[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 2]
[House]
[Pages 1805-1806]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




      THE CHINA MARKET ACCESS AND EXPORT OPPORTUNITIES ACT OF 1999

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, last week, U.S. trade negotiators once 
again met with their Chinese counterparts in an attempt to discuss 
China's accession to the World Trade Organization, the WTO. 
Unfortunately, but also

[[Page 1806]]

predictably, these talks did not produce any significant breakthroughs. 
The Chinese repeated their same old, unsatisfactory demands while 
offering only minimal concessions.
  Though the Washington, D.C. rumor mill and so-called conventional 
wisdom are predicting that the forthcoming Sino-American meeting 
between President Clinton and Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji will showcase 
an agreement for China's WTO accession, the United States and China 
remain so far apart on so many trade issues that this Member is 
doubtful that a complete and commercially viable agreement can be 
reached in such a short time frame.
  Instead, the President and the Premier will be faced with China 
continuing to have a huge and growing trade surplus with the United 
States. The record $60 billion trade deficit with China in 1998 
represents a 15.5 percent increase over the 1997 level. Now as the 
trade deficit with China is averaging more than $1 billion per week, 
under current trends the projected trade deficit for 1999 could exceed 
$70 billion. It is also clear that the American exports will continue 
to face new and growing problems of access to the Chinese markets.
  It seems to this Member that the underlying problem remains that 
China already enjoys, without making any real concessions, the low 
tariff benefit of normal trade with the United States. From the Chinese 
perspective, why should they change?
  Recognizing that China gets a free ride into U.S. markets without 
giving U.S. exporters similar, fair treatment, the distinguished 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Ewing), the distinguished gentleman from 
Mississippi (Mr. Pickering) and this Member have again introduced 
legislation that gives American trade negotiators the tools needed to 
pry open China's markets as we did last Congress on May 22, 1997.
  This legislation, the China Market Access and Export Opportunities 
Act, requires that China either make an acceptable offer to join the 
World Trade Organization or face snap-back tariffs. That is a 
reasonable approach to negotiations that are stymied and a U.S. trade 
deficit that is rapidly growing and unsustainable.
  The Bereuter-Ewing-Pickering legislation will help induce China's 
leaders to comply with the world trade rules by eliminating our annual 
normal trade relations review when China accedes to the WTO. No longer 
will the President have to waive or certify that China meets Jackson-
Vanik requirements. China, under this legislation, will receive normal 
trade status routinely unless either the Congress or the President use 
other existing authorities to raise tariffs on China's goods. As a 
result, this action will eliminate Beijing's contention that China 
could make all of the structural and trade liberalization changes 
necessary to join the WTO only to have the U.S. Congress continue its 
annual and increasingly contentious NTR reviews.
  The China Market Access and Export Opportunities Act requires the 
President to first determine if China is, quote, not according adequate 
trade benefits, close quote, as defined in existing law to the United 
States; and second, if China is not taking adequate steps to become a 
WTO member by January 1, 2001. This is also the date by which the 
current bilateral U.S. trade agreement must be renewed. If the 
President makes a negative conclusion on either of these two findings, 
then the President shall announce the imposition of snap-back tariffs 
on China within 6 months of that determination. In imposing the snap-
back tariffs, the President has wide discretion to determine both the 
amount of the tariff and on which categories of products the snap-back 
tariffs will be imposed. However, under no circumstances can the 
President exceed the legislation's snap-back tariff ceiling which is 
the pre-Uruguay round MFN tariff rate; in other words, the Column 1 
tariff rates in effect on December 31, 1994.
  A study by the Congressional Research Service estimates an additional 
$325 million in tariff revenue would be generated for the U.S. Treasury 
if the President were to utilize his full snap-back authority, for 
example, on just the top 25 Chinese exports to the United States. This 
estimate, based upon 1995 figures, is not adjusted to reflect any 
downward demand for the products due to the increased tariff.
  The President would be required under this legislation to terminate 
the imposed snap-back tariffs on China on the date China becomes a WTO 
member or on the date the President determines that China is according 
adequate trade benefits to the United States and making significant 
steps to become a WTO member, whichever is earlier. The President also 
will be able to modify any of the snap-back tariffs upward within the 
cap or downward in response to Chinese actions or inactions as long as 
the appropriate congressional committees are notified.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support and cosponsor the 
Bereuter-Ewing-Pickering legislation.
  Because the China Market Access and Export Opportunities Act proposes 
tariffs averaging from 4% to 7% rather than the average 44% tariff 
increase which would result if NTR is revoked, our proposal is 
realistic and enforceable and Beijing will have strong motive to move 
to WTO membership and reciprocally open their markets. Currently, 
China's leaders in effect ignore Congress' annual threat to revoke NTR 
because they know we will not impose such draconian tariffs on U.S. 
imports. China knows that the impact of such severe import duties on 
economies of important U.S. partners like Hong Kong and Taiwan would be 
excessively damaging. By giving the President the flexibility to vary 
and modify these tariffs within the statutorily imposed level, our 
``scalpel-like'' snap-back mechanism--rather than the ``meat axe'' 
approach of the annual NTR process--greatly increases the United States 
Trade Representative's ability to negotiate acceptable terms for 
China's accession to the WTO. It is a realistic carrot-and-stick 
approach.
  Mr. Speaker, China's desire to join the World Trade Organization 
represents a historic opportunity for the United States to level the 
playing field for U.S. companies, workers and farmers to sell their 
products in China. However, this opportunity will be lost if the U.S. 
Congress and the Administration do not agree on a responsible strategy 
to coax China into that organization after it has met eligibility 
standards. The China Market Access and Export Opportunities Act is a 
tough but reasonable way to pressure Beijing to eliminate those trade 
barriers and structural impediments which currently stand between China 
and its membership in the WTO. The economic and trade liberalization 
reforms in China which this legislation promotes will reduce our 
enormous and ever-growing bilateral trade deficit and benefit American 
workers and consumers while stimulating the most positive forces of 
political and social change in China. It is a win-win approach which 
this Member encourages his colleagues to support by supporting the 
Bereuter-Ewing-Pickering legislation being introduced today.

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