[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 20]
[House]
[Pages 29224-29231]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



  CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 1555, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR 
                            FISCAL YEAR 2000

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the unanimous consent agreement of 
earlier today, I call up the conference report on the House bill (H.R. 
1555) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2000 for intelligence 
and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, 
the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, and ask for 
its immediate consideration in the House.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). Pursuant to the order of 
the House of today, the conference report is considered as having been 
read.
  (For conference report and statement, see proceedings of the House of 
Friday, November 5, 1999, at page H. 11630).
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and 
the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I obviously rise in strong support of the conference 
report to accompany H.R. 1555, the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2000.
  Mr. Speaker, in H.R. 1555 we begin the funding for the intelligence 
community of the next millennium. That, Mr. Speaker, is a most useful 
perspective for what we have tried to do in our conference report. How 
can we adapt the tools and skills of the Cold War to meet the 
challenges of the 21st century? These are new times. We need new ways 
to approach them.
  Underlying that question is how, and in some cases whether, we plan 
to meet those challenges. How we define our interests, Mr. Speaker, 
will depend on how we define ourselves. What kind of country will we be 
in the next century? In 2020, when my grandchildren are grown, what 
will the American flag mean to them and to people around the world?
  In the classified schedule of authorizations in our conference 
report, we frame a preliminary answer to these questions. In that 
report, Mr. Speaker, we bring forward the basic tools and skills of the 
Cold War to bear on the new threats of the next century: the 
international drug cartels that bring poison into our cities, the 
elusive conspiracies that put the pieces of nuclear weapons into the 
hands of rogue leaders, and the shadowy networks that want to bomb our 
buildings overseas and here at home.
  We will also need to use these tools and skills to meet new and 
unanticipated challenges that will arise in the coming years. Synthetic 
pharmaceuticals, genetic terrorists? I cannot know what threats will 
face my grandchildren in the year 2020 as Americans, but I can tell the 
Members what intelligence tools and skills will be necessary to meet 
those threats.
  That is our job. We may not know the who, In other words, but we 
clearly know the how. We have learned that, and now we have to provide 
for it. In our conference report, Mr. Speaker, we continue to focus on 
this, how we will meet the threats and the challenges of the future, 
which is indeed upon us.
  We will need more human intelligence or HUMINT, as we call it. Over 
the past year we have had to understand and to act upon crises in 
Belgrade, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, East Timor, southern Colombia, and a 
whole host of other hard-to-pronounce places. In each case, 
policymakers need more HUMINT on the plans and the intentions of the 
rogue leaders, dissidents, terrorists, guerillas, and traffickers 
involved in these crises.
  Where will the crises of the year 2000 arise, Kabul, Kinshasa, Lagos? 
I do not know, but they will be out there, and wherever they do arise 
our policymakers will need intelligence officers on the ground to 
collect HUMINT on the plans and intentions of those involved.
  For that reason, Mr. Speaker, our conference report continues the 
rebuilding of our HUMINT capabilities around the world. No surprises is 
the right way to go.
  We will continue to need signals intelligence, or SIGINT, as it is 
called. As in the past, our ability to collect SIGINT has helped to 
protect our shores from cocaine and our citizens from terrorists. That 
ability, however, is threatened in a fundamental way by digital 
technologies.

                              {time}  1600

  For that reason, Mr. Speaker, our conference report continues the 
recapitalization of our SIGINT capability. This is a huge undertaking 
and an extraordinarily significant one.
  We must improve the processing of imagery intelligence, or IMINT as 
it is called. Our ability to collect imagery has accelerated at 
lightning speed, but our ability to process imagery remains at a crawl. 
Collection and processing, however, are two halves of one whole. They 
must work together.
  At present, the combination of collection and processing and imagery 
is a Ferrari welded to a Ford Falcon. That combination simply will not 
drive our IMINT capability in 2020. And for that reason, Mr. Speaker, 
our conference report challenges the Intelligence Community to invest 
more in its ability to process imagery. It does no good to have the 
pictures if we do not have analysts to review them.
  We must rebuild our covert action capability. The rise of rogue 
leaders and regional conflicts has demonstrated once again that the 
President must have an option between the use of F-16s and doing 
nothing. The

[[Page 29225]]

President must have, whenever appropriate, the ability to influence an 
adversary through the various forms of covert action, properly 
oversighted, of course.
  For that reason, Mr. Speaker, our conference report provides 
additional funding for development of the Intelligence Community's 
covert action capabilities.
  Rebuilding and refining our HUMINT, our SIGINT, our IMINT, and our 
covert action capabilities are central to the conference report 
accompanying H.R. 1555. In addition, we address legislatively a number 
of specific issues that have arisen with regard to the use and the 
oversight of these capabilities.
  In section 309 of our conference report, we direct the National 
Security Agency, the NSA, to report in detail on the legal standards 
that it employs for the interception of communications. I can report, 
notwithstanding this provision, that the committee has substantial 
insight into the action of the NSA and the guidance of its legal staff. 
I have thus far no reason to believe that the NSA is not scrupulous in 
following the Constitution and the laws conducting its SIGINT mission. 
However, our job is oversight and we take it seriously.
  In section 311 of our conference report, we require that the Director 
of Central Intelligence report to Congress on any involvement of U.S. 
intelligence agencies in the abuses of the Pinochet regime in Chile. In 
response to public and Congressional interest, I have introduced 
legislation with Senator Moynihan that would coordinate and expedite 
the gathering and dissemination of such information. The story of U.S. 
intelligence in Chile, whether good or bad, inspiring or embarrassing, 
is part of American history. Such stories should, to the extent 
possible, be provided to the American people. I am hopeful that Senator 
Moynihan and I have introduced the means to make that happen, and I 
believe we have.
  Finally, in title VIII of our conference report, we provide the 
President with an important new tool against the menace of foreign drug 
lords who poison our cities. In title VIII, called ``The Foreign 
Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act,'' the President and the Secretary of 
Treasury may publicly identify foreign drug lords and block their 
transactions and assets. Title VIII extends an executive order against 
Colombian drug lords to include all foreign drug lords. It provides the 
President with a new way to use intelligence in the war on drugs. It is 
long overdue. It is a tried and tested measure. It works and we need to 
use it.
  Mr. Speaker, only through a cooperative, bipartisan effort could our 
committee have addressed so wide a range of authorizations and 
legislative provisions in this conference report, and also, 
incidentally, with such a good professional staff as we have.
  The ideas and counsel of the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), 
our ranking member, form a major part of this report. It draws as well 
on the considerable expertise of the Democratic staff of this 
committee. And I am pleased to say our committee in my view works on a 
very close, bipartisan, cooperative basis and the results of that are 
evident to all.
  Our work together on this conference report is a part of an annual 
demonstration that partisanship, like beepers and cell phones, actually 
get checked at the outer door of our committee before Members can come 
into our committee's spaces.
  In sum, Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of a strong bipartisan 
conference report that provides funding and direction for the 
Intelligence Community of the next millennium. It also provides 
legislation that addresses oversight issues and expands the use of 
intelligence in the war on drugs. I urge Members to support this 
conference.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise to support the conference report. First of all, 
let me congratulate the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss), the 
chairman of our committee, because I think many times not only I, but 
the staff and other Members thought that we would never reach the floor 
today. It was due to his diligence and the staff's diligence that we 
are here today with what I think is a fine conference report.
  I also would like to thank John Millis and his staff and Mike Sheehy, 
our minority counsel, and our staff for working in a very cooperative 
manner. There is one gentleman on the majority staff who is not present 
today and that is Tim Sample. That is because his father, Robert 
Sample, passed away recently. But Tim has done an outstanding job for 
us, and I know the House extends its sympathy to Tim Sample and his 
family.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to make special mention of two issues 
addressed in the conference report. Recently, the National 
Reconnaissance Office announced the award of a contract to produce the 
next generation of imagery satellites. These devices will vastly 
increase the amount of imagery which can be collected. Collection, 
however, is not the only element in the production of imagery 
intelligence. Equally important are the elements of tasking, 
processing, exploitation and dissemination, known collectively as TPED.
  Mr. Speaker, to shortchange TPED is to guarantee that the benefit of 
investments in collection systems will never be fully realized. The 
imbalance between TPED and collection is now at a critical stage, not 
because its consequences will be felt in the next month, but because 
there is no evidence that the executive branch is serious about 
addressing it adequately in the next few budget submissions.
  The conferees agreed to report language which I think is strong and 
makes clear if the administration cannot budget appropriately for TPED, 
the scale of the collection system should be modified. There is 
adequate time in which to assess the resolve of the executive branch on 
this matter, but in my judgment we are long past the point where we can 
merely exhort the leadership in the defense and intelligence agencies 
to bring collection and TPED into balance. The report language is 
intended to be helpful, but there should be no mistaking the 
frustration of the conferees with past efforts to achieve realistic 
budget submissions on this matter.
  Mr. Speaker, last week the House adopted overwhelmingly the so-called 
drug kingpin legislation which would be used to identify foreign 
individuals and entities that play a significant role in international 
narcotics trafficking. The bill also provides for the blocking of 
access to the assets in the United States of those individuals and 
entities, as well as the assets of those who assist or provide 
financial or technical support to them.
  That legislation is contained in this conference report in place of 
an amendment on the same issue which had been adopted during the 
consideration of the intelligence authorization bill in the Senate.
  During the debate in the House on the drug kingpin measure, concerns 
were raised about the impact the bill could have on the property of 
United States persons who might have a business relationship with an 
individual or entity identified as a significant narcotics trafficker, 
even if the relationship was not directly related to the trafficking 
activities. Similar concerns may be raised today. Some have asserted 
that the bill would preclude judicial review of an action to block 
access to the assets of a United States person. I would be extremely 
concerned by that result.
  Others contend that the Administrative Procedures Act and the Federal 
court system would be available to a United States person who desires 
to challenge an asset-blocking action under the bill.
  Mr. Speaker, the conferees did not intend to create a situation in 
which the ability of a United States person to challenge an asset-
blocking action under the bill would be less than the ability of a 
foreign person. To ensure that an unintended consequence did not result 
in this area, the conferees agreed to include a provision which would 
establish a commission to examine the judicial review questions raised

[[Page 29226]]

by the drug kingpin measure and report its findings to the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee on the Judiciary, and the 
Committee on International Relations.
  If the commission concludes that due process concerns raised about 
this legislation are legitimate, I expect that the Congress will take 
prompt and immediate action.
  Mr. Speaker, intelligence programs play an important role in our 
national security. The conference report strengthens many of those 
programs and I urge its adoption.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. McCollum), a distinguished member of the committee, a 
chairman of one of our subcommittees, the Subcommittee on Human 
Intelligence, Analysis and Counterintelligence, a Member who has 
distinguished himself as leading in the efforts in the war on 
terrorism.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to take the time at this 
moment to support this bill. I join in supporting H.R. 1555. The bill 
is a good one. It reflects a great deal of work by Members and the 
staffs of the two committees of jurisdiction.
  Mr. Speaker, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Intelligence, 
Analysis and Counterintelligence, I am especially glad to report the 
committee's mark has addressed a wide range of pressing requirements in 
each of the subcommittee's areas of responsibility. The bill continues 
the committee's multiyear effort to rebuild our Nation's human 
intelligence capabilities, as the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) has 
remarked earlier. These have been depleted over the years and are now 
being rebuilt, as they have been over the last several years, and this 
bill adds enormously to that.
  The bill also includes much-needed support for both the intelligence 
and law enforcement communities to beef up our counterintelligence 
programs in a responsible and carefully targeted effort. I am equally 
pleased that this legislation provides resources for improving our 
analytical efforts towards emerging threats in such diverse 
environments as Colombia, North Korea and the former Soviet Union.
  Among the most significant provisions in the conference report is 
title VIII, otherwise known as The Foreign Narcotics Kingpins 
Designation Act. The House considered and approved this legislation 
just last week as a stand-alone measure. I am happy to report that the 
House's action was instrumental in persuading the Senate to incorporate 
the House-passed kingpins language as a part of this conference report.
  Based on the success of President Clinton's 1995 executive order 
targeting the finances of the Cali Cartel kingpins, I strongly believe 
that the enactment of this legislation will permit our Nation to fight 
the war against major narcotics traffickers smarter and with greater 
precision.
  The kingpins legislation gives the President additional legal and 
financial tools to go after the world's most significant drug kingpins. 
By building on the legal and administrative precedents established 
during the 4-year development of the Colombia-focused program, the 
cosponsors and the administration sought to ensure sufficient legal 
protection for the innocent, while intensifying the pressure on foreign 
persons and foreign businesses involved in large-scale narcotics 
trafficking and money laundering activities.
  This mechanism is intended to respond to the emerging threat posed by 
these global criminals and their organizations. Based on the success 
obtained to date against the Colombians, it is my expectation that this 
policy tool could be used with equal success against drug lords based 
in Southeast and Southwest Asia, Europe, the Former Soviet Union, and 
elsewhere in Latin America. To ensure that the new tool is properly 
funded and staffed, I would urge the administration provide the 
necessary personnel and resources within its fiscal year 2001 budget 
submissions to the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets 
Control and to the relevant units of the Intelligence Community.
  Mr. Speaker, it strikes me that by going after the assets of these 
kingpins in the United States, we have a great opportunity to destroy 
the cartels in ways we otherwise would not, and this is the strongest 
tool to date.
  Mr. Speaker, I strongly support the Intelligence authorization 
conference report before us today, and I urge all of my colleagues to 
do so.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. McCOLLUM. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. McCollum) 
stated a moment ago that in title VIII of the bill, the rights of 
innocent persons are protected----
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). The time of the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. McCollum) has expired.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Sisisky).
  Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the conference 
agreement on H.R. 1555, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2000. First, let me take this opportunity to congratulate the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), for his efforts in producing a 
bipartisan bill that addresses the intelligence needs of policymakers 
and our military.
  Additionally, praise must also be extended to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Dixon), our ranking Democratic member, for his work in 
helping to craft this important piece of legislation and for his 
leadership on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  Mr. Speaker, this bill is very consistent with the requests submitted 
by the President. In several areas, the committee recommends modest 
increases in the request. The committee has recommended additional 
funding for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance airborne 
platforms that were so important during Operation Allied Force and 
continue to be critical in the Balkans, Korea and for counterdrug 
activities.
  During Operation Allied Force, we had no ground forces deployed to 
drive the Serbs into the open, so intelligence surveillance and 
reconnaissance airborne platforms provided the eyes and ears for our 
commanders, air crews and targeteers.

                              {time}  1615

  Without these platforms, we would have had little success against 
mobile targets. These platforms provided unprecedented levels of 
information to our warfighters.
  This funding is critical. The military services have not provided 
sufficient funding for these very high-demand, low-density assets. For 
a small campaign like Allied Force, the European Command found it 
necessary, not only to dedicate all their intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance airborne platforms, leaving forces in Bosnia and 
Saudi Arabia vulnerable, but platforms had to also be borrowed from 
other theaters.
  Operation Allied Force proved the value of our investment in unmanned 
aerial vehicles or UAV's. The Army Hunter unmanned aerial vehicle was 
flown aggressively and successfully during the air campaign and UAV's 
are essential for peacekeeping operations in the U.S. sector of Kosovo 
today. The bill rightly contains increased funding for unmanned aerial 
vehicles.
  The committee strongly believes that it is not enough to just develop 
intelligence collection platforms; a corresponding investment must be 
made in the people and the systems that task, process, exploit, and 
disseminate what is collected.
  Collection systems are costly enough, but will be of little value if 
the data cannot be immediately analyzed and disseminated to support 
rapid retargeting or other time-critical activities. The committee has 
put a tough provision in the conference report to address this issue 
and expects the administration to remedy imbalances in the imagery 
architecture.
  Mr. Speaker, this bill would provide the funds that are needed to 
sustain

[[Page 29227]]

our efforts to combat terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and weapons 
proliferation. I am pleased to support the bill. I urge my colleagues 
to support it as well.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, it is my privilege to yield 5 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Lewis), the vice chairman 
of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and there be no 
daylight between us, appropriator of the committee who has done a 
marvelous job of making sure the authorization and the appropriations 
match up, and I offer my congratulations to him.
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from 
Florida (Chairman Goss) very much for his remarks as well as his time.
  Mr. Speaker, in the years I have served in the Congress, I hold in 
the highest regard the work that I have done with the Members of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in the House and in the 
other body as well. But, particularly, I want to express my 
appreciation to the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) as well as 
to the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) and their very fine staffs 
for the conference report they have developed this year.
  I also want to extend my appreciation for their patience with me as I 
have gone about learning the work that swirls around the Subcommittee 
on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations this year. I have not 
been available as nearly as much as I would have liked, but their 
patience is much appreciated as well as their help.
  I want to spend a few minutes discussing what I view perhaps is the 
most important action taken in this conference report. It should come 
as no surprise to anyone who follows unclassified discussions of our 
intelligence capabilities that we are at the beginning of building a 
space-borne imagery intelligence capability that is meant to take us 
through the next several decades.
  This capability, usually known as FIA for the term ``future imagery 
architecture,'' will be an incredible improvement over what we can now 
do. The satellites promise to deliver many times the data at a much-
reduced interval between pictures. It has the potential to 
revolutionize the way we employ our military. It can also greatly 
complicate the lives of those terrorists, drug lords, and weapons 
proliferators who threaten our national security. For this reason, 
Congress has been supportive of FIA.
  FIA, to be carried out over the next decade or so, will be the most 
expensive program in the history of the intelligence community. Over 
the last 2 years, Congress has imposed spending caps on the program to 
make sure its costs will not overwhelm the limited money that is 
available for our intelligence work.
  Despite this imposition of those spending caps, there remain severe 
problems with FIA. We on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
are gravely concerned that the program as currently planned has the 
potential of being the biggest white elephant in U.S. intelligence 
history.
  Now, why would I suggest that? Well, why? Because there is, 
effectively, no money budgeted now to task the satellites, process the 
digital data they collect, exploit the information coming from the 
data, and then disseminate the information to the national policymaker, 
the President perhaps, the analysts, or the military unit that needs 
the information. The best that we can do is hope, in the current 
circumstances.
  Let me say that, for 4 years, Congress has warned that the 
intelligence and the defense communities must keep up to the need to 
fund the activities to step up to that need to fund these activities to 
make the system useful. The tasking, the processing, exploitation and 
dissemination, what we call TPED, has got to have that fundamental 
support.
  We have been told do not worry, we will take care of it. All the 
while, we get candid comments from the executive branch that, in 
reality, there is no plan to fund TPED and not even an understanding of 
how we ought to go about it.
  In this bill, Congress has told the administration enough is enough. 
We have said that, unless there is a plan implemented that will process 
the satellite data that FIA will collect, we will not buy the satellite 
system as currently proposed. In English, it does not do any good to 
take pictures that no one will ever see.
  We are hopeful the administration will step up to the challenge, that 
the military services who are to be the principal beneficiaries will 
step up and help pay for the bill, and that the intelligence community 
will also help by finding priorities that it, too, can set aside for a 
while. If not, they must next year join with us to rethink this hugely 
expensive program so as to downsize it and somehow find other savings 
in its development that will allow us to fund the TPED functions 
without which FIA will be worthless.
  This has been a difficult matter, and I am proud of how the members 
of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligences have dealt with this 
head on. We are all advocates of a strong intelligence community, but 
such advocacy must be guided by good sense, good judgment, and a 
jealous protection of taxpayers' dollars. It is time to pay the bill 
for taking the intelligence community into the new millennium.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop), who is the ranking member on the 
Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence.
  Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Dixon) for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, it is my privilege to serve as the ranking member of the 
Subcommittee on Tactical and Technical Intelligence. This subcommittee 
oversees intelligence collected by technical means, such as satellites 
and airplanes and ships.
  During debate on this bill in the House, I urged my colleagues to 
support the legislation; and I applauded the gentleman from Florida 
(Chairman Goss) for his respect of the views of the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Dixon), the ranking member, and of all of the Democrats 
on the committee. I commended as well the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. 
Castle), chairman of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical 
Intelligence.
  I believe that this conference report deserves the same endorsement 
from the House. It is consistent with the administration's request. It 
is fair, and it will enhance our nation's security.
  I want to point out to my colleagues that this conference report is 
the only authorization for those intelligence activities of a 
distinctly national character. The intelligence activities that are 
unique to the Department of Defense are conferenced with the armed 
services committees, and the authorization of those activities appears 
in both the National Defense Authorization Act and the Intelligence 
Authorization Act. These DoD-unique intelligence activities make up a 
large fraction of the nation's overall intelligence budget.
  This conference report would add about 1 percent to the President's 
request for national intelligence activities. As with the House version 
of the bill, there would be modest increases in the budgets for 
activities centered in the National Security Agency, the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency, and somewhat 
less money for the National Reconnaissance Office, which manages the 
acquisition of our intelligence satellites.
  I am pleased that we have fully funded the major satellite 
acquisition programs, including the new future imagery architecture, or 
FIA. These new imagery satellites will greatly increase the volume of 
imagery we can collect, as well as provide for more frequent coverage 
of targets, which together will address deficiencies identified in 
Operation Desert Storm and more recent conflicts.
  However, these enhanced collection capabilities will not count for 
much unless we also invest in the means to exploit and disseminate the 
imagery on the ground. On this score, executive branch planning has 
been extremely poor. The conference report would require a reduction in 
planned collection

[[Page 29228]]

capabilities unless substantial improvements are planned for 
exploitation and dissemination.
  I would also like to call attention to significant problems at the 
National Security Agency. The NSA is facing tremendous challenges 
coping with the explosive development of commercial communications and 
computer technology. As the new NSA director has pointed out, while the 
new technology is providing incredible benefits to our Nation's 
security and economy, it is taxing in the extreme to those charged with 
intercepting the communications of hostile powers and drug lords. At 
the same time, NSA has not demonstrated much prowess in coping with the 
challenge.
  The new director of NSA, I believe, grasps the seriousness of the 
situation. I hope that we have made progress in focusing the attention 
of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence on 
this critical issue.
  Fixing NSA's internal problems is only half the answer. A sustained 
funding increase of some magnitude will also probably be necessary, and 
there are no obvious candidates yet for offsetting cuts. Action, 
however, is imperative since the nation cannot navigate with an 
impaired sense of hearing.
  In closing, Mr. Speaker, this is a responsible bill that will enhance 
our nation's security. It supports our military forces and our efforts 
to combat terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and weapons proliferation. 
I am pleased to endorse it, and I urge my colleagues on both sides of 
the aisle to support it as well.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, might I make an inquiry of how much time 
remains on both sides.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). The gentleman from Florida 
(Mr. Goss) has 15 minutes remaining. The gentleman from California (Mr. 
Dixon) has 17\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, it is my privilege to yield 3 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle), chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence, the former 
governor of Delaware, who is going to tell us about that subcommittee.
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman from 
Florida, the chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, for yielding to me, and I thank him for the tremendous 
work that he does for this country, something that is probably not 
recognized by many people any place in the country other than people in 
the intelligence community because of the closed nature of what we do.
  The gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) also is a superb individual 
in that committee who has helped so much with the intelligence 
responsibilities of the country.
  I would like to also thank the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop) 
who just spoke, who is the ranking member on the subcommittee which I 
do chair, which is the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical 
Intelligence.
  I also rise in full support of this conference report for the fiscal 
year 2000 intelligence authorization.
  As chair of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence, 
I would like to highlight a few major points of committee emphasis over 
the past year in areas of technical and tactical intelligence.
  We spent a great deal of time investigating the Chinese embassy 
bombing. As a subcommittee, we looked at satellite launch failures and 
intelligence support for military operations. There has been 
considerable emphasis on the requirements for future satellites and on 
associated production issues, and a lot of investigation and questions 
focused on revitalization of our Signals Intelligence capability at the 
National Security Agency.
  I am keenly aware of the vital contributions of space-based assets to 
the United States national security, and there clearly is a future. 
From diplomacy to precision strikes, our assets in space are essential 
for confident planning and execution of policy. Continuity in satellite 
operations hinges on another critical program, space launch.
  Therefore, the large number of recent launch failures became an issue 
of intense concern for me personally. Several ongoing investigations 
are examining reasons for the failures. There is no doubt that the 
issue is being taken seriously and that very competent government and 
industry personnel are working to identify and to resolve problems.

                              {time}  1630

  However, because the cost of each failure can be so enormous, we must 
strive for the right balance of independent assessments. The committee 
will continue to scrutinize the launch issues and exercise its 
oversight duties. Depending on the results of ongoing studies, I am 
considering a legislative provision mandating review by an independent 
panel.
  In our hearings on support for the military, a predominant theme was 
the continued imbalance between collection and other intelligence 
assets. For years, the committee has stressed the need for better 
planning and financing of intelligence processing, analysis and 
dissemination. This year we are insisting that our future imagery 
satellite capabilities be at least roughly balanced with ground 
capabilities.
  Signals intelligence has also suffered from gaps in what we call 
``end to end'' capability, as well as from enormous leaps in target 
technology. For several years, the committee has insisted that changes 
are needed at the National Security Agency in order to modernize our 
SIGINT capabilities and improve efficiency.
  The committee is most gratified that the new director of NSA, 
Lieutenant General Mike Hayden, agreed to conduct unrestrained studies 
of the need for reform, using both an internal and an external team. 
These studies were just completed. Both endorsed previous committee 
findings identifying systemic obstacles to efficiency and change. The 
difficult part, sorting and implementing solutions proposed by the 
teams, soon begins. General Hayden has our strong support for decisive 
action that will, by nature, be controversial.
  We will not rest easy until SIGINT is once again healthy.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Roemer), a very valuable member of our committee.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California for 
yielding me this time, and I also want to thank him and the chairman 
for their patience, their insight and their help to a new member of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for the past 11 months.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise to note the importance of a strong and effective 
intelligence community. Dating back over 220 years, certainly General 
George Washington started our intelligence community with the help of 
such brave patriots as Nathan Hale, who we lost in the first 
intelligence operation when he was hung by the British. That history 
and that importance continues as an important thread through the United 
States efforts in our military history and in our history to be 
effective in gleaning information from around the world.
  If my colleagues read the report, it is equally important, if not 
even more important today, to have a cost effective and efficacious 
intelligence community. We deal with such issues as direct cooperation 
with our military in conflict. Nothing is more important than getting 
that information in a very timely methodology to our troops in battle.
  We have in this report international narcotics trafficking. Very 
important for the security of our young people. We have 
counterintelligence and anti-terrorism efforts. Very important for the 
security of our country. Anti-proliferation of nuclear weapons, where 
we work very closely with the intelligence community. And a fourth 
area, cyber warfare, where other countries can either organize or hack 
into our defense capabilities or our business capabilities, something 
that we need to look at in even more important and focused ways. So for 
these reasons I think it is even more important for the intelligence 
community to be more effective in what they do.

[[Page 29229]]

  The 1996 report on the Roles and Capability of the Intelligence 
Community, Preparing for the 21st Century, issued by Harold Brown and 
Warren Rudman, pointed out four areas that we need to improve in, and I 
strongly encourage the intelligence community, with the help of our 
chairman and our ranking member and our bipartisan work, to get better 
in their cost effectiveness. We had a terrible mistake in the bombing 
in Kosovo of the Chinese embassy. That is not an issue of money, that 
is an issue of doing the basic job of mapping.
  Secondly, the coordination between the intelligence agencies. We need 
integrated capabilities.
  Thirdly, we need to improve the capabilities of the intelligence 
estimates. They were not particularly accurate in making and measuring 
the breakup of the former Soviet Union.
  And, fourthly, making sure we have a balance between the human 
intelligence and the satellite intelligence. Both are very important 
for our national security. I hope we can balance these efforts in the 
coming year and have a budget that reflects cost effectiveness.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Nadler).
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, it has been said that truth is the first 
casualty in war. It is also true that constitutional liberty can be a 
casualty of war. Certainly when it comes to the so-called war on drugs, 
we are very casual about sacrificing our liberties.
  Title VIII of this bill, the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation 
Act, empowers the President to designate people as ``significant 
foreign narcotics traffickers.'' Once designated, all property in the 
United States of such a person is seized. Any American who does any 
business with him can be jailed for 10 years and fined $10 million. All 
this without any criteria for such designation in the bill. All this 
without any evidence being necessary. No notice, no hearing, no 
opportunity to be heard, no protection for the innocent, and no 
judicial review.
  Even the Anti-terrorism Act of 1996 allows a group designated by the 
person as a foreign terrorist organization the right to challenge the 
designation in court. But not this bill. No judicial review. The 
President is given the powers of a pre-Magna Carta King of England to 
accuse and find guilty with no due process, no process at all, and no 
appeal.
  In 1951, the Supreme Court, in the case of Joint Anti-Fascist 
Committee vs. McGrath, said that the Fifth Amendment due process clause 
barred the government from condemning organizations as Communists 
without giving them notice and opportunity to be heard in their own 
defense. This title gives no notice, no opportunity to be heard, and no 
appeal. It is clearly unconstitutional and grossly subversive of the 
liberty for which this country stands and which we are sworn to uphold.
  It is a travesty that this very important and very dangerous title 
was rushed through this House without any hearings and without any 
committee review. This title alone richly merits the defeat of the 
entire conference report, and I will urge my colleagues to vote against 
the report because of this title.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire about the remaining balances of 
time for both sides?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). The gentleman from Florida 
(Mr. Goss) has 11\1/2\ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Dixon) has 12\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Pelosi).
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time and for his leadership, as well as for the leadership of our 
distinguished chairman, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
  One of the provisions of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2000 which I have been most interested in is an amendment 
offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey) during floor 
consideration of this bill. The Hinchey amendment required the Director 
of Central Intelligence to produce a report on the activities of the 
officers, covert agents, and employees of the intelligence community 
with respect to the Pinochet regime in Chile.
  The Hinchey amendment was somewhat controversial. It was very 
controversial in fact. It was argued that the search for documents 
related to human rights violations in Chile directed by the National 
Security Council was sufficient and nothing further was needed. The 
issue of cost was also raised, as was the question of how much time 
should be allotted for the DCI to produce an adequate report on the 
subject.
  Others of us argued that a report was needed on U.S. intelligence 
activities in Chile with respect to the assassination of President 
Allende, the accession of General Pinochet, and the violations of human 
rights committed by officers and agents of Pinochet. Indeed, such a 
report is long overdue.
  An authoritative report from the DCI submitted to the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations on 
the role of the CIA and other elements of the intelligence community 
will put into context the information that is now being reviewed, 
declassified, and released under the direction of the National Security 
Council. I believe this report should make clear exactly what, if 
anything, the CIA was doing in concert with General Pinochet and his 
supporters before and during the Pinochet regime.
  Mr. Speaker, I would have preferred to have had a report produced 
within 4 or 6 months of enactment of this bill, but I am grateful to 
the chairman, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), and our 
distinguished ranking member, the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Dixon), for their leadership. We were able to agree that the report be 
produced in no later than 270 days after enactment and not a year from 
now, as some would have preferred. I commend the gentlemen for 
including this in the legislation.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Hinchey).
  Mr. HINCHEY. Mr. Speaker, I also want to commend the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss), the ranking member, the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Dixon), and also my good friend, the gentlewoman from California 
(Ms. Pelosi), for their hard work in forging this legislation.
  The conference report includes my amendment, which was adopted by the 
House on a voice vote back in May, requiring the CIA to report to 
Congress on its activities in Chile during the early 1970s. It is time 
that the Central Intelligence Agency accounted for its role in the 
military coup that toppled the democratically elected government of 
Salvador Allende and led to his death. The American people need to know 
how our government supported the rise of Augusto Pinochet, a ruthless 
dictator who systematically murdered and tortured his enemies.
  General Pinochet has been under house arrest in London for the past 
year awaiting trial in Spain for his crimes against humanity. The 
British courts recently upheld the Spanish judge's petition to 
extradite him.
  Last year, the National Security Agency directed the CIA and other 
government departments and agencies to disclose relevant information 
regarding Pinochet's military coup and subsequent crimes against 
humanity. The CIA has not yet complied with this order and has released 
only a handful of documents to this date. My amendment will ensure that 
the CIA releases these documents and accounts for its activities during 
this dark period in Chile's history.
  Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the willingness of the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss) to work with me on this issue, and I thank him very 
much for that. I also thank our ranking member, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Dixon), and also the gentlewoman from California (Ms. 
Pelosi) for their strong and effective advocacy on behalf of my 
amendment. I know full well that our success would not have been 
possible

[[Page 29230]]

had it not been for their diligence, attention and good work.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Nevada 
(Mr. Gibbons), a decorated colleague and member of our committee from 
somewhere west of the Mississippi, who has been invaluable in advising 
me on military equipment, Air Force needs, and other needs of that ilk, 
and who adds a great deal of value to the committee.
  Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the conference 
report for the intelligence authorization bill, and I want to thank my 
friend from Florida, somewhere east of the Mississippi, and the 
chairman of the committee for yielding me this time.
  This past year, Mr. Speaker, has been a challenging one for the 
intelligence community, particularly in the area of support for our 
military operations. The United States launched a heavy 4-day offensive 
against Iraq in the late time frame of December 1998 and fought a war 
over Kosovo and Serbia earlier this year, all this while our pilots are 
enforcing the no-fly zones over Iraq. Meanwhile, crises or potential 
crises in other parts of the world, like the Taiwan Strait, Korea, 
Indonesia, India and Pakistan, and the Caucasus keep our military on a 
high state of alert.
  Ten years today after the fall of the Berlin Wall I think it is safe 
to say, Mr. Speaker, that the post-Cold War honeymoon is over. With the 
men and women of our armed forces deployed across the world, it is 
especially important that we meet the pressing need for intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance, or ISR, to support their missions and 
provide for their protection.
  For several years, members of the intelligence community have 
recognized that American ISR resources and personnel are stretched 
thin, and we have searched for ways to address these shortfalls. This 
year, airborne ISR was one of the committee's very top priorities, and 
I believe this conference report reflects that. Mr. Speaker, while we 
have not solved all the ISR problems, this bill takes concrete steps 
toward providing the accurate, timely intelligence and warnings 
necessary to save American lives and win the battles on the ground and 
in the air.

                              {time}  1645

  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this conference report.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I again want to urge adoption of this report. I think it 
is a fine work product. The gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) raises 
an issue of due process. It is my feeling, Mr. Speaker, although there 
is some controversy, that there is nothing in this bill that abrogates 
existing rights of U.S. persons to address their grievance either 
through the Administrative Procedure Act or ultimately in a Federal 
district court.
  But just in case there is a question on that, and there is, we have 
provided in this conference report a commission to examine that issue. 
As I indicated in my opening comments, I hope the commission would act 
expeditiously on this matter. I think that is sufficient to cover that 
issue.
  Once again, I would like to thank the chairman of the committee for 
his cooperation and all the members of the committee for their efforts.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Dixon) very much for his hard work and close teamwork and the great 
spirit of bipartisanship and concern for our country and its national 
security that he brings himself and his members and, in fact, all our 
members to the committee.
  I am exceedingly proud of our committee. I am very proud of the 
membership. The value added of each and every Member brings to the 
committee a wide variety of view and opinion across the country of the 
gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons), who just spoke who represents vast 
areas of countryside, and others who represent more concentrated, 
consolidated urban areas.
  We have what I think is a very balanced perspective of the United 
States of America and its national security needs. But behind as good a 
membership team as that, I would say we have the finest professional 
staff on the Hill. I would measure them against any other professional 
staff. I take great pride in them. And again, I do not make 
distinctions about party affiliation.
  Mr. Millis, our chief of staff, does an excellent job, as does Mike 
Shehy. Both of them I treat as co-equals in running the affairs of the 
committee. Pat Murray, our general counsel. We have had an expression 
today of sympathy that is both personal and collective from all of us 
to our budget cruncher, Tim Sample. But for all those names I just 
mentioned, there are other members of the committee that have equally 
pulled the oars just as well in their own area of expertise and deserve 
to be recognized and thanked by all of America for the work they do.
  I think that the points that needed to come out other than the basic 
themes that we have made clear in this authorization process, which I 
point out are exactly in line with the appropriations process, and have 
gone through a very arduous conference process with our colleagues in 
the other body, we have covered the ground that we needed to cover; and 
I think we covered it very well.
  We certainly have taken into consideration what our other colleagues 
who are not on the committee have brought forward during this long, 
deliberative process this year since the authorization bill began, as 
we have heard in some of the testimonies from the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Hinchey). And there are many other Members who have brought 
matters forward, I think the gentleman from New York (Mr. Sweeney), the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Waters), and the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Barr). Several come to mind.
  We have tried to accommodate in every way their concerns. We may not 
have done it in exactly the way they asked, but they have gotten 
consideration and I think a reasonable result out of this.
  The gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) has expressed concern about 
our title XIII. I would point out that our title XIII, as the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Dixon) just pointed out, basically is the same as 
what this House has passed recently on a vote of 385-26. The language 
is virtually the same. But in an abundance of caution and fair play and 
deliberation to make sure that we have got it right, we have gone 
forward with the idea of a panel to review the situation just to be 
extra sure because these are important rights we are talking about.
  I think it is that kind of fair play and that kind of reasonableness 
in dealing with legitimate concerns that this committee needs to be 
attentive to, and I think we have passed that test. I stand forth here 
today to ask every Member of this House to proudly support this piece 
of legislation. I believe it is worthy of their vote.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Speaker, I have deep concerns about the amount and 
use of the funds authorized by H.R. 1555, the Intelligence 
Authorization bill for fiscal year 2000. However, I am especially 
gratified that the Conference Committee included Section 313, 
``Reaffirmation of Longstanding Prohibition Against-Drug Trafficking by 
Employees of the Intelligence Community,'' in the conference report.
  Section 313 clearly states that the employees of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other intelligence agencies are 
prohibited from participating in drug trafficking activities. Drug 
trafficking is clearly defined to include the manufacture, purchase, 
sale, transport or distribution of illegal drugs. Section 313 also 
requires CIA employees to report known or suspected drug trafficking 
activities to the appropriate authorities. Section 313 is based on an 
amendment that I offered during floor consideration of H.R. 1555. The 
House adopted my amendment by voice vote on May 13, 1999.
  Most Americans would assume that the CIA would never traffic in 
illegal drugs and would take all necessary actions to prosecute known 
drug traffickers. History, however, has proven that this is not the 
case.

[[Page 29231]]

  For 13 years, the CIA and the Department of Justice followed a 
Memorandum of Understanding that explicitly exempted the CIA from 
requirements to report drug trafficking by CIA assets, agents, and 
contractors to federal law enforcement agencies. This allowed some of 
the biggest drug lords in the world to operate without fear that their 
activities would be reported to the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) or 
any other law enforcement authorities. This remarkable--and secret--
agreement was in force from February 1982 until August of 1995.
  For the past three years, I have been investigating the allegations 
of drug trafficking by the Nicaraguan Contras during the 1980's. My 
investigation has led me to the conclusion that U.S. intelligence 
agencies knew about drug trafficking by the Contras in South Central 
Los Angeles and throughout the United States and chose to continue to 
support the Contras without taking any action to stop the drug 
trafficking.
  Even more remarkable is the fact that there is evidence that the CIA 
has actually participated in drug trafficking activities. In the late 
1980's, the CIA began to develop intelligence on the Colombian drug 
cartels. To infiltrate the cartels, the CIA arranged an undercover 
drug-smuggling operation with the Venezuelan National Guard. More than 
one and one-half tons of cocaine were smuggled from Colombia into 
Venezuela and then stored at a CIA-financed Counternarcotics 
Intelligence Center in Venezuela.
  In certain circumstances, the DEA arranges ``controlled shipments'' 
of illegal drugs, in which the drugs are allowed to enter the United 
States and then tracked to their destination and seized. However, in 
this case, the CIA was more interested in keeping the drug lords happy 
than confiscating the drugs and prosecuting the traffickers. The CIA 
asked the DEA for permission to ``let the dope walk,'' that is allow 
the drugs to be sold on our nation's streets. The DEA refused, but the 
CIA ushered the drugs into the United States anyway.
  On November 19, 1990, a shipment of 800 pounds of cocaine was seized 
by the U.S. Customs Service at the Miami International Airport. Customs 
traced the cocaine back to the Venezuelan National Guard and the CIA. 
Unfortunately, we may never know precisely how much cocaine entered the 
United States through the CIA's pipeline or how much eventually reached 
our nation's streets. No one at the CIA was ever charged.
  The inclusion of Section 313 in H.R. 1555 sends a clear message to 
our nation's intelligence community: intelligence employees, agents and 
assets are not above the law. The CIA should be working to stop the 
harmful trafficking in illegal drugs that is destroying our 
communities. It should not be assisting the drug traffickers.
  I appreciate the support of my colleagues on this important issue and 
I especially appreciate the willingness of the conferees to include 
Section 313 in the conference report for H.R. 1555.
  Despite the inclusion of Section 313, I am deeply concerned about the 
amount and use of the funds authorized by H.R. 1555. The United States 
government spends tremendous amounts of money on covert activities, 
espionage and other intelligence activities with little congressional 
oversight and without the knowledge or support of the American people. 
Spending on intelligence activities should be decreased considerably 
and congressional oversight over intelligence agencies must be 
improved. Furthermore, I cannot in good conscience support an 
intelligence authorization bill as long as the total amount of funds 
spent on intelligence activities remains classified and unknown to the 
people we are elected to represent.
  I therefore must urge my colleagues to oppose H.R. 1555.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I 
move the previous question on the conference report.
  The previous question was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaTourette). The question is on the 
conference report.
  The conference report was agreed to.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

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