[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 19]
[Senate]
[Pages 26973-26974]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



    PRESIDENTIAL AND SENATORIAL COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR TESTING TREATY

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I address the Senate today with regard to 
a bill that I am introducing which provides for the establishment of a 
commission to be known as the Presidential and Senatorial Commission on 
a Nuclear Testing Treaty.
  On October 15, shortly after the historic debate in the Senate and 
the vote taken on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, I addressed the 
Senate, suggesting that the President and the Senate explore options by 
which a commission could be appointed for the purpose of assessing 
issues relating to testing of nuclear weapons, and the possibility of 
crafting a treaty that would meet the security interests of our Nation, 
while enabling America to once again resume the lead in arms control.
  Following the historic debate and vote, I voted against that treaty, 
and I would vote again tomorrow against that treaty, and the day after, 
and the day after that. I say that not in any defiant way, but simply, 
after three hearings of the Armed Services Committee and one of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, after very careful analysis, after hours 
of discussion with my colleagues, after participating in the debate, it 
was clear to me that the record did not exist to gain my support nor, 
indeed, the support of two-thirds majority of the Senate.
  It is my view that the Senate and the President will join together to 
provide bipartisan leadership to determine, in a collaborative way, how 
to dispel much of the confusion in the world about why this Senate 
failed to ratify the treaty, to explain what the options are now, and 
to show that we are analyzing all of the other possibilities relating 
to a nuclear testing treaty. This, hopefully, will dispel such 
confusion. Much of that confusion is based on misconceptions and wrong 
information. But we can overcome that.
  We must explain that this Government has coequal branches--the 
executive, headed by the President; and the legislative, represented by 
the Congress--and how our Constitution entrusts to this body, the 
Senate, sole authority to give advice and consent. This body exercised 
that obligation, I think, in a fair and objective manner. But we are 
where we are.
  My bill is somewhat unique, Mr. President. I call for a commission 
with a total of 12 members--6 to be appointed by the majority leader of 
the Senate; 6 to be appointed by the distinguished Democratic leader of 
the Senate, with coequal responsibility between two members to be 
designated as cochairmen. I did that purposely to emphasize the need 
for bipartisanship. We, the Senate, will not ratify the treaty unless 
there are 67 votes in the affirmative. This last vote was 19 votes 
short--votes cast by individuals of this body of clear conscience. That 
significant margin of 19 votes, in my judgment, can only be overcome 
through a bipartisan effort to devise a nuclear testing treaty seen 
clearly as in our national interests.
  The cochairmen will be appointed--first, one by the distinguished 
majority leader of the Senate, and the second by the President, in 
consultation, of course, with the distinguished minority leader. That 
brings the President well into the equation. He will undoubtedly be in 
consultation with the distinguished minority leader throughout the 
series of appointments by the minority leader.
  This commission can have no more than two Members of the Senate 
appointed by the majority leader, and no more than two Members of the 
Senate, if he so desires, appointed by the minority leader. Therefore, 
up to four Senators could participate. But the balance of the 12--eight 
members--will be drawn from individuals who have spent perhaps as much 
as a lifetime examining the complexity of issues surrounding nuclear 
weapons, the complexity of the issues surrounding all types of 
treaties, agreements, and understandings relating to nonproliferation.
  We saw them come forward in this debate--individuals such as former 
Secretaries of Defense, former Secretaries of State, men and women of 
honest, good intention, with honest differences of opinion, and those 
differences have to be bridged. By including eight individuals not in 
the Senate along with four Senators--if it is the will of the leaders--
we can lift this issue out of the cauldron of politics. We can show the 
world that we are making a conscientious effort to act in a bipartisan 
manner. The experts the majority leader and the ones the minority 
leader, in consultation with the President, would pick will be known to 
the world--former Secretaries of Defense of this Nation, former 
Secretaries of State, former National Laboratory Directors, individuals 
whose collective experience in this would add up to hundreds of years. 
In that way, I believe we will bring credibility to this process and 
will result in this commission being able to render valuable advice and 
recommendations to the Senate and the President at the end of their 
work.
  Several years ago, I was privileged to be the Ranking Member of the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. There was a great deal of 
concern in the Senate toward the Central Intelligence Agency and how it 
was operating at that time. As a matter of fact, some of our most 
distinguished Members--one indeed I remember clearly--called for the 
abolishment of the CIA. This individual was extremely disturbed with 
the manner in which they were conducting business.
  I took it upon myself at that time to introduce in the Senate 
legislation calling for the establishment of a commission to make an 
overall study of our intelligence and to make recommendations to the 
President and the Congress. Congress adopted the legislation I 
introduced and it was enacted into law.
  The first chairman of that commission was Les Aspin, former Secretary 
of Defense, who, unfortunately, had an untimely death. He was succeeded 
by Harold Brown, former Secretary of Defense and former Secretary of 
the Air Force, who I knew well. I served with him. Our former 
colleague, Senator Rudman, was also closely involved. I was privileged 
to be on that commission. It did its work. It came up with 
recommendations. The intelligence community accepted those 
recommendations. The CIA survived and today flourishes.
  I have given the outline of the commission I am proposing today. Let 
me briefly refer to the basic charge given the commission and the work 
they should perform.
  Duties of the commission: It shall be the duty of the commission, (1) 
to determine under what circumstances the nuclear testing treaty would 
be in the national security interests of our Nation; (2) to determine 
how a nuclear testing treaty would relate to the security interests of 
other nations. I was motivated to do this because of the 
misunderstanding about the important and decisive action taken by this 
body.
  (3) To determine provisions essential to a nuclear testing treaty 
such that that treaty would be in the national security interests of 
the United States; (4) to determine whether a nuclear testing treaty 
would achieve the nonproliferation and arms control objectives of our 
Nation.
  The bill includes a number of other recitations and other important 
provisions.
  We deal with the question of verification. We deal with the question 
of the science-based stockpile stewardship program, now being monitored 
and

[[Page 26974]]

more fully developed by the Department of Energy.
  All of this is carefully covered in this legislation I make to this 
body tonight.
  This is one Senator who believed he had an obligation to confer with 
his colleagues about this important matter. I believe it is important 
that this legislation be laid down as a starting point. It may well be 
that other colleagues have better ideas. I take absolutely no pride of 
authorship in this effort. Perhaps others can contribute ideas as to 
how this legislative proposal might be amended.
  Eventually, collectively, I hope we can work with our leadership in 
establishing some type of commission so the consideration of a nuclear 
testing treaty can go foward and people around the globe will have a 
better understanding of our efforts to achieve a more secure world.
  I went back to do a little research which proved quite interesting. 
We have heard so many times in this Chamber that politics should stop 
at the water's edge. I was reminded of this as I was privileged, along 
with many others in this Chamber, to attend the presentation to the 
former President of the United States, Gerald R. Ford, and his lovely 
wife, Mrs. Betty Ford, the Congressional Gold Medal.
  I took down some notes from President Ford's wonderful speech. I had 
the privilege of serving under President Ford as Secretary of the Navy 
and, indeed, Chairman of the Bicentennial. I have great respect for 
him.
  He talked about Senator Vandenberg and how Senator Vandenberg was an 
absolute, well-known conservative. Yet it was Senator Vandenberg's 
leadership that got the Marshall Program through the Senate of the 
United States. The Marshall Program was a landmark piece of legislation 
initiated by President Truman. Indeed, in some of the accounts of 
history, some people said it should be called the Truman Plan. But 
Truman said ``Oh, no, don't name it after me because the Congress won't 
accept it; name it after George Marshall''--showing the marvelous 
character of the wonderful President.
  President Ford also talked about Everett Dirksen. He said:

       The executive branch and the legislative branch worked with 
     him arm in arm on relationships that were important between 
     this country and the rest of the world.

  Those are Ford's words.
  Bipartisanship helped get the Marshall Plan through and enabled this 
country to show strength in the face of the cold war period.
  That is history, ladies and gentleman.
  I don't suggest in any way that I am making history here tonight. But 
I think it is very important that other Senators take time to look at 
this and contribute their own ideas. It will require a significant 
measure of bipartisanship to achieve the objectives of the commission I 
am proposing. Let's see what we can do to work with our leadership and 
go forward.
  The events of history are interesting. Senator Vandenberg, chairman 
of the Foreign Relations Committee, in 1948, thought Tom Dewey was 
going to win the Presidency. He wrote into the Republican platform the 
following phrase. I quote him:

       We shall invite the minority party to join us under the 
     next Republican administration in stopping partisan politics 
     at the water's edge.

  As it turned out, Truman won that historic election. And what did 
Vandenberg do but go on and work with President Truman in the spirit of 
that statement that he put into the Republican platform, and the first 
landmark that the two achieved was the Marshall Plan.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.

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