[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 20]
[Senate]
[Pages 29420-29421]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



        ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to commend the Secretary 
of Defense, Bill Cohen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Hugh Shelton, the Commander in Chief Joint Forces Command 
Admiral Hal Gehman, and the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki 
for their commitment to transforming our current military force to one 
which will assure our military superiority well into the twenty first 
century.
  Secretary Cohen and General Shelton have taken strong and direct 
action to establish transformation as the guiding policy for the 
Department of Defense. Their leadership responds to what are now 
broadly accepted conclusions about the security environment we will 
face and the challenges and opportunities resulting from the Revolution 
in Military Affairs. Many, both inside and outside the Pentagon, have 
concluded

[[Page 29421]]

that these changes are of such magnitude that they require that our 
military in the twenty first century be fundamentally different than 
today's military. This view was compellingly articulated by the 
National Defense Panel, which was created by this body. And it was 
given the force of policy by Secretary Cohen in the Quadrennial Defense 
Review.
  But how are we to know what this very different military should look 
like? Secretary Cohen and General Shelton, encouraged and supported by 
legislation we passed last year, established a process to answer that 
question. On the first of October, 1998, they charged the Commander in 
Chief of the United States Atlantic Command, Admiral Harold Gehman, to 
put in place a joint experimentation process to objectively determine 
which new technologies, organizations, and concepts of operation will 
most likely to future military superiority. Since that time Admiral 
Theman has done a superb job of establishing a process and beginning 
experiments toward that end. In June, 1999, Admiral Gehman began 
experiments to address how the U.S. military should be equipped and 
organized to effectively find and strike critical mobile enemy targets, 
such as ballistic missiles. Other experiments to address near, mid, and 
far term strategic and operational problems will follow. On the first 
of October of this year the Secretary and the Chairman increased the 
priority of the policy of transformation by redesignating the United 
States Atlantic Command as the United States Joint Forces Command. This 
change is more than simply a change in name. It underlines the 
increasing importance of increased jointness in meeting the security 
challenges of the twenty first century, increases the priority assigned 
to experimentation, and reflects the expanded role that the United 
States Joint Forces Command assumes in order to achieve that goal. I 
applaud Secretary Cohen and General Shelton for their commitment to 
transformation of the U.S. military and their courage to make the tough 
changes needed to get it done.
  I am also pleased to see that their leadership is having a positive 
effect on our military Services' plans to transform themselves to meet 
the coming challenges. The U.S. Air Force has begun to reorganize its 
units into Air Expeditionary Forces to be more responsive to the need 
for air power by the warfighting commanders. And I note with great 
admiration that on October 12, 1999 General Eric Shinseki, Chief of 
Staff of the U.S. Army, announced his intention to begin to transform 
the U.S. Army from a heavy force designed largely for the Cold War to 
one that will be more effective against the threats that most now see 
as most likely and most dangerous. The goal is to make the U.S. Army 
more strategically relevant by making it lighter, more deployable, more 
lethal, and more sustainable. General Shinseki plans to find 
technological solutions to these problems, and intends to create this 
year an experimentation process at Fort Lewis Washington in order to 
begin to construct this new force. He has said that he wants to 
eliminate the distinction between different types of Army units, and 
perhaps in time go to an all-wheeled fleet of combat vehicles, 
eliminating the tank as we have known it for almost a century. These 
are historic and very positive steps. But there is much progress that 
must still be made. For example, the Army and the Air Force must now 
implement their plans in concert with the other services, and with the 
Joint Forces Command.
  Fundamental change is very difficult to effect, especially in 
organizations, like the Department of Defense, that are large and 
successful. Frankly, I am a little surprised that we have been able to 
achieve these changes in so short time. But organizations that don't 
change ultimately fail, and that is not an outcome we can accept. So we 
should not only applaud these moves, but support them, and encourage 
faster and more direct action. An excellent report by the Defense 
Science Board in August, 1999 suggests some things we can do to provide 
this support. The most important are encouraging the development of a 
DOD-wide strategy for transformation activities, and insisting on the 
establishment of processes to turn the results of experiments into real 
capabilities for our forces. And we must ensure that this effort is not 
hobbled by lack of resources. Perhaps most importantly, we must insist 
that no Service plan nor program be agreed to or resourced unless we 
are assured that it has passed through a rigorous joint assessment and 
is consistent with the joint warfighting needs of our military 
commanders.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in complementing our senior leaders 
and to support their efforts to move to the next level of jointness as 
they grapple with the difficult task of building the most effective 
American military possible for the 21st century.

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