[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 20]
[House]
[Page 29179]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[[Page 29179]]

ANTIDUMPING AND ANTISUBSIDY PROVISIONS SHOULD NOT BE NEGOTIATED AWAY IN 
                            NEW ROUND OF WTO

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of 
January 19, 1999, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Visclosky) is 
recognized during morning hour debates for 4 minutes.
  Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Speaker, I rise to press my argument that as the 
new round of WTO negotiations begin in Seattle later this month, we 
should support the administration's position not to negotiate away the 
antidumping and antisubsidy provisions of our trade laws.
  I would also ask that this House vote to support this position by 
supporting H. Res. 298.
  Seattle is the follow-on to the Uruguay Round which was completed on 
April 15, 1994, and signed by ministers from over 125 countries. Part 
of this agreement included changes to the antidumping laws which had 
been included in GATT since its original inception in 1947. In fact, 
article 6 of the 1947 GATT states very clearly that the contracting 
parties recognize that dumping is to be condemned.
  The scope of negotiations at the Seattle round discussions of the 
World Trade Organization were specified during the Uruguay Round. 
However, some countries now are seeking to circumvent the agreed list 
of negotiating topics and reopen the debate over the WTO's antidumping 
and antisubsidy rules.
  Antidumping duties are assessed on imported merchandise that is sold 
at less than fair market value. Countervailing duties are assessed to 
reverse the effects of foreign government subsidies to manufacturers. 
Today, over 290 products from 59 countries have been found to have been 
traded in violation of these international standards.
  The ability to impose binding tariffs and apply them equitably to all 
trading partners is the key to a smooth and liberal flow of trade. Many 
of my colleagues think that this is a steel issue. That could not be 
further from the truth. The experience of the U.S. cement industry 
indicates that the antidumping law can be an effective remedy for 
unfairly priced imports.
  U.S. consumption of cement increased substantially during the 1983 to 
1989 economic expansion as construction boomed. U.S. cement producers, 
however, were prevented from benefiting in this growing demand by a 
surge of low-priced imports in that 6-year period of time.
  U.S. production capacity declined by 10 percent and the number of 
U.S. plants decreased from 142 to only 109.
  Beginning in 1989, southern cement producers successfully prosecuted 
antidumping petitions against imports from several countries. The 
Commerce Department found dumping margins for imports from 58 to 64 
percent. As a result of these measures, cement producers began their 
recovery process in our country.
  Another example often cited is that of the U.S. semiconductor 
industry in 1986. After foreign dynamic random-access memory chips, 
DRAMs, were dumped in the United States for 2 years, 7 out of 9 U.S. 
companies ceased making these chips.
  After those foreign firms dominated the world market, they raised the 
price of DRAMs. The subsequent use of U.S. antidumping laws contributed 
finally to the revival of the U.S. semiconductor industry, which in 
1993 again held the number one position in the world.
  Given the fact again that there are 230 cosponsors of House 
Resolution 298, I would renew my request to the House leaders that this 
measure be brought to the floor for a vote.

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