation 
of controls over nuclear-related dual-use equipment and technology.
  During the last 6 months, we reviewed intelligence and other reports 
of trade in nuclear-related material and technology that might be 
relevant to nuclear-related sanctions provisions in the Iran-Iraq Arms 
Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, as amended; the Export-Import Bank Act 
of 1945, as amended; and the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 
1994. No statutory sanctions determinations were reached during this 
reporting period. The administrative measures imposed against ten 
Russian entities for their nuclear- and/or missile-related cooperation 
with Iran remain in effect.


                    chemical and biological weapons

  The export control regulations issued under the Enhanced 
Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remain fully in force and 
continue to be applied by the Department of Commerce, in consultation 
with other agencies, in order to control the export of items with 
potential use in chemical or biological weapons or unmanned delivery 
systems for weapons of mass destruction.
  Chemical weapons (CW) continue to pose a very serious threat to our 
security and that of our allies. On April 29, 1997, the Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons 
Convention or CWC) entered into force with 87 of the CWC's 165 States 
Signatories as original States Parties. The United States was among 
their number, having ratified the CWC on April 25, 1997. Russia 
ratified the CWC on November 5, 1997, and became a State Party on 
December 8, 1997. To date, 126 countries (including China, Iran, India, 
Pakistan, and Ukraine) have become States Parties.
  The implementing body for the CWC--the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)--was established at entry-into-
force (EIF) of the Convention on April 29, 1997. The OPCW, located in 
The Hague, has primary responsibility (along with States Parties) for 
implementing the CWC. It consists of the Conference of the States 
Parties, the Executive Council (EC), and the Technical Secretariat 
(TS). The TS carries out the verification provisions of the CWC, and 
presently has a staff of approximately 500, including about 200 
inspectors trained and equipped to inspect military and industrial 
facilities throughout the world. To date, the OPCW has conducted over 
500 routine inspections in some 29 countries. No challenge inspections 
have yet taken place. To date, nearly 170 inspections have been 
conducted at military facilities in the United States. The OPCW 
maintains a permanent inspector presence at operational U.S. CW 
destruction facilities in Utah and Johnston Island.
  The United States is determined to seek full implementation of the 
concrete measures in the CWC designed to raise the costs and risks for 
any state or terrorist attempting to engage in chemical weapons-related 
activities. The CWC's declaration requirements improve our knowledge of 
possible chemical weapons activities. Its inspection provisions provide 
for access to declared and undeclared facilities and locations, thus 
making clandestine chemical weapons production and stockpiling more 
difficult, more risky, and more expensive.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 was 
enacted into U.S. law in October 1998, as part of the Omnibus 
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act for Fiscal 
Year 1999 (Public Law 105-277). My Administration published an 
Executive order on June 25, 1999, to facilitate implementation of the 
Act and is working to publish regulations regarding industrial 
declarations and inspections of industrial facilities. Submission of 
these declarations to the OPCW, and subsequent inspections, will enable 
the United States to be fully complaint with the CWC. United States 
noncompliance to date has, among other things, undermined U.S. 
leadership in the organization as well as our ability to encourage 
other States Parties to make complete, accurate, and timely 
declarations.
  Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically isolated 
and prohibited by the CWC from trading with States Parties in certain 
key chemicals. The relevant treaty provisions are specifically designed 
to penalize countries that refuse to join the rest of the world in 
eliminating the threat of chemical weapons.
  The United States also continues to play a leading role in the 
international effort to reduce the threat from biological weapons (BW). 
We participate actively in the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) of States Parties 
striving to complete a legally binding protocol to strengthen and 
enhance compliance with the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Biological Weapons 
Convention or BWC). This Ad Hoc Group was mandated by the September 
1994 BWC Special Conference. The Fourth BWC Review Conference, held in 
November/December 1996, urged the AHG to complete the protocol as soon 
as possible but not later than the next Review Conference to be held in 
2001. Work is progressing on a draft rolling text through insertion of 
national views and clarification of existing text. Five AHG negotiating 
sessions were scheduled for 1999. The United States is working toward 
completion of the substance of a strong Protocol next year.
  On January 27, 1998, during the State of the Union address, I 
announced that the United States would take a leading role in the 
effort to erect stronger international barriers against the 
proliferation and use of BW by strengthening the BWC with a new 
international system to detect and deter cheating. The United States is 
working closely with U.S. industry representatives to obtain technical 
input relevant to the development of U.S. negotiating positions and 
then to reach international agreement on data declarations and on-site 
investigations.
  The United States continues to be a leading participant in the 30-
member Australia Group (AG) chemical and biological weapons 
nonproliferation regime. The United States attended the most recent 
annual AG Plenary Session from October 4-8, 1999, during which the 
Group reaffirmed the members' continued collective belief in the 
Group's viability, importance, and compatibility with the CWC and BWC. 
Members continue to agree that full adherence to the CWC and BWC by all 
governments will be the only way to achieve a permanent global ban on 
chemical and biological weapons, and that all states adhering to these 
Conventions must take steps to ensure that their national activities 
support these goals. At the 1999 Plenary, the Group continued to focus 
on strengthening AG export controls and sharing information to address 
the threat of CBW terrorism. The AG also reaffirmed its commitment to 
continue its active outreach program of briefings for non-AG countries, 
and to promote regional consultations on export controls and non-
proliferation to further awareness and understanding of national 
policies in these areas. The AG discussed ways to be more proactive in 
stemming attacks on the AG in the CWC and BWC contexts.
  During the last 6 months, we continued to examine closely 
intelligence and other reports of trade in CBW-related material and 
technology that might be relevant to sanctions provisions under the 
Chemical and Biological Weapons Controls and Warfare Elimination Act

[[Page 29426]]

of 1991. No new sanctions determinations were reached during this 
reporting period. The United States also continues to cooperate with 
its AG partners and other countries in stopping shipments of 
proliferation concern.


          Missiles for Delivery of Weapons of mass Destruction

  The United States continues carefully to control exports that could 
contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass 
destruction, and closely to monitor activities of potential missile 
proliferation concern. We also continued to implement U.S. missile 
sanctions laws. In March 1999, we imposed missile sanctions against 
three Middle Eastern entities for transfers involving Category II 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex items. Category I 
missile sanctions imposed in April 1998 against North Korean and 
Pakistani entities for the transfer from North Korea to Pakistan of 
equipment and technology related to the Ghauri missile remain in 
effect.
  During this reporting period, MTCR Partners continued to share 
information about proliferation problems with each other and with other 
potential supplier, consumer, and transshipment states. Partners also 
emphasized the need for implementing effective export control systems. 
This cooperation has resulted in the interdiction of missile-related 
materials intended for use in missile programs of concern.
  In June the United States participated in the MTCR's Reinforced Point 
of Contact Meeting (RPOC). At the RPOC, MTCR Partners held in-depth 
discussions of regional missile proliferation concerns, focusing in 
particular on Iran, North Korea, and South Asia. They also discussed 
steps Partners can take to further increase outreach to nonmembers. The 
Partners agreed to continue their discussion of this important topic at 
the October 1999 Noordwijk MTCR Plenary.
  Also in June, the United States participated in a German-hosted MTCR 
workshop at which Partners and non-Partners discussed ways to address 
the proliferation potential inherent in intangible technology 
transfers. The seminar helped participants to develop a greater 
understanding of the intangible technology issue (i.e., how 
proliferators misuse the internet, scientific conferences, plant 
visits, student exchange programs, and higher education to acquire 
sensitive technology), and to begin to identify steps governments can 
take to address this problem.
  In July 1999, the Partners completed a reformatting of the MTCR 
Annex. The newly reformatted Annex is intended to improve clarity and 
uniformity of implementation of MTCR controls while maintaining the 
coverage of the previous version of the MTCR Annex.
  The MTCR held its Fourteenth Plenary Meeting in Noordwijk, The 
Netherlands, on October 11-15. At the Plenary, the Partners shared 
information about activities of missile proliferation concern 
worldwide. They focussed in particular on the threat to international 
security and stability posed by missile proliferation in key regions 
and considered what practical steps they could take, individually and 
collectively, to address ongoing missile-related activities of concern. 
During their discussions, Partners gave special attention to DPRK 
missile activities and also discussed the threat posed by missile-
related activities in South and North East Asia and the Middle East.
  During this reporting period, the United States continued to work 
unilaterally and in coordination with its MTCR Partners to combat 
missile proliferation and to encourage nonmembers to export responsibly 
and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. To encourage international focus 
on missile proliferation issues, the USG also placed the issue on the 
agenda for the G8 Cologne Summit, resulting in an undertaking to 
examine further individual and collective means of addressing this 
problem and reaffirming commitment to the objectives of the MTCR. Since 
my last report, we continued our missile nonproliferation dialogues 
with China (interrupted after the accidental bombing of China's 
Belgrade Embassy), India, the Republic of Korea (ROK), North Korea 
(DPRK), and Pakistan. In the course of normal diplomatic relations we 
also have pursued such discussions with other countries in Central 
Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East.
  In March 1999, the United States and the DPRK held a fourth round of 
missile talks to underscore our strong opposition to North Korea's 
destabilizing missile development and export activities and press for 
tight constraints on DPRK missile development, testing, and exports. We 
also affirmed that the United States viewed further launches of long-
range missiles and transfers of long-range missiles or technology for 
such missiles as direct threats to U.S. allies and ultimately to the 
United States itself. We subsequently have reiterated that message at 
every available opportunity. In particular, we have reminded the DPRK 
of the consequences of another rocket launch and encouraged it not to 
take such action. We also have urged the DPRK to take steps towards 
building a constructive bilateral relationship with the United States.
  These efforts have resulted in an important first step. Since 
September 1999, it has been our understanding that the DPRK will 
refrain from testing long-range missiles of any kind during our 
discussions to improve relations. In recognition of this DPRK step, the 
United States has announced the easing of certain sanctions related to 
the import and export of many consumer goods.
  In response to reports of continuing Iranian efforts to acquire 
sensitive items from Russian entities for use in Iran's missile and 
nuclear development programs, the United States continued its high-
level dialogue with Russia aimed at finding ways the United States and 
Russia can work together to cut off the flow of sensitive goods to 
Iran's ballistic missile development program. During this reporting 
period, Russia's government created institutional foundations to 
implement a newly enacted nonproliferation policy and passed laws to 
punish wrongdoers. It also passed new export control legislation to 
tighten government control over sensitive technologies and began 
working with the United States to strengthen export control practices 
at Russian aerospace firms. However, despite the Russian government's 
nonproliferation and export control efforts, some Russian entities 
continued to cooperate with Iran's ballistic missile program and to 
engage in nuclear cooperation with Iran beyond the Bushehr reactor 
project. The administrative measures imposed on ten Russian entities 
for their missile- and nuclear-related cooperation with Iran remain in 
effect.


               Value of Nonproliferation Export Controls

  United States national export controls--both those implemented 
pursuant to multilateral nonproliferation regimes and those implemented 
unilaterally--play an important part in impeding the proliferation of 
WMD and missiles. (As used here, ``export controls'' refer to 
requirements for case-by-case review of certain exports, or limitations 
on exports of particular items of proliferation concern to certain 
destinations, rather than broad embargoes or economic sanctions that 
also affect trade.) As noted in this report, however, export controls 
are only one of a number of tools the United States uses to achieve its 
nonproliferation objectives. Global nonproliferation norms, informal 
multilateral nonproliferation regimes, interdicting shipments of 
proliferation concern, sanctions, export control assistance, 
redirection and elimination efforts, and robust U.S. military, 
intelligence, and diplomatic capabilities all work in conjunction with 
export controls as part of our overall nonproliferation strategy.
  Export controls are a critical part of nonproliferation because every 
proliferant WMD/missile program seeks equipment and technology from 
other countries. Proliferators look overseas because needed items are 
unavailable elsewhere, because indigenously produced items are of 
insufficient quality or quantity, and/or because imported items can be 
obtained more quickly and cheaply than producing them at

[[Page 29427]]

home. It is important to note that proliferators seek for their 
programs both items on multilateral lists (like gyroscopes controlled 
on the MTCR Annex and nerve gas ingredients on the Australia Group 
list) and unlisted items (like lower-level machine tools and very basic 
chemicals). In addition, many of the items of interest to proliferators 
are inherently dual-use. For example, key ingredients and technologies 
used in the production of fertilizers and pesticides also can be used 
to make chemical weapons; vaccine production technology (albeit not the 
vaccines themselves) can assist in the production of biological 
weapons.
  The most obvious value of export controls is in impeding or even 
denying proliferators access to key pieces of equipment or technology 
for use in their WMD/missile programs. In large part, U.S. national 
export controls--and similar controls of our partners in the Australia 
Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, and Nuclear Suppliers Group--
have denied proliferators access to the largest sources of the best 
equipment and technology. Proliferators have mostly been forced to seek 
less capable items from nonregime suppliers. Moreover, in many 
instances, U.S. and regime controls and associated efforts have forced 
proliferators to engage in complex clandestine procurements even from 
nonmember suppliers, taking time and money away from proliferant 
programs.
  United States national export controls and those of our regime 
partners also have played an important leadership role, increasing over 
time the critical mass of countries applying nonproliferation export 
controls. For example, none of the following progress would have been 
possible without the leadership shown by U.S. willingness to be the 
first to apply controls: the seven-member MTCR of 1987 has grown to 32 
member countries; several nonmember countries have been persuaded to 
apply export controls consistent with one or more of the regimes 
unilaterally; and most of the members of the nonproliferation regimes 
have applied national ``catch-all'' controls similar to those under the 
U.S. Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative. (Export controls 
normally are tied to a specific list of items, such as the MTCR Annex. 
``Catch-all'' controls provide a legal basis to control exports of 
items not on a list, when those items are destined for WMD/missile 
programs.)
  United States export controls, especially ``catch-all'' controls, 
also make important political and moral contributions to the 
nonproliferation effort. They uphold the broad legal obligations the 
United States has undertaken in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
(Article I), Biological Weapons Convention (Article III), and Chemical 
Weapons Convention (Article I) not to assist anyone in proscribed WMD 
activities. They endeavor to assure there are no U.S. ``fingerprints'' 
on WMD and missiles that threaten U.S. citizens and territory and our 
friends and interests overseas. They place the United States squarely 
and unambiguously against WMD/missile proliferation, even against the 
prospect of inadvertent proliferation from the United States itself.
  Finally, export controls play an important role in enabling and 
enhancing legitimate trade. They provide a means to permit dual-use 
export to proceed under circumstances where, without export control 
scrutiny, the only prudent course would be to prohibit them. They help 
build confidence between countries applying similar controls that, in 
turn, results in increased trade. Each of the WMD nonproliferation 
regimes, for example, has a ``no undercut'' policy committing each 
member not to make an export that another has denied for 
nonproliferation reasons and notified to the rest--unless it first 
consults with the original denying country. Not only does this policy 
make it more difficult for proliferators to get items from regime 
members, it establishes a ``level playing field'' for exporters.


                            threat reduction

  The potential for proliferation of WMD and delivery system expertise 
has increased in part as a consequence of the economic crisis in Russia 
and other Newly Independent States, causing concern. My Administration 
gives high priority to controlling the human dimension of proliferation 
through programs that support the transition of former Soviet weapons 
scientists to civilian research and technology development activities. 
I have proposed an additional $4.5 billion for programs embodied in the 
Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative that would support activities in 
four areas: nuclear security; nonnuclear WMD; science and technology 
nonproliferation; and military relocation, stabilization and other 
security cooperation programs. Congressional support for this 
initiative would enable the engagement of a broad range of programs 
under the Departments of State, Energy, and Defense.


                                expenses

  Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1641(c)), I report that there were no specific expenses directly 
attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred by the 
declaration of the national emergency in Executive Order 12938, as 
amended, during the period from May 15, 1999, through November 10, 
1999.
                                                  William J. Clinton.  
  The White House, November 10, 1999.

                          ____________________