[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 2]
[Senate]
[Pages 2786-2801]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




              COUNTLESS FRIENDS MOURN VINEGAR BEND MIZELL

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, one doesn't lose a friend like Wilmer 
Mizell without experiencing a deep and penetrating sadness. And, by the 
way, Mr. President, my reference to ``Wilmer'' just now is one of the 
few times I have ever called him that. Sure, that's the name on his 
birth certificate; he was officially identified as Wilmer for the very 
good reason that Wilmer is the name given him by his parents.
  At least 95 percent of his thousands of friends knew him as ``Vinegar 
Bend'', or sometimes as just ``Vinegar''. And everybody who knew him 
loved him. (He was born in Vinegar Bend, Alabama, 68 years ago.)
  Vinegar Bend died this past Sunday while visiting his wife's family 
in Texas. He suffered a severe heart attack some weeks ago, but had 
bounced back and was apparently feeling well until the fatal attack on 
Sunday.
  Vinegar Bend Mizell served three terms in the U.S. House of 
Representatives from 1969 through 1974. His first wife, Nancy, was 
exceedingly popular among Members of the House and Senate until her 
death several years ago. He and his second wife, Ruth Cox Mizell, were 
a devoted couple.
  Mr. President, I have at hand a newspaper account regarding Vinegar 
Bend's death. I ask unanimous consent that the article, published 
Monday in The Greensboro (N.C.) News and Record, headed ``Former 
Ballplayer; N.C. Congressman Mizell Dies at 68'' be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       [From the Greensboro (NC) News and Record, Feb. 22, 1999]

         Former Ballplayer, N.C. Congressman Mizell dies at 68

                     (From Staff and Wire Reports)

       Wilmer ``Vinegar Bend'' Mizell spent 10 years in the majors 
     and three terms in Congress.

       High Point.--Former congressman and Major League Baseball 
     pitcher Wilmer ``Vinegar Bend'' Mizell died Sunday while 
     visiting his wife's family in Texas. He was 68.
       Mizell, whose folksy, country-boy ways made him popular 
     with voters in central North Carolina and with baseball fans 
     in St. Louis and Pittsburgh, may have died from lingering 
     effects of a heart attack suffered last October while 
     attending a high school football game, said his son, David 
     Mizell who is coach at High Point Andrews High School.
       David Mizell's team was playing North Davidson in Welcome, 
     near the Midway community where Mizell has lived since the 
     early 1950s when he pitched for the minor league team in 
     Winston-Salem.
       Mizell, after a 10-year career in the Major Leagues, became 
     a Davidson County commissioner and then served three terms in 
     Congress from the 5th Congressional District which included 
     Davidson and Forsyth counties. He was defeated in 1974 by 
     Democrat Stephen Neal, a year in which Republican candidates 
     nationwide suffered losses in the aftermath of the Watergate 
     scandal.
       Mizell later held sub-cabinet posts in the Commerce and 
     Agricultural departments under President Ford and Reagan. For 
     Reagan, Mizell was the agricultural department's top lobbyist 
     in the halls of Congress.
       Mizell was known for his flat-top haircut. His nickname 
     came from his hometown of Vinegar Bend, Ala. In the majors, 
     Mizell pitched for the St. Louis Cardinals from 1952 until 
     1960 when he was traded to the Pittsburgh Pirates. He helped 
     the Pirates win the National League pennant that year. Mizell 
     pitched a losing game in the World Series that followed.
       He finished his career with the New York Mets in 1962. His 
     career record was 90 wins and 88 losses, with an earned run 
     average of 3.85.
       Mizell died in Kerrville, Texas, while he and his second 
     wife, Ruth Cox Mizell, were visiting her family. Besides 
     Midway, the couple also had a home in Alexandria, Va., David 
     Mizell said.
       Funeral services will be Thursday in Midway.

  (Pursuant to the unanimous consent agreement of February 12, 1999, 
pertaining to the impeachment proceedings, the following statements 
were ordered to be printed in the Record:)
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. Chief Justice, my colleagues, in just a few moments, 
each of us will be called upon to do something that no one has done in 
American history. We will be voting on two articles of impeachment 
against an elected President of the United States.
  Having listened carefully to nearly 50 of our colleagues who share my 
point of view, it is both difficult and unnecessary to attempt to 
reiterate the powerful logic and the extraordinary eloquence of many of 
their presentations.
  I share the view expressed by so many that this body must be guided 
by two fundamental principles. I recognize that we are not all guided 
by these principles, but I and others have been guided, first, by this 
question: Has the prosecution provided evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and, second, if so, do the President's offenses rise to the 
level of gravity laid out by our founders in the Constitution?
  After listening to both sides of these arguments now for the past 5 
weeks, I believe--I believe strongly--that the record shows that on 
both principles the answer is no--no, the case has not been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and, no, even if it had been it would not 
reach the impeachable level.
  I also share the view expressed by many of my colleagues on the 
process which brought us here: an investigation by an independent 
counsel which exceeded the bounds of propriety; a decision by the 
Supreme Court subjecting sitting Presidents to civil suits--it is my 
prediction that every future President will be faced with legal trauma 
as a result--a deeply flawed proceeding in the House Judiciary 
Committee, which in an unprecedented fashion effectively relinquished 
its obligation to independently weigh the case for impeachment; the 
disappointing decision to deny Members of the Senate and the House the 
opportunity to vote on a censure resolution, even though I believe it 
would be supported by a majority in both Houses; and finally, the 
bitterly partisan nature of all the actions taken by the House of 
Representatives in handling this case.
  But as deeply disappointed as I am with the process, it pales in 
comparison to the disappointment I feel toward this President. Maybe it 
is because I had such high expectations. Maybe it is because he holds 
so many dreams and aspirations that I hold about our country. Maybe it 
is because he is my friend. I have never been, nor ever expect to be, 
so bitterly disappointed again.
  Abraham Lincoln may have been right when he said, ``I would rather 
have a full term in the Senate, a place in which I would feel more 
consciously able to discharge the duties required, and where there is 
more chance to make a reputation and less danger of losing it, than 4 
years of the Presidency.''
  Maybe it is because of my disappointment that I was all the more 
determined to help give the Senate its chance to make a reputation, as 
Lincoln put it, at this time in our Nation's history.
  The Senate has served our country well these past 2 months. And I now 
have no doubt that history will so record. There are clear reasons why 
the Senate has succeeded in this historic challenge.
  First is the manner in which the Chief Justice has presided over 
these hearings. We owe him a big, big debt of gratitude. He has 
presented his rulings with clarity and logic. He has tempered the long 
hours and temporary confusion with a fine wit. In an exemplary fashion, 
he has done his constitutional duty and has made it possible for us to 
do ours.
  The second reason is our majority leader. Perhaps more than anyone in 
the Chamber, I can attest to his steadfast commitment to a trial 
conducted with dignity and in the national interest. He has 
demonstrated that differences--honest differences--on difficult issues 
need not be dissent, and in that end the Senate can transcend those 
differences and conclude a constitutional process that the country will 
respect, and I do.
  Third is our extraordinary staff--the Chaplain, my staff in 
particular, Senator Lott's staff, the floor staff, the 
Parliamentarians, the Sergeant at Arms, the Secretary of the Senate. 
They have served us proudly. Their professionalism and the quality that

[[Page 2787]]

they have demonstrated each and every hour ought to make us all proud.
  Finally, if we have been successful, it has been because of each of 
you--your diligence, your deportment, your thoughtful arguments on 
either side of these complex, vexing questions. This experience and 
each of you--each of you--have made me deeply proud to be a Member of 
the U.S. Senate.
  Growing up in South Dakota, I learned so much, as many of us have, 
from relatives and from the people in my hometown, and my parents 
especially. Something my father admonished me to do so many, many times 
in growing up is something I still remember so vividly today. He said, 
``Never do anything that you wouldn't put your signature on.'' I 
thought of that twice during these proceedings--once when we signed the 
oath right here, and again last night when I signed the resolution for 
Scott Bates.
  I will hear Scott Bates' voice when I hear my name called this 
morning. My father passed away 2 years ago. He and Scott are watching 
now. And I believe they will say that we have a right to put our 
signature on this work, on what we have done in these past 5 weeks, for 
with our votes today we can now turn our attention to the challenges 
confronting our country tomorrow. And, as we do, I hope for one thing: 
That we will soon see a new day in politics and political life, one 
filled with the same comity and spirit that I feel in the room today, 
one where good governance is truly good politics, one which encourages 
renewed participation in our political system. It is a hope based upon 
a fundamental belief which is now 210 years old, a belief that here in 
this country with this Republic we have created something very, very 
special, a belief so ably articulated by Thomas Paine as he wrote 
``Common Sense.''

       The sun will never shine on a cause of greater worth. This 
     is not the affair of a city, a county, a province, or a 
     kingdom, but of a continent. This is not the concern of the 
     day, a year, or an age.
       Posterity is are virtually involved in the contest, and 
     will be more or less affected even to the end of time by the 
     proceedings now.

  So it is as we cast our votes today and begin a new tomorrow.
  Each of us understands that the decision we must make is the most 
demanding assigned to us, as Senators, by the Constitution. The Framers 
did not believe it a simple matter to remove a President. They did not 
intend that it occur easily.
  Only a certain class of offenses--treason, bribery and other high 
crimes and misdemeanors--could justify the President's removal. Only a 
supermajority--two-thirds of the Senate--could authorize it.
  The Framers made as plain as they could that each Senator must judge, 
on all the circumstances of the case, whether the facts support this 
extraordinary remedy.
  As I look at this case, I am compelled to consider it from beginning 
to end--from the circumstances under which the House fashioned and 
approved the articles, to the trial here in the Senate when the House 
pressed its arguments for conviction. And I find a case troubled from 
beginning to end--one marked by constitutional defects, inconsistencies 
in presentation, surprising concessions by the Managers against their 
own position, and even damage done to that position by their own 
witnesses.
  In short, the case I have seen is one that I do not believe can bear 
the weight of the profound constitutional consequences it is meant to 
carry.
  Its constitutional defects began in the House.
  Rather than initiating its own investigation, and making its own 
findings, the House rested on the referral from Independent Counsel 
Kenneth Starr.
  Never before has the House effectively relinquished its obligation to 
independently weigh the case for impeachment.
  But this time it did, relinquishing that obligation to Mr. Starr.
  Mr. Starr's 454-page referral became the factual record in the House. 
The arguments he made in that referral served almost exclusively as the 
basis for the articles prepared and voted by the House.
  The House called no independent fact witness. The only witness was 
Mr. Starr. And it is telling that Mr. Starr's own ethics adviser, 
Professor Sam Dash, resigned his position with the Office of 
Independent Counsel to protest the improper role played by Mr. Starr in 
the impeachment process.
  The House proceedings set a dangerous constitutional precedent, and 
the decision to follow this course has reverberated throughout the 
trial here in the Senate.
  Because Mr. Starr carried the case in the House, the House did not 
develop or explain its own case until the time came to prepare for 
trial in the Senate. Those explanations, when they came, were replete 
with inconsistencies--not technical or minor inconsistencies, but 
rather inconsistencies that struck at the heart of their position.
  On the one hand, the Managers charged the President with serious 
crimes. Yet, they also argued that they should not be required to prove 
``beyond a reasonable doubt'' that the President committed those 
crimes--that they need not meet the standard that applies throughout 
our criminal justice system.
  On the one hand, the Managers acknowledged that the House rejected an 
article based on President Clinton's deposition in the Jones case. Yet, 
throughout their presentations, including their videotaped presentation 
on February 6, they repeatedly relied on the President's statements in 
that civil deposition.
  On the one hand, the Managers insisted that the record received from 
the House provided clear and irrefutable evidence of the President's 
guilt. Yet, one Manager declared that reasonable people could differ on 
the strength of the case, and another stated that he could not win a 
conviction in court based on that record.
  On the one hand, the Managers originally claimed a record so clear 
that the House was not required to call a single fact witness--other 
than Mr. Starr. Yet, in the Senate, they insisted that their case 
depended vitally on witnesses.
  In the end, the Senate authorized the deposition of witnesses, two of 
whom--Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan--were central to the core allegations 
of perjury and obstruction of justice. These were witnesses identified 
by the House--witnesses the Managers expected to help support their 
case.
  This is not, however, how it turned out.
  In the final blow to the case for removal brought by the Managers, 
those very witnesses provided the Senate with clear and compelling 
testimony--in the President's defense.
  It cannot have escaped many of us that the defense showed more and 
longer segments of this testimony than the Managers who sought these 
witnesses in the first place.
  What did Ms. Lewinsky say about the false affidavit she filed in the 
Jones case? That she never discussed the contents with the President. 
That she thought she might be able to file a truthful, but limited 
affidavit and still avoid testifying. That she had reasons completely 
independent from the President's for wanting to avoid testimony. That 
the President did not ask her to lie or promise her a job for her 
silence.
  What did Ms. Lewinsky say about the return of the gifts given to her 
by the President? That she raised with the President whether she should 
turn the gifts over to Ms. Currie. That she recalls that the President 
may have advised her to turn them all over to the Jones lawyers. That 
she told an FBI agent of this advice, but it somehow was omitted from 
the Independent Counsel's investigative report. That six days before 
her White House meeting with the President, she had already made an 
independent decision to withhold gifts from her own lawyer.
  What did Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan say about the job search for Ms. 
Lewinsky? That it was never connected to the preparation of her 
affidavit, much less conditioned on her making any false statements to 
a court.
  What did Mr. Jordan say about any pressure placed on the companies he 
contacted to hire Ms. Lewinsky? That

[[Page 2788]]

he only recommended her. That two companies he contacted would not hire 
her. That the third company, which did hire her, did so on the strength 
of an interview in which she made a strong personal impression--much 
like the one she made to the Managers in their first meeting with her.
  These witnesses--the House's witnesses--made it impossible, I 
believe, for the Managers to sustain a case already weakened by a 
defective House process, serious inconsistencies in their arguments, 
and doubts about its merits that even some of the Managers themselves 
candidly expressed.
  Surely a case for removal of the President must be stronger.
  Surely a case for conviction must be strong enough to unite the 
Senate and the public behind the most momentous of constitutional 
decisions.
  Surely a case to remove the President from office must be strong 
enough to meet the high standards established with such care by the 
Constitution's Framers.
  In requiring that the Senate remove only for ``high'' crimes and 
misdemeanors, the Framers acted with care. As the House Judiciary 
Committee stated in its Watergate report 25 years ago, ``[I]mpeachment 
is a constitutional remedy addressed to serious offenses against the 
system of government.'' Its purpose is to protect our constitutional 
form of government, not to punish a President.
  It is for this reason that the Framers made clear that not all 
offenses by a Chief Executive are ``high'' crimes--and that even a 
President who may have violated the law, but not the Constitution, 
remains subject to criminal and civil legal process after he or she 
leaves office.
  Whatever legal consequences may follow from this President's actions, 
the case made by the House Managers does not satisfy the exacting 
standard for removal.
  For all of these reasons, I will vote to acquit on both articles.
  This is my constitutional judgment about whether the Senate should 
remove the President from office. My personal judgment of the 
President's actions is something altogether different, reflecting my 
values and those of South Dakotans and millions of Americans.
  Like them, I am extraordinarily disappointed, and angered, by the 
President's behavior. Since I have long considered the President a 
friend, my own sense of betrayal could not run more deeply.
  There is no question that the President's deplorable actions should 
be condemned by the Senate.
  I fervently hope that the Senate will do what the House would not--
permit the people's elected representatives to express themselves and 
reflect their constituents' views on the President's conduct, for the 
benefit of our generation and those still to come.
  So let us proceed now to a vote and resolve this constitutional task 
after these long and arduous months. Then the time will have come to 
return to the urgent work of the country.
  When we do, I believe that all of us--members of the majority and 
members of the minority, however we choose to cast our votes--will be 
able to agree on this:
  That in 1999, 100 Senators acted as the Constitution required, 
honoring their oath to do impartial justice and acting in the best 
interests of this country they so dearly love.
  Mr. BOND. Mr. Chief Justice, my colleagues, I do not intend to give a 
comprehensive statement, nor do I intend to use all of the time 
allotted. But I feel it is very important to answer some of the points 
that have been raised. And let me deal with just a few of those.
  When I spoke to you in a previous session here, I mentioned the cover 
story, and said that while the cover story was not impeachable--the 
cover story which was admitted by counsel for the White House--it is a 
framework and a context in which we judge other actions.
  Objection has been made by my friends primarily on this side of the 
aisle that on occasion we have cited evidence where the President may 
not have been truthful, and we may have raised other arguments that go 
beyond the boundaries of the articles of impeachment as grounds for 
impeachment. Let me hasten to add that I hope that no one would vote 
for a conviction on anything other than the items set forth in article 
I and the items set forth in article II. If there are other activities 
that may bear upon or indicate a pattern of conduct, that is one thing. 
But we must make our decision on the basis of that which has been 
presented to us by the House.
  On the other side, we have heard some very spirited and enthusiastic 
attacks on the independent counsel and on the House managers and even 
on the Paula Jones case itself. Let me make just a few points.
  No. 1, we threw Judge Alcee Hastings out of office as a judge for 
lying in a grand jury proceeding where he was not convicted. The 
objective is not to say that you can only commit perjury when a case is 
won or someone is convicted.
  No. 2, the independent counsel got into this because the attorney 
general felt that there were grounds to pursue the potential violations 
of law by the President in the Monica Lewinsky case. And a three-judge 
court agreed, and the independent counsel was assigned to pursue this.
  Whatever you may think about what the House did, or what the Paula 
Jones attorneys did, or what the independent counsel did, that is not 
the question before us. That can be addressed, as some of my colleagues 
said, if there are investigations by the Department of Justice on 
improper activities by the OIC. Let that proceed in its own realm. We 
are here to judge on the evidence before us.
  As I said, we have a cover story. We have a cover story that was 
utilized regularly throughout by this President and by Monica Lewinsky.
  Objection has been made that, while we have the clear testimony that 
William Jefferson Clinton never said you should lie, he never said 
expressly you should file a false affidavit. Well, of course, he 
didn't. Of course, he didn't. He is a very sophisticated, very able 
lawyer. And, if you are concocting a scheme to obstruct justice, you 
don't tell somebody who is to be part of that scheme with you that you 
should lie under oath, that you should file a false affidavit because 
those people might just get called to testify under oath at some point, 
as they were in this case. But Mr. Clinton didn't have to do that, 
because Monica Lewinsky understood very clearly that she was to stay 
with the cover story until she was told not to. She filed the false 
affidavit that he sought. He and his counsel used it in the deposition.
  Why was it filed? To keep him from having to testify truthfully in 
the deposition. Was he surprised by it? I do not believe it has one 
iota of credibility to say that after he went out and procured that 
false affidavit, he didn't know that his attorney was going to use it, 
and he was not going to rely on it. He got her to do the felonious deed 
of filing a false affidavit so he could avoid the danger of having to 
lie himself in a deposition.
  Mr. Clinton didn't engage in a conspiracy with his lawyer, Mr. 
Bennett. We hear about the one-man conspiracy. No. He foisted that on 
his attorney. And Mr. Bennett, when he found out about the falsity of 
that affidavit, had to do what no attorney ever wants to do--he had to 
write a letter to the judge, and say, ``Disregard it. Disregard it. I 
was part, inadvertently, of a scheme to defraud the court.'' And you 
notice he is not in the case any longer. He could not be part of that.
  We know that Mr. Clinton enlisted his loyal secretary to violate the 
law to go pick up gifts, and she and Monica Lewinsky, once again, 
committed felonies to continue the story to protect the President. And 
the gifts wound up under Betty Currie's bed.
  Mr. Clinton went to Betty Currie on a Sunday and 2 days later and 
told her things that he hoped she would say before the grand jury. He 
told his other subordinates things that he hoped they would say. He 
even trashed her when it appeared that she might be a hostile witness.
  Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I suggest to you that when you 
have

[[Page 2789]]

this clear-cut evidence of a scheme carried out with direct evidence, 
testimony of Monica Lewinsky and others, Betty Currie and his 
subordinates, an Audrain County jury would not have any trouble finding 
him guilty of tampering with a witness or obstructing justice.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chief Justice and fellow Senators, I appreciate 
this proceeding. And I appreciate the process we have gone through. I 
hope my remarks will be in the spirit of deliberation, and that some of 
what I say will be of value to you.
  If there was a mistake made in this case, it is that we have treated 
this more like a piece of legislation than a trial. It probably would 
have been better to have just allowed the House to have a week or 8 
days to present evidence and the other side present their evidence and 
then vote and we would have been out of here. As it is, we have been 
involved in the managing of it. And I have been impressed that together 
we have somehow gotten through it in a way that I think I can defend. 
It is marginal, but I think we have conducted a trial that I feel we 
can defend.
  The impeachment came from the House so we have to have a trial and a 
vote, in my opinion. Judging on matters like this is not easy, but we 
all have had to do it. Juries make decisions like this every day. The 
President has to grant pardons and make appointments and remove 
appointments. Senators have to vote on nominations and so forth. I have 
had the adventure of appearing before Senators judging me on a previous 
occasion. And now I am in this body and the other day the Chief Justice 
declared that we were all a court, and I thought, ``My goodness, I am a 
Federal judge and a Senator, how much better can life get than that?''
  Now, someone suggested that this is a political trial. But the more 
we make it like a real trial, the better off we are going to be and the 
better the people are going to like it and the more they will respect 
it. Our responsibility is to find the facts, apply the Constitution, 
the law, and the Senate precedent to those facts. And precedent is 
important. We should follow it unless we clearly articulate a reason to 
change. Unless we do so we are failing in our duty. If we want to 
change our precedent, we obviously have that power. But we don't come 
at this with a blank slate since the 1700s and Federalist 65. We have 
had a lot of impeachments since then, and this Senate has established 
some precedent during that time. I think the dialogue between Madison 
and Mason suggests a somewhat different view of things than Federalist 
65, in the mind of many. But I would just say to you we have had 
impeachment trials of Judges Claiborne, Nixon and Hastings since then. 
That is our precedent, in recent years, about what we believe are our 
laws and how they should be interpreted.
  I would say this about the case. Others may see it differently. But 
with regard to the obstruction article, I might have a bit of a quibble 
with the way the case was presented. I think there was a lot of time 
and effort spent on trees and not enough on the plain forest. Let me 
just say to you why I believe the proof of obstruction of justice is so 
compelling, beyond a reasonable doubt, to a moral certainty. And that 
is, because the President received interrogatories, he got a subpoena 
to a deposition, and he knew his day was coming. He knew he was going 
to have to tell the truth or he was going to have to tell a lie, and it 
wasn't going away.
  He tried to avoid the day. He went all the way to the Supreme Court 
to try to stop that case from going forward, and the U.S. Supreme Court 
unanimously ruled ``No, you don't get special privileges. You have to 
go forward with the case.'' So, here he is having to do something. If 
he states he did not have a sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky, 
if he files an answer to an interrogatory, which he did in December, in 
which he flatout stated that he had never had sex with a State or 
Federal employee in the last decade, that would be false. He filed such 
a false answer to a lawful interrogatory.
  Then he is at a deposition, and what happens at the deposition? His 
attorney tries to keep him from being asked about Monica Lewinsky. They 
produce her affidavit and the attorney says that the President has seen 
that affidavit and had the opportunity to study it. The President 
testifies later in that deposition: It is ``absolutely true.'' That is 
when it all occurred, right there, and talking with Monica beforehand 
was critical because if she didn't confirm the lie he was going to tell 
he couldn't tell it. She wanted a job and the President got it for her. 
If they didn't submit the Lewinsky affidavit, the President was going 
to be asked those questions. If they talked about the gifts, the cat 
was going to be out of the bag. It is just that simple. The wrong 
occurred right there.
  Then, when he left that deposition, he was worried. He called Betty 
Currie that night, right after that deposition, the same day, because 
he knew he had used her name and she was either going to have to back 
him up or he was in big trouble. So, he coached her. That is what it is 
all about. You can talk about the facts being anything you want to, but 
that is the core of this case and it is plain and it is simple for 
anybody to see who has eyes to see with, in my view. So I think that is 
a strong case. The question is whether or not, if you believe that 
happened, you want to remove him from office, and I would like to share 
a few thoughts on that.
  Having been a professional prosecutor for 12 years as U.S. attorney, 
and I tried a lot of cases myself, I really have felt pain for Ken 
Starr. I had occasion to briefly get to know him. I knew that his 
reputation within the Department of Justice as Solicitor General was 
unsurpassed. He was given a responsibility by the Attorney General of 
the United States and a court panel to find out what the truth was. The 
President lied, resisted, attacked him, attacked anybody Mr. Starr 
dealt with, virtually, in seeking the truth. And Ken Starr gets blamed 
for that, and then 7 months later we find out that the President was 
lying all the time. He was lying all the time. And somehow this is Ken 
Starr's fault that he pursued the matter? I am sure he suspicioned the 
President was lying but it couldn't be proven until the dress appeared 
and then we finally got something like the truth.
  Now, one of the most thunderous statements made by counsel--I am 
surprised it didn't make more news than it did--was the representation 
by White House counsel that judges hold office on good behavior.
  Those of you who fight tenaciously for the independence of the 
judiciary, know that this is not the standard for removal of judges. 
The courts have gone through it in some detail. Law reviews have been 
written about it. Judge Harry T. Edwards, Court of Appeals for D.C. 
Circuit, wrote in a Michigan law review that:

       Under article II, a judge is subject to impeachment and 
     removal only upon conviction by the Senate of treason, 
     bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.

  This is because he is a civil officer. The President, Vice President 
and Judges are civil officers of the United States. There is only one 
standard for impeachment.
  The Constitution is a marvelous document. We respect it. To do so, we 
must enforce it as it is written. It says that civil officers, judges 
are removed for only those offenses. There are no distinctions between 
the President and judges. Just because one official is elected and one 
is not elected, one's term is shorter, or there are more judges than 
Presidents--makes no difference--that is not what the Constitution 
says. They face the same standard for impeachment.
  I really believe we are making a serious legal mistake if we suggest 
otherwise. If the standard is the same, then we have a problem, because 
we removed a bunch of judges for perjury.
  Of course, a President gets elected, but the President holds office 
subject to the Constitution. One of the limitations on your office as 
an elected official is don't commit a high crime or misdemeanor and if 
you commit a high crime or misdemeanor, you are to be removed. I don't 
think there is a lot of give in this, frankly.

[[Page 2790]]

  With regard to precedent, precedent is important because it helps us 
be objective, less political, less personal and do justice fairer. That 
is what the Anglo-American common law is all about. Judges have 
established precedent, and judges tend to follow that precedent unless 
there is a strong reason not to. This is important for the rule of law.
  Perjury and its twin, obstruction of justice, do amount to 
impeachable crimes and our precedent in the Judge Nixon case proves 
that. I believe we set a good standard in that case, finding that 
perjury is a high crime, clearly, and we ought to stay with this 
standard.
  Some have argued that the House Judiciary Committee on the President 
Nixon matter declared that tax evasion was not an impeachable offense 
because it was not directly related to one of the President's duties. I 
don't think that is clear at all. As a matter of fact, as I recall a 
few House Members and minority Members signed a statement to that 
effect. But let me ask you this, and think about this, if a minority on 
the House Judiciary Committee voted on something, or Gerald Ford said 
something when he was in the House about impeachment, such is not 
precedent for the U.S. Senate. It is our precedent that counts. It is 
the precedent established by Judge Hastings, Judge Nixon, and Judge 
Claiborne that we ought to be concerned about.
  I do not believe the Constitution says that the standard for removal 
is whether somebody is a danger to the Republic's future. The 
Constitution says if you commit bribery, treason, or other high crimes 
or misdemeanors, you are out, unless there are some mitigating 
circumstance somebody can find, but the test is not whether or not the 
official is going to continue to do the crime in the future. What if it 
is a one-time bribery that is never again going to happen. Mr. Ruff 
advocated the ``danger'' standard, and it really disturbed me because 
it is not in the Constitution.
  If we were to reject the standard we use for judges for impeachment, 
I do believe that would mean a lowering of our standards. We will not 
be holding the President to the same standards we are holding the 
judges in this country, and I don't think the Constitution justifies a 
dual standard.
  As a prosecutor who has been in the courtroom a lot, I am not as 
cynical as some have suggested today about the law. I have been in 
grand juries hundreds of times--thousands really. I have tried hundreds 
of cases. I have seen witnesses personally. I have been with them 
before they testified and have seen them agonize over their testimony. 
I know people who file their tax returns and pay more taxes than they 
want to, voluntarily, because they are men and women of integrity. I 
have seen it in grand juries. I have seen people cry because they did 
not want to tell the truth, but they told it. They filed motions to 
object to testifying, but when it came right down to it, they told the 
truth.
  I believe truth is a serious thing. Truth is real and falsehood is 
real. This is, in my view, a created universe and we have a moral order 
and when we deny the truth we violate the moral order and bad things 
happen. Truth is one of the highest ideals of Western civilization 
commitment to it defines us as a people. As Senator Kyl said, you will 
never have justice in a court of law if people don't tell the truth.
  So this is a big deal with me. I have had that lecture with a lot of 
people who were about to testify. I believe we ought not to dismiss 
this lightly.
  There was a poignant story about Dr. Battalino and her conviction for 
lying about a one-time sex act and the losses she suffered. Let me tell 
you this personal story, and I will finish.
  I was U.S. attorney. The new police chief had come to Mobile. He was 
a strong and aggressive leader from Detroit. He was an African-
American. He shook up the department, established community-based 
policing, and caused a lot of controversy. A group of police officers 
sued him. His driver, a young police officer, testified in a deposition 
that the chief had asked him to bug other police officers illegally. 
Not only that, he said, ``I've got a tape of the chief telling me to 
bug.''
  It leaked to the newspapers, all in the newspapers. They wanted to 
fire the chief. The FBI was called because it is illegal to bug 
somebody if there is not a consenting person in the room.
  It is different with Linda Tripp. Let me just explain the law. If you 
can remember and testify to what you hear in conversation, you can 
record that conversation and play it later under law of virtually every 
State in America. Maryland apparently is different.
  Here, the driver's action would be illegal. Anyway, the young officer 
finally, under pressure of the FBI, confessed. The lawsuit hadn't 
ended. The civil suit was still going on. He went back and changed his 
deposition and recanted. His lawyer came to me and said, ``Don't 
prosecute him, Jeff. He's sorry. He finally told the truth. He went 
back. The case wasn't over.''
  We prosecuted him. I felt like he had disrupted the city, caused 
great turmoil and violated his oath as a police officer, and that we 
could not just ignore that. The case was prosecuted. He was convicted, 
and it was affirmed on appeal.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. Chief Justice and fellow colleagues, in the 
Capitol's Mansfield Room where our Conference has met over the last few 
weeks, there is a picture of our first president--George Washington--
who celebrates a birthday this Monday. I was reminded that, from 
childhood through adulthood, George Washington carried around with him 
a copy of the Rules of Civility. The rules could be seen as a roadmap 
of how one should conduct himself or herself appropriately in society. 
As the Senate began its course through uncharted waters, civility has 
been our goal, if not our duty. We have done our best to work together, 
to be respectful of each other's views and to do justice according to 
the Constitution. Had we not started with this goal in mind, I fear the 
debate would have quickly descended into rancor doing a disservice to 
our Nation.
  In the next few minutes, I want to explain how this trial unfolded 
for me, as well as the rationale behind some of the votes I've cast, 
including on the Articles of Impeachment.
  When the historians write their accounts of the impeachment trial of 
William Jefferson Clinton, I trust that, regardless of where one comes 
down on the facts of the case, they will agree that the Senate did it 
right. We conducted a trial that was fair to all sides, correct 
according to the Constitution and expeditious in accordance with the 
wishes of the American people. We also did our best to conduct our 
deliberations on a bipartisan basis.
  We began this process by taking a second and most solemn oath of 
office: to do impartial justice. For me, as a Senator, I can think of 
no more somber and important a constitutional duty than the one that 
was given us. Our first task was to draft a blueprint of how we would 
proceed in the trial. We met in closed session in the Old Senate 
Chamber where the discussions were civil, respectful and frank on both 
sides. In the end, it was Senator Gramm of Texas, joined by Senator 
Kennedy of Massachusetts, two opposite sides of the political spectrum, 
that led us to a unanimous bipartisan agreement on how to proceed. The 
support of all 100 Senators was important because it opened the door to 
a trial that was conducted in a professional and judicious manner and 
without the discord that so many of the Washington wisemen had 
predicted.
  After hearing the opening arguments made by both sides, Senator 
Robert Byrd offered a motion to dismiss the case against the President. 
If successful, this would have been the first dismissal of an 
impeachment trial in our Nation's history.
  My vote against this dismissal motion was premised on my sworn 
Constitutional obligation to hear the facts and evidence, and consider 
the law before I rendered a decision on whether the Articles warranted 
the President's conviction and removal from office. Indeed, this was 
part of the oath we took--to do impartial justice. The Senate would not 
have been able to render a fair and correct judgment on the Articles 
without receiving and objectively assessing the wealth of evidence

[[Page 2791]]

presented by the House of Representatives and the White House. In 
short, dismissal was premature and inappropriate.
  Consistent with our duty to consider all the evidence fully, I 
supported an effort to allow both the House Managers and the White 
House the opportunity to depose a limited number of key witnesses to 
resolve inconsistencies in testimony. After reviewing the depositions, 
I supported a bipartisan motion to make all of this information--both 
the videotapes and written transcripts--part of the permanent record so 
that each and every American could examine the evidence and draw their 
own conclusions. I also voted to allow both the House Managers and the 
White House to use the videotaped deposition testimony on the floor of 
the Senate.
  Although I did support deposing a limited number of witnesses, I did 
not support an attempt to allow Ms. Lewinsky to testify as a live 
witness on the floor of the Senate. In my judgment, we provided the 
House Managers a more than adequate opportunity to present their case: 
allowing for witnesses to be deposed, for House Managers to ask any 
questions necessary to resolve inconsistencies in testimony and to 
allow any portion of these tapes to be used on the floor to argue the 
case against the President. Consequently, I thought it inappropriate 
and unnecessary for Ms. Lewinsky to testify on the Senate floor. 
Seventy Senators felt similarly on this issue.
  The presentation with videotaped excerpts, rather than live 
witnesses, allowed both sides to make their arguments cogently. In my 
opinion, witnesses questioned on the floor, under a time agreement, 
would have made for a more fragmented process--objections by counsel 
would have disrupted the flow of presentations considerably. I believe 
that our decision to exclude live witness testimony was appropriate, 
fair and improved the nature of closing arguments.
  It is the same sense of obligation and a desire to maintain decorum 
that guided me in my vote to uphold the Senate's time-tested tradition 
of deliberating impeachment trials in private. Opening the doors of the 
Senate during these final deliberations would have been a tragic 
mistake that would ignore years of precedent on this issue. For 2,600 
years, since the ancient Athenian lawgiver Solon, trials have been open 
and jury deliberations have been private. Throughout our own history in 
every courthouse in America, we have open trials, we have public 
evidence, we have public witnesses, but when the jury deliberates, it 
meets in private. Jury deliberations are held in private for the 
protection of all parties, and to ensure for a frank and open 
discussion of the evidence.
  Private jury deliberations have also been part of the Senate rules 
for 130 years. Some argue that these rules are outdated and need to be 
revised. However, in 1974 and 1986, when the Senate had an opportunity 
to vote on changes to these rules, it chose to leave intact the 
precedent that the deliberations should remain closed.
  Our private deliberations have promoted civil discussion on this 
grave matter of impeachment. Some of the most profound and thoughtful 
statements I've heard have come during these private meetings--where 
the absence of cameras has had the effect of turning politicians into 
statesmen. These private deliberations set a tone of civility and 
allowed the healing process to begin.
  After hearing all evidence and deliberations, at the end, I voted for 
both impeachment articles. Setting all the legal contortions aside, a 
vote against the Articles, or to acquit, would be to ratify that there 
are two sets of law in our country--one set for our citizens, and 
another for the President of the United States. This is a conclusion I 
could not reach or support. Therefore, my vote on both Articles says in 
the simplest terms that no American is above the law and there must be 
one law that applies to us all.
  Today's outcome should be a surprise to no one. From the beginning, 
our two parties approached this issue in fundamentally different ways. 
While Democrats and Republicans agree that President Clinton committed 
very serious offenses, the disagreement is over whether or not these 
issues rise to the level that he should be removed from office. To some 
extent, the die had been cast when the Democrat Party decided to rally 
around the President. Like President Nixon's fate was sealed when his 
party fell against him, President Clinton's presidency was secured by 
his party's allegiance.
  My hope is that no future Senate will ever be required to consider 
Articles of Impeachment against the President of the United States. 
But, if they do, I have every confidence that we have left behind an 
appropriate roadmap for them to fulfill their constitutional 
responsibilities. I am proud of the Senate and its Members. The Senate 
should be proud of the way it has conducted itself: we have done our 
jobs right by being fair to all parties, correct according to the 
Constitution and expeditious in accordance with the wishes of the 
American people.
  In conclusion, I would like to thank the leaders on both sides. In 
particular, I would like to single out Senator Lott for his 
leadership--this has clearly been one of his finest hours as our 
Majority Leader.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. Chief Justice and distinguished Senators, Daniel 
Webster once observed that a ``sense of duty pursues us ever. It is 
omnipresent like the Deity. If we take to ourselves the wings of 
morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, duty performed or 
duty violated is still with us. . . .'' The duty which has faced each 
United States Senator is the obligation to do impartial justice in a 
matter of significant historical import with lasting consequences for 
our constitutional order--the consideration of the impeachment articles 
against President William Jefferson Clinton.
  Our duty calls on us to answer a serious question--whether the 
President's actions warrant his removal from office. Fundamentally, in 
arriving at our individual decisions, we must consider what is in the 
best interests of the American people. The President engaged in 
conduct, that even his defenders recognize, was reprehensible and 
wrong. A bipartisan majority of the House also found that he committed 
serious, impeachable crimes.
  So, the test for the Senate must be to do what's in the best interest 
of our nation. It is not a matter of what is easiest or cleanest. It is 
a matter of what is in the immediate and long term national interest. 
This has been, and it will continue to be, a subjective and difficult 
standard and one which I will discuss in greater detail later in my 
remarks.
  First, however, I wish to speak on the Senate's procedural 
responsibility when sitting as a Court of Impeachment, the 
constitutional law concerning impeachable offenses, and the Articles of 
Impeachment at issue in the present case; finally, I will conclude with 
a discussion of whether--assuming the facts alleged have been proven--
the best interests of the country would be served by removing President 
Clinton from office.


                          I. The Senate's Role

  Let me begin by explaining what the role of the Senate is in the 
impeachment process.
  Simply put, the Senate's role in the impeachment process is to try 
all impeachments. As Joseph Story wrote:

       The power [to try impeachments] has been wisely deposited 
     with the Senate. . . . That of all the departments of the 
     government, `none will be found more suitable to exercise 
     this peculiar jurisdiction than the Senate.' . . . Precluded 
     from ever becoming accusers themselves, it is their duty not 
     to lend themselves to the animosities of party, or the 
     prejudices against individuals, which may sometimes 
     unconsciously induce'' the other body. In serving as the 
     tribunal for impeachments, we must strive to attain and 
     demonstrate impartiality, integrity, intelligence and 
     independence. If we fail to do so, the trial and our judgment 
     will be flawed.--Joseph Story, Commentaries on the 
     Constitution of the United States, Section 386.

  In short, impeachment trials require Senators to act, wherever 
possible, with principled political neutrality. One question I have 
repeatedly asked myself during this scandal--when faced with questions 
concerning the interpretation of the relevant law, the process,

[[Page 2792]]

the calls for resignation, or forgiveness--has been whether I would 
have taken the same position were this a Republican President. I have 
done this throughout the past year and expect many of my colleagues 
have done the same.
  In 1993, the Supreme Court ruled in the case of United States versus 
Nixon that the process by which the Senate tries impeachments was 
nonjusticiable. As a result of the Nixon decision, the Senate has a 
heightened constitutional obligation in impeachment cases. As 
constitutional scholar Michael Gerhardt notes in his 1996 book, The 
Federal Impeachment Process, ``Congress may make constitutional law--
that is, make judgments about the scope and meaning of its 
constitutionally authorized impeachment function--subject to change 
only if Congress later changes its mind or by constitutional amendment. 
Thus, Nixon raised an issue about Congress's ability, in the absence of 
judicial review, to make reasonably principled constitutional 
decisions.''
  I believe the Senate has conducted this trial in a fair manner and 
that we have made principled constitutional decisions. I want to 
commend my colleagues on both sides of the aisle--in particular the 
Majority Leader, Trent Lott--for the impartial and proficient manner in 
which we have conducted our constitutional obligation.
  At the core of our deliberations was the tension between, on the one 
hand, our shared interest in putting this matter behind us and getting 
on with the Nation's business, and, on the other hand, our interest in 
affording the President, and the weighty matter of impeachment, that 
process which is due and fair. While there are decisions the Senate 
reached with which I differed, I want to make clear my view that the 
Senate has ably balanced these competing interests. A fair and full 
trial that we were once told would take one year has been completed in 
less than six weeks. The credit for this process rests with every 
Member of the Senate, with the House Managers, counsel for the 
President, and the Chief Justice.


                      ii. the impeachment standard

  Of great concern to me is what the standard should be for impeachment 
in this and future trials. The President's Counsel has argued that the 
President can only be removed for constituting, what Oliver Wendell 
Holmes termed in free speech cases, a ``clear and present danger.'' It 
was contended that a President can only be removed if he is a danger to 
the Constitution. As such, according to the President's Counsel, 
removable conduct must relate to egregious conduct related to 
performance in office. Even if the House's allegation--that President 
Clinton committed acts of perjury and obstruction of justice is proven 
true--it was argued--than such behavior does not rise to impeachable 
offenses because it was private, not public, conduct. In this case an 
inappropriate sexual relation with a subordinate employee--was the 
predicate of the charged offenses.
  But such a standard establishes an impossibly high bar as to render 
impotent the impeachment clauses of the Constitution. I hope that no 
matter the outcome of this trial, President Clinton's view of what 
constitutes an impeachable offense does not become precedent. If it 
does, I fear the moral framework of our Republic will be frayed. If it 
does, the legitimacy of our institutions may very well become tattered. 
It would create the paradox of being able to convict and jail an 
official for committing, let's say, homicide, but not to be able to 
remove that official from holding positions of public trust. Committing 
crimes of moral turpitude, such as perjury and obstruction of justice, 
go to the very heart of qualification for public office.
  The overwhelming consensus of both legal and historical scholars is 
that the Constitution mandates the removal of the ``President, Vice 
President, and all civil Officers of the United States''--which 
includes federal judges--``upon impeachment by the House and conviction 
by the Senate of treason, bribery or other high crimes and 
misdemeanors.'' (U.S. Const. Art. II. Sec. 4). The precise meaning of 
this latter clause is critical to the outcome of the impeachment trial.
  The President's advocates agree with their critics that this standard 
is the sole standard for presidential impeachment, but contend that the 
``or other'' phrase indicates that grounds for impeachment must be 
criminal in nature because treason and bribery are crimes or acts 
committed against the state.
  Such crimes or acts must be heinous, they contend, because the term 
``crimes and misdemeanors'' is preceded by the descriptive adjective 
``high'' in the impeachment clause. These advocates also claim that 
there exists no proof of criminal wrongdoing, that we have evidence of 
only a private affair unrelated to performance in public office, and 
that abuse of power related to official conduct--not present here--is a 
prerequisite for impeachment.
  Many learned scholars oppose this view. Looking at the debates in the 
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787, they note that the 
Convention originally chose treason and bribery as the sole standard 
for impeachment. George Mason argued that this standard was too 
stringent and advocated that ``maladministration'' be added to the 
list. James Madison objected, believing that no coherent definition of 
``maladministration'' existed and that such a lenient standard would 
make the President a pawn of the Senate. The Convention, as a result, 
settled on the phrase ``treason, bribery or other high crime or 
misdemeanor.'' It is clear that the phrase ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors'' was considered by the Framers to have a more narrow and 
specific meaning and, indeed, it is a term taken from English 
precedent.
  Accordingly, many scholars, including Raoul Berger, the dean of 
impeachment scholars (Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems (1973)), 
contend that the phrase ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' is a common 
law term of art that reaches both private and public behavior. Treason 
and bribery are acts that harm society in that they constitute a 
corruption on the body politic. Consequently, ``other high crimes and 
misdemeanors'' encompasses similar acts of corruption or betrayals of 
trust, and need not constitute formal crimes. Indeed, Alexander 
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 65 makes clear that impeachment is 
political, not criminal, in nature and reaches conduct that goes to 
reputation and character. In the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 
the term ``misdemeanor'' refers not to a petty crime, but to bad 
demeanor.
  History thus demonstrates that acts or conduct that demeans the 
integrity of the office, or harms an individual's reputation in such a 
way as to engender a lack of public confidence in the office holder or 
the political system is an impeachable offense. Justice Joseph Story, 
in his celebrated Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 
Sec. 762 (1835), made this abundantly clear when he wrote that 
impeachment lies for private behavior that harms the society or demeans 
its institutions:

       In the first place, the nature of the functions to be 
     performed: The offences, to which the power of impeachment 
     has been, and is ordinarily applied, as a remedy, are of a 
     political character. Not but that crimes of a strictly legal 
     character fall within the scope of the power, (for, as we 
     shall presently see, treason, bribery, and other high crimes 
     and misdemeanors are expressly within it;) but that it has a 
     more enlarged operation, and reaches, what are aptly termed, 
     political offenses, growing out of personal misconduct, or 
     gross neglect, or usurpation, or habitual disregard of the 
     public interests, in the discharge of the duties of political 
     office.

  Even though the Framers rejected the English model of impeachment as 
a form of punishment and promulgated removal as the remedy for 
conviction, most scholars contend that the Framers looked to English 
precedent to define ``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' There is a wealth 
of evidence that a betrayal of public trust or reckless conduct that 
places a high office in disrepute constitutes ``high misdemeanors.'' 
The modifier ``high'' refers to acts against the state or commonwealth. 
In the eighteenth century, the term ``political'' also encompassed our 
modern term of ``social.'' So conduct that

[[Page 2793]]

harmed society as a whole, or denigrated the public respect and 
confidence in governmental institutions, constituted ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors.''
  As such, both English and American officials have been impeached for 
drunkenness, for frequenting prostitutes, even for insanity, in other 
words private conduct that is unrelated to official acts. Such behavior 
is seen as defaming the office that the accused held and diminishing 
the people's faith in government. Impeachment is thus seen by many 
scholars as a means of removing unqualified office holders.
  Thus, impeachment and removal does not have to be predicated upon 
commission of a crime. Consequently, impeachment and removal is not in 
essentially a criminal punishment, a conclusion that is also textually 
demonstrated by the fact that the Framers expressly provided for later 
indictment and criminal conviction of an impeached and removed 
President.
  A high crime and misdemeanor--according to this view--does not have 
to amount to a crime or be related to official conduct. Even if 
President Clinton's acts of perjury were predicated upon lying about a 
private sexual relation, they still must be considered high crimes and 
misdemeanors. The fact that the underlying behavior was private in its 
genesis is irrelevant. Such private acts demean the Office of the 
President, and betray public trust. Those acts therefore are 
impeachable.
  But I must emphasize that even if the President's Counsel is correct 
in that private acts unrelated to performance in office are not 
impeachable offenses, I believe the gravamen of what President Clinton 
committed are public, not private, acts that are unambiguous breaches 
of public trust. Perjury and particularly obstruction of justice are 
conduct that attack the very veracity of our justice system. 
(Furthermore, I vehemently disagree that the underlying conduct was a 
purely private concern because the conduct involved a federal employee 
in a work environment).
  Lying under oath, hiding evidence, and tampering with witnesses 
destroy the truth-finding function of our investigatory and trial 
system. Perjury and obstruction of justice are particularly pernicious 
if committed by a President of the United States, who has sworn 
pursuant to the oath of office to protect the Constitution and laws of 
the United States. Whether perjury and obstruction of justice can be 
considered private or public acts is of no moment. They are twin ``high 
crimes'' harming the political order and requiring impeachment and 
removal from office.
  A related argument made by the President's Counsel is that a 
President should be held to a less stringent standard than federal 
judges in impeachment trials. Because many judges have been removed for 
conduct unrelated to performance in office, such as Judges Claiborne 
and Nixon, who were convicted and removed for perjurious statements 
unrelated to their performance in office, the President is almost 
compelled to make this argument.
  In essence, The President's Counsel contend that Article III's 
requirement that judges hold office for ``good behavior'' is not simply 
a description of the term of office, but a grounds for impeachment if 
violated. Presidents--and other civil officers--are subject to the more 
stringent high crimes and misdemeanor standard.
  Most scholars reject this view. For instance, Michael J. Gerhardt 
(The Federal Impeachment Process (1996)) testified in the House 
Constitutional Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee in November that 
the impeachment standard of high crimes and misdemeanors applies to all 
civil officers, including judges as well as the President. This is the 
sole constitutional ground for impeachment. Article III's good behavior 
provision for judges simply sets the duration for judicial office 
(lifetime unless impeached). There are simply no differing standards 
for judges and the President.


                       iii. article one--perjury

  Let me now turn to the facts of this case. The House alleges in 
Article I that the President should be removed because he committed 
acts of perjury. The House alleges in Article II that the President 
should be removed because he obstructed and interfered with the 
mechanisms and duly constituted processes of the justice system.
  To demonstrate why I believe it is so, it is necessary to discuss 
both the legal standards and how the facts meet the requirements of 
those standards. I will first discuss perjury, and, next, turn to 
obstruction of justice.


       Article I of the Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton

  In his conduct while President of the United States, William 
Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully 
to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the 
best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of 
the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed, has willfully corrupted and 
manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his personal 
gain and exoneration, impeding the administration of justice, in that:
  On August 17, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton swore to tell the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth before a Federal 
Grand Jury of the United States. Contrary to that oath, William 
Jefferson Clinton willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading 
testimony to the grand jury.


      I. Statements before the Grand Jury that constitute perjury

                                Overview

  ``Whoever under oath . . . in any proceeding before or ancillary to 
any court or grand jury knowingly makes any false material declaration 
. . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five 
years, or both.'' See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623(a). In a prosecution for 
perjury under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623(a), the prosecution must prove the 
following elements: (i) the declarant was under oath, (ii) the 
testimony was given in a proceeding before a court of the United 
States, (iii) the witness knowingly made, (iv) a false statement, and 
(v) the testimony was material. United States v. Whimpy, 531 F.2d 768 
(1976). The first two elements are not at issue here because it is 
undisputed that President Clinton testified under oath before a Grand 
Jury of the United States. As the discussion below reveals, the House 
Managers proved the remaining elements of perjury beyond a reasonable 
doubt for key aspects of President Clinton's Grand Jury testimony.


           A. Statements to Betty Currie on January 18, 1998

  President Clinton committed perjury before the Grand Jury when he 
testified falsely concerning his motivation for making five statements 
to Betty Currie. Hours after his deposition in the Jones case, 
President Clinton called his secretary Betty Currie and asked her to 
come to the White House the next day, January 18. See Currie 1/27/98 GJ 
at 65-66. On that Sunday afternoon, the President made the following 
five statements to Ms. Currie about Monica Lewinsky: (1) ``You were 
always there when she was there, right?''; (2) ``We were never really 
alone.''; (3) ``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, 
right?''; (4) ``You can see and hear everything, right?''; and (5) 
``She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that.'' Id. at 71-74. 
President Clinton repeated these same questions and statements to Betty 
Currie a few days later. See BC 1/27/98 GJ at 80-81. When he discussed 
his deposition testimony regarding Ms. Lewinsky with Betty Currie on 
these two occasions, President Clinton violated Judge Wright's strict 
order prohibiting any discussion of the Jones deposition.


                                falsity

  President Clinton lied to the Grand Jury when he testified about his 
motivation for making these statements. When asked before the Grand 
Jury about these statements to Betty Currie, the President testified 
that he asked these ``series of questions'' in order to ``refresh [his] 
memory about what the facts were.'' See WJC 8/17/98 GJ at 131. He 
further testified that he wanted to ``know what Betty's memory was 
about what she heard, what she could hear'' and that he was ``trying to

[[Page 2794]]

get as much information as quickly as I could * * * [a]nd I was trying 
to figure [it] out * * * in a hurry because I knew something was up.'' 
See WJC 8/17/98 at 56. Immediately following extensive questioning on 
this issue, a different prosecutor from the Office of Independent 
Counsel asked the President that ``[i]f I understand your current line 
of testimony, you are saying that your only interest in speaking with 
Ms. Currie in the days after your deposition was to refresh your own 
recollection.'' (Emphasis added.) See WJC 8/17/98 GJ at 141-142. 
President Clinton answered: ``Yes.'' Id.
  President Clinton's testimony that he was ``only'' trying to 
``refresh [his] memory about what the facts were'' is perjury because a 
person cannot ``refresh'' his memory with statements and questions that 
he knows are false. Each of President Clinton's five statements to 
Currie is either an outright lie or extremely misleading. President 
Clinton knew the facts of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and he 
knew his statements to Betty Currie were false. By definition, these 
false questions and statements could not have helped President Clinton 
accurately refresh his memory.
  In addition, Betty Currie could not possibly have known the answers 
to some of these questions. For example, how could Betty Currie have 
known whether the President ever ``touched'' Ms. Lewinsky or whether 
Ms. Currie was ``always there when [Ms. Lewinsky] was there?'' Common 
sense defies the President's explanation: if one is trying to refresh 
his memory or gather information quickly, he does not ask questions of 
a person to which the person could not know the answers. The fact that 
Betty Currie could not have known the answers to these questions 
further undermines President Clinton's testimony that he was trying to 
refresh his memory or gather information quickly.
  If the President was merely trying to refresh his recollection or 
gather information quickly why did he repeat these questions and 
statements to Currie a few days later? As the House Managers noted 
during the trial, instead of asking a series of specific leading 
questions, why didn't President Clinton ask Currie a general question 
about what she recalled about Ms. Lewinsky's activity at the White 
House? Moreover, President Clinton's blatant violation of Judge 
Wright's order prohibiting any discussion of the Jones deposition casts 
further doubt on his testimony on this issue. The President's testimony 
regarding his motivation for these statements is false. He did not make 
these statements to refresh his recollection. Rather, as the following 
section explains, the President made these statements to Ms. Currie in 
order to influence her potential testimony in the Jones suit and to 
influence her possible responses to the media.


                               Knowingly

  In a perjury case under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623, the prosecution must 
prove that the defendant ``knowingly'' made the false statement. Under 
this statute, ``knowingly'' means merely that the defendant made the 
false statement ``voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of 
mistake or accident or other innocent reason.'' United States v. 
Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 469 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Watson, 623 
F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1980).
  The President knowingly made these false statements about his 
motivation for speaking to Betty Currie after his deposition. He did 
not make these statements by ``mistake or accident or other innocent 
reason.'' Rather, President Clinton lied about his motivation to 
conceal his true purpose in making these statements to Currie. In 
reality, President Clinton was attempting to corroborate his deceitful 
testimony in the Jones deposition with a prospective witness. When he 
made these statements to Currie, the President knew that she was a 
likely witness in the Jones case because he repeatedly referred to 
Currie when asked about Ms. Lewinsky by the Jones lawyers. See Clinton 
1/17/98 Dep. at 58. President Clinton actually told the Jones lawyers 
to ``ask Betty'' in response to one question in the deposition. Id. at 
64-66. In fact, Betty Currie was subpoenaed by the Jones lawyers only 
days after the President's deposition.
  Moreover, in addition to influencing a prospective witness in the 
Jones suit, the President had another motivation for coaching Ms. 
Currie: She was a probable target of press inquiries about this 
controversy. In fact, a prominent reporter from Newsweek had already 
called Currie on January 15, 1998 and asked her about Ms. Lewinsky. See 
Currie 5/6/98 GJ at 120-121. The President had a motive to influence 
information Currie might give to the media--in addition to testimony 
she might give as a witness in Jones versus Clinton. The President 
knowingly made these statements to Ms. Currie in order to influence 
both her potential testimony and her possible responses to the media.


                              Materiality

  ``Because the Grand Jury's function is investigative, materiality in 
that context is broadly construed.'' United States v. Gribbon, 984 F.2d 
471 (2d Cir. 1993). Courts have consistently held that in a Grand Jury, 
``a false declaration is `material' within the meaning of [18 U.S.C.] 
Sec. 1623 when it has a natural effect or tendency to influence, impede 
or dissuade the Grand Jury from pursuing its investigation.'' United 
States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994).
  President Clinton's false statements to the Grand Jury regarding his 
January conversations with Betty Currie are material to the Grand 
Jury's investigation of obstruction of Justice. To determine whether 
the President obstructed justice in the Jones case, it was critical for 
the Grand Jury to ascertain whether President Clinton attempted to 
influence the testimony of Currie, a potential witness in that case. 
President Clinton's statements to Currie the day after his deposition 
strongly indicate that he was seeking to influence her testimony. The 
President's false statements about his motivation for making these 
statements to Currie had the ``natural effect or tendency'' to ``impede 
or dissuade the Grand Jury from pursuing its investigation'' of 
obstruction of justice in the Jones case.


                        The President's Defense

  In his trial brief, the President offers only a brief defense to this 
perjury allegation. First, the President argues that ``Ms. Currie's 
testimony supports the President's assertion that he was looking for 
information as a result of his deposition'' when he made these 
statements to Currie. See President's Trial Brief at 53. As discussed 
earlier, however, this is implausible. A person cannot accurately 
gather information by making false or misleading statements to another 
person.
  Second, in his brief, the President refers to Currie's Grand Jury 
testimony in which she testified that she felt no pressure to agree 
with the President when he made these questions and statements. See 
President's Trial Brief at 51-53. However, the fact that Ms. Currie 
testified that she did not feel pressured is completely irrelevant to 
whether the President committed perjury concerning these statements. 
President Clinton's state of mind--not Ms. Currie's--is at issue here 
because he is the one accused of perjury.
  In sum, the House Managers proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 
President Clinton (1) knowingly (2) lied about his motivation for 
making these deceitful statements to Betty Currie (3) concerning a 
material matter under investigation by the Grand Jury (4) while under 
oath before a federal Grand Jury.


  B. The nature and extent of the physical relationship with Lewinsky

  Another example of perjury before the Grand Jury concerns President 
Clinton's testimony that he did not engage in ``sexual relations'' with 
Ms. Lewinsky even under his alleged understanding of the definition 
used in the Jones case. Even under his purported interpretation of the 
term, however, Clinton admitted to the Grand Jury that if the person 
being deposed touched certain enumerated body parts of another person, 
then that would constitute ``sexual relations.'' See WJC 8/17/98 at 95-
96. When asked if he denied engaging in such specific conduct, Clinton 
answered ``[t]hat's correct.'' Id.


                                Falsity

  President Clinton lied to the Grand Jury when he testified concerning 
the

[[Page 2795]]

nature and extent of the sexual relationship. First, human nature and 
common sense strongly undermine President Clinton's testimony. It is 
undisputed that President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in sexual 
activity on at least ten occasions over the course of 16 months. 
President Clinton's testimony to the Grand Jury that he never touched 
Ms. Lewinsky in certain areas with the intent to arouse is simply not 
believable given the nature and extent of their contact.
  In addition, Ms. Lewinsky's testimony directly contradicts the 
President. She testified in detail repeatedly before the Grand Jury 
about each of their sexual encounters. According to Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony, she and President Clinton engaged in conduct that 
constituted ``sexual relations'' even under the President's purported 
understanding of the term during 10 encounters. It is important to note 
that Ms. Lewinsky's testimony about the extent of their sexual conduct 
occurred before the President's Grand Jury testimony made these precise 
sexual details important. Moreover, Ms. Lewinsky's friends, family 
members, and medical therapists corroborated her account by testifying 
to the Grand Jury that Lewinsky made near-contemporaneous statements to 
them that President Clinton fondled her in a variety of ways during 
their encounters. Finally, the fact that President Clinton lied to the 
American people about this tawdry affair badly undermines his 
implausible testimony on this issue.


                               Knowingly

  As mentioned earlier, in a perjury case under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623, 
the prosecution must prove that the defendant ``knowingly'' made the 
false statement. Under this statute, ``knowingly'' means merely that 
the defendant made the false statement ``voluntarily and intentionally, 
and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.'' 
United States v. Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 469 (7th Cir. 1998), United 
States v. Watson, 623 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1980).
  President Clinton knowingly made these false statements about the 
nature and extent of his sexual relationship. He did not make these 
statements by ``mistake or accident or other innocent reason.'' 
Instead, the President had a strong motive to lie about the extent of 
the sexual contact in order to avoid being accused of perjury in the 
Jones deposition. After Ms. Lewinsky's dress was discovered, President 
Clinton could no longer deny a sexual affair. However, because he 
repeatedly denied having ``sexual relations'' with Ms. Lewinsky in the 
Jones deposition, the President was trapped. As mentioned earlier, the 
President was forced to admit that fondling Ms. Lewinsky in certain 
ways would constitute ``sexual relations'' even under his purported 
interpretation of the term. Consequently, President Clinton had to deny 
such fondling before the Grand Jury to prevent an admission that he 
committed perjury in his civil deposition, despite how implausible this 
denial is. In summary, President Clinton committed perjury before the 
Grand jury by insisting that his testimony in the Jones deposition on 
this key matter was true. Perhaps due to fear of being charged with 
perjury in the Jones deposition, President Clinton committed the more 
serious offense of perjury before a Grand Jury.


                              Materiality

  As mentioned earlier, ``because the Grand Jury's function is 
investigative, materiality in that context is broadly construed.'' 
United States v. Gribbon, 984 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1993). Courts have 
consistently held that in a Grand Jury, ``a false declaration is 
`material' within the meaning of [18 U.S.C.] Sec. 1623 when it has a 
natural effect or tendency to influence, impede or dissuade the Grand 
Jury from pursuing its investigation.'' United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 
751 (2d Cir. 1994).
  The President's false statements about the extent of his sexual 
conduct with Ms. Lewinsky are material to the Grand Jury's 
investigation of whether the President committed perjury in the Jones 
deposition. In an effort to determine whether President Clinton 
testified truthfully in his deposition, the Office of Independent 
Counsel questioned the President at length before the Grand Jury about 
the nature and extent of his sexual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The 
President's tortured definition of sexual relations makes these details 
material to whether he committed perjury in the Jones deposition. 
Simply put, if the President touched Ms. Lewinsky in certain ways, he 
is guilty of perjury in the Jones deposition. Obviously, President 
Clinton's false statements on this matter had the ``natural effect or 
tendency to influence, impede or dissuade the Grand Jury from pursuing 
its investigation'' of perjury in the Jones deposition.


                        The President's Defense

  In President Clinton's trial brief, the only rebuttal to his 
allegation of perjury is that ``[t]his claim comes down to an oath 
against an oath about immaterial details concerning an acknowledged 
wrongful relationship.'' See Clinton Trial Brief at 44. Even this one 
pithy sentence, however, is inaccurate. First, as the earlier 
discussion reveals, there is more evidence than an oath against an 
oath. Human nature and common sense badly undermine the President's 
testimony. In addition, Ms. Lewinsky testified in detail repeatedly 
before the Grand Jury about the extent of the sexual relationship, 
while the President reverted to his prepared statement 19 times to 
avoid answering specific sexual questions. Moreover, the testimony of 
Ms. Lewinsky's family, friends, and medical therapists provide 
additional evidence of the President's perjury. Finally, the fact that 
President Clinton lied to the entire nation about this sordid affair--
and only acknowledged the affair when confronted with evidence of Ms. 
Lewinsky's dress--devastates his credibility on this issue.
  In sum, the House Managers provide beyond a reasonable doubt that 
President Clinton (1) knowingly (2) lied about the extent of his sexual 
activity with Ms. Lewinsky (3) concerning a material matter under 
investigation by the Grand Jury (4) while under oath before a federal 
Grand Jury.


                    Other Lies before the Grand Jury

  In addition, I have concluded that President Clinton lied in other 
instances before the Grand Jury. While these lies might not sustain a 
conviction for perjury in a court of law, they are profoundly troubling 
nonetheless. For instance, it strongly appears that President Clinton 
lied to the Grand Jury when he testified that he did not believe 
certain acts that he and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in were covered by any of 
the terms and definitions used in the Jones suite. The following 
definition of ``Sexual Relations'' was used at the Jones deposition:

       For the purposes of this deposition, a person engages in 
     `sexual relations' when the person knowingly engages in or 
     causes contact with . . . [certain enumerated body parts] of 
     any person with the intent to arouse . . .'' (Emphasis 
     added.)

Amazingly, President Clinton testified to the Grand Jury that he does 
not believe and did not believe at the Jones deposition that this 
definition includes certain acts which I will not specify. Without 
addressing these lurid details, Clinton interprets ``any person'' to 
mean ``any other person'' under the definition. There is no legal basis 
for him to interpret the definition in this manner.
  I do not believe that President Clinton can reasonably claim this 
interpretation. First, under the President's interpretation, one person 
can engage in sexual relations, while his or her partner in the same 
activity is not engaged in sexual relations. Obviously, this is an 
implausible and absurd conclusion. Second, no reasonable person would 
have understood the definition in the Jones suit not to encompass the 
particular activity that President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in. 
It is important to remember that the underlying allegation in the Jones 
suit concerned the same particular acts involved in the Lewinsky 
affair. Why would the Jones' lawyers use a definition that did not 
include the very conduct alleged by their client? Given this context, 
the President's testimony that he did not believe the definition 
included certain conduct is not believable.
  Finally, the President had a clear motive to lie about his 
understanding of the definition of sexual relations.

[[Page 2796]]

After Ms. Lewinsky's dress was discovered, the President could no 
longer deny his sexual affair. However, the President repeatedly denied 
having ``sexual relations'' with Ms. Lewinsky in the Jones deposition. 
President Clinton's absurd interpretation of the definition of sexual 
relations allowed him to admit to a sexual relationship--which he had 
to do given the dress--without simultaneously admitting to perjury in 
the Jones deposition. Because perjury is such a difficult crime to 
prove, I have concluded that the President might not be convicted in a 
court of law for perjury concerning his testimony on this issue. I am 
convinced, however, that President Clinton lied to the Grand Jury about 
this matter. While this testimony might not generate a conviction in a 
court of law, it was clearly contrived and is profoundly troubling.


                IV. Article Two--Obstruction of Justice

  Let me now turn to the facts of the second article of impeachment 
alleging obstruction of justice. Article Two alleges that:

       In his conduct while President of the United States, 
     William Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his oath 
     faithfully to execute the office of President of the United 
     States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, 
     and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in 
     violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the 
     laws be faithfully executed, has prevented, obstructed, and 
     impeded the administration of justice, and has to that end 
     engaged personally, and through his subordinates and agents, 
     in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, 
     cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony 
     related to a Federal civil rights action brought against him 
     in a duly instituted judicial proceeding.

  In order to determine whether the President has engaged in the type 
of acts charged, it is important that the law be first addressed in 
order to guide us in understanding how the facts relate to the 
violations alleged.
  A. The Law of Obstruction of Justice:
  1. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503:
  The Federal obstruction of justice statute punishes ``[w]hoever . . . 
corruptly . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to 
influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice.'' 18 
U.S.C.A. Sec. 1503(a). Known as the ``omnibus clause,'' Sec. 1503(a) 
``clearly forbids all corrupt endeavors to obstruct or impede the due 
administration of justice,'' United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968, 
976 (5th Cir. 1989), which is defined as ``the performance of acts 
required by law in the discharge of duties such as appearing as a 
witness and giving truthful testimony when subpoenaed.'' United States 
v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 641 (5th Cir. 1977). The statute has 
alternatively been interpreted as forbidding ``interferences with . . . 
judicial procedure'' and aiming ``to prevent a miscarriage of 
justice.'' United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1398 (11th Cir. 
1984).
  ``There are three core elements that the government must establish to 
prove a violation of the omnibus clause of section 1503: (1) there must 
be a pending judicial proceeding; (2) the defendant must have knowledge 
or notice of the pending proceeding; and (3) the defendant must have 
acted corruptly with the specific intent to obstruct or impede the 
proceeding in its due administration of justice.'' United States v. 
Williams, 874 F.2d 968, 976 (5th Cir. 1989). Accord United States v. 
Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 437 (4th Cir. 1993) (adding the word ``influence'' 
to the terms ``obstruct or impede'' in the intent element).
  The purpose of the statute, according to the Supreme Court is not 
directed at the success of the corruptive effort, ``but at the 
`endeavor' to do so.'' United States v. Russell, 255 U.S. 138, 143 
(1921) (opining that the word ``endeavor'' was used instead of 
``attempt'' in order to avoid the technical distinctions between 
attempts, which are punishable, and preparation for attempts, which are 
not). See also United States v. Aguilar 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995) 
(holding that while the endeavor must have the `natural and probable 
effect' of interfering with the due administration of justice, the 
defendant's actions need not be successful, citing Russell).
  2. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512.
  The statute criminalizing witness tampering prohibits, inter alia, 
the use or attempted use of corrupt persuasion or misleading conduct 
with the intent of influencing, delaying, or preventing testimony in an 
official proceeding, causing a person to withhold testimony or 
documentary evidence, alter or destroy physical evidence, evade legal 
process, or be absent from an official proceeding to which such person 
has been legally summoned. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(b). ``To sustain its 
burden of proof for the crime of tampering with a witness . . . the 
Government must prove . . . that the [d]efendant knowingly, corruptly 
persuaded or attempted to corruptly persuade . . . a witness; and 
second, that the [d]efendant . . . did so intending to influence the 
testimony of [that witness] at the [g]rand [j]ury proceeding.'' United 
States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 452-453 (2d Cir. 1996).
  The witness tampering statute's prohibition of corruptly persuading 
someone with intent to ``influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of 
any person in an official proceeding,'' has been interpreted to mean 
exhorting a person to violate his legal duty to testify truthfully in 
court. United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(rejecting defendant's argument that a simple request to testify 
falsely was outside the scope of Sec. 1512(b)), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 
1279 (1997). As the Second Circuit explained: ``Section 1512(b) does 
not prohibit all persuasion but only that which is `corrupt.' The 
inclusion of the qualifying term `corrupt' means that the government 
must prove that the defendant's attempts to persuade were motivated by 
an improper purpose to . . . . A prohibition against corrupt acts `is 
clearly limited to . . . constitutionally unprotected and purportedly 
illicit activity.'' United States v. Thompson 76 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir. 
1996) (quoting United States v. Jeter, 775 F2d 670, 679 (6th Cir. 
1985)).
  Apart from corrupt persuasion with intent to influence a person's 
testimony, Sec. 1512(b) proscribes engaging in misleading conduct with 
intent to influence such testimony. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(b)(1). As one 
court described it, ``[t]he most obvious example of a section 1512 
violation may be the situation where a defendant tells a potential 
witness a false story as if the story were true, intending that the 
witness believe the story and testify to it before the grand jury. 
United States v. Rodolitz, 786 F.2d 77, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1986).
  Some courts have interpreted conduct that was not misleading to the 
person at whom it was directed, even if it was intended to mislead the 
government, as outside the scope of Sec. 1512. See e.g. United States 
v. King, 762 F.2d 232, 237-238 (2d Cir. 1985). However, the Rodolitz 
court distinguished the facts in King, where there was insufficient 
evidence that the witness was actually misled, from the situation where 
the declarant makes false statements to a witness who is ignorant of 
their falsity. See Rodolitz, 786 F.2d at 81-82 (``In giving the 
statutory language its fair meaning, the court must find that making 
false statements to convince another to lie falls squarely within the 
definition of `engaging in misleading conduct toward another person' 
under section 1512.'').
  The witness tampering statute explicitly states that ``an official 
proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of 
the offense.'' 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(e)(1). However, courts have implied 
some state of mind element. E.g. United States v. Kelly, 36 F.3d 1118, 
1128 (D.C.Cir. 1994) (``It therefore follows that Sec. 1512 does not 
require explicit proof of [defendant's] knowledge . . . that such 
proceedings were pending or were about to be instituted. . . . The 
statute only requires that the jury be able reasonably to infer from 
the circumstances that [defendant], fearing that a grand jury 
proceeding had been or might be instituted, corruptly persuaded persons 
with the intent to influcence their possible testimony in such a 
proceeding.'')
  B. The Facts Related to Obstruction of Justice.
  1. Subparts (1) and (2) of Article II:
  In Subpart (1) of Article II, it is averred that:
  On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly 
encouraged a witness in a federal civil action brought against him to 
execute a

[[Page 2797]]

sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, false 
and misleading.
  Subpart (2) alleges that:
  On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly 
encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought against 
him to give perjurious, false and misleading testimony if and when 
called to testify personally in that proceeding.
  Subparts (1) and (2) are flip sides of the same coin. In essence, the 
two subparts charge that the President's 2:30 a.m. phone call to Ms. 
Lewinsky on December 17, 1997, informing her of her presence on a 
witness list in the Jones case was designed to encourage her to provide 
a false affidavit in the case to avoid testifying, or failing that, 
that she give false testimony hiding the true nature of their 
relationship. What does the evidence show?
  It should be recalled that the presence of Ms. Lewinsky's name on the 
Jones witness list first came to the attention of the President no 
later than December 17, 1997. See WJC 8/17/98 at 83-84. He was 
certainly aware of the true nature of their relationship, and it can be 
inferred that he knew that knowledge of the existence of that 
relationship would be detrimental to his case. It is also known that a 
cover story had been developed earlier to hide the relationship from 
others that included the false representation that Ms. Lewinsky's 
visits to the Oval Office were for the purpose of bringing the 
President papers or to visit Ms. Currie. See WJC 8/17/98 at 83-84.
  Ms. Lewinsky testified that in the same 2:30 a.m. conversation in 
which he informed her of the presence of her name on the witness list, 
the President told her that she could always say she was bringing him 
papers or visiting Ms. Currie, consistent with their previous cover 
series. See ML 2/1/99 at Cong. Rec. S1219. Ms. Lewinsky and the 
attorneys for the President have argued that since Ms. Lewinsky did in 
fact ``see'' Ms. Currie on those visits to the President and since she 
was ``carrying'' papers, that story was not untruthful and therefore 
could not have been designed to obstruct justice. However, that 
rationale defies logic and common sense.
  In the first place, the purpose of the visits was not to see Ms. 
Currie. Secondly, the papers she carried were just props, not to be 
handed over to the President, but to falsely characterized as papers 
for the President if questioned. Therefore, were she to testify in a 
deposition that the purpose of her trips to the Oval Office to visit 
the President were actually to deliver papers or visit Ms. Currie, 
those would be false representations. The creation of a cover story 
followed by actions consistent with that cover story do not make the 
story any more truthful. Therefore, the President's instruction to her 
to rely on the cover story is in fact an instruction to her to lie.
  Other evidence supports this conclusion, not the least of which is 
the affidavit filed by Ms. Lewinsky in the case after those discussions 
with the President took place, an affidavit she herself later testified 
as being false. How else could she have characterized it? In that 
affidavit, Ms. Lewinsky stated that she ``never had a sexual 
relationship with the President.'' This was false. She swore that 
``[t]he occasions I saw the President after I left my employment at the 
White House in April, 1996, were official receptions, formal functions 
or events related to the U.S. Department of Defense, where I was 
working at the time. There were other people present on those 
occasions.'' This statement too was false. She also averred that ``I do 
not possess any information that could possibly be relevant to the 
allegations made by Paula Jones or lead to admissible evidence in this 
case.'' Once again, this statement was false, as the President was 
aware, since he knew of the gifts he had given to Ms. Lewinsky. See WJC 
8/17/98 at 32-35.
  The President repeatedly said that he thought that Ms. Lewinsky 
``could,'' and he emphasizes the word ``could,'' have been able to 
draft a narrow truthful affidavit. See WJC 8/17/98 at 69, 116-17. The 
problem is that although she ``could'' have been able to draft such an 
affidavit, the end product was not a truthful affidavit. Thus the 
President's intentional failure to prevent his attorney from using that 
false affidavit at his deposition provides further evidence of his 
corrupt intention during the December 17, 1997, phone call to Ms. 
Lewinsky.
  Given these facts, the House has proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the President endeavored to corruptly influence the affidavit and 
potential testimony of Ms. Lewinsky in his December 17, 1997, 2:30 a.m. 
call to her.
  2. Subpart (3) of Article II:
  In Subpart (3), it is alleged that:
  On or about December 28, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly 
engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence that 
had been subpoenaed in a Federal civil rights action brought against 
him.
  This allegation relates to the obstruction of justice by Ms. Lewinsky 
and Ms. Currie in hiding gifts provided to Ms. Lewinsky by the 
President under the bed of Ms. Currie. The only question that needs to 
be answered here in whether the President participated in that effort.
  What does the evidence show? By December 28, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky had 
been subpoenaed to appear as a witness in the Jones case. In addition 
to demanding her appearance to testify, the subpoena also required that 
Ms. Lewinsky turn over any gifts given to her by the President. See ML 
2/1/99 at Cong. Rec. S1221. Under the pretense of meeting with Ms. 
Currie, Ms. Lewinsky went to the White House on Sunday, December 28, 
1997, to discuss her subpoena with the President. Now at the time of 
that visit, there is no indication that the President was aware that 
particular items had been subpoenaed by the Jones lawyers from Ms. 
Lewinsky. Without the benefit of that information, the President freely 
gave Ms. Lewinsky a number of additional gifts. See ML 2/1/99 at Cong. 
Rec. S1224. So when Ms. Lewinsky informed the President of that fact, 
one can infer that he must have been at the very least, surprised, and 
probably, somewhat troubled. When asked by Ms. Lewinsky at that meeting 
whether she should hide the gifts or give them to someone else like Ms. 
Currie for safekeeping, the President either failed to respond or said 
he needed to think about it. See ML 2/1/99 at Cong. Rec. S1224.
  Ms. Lewinsky testified that she left the White House and later 
received a phone call from Ms. Currie stating that she understood Ms. 
Lewinsky had something for her, or, the President said you have 
something for me. Ms. Lewinsky immediately understood that statement by 
Ms. Currie to refer to the gifts from the President she had discussed 
with him earlier in the day. See ML 2/1/99 at Cong. Rec. S1225. She 
then proceeded to gather up all those gifts. However, according to Ms. 
Lewinsky, she unilaterally withheld some of those gifts from Ms. Currie 
which were of sentimental value to her.
  The President's first defense to this allegation is based upon a 
minor discrepancy in Ms. Lewinsky's testimony concerning the time that 
the gifts were retrieved by Ms. Currie. The argument is that if Ms. 
Lewinsky was mistaken by one and one half hours in her recollection of 
when the gifts were retrieved by Ms. Currie, then her recollection of 
who initiated the retrieval is also suspect. See Statement of Cheryl 
Mills 1/20/99 at Cong. Rec. S826-27.
  This is a red herring. The timing itself is unimportant. What is 
important is the fact that the call came from Ms. Currie. See ML 2/1/99 
at Cong. Rec. S1225. Ms. Currie's cell phone records tend to support 
the notion that Ms. Lewinsky's memory is accurate as to who called whom 
about the gifts. After all, the only way that Ms. Currie would have 
known about the gifts and made the call is if the other party to those 
discussions, the President, apprised her of that conversation and asked 
her to pick up the gifts.
  The fall-back defense of the President is based upon the fact that he 
had given her more gifts that same day, the idea being that his giving 
other gifts to Ms. Lewinsky is inconsistent with a plan to hide those 
gifts. See Statement of Cheryl Mills 1/20/99 at Cong. Rec. S827. This, 
however, is belied by the fact that the President provided her

[[Page 2798]]

with those gifts before the issue of the gifts being subpoenaed came up 
in their conversation that day. See ML 2/1/99 at Cong. Rec. S1224. It 
is reasonable to infer that the President's understanding of the gift 
pickup was unrestricted. He expected Ms. Lewinsky to give all the gifts 
to Ms. Currie for safekeeping, even the ones she had received that day. 
The fact that Ms. Lewinsky kept some of the gifts does not change the 
nature of the intended scheme.
  The evidence adduced as to Subpart (3) shows beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the President corruptly engaged in, encouraged or supported 
a scheme to conceal evidence in the Jones case.
  3. Subpart (4) of Article II:
  Subpart (4) makes the accusation that:
  Beginning on or about December 7, 1997, and continuing through and 
including January 14, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton intensified and 
succeeded in an effort to secure job assistance to a witness in a 
Federal civil rights action brought against him in order to corruptly 
prevent the truthful testimony of that witness in that proceeding at a 
time when the truthful testimony of that witness would have been 
harmful to him.
  It is uncontroverted that Vernon Jordan did not actively seek to find 
a job for Ms. Lewinsky until she was on the witness list in the Jones 
case. Once she was on the witness list, he engaged in a high level job 
search under the guidance of the President and reported his progress in 
that regard directly to the President. See VJ 2/2/99 at Cong. Rec. 
S1231-36. Moreover, he knew at the time of his job search that Ms. 
Lewinsky was a potential witness in the Jones case and, according to 
Ms. Lewinsky, was apprised by her of the sexual nature of her 
relationship with the President. See ML 8/6/98 GJ at 138-39. And of 
course, in that very same time frame, he procured for her an attorney 
to help her file a false affidavit freeing her from testifying in the 
case and to prepare that false affidavit in time for it to be used in 
the President's deposition in the Jones case. See VJ 2/2/99 at Cong. 
Rec. S1240-41.
  One could speculate that the President's use of one of the most 
powerful attorneys in Washington, and a close friend of the President, 
to find a lowly Defense Department employee and former intern a 
lucrative and prestigious job by contacting some of the most powerful 
executives in the country was just an act of kindness unrelated to her 
pending testimony in the Jones case. One could conclude that the 
numerous calls made by Mr. Jordan to the President and Ms. Currie, the 
calls made by the President to Mr. Jordan, and the calls made by Mr. 
Carter to Mr. Jordan, calls which coincided with the effort to get Ms. 
Lewinsky to file a false affidavit and secure her a job, were simply 
coincidental.
  One could surmise that Mr. Jordan's call to Ronald Perelman after Ms. 
Lewinsky felt she had a bad interview, which call led to a second 
successful interview, was unrelated to her cooperation in signing the 
affidavit only a day earlier. One could believe that Mr. Jordan had a 
great interest in assisting Ms. Lewinsky to find a job prior to her 
name showing up on the witness list in the Jones case and only failed 
to do so because he had no time, but was somehow able to find and 
devote substantial time to that effort, coincidentally, after her name 
showed up on the witness list. One could undertake such speculation. 
But that would defy common sense and reason.
  The President became personally engaged in the effort to find Ms. 
Lewinsky a job only after her name appeared on the Jones witness list. 
He then used his powerful friend to find Ms. Lewinsky a job because he 
believed out of gratitude for his help in obtaining a job, she would 
continue to hide their relationship. He kept in constant direct contact 
with Mr. Jordan up until the time that the affidavit was completed and 
she had received and accepted a job offer from Revlon. Indeed, the 
President actually spoke to Mr. Jordan during a meeting between her and 
Mr. Jordan on December 19, 1997. See ML 8/6/98 GJ at 131. Mr. Jordan 
immediately called the President to report his fears the moment he 
thought Ms. Lewinsky may have turned government witness when he learned 
Mr. Carter had been relieved of his representation by her. See VJ 6/9/
98 GJ at 45-46.
  One need only look at the contrary actions by the President once he 
believed Ms. Lewinsky may have decided to cooperate with the 
Independent Counsel investigation. Once he believed that she may have 
been cooperating with the Office of the Independent Counsel, he began 
to disparage her to aides like Sidney Blumenthal. See SB 2/3/99 at 
Cong. Rec. S1248. After that date, the President discussed the wisdom 
of destroying her credibility and reputation with Dick Morris. See DM 
8/18/98 GJ at 35. Can anyone doubt that her favorable testimony was 
tied into the President's efforts to conceal his relationship with her 
and that the intensified job search was the President's endeavor to 
keep her from telling the truth? Put another way, does anyone believe 
that the President would have used Vernon Jordan to help get her a job 
after she agreed to tell the truth to the Jones attorneys or to the 
Independent Counsel? Of course not. It was not in the President's 
interest to reward her for the truth--she was only rewarded for her 
failure to tell the truth. Her reward for telling the truth was to be 
smeared by the President and his spin machine.
  The President's attorneys repeat the mantra that Ms. Lewinsky 
believes that she was not promised a job for her false testimony in the 
Jones case. But that really isn't the issue. The law requires an 
endeavor to corruptly influence her testimony. Regardless of how Ms. 
Lewinsky perceived or misperceived the reasons for the high level 
assistance she received, there was no such misconception on the part of 
the President and Mr. Jordan. The corrupt endeavor by the President was 
confirmed by two powerful and compelling words that cannot be parsed or 
stripped of meaning. Those two words summed up the month long effort to 
protect the President: ``Mission Accomplished.'' There can be no other 
meaning of those words in the context used by Mr. Jordan other than the 
completion of a crucial and time sensitive task by him on behalf of the 
President.
  The proof as to subpart (4) is sustained beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the President intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job 
assistance to a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought 
against him in order to corruptly prevent the truthful testimony of 
that witness in that proceeding at a time when the truthful testimony 
of that witness would have been harmful to him.
  4. Subpart (5) of Article II:
  Subpart (5) alleges that:
  On January 17, 1998, at his deposition in a Federal civil rights 
action brought against him, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly allowed 
his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge 
characterizing an affidavit, in order to prevent questioning deemed 
relevant by the judge. Such false and misleading statements were 
subsequently acknowledged by his attorney in a communication to that 
judge.
  There is no question that during the deposition of the President by 
the Jones attorneys, the President's attorney, Mr. Bennett, made the 
following statement:

     . . . Counsel is fully aware that Ms. Lewinsky has filed, has 
     an affidavit which they are in possession of saying that 
     there is absolutely no sex of any kind, in any manner, shape 
     or form, with President Clinton . . . 

  Mr. Bennett made this statement in an effort to cut off any 
questioning of the President about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. 
That statement was false, as was later admitted by Mr. Bennett, even 
given the contorted reading of the definition of sexual relations as 
purportedly understood by the President. It is equally clear that the 
President did not correct this assertion by his attorney.
  The President's primary defense to this allegation is that he wasn't 
paying attention to what was said by his attorney. This statement can 
not be believed. The videotape of that deposition clearly shows the 
eyes of the President shifting from person to person as each spoke or 
argued their perspective on the issue. As each spoke,

[[Page 2799]]

the President focused on the speaker. It is ludicrous to assert that 
when the name Monica Lewinsky was brought up, the President was not 
keenly aware of the significance of that line of questioning.
  He knew the work that had been done to get her affidavit completed 
before the deposition. He understood the disclosure of that 
relationship could do irreparable damage to his case and to his 
Presidency. There is nothing to indicate he was anything less than 
completely aware of what was said and of his failure to correct that 
record to his detriment. I choose to believe my own eyes and common 
sense, not the implausible explanation put forward by the attorneys for 
the President.
  The secondary defense offered by the President, that Mr. Bennett's 
use of the word ``is'' precluded the necessity to reveal any sexual 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky not occurring, essentially, in that room 
during the deposition, is not worthy of a detailed refutation or 
response.
  The evidence demonstrates that the President allowed his attorney to 
make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge characterizing 
an affidavit, in order to prevent questioning deemed relevant by the 
judge, thus obstructing the administration of justice.
  5. Subpart (6) of Article II:
  In Subpart (6), the House makes the contention that:
  On or about January 18, 1998, and January 20-21, 1998, William 
Jefferson Clinton related a false and misleading account of events 
relevant to a Federal civil rights action brought against him to a 
potential witness in that proceeding, in order to corruptly influence 
the testimony of that witness.
  This allegation relates to the statements made to Ms. Currie by the 
President in his unusual Sunday meeting with her after the Jones 
deposition, and in his repetition of those statements the following 
Tuesday or Wednesday after the Starr investigation had become public. 
The President has not contested the fact that the statements made to 
Ms. Currie were false and misleading. Nor has he provided any answer as 
to why the statements, if designed to help refresh his recollection, 
were false and had to be repeated to her again several days later. 
After being confronted with the subpoena issued to Ms. Currie by the 
Jones attorneys in the days after his deposition, and the revised 
witness list containing her name, the President's attorneys have now 
backed off the notion that no one could have thought Ms. Currie would 
be a witness at the time of these statements. Despite this, the 
President still asserts that those false and misleading statements were 
designed to refresh his recollection and that he personally did not 
believe that she would become a witness. Once again, this defense 
defies credulity.
  When these statements were made, the President was defying a court 
order not to discuss his testimony. See WJC 1/17/98 DT at 212-13. He 
knew it was essential to do so regardless of that order because he had 
blatantly inserted Ms. Currie into the case as a fact witness. He 
mentioned her name during his deposition no less than six times, on one 
occasion even stating that the Jones attorneys would have to ``ask 
Betty.'' See generally WJC 1/17/98 DT. Clearly, the Jones attorneys got 
the message; they added Ms. Currie to the witness list and subpoenaed 
her the following week. So did the President. Having ``brought'' her 
into the case, the President realized the absolute need to make sure 
her testimony would dovetail with his assertions that he had no 
improper relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
  It is apparent that the Sunday meeting was designed to corruptly 
mislead Ms. Currie when she would be called as a witness in the Jones 
case. What was left unanswered by the President, but for which there 
can be but one answer, was why the President repeated the false 
statements to Ms. Currie on Tuesday or Wednesday.
  The answer lies in the record. By Tuesday, the president had learned 
that Judge Starr was investigating the case. See VJ 6/9/98 GJ at 55-74. 
He knew that the evidence in the Jones case would lead Judge Starr to 
Ms. Currie, just as surely as he knew it would lead the Jones attorneys 
to her. So he had to reinforce the false statements he had told Ms. 
Currie the previous Sunday because the stakes had just risen 
substantially. The President needed to be sure he was covered by Ms. 
Currie for both the Jones case and for the Independent Counsel 
investigation to come.
  Once again the evidence shows that the President related a false and 
misleading account of events relevant to a Federal civil rights action 
brought against him to a potential witness in that proceeding, in order 
to corruptly influence the testimony of that witness.
  6. Subpart (7) of Article II:
  The House asserts in Subpart (7) that:
  On or about January 21, 23 and 26, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton 
made false and misleading statements to potential witnesses in a 
Federal grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence the 
testimony of those witnesses. The false and misleading statements made 
by William Jefferson Clinton were repeated by the witnesses to the 
grand jury, causing the grand jury to receive false and misleading 
information.
  This subpart relates to the President's discussions with Erskine 
Bowles, John Podesta and Sidney Blumenthal concerning the nature of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Now the President does not deny the 
testimony of Mr. Podesta where he related that the President said that 
he had no sexual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, including oral sex. 
Nor does he deny the testimony of Sidney Blumenthal that he 
characterized Ms. Lewinsky as a stalker who had threatened him, and 
whose seduction he had declined. The President also admits that he knew 
it was likely they would be grand jury witnesses when he made those 
statements to them.
  Their client having conceded the basic facts of this allegation, the 
President's attorneys first try to make the argument that the President 
could not have been intending to influence the grand jury since he did 
not tell his aides anything different than he had told any other person 
publicly. However, the evidence is unrefuted that his denials to his 
aides were fundamentally different from his public pronunciations in 
that they departed from even his tortured definition of sexual 
relations. Moreover, he created a false impression of Ms. Lewinsky in 
order to besmirch her character and credibility in a blatant attempt to 
both misguide the grand jurors, and it can be inferred by the fact such 
information was provided to his communications aide, to publicly 
disparage her character.
  The second defense offered is that the President's attempts to keep 
his aides out of the grand jury show he was not trying to corruptly 
influence that body. However, this argument loses force in light of the 
fact that only specious arguments were made to prevent their testimony. 
Knowing they would fail, they were arguably designed to serve his 
private interest in delaying the investigation and creating an 
impression of Judge Starr as overreaching and out of control. Moreover, 
the President had months to correct his misstatements to Mr. Blumenthal 
prior to his grand jury testimony, but failed to do so even when he 
knew he would be called before the grand jury to repeat the earlier 
lies told to him by the President. See SB 2/3/99 at Cong. Rec. S1249.
  In effect, the President killed two birds with one stone. His 
chimeric fight to prevent his aides from testifying was used 
effectively in a public relations campaign to impugn the Independent 
Counsel investigation. And when he lost the ``battle'' that he knew 
would inevitably fail, he was aware the false and slanderous testimony 
preordained to be given by his aides would be of assistance to him in 
misleading the grand jury.
  There is substantial proof as to Subpart (7) that the President made 
false and misleading statements to potential witnesses in a Federal 
grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence the testimony of 
those witnesses.

[[Page 2800]]

  For the reasons I have just outlined, the evidence proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the President is guilty of Article II.


                            v. why removal?

  This impeachment trial is of momentous constitutional consequence. A 
removal of the President--a coequal branch of government--must not be 
taken lightly. But that--now that we have decided to end the trial by a 
final vote--does not negate the duty that each Senator has, as 
individual conscience dictates, to vote to acquit or convict based upon 
the evidence. Posterity demands that each of us justify the votes 
Senators render in the impeachment trial of the President.
  Future generations of Americans will look to what we do as precedents 
for impeachments. This is particularly true since our Nation has faced 
only one impeachment trial of a President--that of Andrew Johnson in 
1868. But it is also true for judges and other federal officials as 
well. Let me thus explain in some detail why I shall vote for 
conviction.
  The Constitution vests great discretion in the Senate in determining 
whether to remove an impeached official. The Framers intentionally 
followed the English model where the House of Commons possessed the 
power to impeach or indict officials and the House of Lords the 
authority to try the impeached official. As such, the House of 
Representatives was delegated the authority to impeach and the Senate 
the power to try, convict, and remove. The Senate was chosen as the 
repository of this awesome power because it was considered the more 
mature chamber of Congress. Serving six year terms instead of the two 
years for the House, the Senate was seen as a bulwark against the 
shifting tides of public opinion.
  The age qualification differences--30 for the Senate and 25 for the 
House-- demonstrates that maturity in the Senate would dominate over 
youthful passion. And most important, while the House was prone to 
passionate factional rifts, because Representatives are elected from 
small sometimes single-issue districts, Senators are elected state-wide 
where, it was hoped, factions would counteract factions. Thus, the 
Senate was designed to be more attuned to the public interest than to 
the special interest.
  Consequently, when the Senate sits as a court of impeachment, it does 
not have to rubber-stamp the House's view as to what is an impeachable 
offense. As recognized by the Supreme Court in the Nixon case, the 
Senate was vested by the Framers with the sole power to try 
impeachments. The Senate is thus vested with independent judgment as to 
what process to employ in the trial.
  It also follows that the Senate was granted the discretion to 
determine whether the factual allegations made by the House are true 
and whether such findings by the Senate rise to the level of high 
crimes and misdemeanors. Furthermore, the Senate, as the Upper Chamber 
insulated against popular passions and the factions of special 
interests, could make a subjective determination of the public good in 
defining high crimes and misdemeanors and in removing an official.
  In the words of my esteemed colleague, Robert Byrd, the answer of 
whether a person is fit to remain in office requires both detached 
objectivity and subjective judgment rising above temporary popular 
passions of whether continuation in office ``brings the political (or 
judicial) system into disrepute and undermines the people's trust and 
confidence in government.''
  Supportive of this discretionary authority to remove officials--an 
authority that must be divorced from the fleeting and flaming emotions 
of the times--is the constitutional supermajority safeguard of a \2/3\ 
vote of the Senate needed to remove officials. This requirement is a 
further guarantee against the tide of popular passion and tilts the 
impeachment process towards acquittal.
  Accordingly, a Senator in impeachment trials must consider two 
factors: (1) whether the allegations are true; and (2) whether the 
facts proven rise to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors--
impeachable offenses. In determining the second prong--whether the 
facts proven rise to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors--the 
subjective intent of Senators of what is in the public interest is a 
factor to consider. I have already discussed the facts and the standard 
for impeachable offenses. Now I will discuss whether the public 
interest--in other words what is best for the country--requires that 
the acts committed by President Clinton rise to the level of high 
crimes and misdemeanors requiring his removal.
  I believe that it has. Some of my colleagues, particularly those on 
the other side of the aisle, contend that it is not in the public 
interest to remove President Clinton, because the economy is doing 
well, or because of his foreign policy successes, or because he is 
extremely popular in the polls. But these factors--no matter how 
important--do not justify ignoring the constitutional mandate of 
removal upon proving that impeachable acts were committed.
  Polls should not be a factor in this trial. Our system of government 
is not a pollocracy. It is a representative republic where the people, 
as a constitutional matter, speak only through elections of their 
representatives. America is thus a constitutional republic, and will 
remain so ``if''--in the words of Benjamin Franklin--``you can keep 
it.'' The only way to ``keep it'' is to respect the processes 
established by the Constitution itself.
  Simply put, the Constitution mandates the conviction and removal of 
civil officers, including the President, upon proving ``treason, 
bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' I believe that the 
House Managers have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that President 
Clinton has committed acts of perjury and obstruction of justice. I 
believe that Senators should come to the same subjective determination, 
as I have, that these acts of perjury and obstruction of justice so 
erode our civil and criminal justice system as to conclude that the 
public good is served by removal.
  A President of the United States is not simply a political leader. A 
President is a head of state and a role model for Americans, 
particularly our children. What kind of message will we send to our 
posterity if President Clinton's conduct is not considered worthy of 
removal? What amount of cynicism and disrespect for our governmental 
institutions will we engender if we impose one set of rules for the 
common man--imprisonment for acts of perjury and obstruction of 
justice--and another for the President of the United States--who 
receives a pass from removal because he is powerful or has done a 
``good job'' in some eyes?
  Our children are extremely vulnerable to the growing cynicism 
surrounding this trial. We have all heard stories that some children 
justify their deceits by claiming that the President of the United 
States lied as well. Many wise philosophers have exclaimed that a 
republic can survive only if its citizens are moral. I am afraid that 
our children may not learn that lesson.
  Not to remove here is to diminish the rule of law. As Manager Rogan 
warned in his closing argument, ``[u]p until now, the idea that no 
person is above the law has been unquestioned. And yet this standard is 
not our inheritance automatically. Each generation of Americans 
ultimately has to make the choice for themselves. Once again, it is 
time for choosing. How will we respond?'' We should respond by 
safeguarding the rule of law by voting to remove the President.
  Whether President Clinton has done a ``good job'' is a matter of 
partisan debate. In fact, adopting a ``good job'' exception--a term 
that is so flexible and vague as to be meaningless as a constitutional 
standard--merely exacerbates the partisan tensions ever present in 
impeachment trials.
  The same analysis applies for the ``good economy means no removal'' 
theory. It is intuitive that economic growth can never justify crime or 
acts rising to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors warranting 
removal. If President Clinton is removed, our economy will not suffer. 
The world will still spin on its axis. Our Constitution provides for 
orderly succession and stable government. Removal will not overturn an 
election, as some have argued.

[[Page 2801]]

The constitutional impeachment procedures were designed simply to 
remove unqualified or corrupt officials. Vice President Gore, pursuant 
to the Constitution, will become President and life will go on.
  Let me emphasize that by requiring removal upon proving the 
commission of impeachable offenses, the Framers believed that it is in 
the public good to remove the official.
  President Clinton is guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors and his 
poll numbers, no matter how lofty, cannot insulate him from the 
dictates of the Constitution. The President believes that a rule of 
polls should govern the Senate's decision. But as Manager Rogan 
correctly observed, ``the personal popularity of any President pales 
when weighed against the fundamental concept that forever distinguishes 
us from every nation on the planet. No person is above the law.'' There 
is no escaping the Senate's duty enshrined in the impeachment oath that 
we do ``impartial justice'' and remove the President if we believe that 
his actions amounted to high crimes and misdemeanors.


                             vi. conclusion

  I do not take pleasure or gain any sense of gratification for the 
decision I must make today. For literally months, night and day, I have 
anguished over the serious accusations against President Clinton and 
what they mean for our country, our society, and our children.
  I know none of us enjoys sitting in judgment of the President, our 
fellow human-being, but that is our job and we cannot ignore our 
responsibility. I believe most of us will do a sincere job of trying to 
fulfill our oath to do impartial justice.
  I have diligently strived to extend my deepest respect to the 
President--indeed, to the Presidency--throughout this process. I wanted 
to be able to support President Clinton. I believe that I have been 
more than fair. I have tried not to rush to judgment.
  All of my life I've been taught to forgive and forget. I've always 
tried to live up to that belief. As a leader in my church, I have dealt 
with a great number of human frailties, people with a wide variety of 
problems, and I've always believed that good people can repent of their 
sins and be forgiven.
  Indeed, to the dismay of some, I had expressed a hope and a desire 
early on in this constitutional drama that the President would 
acknowledge his untruthful statements. He chose to do otherwise and 
perpetuated his untruthfulness. Although some believe this is solely a 
private matter, I feel this is really about the President's fidelity to 
the oath of office and the rule of law.
  I have always been prepared to vote my conscience. Indeed, my 
concerns regarding the bad precedent a likely acquittal would set have 
been somewhat calmed by something the great constitutional scholar, 
Joseph Story, once wrote about acquittal in impeachment cases. Mr. 
Story noted that in cases in which two-thirds of the Senate is not 
satisfied that a conviction is warranted, ``it would be far more 
consonant to the notions of justice in a republic, that a guilty person 
should escape than that an innocent person should become the victim of 
injustice from popular odium * * * ''
  Nonetheless, I am reminded of a quote by President Theodore 
Roosevelt, a statement that applies to the matter before the Senate:

       Honesty is not so much a credit as an absolute prerequisite 
     to efficient service to the public. Unless a man is honest, 
     we have no right to keep him in public life; it matters not 
     how brilliant his capacity * * *.
       `Liar' is just as ugly a word as `thief,' because it 
     implies the presence of just as ugly a sin in one case as in 
     the other. If a man lies under oath or procures the lie of 
     another under oath, if he perjures himself or suborns 
     perjury, he is guilty under the statute law. Under the higher 
     law, under the great law of morality and righteousness, he is 
     precisely as guilty if, instead of lying in a court, he lies 
     in a newspaper or on the stump; and in all probability the 
     evil effects of his conduct are infinitely more widespread 
     and more pernicious.

  President Theodore Roosevelt's words cannot be ignored--nor can the 
Constitution. After weighing all of the evidence, listening to 
witnesses, and asking questions, I have concluded that President 
Clinton's actions warrant removal from office.
  Committing crimes of moral turpitude such as perjury and obstruction 
of justice go to the heart of qualification for public office. These 
offenses were committed by the chief executive of our country, the 
individual who swore to faithfully execute the laws of the United 
States.
  This great nation can tolerate a President who makes mistakes. But it 
cannot tolerate one who makes a mistake and then breaks the law to 
cover it up. Any other citizen would be prosecuted for these crimes.
  But, President Clinton did more than just break the law. He broke his 
oath of office and broke faith with the American people. Americans 
should be able to rely on him to honor those values that have built and 
sustained our country, the values we try to teach our children--
honesty, integrity, being forthright.
  For 13 miserable months, we have struggled with the question of what 
to do about President Clinton's actions. The struggle has divided the 
Nation.
  To those of us who have ourselves taken an oath to uphold the 
Constitution--which represents the rule of law and not of men--it 
should not matter how brilliant or popular we feel the President is. 
The Constitution is why we govern based on the principle of equality 
and not emotion. The Constitution is what guides us as a nation of laws 
and not personalities. The Constitution is what enables us to live in 
freedom.
  I will vote for conviction on both articles of impeachment--not 
because I want to--but because I must. Upholding our Constitution--a 
sacred document that Americans have fought and died for--is more 
important than any one person, including the President of the United 
States.
  When all is said and done, I must fulfill my oath and do my duty. I 
will vote ``Guilty'' on both Article One and Article Two.

                          ____________________