[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 2]
[House]
[Pages 1979-1981]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




     REPORT ON EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN BOSNIA AND 
 HERZEGOVINA--MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. 
                              NO. 106-17)

  The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message 
from the President of the United States; which was read and, together 
with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the 
Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed:

To the Congress of the United States:
  Pursuant to section 7 of Public Law 105-174, I am providing this 
report to inform the Congress of ongoing efforts to achieve sustainable 
peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). This is the first semiannual 
report that evaluates progress in BiH against the ten benchmarks 
(``aims'') outlined in my certification to the Congress of March 3, 
1998. NATO adopted these benchmarks on May 28, 1998, as part of its 
approval of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) military operations plan 
(OPLAN 10407). The Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council 
(PIC) subsequently adopted corresponding benchmarks in its Luxembourg 
Declaration of June 9, 1998.
  NATO, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and my 
Administration have coordinated closely in evaluating progress on 
Dayton implementation based on these benchmarks. There is general 
agreement that there has been considerable progress in the past year. 
The basic institutions of the state, both political and economic, have 
been established. Key laws regarding foreign investment, privatization, 
and property are now in place. Freedom of movement across the country 
has substantially improved. Fundamental reform of the media is 
underway. Elections have demonstrated a continuing trend towards 
growing pluralism. Nevertheless, there is still much to be done, in 
particular on interethnic tolerance and reconciliation, the development 
of effective common institutions with powers clearly delineated from 
those of the Entities, and an open and pluralistic political life. The 
growth of organized crime also represents a serious threat.
  With specific reference to SFOR, the Secretaries of State and 
Defense, in meetings in December 1998 with their NATO counterparts, 
agreed that SFOR continues to play an essential role in the maintenance 
of peace and stability and the provision of a secure environment in 
BiH, thus contributing significantly to progress in rebuilding BiH as a 
single, democratic, and multiethnic state. At the same time, NATO 
agreed that we do not intend to maintain SFOR's presence at current 
levels indefinitely, and in fact agreed on initial reductions, which I 
will describe later in this report. Below is a benchmark-by-benchmark 
evaluation of the state-of-play in BiH based on analysis of input from 
multiple sources.
  1. Military Stability. Aim: Maintain Dayton cease-fire. Considerable 
progress has been made toward military stabilization in BiH. Entity 
Armed Forces (EAFs) are in compliance with Dayton, and there have been 
no incidents affecting the cease-fire. EAFs remain substantially 
divided along ethnic lines. Integration of the Federation Army does not 
reach down to corps-level units and below. However, progress has been 
made through the Train and Equip Program to integrate the Ministry of 
Defense and to provide the Federation with a credible deterrent 
capability. Although it is unlikely to meet its target of full 
integration by August 1999, the Federation Ministry of Defense has 
begun staff planning for integration. The Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) 
continues its relationship with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) Army. Similarly, the Bosnian Croat element of the Federation Army 
maintains ties with Croatia. In both cases, however, limited resources 
impinge on what either Croatia or the FRY can provide financially or 
materially; the overall trend in support is downward. In some areas, 
the VRS continues to have certain qualitative and quantitative 
advantages over the Federation Army, but the Train and Equip Program 
has helped narrow the gap in some key areas. The arms control regimes 
established under Articles II (confidence and security-building 
measures) and IV (arms reduction and limitations) of Annex 1-B of the 
Dayton Peace Accords are functioning. In October 1997, BiH and the 
other parties were recognized as being in compliance with the 
limitations on five major types of armaments (battle tanks, armored 
combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters) 
set forth in the Article IV agreement, which were derived from the 
Annex 1B 5:2:2 ratios for the FRY, Republic of Croatia, and BiH 
respectively. The parties have since maintained armament levels 
consistent with the limitations and are expected to do so in the 
future. A draft mandate for an Article V agreement (regional stability) 
has been approved; negotiations are due to begin in early 1999. 
Military stability remains dependent on SFOR as a deterrent force.
  2. Public Security and Law Enforcement. Aim: A restructured and 
democratic police force in both entities. There has been considerable 
progress to date on police reform due to sustained joint efforts of the 
International Police Task Force (IPTF), Office of the High 
Representative (OHR), and SFOR, which have overcome a number of 
significant political obstacles. So far, approximately 85 percent of 
the police in the Federation have received IPTF-approved training, as 
have approximately 35 percent of the police in the Republika Srbska 
(RS). All sides continue to lag in the hiring of minority officers and, 
as the IPTF implements its plans to address this problem, tensions will 
increase in the short-term. SFOR often must support the IPTF in the 
face of crime, public disorder, and rogue police. Monoethnic police 
forces have often failed to facilitate minority returns. In these types 
of scenarios, SFOR's use of the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) 
has been a force multiplier, requiring fewer, but specially trained 
troops. At this point, SFOR's essential contribution to maintaining a 
secure environment, to include backing up IPTF in support of nascent 
civilian police forces, remains critical to continued progress.
  3. Judicial Reform. Aim: An effective judicial reform program. 
Several key steps forward were taken in 1998, such as the signing of an 
MOU on Inter-Entity Legal Assistance on May 20, 1998, and establishment 
of an Inter-Entity Legal Commission on June 4, 1998. The Federation 
Parliament in July adopted a new criminal code. Nevertheless, the 
judicial system still requires significant reform. Judges are still 
influenced by politics, and the system is financially strapped and 
remains ethnically biased. Execution of judgments, in particular 
eviction of persons who illegally occupy dwellings, is especially 
problematic. The progress made in the area of commercial law is 
encouraging for economic development prospects.

[[Page 1980]]

  4. Illegal Institutions, Organized Crime, and Corruption. Aim: The 
dissolution of illegal pre-Dayton institutions. Corruption remains a 
major challenge to building democratic institutions of government. 
Structures for independent monitoring of government financial 
transactions are still not in place. Shadow institutions still need to 
be eliminated. The burden of creating institutions to combat fraud and 
organized crime falls mostly to the international community and in 
particular to the IPTF. SFOR contributes to the secure environment 
necessary for the success of other international efforts to counter 
these illegal activities.
  5. Media Reform. Aim: Regulated, democratic, and independent media. 
Approximately 80 percent television coverage has been achieved in BiH 
through the international community's support for the Open Broadcasting 
Network (OBN), which is the first (and so far only) neutral source of 
news in BiH. Several television and radio networks have been 
restructured and are led by new management boards. Most are in 
compliance with Dayton except for some regional broadcasts. The 
Independent Media Commission assumed responsibility for media 
monitoring from the OSCE on October 31, 1998. Progress has been 
significant, but BiH still has far to go to approach international 
standards. SFOR's past actions in this area are a key deterrent against 
illegal use of media assets to undermine Dayton implementation.
  6. Elections and Democratic Governance. Aim: National democratic 
institutions and practices. With the exception of the election of a 
nationalist to the RS presidency, the September 1998 national elections 
continued the long-term trend away from reliance on ethnically based 
parties. The two major Serb nationalist parties lost further ground 
and, once again, will be unable to lead the RS government. Croat and 
Bosniak nationalist parties retained control, but saw margins eroded 
significantly. In this regard, SFOR's continued presence will 
facilitate conduct of the municipal elections scheduled for late 1999 
but, as has been the case with every election since Dayton, the trend 
of increasingly turning over responsibility for elections to the 
Bosnians themselves will continue.
  7. Economic Development. Aim: Free-market reforms. While the process 
of economic recovery and transformation will take many years, some 
essential groundwork has been laid. Privatization legislation and 
enterprise laws have been passed, and banking legislation has been 
partially passed. Fiscal revenues from taxes and customs have increased 
significantly. Nevertheless, the fiscal and revenue system is in its 
infancy. Implementation of privatization legislation is slow and the 
banking sector is under-funded, but there are signs of development in 
GDP. There has been a marked increase in freedom of movement, further 
enhanced by the uniform license plate law. SFOR's continued 
contribution to a secure environment and facilitating freedom of 
movement is vital as economic reforms begin to take hold.
  8. Displaced Person and Refugee (DPRE) Returns. Aim: A functioning 
phased and orderly minority return process. While there have been some 
significant breakthroughs on DPRE returns to minority areas, such as 
Jajce, Stolac, Kotor Varos, Prijedor, Mostar, and Travnik, the overall 
numbers have been low. In some areas where minority DPREs have 
returned, interethnic tensions rose quickly. Some nationalist political 
parties continue to obstruct the return of minority DPREs to the areas 
they control. Poor living conditions in some areas present little 
incentive for DPREs to return. The Entities are using DPREs to resettle 
regions (opstinas) that are of strategic interest to each ethnic 
faction. SFOR's contribution to a secure environment remains vital to 
OHR efforts to facilitate minority returns.
  9. Brcko. Aim: A multiethnic administration, DPRE returns, and secure 
environment. Freedom of movement in Brcko has improved dramatically. 
Citizens of BiH are increasingly confident in using their right to 
travel freely throughout the municipality and the region. Police and 
judicial elements have been installed, but the goal of multiethnicity 
in these elements still has not been realized. About 1,000 Federation 
families have returned to the parts of Brcko on the RS side of the 
Inter-Entity Boundary Line, but few Serb displaced persons have left 
Brcko to return to their pre-war homes. SFOR support will be a critical 
deterrent to the outbreak of violence during the period surrounding the 
Arbitrator's decision on Brcko's status anticipated for early in 1999.
  10. Persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWCs). Aim: Cooperation with 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
leading to the transfer of PIFWCs to The Hague for trial. Thanks to 
action by the Congress, the Secretary of State now has the ability to 
offer rewards of up to $5 million for information leading to the arrest 
or conviction of PIFWCs. Of the 81 people indicted publicly by the 
Tribunal, only 29--36 percent--are still at large. The two highest-
profile indictees, Karadzic and Mladic, are among them. Bosnians are 
cooperating with the ICTY, but the failure of the RS to support the 
ICTY is a major obstacle to progress. Bosnian Croats have cooperated 
with respect to the surrender of all but two public indictees, but have 
not cooperated fully with respect to the Tribunal's orders that they 
turn over documents needed for the fair trial of a number of indictees. 
SFOR continues to provide crucial support in the apprehension of PIFWCs 
and for ICTY exhumations.
  In my report to the Congress dated July 28, 1998, I emphasized the 
important role that realistic target dates, combined with concerted use 
of incentives, leverage, and pressure on all parties, should play in 
maintaining the sense of urgency necessary to move steadily toward an 
enduring peace.
  The December 1998 Peace Implementation Council Declaration and its 
annex (attached) offer target dates for accomplishment of specific 
tasks by authorities in BiH. The PIC decisions formed the background 
against which NATO Defense Ministers reviewed the future of SFOR in 
their December 17 meeting. Failure by Bosnian authorities to act within 
the prescribed timeframes would be the point of departure for more 
forceful action by the OHR and other elements of the international 
community. Priorities for 1999 will include: accelerating the 
transition to a sustainable market economy; increasing the momentum on 
the return of refugees and displaced persons, particularly to minority 
areas; providing a secure environment through the rule of law, 
including significant progress on judicial reform and further 
establishment of multiethnic police; developing and reinforcing the 
central institutions, including adoption of a permanent election law, 
and the development of greater confidence and cooperation among the 
Entity defense establishments with the goal of their eventual 
unification; and pressing ahead with media reform and education issues.
  In accordance with the NATO Defense Ministers' guidance in June 1998, 
NATO is conducting a series of comprehensive reviews at no more than 6-
month intervals. The first of these reviews was completed on November 
16, 1998, and recently endorsed by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) 
Foreign and Defense Ministers. In reviewing the size and shape of SFOR 
against the benchmarks described above, the United States and its 
allies concluded that at present, there be no changes in SFOR's 
mission. NATO recommended, however, that steps begin immediately to 
streamline SFOR. The NAC Foreign and Defense Ministers endorsed this 
recommendation on December 8, 1998, and December 17, 1998, 
respectively. The Defense Ministers also endorsed a report from the 
NATO Military Authorities (NMAs) authorizing further adjustments in 
SFOR force levels--in response to the evolving security situation and 
support requirements--to be completed by the end of March 1999. While 
the specifics of these adjustments are still being worked, they could 
amount to reductions of as much as 10 percent from the 6,900 U.S. 
troops currently in SFOR. The 6,900 troop level already represents a 20 
percent reduction from the 8,500 troops deployed in June 1998 and is 66 
percent less than

[[Page 1981]]

peak U.S. deployment of 20,000 troops in 1996.
  The NATO Defense Ministers on December 17, 1998, further instructed 
NMAs to examine options for possible longer-term and more substantial 
adjustments to the future size and structure of SFOR. Their report is 
due in early 1999 and will give the United States and its Allies the 
necessary information on which to base decisions on SFOR's future. We 
will address this issue in the NAC again at that time. Decisions on 
future reductions will be taken in the light of progress on 
implementation of the Peace Agreement. Any and all reductions of U.S. 
forces in the short or long term will be made in accordance with my 
Administration's policy that such reductions will not jeopardize the 
safety of U.S. armed forces serving in BiH.
  My Administration values the Congress' substantial support for Dayton 
implementation. I look forward to continuing to work with the Congress 
in pursuit of U.S. foreign policy goals in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
                                                   Willam J. Clinton.  
       The White House, February 4, 1999.

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