[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 2]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 2872-2873]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                   KAZAKSTAN'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

                                 ______
                                 

                       HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

                             of new jersey

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, February 23, 1999

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to bring to the 
attention of my colleagues disturbing news about the presidential 
elections in Kazakstan last month, and the general prospects for 
democratization in that country. On January 10, 1999, Kazakstan held 
presidential elections, almost two years ahead of schedule. Incumbent 
President Nursultan Nazarbaev ran against three contenders, in the 
country's first nominally contested election. According to official 
results, Nazarbaev retained his office, garnering 81.7 percent of the 
vote. Communist Party leader Serokbolsyn Abdildin won 12 percent, Gani 
Kasymov 4.7 percent and Engels Gabbasov 0.7 percent. The Central 
Election Commission reported that over 86 percent of eligible voters 
turned out to cast ballots.
  Behind these facts--and by the way, none of the officially announced 
figures should be taken at face value--is a sobering story. Nazarbaev's 
victory was no surprise: the entire election was carefully orchestrated 
and the only real issue was whether his official vote tally would be in 
the 90s--typical for post-Soviet Central Asian dictatorships--or the 
80s, which would have signaled a bit of sensitivity to Western and OSCE 
sensibilities. Any suspense the election might have offered vanished 
when the Supreme Court upheld a lower court ruling barring the 
candidacy of Nazarbaev's sole plausible challenger, former Prime 
Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, on whom many oppositions activists have 
focused their hopes. The formal reason for his exclusion was both 
trivial and symptomatic: in October, Kazhegeldin had spoken at a 
meeting of an unregistered organization called ``For Free Elections.'' 
Addressing an unregistered organization is illegal in Kazakstan, and a 
presidential decree of May 1998 stipulated that individuals convicted 
of any crime or fined for administrative transgressions could not run 
for office for a year.
  Of course, the snap election and the presidential decree deprived any 
real or potential challengers of the opportunity to organize a 
campaign. More important, most observers saw the decision as an 
indication of Nazarbaev's concerns about Kazakstan's economic decline 
and fears of running for reelection in 2000, when the situation will 
presumably be even much worse. Another reason to hold elections now was 
anxiety about the uncertainties in Russia, where a new president, with 
whom Nazarbaev does not have long-established relations, will be 
elected in 2000 and may adopt a more aggressive attitude towards 
Kazakstan than has Boris Yeltsin.
  The exclusion of would-be candidates, along with the snap nature of 
the election, intimidation of voters, the ongoing attack on independent 
media and restrictions on freedom of assembly, moved the OSCE's Office 
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to call in 
December for the election's postponement, as conditions for holding 
free and fair elections did not exist. Ultimately, ODIHR refused to 
send a full-fledged observer delegation, as it generally does, to 
monitor an election. Instead, ODIHR dispatched to Kazakstan a small 
mission to follow and report on the process. The mission's assessment 
concluded that Kazakstan's ``election process fell far short of the 
standards to which the Republic of Kazakstan has committed itself as an 
OSCE participating State.'' That is an unusually strong statement for 
ODIHR.
  Until the mid-1990s, even though President Nazarbaev dissolved two 
parliaments, tailored constitutions to his liking and was 
singlemindedly accumulating power, Kazakstan still seemed a relatively 
reformist country, where various political parties could function and 
the media enjoyed some freedom. Moreover, considering the even more 
authoritarian regimes of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and the war and 
chaos in Tajikistan, Kazakstan benefited by comparison.
  In the last few years, however, the nature of Nazarbaev's regime has 
become ever more apparent. He has over the last decade concentrated all 
power in his hands, subordinating to himself all other branches and 
institutions of government. His apparent determination to remain in 
office indefinitely, which could have been inferred by his actions, 
became explicit during the campaign, when he told a crowd, ``I would 
like to remain your president for the rest

[[Page 2873]]

of my life.'' Not coincidentally, a constitutional amendment passed in 
early October conveniently removed the age limit of 65 years. Moreover, 
since 1996-97, Kazakstan's authorities have co-opted, bought or crushed 
any independent media, effectively restoring censorship in the country. 
A crackdown on political parties and movements has accompanied the 
assault on the media, bringing Kazakstan's overall level of repression 
closer to that of Uzbekistan and severely damaging Nazarbaev's 
reputation.
  Despite significant U.S. strategic and economic interests in 
Kazakstan, especially oil and pipeline issues, the State Department has 
issued a series of critical statements since the announcement last 
October of pre-term elections. These statements have not had any 
apparent effect. In fact, on November 23, Vice President Gore called 
President Nazarbaev to voice U.S. concerns about the election. 
Nazarbaev responded the next day, when the Supreme Court--which he 
controls completely--finally excluded Kazhegeldin. On January 12, the 
State Department echoed the ODIHR's harsh assessment of the election, 
adding that it had ``cast a shadow on bilateral relations.''
  What's ahead? Probably more of the same. Parliamentary elections are 
slated for October 1999, although there are indications that they, too, 
may be held before schedule or put off another year. A new political 
party is emerging, which presumably will be President Nazarbaev's 
vehicle for controlling the legislature and monopolizing the political 
process. The Ministry of Justice on February 3 effectively turned down 
the request for registration by the Republican People's Party, headed 
by Akezhan Kazhegeldin, signaling Nazarbaev's resolve to bar his rival 
from legal political activity in Kazakstan. Other opposition parties 
which have applied for registration have not received any response from 
the Ministry.
  Mr. Speaker, the relative liberalism in Kazakstan had induced Central 
Asia watchers to hope that Uzbek and Turkmen-style repression was not 
inevitable for all countries in the region. Alas, all the trends in 
Kazakstan point the other way: Nursultan Nazarbaev is heading in the 
direction of his dictatorial counterparts in Tashkent and Ashgabat. He 
is clearly resolved to be president for life, to prevent any 
institutions or individuals from challenging his grip on power and to 
make sure that the trappings of democracy he has permitted remain just 
that. The Helsinki Commission, which I co-chair, plans to hold hearings 
on the situation in Kazakstan and Central Asia to discuss what options 
the United States has to convey the Congress's disappointment and to 
encourage developments in Kazakstan and the region towards genuine 
democratization.

                          ____________________