[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 18]
[Senate]
[Pages 25548-25549]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                               CTBT VOTE

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I want to take a few minutes today to correct 
some misconceptions about the reasons why the Senate voted to reject 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Wednesday, and the impact its 
rejection will have on efforts to control the spread of nuclear 
weapons.
  Some have asserted that the Senate acted to reject the treaty for 
partisan political reasons. At the same time, they threatened grave 
political consequences for those who opposed the treaty. Obviously, 
there is a lot more politics in the aftermath of the treaty's rejection 
(by supporters) than in its not popular, but principled rejection. 
Simply put, Senators voted to defeat the treaty because it jeopardized 
our nation's security by undermining the U.S. nuclear deterrent that 
has served our country so well for the past 50 years.
  Nor was this evidence that Republicans are isolationist, as the 
President charged. It is Republicans who support free trade agreements 
(rather than the President's party, which is dominated by labor union 
isolationism). And Republicans strongly supported NATO expansion.
  Our distinguished colleague, Senator Lugar, summed up the case 
against the CTBT quite well stating,

       I do not believe that the CTBT is of the same caliber as 
     the arms control treaties that have come before the Senate in 
     recent decades. Its usefulness to the goal of non-
     proliferation is highly questionable. Its likely 
     ineffectuality will risk undermining support and confidence 
     in the concept of multi-lateral arms control. Even as a 
     symbolic statement of our desire for a safer world, it is 
     problematic because it would exacerbate risks and 
     uncertainties related to the safety of our nuclear stockpile.

  The majority leader and other opponents of this treaty never asked 
Members to vote against it for reasons of party loyalty. Rather, 
Senators were persuaded to reject the treaty by the facts about its 
effect on our security. In fact, Republican Senators were on both sides 
of this issue, while Democrats paradoxically, voted lockstep, except 
for Senator Byrd, who voted present.
  Unfortunately, the President and the Democratic leader have asserted 
that the process for consideration of the treaty was unfair, and have 
implied they were forced to vote on the treaty.

[[Page 25549]]

With all due respect, these assertions strike me as nothing more than 
sour grapes. Let's review the history that brought us to the vote 
yesterday.
  For 2 years, the President and other supporters of the CTBT called on 
the Senate to take up the treaty.
  In his State of the Union Address in 1998, President Clinton called 
for it to be taken up ``this year.''
  In June 1998, President Clinton said it was ``important that the 
Senate debate and vote on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty without 
delay.''
  On August 9 of this year, the President asked ``the full Senate to 
vote for ratification as soon as possible.''
  On April 1 of this year, Secretary of State Albright gave a speech 
calling for action on the CTBT, ``this year, this session, now.''
  And some of our colleagues on the other side of the aisle were quite 
outspoken in calling for a vote on the treaty. In 1998, the Democratic 
leader, Senator Daschle said on the Senate floor that ``We believe that 
it's important for us to move this very important treaty this year.'' 
And just over 2 weeks ago, he stood on the Senate floor and said, ``I 
still think, one way or the other, we ought to get to this treaty, get 
it on the floor, debate it, and vote on it.''
  And as we all know, it was the threat to bring the business of the 
Senate to a halt that led the majority leader to offer a unanimous 
consent agreement on the CTBT. On September 8--with 22 days remaining 
in the fiscal year to dispose of the remaining appropriations bills--
Senator Dorgan said the following:

       When [the majority leader] comes to the floor, I intend to 
     come to the floor and ask him when he intends to bring this 
     treaty to the floor. If he and others decide it will not come 
     to the floor, I intend to plant myself on the floor like a 
     potted plant and object. I intend to object to other routine 
     business of the Senate until this country decides to accept 
     the moral leadership that is its obligation and bring this 
     treaty to the floor for a debate and a vote.

  Supporters of the CTBT clearly wanted a vote on the treaty; it now 
turns out they actually only wanted a vote if they could win. Well, 
that's not the way it works.
  I have also been surprised that some Senators have complained that 
the time for consideration of the treaty was too short. Let's remember 
that the time-frame for consideration of the treaty was established by 
unanimous consent. In fact, the majority leader first offered a 
unanimous-consent agreement on September 30. The Democratic leader 
objected to that first request, asking for it to be modified to add 
more time--4 more hours of general debate, and up to 8 hours for 
amendments (in addition to the 10 hours already allocated). The 
majority leader accommodated the Democratic request, and on October 1, 
a modified version of the unanimous-consent request was again offered, 
and not a single Senator objected either to the time or to the date. 
The latter is also important, because setting the date for the vote on 
October 12 or 13 (it occurred on the 13th) meant there were almost 2 
weeks for ``education'' of Senators who had not already become educated 
on the treaty. (Presumably those who were fomenting consideration of 
the treaty had taken the time to familiarize themselves with it. They 
can hardly argue they needed more time in view of their insistence.)
  In any event, we all agreed on a time-table to take up the treaty. 
This is why I am disappointed that some have charged that the majority 
leader scheduled the vote out of some sense of partisanship. If Members 
had a concern about the time frame for the treaty's consideration, any 
single Senator could have objected--but none did. And the week after 
the agreement, three Senate committees held hours of hearings. 
Responsible Senators had plenty of time to learn enough to make an 
informed decision, witness the early expression of support by those who 
said others needed more time (i.e., those who didn't agree with them).
  I am also disappointed by assertions that, by rejecting the CTBT, the 
United States Senate has diminished America's moral authority in the 
fight against nuclear proliferation. I deeply regret that this 
sentiment has been echoed, and to some degree instigated, by Members of 
this body and the administration who find themselves on the losing side 
of the debate.
  Nothing could be further from the truth. By rejecting this deeply 
flawed accord, the Senate has anchored the United States firmly on the 
moral high ground.
  My vote against this treaty rested on three premises:
  First, we must be able to test if we are to maintain safe and 
reliable nuclear weapons because they help to secure peace for American 
citizens and for the rest of the world.
  Second, this unenforceable, unverifiable treaty would have little if 
any impact on the problem of proliferation. In fact, it might actually 
cause more nations to seek nuclear weapons if they became unsure of the 
reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
  It is vitally important that our Nation pursue efforts to combat 
nuclear proliferation. But we should pursue meaningful efforts with 
real effects. Unfortunately, while criticizing treaty opponents of not 
being serious about proliferation, it is the Clinton administration 
that has not been willing to take serious actions to combat 
proliferation. For example, in 1997, when reports began to surface 
about Russian missile assistance to Iran, I led a group of 99 Members 
of the House and Senate, in writing to the President to urge him to 
invoke sanctions to halt this trade. The President refused. In November 
1997, the Senate unanimously passed a concurrent resolution that I 
sponsored, expressing the sense of the Congress that the President 
should sanction the Russian organizations involved in selling missile 
technology to Iran. The House also passed this resolution 
overwhelmingly by a vote of 414 to 8. Again the President refused to 
impose sanctions.
  The Congress tried again to spur the administration to action 6 
months later, when we passed the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions 
Act mandating sanctions on any organization involved in assisting 
Iran's missile program. This bill passed the Senate by a vote of 90 to 
4. Yet when it reached the President's desk, he vetoed the bill. As 
these examples show, this administration is simply not willing to take 
the tough actions necessary to prevent proliferation. It is these 
meaningful measures that will reduce proliferation, not an 
unenforceable, unverifiable treaty.
  The third and final reason I voted against the CTBT is that the 
Constitution establishes the Senate as co-equal with the President in 
committing this country to treaties. I take this responsibility 
seriously, and will not simply rubber-stamp any arms control agreement 
that does not meet at least minimum standards--and this one does not. 
Rejection will help future negotiators insist on meaningful provisions 
that are verifiable and enforceable.
  Each of these premises is morally sound; in my view they are morally 
superior than a vote for this flawed pact, no matter how well-
intentioned.
  Because this treaty would have harmed our security, its ratification 
would have been an abdication of our moral responsibility to maintain 
peace through strength. In 1780, President George Washington said, 
``There is nothing so likely to produce peace as to be well prepared to 
meet an enemy.'' Two hundred years later, President Ronald Reagan 
called this doctrine ``Peace Through Strength.'' History has redeemed 
the judgment of Ronald Reagan in first adopting this stance with the 
Soviet Union; I believe that history will redeem the rejection of the 
CTBT as well.

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