[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 20]
[Senate]
[Pages 28376-28377]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                            SOCIAL SECURITY

  Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, I come before the Senate today to speak 
about a subject which has been the topic of much political rhetoric in 
recent days: Social Security. While there was a time when not all in 
Congress acknowledged this fact, Social Security's long-term solvency 
is crucial to today's and tomorrow's retirees. There has never been a 
more successful Government program: Social Security has helped cut the 
poverty rate of older Americans by two-thirds. We must ensure this 
program will survive well into the 21st century.
  The current dispute centers on which party is more committed to 
preservation of the Social Security program. I must say that I am 
personally pleased to see this development, which reflects the fact 
that Social Security is truly a consensus issue among the American 
people. The current debate takes place in the confusing world of arcane 
budgetary terminology and it is sometimes difficult to sort out. 
However, in evaluating the present-day claims and counterclaims, the 
historic record clearly shows that it is the Democratic Party which has 
consistently fought to protect the program since its inception in the 
Social Security Act of 1935. And though I could certainly be accused of 
being biased on the question, I believe that a close look will reveal 
unmistakably that Democratic proposals to save Social Security for 
future generations greatly surpass the recent efforts of my friends 
across the aisle in laying claim to be the protectors of Social 
Security.
  For example, let's look at the competing proposals to place a 
``lockbox'' around Social Security and see which one truly best 
protects the benefits of tomorrow's recipients.
  First, Democratic lockbox proposals establish a Social Security and 
Medicare lockbox that precludes any portion of the Social Security 
surplus or any portion of the surplus reserved for Medicare to be used 
for any purpose other than to strengthen and preserve these programs. 
Over the next 15 years, the Democratic lockbox would protect 100 
percent of the Social Security surplus each year, and one-third of any 
on-budget surplus for Medicare.
  On the other hand, the Republican lockbox proposal does not reserve 
any of the projected surpluses for Medicare, nor does it extend the 
life of the Social Security trust fund, which, under their proposals, 
will be insolvent in 2034. Furthermore, in the absence of protections 
for Medicare, this critical program is projected to be insolvent in 
2015. Perhaps most importantly, the Republican proposals include 
language which creates a large potential loophole for the lockbox 
protections. Specifically, if any legislation is designated as ``Social 
Security reform provisions''--regardless of whether such provisions 
help or hurt the interests of beneficiaries--lockbox surpluses would 
not have to be used to pay benefits and could be used for tax cuts. 
Finally, the Republican lockbox proposal does not even require that 
such Social Security ``reform'' legislation extend the solvency of the 
Social Security program. Is this meaningful, long-term protection for 
Social Security?
  Some on the other side have accused Democrats of raiding Social 
Security surpluses, yet the bipartisan Congressional Budget Office--
whose head was appointed by the Republican leadership--has determined 
that spending bills supported by the congressional majority have 
already tapped into the Social Security surplus by at least $13 
billion. In belated recognition of this fact, House Republicans have 
proposed a 1.4 percent across-the-board cut in the operating budgets of 
Federal agencies. As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I 
am loath to take a step in the wrong direction just after we have 
recently provided--on a bipartisan basis--the Department of Defense 
with much-needed budget relief for both personnel and equipment costs.

[[Page 28377]]

  But when we consider the impact of recent congressional proposals on 
the future of Social Security we must look back no further than August 
1999 when the Republican majority pushed through Congress a tax cut 
that, at the time, I labeled a ``convenient but fiscally irresponsible 
measure.'' This tax bill would have consumed virtually all of the 
projected $1 trillion non-Social Security budget surplus over the next 
10 years, without setting aside any funds for Medicare solvency. The 
direct revenue loss was estimated at $792 billion over that period, and 
with the sharply diminished surplus, higher interest costs on the 
national debt would bring the total to $964 billion. And the projected 
$1 trillion surplus itself is dependent on large cuts in national 
defense, education, and other priority programs. If one only assumes 
that these programs are held at their current levels, plus inflation, 
the projected 10-year surplus falls from $1 trillion to $46 billion.
  Clearly, enactment of this massive tax cut, which the President 
appropriately vetoed, would have vastly compromised and complicated our 
ability to preserve Social Security and Medicare. No other action 
considered in this Congress comes even close to having this large a 
negative impact on Social Security's future.
  We can continue to attempt to ``one-up'' each other over who has the 
better plan to protect the existing Social Security trust fund. In 
trying to set the record straight from my own viewpoint, I have spoken 
today from perhaps a partisan perspective. However, there is plenty of 
blame to go around for our joint failure in this session of Congress to 
use the unique opportunity afforded by the long-sought end to massive 
Federal budget deficits to enact true Social Security reform to protect 
the benefits of millions of future recipients. The millions of 
Americans who depend on Social Security for themselves or their parents 
and grandparents, now and in the future, deserve no less.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennett). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

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