[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 20]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 28864-28865]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                       WTO MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE

                                 ______
                                 

                        HON. PETER J. VISCLOSKY

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                       Thursday, November 4, 1999

  Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Speaker, under Article I, Section 7 of the 
Constitution, the House of Representatives has the authority to 
originate revenue provisions; not the Senate, the Administration, or 
the U.S. Trade Representative. Later this month, the United States will 
host a Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
Seattle, Washington. The Ministerial is expected to launch a new round 
of multilateral trade negotiations, based on a ``built-in agenda'' 
established in the Uruguay Round agreements which Congress ratified in 
1994. That build-in agenda, which I whole-heartedly support, includes 
revisiting the existing WTO rules for agricultural trade, services 
trade, and intellectual property protection. Many of our trading 
partners have indicated that they would like to reopen the five year 
old agreement on Antidumping (AD) and Countervailing Duty (CVD) laws. 
By not giving the Administration the clear message from Congress that 
AD and CVD laws are not to be placed on the table for negotiations, we 
are essentially allowing the Administration to act on authority it does 
not have.
  Dumped products are levied a tariff under existing U.S. law. These 
tariffs are revenue raisers which are paid directly to the U.S. 
Treasury. By allowing negotiations to be made which weaken our trade 
laws and let in more dumped products, the House would be turning over 
power to the Executive Branch given to it exclusively under the 
Constitution. Trade agreements and international treaties, as signed by 
the Administration, are binding under international law, whether or not 
they are approved by Congress. Article 6 of the original General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), signed in 1947, declares that 
dumping ``shall not be condoned.''
  This resolution has privilege because only the House has the 
authority to alter existing revenue provisions. Allowing the 
Administration to negotiate AD and CVD laws would further diminish the 
loss of constitutional power the House has suffered over time. Strong 
antidumping and antisubsidy rules are a cornerstone of the liberal 
trade policy of the United States and are essential to the health of 
the manufacturing and farm sectors in the United States. Abolishing AD 
and CVD would remove these sectors from the U.S. economy, and lead to 
economic disaster.
  Additionally, according to Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, 
the Congress has the power and responsibility to regulate foreign 
commerce and the conduct of international trade negotiations. An 
important part of Congress' participation in the formulation of trade

[[Page 28865]]

policy is the enactment of official negotiating objectives against 
which completed agreements can be measured when presented for 
ratification.
  Congress exercised that power in 1994 when it ratified the agenda for 
the Seattle WTO Ministerial, which included agricultural trade, 
services trade, and intellectual property protection. The agenda, 
enacted into Federal Law as P.L. 103-465, did not include antidumping 
or antisubsidy rules. More than 225 Members of Congress are concerned 
that a few countries are seeking to circumvent the agreed list of 
negotiation topics and reopen debate over the WTO's antidumping and 
antisubsidy rules. Congress has not approved new negotiations on 
antidumping or antisubsidy rules and has clearly, but so far 
informally, signaled its opposition to such negotiations. It has long 
been and remains the policy of the United States, as well as the 
international community, to support its antidumping and antisubsidy 
laws and to defend those laws in international negotiations. In fact, 
Article 6 of the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), signed in 1947, declares that dumping ``shall not be 
condoned.''
  Furthermore, Section 702 of House Rule IX, entitled ``General 
Principles,'' concluded that certain matters of business arising under 
the Constitution mandatory in nature for the House have been held to 
have a privilege which superseded the rules establishing the order of 
business. This is a question of the House's Constitutional authority 
and is therefore privileged in nature. In the 105th Congress, the House 
ruled favorably on a measure which contained a constitutional question 
similar to the one before it now. On March 5, 1998, the House held that 
H. Res. 379, a resolution which stated that only the House had the 
authority to originate a revenue provision, had privilege under Rule 
IX, and then approved the resolution. This resolution was in response 
to a Senate measure which infringed upon the House's constitutional 
duty by repealing a revenue provision and replacing it with a user fee. 
H. Res. 379 had privilege before the House because the Senate provision 
was a revenue reducing measure. The question of privilege currently 
before the House concerns the same principle. A trade agreement signed 
by the President commits the United States and is binding under 
international law, even if the Congress never ratifies it. Eliminating 
or weakening AD or CVD laws would reduce United States Treasury 
receipts, thus reducing overall revenue. If these laws are placed on 
the table for negotiations, it would give the Administration the 
authority to commit the United States to agreements under power it does 
not have. For these reasons, my motion has privilege.
  The WTO antidumping and antisubsidy rules concluded in the Uruguay 
Round have scarcely been tested since they entered into effect and 
certainly have not proved defective. Opening these rules to 
renegotiation could only lead to weakening them, which would in turn 
lead to an even greater abuse of the world's open markets, particularly 
that of the United States. Avoiding another divisive fight over these 
rules is the best way to promote progress on the other, far more 
important, issues facing WTO members; and it is therefore essential 
that negotiations on these antidumping and antisubsidy matters not be 
reopened under the auspices of the WTO or otherwise. Under present 
circumstances, launching a negotiation that includes antidumping and 
antisubsidy issues would affect the rights of the House and the 
integrity of its proceedings.
  A precedent exists for bringing H. Res. 298 out of committee and to 
the House floor immediately. On October 26, 1999, H. Con. Res. 190 was 
brought to the floor under suspension of the rules because it concerned 
the upcoming Seattle Round. This measure only had 13 co-sponsors, while 
H. Res. 298 has 228 co-sponsors. The majority of the House should be 
heard.
  Two hundred and twenty-nine Members of the House of Representatives 
call upon the President: not to participate in any international 
negotiation in which antidumping or antisubsidy rules are part of the 
negotiating agenda; to refrain from submitting for congressional 
approval agreements that require changes to the current antidumping and 
countervailing duty laws and enforcement policies of the United States; 
and to enforce the antidumping and countervailing duty laws vigorously 
in all pending and future cases.
  Mr. Speaker, this debate today is not about the merits of my 
resolution, nor is it about the 228 cosponsors who would like to see 
this matter resolved before the House. My question of privilege regards 
the sanctity of our proceedings as a House. The U.S. Constitution 
conveys upon this body the power to originate revenue provisions. It is 
not only our responsibility, it is our duty and obligation to send a 
clear message to the Administration that the United States House of 
Representatives will not weaken its trade laws. We need to live up to 
our obligations.
  Mr. Speaker, since a majority of the Members of this House have 
signed onto the original resolution as cosponsors, I ask the Speaker to 
recognize any Member wishing to speak on the resolution.

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