[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 20]
[Senate]
[Pages 29417-29418]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                    NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE REPORT

  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, a report on the National Missile Defense 
program has been completed and will be released shortly by a panel of 
experts which is chaired by retired Air Force General Larry Welch. The 
director of the Defense Department's Ballistic Missile Defense 
Organization requested this report which examines the National Missile 
Defense program and makes several recommendations for improvement.
  Many will remember that General Welch and his panel issued a previous 
report last year which examined aspects of both the National Missile 
Defense program and several Theater Missile Defense programs.
  Generally speaking, the newest Welch Report is a helpful critique of 
the National Missile Defense Program. Given the importance of this 
program, additional knowledge of its inherent risks will help BMDO to 
structure and run the best program possible.
  In particular, I support the report's emphasis on giving the BMDO 
program manager, as well as the Lead Systems Integrator, increased 
authority in running this program.
  The report's emphasis on additional ground testing and purchasing 
additional hardware--such as a second launcher for the Kwajalein test 
site--makes good sense.
  Any program subjected to scrutiny on the level of the Welch Panel's 
will face some criticism about particular aspects of how the program is 
being conducted. But one key phrase in the report is worth keeping in 
mind, and I quote: ``Given the set of challenges and the phased 
decision process, the JPO [BMDO's NMD Joint Program Office] and LSI 
[Boeing, the Lead System Integrator] have formulated a sensible, 
phased, incremental approach to the development and deployment 
decision--while managing the risk.''
  Every DoD program has some degree of risk; the risk in each program, 
NMD included, can be mitigated by additional time and money. However, 
the NMD program is not being developed in a vacuum, a point clearly 
made by North Korea's flight test of the three-stage Taepo Dong I ICBM 
in August of 1998. We don't have the luxury of time. Because of the 
proliferation threat, our choice is simple: We can accept additional 
program risk, or we can leave

[[Page 29418]]

the United States vulnerable to rogue threats of coercion by placing a 
premium on wringing risk from the NMD program.
  The emphasis must be on protecting America and American interests. 
The continued vulnerability of the United States is unacceptable, which 
is why many of the Welch Report's recommendations should be implemented 
as quickly as possible.
  Because of the threat we have no choice but to accept a high-risk 
program. We ought to accept as much risk as we can stand, because the 
consequences of not being prepared for the threat are so high. ``High'' 
risk is not synonymous with ``failure,'' as demonstrated by the recent 
successful intercept conducted by this program. Decision points in the 
National Missile Defense program should not be adjusted because of a 
high level of risk in the program, but only if the level of risk 
becomes unacceptably high. To date no senior Defense Department 
official has told me that the level of risk in the NMD program is 
unacceptable.
  Much of this report focuses on a lack of hardware to test and 
insufficient simulation facilities. That is the reason Congress added 
$1 billion for missile defense last year.
  The Welch Report also calls for flight tests against more varied 
targets. After the recent successful NMD flight test, there was an 
unfortunate rush to judgment by some who wanted to indict this program 
as a fraud for not attempting the most complex intercept test 
immediately. These critics were obviously unaware of the fact that it 
was the Welch Panel, during its investigation, which recommended to 
BMDO that the recent flight test be simplified. I support the Welch 
Report's suggestion for realistic testing, and hope that everyone will 
keep in mind the importance of testing the basics first, and then 
proceeding to more complex tests.
  There are, of course, some problems with testing against more 
realistic targets that have nothing at all to do with the NMD program. 
According to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, BMDO believes 
it is--and I quote from a note BMDO sent to my staff--``constrained by 
START treaty limitations''--from testing against more realistic 
targets.
  This surely must be a misunderstanding within the Defense Department 
that will be resolved quickly.
  I want to commend the members of the panel who produced the Welch 
Report. I hope that some of their concerns have been ameliorated by the 
recent NMD intercept, which occurred too late to be included in their 
report.

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