[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 19]
[House]
[Pages 27350-27354]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                   SECURITY ISSUES RELATING TO RUSSIA

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Fletcher). Under the Speaker's announced 
policy of January 6, 1999, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) 
is recognized for 60 minutes.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, as I have done frequently in 
the past, I want to just talk this evening about a situation that 
occurred in a hearing this week relative to our relations with Russia.
  The last time I addressed this body it was to focus on a new 
direction in our relations with Russia, a new set of eight principles 
that the factions of the state Duma had agreed with, allowing us to 
continue to provide investment and economic opportunity in Russia but 
to set some new guidelines. That bill, which I dropped approximately 
one month ago, had 25 Democrat and 25 Republican sponsors when I 
introduced it. We have now gotten additional support and, in fact, we 
are hoping to continue to grow the kind of movement in the Congress 
that says that in spite of Russia's economic problems, we must still be 
engaged but be engaged in a different way.
  I rise tonight, however, Mr. Speaker, to discuss a security issue 
relative to Russia based on a set of hearings that I have conducted on 
my subcommittee over the past 5 years. Two years ago, Mr. Speaker, I 
had the highest ranking GRU defector ever from the former Soviet Union, 
Stanislav Lunev come before our Committee on Armed Services, and in a 
hearing that was open to the public, but in which hearing we had to 
hide his identity because he is in a witness protection program in this 
country, he testified about his role as a GRU agent and what his 
responsibilities were.
  During that testimony, besides giving us an insight into the mindset 
of Soviet intelligence, he talked about what he thought may in fact 
continue to be some problems with our relationship with Russia today. 
One of the more troubling things that Lunev spoke of was when he was 
assigned to the Washington embassy of the former Soviet Union, under 
the cover of being a Tass correspondent, one of his primary 
responsibilities was to identify and locate potential sites for the 
drops and the location of sensitive Soviet military equipment and 
hardware that could be accessed in time of a conflict in the United 
States.
  Now, we had no separate way of corroborating the testimony of Mr. 
Lunev at that time, yet these comments were made on the public record 
and were obviously of great concern to us. Well, this past summer 
something new happened, Mr. Speaker, and that was that the Cambridge 
scholar Christopher Andrew, who has written over 10 books, very 
scholarly books on intelligence operations around the world, and who 
has specialized in the intelligence of the former Soviet Union and the 
current practices of the current intelligence operations inside of 
Russia, Christopher Andrew was able to get access to a series of files 
that have been given to the British Government.

                              {time}  2000

  For 6 years he worked on the files in a way that allowed him to 
produce a book last month which was the basis of the hearing that I 
chaired. I want to go through that because the testimony of Christopher 
Andrew reinforces what Stanislav Lunev had said in our committee 
hearing 2 years prior. Some very troubling information came out of 
that, and there is, I think, reason for us to move quickly.
  I have written to Secretary Albright and hope tonight to dwell upon 
why I think it is important for the administration to act on the 
findings of Christopher Andrew in his book.
  It seems as though, Mr. Speaker, that the head archivist for the KGB 
files in Moscow for a period of over 20 decades by the name of 
Mitrokhin did not like the kind of activities the KGB was involved in 
in the Soviet era.
  During his tenure as the chief archivist, there was a decision made 
in Moscow to relocate the central files of the KGB from downtown Moscow 
to one of the Ring Road sites. Since Mitrokhin was in charge of the 
archives, his job was to monitor these archives and always keep them 
under his control. In fact, he oversaw the move of the files had to be 
checked out of the Moscow site and then checked in at the new site, 
both of which were done by Mitrokhin and people who worked for him.
  Now, he had been recognized during his career as an outstanding 
public servant in the Soviet Union. In fact in the book, there is a 
photograph of the documentation awarded to him signed by the chief of 
the KGB praising him for the outstanding work he did on behalf of the 
Soviet Union.
  But because Mitrokhin privately did not like many of the practices of 
the KGB, especially those individual attacks on people and the attacks 
on ethnic groups, he secretly during his career of over 2 decades on a 
daily basis copied down in his own handwriting as many of the KGB files 
as he could. Each day during his tenure as the head archivist of the 
KGB, he would then place these handwritten notes inside of his 
clothing, would sneak them out of the KGB headquarters, and on a daily 
basis put them under the flooring of his dacha. He did this for a 
number of years, assembling a huge file of handwritten notes that 
basically were copied from the KGB archives.
  In 1992, after the reforms took place in Russia, Mitrokhin emigrated 
through one the three Baltic states. He initially went to an American 
embassy

[[Page 27351]]

and told them who he was and the kind of information he had. For some 
reason, he was not able to link up with the American Government to 
allow him to emigrate to the West. He then went to the British Embassy, 
and the Brits offered him complete asylum for himself and his family.
  In fact, since 1992, he has been living along with his family under a 
secret identity in Great Britain. He brought the files with him, the 
handwritten notes that he had copied from the KGB archives.
  Obviously, there was a huge wealth of information about actions that 
went on within the Soviet Union by their intelligence services. The 
Brits, when they got this cache of information, realized they had 
something that was invaluable because it gave the West the first 
complete insight into what kinds of actions and activities the KGB was 
involved in, what kinds of things against America and the West.
  There were some other startling pieces of information in those files. 
The British Government, in getting these files, wanted them to be 
thoroughly examined, reviewed, and translated by someone that they had 
confidence in. And because of Christopher Andrew's reputation as a 
Cambridge scholar and Russian intelligence expert, they brought him in 
and gave him complete access to the Mitrokhin files.
  For 6 years, Mr. Speaker, Mitrokhin on a regular daily basis met with 
Andrew and he and Christopher Andrew developed this publication which 
was released on the market in September of this year, just one month 
ago, entitled ``The KGB Files: The Sword and the Shield, the Mitrokhin 
Archives and the Secret History of the KGB.''
  There is extensive documentation of what Mitrokhin found and the 
files that he was able to remove in his own handwritten notes. But, Mr. 
Speaker, I do not have time tonight to go into all the details the way 
the KGB manipulated the response in America to the J.F.K. 
assassination, the way the KGB attempted to manipulate the perceptions 
of the FBI here in our country. But all that is here in the book.
  But there is one set of facts that I do want to focus on this evening 
because they involve the security of American people throughout this 
Nation.
  Mr. Speaker, I am not satisfied with the response to date of what is 
contained in the files. In the files, Mr. Speaker, Mitrokhin spoke of 
the KGB during the Cold War era prelocating military hardware and 
equipment throughout Europe and throughout North America. These caches 
of weapons included transmitter technology, included in some cases 
detonating devices, in some cases included classified information about 
that country and its operations, and perhaps even included material 
that would be necessary for producing a weapon of mass destruction or 
perhaps even a weapon of mass destruction itself.
  When Mitrokhin copied down the notes in this area, he could not copy 
down, because of time limitations and his own interest, every detailed 
location of every site in both Europe and North America because there 
were extensive amounts of sites all over the world, but he did document 
a few. But he also referenced locations throughout North America, many 
of which were in the United States where the KGB deliberately stored 
military materiel under the Earth in selected spots that were booby-
trapped. These booby-trapped spots evidently are still in place today.
  Now, when Mitrokhin in the archives gave this information to 
Christopher Andrew, who published this in his book, this reinforces, 
Mr. Speaker, what Stanislav Lunev told us 2 years ago, that the Soviet 
Union and the KGB had taken great efforts to pre-position military 
hardware inside of our country's borders buried at specific locations 
that could be accessed by Soviet operatives if and when the time came 
for conflict with the Soviet Union.
  These sites were also located throughout Europe and the European 
countries. In fact, in the Mitrokhin archives it was noted that many, 
if not most, of these sites were booby-trapped with bombs that would go 
off if someone attempted to dig up the cache of weapon materiel.
  Mr. Speaker, at least two countries that I am aware of, in getting 
information from the Mitrokhin files, were able to get the exact 
locations of the sites that Mitrokhin copied down from the KGB files, 
Switzerland and Brussels. In each case, the governments of those two 
countries went to the exact sites identified in the KGB files as 
outlined in this book.
  The exact locations marked off by landmarks above ground led the 
governments and the agents of both of these countries to sites where 
they dug down. In each case, the sites were booby-trapped.
  In fact, following the Swiss excavation of the one site, the Swiss 
Government put out a warning to its citizens that if they were to 
encounter a similar site, they should not go near it because the 
bombing device that was used to protect the site of the Soviet weaponry 
was strong enough to kill a human being.
  The Swiss Government and the Belgium Government dug up these sites, 
and exactly where the Mitrokhin files said they would be, they found 
the military hardware that the Soviet Union had placed there without 
those countries having any idea of what the Soviets had done.
  Now, someone would consider that to be an act of provocation for a 
foreign government to specifically locate materiel that could be used 
for war on the territory of another country during time of peace. In 
fact, in the book, Mr. Speaker, there are photographs of the site in 
Switzerland where the digging was done, where the cache of weapons was 
located, and there are photographs of what the Swiss recovered from 
that site.
  Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record a press release dated September 
15, 1999.

            [From the Agence France--Presse, Sept. 15, 1999]

                    KGB Caches Discovered in Belgium

       Brussels, Sept. 15 (AFP)--Three secret depots used by the 
     Soviet intelligence service, the KGB, have been discovered in 
     Belgium, national papers reported Wednesday.
       The caches were found in forests in the centre of the 
     country, and contained radio sets dating from the late 1960s, 
     according to Jos Colpin, spokesman for the Brussels 
     prosecutor's office.
       The location of the hiding-places was revealed in documents 
     passed over to Britain in 1992 by the former KGB archivist 
     Vasily Mitrokhin.
       Those documents form the basis of a new book--the Mitrokhin 
     Archives, by British academic Christopher Andrew, to be 
     published shortly.

  This press release is from Agence France-Presse, and the headline is 
``KGB Caches Discovered in Belgium.'' One month ago, Mr. Speaker. And 
this is what it read from Brussels. September 15 is the date. ``Three 
secret depots used by the Soviet intelligence service, the KGB, have 
been discovered in Belgium, national papers reported Wednesday. The 
caches were found in forests in the center of the country and contained 
radio sets dating from the late 1960s, according to Jos Colpin, 
spokesman for the Brussels prosecutor's office. The location of the 
hiding places was revealed in documents passed over to Britain in 1992 
by the former KGB archivist Vasily Mitrokhin. Those documents form the 
basis of a new book, `The Mitrokhin Archives,' by British academic 
Christopher Andrew, to be published shortly.''
  Well, that book has since been published.
  So now, Mr. Speaker, we not only have the testimony of Lunev 2 years 
ago that, in fact, his job as an agent in the Soviet Embassy here in 
Washington was to locate sites in America where weapons caches could be 
prelocated, now we have confirmed information that several of these 
sites have been located based on the Mitrokhin files in both 
Switzerland and Belgium.
  The question then arises, what about the sites in the United States?
  Now, after talking to Christopher Andrew at length and after talking 
to the highest ranking KGB defector ever from the Soviet Union, Oleg 
Gordievski, who I had flown over here this past Wednesday to also 
testify before my committee, we now have information that in the 
Mitrokhin files are

[[Page 27352]]

references to a number of sites throughout the U.S. where similar 
caches of weapons and technology were stored by the Soviet Union 
underground in specifically marked locations.
  In talking to Christopher Andrew personally and in the hearing, we 
questioned him at length about whether or not the specific sites were 
noted as they were noted in the case of the Swiss and the Belgium 
sightings of the KGB materials. Christopher Andrew said that, to the 
best of his ability, he went through the Mitrokhin files, the notes, 
and he could not find specific locations in America of the kind that 
were provided for Switzerland and Belgium.
  Now, I also called in the FBI, Mr. Speaker, last week before 
Christopher Andrew came in; and I talked to Louis Freeh and asked him 
to send over some agents, which he did. On Wednesday of last week, I 
met with three FBI agents who focus on Russia; and I asked them if they 
were aware of the Mitrokhin files, and they said they were. They agreed 
it was a massive source of unbelievable data that allowed to us see the 
kind of activities that the KGB had been involved in.
  I asked the FBI if they knew whether or not their ability to have 
access to the Mitrokhin files provided by the British intelligence 
service allowed the FBI to see specific locations, and they told me 
that it did not. They knew of the general locations. They knew that 
there were locations supposedly in Minnesota, someplace near Brainerd, 
Minnesota; in Montana; in New York, presumably by the harbor there; 
near a pipeline in Texas; near harbor installations in California, as 
well as a number of general sites throughout America.
  Neither the FBI nor Christopher Andrew were able to give me specific 
locations where we could direct our military or the FBI to go in and 
conduct an expedition to actually dig up the equipment much in the way 
that the Swiss and the Belgians did.
  Our military, Mr. Speaker, in a press conference that was held at the 
Pentagon last month, was also asked a question by a media reporter 
after the book came out, if our military had been advised or if they 
knew that there were caches of weapons and materials that had been 
stored in the United States without our knowledge as documented by the 
Mitrokhin files.
  The military officer who was conducting the press conference said the 
military was aware of the book, aware of the Mitrokhin archives, but 
were not aware of any specific sites identified.

                              {time}  2015

  Mr. Speaker, at the hearing that occurred this past Wednesday, where 
I had Christopher Andrew himself and where I had Oleg Gordievski 
himself, the highest ranking KGB defector from Russia ever who in fact 
was the KGB London chief who ran that office there, and who worked in 
the KGB for decades, both of them unequivocally, emphatically said 
there is no doubt, no doubt whatsoever in their minds that the Soviets 
stored military equipment and hardware throughout the United States at 
installations that their agents dug up, placed this equipment 
underground, that this equipment was probably booby-trapped and it 
included not just telemetry equipment, not just radio equipment but 
probably included material that could be used for weapons, detonation 
equipment or perhaps even material involving weapons of mass 
destruction.
  So now, Mr. Speaker, we have three people. We have Stanislav Lunev 
who 2 years ago said his job as an agent in Washington was to locate 
sites, in fact he said they were out in the Shenandoah Valley and in 
suburban Washington that he specifically went to to point out to his 
superiors back in Moscow, locations where the Soviets could drop 
materials, military materials, materials that could be accessed by 
Soviet agents. This past Wednesday, we have two other individuals, 
Gordievski, the KGB defector, and Christopher Andrew who has worked for 
6 years with Mitrokhin on the archives, who have both unequivocally 
stated that there is no doubt in their minds that there is equipment 
today throughout the U.S. stored in sites that only the KGB knows the 
exact locations of.
  Mr. Speaker, I am concerned, because this means that throughout this 
country, perhaps in forested areas as we saw occur in Belgium, perhaps 
in remote towns and villages or perhaps outside of major cities, there 
are perhaps scores of locations that have been secretly listed in the 
KGB archives that Mitrokhin did not copy down the exact locations of 
because he could not copy down every location of every site. That was 
not his main purpose. He wanted to show examples. The examples he 
picked were in Europe. But there is no doubt in the minds of the London 
chief of the KGB and Christopher Andrew who worked with Mitrokhin that 
in the KGB files back in Moscow are the specific identifying locations 
of every site in the U.S., in every State where these materials were 
deposited during the Cold War.
  That would lead one to the obvious question that we would think would 
have already been asked, and that is what I asked of the FBI: Have we 
as a Nation since we found out this information asked Russia to give us 
the identity of the sites? Mr. Speaker, I can tell you in my 
conversation with the three FBI agents that I met with, their answer 
was that our government has not yet asked the Russian government to 
give us the exact locations of these sites. To further confirm that, 
when the Pentagon press conference was held last month on the same 
issue when it came up at a press conference, the Pentagon officer that 
was responding was asked the same question, have we asked the Russians 
for the specific sites of the U.S. locations. The answer was the same 
answer that I got from this FBI last week: ``No, we have not asked that 
question.''
  Mr. Speaker, on the record this past Wednesday, Christopher Andrew 
told me on the record that our government has known about the sites in 
the U.S. for a minimum of 3 years, that he is aware of, where FBI and 
U.S. intelligence had access to the Mitrokhin files. His best guess is 
that the British intelligence probably gave these archives to the FBI 
when they got them back in 1992 and in 1993. And if that is the case, 
it means our government has known that this information existed for 6 
or 7 years.
  Mr. Speaker, what this tells us is for the past 6 or 7 years, no one 
from this administration has felt it important enough to ask the 
Russian government to give us the sites where these materials were 
stored by the Soviet Union during the Cold War which are still in place 
and which are probably in fact booby-trapped as the sites in 
Switzerland and Belgium were booby-trapped.
  Now, Mr. Speaker, to me that is an outrage. It is an outrage and a 
dereliction of duties on the part of this administration. If we know as 
I now know that we know that the Mitrokhin archive records show that 
there are specific locations in America that we do not have the exact 
identity of, then it behooves this administration to make this a formal 
request of the Russian government. What amazes me, Mr. Speaker, is over 
the past 6 and 7 years, we have given the Russian government on average 
a billion dollars a year through direct programs. We have replenished 
the IMF with billions of dollars to help Russia's economy, even though 
much of it was ripped off by the corruption in Russia, largely centered 
around Boris Yeltsin. And we have also given money to the World Bank 
which has been used in Russia. We have leverage. I think it behooves 
Russia without leverage in this age of new cooperation to give us the 
specific information from the previous Communist-controlled KGB about 
where these materials were stored. We do not have that information 
today, Mr. Speaker.
  At this point in time, Mr. Speaker, I would like to submit a letter 
for the Record signed by myself and the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. 
Oberstar).

                                     House of Representatives,

                                 Washington, DC, October 22, 1999.
     Hon. Madeleine Albright,
     Secretary of State,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Secretary Albright: This week, the House Military 
     Research and Development Subcommittee will hear testimony 
     from author Christopher Andrew (``The Sword and

[[Page 27353]]

     the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of 
     the KGB'' and ``KGB: The Inside Story'') on KGB operations 
     during the Soviet era and contemporary Russian threat 
     perceptions.
       In his most recent book, Andrew documents the extent to 
     which Soviet leaders were convinced of an imminent nuclear 
     war--as late as the 1980s. He also describes in great detail 
     the lengths to which they were willing to go to prevail in 
     the event of such a conflict. Among the more chilling 
     revelations is the documented pre-deployment of arms and high 
     explosives in Europe and the United States. These plans were 
     documented by KGB archivist and defector Vasili Mitrokhin--
     who shared the most extensive collection of classified KGB 
     notes ever with the British Intelligence Service, the United 
     States and author Christopher Andrew.
       While the disclosure of the KGB's weapons pre-deployment 
     plan has led to the unearthing of weapons caches in 
     Switzerland and Belgium, we understand that the United States 
     still has not located Russian weapons sites here. According 
     to officials at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
     the United States only has information on the general 
     vicinity of pre-deployed Russian weapons caches--such as the 
     one reported to be located near Brainerd, Minnesota.
       The Mitrokhin files were made available to the West in 
     1992, and European weapons sites were identified and removed 
     last year. We are concerned that the United States still 
     lacks the critical information necessary to remove these 
     known dangers to its citizens. More troubling, these recent 
     findings appear to confirm the testimony of former Russian 
     military intelligence officer Stanislav Lunev, who last year 
     told the House Military Research and Development Subcommittee 
     of GRU operations involving the pre-deployment of atomic 
     demolition units (often referred to as ``nuclear suitcases'') 
     in the United States.
       We are writing to inquire whether the United States 
     government has ever asked the Russian government to provide 
     detailed site information on pre-deployed weapons. If not, 
     why not? Do we plan to request that information of the 
     Russian government now? If the United States has requested 
     that information of the Russians, please inform us when those 
     inquiries were made, and what information was provided.
       As we struggle to forge a new relationship with Russia, the 
     existence of these weapons sites only serves to aggravate 
     remaining tensions between our countries. We believe it is 
     absolutely essential that the United States aggressively 
     pursue the Russian government to identify all pre-deployed 
     weapons sites in the United States, and that we eliminate 
     such remnants of the Cold War. We ask your cooperation to 
     ensure that happens, and look forward to hearing from you on 
     the status of that effort.
           Sincerely,
     James Oberstar,
                                               Member of Congress.
     Curt Weldon,
                                               Member of Congress.

  Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Minnesota is a colleague of ours, a 
very capable Member, a member of the other party who lives and 
represents the district including Brainerd, Minnesota. I went to the 
gentleman from Minnesota when I had interviewed Christopher Andrew and 
when I told him I had Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievski coming to 
Washington to testify in open hearing. The gentleman from Minnesota 
came over to that hearing because obviously he is concerned for the 
safety of his constituents. He expressed the same degree of frustration 
that the administration had not yet asked the question as I did. So he 
and I penned this letter which is now a part of the Congressional 
Record for all Americans to see which he and I signed jointly on 
October 22 and sent to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. In the 
letter, we outline that the Mitrokhin files which our intelligence and 
the British intelligence have said are the most significant information 
we have ever gotten from the former Soviet intelligence service and the 
fact that we have had access to these intelligence files for at least 3 
and probably as much as 7 years, and yet we have been told by both the 
military and by the FBI that we have not asked the Russian government 
to provide detailed information on these predeployed weapons and 
military technology. And we asked the Secretary of State in the letter, 
if our information is wrong, if the FBI is mistaken, if the military is 
mistaken, then, Madam Secretary, tell us that we have asked the 
Russians, tell us when we asked the Russians and tell us what the 
response was so that we can reassure our constituents that we have 
located and dug up every site where the Soviets prelocated this 
military hardware and equipment. And if we have not requested that 
information from the Russians, which I am assuming we have not, then 
the question is, why have we not and when are we going to question the 
Russians to get their intelligence service, now known as the SBR, no 
longer the KGB, to give us the exact locations of the storage of these 
materials.
  Mr. Speaker, I am not here to alarm the American people. I do not 
think that the Russians would be foolish enough, even the KGB, to store 
portable weapons of mass destruction in America underground, although I 
was with General Alexander Lebed 2\1/2\ years ago in May in his office 
in Moscow when he outlined to me that one of his responsibilities when 
he worked for Yeltsin as security adviser was to locate 132 suitcase-
sized nuclear weapons that the Soviet Union had built, and using all 
the influence of his office, he was only able to locate 48 of those 
devices. Each of these small atomic demolition munitions, carrying a 
capacity of one to 10 kilotons. That is about the size of the bombing 
of Hiroshima, 10 kilotons, so it would produce a massive, massive 
explosion. After Lebed told us the story, and there were five Members 
of Congress with me from both parties, I came back to Washington and I 
asked the CIA if we had any information to know whether or not Lebed 
would in fact know this information that he had told us about trying to 
identify these small nuclear devices and whether or not we knew if they 
were safe. The CIA told me we did not have any way of knowing whether 
or not Lebed was being factual with us.
  A TV producer for ``60 Minutes'' got ahold of our trip report when it 
was filed 2 months after we had been in Moscow and met with Lebed. The 
producer asked me if I was willing to do an interview on camera, which 
I agreed to. They traveled to Moscow and interviewed General Lebed, who 
by the way is now the governor of Krasnoyarsk, one of the largest 
republics in Russia. Those interviews aired in the lead story on 
national TV 2 months ago last September, and in that story Lebed 
reaffirmed what he told me and our delegation, that there were in fact 
loose nuclear suitcases, small atomic demolition munitions that he 
could not locate when he was Boris Yeltsin's top security adviser. The 
Russian government ridiculed Lebed when that came out publicly and they 
called him a traitor and said they had never produced such devices.
  The worst part is, Mr. Speaker, when a press briefer over at the 
Pentagon following the criticism by the Russian government of Lebed, 
when that press briefer was asked to comment on the revelation by Lebed 
about the small nuclear suitcases, our government official at the 
Pentagon said, we have no reason to doubt the Russian government, 
thereby agreeing with the Russian government that they never produced 
these devices.
  I then brought over a Russian friend of mine, Dr. Alexi Yablakov, who 
is one of the leading academic scientists in Russia, and in October of 
that year I had him testify before my committee. In a public hearing in 
Washington, he stated, not only was he aware of these devices but he 
had scientist friends who worked on these devices, some of which were 
being produced for the KGB. That is in the public record. So we had 
another individual from Russia, Alexi Yablakov, confirming what Lebed 
said about the production of small nuclear weapons that are portable 
and can be carried around. Again, the Russian government criticized 
Yablakov and said he was a fool and did not know what he was talking 
about.
  Wanting to get to the bottom of the story, I traveled to Moscow in 
December of that year and I had a meeting with the defense minister of 
all of Russia, Defense Minister Sergeyev. He knows that I have been 
working on some proactive, positive efforts to help the Russian 
military, help them develop housing for their troops, helping them 
develop solutions for a terrible problem they have with their nuclear 
waste. After discussing the positive things that we are doing with the 
Russian military, I asked Defense Minister Sergeyev point-blank across 
the table,

[[Page 27354]]

Defense Minister, will you please tell me, what is the truth about 
these small atomic demolition devices that Lebed has said existed that 
he could not locate and that Yablakov has verified were produced. The 
defense minister for Russia said to me in that meeting, yes, Russia 
produced such devices during the Cold War. And he further went on to 
say, and so did you in the States. He said, we are aware that you 
destroyed your small atomic demolition munitions years ago because we 
had witnessed such destruction. He went on to say, ``Congressman 
Weldon, I assure you that by the year 2000, we will have dismantled all 
of our small atomic demolition munitions.'' That was 2 years ago come 
this December, Mr. Speaker. Whether or not they have all been 
destroyed, we have no idea. Whether or not Lebed was accurate in saying 
that some of them could in fact be up for sale to rogue nations or 
terrorists, we do not know. Whether or not Lunev was correct in saying 
his job as a Tass correspondent was to locate sites to put materials, 
we have to assume. But we now have two additional witnesses. We now 
have the highest ranking KGB defector in the history of the KGB, Oleg 
Gordievski, and we now have Christopher Andrew who has had access to 
the Mitrokhin files of the KGB's own archives telling us, there is no 
doubt, 100 percent certainty that the Soviet Union located military 
hardware and equipment inside the territory of our country at a number 
of locations which may have included, may, a nuclear device.
  Now, we have no evidence to verify that such a device was located, 
but in the written and stated public testimony of both of these 
individuals on Wednesday, they both said there was a possibility that 
such devices could have been stored in an underground facility or an 
underground pit that would have been dug up by Soviet operators during 
the Cold War.

                              {time}  2030

  Now, Mr. Speaker, again I am not trying to arouse a sense of 
uneasiness. I am just saying that we just do not know, we just do not 
know what types of devices were stored in our country underground at 
specific locations by Russian agents, Soviet agents, KGB agents. But we 
do know the storage was completed, we do know that there are sites all 
over this country where these materials are today still under ground 
probably in locations that are booby trapped if people were to approach 
them not knowing what they were encountering, and to the best of my 
knowledge at this moment our government has not asked the question of 
the Russian government about where these sites are.
  Now one would ask the logical question: Why would our government not 
want to ask the Russian government? After all, they have said publicly 
that the files are the best information we have ever gotten.
  Our intelligence service has said publicly that this is the best hard 
information we have ever gotten from the KGB. We have independently 
confirmed by Oleg Gordievsky, the highest-ranking KGB defector ever who 
was the London chief of the KGB desk for the Soviet Union.
  So we have confirmation. There is no reason to doubt that what 
Mitrokhin found in the archives is true and that all over America 
today, perhaps in mountainous areas, perhaps in national parks, perhaps 
in remote and isolated areas that only the Soviet KGB knows, are stored 
Russian military equipment, technology and hardware, and the door is 
left open that perhaps there are weapons stored at some of these sites, 
weapons that could kill or harm significant numbers of American people.
  Mr. Speaker, I am outraged that we have not asked the question. I 
bring this special order tonight before our colleagues and the American 
people because I want answers. I want to know what this administration 
is going to do to hold Russia accountable, to obtain the information 
from the SVR-KGB archives about the specific sites that have been 
identified that we know are in the KGB archives that we need to see and 
be able to respond to.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank the staff for sticking around for this special 
order, I urge our colleagues to contact and interact with their 
constituents, and I urge Americans all over this country to interact 
with Members of Congress to demand of both a Member of Congress and the 
White House that we get answers about the Mitrokhin files, about this 
particular information relative to weapon storage and military material 
storage and to also begin to ask questions about much of the other 
material that is contained in the Mitrokhin archives.
  This is only the first edition. Christopher Andrew expects a second 
edition to be out sometime in the Year 2000 which will go into more 
detail. We cannot wait for the second edition because we are then going 
to be able to see some people in America who during the Cold War the 
KGB thought were really acting on their behalf as opposed to America's 
behalf. They are going to be named in the next edition, and perhaps 
America will have a better insight into what really happened in this 
city during the Cold War period when the Soviet KGB was relying on key 
Americans to help them weaken our country and perhaps prepare for the 
ultimate, which would have been a direct military confrontation with 
our Nation.
  Mr. Speaker, I bring this information to the attention of our 
colleagues in the spirit of wanting to work in a positive relationship 
with Russia, one that I consistently say must be based on strength, 
consistency and candor. In my opinion this administration has none of 
those three attributes, which is why we do not today have the 
information relative to this because I am convinced this administration 
does not want to raise this information because they think it would 
further embarrass Boris Yeltsin, and that has been the basis of our 
relationship for 8 years. President Clinton, Boris Yeltsin, Al Gore, 
Victor Chernomyrdrin until he was removed from office, anything that 
surfaced that would embarrass either of those two Russian leaders we 
pretend it did not happen, whether it was the theft of IMF, whether it 
was the abuse of one of our Navy officers like Lieutenant Jack Daly, 
whether it was arms control violations, which I have said at numerous 
times on the floor of this House, or whether it was instability in 
Russia, that we did not want to call the attention of the people of 
this country for fear that it would embarrass Yeltsin in his homeland 
because that is the mainstay of our relationship, and I am convinced 
that that perhaps is the reason why we have failed to ask the question 
of the Russians about these devices, because this administration 
perhaps fears that when we start to dig up all over America locations 
of equipment that we know have been there for 3 or perhaps 7 years, 
there are going to be a lot of people in this country who are going to 
start to ask some very difficult questions of their elected leaders.

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