[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 17]
[Senate]
[Pages 25098-25144]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[[Page 25098]]

                           EXECUTIVE SESSION

                                 ______
                                 

             COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY--Resumed

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I yield back all time under our control with 
the exception of 54 minutes, which would then put both sides with an 
equal amount of time.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sessions). The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, may I have the attention of the majority 
leader.
  Mr. President, may we have order in the Senate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I say what I am about to say without rancor. 
I hope I can.
  I have been in this body now 41 years at the end of this year. I was 
majority leader for 4 years, then minority leader for 6 years, and then 
majority leader for 2 more years.
  Mr. President, as majority leader, and as minority leader, I never 
once objected to a Senator's request to speak for a few minutes--15 
minutes in my case today--nor do I ever expect to object to another 
Senator's request to speak. My request was for only a short amount of 
time. The distinguished majority leader objected. He has a perfect 
right to object. I don't question his right to object. But, Mr. 
President, I think we have come to a very poor pass in this Senate when 
Senators can't stand to hear a Senator speak for 15 minutes. Our 
forefathers died for the right of freedom of speech. I may not agree 
with what another Senator says, but, as someone else has said, I will 
defend to the death his right to say it.
  Mr. Leader, I very much regret that you objected to my request to 
speak for 15 minutes. I don't get in your way in the Senate often.
  Mr. President, I want to adhere to the rules. I don't get in the 
distinguished majority leader's way very often. He doesn't find me 
objecting to his requests. I know he has great responsibilities as the 
majority leader of the Senate. He has a heavy burden. Having borne that 
burden, having borne those responsibilities, I try to act as I should 
act in my place and let the two leaders run the Senate. I don't cause 
the majority leader much trouble here. He will have to say that. He 
will have to admit that. I don't get in his hair. I don't cause him 
problems. But, Mr. President, when a Senator, the senior Senator of the 
minority asks to speak for 15 minutes, I think it has to be offensive, 
not only to this Senator but to other Senators.
  I would never object, Mr. Majority Leader, to a request from your 
side. Suppose Strom Thurmond had stood to his feet. He is the senior 
Member of this body. I think there has to be some comity. I think it 
comes with poor grace to object to a senior Member of the Senate who 
wishes to speak before a critical vote.
  Now, the majority leader said in his opinion, or something to that 
effect, that I could speak after the motion had been decided upon, and 
there would be time allowed under the order, and there would be time 
then to make a speech. That was his opinion.
  In this Senator's opinion, this Senator felt that it was important 
for this Senator to speak at that time. Not that I would have changed 
any votes, but I think I had the right to speak. What is the majority 
leader afraid of? What is the majority leader afraid of?
  Mr. LOTT. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BYRD. I will yield in a moment. I will accord the Senator that 
courtesy.
  Mr. President, what is the majority leader afraid of? Is he afraid to 
hear an expression of opinion that may differ from his? As majority 
leader, I never did that. When I was majority leader, I sought to 
protect the rights of the minority. That is one of the great functions 
of this Senate, one of its reasons for being. I would defend to the 
death the right of any Senator in this body to speak. Fifteen minutes? 
Consider the time we have spent. We haven't spent a great deal of time 
on this treaty. I regret very much the majority leader saw fit to 
object to my request to speak.
  Now, I am glad to yield to the distinguished majority leader. Mr. 
President, I ask that my rights to the floor be protected. I am not 
yielding the floor now.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me to respond?
  Mr. BYRD. Yes.
  Mr. LOTT. Let me begin by saying the same thing Senator Byrd said at 
the beginning of his remarks. I respond without any sense of rancor. I 
know that sometimes in the Senate we get very intent and very 
passionate about issues. I know this issue is one we all are very 
concerned about, and passions do run high, as they should, because we 
have very strongly held opinions. Thank goodness, though, we still are 
able to do as we did last night, retire to another building and enjoy 
each other's friendship and company, and then we return to the issues 
at hand. We debate them mightily, with due respect and without rancor.
  As far as the amount of time that has been spent on debate on this 
treaty, I went back and checked recent treaties. In fact, the only one 
that took as much time on the floor of the Senate as this treaty in 
recent history was the chemical weapons treaty, in which, I remind the 
Senator, I was also involved. Usually treaties are debated a day or 
two, 6 hours or 12 hours. I think this one is going to wind up being 
about 15 or 16 hours. I think we have had time to have the debate that 
was necessary on this issue. After all, it has been pending in various 
ways for at least 2 years, and the treaty was actually signed, I think, 
way back in 1995, if I recall correctly.
  I understand what Senator Byrd is saying. I, too, have been around 
awhile. I know only Senator Thurmond can match your record. But I have 
been in Congress 27 years myself. I served in the House 16 years, where 
I was chairman of the Research Committee. I served 8 years as the whip 
of my party in the House. I have been in the Senate since 1989, where I 
served as secretary of the conference, the whip, and leader. I 
understand the importance of the differences between the two bodies and 
the precedents and the tradition and the comity and the respect for 
each other. I have a great deal of respect and love for this 
institution and, in fact, for the Senator from West Virginia.
  Having said all of that, this was a motion, a request. I made a 
motion to go back to the Executive Calendar, a nondebatable motion. 
Then there was a request in effect to have debate. It wasn't as if 
there wouldn't be debate on the substance of the treaty. There are 
almost 3 hours of time remaining on the treaty. But in that extra 
effort to be fair, so the closing debate would be equal, we have 
already yielded back 54 minutes so there would be 2 hours approximately 
on each side.
  I want to make sure Senators have a chance to be heard and that their 
voices are not muted. Yours will not be, under the time we have left. 
But in that case, I thought the time would have delayed getting to a 
conclusion on this very important matter. It was a nondebatable motion, 
and we had time left for debate. I believed it was the correct thing to 
do. I regret the Senator feels strongly to the contrary.
  I recognize that he has been not only not an impediment to my trying 
to do my job but quite often has been helpful. I appreciate that. I am 
sorry he feels that way.
  I knew he was going to make the motion. I knew there was going to be 
an effort to have extended debate on a nondebatable motion to go back 
to a treaty, which I had, frankly, made a mistake, probably, in 
interrupting it to go to the Agriculture appropriations conference 
report. I did it because we need to get to these appropriations bills, 
as the Senator knows.
  Majority leaders have to balance time schedules and views of Senators 
and different bills, appropriations bills, the desire to get to 
campaign finance reform. I gave my word to more than one Senator that 
we would begin today on campaign finance reform. I am still determined 
to keep that commitment. But if it is 8 or 9, they will say: Well,

[[Page 25099]]

you didn't keep your word. It is too late. All of that came into play.
  I assure you, I would want Senator Byrd's voice to be heard, Senator 
Daschle's, on any nondebatable motion and on this treaty. I am sure the 
time will come when I will stand up. In fact, I remember one occasion--
Senator Dodd will remember this because he came to me and said: I 
appreciate your doing that--when there was an effort to cut you off. I 
stood up and said no. I asked unanimous consent that the Senator have 
that time. I stood up when I thought it was unfair. This time, on a 
nondebatable motion to go back to the Executive Calendar, I thought it 
was unfair, in fact, to have an extended debate on that.
  I appreciate your giving me a chance to respond. I hope we can work 
through this. We will get to a final vote. Sometimes we come up with 
agreements that allow things to go to another day. Sometimes we strive 
mightily and we can't reach that. And sometimes you just have to 
fulfill your constitutional responsibility and you just vote.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia has the floor.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my time be 
taken out of our side and not yours.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, reserving the right to object. I ask 
unanimous consent that, since neither of the statements made by the 
Senators relates directly to the treaty, none of the time be taken out 
of the limited time remaining for debate on the treaty.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I will not object.
  I reiterate that we need to get to a conclusion on the debate and 
have the vote on this issue, so we can move to campaign finance reform, 
as I committed to Senator McCain, within a reasonable hour tonight. But 
I will not object.
  Also, I yield the floor because I don't want to eat up any more time 
in the late afternoon.
  Mr. BYRD. The Senator doesn't have the floor to yield.
  Mr. LOTT. I yield as far as my comments are concerned back to the 
Senator who has the time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the time will be reasserted 
to its original agreed period for each side.
  Mr. BYRD. If the distinguished majority leader will listen, I want 
his attention. I don't want to say anything behind his back. He might 
be offended. I want him to hear what I say and be able to respond to 
it.
  Mr. President, the distinguished majority leader spoke about how long 
he served in the House. That had nothing to do with my request for 15 
minutes. I served in the Senate 30 years before the distinguished 
majority leader ever got to the Senate. Two-thirds of the Members of 
this Senate have never served with me when I was majority leader in 
this Senate. Two-thirds. I am not interested in what the rules of the 
House are. I served over there.
  I am interested in free speech, freedom of speech. May I say, in 
response to the distinguished majority leader, I know what the rules 
are. I know that the motion to return to executive session is not 
debatable. I know that very well. Mr. President, the distinguished 
majority leader alluded to an extension of debate on this treaty--
something to the effect that he had heard there were going to be 
efforts to extend that debate. I am not one of those. I wasn't part of 
that, and I never heard of it. So help me God, I had no desire to 
extend the debate. I wanted to say something about that motion, not 
just about the treaty. I wanted to speak before the motion. I was 
denied that right--not that I would have changed any votes, but it is 
my right as a Senator.
  There is too much of what the House does that we don't need to do in 
this Senate. I am afraid that too many Senators feel that we need to be 
like the House. This Senate exists for the protection of the minority, 
for one thing. It also exists to allow Members to speak freely and to 
their heart's content. I understand unanimous consent agreements. I 
have probably gotten more unanimous consent agreements than any other 
majority leader that ever was a part of this Senate. I walked in the 
Senator's shoes. I walked in the majority leader's shoes. But never--
never--would I object to a Senator asking for 15 minutes to speak on a 
motion, notwithstanding the fact that the rules preclude debate. That 
is why unanimous consents have to be made. You have to get unanimous 
consent to speak in a situation like that. I was denied that.
  Mr. President, this Senate needs to remember that we operate here by 
courtesy. We have to be courteous to one another. We have to remember 
that we work together for the country, we work for the Senate; and it 
is going to take cooperation and understanding. I try to be a gentleman 
to every Senator in this body. I don't think there is any Senator who 
can say I have not been a gentleman to him in my dealings with him or 
her. The Senate is for two main purposes; there are two things that 
make the Senate different from any other upper body in the world--the 
right to amend, which this side is often denied, and which I never 
denied. If there were 50, 60, or 70 amendments, I said find out from 
both sides how many Senators wanted to offer amendments and then we 
will try to get consent that there be no other amendments, and vote. So 
there is the right to amend and the right to speak--freedom of speech. 
As long as Senators may stand on their feet and speak as long as they 
wish, the liberties of the American people will be assured.
  Mr. Leader, I will not carry this. I have said my piece today. I am 
offended by what the majority leader did, but I am going to forgive 
him. I am. I don't live with yesterday regarding relations in this 
Senate. I think too much of the Senate. That is why I am running again; 
I think too much of the Senate. I could retire and receive $21,500 more 
annually in my retirement than I will earn as a Senator. Besides, I 
could be free to take another job. But it isn't money that I seek; it 
isn't wealth that I seek. I love this Senate. I am a traditionalist. I 
live by the traditions of the Senate. I try to live by the rules of the 
Senate. I try to remember that if I offend a Senator today, he may be 
the very Senator who will help me tomorrow. I try to remember that. I 
try to make that a practice.
  The majority leader made a mistake, if I may respectfully say so. But 
I will not hold that against him. I will shake his hand when this is 
over, because first, last, and always I try to be a man, one who can 
look in the eye of my fellow man and, if I have done him wrong, I want 
to apologize to him before the Sun sets. That is my creed. We need to 
have better comity than we are having in the Senate--not that I will be 
a problem. But the American people are watching. They see this. And the 
majority leader has the votes. He doesn't have to be afraid of a motion 
the minority might make. He doesn't have to care what the minority may 
say. Nobody needs to be afraid of an opinion I might express before a 
vote. And no time is saved by it, as we now see. No time is saved. 
(Laughter)
  If I had any real ill will in my heart, I would take the rest of the 
afternoon to speak, and maybe more. But I thank the majority leader for 
his kindness to me in the past. I understand his problems. I don't want 
to get in his way. I have said things behind his back that were good. I 
have talked about the attributes of this leader behind his back. And 
anything I say today, that is all; I am getting it off of my heart. The 
majority leader, I think, will contemplate what has been done here 
today and, in the long run--if I may offer a little bit of wisdom that 
I possess from my 41 years of experience in this body--he will be just 
a little less relentless in his drive to have the majority's will 
uncontested.
  Remember, there will come a day when he will need the help of the 
minority. The minority has been right in history on a few occasions and 
may be right again. The day may come when the minority in the Senate of 
today will be the majority of tomorrow. If I am still living and in 
this Senate at that time, I will stand up for the rights of the 
minority because that is one of the main functions of the Senate.

[[Page 25100]]

  Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished majority leader if he 
wishes to respond to anything I said.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for the offer to yield. 
I think I have said enough. I appreciate what he has had to say. I 
appreciate the fact that he has said his piece and we will move on 
about our business. That is my attitude, too.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, could the Chair clarify as to the amount 
of time remaining on both sides?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 45 minutes 41 seconds on the 
Senator's side, and 54 minutes on the Republican side.
  Mr. DASCHLE. The Democratic side has 45 minutes remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Forty-five minutes 41 seconds.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry: Was that what we had 
prior to the motion to go back into executive session?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. No. The clock was reset. It was timed 
according to the original agreement, the original time the Democratic 
leader had been allotted.
  Mr. BIDEN. Parliamentary inquiry: I thought it was 54 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Fifty-four minutes, and then the Senator from 
West Virginia spoke again, and that time was deducted.
  Mr. BIDEN. I ask unanimous consent that the whole colloquy --all of 
what took place--not go against the time of either side because I 
thought that was the request the minority leader made. I hope we can do 
that. We have a number of Senators wishing to speak. It is only 54 
minutes on each side. I would appreciate it if there would not be an 
objection to that unanimous consent request. The clock started, 54 
minutes per side; ready, get set, go.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. INHOFE. I object.
  Mr. BIDEN. I thank my friend. I thank him for the courtesy.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  The Democratic leader.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I am going to use my leader time. I 
understand I don't have to use a unanimous consent request to obtain 
the 20 minutes available to me. I will not use the full 20 minutes.
  My colleagues are going to rise to speak to the treaty itself. Up 
until now, I have refrained from talking about the deliberations 
themselves, but I think for the Record it is important for us to state 
how it is we got here.
  We just cast a vote of profound consequence. The choice that vote 
presented the Senate this afternoon was quite simple. It was a choice 
between statesmanship or partisanship.
  This was not just a procedural motion. Let's begin with that 
understanding. The motion that just passed on a party line vote was a 
vote to kill the test ban treaty. What is all the more important--and 
people should understand--was that there was no requirement that we 
cast this vote. This vote was not necessary. We did not have to go to 
executive session. We could have precluded that vote. Nothing on the 
Executive Calendar would have been affected adversely by allowing the 
treaty to stay on the Executive Calendar.
  So everyone ought to understand that. This was a voluntary choice 
made by the majority leader.
  That is the first point.
  The second point relates to how it is we got here.
  This treaty was submitted, as has been repeatedly stated in the 
Record, on September 22, 1997. Ever since that time, my colleagues on 
this side of the aisle have requested that there be hearings, that 
there be some thorough consideration of this very important matter.
  A number of other countries have already made the decision we were 
asking this body to make. One-hundred and fifty have signed it. Fifty-
one countries have voted already to ratify it.
  We were asking that there be hearings.
  I don't know where the majority leader got his information about the 
length of time this treaty has been debated versus all the other 
treaties. It is interesting. I will submit for the Record all of the 
treaties and the consideration given them since 1972.
  But just quickly to summarize, it is important to note that the 
Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty took 23 days of committee hearings 
and 9 days of floor consideration.
  The START I treaty took 19 days of hearings and 5 days of floor 
consideration.
  The Antiballistic Missile Treaty, approved in 1972, took 8 days of 
hearings and 18 days--more than half a month--of consideration on the 
Senate floor.
  Mr. President, we have had a couple of days on this particular issue. 
I ask unanimous consent that the entire list of treaties and the amount 
of time given them on the floor and in committee be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

Senate Consideration of Major Arms Control and Security Treaties--1972-
                                  1999

       Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty/SALT I (approved 1972):
       Eight days of Foreign Relations Committee hearings;
       Eighteen days of Senate floor consideration.
       Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (1988):
       Twenty-three days of Foreign Relations Committee hearings;
       Nine days of Senate floor consideration.
       Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (1991):
       Five days of Foreign Relations Committee hearings;
       Two days of Senate floor consideration.
       START I Treaty (1992):
       Nineteen days of Foreign Relations Committee hearings;
       Five days of Senate floor consideration.
       START II Treaty (1996):
       Eight days of Foreign Relations Committee hearings;
       Three days of Senate floor consideration.
       Chemical Weapons Convention (1997):
       Fourteen days of Foreign Relations Committee hearings;
       Three days of floor consideration.
       NATO Enlargement (1998):
       Seven days of Foreign Relations Committee hearings;
       Eight days of floor consideration.
       Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (submitted 1997):
       One day of Foreign Relations Committee hearings 
     (scheduled).

  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, what Democrats sought, very simply, was 
complete consideration in all the committees for whatever time it may 
have taken to ensure we have established the kind of record we 
established on all the other treaties before we voted on them. That is 
what we asked. That is what we sought in our letter to the Majority 
Leader.
  The Republicans' response was cynical. They proposed we limit debate 
to 14 hours, that there be one amendment on a side, and that no time be 
given to proper hearings. They left us as Democrats the choice: 
Filibuster the treaty on which we have called for consideration, or 
accept a unanimous consent agreement.
  There was one reason that Republicans forced this choice--one reason, 
and one reason only. It was a partisan attempt to embarrass the 
President and embarrass Democrats. That was the reason.
  So it is now clear, based upon a letter being circulated by Senator 
Warner and others, that the President should delay consideration of 
this treaty. Over 51 Senators have now signed a letter circulated by 
Senators Moynihan and Warner. Nearly 60 Senators--a majority--have now 
said we ought to postpone consideration of this treaty.
  In fact, based upon this clear belief on the part of a majority of my 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle, I encouraged the President to 
submit a statement asking the Senate to delay the vote. He did. A 
couple of days ago, he made a formal request that the Senate delay 
consideration of this treaty until a later date to allow ample 
consideration of all the questions raised and the tremendous 
opportunities presented by this treaty.
  The Joint Chiefs of Staff have made similar requests. The Secretary 
of Defense, the Secretary of State, former Secretaries of Defense, 
former Chairs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have all recommended 
publicly and privately that this treaty consideration be delayed.

[[Page 25101]]

  I added to the voice yesterday. I submitted a letter to the majority 
leader wherein I was willing personally to commit to hold over on a 
final vote for the rest of this Congress, barring any unforeseen and 
extraordinary circumstances as defined by myself and the Majority 
Leader. We may have seen an example just yesterday of just such a 
circumstance. What happens in Pakistan, what happens in India, what 
happens in North Korea, what happens in the Middle East, what happens 
in Iraq and Iran, what happens in an awful lot of those countries could 
have a profound effect on the decisions made in the Senate over the 
course of the next 14 months.
  Yet it was the view expressed by some in the majority, and now 
apparently all in the majority, that even in the most extraordinary 
circumstances, the Senate will not take up this treaty. Now we are left 
with nothing more than an up-or-down vote on the treaty itself.
  Now I have heard the latest rumor. In the last couple of hours, we 
are told that it is article 18 of the Vienna Convention that requires 
us to act. Mr. President, nothing could be farther from the truth--
nothing. Nothing in article 18 requires us to vote. The obligations of 
a signatory have already attached to the United States and will 
continue to do so until the President, only the President, makes clear 
the United States' intent not to become a party.
  The Senate will not change this by voting the treaty down or 
suspending its consideration today. So don't let anyone mislead this 
body about the ramifications of article 18.
  We find ourselves now at the end of this debate with the recognition 
on the part of Members in our caucus that, of all of our solemn 
constitutional responsibilities, there cannot be one of greater import 
than the consideration of a treaty. And, remarkably, incredibly, no 
constitutional obligation has been treated so cavalierly, so casually, 
as this treaty on this day. This is a terrible, terrible mistake. If 
it's true that politics should stop at the water's edge, it is also 
true that politics should stop at the door to this chamber when we are 
considering matters of such grave import.
  I urge those colleagues who have yet to make up their minds about 
this treaty to do the right thing; to support it, to recognize the 
profound ramifications of failure, to pass it today.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. DORGAN. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. DASCHLE. I am happy to yield to the Senator.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I think there was a misunderstanding 
regarding the previous unanimous consent request.
  My understanding is the Senator from South Dakota asked unanimous 
consent that the presentation by Senator Byrd and the discussion 
between Senator Byrd and the majority leader not come out of the 
allocated time. I think each side had 54 minutes remaining. The Chair 
indicated Senator Byrd spoke twice. Senator Byrd was recognized once 
and did not relinquish the floor. I am not suggesting there was 
anything deliberate, but I think there was a misunderstanding with 
respect to the time that should exist. I think this side should have 
had 54 minutes based on the unanimous consent request made by the 
Senator from South Dakota.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I also thought we had reached a unanimous 
consent understanding that there would not be time taken off either 
side for the colloquy that Senators Byrd and Lott encountered.
  As I understand it, the Chair ruled that the time up until the point 
that I made the unanimous consent request was not going to be taken 
from either side, but the remaining time was counted against us. I was 
making the assumption that the entire colloquy would be left outside 
our timeframe, and I again make that unanimous consent request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I don't object, but I ask the Senator to 
withhold because I think we have a solution to it that will be 
satisfactory to both sides.
  Mr. DASCHLE. I will withhold the unanimous consent request and look 
forward to that discussion.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, what is the existing time now--post the 
minority leader's request?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina has 54 minutes 
and there are 48 minutes 41 seconds on the other side.
  Mr. HELMS. The proposal I make is that I yield back all time under 
our control with the exception of 45 minutes. This action again makes 
the time remaining exactly equal on both sides, or at least I hope it 
does.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. Is there 
objection?
  Mr. DORGAN. Reserving the right to object.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Reserving the right to object, if that is the Senator's 
solution, I am disappointed. We have a number of Senators who have not 
yet had the opportunity to speak. As it is, it is going to be very 
difficult to divide what remaining time there is.
  I renew the unanimous consent request that we be given the 54 minutes 
that we understood we were entitled to when I made the first unanimous 
consent request.
  Mr. HELMS. Reserving the right to object.
  Mr. INHOFE. Reserving the right to object.
  Mr. HELMS. Reserving the right to object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, what is the time the minority leader has 
under his proposal?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority has 48 minutes.
  Mr. HELMS. We have a 3-minute difference; is that correct?
  Mr. DASCHLE. Six minutes.
  Mr. HELMS. The Chair says 48 minutes.
  Mr. DASCHLE. I am asking for the 54 minutes the Senate was originally 
allotting either side when this debate began.
  Mr. HELMS. I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The objection is heard.
  Mr. HELMS. I yield back all time under the control with the exception 
of 45 minutes. This action, again, makes the time remaining equal on 
both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right.
  Mr. HELMS. If they want to object to that, let them try.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. I am going to ask speakers on both sides to have no 
conversation because we have very little time. I say to the Senators on 
my side, we are limiting ourselves as far as it will go to 5 minutes 
per Senator.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a letter from 
the distinguished former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                 October 13, 1999.
     Hon. Jesse Helms,
     Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: As you know, I--together with former 
     National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and former CIA 
     Director and Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch--had 
     recommended in a letter dated October 5th to Senators Lott 
     and Daschle and in an op-ed in the October 6th Washington 
     Post that a vote on ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear 
     Test Ban Treaty be postponed to permit a further discussion 
     and clarification of the issues now too controversial. This 
     having proved unachievable, I am obliged to state my 
     position.
       As a former Secretary of State, I find the prospect that a 
     major treaty might fail to be ratified extremely painful. But 
     the subject of this treaty concerns the future security of 
     the United States and involves risks that make it impossible 
     for me to recommend voting for the treaty as it now stands.
       My concerns are as follows:


                     importance of nuclear weapons

       For the entire postwar period, the American nuclear arsenal 
     has been America's ultimate shield and that of our allies. 
     Though we no longer face the same massive threat that we did 
     during the Cold War, new dangers have arisen. Our nuclear 
     arsenal is our principal deterrent to the possible use of 
     biological and chemical warfare against America, our 
     military, and our allies.

[[Page 25102]]




                              verification

       Almost all experts agree that nuclear tests below some 
     yield threshold remain unverifiable and that this threshold 
     can be raised by technical means. It seems to me highly 
     dangerous to leave such a vacuum regarding a matter 
     fundamentally affecting the security of the United States. 
     And the fact that this treaty is of indefinite duration 
     compounds the problem. The CIA's concerns about recent 
     ambiguous activities by Russia, as reported in the media, 
     illustrate difficulties that will only be compounded by the 
     passage of time.
       Supporters of the treaty argue that, because of their small 
     yield, these tests cannot be significant and that the treaty 
     would therefore ``lock in'' our advantages vis-a-vis other 
     nuclear powers and aspirants. I do not know how they can be 
     so sure of this in an age of rapidly exploding technology and 
     whether, on the contrary, this may not work to the advantage 
     of nations seeking to close this gap. After all, victory in 
     the Cold War was achieved in part because we kept increasing, 
     and not freezing, our technological edge.


                           nuclear stockpile

       I am not a technical expert on such issues as proof 
     testing, aging of nuclear material, and reworking existing 
     warheads. But I find it impossible to ignore the concern 
     about the treaty expressed by six former Secretaries of 
     Defense and several former CIA Directors and National 
     Security Advisers. I am aware that experts from the weapons 
     laboratories have argued that there are ingenious ways to 
     mitigate these concerns. On the other hand, there is a 
     difference between the opinion of experts from laboratories 
     and policymakers' confidence in the reliability of these 
     weapons as our existing stockpile ages. When national 
     security is involved, one should not proceed in the face of 
     such doubts.


                               sanctions

       Another fundamental problem is the weakness of the 
     enforcement mechanism. In theory, we have a right to abrogate 
     the treaty when the ``supreme national survival'' is 
     involved. But this option is more theoretical than practical. 
     In a bilateral treaty, the reluctance to resort to abrogation 
     is powerful enough; in a multilateral treaty of indefinite 
     duration, this reluctance would be even more acute. It is not 
     clear how we would respond to a set of violations by an 
     individual country or, indeed, what response would be 
     meaningful or whether, say, an Iranian test could be said to 
     threaten the supreme national survival.


                           Non-proliferation

       I am not persuaded that the proposed treaty would inhibit 
     nuclear proliferation. Restraint by the major powers has 
     never been a significant factor in the decisions of other 
     nuclear aspirants, which are driven by local rivalries and 
     security needs. Nor is the behavior of rogue states such as 
     Iraq, Iran, or North Korea likely to be affected by this 
     treaty. They either will not sign or, if they sign, will 
     cheat. And countries relying on our nuclear umbrella might be 
     induced by declining confidence in our arsenal--and the 
     general impression of denuclearization--to accelerate their 
     own efforts.
       For all these reasons, I cannot recommend a vote for a 
     comprehensive test ban of unlimited duration.
       I hope this is helpful.
           Sincerely,
                                               Henry A. Kissinger.

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the Senate is moving toward the end of an 
historic confrontation against the most egregious arms control treaty 
ever presented to this body for its advice and consent.
  The CTBT is a dangerous treaty which, if ratified, would do enormous 
harm to our national security. It will not and cannot accomplish its 
highly exaggerated stated goal of halting the spread of nuclear 
weapons, because as the CIA has repeatedly made clear the CTBT cannot 
be verified. Moreover, at the same time, it would undermine America's 
security by undermining confidence in the safety and reliability of our 
nuclear arsenal.
  It is for these reasons that the Senate is prepared to vote down this 
treaty.
  Unable--indeed unwilling even to try to respond to these facts, the 
White House has spitefully argued that Republicans are ``playing 
politics'' with the national security of the United States--a spurious 
charge, which is one of many reasons why the administration has failed 
to convince Senators who have raised substantive concerns.
  Mr. President, the Senate Republicans' purpose in opposing this 
treaty is not because we seek to score political points against a lame-
duck administration.
  We are opposed because the CTBT is unverifiable, and because it will 
endanger the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Those 
who support the CTBT have failed to make a compelling case, and that, 
Mr. President, is precisely why the CTBT is headed for defeat.
  The President and his Senate allies have mouthed the charge that the 
process has been ``unfair''--that Republicans are ramming this vote 
through the Senate in what the White House has falsely asserted as a 
``blind rush to judgment.''
  Let's examine the record: The Senate has held seven separate hearings 
exclusively on the CTBT--three in the Government Affairs Committee, 
three in the Armed Services Committee and one final, day-long marathon 
hearing in the Foreign Relations Committee with 11 different witnesses. 
It is instructive that, after demanding for months that the Foreign 
Relations Committee hold hearings, only a handful of Democrat Senators 
even bothered to show up.
  As for floor debate, we scheduled 22 hours of debate on the CTBT--
more than any other arms control treaty in recent history. By contrast, 
the Senate held just 6 hours of debate on Conventional Forces in Europe 
Treaty; 9\1/2\ hours on the START Treaty; 6 hours on the START II 
treaty; 18 hours on the Chemical Weapons Convention; and just 2 hours 
on the Conventional Forces in Europe Flank Agreement.
  Well, then, some of them have falsely charged, Republicans pushed 
their unanimous-consent request through an unsuspecting Senate, on a 
Friday when few Senators were in town to discuss and consider it--a 
demonstrably false allegation.
  The majority leader shared our draft unanimous-consent request with 
the minority leader on Wednesday, September 29. He offered it on the 
Senate floor the next day, Thursday, September 30. The minority 
objected, and asked for more time to consider it. After consulting with 
the White House, with the State Department, and with the Democrat 
Caucus, they came back with a request for more time for the debate.
  We agreed to give them an additional week before the vote, and 12 
additional hours of floor debate. Then on Friday October 1--after 3 
days of internal discussion--they finally agreed to a unanimous consent 
for a vote they had vociferously demanded for two full years. And they 
are complaining that we are rushing to judgment? As my friend, Senator 
Biden has often pleaded during this debate; Give me a break!
  So the ``politics'' argument failed, and the ``process'' argument 
failed. Now they are turning in desperation to the ``Chicken Little'' 
argument, warning us of the ``disastrous'' consequences should the 
Senate reject the CTBT.
  If we vote the CTBT down, they warn, India and Pakistan may well 
proceed with nuclear test. Well, as Senator Biden may plead: Give me a 
break! That horse has already left the barn. India and Pakistan have 
already tested. Why did they test in the first place? Because of the 
Clinton administration's failed nuclear nonproliferation policies.
  For years, India watched as Red China transferred M-11 missiles to 
their adversary, Pakistan. They watched as this administration stood 
by--despite incontrovertible evidence from our intelligence community 
that such transfers were taking place--and refused to impose sanctions 
on China that are required by law. As a result, they made an 
unfortunate but understandable calculation that the President of the 
United States is not serious about non-proliferation, and that this 
White House is unwilling to impose a real cost on proliferating 
nations.
  The fact of the matter is that no matter how the Senate votes on the 
CTBT, nations with nuclear ambitions will continue to develop those 
weapons. Russia and China will continue their clandestine nuclear 
testing programs.
  North Korea will not sign or ratify the CTBT, and will continue to 
blackmail the West with its nuclear program. And India and Pakistan 
will probably test again--no matter what we do today. Because these 
nations know that this administration is unwilling to impose any real 
costs on such violations.
  By defeating this treaty, the Senate will not change this calculus 
one iota.

[[Page 25103]]

We will not be giving a ``green light'' for nuclear testing. Such tests 
by non-nuclear states are already a violation of the international norm 
established by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The proliferation 
we have witnessed in recent years has been a result of the 
administration's failure to enforce that existing norm, and place a 
real costs on violations of that norm.
  Mr. President, only a willingness to impose real penalties on such 
violations will prevent the expansion of the nuclear club. Papering 
over the problem with a worthless piece of paper like the CTBT will 
accomplish nothing.
  Let me suggest something that will happen when we defeat this treaty. 
This administration, and future administrations, will henceforth think 
twice before signing more bad treaties which cannot pass muster in the 
United States Senate.
  This administration clearly wants the Senate's ``consent'' on 
treaties, but they are not interested in the Senate's ``advice.'' If 
they had asked our ``advice'' on the CTBT before they signed it, they 
would have known well in advance that an unvertifiable, permanent, 
zero-yield ban on all nuclear tests would be defeated. They would have 
negotiated a treaty that could be ratified.
  Mr. President, when the debate ends today, there must be no ambiguity 
about the status of the CTBT. The Senate must make clear that this 
treaty is dead. Unless we vote today to explicitly reject the CTBT, 
under customary international law the U.S. will be bound by the terms 
of this treaty. The CTBT will be effectively in force. That is an 
unacceptable outcome.
  Why must the Senate defeat the CTBT? The answer is clear: Because the 
next administration must be left free to establish its own nuclear 
testing and nuclear nonproliferation policies, unencumbered by the 
failed policies of the current, outgoing administration. We must have a 
clean break, so that the new President can re-establish American 
credibility in the world on non-proliferation. A credibility not based 
on scraps of paper, but on clear American resolve.
  Mr. President, we must vote on this treaty and we must reject it. It 
is our duty and solemn responsibility under the Constitution.
  I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of our time.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from California.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, as a Member of the Foreign Relations 
Committee I sat through the day of hearings. And even in that short 
time--and I know you and I were there together--I was thoroughly 
convinced that our country will be more secure if we sign on and we 
ratify this treaty than if we do not.
  I think we have a very stark choice. We can continue to lead the 
world in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons by supporting this 
treaty or we can start a nuclear chain reaction by opposing it. I pray 
that we will support this treaty.
  As I said in the committee, when I was a child in grammar school--and 
I think a lot of you might remember this--America faced a real threat 
of nuclear war. In my public school we had emergency drills. We were 
taught that if we hid underneath our desks and we covered our eyes and 
we turned away from the windows, we would survive a nuclear strike. We 
were taught that the wood from our desks would save us from the massive 
destruction caused by a nuclear weapon. We also were made to wear dog 
tags around our necks. We were so proud of that. We thought we were 
being just like the people in the Army. We didn't realize the true 
purpose of the dog tag was so that someone could identify our body 
after a nuclear strike.
  The kids in my generation really didn't know that much. But the kids 
in later generations certainly did. When I was in the House, 
Congressman George Miller set up a Select Committee on Children, Youth, 
and Families. One of our first hearings was on the impact of the 
nuclear disaster that was looming ahead of our children. So we had 
testimony from children that they feared for their lives. I do not want 
to go back to those days when the children of the 1980s feared a 
nuclear strike, or my days, when we feared a nuclear strike.
  I have heard the concerns raised about the treaty. And, as I see it, 
the two main arguments against the treaty are verifiability and the 
condition of our stockpile stewardship program.
  So like most Members of the Senate, I look at what the experts say on 
these two issues. Last week, the Secretary of Defense testified on the 
verification issue. He said, ``I am confident that the United States 
will be able to detect a level of testing and the yield and the number 
of tests by which a state could undermine our U.S. nuclear deterrent.''
  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Henry Shelton testified, 
``The CTBT will help limit the development of more advanced and 
destructive weapons and inhibit the ability of more countries to 
acquire nuclear weapons. In short, the world would be a safer place 
with the treaty than without it, and it is in our national security 
interests to ratify the CTBT treaty.'' In fact, four former Chairmen of 
the Joint Chiefs who served under the Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton 
administrations have come out in favor of the treaty.
  On the condition of our nuclear stockpile, I turned to the directors 
of our three national laboratories. They all support ratification of 
the CTBT saying ``we are confident that the Stockpile Stewardship 
program will enable us to maintain America's nuclear deterrent without 
nuclear testing.''
  I've also received a letter from 32 physics Nobel Laureates in 
support of the CTBT. In discussing the stockpile issue, they write,

       Fully informed technical studies have concluded that 
     continued nuclear testing is not required to retain 
     confidence in the safety, reliability and performance of 
     nuclear weapons in the United States' stockpile, provided 
     science and technology programs necessary for stockpile 
     stewardship are maintained.

  Let me also point out that the Senate has passed an amendment to the 
resolution of ratification stating that if ``the President determines 
that nuclear testing is necessary to assure, with a high degree of 
confidence, the safety and reliability of the United States nuclear 
weapons stockpile, the President shall consult promptly with the Senate 
and withdraw from the Treaty . . . in order to conduct whatever testing 
might be required.''
  If our stockpile is not safe and reliable, the President will 
withdraw from the treaty. There doesn't have to be a Senate vote. It's 
not going to get bogged down in rules of the Senate. If there is a 
supreme national interest in withdrawing from the treaty, we will 
withdraw.
  I also think it is important to look at the risks of not going 
forward with this treaty. How can the United States tell Pakistan, 
India, and China not to test their nuclear weapons if we don't ratify 
this treaty? How can we go to our friends and say, don't give Iran the 
technology to produce weapons of mass destruction? I fear that our 
failure to ratify this treaty will set off a nuclear ``chain reaction'' 
throughout the world that the United States will long regret.
  An editorial in the San Francisco Chronicle puts it best in saying 
``A global treaty that invites every country to step forward or face 
condemnation is the only way to corral nuclear danger. If the world 
feels hostile and uncertain now, wait five years without the ban.''
  We can turn it around today if we vote for this treaty. I think there 
are many protections in it which allow the President, any President, to 
say: We should go back to testing.
  I yield the floor.
  (Disturbance in the Visitors' Galleries)
  Mr. HELMS. May we have order in the Senate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, in these brief moments, 5 minutes for each 
Senator--I think it is probably not a bad idea because we have had so 
many hours and hours and hours of debate on this it is becoming 
redundant now--I would like to use this brief period of time only to 
bring out a couple of things that need to be reemphasized.

[[Page 25104]]

  First of all, mistakenly--certainly not intentionally--some of the 
Members have stood on this floor and have implied that the Directors of 
our labs are in support of this treaty. I think it is very important to 
hear a quote from one of the Directors, C. Paul Robinson, Dr. Robinson, 
from Sandia National Lab, speaking in behalf of all three of the 
Directors.
  He said:

       I and others [that's the other three] who are or have been 
     responsible for the safety and reliability of the U.S. 
     stockpile of nuclear weapons have testified to this obvious 
     conclusion many times in the past. To forgo that validation 
     through testing is, in short, to live with uncertainty.

  He goes on to say:

       If the United States scrupulously restricts itself to zero 
     yield while other nations may conduct experiments up to the 
     threshold of international detectability, we will be at an 
     intolerable disadvantage.

  I can't think of anything worse than to be at an intolerable 
disadvantage.
  Second, it has been implied that all these Presidents have been for 
it in the past, Eisenhower and Bush, and everyone has been for this 
treaty. In fact, this is not true. I am sure those who stated it 
thought it was true, but it is not true. Only President Clinton has 
come forth with a treaty that is a zero-yield treaty--that is no 
testing at all--that is unlimited in duration--not 10 years as it was 
in the case of Eisenhower--and unverifiable. So this is the first time. 
It would be unprecedented if this were to happen.
  Third, I hear so many objections as to the unfairness. It doesn't 
really matter how much time there has been devoted for the debate on 
this. Everyone out there, Democrats or Republicans, any one person 
could have stopped this. This was a unanimous consent. It is true we 
had three times the time that was allocated for debate on the CFE 
treaty, twice the time on the START I, three times the time that was 
allocated on START II. That is important, of course. It shows that we 
did give adequate time. But the point is, any Senator could have 
objected. That means every Senator endorsed this schedule by which this 
was going to be handled.
  With the remaining minute that I have, let me just say, as chairman 
of the readiness committee, I have a very serious concern. We have 
stood on the floor of this Senate and have tried to stop the President 
of the United States, this President, Bill Clinton, from vetoing our 
defense authorization bills going back to and including 1993, stating 
in his veto message that he doesn't want any money for a National 
Missile Defense System. He has fought us all the way. We would have had 
one deployed by fiscal year 1998 except for his vetoes. But he has 
vetoed it. That means that there is no deterrent left except a nuclear 
deterrent. That means if a missile comes over, we can't knock the 
missile down so we have to rely on our ability to have a nuclear 
deterrent in our stockpile that works. And all the experts have said 
they don't work now. We can't tell for sure whether they work now.
  We have stood on the floor of this Senate with a chart that shows, on 
all nine of the nuclear weapons, as to whether or not they are working 
today. We do not really know because we haven't tested in 7 years. 
Testing is necessary. We would be putting ourselves in a position where 
we have no missile defense so we have to rely on a nuclear deterrent. 
We don't know whether or not that nuclear deterrent works.
  Last, I would say I wasn't real sure what the minority leader was 
talking about when he talked about article 18 of the Vienna Convention. 
I will just read it one more time so we know if we do not kill this and 
kill it now, we are going to have to live under it. It states:

       A State is obliged to refrain from arguments which would 
     defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when it has signed 
     the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the 
     treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until 
     it shall have made its intentions clear not to become a party 
     to the treaty.

  That is what this is all about. We are the Senate that is going to 
reject this treaty.
  Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I rise to urge my colleagues to ratify the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. If two-thirds of this body fails to 
ratify the treaty, we are squandering a unique opportunity to make the 
world a safer place for our children.
  The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is really quite simple: It bans all 
nuclear explosives testing for weapons or any other purposes. This 
treaty does not ban nuclear weapons. We currently have some 6,000 
nuclear weapons in our arsenal. Nothing in this treaty requires us to 
give up these weapons. Nor does the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
require us to limit our own nuclear testing in a way that we have not 
already chosen to do unilaterally. Yet, opponents of the treaty have 
painted a picture of dire consequences and doom that requires a 
response.
  The history of the 20th century is replete with lessons about the 
danger posed to us by nuclear weapons. Those of us who remember when 
the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
towards the end of World War II are vividly aware of the consequences 
of the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear arms are not a dry topic for 
policy debate. They are devastating weapons that have been used and 
could be used again by any nation that currently possesses nuclear 
weapons or the capability to develop them.
  It was not so long ago that we were in the midst of a nuclear arms 
race during the Cold War. Those of us who remember the Cuban missile 
crisis and the palpable fear that swept across the country at that time 
are well aware of the dangerous potential for a crisis to escalate 
between nations with nuclear capabilities. Yet in the midst of the Cold 
War, we were able to negotiate the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty which 
prohibits nuclear explosions for weapons testing in the atmosphere, 
outer space and under water.
  Must we be on the brink of crisis or engaged in another arms race to 
recognize the value of a nuclear test ban treaty? The Berlin Wall may 
have fallen and the Cold War may be over but the possibility of new and 
threatening nuclear powers emerging in the next century must still 
inform our national security policy. Our formidable stockpile of 
weapons may serve as a deterrent to the current nuclear weapon states, 
but far more frightening is the prospect of nuclear weapons falling 
into the hands of a rogue nation or terrorist organization.
  There is no question that a world without nuclear weapons is a safer 
one. However, we have long moved beyond that point. Rather, we have 
pursued--for the most part in a bipartisan fashion--arms control 
agreements and policies to stem the spread of nuclear weapons. Thus, it 
defies logic that the Senate would not embrace this tool to help us 
ensure that there are fewer nuclear weapons and fewer advanced nuclear 
weapons. Without nuclear explosive testing, those attempting to acquire 
new nuclear weapons cannot be confident that these weapons will work as 
intended. Banning testing is tantamount to banning the development of 
nuclear weapons.
  Since the signing of the CTBT treaty, 154 states have signed the 
treaty and 51 have ratified it. A smaller group of 44 states which have 
nuclear power reactors or nuclear research reactors and are members of 
the Conference on Disarmament are required to ratify the treaty for it 
to go into force. Of this group, 41 have signed the treaty and 26 have 
ratified it. Today, only five countries are nuclear weapons states and 
only three countries are considered to be nuclear ``threshold'' states. 
Limiting nuclear explosive testing is the key to keeping the number of 
nuclear weapon states down.
  For those of my colleagues who see no value in pursuing arms control 
and policies to limit the development of nuclear weapons--weapons that 
one day may be directed toward us or our allies I say that you are out 
of step with the American people. Arms control does not compromise our 
national security: it bolsters it. Polling on this issue and other arms 
control issues indicate that the American people recognize that we are 
safer if there are fewer nuclear arms in the world, especially when we 
continue to have the most robust conventional and nuclear forces in the 
world.

[[Page 25105]]

  Indeed, the CTBT locks in our nuclear superiority, for it is the U.S. 
government that has conducted more nuclear explosive tests than any 
other nation. We are integrating the knowledge acquired during our 
1000-plus tests with ongoing non-nuclear testing and the science-based 
Stockpile Stewardship program to monitor the reliability of our 
weapons. Although some critics have described this approach as risky 
and incomplete, the three directors of our nuclear weapons labs have 
all affirmed that this approach is sufficient to maintain the safety 
and reliability of our stockpile. And, they will continue to review 
these findings on an annual basis.
  Should the lab directors be unable to vouch for the safety and 
reliability of our nuclear weapons, I have no doubt that they will 
advise the President accordingly. For the safeguards package 
accompanying the treaty, and reflecting current U.S. policy relative to 
the treaty, states that the CTBT is conditioned on:

       The understanding that if the President of the United 
     States is informed by the Secretary of Defense and the 
     Secretary of Energy (DOE)--advised by the Nuclear Weapons 
     Council, the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories 
     and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command--that a high 
     level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear 
     weapon type which the two Secretaries consider to be critical 
     to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, the 
     President, in consultation with Congress, would be prepared 
     to withdraw from the CTBT under the standard ``supreme 
     national interests'' clause in order to conduct whatever 
     testing might be required.

  In fact, opponents argue that this treaty cannot restrain nations 
from testing nuclear weapons because there is nothing to prevent 
nations from withdrawing from the treaty. That is the case, of course, 
for all international treaties. While there are no guarantees that this 
treaty will stop nations from testing, signing the CTBT makes it more 
difficult for a nation to conduct nuclear tests. A nation must balance 
its desire to conduct nuclear tests with the likelihood it will be 
subject to international condemnation. Will we be able to overcome 
international pressure should the President be advised that we need to 
conduct nuclear explosive tests again? I am hopeful we will never reach 
that point, but given the willingness of some members to reject this 
treaty today, I don't believe that international pressure will prevent 
us from heeding the advice of our nation's nuclear weapons experts.
  We have heard much over the last few days from those who say that we 
should reject the CTBT because the treaty is not verifiable. Yes, there 
are some nuclear tests we will not be able to verify, particularly at 
the lowest levels. This would be the case whether the treaty was in 
force or not. There is a strong case to be made, however, that tests 
difficult to verify are at low enough levels to render them militarily 
insignificant. Treaty opponents also neglect to mention that we are 
worse off in our ability to monitor nuclear testing around the world 
without the CTBT. As Secretary Cohen stated in his testimony to the 
Armed Services Committee last week, ``I think that our capacity to 
verify tests will be enhanced and increased under the treaty by virtue 
of the fact that we'd have several hundred more monitoring sites across 
the globe that will aid and assist our national technical means.''
  If we fail to ratify the CTBT not only are we squandering an 
opportunity to advance our own national security interests by limiting 
nuclear testing, but we are at risk of undermining everything we have 
achieved until now to stem the spread of nuclear weapons. As Paul 
Nitze, President Reagan's arms control negotiator, explained:

       If the CTBT is not ratified in a timely manner it will 
     gravely undermine U.S. non-proliferation policy. The Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the primary tool for 
     preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, was made permanent 
     in 1995 based on a firm commitment by the United States and 
     the other nuclear weapon states to negotiate a CTBT by 1996. 
     Violation of the spirit, if not the letter of this NPT 
     related commitment of 1995 could give nations an excuse to 
     withdraw from the Treaty, potentially causing the NPT regime 
     to begin to erode and allowing fears of widespread 
     acquisition of nuclear weapons by many nations to become 
     reality.
       By taking away the most significant weapon in the battle to 
     prevent their spread, failure to ratify the CTBT would 
     fundamentally weaken our national security and facilitate the 
     spread of nuclear weapons. Instead of being a leader in the 
     fight against nuclear proliferation, the United States would 
     have itself struck a blow against the NPT.

  Our military leaders have also been advocates for the CTBT. The 
current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff echoed Mr. Nitze's 
remarks when he said in his testimony last week, ``The CTBT will help 
limit the development of more advanced and destructive weapons and 
inhibit the ability of more countries to acquire nuclear weapons. In 
short, the world will be a safer place with the treaty than without it, 
and it is in our national security interests to ratify the CTBT 
treaty.'' Four of the previous five chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff support our ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  The CTBT is not the product of one administration. Rather it is the 
culmination of the work and ideas of several administrations. The 
decision to place a moratorium on nuclear testing was first made in 
1992, by President George Bush when he announced a five-year moratorium 
on tests to develop new warheads, and then when he signed legislation 
containing the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment banning nuclear testing 
for at least one year. That testing moratorium has been maintained by 
President Clinton. And, none of the major presidential candidates have 
said that they are prepared to end this moratorium and begin conducting 
nuclear tests.
  This treaty is not a Democratic treaty: It was President Eisenhower 
who said that the failure to achieve a nuclear test ban was one of 
greatest disappointments of his administration. And it was President 
Eisenhower who said, ``This Government has stood, throughout, for 
complete abolition of weapons testing subject only to the attainment of 
agreed and adequate methods of inspection and control.'' Mr. President, 
that day has arrived.
  This treaty is an American achievement. It was American determination 
and leadership that brought the CTBT negotiations to conclusion, and it 
is American leadership which invigorates international arms control 
efforts in general. I support these efforts.
  The debate we are having is being watched around the world. Our 
allies are dumbfounded that we are on the verge of defeating the CTBT 
and so am I.
  I deplore the partisanship which has underscored this debate. This 
treaty is not about politics. I urge my colleagues to review the merits 
of this treaty in a non-partisan fashion. It is clear from the partisan 
divide that this issue is very much caught up in the politics of this 
institution. So, I wish we had put off further debate and a vote on 
ratification for another day and give the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
the unbiased scrutiny it deserves.
  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I have followed the Senate's consideration 
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty with great interest, and am 
impressed particularly with the statement made last Thursday by Senator 
Lugar--whose experience and knowledge on matters of foreign affairs and 
national security is highly respected by both Republicans and 
Democrats. I associate myself completely with his views.
  I agree with Senator Lugar that this treaty is unverifiable, 
jeopardizes our national security by eliminating our ability to 
modernize and increase the safety of our existing weapons, and will 
fail to achieve its principal goal: to provoke a roll call of countries 
that the simple phrase ``rogue nations'' conjures up in the minds of 
all Americans (North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, as well as China, Russia, 
India, and Pakistan) to refrain from engaging in nuclear testing.
  First, I join Senator Lugar in expressing my regret that the Senate 
is considering the treaty at this time. It has been my strong 
preference that consideration of the treaty take place after the 
election of the next President. President Clinton's record on this 
treaty has been one of political maneuvering and a legacy quest, with 
shockingly little attention dedicated

[[Page 25106]]

to how this treaty serves our nation's security and foreign policy 
objectives. But the timing of the debate and its duration are both the 
results of demands by the President and Senate Democratic leader.
  My support for allowing a new President, should he or she support the 
treaty, to make his case to the Senate based upon its merits and that 
administration's broad foreign policy goals, however, does not mean I 
am not fully prepared to vote against the treaty if the vote takes 
place at this time.
  Senator Lugar presented a thoughtful and well-reasoned, though 
devastating, indictment of the treaty: the treaty will prevent the 
United States from ensuring the reliability, effectiveness and safety 
of our nation's nuclear deterrent, which means we will not be able to 
equip our existing weapons with the most modern safety and security 
measures available; the treaty is not verifiable--not only due to our 
simple technical inability effectively to monitor for tests, but due to 
the lack of agreement on what tests are permitted or not permitted 
under the treaty and the cumbersome, international bureaucracy that 
must be forged to conduct an inspection if tests are suspected; and, 
most importantly, that the treaty is unenforceable, lacking any 
effective means to respond to nations that violate the Treaty's 
conditions. As Senator Lugar  stated, ``This Treaty simply has no 
teeth. . . . The CTBT's answer to illegal nuclear testing is the 
possible implementation of sanctions. . . . For those countries seeking 
nuclear weapons, the perceived benefits in international stature and 
deterrence generally far outweigh the concern about sanctions that 
could be brought to bear by the international community.''
  As I have already said, this debate is premature. It may well be that 
the passage of years and the development of our own technology might 
make ratification of the treaty advisable. It is not so today by a wide 
margin. I must, therefore, vote against ratification in the absence of 
an enforceable agreement to leave the issue to the next President.
  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I come here today to ask a question, a 
question that is a mystery to the vast majority of Americans: Why will 
the United States Senate not ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty?
  If there were any issue debated in the history of this Senate that 
called for more sober reflection, more independent thought, it is how 
to end the proliferation and testing of nuclear weapons. This may be 
the greatest burden the United States will carry into the next 
millennium.
  The United States was the first nation to develop and test nuclear 
arms. More than a half century ago we were the first, and so far only, 
nation to use those arms. Three years ago we were the first nation to 
sign this treaty that takes a step back from a nuclear-armed world.
  No other nation in the world can possibly gain more than the United 
States does from this treaty.
  The treaty holds real promise for putting an end to the international 
development of nuclear weapons. It removes the ability of belligerent 
nations to enhance their nuclear stockpile. It removes the ability to 
use nuclear test explosions to bully and threaten their neighbors. It 
removes the incentive to throw much-needed capital into an insatiable 
and wasteful weapons program.
  The American people understand this simple logic better than some in 
this body. Over 84% of the American public understands that ratifying 
the CTBT is the best way to protect the United States against the 
threat of nuclear attack by other nations. They are not talking about 
defensive missiles, they are talking about an America where their 
children won't have to grow up as they did; under the shadow of nuclear 
annihilation. This treaty, they understand, is a first step toward that 
goal.
  President Dwight D. Eisenhower was a five star general as well as a 
two term President of the United States. He led men in wartime against 
a real, living threat to the security of the United States. He led 
America at the beginning of the cold war, at the most dangerous time 
for nuclear confrontation in our history. He had a unique understanding 
of the needs and necessities of national security, an understanding 
that I don't believe any member of this chamber can pretend to possess. 
His view of a nuclear test ban treaty was this: that the failure to 
achieve such a ban, when the opportunity presented itself would ``have 
to be classed as the greatest disappointment of any administration, of 
any decade, of any time, and of any party.''
  Opponents of this treaty say we are letting down our guard, that we 
are leaving ourselves open to be overwhelmed. President Eisenhower 
understood clearly and personally the dangers of failing to prepare for 
war. But it was precisely this experience with war that led him to 
conceive of the test ban as a means of preserving the safety and 
security of the American people.
  This clear and rational thinking has continued, at least with our 
senior military leaders. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is 
responsible for our entire national defense infrastructure. It is his 
duty to the American people to insure that our military forces, nuclear 
and conventional, are strong, prepared and able to provide for the 
common defense. Our current Chairman, General Hugh Shelton, and Former 
Chairmen General Colin Powell, Admiral William Crowe, General John 
Shalikashvili, and General David Jones all believe firmly that, for the 
safety and security of the American people, the CTBT must be ratified.
  President Bush signed into law a ban on American nuclear testing in 
1992. As a matter of fact, we have not conducted a nuclear test for 
seven years. We have already stopped running this race.
  Has this test ban, already in place domestically for the better part 
of a decade, harmed our nuclear stockpile? The President says no, our 
military leaders say no, and the men whose responsibility it is to 
maintain the weapons say no. The CTBT has the support of all of the 
directors of our national labs whose first responsibility is to ensure 
that our nuclear weapons stockpile functions safely and reliably far 
into the future. They confidently believe this treaty, and the 
continuation of the test ban, is in our national interest.
  It's been seven years since we have conducted a nuclear test. We are 
no less safe then we were a decade ago. No one who is qualified to make 
the judgment believes that we need to resume testing in the future.
  What would passage of this treaty mean? Without test explosions, a 
new nuclear state cannot know that their crude bombs will work. Only 
very recently, after decades, over one thousand tests, and thousands of 
nuclear bombs manufactured, did our bomb making experts feel confident 
enough to proceed without testing. Without testing no other state can 
achieve that level of confidence.
  While testing continues there is always the possibility that a nation 
will develop a bomb that is smaller and more easily concealed, the 
perfect weapon with which to attack a superpower like the United 
States, perhaps even without fear of relation. Missile defenses cannot 
stop a bomb carried over our borders, but an end to testing can stop 
that bomb before it is even made.
  What would the failure of Senate ratification of the CTBT mean? 
Failure by the Senate to ratify the Treaty would mean a future full of 
new and more dangerous weapons. It would make infinitely more difficult 
a new effort to prevent the proliferation and use of nuclear arms. 
Those states that are currently non-nuclear trust that, in exchange for 
not attempting to acquire or develop nuclear arms, the current nuclear 
states will cease using their own.
  The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of our efforts 
to prevent the worldwide spread of nuclear weapons, was indefinitely 
extended in 1995. It was extended with the promise that the CTBT would 
be ratified by the worlds' nuclear powers. If

[[Page 25107]]

we defeat this treaty, we will be breaking that promise, and putting 
our entire world-wide non-proliferation strategy in jeopardy.
  If we cannot commit to cease testing, we cannot expect other nations 
to adhere to their commitments on nuclear non-proliferation. When one 
nation tests nuclear arms, their neighbors get nervous. They are 
justifiably concerned for their defense and security. The natural 
response to this threat, for which there is no real defense, is to 
acquire a threat of ones own.
  A rejection of this treaty by the U.S. Senate would send a chilling 
message around the world. The tests by India and Pakistan earlier this 
year highlight another, more sinister motivation for nuclear tests, the 
desire to threaten and intimidate. How do we expect nations like India 
and Pakistan to react to the Senate's rejection of this treaty?
  For 50 some years we have lived under a gruesome umbrella known as 
Mutual Assured Destruction. This grim strategic relationship between 
the Soviet Union and the United States meant that the entire world 
lived under constant threat of global thermonuclear war. In times of 
great international tension we were a hair trigger away from unleashing 
that destruction. If the treaty fails we must contemplate the prospect 
of dozens of states facing each other in the same insane standoff--in 
Asia, in the Middle East, in Africa--over disputed borders, scarce 
resources and ancient hatreds.
  The opponents of this treaty say we cannot afford the risk that 
another nation might have the skill and luck required to sneak a couple 
of nuclear tests under a world-wide monitoring regime. They believe 
that possibility is a mortal danger to the United States and the 
advances we have made in over 1,000 nuclear tests. I say we cannot 
afford the risk of another 50 years of the unfettered development of 
nuclear weapons around the world.
  Our stockpile is secure, our deterrent is in place. The United States 
does not need to test as we have witnessed over the past seven years.
  We unleashed the nuclear genie that has hung over the world for the 
last 50 years. But in that moment of leadership, when we signed the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, we took a strong step toward making the 
world a safer place. Let us today take the next step toward a safer, 
more secure future.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, earlier today, the Senator from Illinois 
claimed that President Bush supported a moratorium on nuclear testing. 
This assertion is inaccurate. I ask unanimous consent to have printed 
in the Record President Bush's statement upon signing the Fiscal Year 
1993 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, on October 2, 
1992.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

 Statement on Signing the Energy and Water Development Appropriations 
                       Act, 1993, October 2, 1992

       Today I have signed into law H.R. 5373, the ``Energy and 
     Water Development Appropriations Act, 1993,'' The Act 
     provides funding for the Department of Energy. The Act also 
     provides funds for the water resources development activities 
     of the Corps of Engineers and the Department of the 
     Interior's Bureau of Reclamation, as well as funds for 
     various related independent agencies such as the Appalachian 
     Regional Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and 
     the Tennessee Valley Authority.
       I am pleased that the Congress has provided funding for the 
     Superconducting super collider (SSC). This action will help 
     us to maintain U.S. leadership in the field of high-energy 
     physics. SSC-related research has spawned, and will continue 
     to spawn, advances in many fields of technology, including 
     accelerators, cryogenics, superconductivity, and computing. 
     The program serves as a national resource for inspiring 
     students to pursue careers in math and science. SSC related 
     work will support 7,000 first tier jobs in the United States. 
     In addition, 23,000 contracts have been awarded to businesses 
     and universities around the country.
       I must, however, note a number of objectionable provisions 
     in the Act. Specifically, Section 507 of H.R. 5373, which 
     concerns nuclear testing, is highly objectionable. It may 
     prevent the United States from conducting underground nuclear 
     tests that are necessary to maintain a safe and reliable 
     nuclear deterrent. This provision unwisely restricts the 
     number and purpose of U.S. nuclear tests and will make future 
     U.S. nuclear testing dependent on actions by another country, 
     rather than on our own national security requirements. 
     Despite the dramatic reductions in nuclear arsenals, the 
     United States continues to rely on nuclear deterrence as an 
     essential element of our national security. We must ensure 
     that our forces are as safe and reliable as possible. To do 
     so, we must continue to conduct a minimal number of 
     underground nuclear tests, regardless of the actions of other 
     countries. Therefore, I will work for new legislation to 
     permit the conduct of a modest number of necessary 
     underground nuclear tests.
       In July 1992, I adopted a new nuclear testing policy to 
     reflect the changes in the international security environment 
     and in the size and nature of our nuclear deterrent. That 
     policy imposed strict new limits on the purpose, number, and 
     yield of U.S. nuclear tests, consistent with our national 
     security and safety requirements and with our international 
     obligations. It remains the soundest approach to U.S. nuclear 
     testing.
       Sections 304 and 505 of the Act also raise constitutional 
     concerns. Section 304 would establish certain racial, ethnic, 
     and gender criteria for businesses and other organizations 
     seeking Federal funding for the development, construction, 
     and operation of the Superconducting super collider. A 
     congressional grant of Federal money or benefits based solely 
     on the recipient's race, ethnicity, or gender is 
     presumptively unconstitutional under the equal protection 
     standards of the Constitution.
       Accordingly, I will construe this provision consistently 
     with the demands of the Constitution and, in particular, 
     monies appropriated by this Act cannot be awarded solely on 
     the basis of race, ethnicity, or gender.
       Section 505 of the Act provides that none of the funds 
     appropriated by this or any other legislation may be used to 
     conduct studies concerning ``the possibility of changing from 
     the currently required `at cost' to a `market rate' or any 
     other noncost-based method for the pricing of hydroelectric 
     power'' by Federal power authorities.
       Article II, section 3, of the Constitution grants the 
     President authority to recommend to the Congress any 
     legislative measures considered ``necessary and expedient.'' 
     Accordingly, in keeping with the well-settled obligation to 
     construe statutory provisions to avoid constitutional 
     questions, I will interpret section 505 so as not to infringe 
     on the Executive's authority to conduct studies that might 
     assist in the evaluation and preparation of such measures.
                                                      George Bush.
       The White House.

  Mr. KYL. I emphasize the following excerpt from President Bush's 
statement:

       Despite the dramatic reductions in nuclear arsenals, the 
     United States continues to rely on nuclear deterrence as an 
     essential element of our national security. We must ensure 
     that our forces are as safe and reliable as possible. To do 
     so, we must continue to conduct a minimal number of 
     underground nuclear tests, regardless of the actions of other 
     countries.

  The moratorium on testing to which the Senator from Illinois referred 
was not requested by President Bush. It was enacted by Congress as the 
Hatfield, Exon, Mitchell prohibition on testing, over President Bush's 
objections. In a subsequent report to Congress, the President responded 
to this prohibition as follows:

       * * * the administration has concluded that it is not 
     possible to develop a test program within the constraints of 
     Public Law 102-377 [the FY '93 Energy and Water 
     Appropriations Act] that would be fiscally, militarily, and 
     technically responsible. The requirement to maintain and 
     improve the safety of our nuclear stockpile and to evaluate 
     and maintain the reliability of U.S. forces necessitates 
     continued nuclear testing for those purposes, albeit at a 
     modest level, for the foreseeable future. The administration 
     strongly urges the Congress to modify this legislation 
     urgently in order to permit the minimum number and kind of 
     underground nuclear tests that the United States requires, 
     regardless of the action of other States, to retain safe, 
     reliable, although dramatically reduced deterrent forces.

  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has far 
reaching domestic and international security implications, and it 
deserves the most thorough and thoughtful consideration by the Senate. 
Like my colleagues, I have followed the CTBT, and have paid close 
attention to the number of hearings that have taken place in recent 
days, and over the last few years.
  Let me begin by saying that if I thought supporting this treaty would 
make the threat of nuclear war disappear, and give us all greater 
security from these lethal weapons, I would not hesitate in giving my 
support. Unfortunately, the facts do not demonstrate this; indeed, 
implementing this treaty will very likely increase danger to U.S. 
citizens and troops. For that reason, I am obligated to oppose 
ratification.

[[Page 25108]]

  Ratification of the CTBT would prohibit the United States from 
conducting explosive tests of nuclear weapons of any kind. In spite of 
CTBT's goal of curbing the proliferation and development of nuclear 
weapons by prohibiting their testing, it is a dangerous and flawed 
agreement that would undercut U.S. national security.
  American foreign policy must be based on decisions and actions that 
unquestionably enhance the national security interests of the United 
States, and nothing less. Our foreign policy cannot be based on a view 
of the world through rose colored glasses. Decisions must be made on 
the assessment of the clear and present dangers to the United States 
now and in the future. Let me reiterate some of those dangers 
confronting U.S. citizens today.
  There are twenty-five to thirty countries that have sought or are 
seeking and developing ballistic missiles. Last August, North Korea 
flight-tested a long-range missile over Japan, demonstrating its 
potential to strike Alaska or Hawaii in the near future. Although our 
decisive victory in the Gulf War demonstrated to many of our 
adversaries that a challenge on the battlefield would be foolish, 
hostile states now seek to offset our conventional force strength 
through the development of their own nuclear weapons programs. Does 
this Administration really believe that if the U.S. ceased to test, 
nations like North Korea, Libya, or Iran would end nuclear development? 
The dangers to the United States are very real and threats continue to 
grow.
  The center of U.S. defense policy is deterrence. Key to that 
deterrence is the credible threat of retaliation against those who 
would harm the U.S. and her citizens. This threat can only remain 
credible if our stockpile of weapons is reliable and modernized. CTBT 
runs counter to this objective.
  Nuclear tests are the only demonstrated way to assure confidence in 
the reliability and safety of our nuclear weapons. The CTBT will 
diminish our ability to fix problems within the nuclear stockpile and 
make safety improvements. We have long relied on testing these 
extremely complicated weapons to demonstrate both their safety and 
effectiveness.
  The Clinton Administration falsely claims that every Administration 
since Eisenhower has supported CTBT. What the President fails to say is 
that no other Administration has sought a test ban at zero yield like 
the current Administration. Frankly, this is a dangerous proposition 
for the reliability and safety of our arsenal. Former Secretary of 
Defense, James Schlesinger, explained the problem:

       * * * new components or components of slightly different 
     materials must be integrated into weapon designs that we 
     deployed earlier. As this process goes on over the years, a 
     simple question arises: Will this design still work?
       That is why reliability testing is essential. As time 
     passes, as the weapon is retrofitted, we must be absolutely 
     confident that this modified device will still induce the 
     proper nuclear reaction. That is why non-nuclear testing, as 
     valuable as it is, is insufficient. It is why talk of a test 
     ban with zero nuclear yield is irresponsible.

  Mr. Schlesinger's point is well taken. Make no mistake, the effects 
of a zero yield test ban will be catastrophic for U.S. security 
interests.
  The CTBT would also make it very extremely difficult to meet new 
weapons requirements. Throughout American military history, advances in 
air defense and anti-submarine warfare have created a need for new 
weapons, and testing has saved the lives of U.S. airmen. For example, 
nuclear testing was required to make the B83 bomb of the B-1B aircraft 
to allow the plane to drop its payload at a low altitude and high speed 
and escape the pending explosion. The bottom line is a test ban would 
harm modernization efforts, and jeopardize the lives of our men and 
women in uniform.
  Furthermore, the CTBT will do nothing to stop proliferation, even if 
testing is thwarted. This treaty is based on the flawed assumption that 
prohibiting nuclear testing will stop rogue nations from developing 
nuclear weapons. However, this assumption fails to acknowledge that 
rogue nations could likely be satisfied with crude devices that may or 
may not hit intended targets. Killing innocent civilians does not seem 
to be a concern of leaders like Saddam Hussein of Iraq or Kim Jong-Il 
of North Korea. The only thing predictable about rogue nations is their 
unpredictability. Lack of testing is not a security guarantee. South 
Africa and Pakistan long maintained an untested arsenal, in spite of 
bold nuclear aspirations. To presume that absence of nuclear test 
equals enhanced security is dangerous proposition.
  It is also very disturbing that ratification of this treaty would 
abandon a fundamental arms control principle that has been insisted 
upon for the last two decades--that the United States must be able to 
``effectively verify'' compliance with the terms of the treaty. 
Verification has meant that the United States intelligence is able to 
detect a breach in an arms control agreement in time to respond 
appropriately and assure preservation of our national security 
interests.
  Because the CTBT bans nuclear test explosions no matter how small 
their yield, it is impossible to verify. Low-yield underground tests 
are very difficult to detect with seismic monitors. In previous 
Administrations, CTBT negotiations focused on agreements that allowed 
explosions below a certain threshold because it is impossible to verify 
below those levels. As the CTBT is impossible to verify, cheating will 
occur, and U.S. security will be undermined.
  Mr. President, I stand with all Americans today in expressing concern 
about the growing nuclear threat across the globe. The real question 
before us is whether ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
will increase our own national security. Unfortunately, the answer is 
no. The sad truth about the CTBT is that it would be counterproductive 
and dangerous to America's national security. Moreover, I think the 
Senate must recognize that the implications of ratification of the CTBT 
is ultimate nuclear disarmament of the United States. If the U.S. 
cannot maintain a safe and reliable stockpile, and is barred from 
testing them, disarmament will be the de facto policy. The United 
States cannot afford this dangerous consequence. Nuclear deterrence has 
protected America's national and security interests in the midst of a 
very hostile world. I urge my colleagues to vote against this treaty.
  Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, the United States Senate has the 
opportunity to take another important step in ridding the world of the 
threat of nuclear war by ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT). It was three years ago when the United States joined 
nations from around the world in signing a treaty banning nuclear 
explosives testing. It is up to the Senate to ratify this treaty and 
re-establish the United States as the world leader in efforts to stop 
nuclear proliferation.
  Over forty years ago, President Dwight D. Eisenhower began an effort 
to end nuclear testing. During this time, the United States and five 
other nations conducted 2,046 nuclear test explosions--or an average of 
one nuclear test every nine days. The United States has not tested a 
nuclear weapon since 1992 when Congress and President Bush agreed to a 
moratorium on nuclear testing.
  Countries who sign the CTBT agree to stop all above-ground and under-
ground nuclear testing. The treaty also sets up an extensive system of 
monitors and on-site inspections to help ensure that countries adhere 
to the treaty. Finally, the treaty includes six ``safeguards'' proposed 
by the President; the most important of which, allows the United States 
to remove itself from the conditions of the treaty at any point the 
Congress and the President determine it would be in the Nation's 
interest to resume nuclear testing. The current Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, four former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
numerous former military leaders, and an equal number of acclaimed 
nuclear scientists and nobel laureates support ratification of the 
CTBT.
  My support for the CTBT comes with an understanding of the 
limitations associated with stopping countries and rogue nations from 
developing, testing, and deploying nuclear weapons. Opponents of the 
CTBT claim that it is not

[[Page 25109]]

a perfect document and therefore threatens the security of our Nation. 
While I agree that the CTBT is not the definitive answer in stopping 
nuclear proliferation, I contend that it is an important step in the 
ongoing process to prevent nuclear war in the future.
  The CTBT will not threaten our national security. Most importantly, 
the treaty bans the ``bang'', not the ``bomb.'' The United States 
already possesses the largest and most advanced nuclear weapons 
stockpile in the world. I agree that maintaining a strong nuclear 
deterrent is in our country's national security interest. Data 
collected from over 40 years of nuclear testing, coupled with advanced 
scientific computing will ensure the reliability and safety of our 
nuclear weapons without testing. As I mentioned before, the United 
States can also withdraw from the CTBT at any time to conduct whatever 
testing our country feels is necessary.
  In fact, the CTBT will enhance our national security. The CTBT will 
limit the ability of other countries to acquire nuclear capabilities, 
and it will severely constrain the programs of countries that currently 
have nuclear weapons. With or without the CTBT, the United States has a 
critical national security requirement to monitor global testing 
activities. Verification requirements built into the CTBT will provide 
our country with access to additional monitoring stations we would not 
otherwise have. For example, the CTBT requires the installation of over 
30 monitoring stations in Russia, 11 in China, and 17 in the Middle 
East. These are in addition to the on-site inspections of nuclear 
facilities that are also allowed under the treaty.
  Additional monitoring stations and on-site inspections are only 
effective if the countries we are most concerned with actually ratify 
the treaty. Granted, there is no guarantee that the United States' 
ratification of the CTBT will automatically mean that India, Pakistan, 
China, and Russia will follow suit. However, it is an even greater 
chance that these countries will be less inclined to ratify the treaty 
if our country does not take the lead. For those who doubt the 
likelihood of other countries ratifying the CTBT, I point to the 
example of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It can not be refuted 
that the United States ratification of the CWC facilitated ratification 
by Russia, China, Pakistan, and Iran. Ratification by the United States 
is required to bring the CTBT into force, and ratification by the 
United States will strengthen our diplomatic efforts to influence other 
states to sign and ratify the treaty.
  The CTBT will not rid the world of nuclear weapons and it may not 
even prevent all nations from conducting some kind of nuclear tests. 
However, the CTBT provides the best tool available for the United 
States to continue its efforts to combat nuclear proliferation without 
jeopardizing our own national security. I urge my Senate colleagues to 
join me in supporting this important treaty and restoring America's 
leadership on this issue.
  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, the Senate's responsibility for advice and 
consent on treaties places a grave responsibility on the institution 
and its members. There is a very high bar that treaties have to meet, a 
two-thirds vote in the Senate. That is for good reason. Our nation 
takes our treaty obligations seriously, and the Senate is the final 
check on flawed or premature commitments. While I support the goal of 
controlling nuclear proliferation, it is becoming clear the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is not in the best interests of 
this nation.
  After a meeting with the President, personal discussions with some of 
our nation's top diplomats, including former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger, and participation in hearings held by the Foreign Relations 
Committee, I harbor reservations about this treaty in its current form 
and question if it would truly be in the nation's best strategic 
interest as we move into the 21st Century.
  Specifically, the treaty fails to address the key questions of 
verifiability and reliability: can the results that treaty supporters 
hope to achieve be verified, and can the treaty ensure the continued 
reliability of our nation's stockpile?
  Since I have been in the Senate, I have voted for three arms control 
treaties. However, in my judgment, this zero-yield test ban is not in 
our best interest. We would not be able to verify compliance with the 
Treaty or ensure the safety and reliability of our nuclear arsenal. Six 
former Defense Secretaries, two former CIA Directors from the Clinton 
Administration, and two former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
including Minnesota's General Vessey, have concluded that ratification 
of the CTBT would be incompatible with our nation's security interests.
  The original official negotiating position of the Clinton 
Administration was to have a treaty with a finite duration of 10 years 
that permitted low-yield nuclear tests and would have forced countries 
such as Russia and China into a more reliable verification monitoring 
regime. If the Administration had negotiated a treaty along those 
lines, I think it would have had a workable result with a good chance 
of being ratified.
  Instead, the Administration agreed to a treaty of unlimited duration 
and a zero-yield ban that prohibits all nuclear tests; a treaty which 
is clearly unverifiable and a clear departure from the positions of all 
previous Administrations, both Democratic and Republican. For instance, 
President Eisenhower insisted that low-yield nuclear tests be 
permitted. President Kennedy ended a three-year moratorium on nuclear 
tests, saying the U.S. would ``never again'' make that kind of error. 
President Carter opposed a zero-yield test ban while in office because 
it would undermine the U.S. nuclear deterrent. No other Administration 
has ever supported a zero-yield ban which prohibits all nuclear tests.
  Ronald Reagan's words, ``Trust but verify,'' remain a guiding 
principle. But a zero-yield ban is not verifiable. While the exact 
thresholds are classified, it is commonly understood that the United 
States cannot detect nuclear explosions below a few kilotons of yield. 
We know that countries can take advantage of existing geologic 
formations, such as salt domes, to decouple their nuclear tests and 
render them undetectable. Also, advances in commercial mining 
capability have enabled countries to muffle their nuclear tests, 
allowing them to conduct militarily significant nuclear explosions with 
little chance of being detected.
  Should technical means of verification fail, the onsite inspection 
regime is extremely weak. If we suspect a country has cheated, thirty 
out of fifty-one nations on the Executive Council have to agree to an 
inspection. It will be extremely difficult to reach this mark given 
that the Council established under the treaty has quotas from regional 
groups and the U.S. and other nuclear powers are not guaranteed seats. 
If an inspection is approved, the suspected state can deny access to 
particular inspectors and can declare a 50-square kilometer area off 
limits. These are exactly the type of conditions we rejected in the 
case of UNSCOM in Iraq.
  As to the question of reliability, we all recognize that our nuclear 
deterrent is effective only if other nations have confidence that our 
nuclear stockpile will perform as expected. A loss of confidence would 
not only embolden our adversaries, it would cause our allies to 
question the usefulness of the U.S. nuclear guarantee. We could end up 
with more nuclear powers rather than fewer.
  There is a very real threat the credibility of our nuclear deterrent 
will erode if nuclear testing is prohibited. Historically, the U.S. 
often has been surprised by how systems which performed well in non-
nuclear simulations of nuclear effects failed to function properly in 
an actual nuclear environment. Indeed, it was only following nuclear 
tests that certain vulnerability to nuclear effects was discovered in 
all U.S. strategic nuclear systems except the Minuteman II.
  The Stockpile Stewardship Program is advertised as an effective 
alternative to nuclear testing. I hope it will enable us to avoid 
testing in the near future.

[[Page 25110]]

However, many of the critical tools for the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program have not been developed. For example, the high-powered laser 
system which supposedly will have the capacity to test the reliability 
and safety of our nuclear stockpile was scheduled to come on line in 
2003, but has now been pushed back two years later. We should make sure 
that alternatives to nuclear testing are fully capable before we commit 
to abandoning testing.
  There also are very real safety concerns which we must address when 
dealing with aging materials and components of weapons that can degrade 
in unpredictable ways. Right now, only one of the nine types of weapons 
in our nuclear stockpile have all available safety features in place, 
because adding them would have required nuclear testing. It doesn't 
make sense to effectively freeze our stockpile before all of our 
weapons are made as safe as possible. We must make sure that the 
members of our armed forces who handle these weapons are not placed in 
jeopardy, and the communities which are close to nuclear weapons sites 
are not endangered.
  Furthermore, this treaty would not ensure U.S. nuclear superiority. 
As John Deutch, Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft stated in a recent 
op-ed, ``no serious person should believe that rogue nations such as 
Iran or Iraq will give up their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons if 
only the United States ratifies the CTBT.'' There is already a nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Any threshold state that is ready to 
test has already broken the norms associated with that treaty. There is 
no reason to believe that the CTBT regime, which has no real 
enforcement mechanism, will succeed where the NPT has failed. Nations 
that are habitual violators of arms control treaties will escape 
detection, building new weapons to capitalize upon the U.S. 
deficiencies and vulnerabilities created by the CTBT.
  While I support continuing the current moratorium on nuclear testing, 
it seems premature for the United States to consider ratifying the 
CTBT. I can envision a time, however, when ratification of a much 
better negotiated treaty could benefit our nation--but not until we 
have developed better techniques for verification and enforcement, and 
the advanced scientific equipment we need for the stockpile stewardship 
program.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, we are about to begin a new century--a 
new millennium with new opportunities to make the world a safer place. 
The United States must be taking the lead in pursuing those 
opportunities. Which will be possible when this Senate ratifies the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which is our best hope for containing the 
threat of nuclear war.
  Unchecked testing of nuclear weapons is the single greatest threat to 
world peace--and to the security of the United States--as we enter the 
21st century. I know none of my colleagues want nuclear weapons falling 
into the hands of hostile people. None of us want emerging nuclear 
powers to develop advanced weapons of mass destruction.
  The CTBT is not a magic wand, but it would make it more difficult for 
other countries to develop sophisticated nuclear weapons. But unless we 
act now to ratify this treaty, those remain very real possibilities--
with potentially catastrophic consequences.
  Most of us here grew up during a time when the threat posed by 
nuclear weapons manufactured by the former Soviet Union were a day-to-
day, ever-present reality. That particular danger, of course, is part 
of history now. But that doesn't mean the United States or any other 
country can rest easy. In fact, in some ways, the dangers are even 
greater today.
  Forty years ago, we at least knew who the enemy was. We knew where to 
target our defenses. Unless we ratify this treaty and play a role in 
enforcing it, we won't be completely sure which countries are moving 
ahead with a nuclear weapons program.
  Over just the last year and a half, India and Pakistan have conducted 
missile tests, and Pakistan's elected government has just been 
overthrown by a military coup. These developments make it more urgent 
than ever that we hold the line on any further nuclear weapons testing 
world-wide.
  That is exactly what this treaty promises to do. In fact, it 
represents the sort of historic opportunity that was only a dream 
during the Cold War. An opportunity to create an international 
monitoring system that would be our best assurance that no country's 
nuclear testing program moves any further than it already has. But that 
won't happen without this country's participation.
  The United States must take the lead in transforming the CTBT from a 
piece of paper into a force for global security. Our decision to ratify 
will have a profound effect on the way this treaty is perceived by the 
rest of the world. 154 nations have signed the CTBT, but many of those 
countries will ratify it only if the United States leads the way. And 
every nation with nuclear technology must ratify this agreement before 
it comes into force.
  Every President since Dwight D. Eisenhower has stressed the 
importance of controlling nuclear weapons worldwide. And I hope 
everyone here will remember that this treaty has strong support from 
military weapons experts, religious groups, scientists and world 
leaders.
  Even more importantly, the American people support ratification of 
this document. They know how important it is and prove it in polls when 
they say 82% view the treaty ratification as essential. They will 
remember how we vote on this issue. And it has to be pretty tough to 
explain to voters who want their families protected why you didn't vote 
to ban testing of nuclear weapons.
  I know the argument has been made that this treaty will somehow 
compromise our own defenses. But that's a pretty shaky theory. The 
United States can maintain its nuclear stockpile without testing, using 
the most advanced technology in the world. So ratifying this treaty 
won't leave us without a nuclear edge, it will preserve it. At the same 
time, it will signal our commitment to a more secure and lasting world 
peace.
  A number of our colleagues and other people as well have suggested 
that we don't have the required two-thirds majority to ratify this 
treaty. As a result, President Clinton has asked that we delay this 
historic vote a little longer. I am prepared to support that approach 
with great reluctance because rejecting this essential treaty outright 
would be the worst possible outcome. But a delay should give my 
colleagues who are skeptical of this treaty the chance to better 
understand how it will enhance our nation's security and why it has the 
support of the American people.
  I hope that, sometime within the next year, we will have the 
opportunity to continue this debate and provide the necessary advice 
and consent to ratify a treaty that would create a more peaceful world 
in the next century.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I rise today to express my opposition to 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  First, let me say I do believe my colleagues and I share the goal of 
decreasing the number of weapons of mass destruction found throughout 
the world. With that aside, my utmost concern is for the safety of each 
American, and I take very seriously my constitutional responsibility to 
review the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as it relates to the security 
of American citizens. I must take into consideration not only the 
present state of the world, but the future as well.
  I have, in the past, supported moratoriums on nuclear testing. In 
1992, I voted in favor of imposing a 9-month moratorium on testing of 
nuclear weapons with only limited tests following the moratorium. Since 
the Eisenhower Administration, each President has sought a ban on 
nuclear testing to some degree. However, never before has an 
administration proposed a ban on nuclear testing with a zero-yield 
threshold and an unlimited time duration.
  The goal of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, also known as CTBT, is 
to ban all nuclear testing. However, I have not been convinced this 
treaty is

[[Page 25111]]

in the best interests of the United States. From the lack of clear 
definitions to the incorrectness of underlying assumptions to the 
verification and enforcement provisions, I believe the treaty is 
fundamentally flawed. And, these flaws cannot be changed by Senate 
amendment.
  I want to take a few moments to discuss my concerns regarding the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  Verification is critical to the enforcement of any treaty. Without 
verification, enforcement cannot truthfully occur. The Clinton 
Administration has called for zero-yield under the CTBT. No yield. This 
means there should be no nuclear yield released when an explosion 
occurs. There is agreement among the Administration, the intelligence 
community and the Senate that a zero-yield threshold cannot be 
verified.
  The issue of zero yield takes on another level of importance when it 
becomes clear that zero-yield is not the standard defined in the 
Treaty. It is the standard interpreted by President Clinton. Nowhere in 
the Treaty is there a definition of what is meant by a ``test.'' Other 
countries, notably Russia, have not interpreted the Treaty in the same 
manner. We don't know how China has interpreted the ban on ``tests.'' 
We don't know because we cannot verify that China and Russia are not 
testing. Therefore, not only do we have a potential standard that is 
impossible to verify, but other countries have the ability to interpret 
the Treaty differently and act upon their interpretation, and the 
United States will not be able to enforce the higher standard.
  A second major concern of mine involves our existing nuclear 
stockpile. The cold war may be a thing of the past, but threats to our 
nation's security exist today. Our nuclear stockpile exists for a 
reason, and not only are new weapon technologies essential to our 
defense, it is also critical to maintain the security and safety of 
existing weapons.
  Proponents of the CTBT maintain the United States does not need to 
conduct nuclear tests to maintain the integrity of our existing 
stockpile because of President Clinton's Stockpile Stewardship Program. 
The Stockpile Stewardship Program relies upon computer modeling and 
simulations as a substitute for testing. I believe the intent of the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program is good. However, I am not confident in 
the ability of the Stockpile Stewardship Program to keep our existing 
stockpile safe. One-third of all weapons designs introduced into the 
U.S. stockpile since 1985 have required and received post-deployment 
nuclear tests to resolve problems. In three-fourths of these cases, the 
problems were discovered only because of ongoing nuclear tests. In each 
case, the weapons were thought to be reliable and thoroughly tested.
  I see three problems with the Stockpile Stewardship Program as it 
exists today. First, the technology has not been proven. In 1992 
laboratory scientists proposed a series of tests to create the data 
bases and methodologies for stockpile stewardship under a ban on 
nuclear testing. These tests were not permitted. At the very least, 
actual nuclear tests are necessary to produce an accurate computer 
simulation. Second, data from past tests don't address aging, which is 
a central problem in light of the highly corrosive nature of weapon 
materials. Shelf life of U.S. nuclear weapons is expected to be 20 
years, and many weapons are reaching that age. Without testing we will 
not have confidence in refurbished warheads. My third concern relates 
to China. Apparently, China has acquired the ``legacy'' computer codes 
of the U.S. nuclear test program. The Clinton administration proposes 
to base its efforts to assure stockpile viability on computer 
simulation which is highly vulnerable to espionage--and even to 
sabotage--by introducing false data. There is no such thing as a secure 
computer network.
  The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will not go into effect until 44 
specific countries both sign and ratify the Treaty. In addition to the 
United States, China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, India and Pakistan 
have yet to ratify, and India and Pakistan have not even signed the 
Treaty. The argument is made that U.S. ratification would quickly lead 
to ratification by these other countries. I would reply by saying 
that--as the Treaty is constructed--each of these countries could 
indeed sign and ratify the Treaty. Then, they could proceed with low-
yield nuclear testing which cannot be verified.
  Even if nuclear testing is suspected, under the terms of the CTBT, 
any inspection must be supported by 30 of the 51 members of an 
Executive Council elected by all State Parties to the Treaty. And, the 
United States is not even guaranteed a position on the Executive 
Council. Furthermore, onsite inspections are subject to a number of 
limitations. First, inspection activities are subject to time limits 
(25 days.) Any collection of radioactive samples must be accompanied by 
an approval by a majority of the Executive Council. No State Party is 
required to accept simultaneous on-site inspections on its territory. 
And finally, the State party under inspection may refuse to accept an 
observer from the State party requesting the inspection. There is 
currently a supporter of inspection limitations similar to these; his 
name is Saddam Hussein.
  Effective arms control treaties can be extremely helpful in limiting 
the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Moratoriums on nuclear 
testing and limiting the yield of tests have highlighted the ability of 
the United States and other responsible countries to shape the current 
environment while protecting against the intentions of rogue states. I 
remain hopeful that our technology will one day rise to the level of 
verifying a zero-yield nuclear test ban. I remain hopeful that China, 
Russia, India and Pakistan may one day commit themselves--in both words 
and actions--to cease developing and testing nuclear weapons. Until 
that day, or until a Treaty is brought before the Senate that can be 
verified and fairly enforced, I will continue to support policy that 
protects American citizens. And in this case, it means opposing the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I rise to join my colleagues in voicing 
my strong support for Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty.
  I joined many of my colleagues in calling for Senate consideration of 
the CTBT. But I must say, I am very disappointed in the process put 
into place for the consideration of this hugely important issue.
  This Senate is failing our great tradition of considering treaties 
without partisan political influences. So many giants in American 
history have argued for and against treaties right here on the Senate 
floor.
  Senator Henry ``Scoop'' Jackson from my own State of Washington was 
one of these giants. Following his death in 1983, Charles Krauthammer 
wrote the following in Time magazine:

       The death of Senator Henry Jackson has left an empty 
     stillness at the center of American politics. Jackson was the 
     symbol, and the last great leader, of a political tradition 
     that began with Woodrow Wilson and reached its apogee with 
     John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Hubert Humphrey. That 
     tradition--liberal internationalism--held that if democratic 
     capitalism was to have a human face, it had to have a big 
     heart and strong hand.

  Scoop believed in that strong hand. Senator Jackson was one of the 
Senate's workhorses on defense issues. Few had the intimate knowledge 
of defense and foreign policy matters that Scoop did. And this 
expertise extended to arms control issues as well. Jackson was famous 
for taking apart arms control agreements and forcing the Executive 
Branch and his congressional colleagues to understand fully the matter 
at hand. And, Jackson was a leader at perfecting arms control 
agreements that fully protected U.S. interests.
  Senator Jackson was a defense giant throughout the cold war. He 
championed his country's defense from the days of FDR to Ronald 
Reagan's first term as President. Yet, he managed to vote for every 
single arms control treaty that came before the Senate. He tackled the 
issues and he protected U.S. interests and national security

[[Page 25112]]

with absolute devotion to country free from partisan politics. Jackson 
epitomized the Senate at its best; senators working together without 
time constraints; senators holding the Administration accountable; 
senators engaged to strengthen U.S. foreign and defense policy.
  Sadly, this Senate has taken a different course. Few can argue with 
any sincerity that the Senate has given the CTBT a thorough 
consideration. The treaty's certain defeat was dictated by partisanship 
before a single hearing was held on the issue. Advise and consent, the 
Senate's historical and constitutional duty has been laid aside by a 
majority party currying favor with extremist political forces.
  In spite of the pre-determined fate of the CTBT, I want to take a few 
minutes to briefly explain my strong support for the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty.
  The arguments used to end nuclear testing in 1992 are just as valid 
today.
  My service in the Senate has largely mirrored the U.S. moratorium on 
nuclear weapons tests. President Bush wisely halted U.S. nuclear 
weapons testing after a thorough review of our nuclear weapons arsenal 
and particularly the safety, reliability and survivability of our 
stockpile.
  The directors of our nuclear weapons laboratories, numerous 
prestigious weapons scientists, prominent military leaders and many 
others remain convinced that the United States can safely maintain its 
nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing.
  The CTBT freezes in place U.S. supremacy in nuclear weaponry.
  The United States maintains a 6,000 warhead nuclear arsenal. This 
arsenal is the result of more than 1,000 nuclear weapons tests. Our 
nuclear weapons program is without equal in the world.
  Dr. Hans Bethe, Nobel Prize winning physicist and former Director of 
Theoretical Division at the Los Alamos Laboratory wrote the President 
on this very point in early October. Dr. Bethe's letter states:

       Every thinking person should realize that this treaty is 
     uniquely in favor of the United States. We have a substantial 
     lead in atomic weapons technology over all other countries. 
     We have tested weapons of all sizes and shapes suitable for 
     military purposes. We have no interest in and no need for 
     further development through testing. Other existing nuclear 
     powers would need tests to make up this technological gap. 
     And even more importantly, a test ban would make it 
     essentially impossible for new nuclear power to engage.

  Here's a leading nuclear scientist, a Nobel Prize winning physicist, 
and he says the CTBT is ``uniquely in favor of the United States.'' To 
me, this is an immensely powerful argument in favor of CTBT.
  Failure to ratify the test ban treaty will send a disastrous message 
to the international community.
  Already our closest allies are calling upon the United States to 
ratify the CTBT. Many countries urging the U.S. to ratify the treaty 
are the same countries covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella including 
our closest NATO allies.
  Given our unmatched nuclear superiority, is the United States' 
national interest advanced by working with the global community to 
combat potential nuclear threats? The answer to me is a resounding yes.
  The United States is safer if the world is working together to combat 
any proliferation threats. Without the CTBT, the global effort to 
combat proliferation will be seriously undermined and U.S. credibility 
and sincerity will be jeopardized.
  Our efforts to contain and control a nuclear arms race in South Asia 
will be undermined. The global resolve to contain proliferation in the 
Middle East in countries like Iran and Iraq will diminish. Rogue states 
like North Korea will not face the same international resolve on 
weapons experimentation and development. It will be easier for nations 
like China to modernize its nuclear weapons program if the CTBT does 
not enter into force. Our already difficult efforts to work with a 
fraying nuclear establishment in Russia will also be setback by the 
U.S. failure to lead the effort to end nuclear weapons testing once and 
for all.
  The CTBT is largely a creation of the United States. For more than 40 
years, Republican and Democratic Administrations have pushed the world 
to end nuclear weapons testing. President Clinton signed the CTBT upon 
its successful negotiation in 1996. More than 140 countries have signed 
the treaty. Some 40 countries have ratified the treaty. U.S. 
ratification of the CTBT is one of the last remaining hurdles to the 
treaty entering in force.
  Mr. President, I will cast my vote with absolute confidence for 
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, we live in dangerous and uncertain times. 
The global threats to peace and security known well to us during the 
Cold War have been replaced by terrorist states and rogue nations with 
growing nuclear arsenals. Historically, existing international arms 
control agreements have made our nation, and our world, a safer place. 
The United States has been a world leader to reduce global nuclear 
tests. Several nuclear test ban treaties already are in effect, 
including the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), which banned nuclear 
blasts in the atmosphere, space, and underwater; the 1974 Threshold 
Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), which banned tests on devices above 150 
kilotons; and the 1990 Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty.
  Unfortunately, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will not provide the 
same protections as these other weapons treaties. That is why I cannot 
support it.
  I am against the CTBT for two fundamental reasons: 1. The Treaty does 
not guarantee us an ability to maintain a safe, viable, and advanced 
nuclear stockpile; and 2. The Treaty does not provide effective 
verification and enforcement if other nations violate the Treaty.
  The Clinton administration has proposed replacing our testing system 
with a computer simulated Stockpile Stewardship Program. Right now, we 
simply do not know if this program can serve as a reliable surrogate 
for testing. We do not know if computer simulations can mimic 
accurately the functions of actual testing. We do not know if computer 
simulations can provide adequate information so we can modernize and 
our devices in response to changing threats and new weapons systems. 
What we do know is that in order for our own nuclear defenses to be an 
effective deterrent, they must be able to work. Ratification of the 
CTBT would close off the only means that currently can ensure the 
reliability, safety, and security of our nuclear defense stockpile.
  I also am opposed to the CTBT because it does not provide adequate 
verification and enforcement mechanisms. Nations will be able to 
conduct nuclear tests well below the detection threshold of the 
Treaty's current monitoring system. If a rogue nation, like Iraq, 
conducts a nuclear test, and the United States insists on an on-site 
inspection, the treaty first would require 30 of 51 nations on the CTBT 
executive council to approve the inspection. If approved, the country 
to be inspected could still declare up to 50 square kilometers as being 
``off limits'' from the inspection. How can measures like this ensure 
other nations will comply with the CTBT? They simply can't.
  The national security of our nation would not be served with the 
adoption of the current CTBT. I believe ratification of the CTBT could 
compromise our national security. The Senate should defeat its 
ratification.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I rise to support the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.
  This is a sad day for the Senate. Despite limited debate on this 
issue, the appeal of the President and bi-partisan pleas of over 51 
Senators to delay consideration of this treaty, the Majority Leader has 
decided to force our vote on this treaty. The very nature and timing of 
the issue requires that we come together and act in a responsible, non-
partisan manner. We are faced with an historic opportunity to send 
nations around the world an important, powerful message--let's make 
sure it is the right message and that we vote to ratify this important 
treaty.
  Ratification will strengthen--not weaken--America's national 
security.

[[Page 25113]]

We must remember that ratification will not force America to abandon or 
alter its current practice regarding nuclear testing--we stopped 
nuclear testing seven years ago. And why did we stop nuclear testing? 
Because we have a robust, technically sophisticated nuclear force and 
because nuclear experts affirm that we can maintain a safe and reliable 
deterrent without nuclear tests. This is also one reason why we should 
ratify the CTBT.
  Another reason to ratify the CTBT is that it will strengthen our 
national security by limiting the development of more advanced and more 
destructive nuclear weapons. As we all know, we have the most powerful 
nuclear force in the world. Thus, limiting the development of more 
advanced and destructive nuclear weapons limits the power of rogue 
nations around the world from strengthening their own nuclear arsenal. 
It allows America to maintain its nuclear superiority.
  Full ratification and implementation of the CTBT will also limit the 
possibility of other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. 
Furthermore, it will provide us with new mechanisms to monitor 
suspicious activities by other nations. For example, it provides for a 
global network of sensors and the right to request short notice, on-
sight inspections in other countries.
  But failure to ratify the CTBT will jeopardize our national security 
as well as the security of countries around the world. If we fail to 
act, the treaty cannot enter into force for any country. Let us not 
forget that nuclear competition led Pakistan and India to conduct 
underground nuclear testing over one year ago. Without this treaty, 
nuclear competition will only continue to grow and to spread. Without 
this treaty, underground nuclear testing will not only continue but 
will be carried out by even more countries--not by our allies, but 
rather, by our enemies.
  I am dismayed that we are even forced to consider this vital treaty 
in light of the current unrest in Pakistan and India. Now, more than 
ever, we must demonstrate national unity.
  We must listen to the experts who urge us to ratify the treaty--the 
Secretaries of Defense and Energy, the Directors of the National 
Weapons Laboratories and the Nobel laureates. We must listen to 
national leaders around the world beseeching us to ratify the treaty--
asking us to act as a responsible international leader and to serve as 
a positive example for other nations to follow. And most important, we 
must listen to the American people--the majority of whom are pleading 
with us to make our world a safer place and to ratify this treaty.
  Let us not forget that 152 countries have signed the CTBT. America 
led these countries by being the first to sign the treaty. Other major 
nuclear powers, such as Britain, France, Russia and China followed our 
lead. To date, 41 countries have ratified. Although we will not be the 
first country to ratify, let us not be the first country to jeopardize 
its very existence.
  We live in a dangerous world--where terrorists and rogue nations are 
developing the most repugnant weapons of mass destruction. We need to 
think clearly about what message we are sending today to the rest of 
the world--to our allies and to our adversaries. Our actions today will 
influence action by countries around the world. If we ratify, other 
countries will follow suit and ratify. Our failure to ratify will go 
beyond encouraging other nations to follow suit. It will prevent the 
very entry into force of this historic agreement.
  Let us send a powerful message to our neighbors around the world and 
ratify this historic treaty. Let us ratify the treaty and guarantee a 
safer future for our children by strengthening the security of our 
country and of the world.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, there are few responsibilities of the 
Senate more important than the constitutional duty to offer our advise 
and consent on treaties.
  After long deliberation and after a series of classified and 
unclassified hearings, I have determined that I cannot support 
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. There are serious 
flaws in this document that could endanger our national security in the 
future.
  Make no mistake, the world is a dangerous place. We must deal with 
the world as it is, not as we wish it were. And we must approach 
ratification of this treaty with only one view; does it advance the 
cause of world peace without jeopardizing our own security.
  The treaty fails on both counts.
  First, this treaty is not verifiable. I cannot vote for a treaty that 
will bind the United States, but which will be ignored by other nuclear 
nations.
  There are differing opinions concerning the ability to detect nuclear 
testing. But the issue is more complex than just detecting a detonation 
of a nuclear device with a yield greater than allowed by the treaty. 
If, for example, if a detonation occurred and we decided that we should 
inspect the site, how would we do the inspection?
  First, 31 nations have to agree that a violation has occurred before 
site inspections would be authorized. The chances of 31 nations 
agreeing a violation has occurred are remote. But why do proponents of 
the treaty think a nation that has just violated the treaty will allow 
an inspection? You need to look no further than Iraq to appreciate the 
difficulty in inspecting a nation that wants to obfuscate such testing.
  Just a quick review of the significant events that escaped our 
intelligence community in the recent past do not give confidence that 
they will uncover violations of this treaty. Our intelligence officers 
missed the development of the advanced missile development by North 
Korea, they failed to recognize the signs that both India and Pakistan 
were going to test nuclear weapons, they provided incorrect information 
resulting in our bombing the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, and they 
failed to provide sufficient information to prevent us from conducting 
a missile attack on a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum.
  Additionally, there was confusion over the exact number of nuclear 
tests conducted by India and Pakistan.
  Secondly, ratification of this treaty will not reduce development or 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. A basic truth for any nation is that 
it will act in a manner that best suits its national interests. The 
downside of our military dominance compared to the rest of the world is 
that it forces weaker nations to rely on weapons of mass destructions 
as a counter to our conventional strength. Russia and China have both 
publicly stated that a new reliance on nuclear weapons is necessary to 
``balance'' our dominance. Rogue nations cannot possibly challenge us 
with conventional weapons and therefore feel compelled to acquire or 
develop non-conventional weapons.
  This treaty will not stop or slow down the development of nuclear 
weapons if a nation deems these weapons as vital to their national 
interests. Russia and China will not be deterred from enhancing their 
nuclear weapon performance simply because they have signed this treaty.
  Yet, our own nuclear defense program would be limited under the 
treaty.
  Third, the Stock Pile Stewardship program as outlined will not 
guarantee safe and reliable nuclear weapons. This is a technical area. 
But there is considerable differences of opinion between impressive 
scientists about whether we can maintain our stock pile as safe and 
reliable without nuclear testing. Without such assurance of safety and 
reliability and with the knowledge that the United States will maintain 
a nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future, I cannot support such a 
treaty that would potentially put our stockpile at risk.
  Treaty proponents will argue that any time the appropriate leaders of 
defense, energy and the scientific community say we must test to insure 
reliability and safety, we can withdraw from the treaty. I have little 
confidence that once this treaty is approved, ``pulling the sword 
Excaliber from the stone'' would seem a trivial task compared to 
withdrawal from a nuclear test ban treaty.
  The point is that once the treaty is signed, we need to be confident 
that we can maintain a safe, reliable nuclear

[[Page 25114]]

stockpile. We have no such confidence today--perhaps the technology 
will be in place in 5-15 years--and therefore we should not jeopardize 
our nuclear deterrent by agreeing to this treaty.
  Because we cannot verify whether other nations are following the 
treaty, because the treaty does not halt or prevent proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and because the treaty could lead to reduced 
reliability and safety of our nuclear stockpile, I cannot support its 
ratification.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, the Senate finds itself in a very 
uncomfortable position today. We have before us one of the most 
important treaties negotiated this decade, the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty. It is not perfect. It does not do everything we wish it would. 
Its verification provisions are not air-tight, and its sanctions for 
violators are not particularly stiff.
  I understand many of my colleagues' uneasiness about the treaty. 
Prior to last week, there had been no deliberate consideration of the 
CTBT before any Senate committee. Members have had little opportunity 
to learn about the treaty and have their questions addressed. A 
significant portion of the Senate has just in the last two weeks begun 
to carefully examine the details of the treaty. This is no way to 
conduct the ratification process on a matter of such importance to 
national security, and puts Senators in a very uncomfortable position. 
For some time, I have urged the Foreign Relations Committee to hold 
hearings on this treaty and allow this debate to begin. But for better 
or worse, this is the situation we find ourselves in, and having 
exhausted appeals for a delay in the vote, I trust my colleagues will 
do their best to thoroughly evaluate what is now before them.
  Implementation of the CTBT would bring, however, a significant 
improvement in our ability to stop the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. The Test Ban Treaty would constrain the development of new and 
more deadly nuclear weapons by nations around the globe by banning all 
nuclear weapon test explosions. It would also establish a far-reaching 
global monitoring system and allow for short-notice on-site inspections 
of suspicious events, thereby improving our ability to detect and deter 
nuclear explosions by other nations. The fact that the CTBT was signed 
by 154 nations is a major tribute to American diplomacy. Many of these 
nations are now looking to America for leadership before they proceed 
to ratification of the treaty, and under the provisions of the treaty, 
it will not enter into force until the United States has ratified.
  Rejection of the test ban treaty could give new life to dormant 
nuclear testing programs in countries like Russia and China. It could 
also renew dangerous, cold war-era nuclear arms competitions. And we 
would have a very difficult time asserting our leadership in urging any 
nation to refrain from testing. Not only would we lose an historic 
opportunity to lock in this agreement among nations, we would undermine 
the power of our own diplomacy by not following through on an 
initiative that we have spearheaded.
  Critics charge that we cannot be 100 percent certain that we can 
detect any test of any size by any nation. I would concede that is 
true. But when it comes to national defense, nothing is 100 percent 
certain. We can never be sure any weapon will work 100 percent of the 
time. We can be certain, however, that this treaty will improve our 
ability to constrain the nuclear threat today and in the future. We owe 
it to our children and our grandchildren to add this important weapon 
to our defense arsenal.
  I urge my colleagues to vote for ratification of the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want to inform my colleagues on this 
side--I apologize for it--the most I can give any colleague is 2 
minutes. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Michigan.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, with this fateful vote tonight the world 
becomes a more dangerous place. That is what our top military leaders 
are telling us. To quote General Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs:

       The world will be a safer place with the treaty than 
     without it. And it is in our national security interest to 
     ratify the treaty.

  Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen says that this treaty will ``help cap 
the nuclear threat.''
  Mr. President, we no longer have standing, when we defeat this 
treaty, to tell China or India or Pakistan or any other country: Don't 
test nuclear weapons.
  We will have lost our standing, and I believe will have lost our 
bearings. By rushing headlong into this vote tonight and defeating a 
treaty which 150 nations have signed--it was said a few moments ago 
that our lab Directors say that the treaty would endanger their safety 
and reliability testing.
  I ask unanimous consent that a joint statement of the lab Directors 
be printed in the Record saying that ``we are confident that a fully 
supported and sustained Stockpile Stewardship Program will enable us to 
continue to maintain America's nuclear deterrent without nuclear 
testing.''
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

Joint Statement by three Nuclear Weapons Laboratory Directors: C. Paul 
  Robinson, Sandia National Laboratories, John C. Browne, Los Alamos 
 National Laboratory, and C. Bruce Tarter, Lawrence Livermore National 
                               Laboratory

       ``We, the three nuclear weapons laboratory directors, have 
     been consistent in our view that the stockpile remains safe 
     and reliable today.
       ``For the last three years, we have advised the Secretaries 
     of Energy and Defense through the formal annual certification 
     process that the stockpile remains safe and reliable and that 
     there is no need to return to nuclear testing at this time.
       ``We have just forwarded our fourth set of certification 
     letters to the Energy and Defense Secretaries confirming our 
     judgment that once again the stockpile is safe and reliable 
     without nuclear testing.
       ``While there can never be a guarantee that the stockpile 
     will remain safe and reliable indefinitely without nuclear 
     testing, we have stated that we are confident that a fully 
     supported and sustained stockpile stewardship program will 
     enable us to continue to maintain America's nuclear deterrent 
     without nuclear testing.
       ``If that turns out not to be the case, Safeguard F--which 
     is a condition for entry into the Test Ban Treaty by the 
     U.S.--provides for the President, in consultation with the 
     Congress, to withdraw from the Treaty under the standard 
     ``supreme national interest'' clause in order to conduct 
     whatever testing might be required.''

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, our three allies, in an unprecedented move, 
have directly appealed to this Senate to ratify this treaty. Great 
Britain, France, Germany, directly appealed to this Senate.
  Finally, it is unprecedented that this Senate would defeat a treaty 
of this magnitude with this speed without a report even from the 
Foreign Relations Committee. I think we are doing a real disservice to 
world peace and stability by defeating this treaty.
  I thank my friend for the time he has yielded me.
  Mr. BIDEN. Parliamentary inquiry.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. If when the vote occurs on the Resolution of Ratification 
it does not achieve 67 votes, what happens to the treaty?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The treaty would then stay on the calendar 
until the end of the Congress.
  Mr. BIDEN. Further parliamentary inquiry: At the end of the Congress, 
what would then happen to the treaty?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The treaty would then be returned to the 
Foreign Relations Committee.
  Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  Mr. HELMS. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Texas, Mrs. 
Hutchison.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I want to be notified at 2\1/2\ 
minutes. I am going to split my time with Senator Shelby who has not 
arrived. I will take

[[Page 25115]]

my 2\1/2\, and then when he arrives, he will use the other 2\1/2\ 
minutes.
  If America does not form a nuclear umbrella to protect world peace, 
who will? To whom will our allies look to protect them from an incoming 
ballistic missile? Only America can do that, and there are only two 
ways we have to deter a rogue nation from lobbing a nuclear missile 
into some other country. The first is a missile defense system which 
belatedly we are now deploying. It is not yet ready, but we are on the 
way. That is No. 1. No. 2 is the ability to be sure we have a safe and 
secure and viable nuclear arsenal.
  This is not a treaty that has been debated for 20 years. It is not 
the same treaty that preceding Presidents negotiated. It is different 
in this respect: Every other President held firm for the United States 
to test at a low level. President Clinton gave that up. That is part of 
the reason this treaty is before us and why the other countries came in 
because the low-level testing is not able to be detected. No other 
President gave in on that issue.
  Secondly, no other President gave in on the issue of permanence. The 
idea that we would unilaterally disarm ourselves in perpetuity is 
irresponsible.
  I do not like the fact we are taking up this treaty now. I do not 
want to send a bad signal. But most of all, I do not want to leave 
ourselves and our allies unprotected from some rogue nation that has 
nuclear capabilities, and we know there are many.
  I want to go back and look at the record, and let's talk about peace 
through strength. It was not peace through weakness and unilateral 
disarmament that stopped the Cold War. It was peace through strength. 
We cannot let that go away by signing a treaty that is not in our 
interests. There are other avenues. There is renegotiating the treaty 
so we can test at a low level, so we will be able to say to the world: 
We have a nuclear arsenal, so do not even think about lobbing a nuclear 
missile at us or any of our allies. We could renegotiate the treaty so 
it has a term or a timetable. There are alternatives. I hope we will 
not be rammed into doing something that is wrong for our country 
because there are alternatives.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an excerpt of testimony 
from General Shalikashvili in a March 1997 appropriations hearing be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

          Excerpts--Senate Appropriations Hearing, March 1977


                        nuclear weapons testing

       Senator Hutchison. Second, I am always interested in the 
     Department of Energy's role in the maintenance and storage of 
     our nuclear stockpile. I would like to ask you a general 
     question.
       Are you confident that they are doing everything that you 
     think is prudent in maintaining and storing our weapons? Do 
     you think we are maintaining and storing enough? And do you 
     think we can rely on a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile 
     when we have banned any testing?
       General Shalikashvili. The answer is yes, and let me tell 
     you what I base this on.
       I think it is 2 years ago that the President established a 
     system where each year the Secretary of Defense, the 
     Secretary of Energy, and the Commander of our Strategic 
     Forces, now General Habiger in Omaha, have to certify that 
     the stockpile is safe and reliable. The system is such that 
     if any one of them reports that it is not so, then the 
     President has to consult with Congress on that issue.
       Senator Hutchison. How do they tell when you cannot 
     actually test? Do you think the computer modeling is 
     sufficient? Do you think the testing is sufficient when you 
     can't test?
       General Shalikashvili. The Energy Department has proposed 
     and the Secretary of Defense has agreed with the 
     establishment of a science-based stockpile verification 
     program. It is a very costly program. To stand it up--and I 
     might have my number off but not by much--it is about $4 
     billion a year, to establish the laboratories, the computer 
     suites, and all of that, to establish it.
       What I monitor is whether--this year, for instance, in the 
     energy budget there is approximately $4 billion toward the 
     science-based stockpile verification program. Just 10 days 
     ago I was in Omaha to get a briefing from General Habiger on 
     how he is coming along on making the judgment that this year 
     the stockpile is still safe and reliable.
       Not only is he in constant communications with the nuclear 
     laboratory directors who work that issue, he also has a panel 
     of prominent experts on the subject who report to him. Based 
     upon his observations, because he monitors what is on the 
     missiles and so on, his discussions with the labs and the 
     report that he gets from the panel that is established just 
     to answer that question, last year, for the first time, he 
     made the judgment that it was safe. He tells me that, unless 
     something comes up before he reports again, he is going to 
     again certify this year.
       With each year that goes by and we are further and further 
     away from having done the last test, it will become more and 
     more difficult. That is why it is very important that we do 
     not allow the energy budget to slip, but continue working on 
     this science-based stockpile verification program and that we 
     get this thing operating.
       But even then, Senator, we won't know whether that will be 
     sufficient not to have to test. What we are talking about is 
     the best judgment by scientists that they will be able to 
     determine the reliability through these technical methods.
       Senator Hutchison. Do you think we should have some time at 
     which we would do some testing just to see if all of these 
     great assumptions are, in fact, true?
       How can we just sit here and say gee, we really hope this 
     works and then be in a situation of dire emergency and have 
     them fizzle?
       General Shalikashvili. I don't know. I won't pretend to 
     understand the physics of this enough. But I did meet with 
     the nuclear laboratory directors and we talked about this at 
     great length.
       They are all convinced that you can do that. But when I ask 
     them for a guarantee, they cannot give it to you until all of 
     the pieces are stood up. Obviously, if we stand it up, and we 
     cannot do that, then we will have to go back to the President 
     and say we will have to test.
       Hopefully, it will work out. But we are still a number of 
     years away before we will have that all put together so that 
     we can tell you for sure whether it will work or not.
       Senator Hutchison. Well, mark one Senator down as 
     skeptical.
       General Shalikashvili. Mark one Chairman of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff joining you in that skepticism. I just don't 
     know.
       But I know that if you do not help us to make sure that 
     energy puts that money against it and does not siphon it off 
     for something else, then I can assure you we won't get there 
     from here.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has used 2\1/2\ minutes.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I thank the Chair. I reserve 2\1/2\ minutes for 
Senator Shelby.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
Vermont.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, it is with regret, after 25 years in this 
Chamber, a Chamber I love so much, that I say it is a travesty the 
Senate is on the verge of rejecting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban 
Treaty. The idea of a treaty banning all nuclear tests has been around 
since President Dwight Eisenhower called for one more than 40 years ago 
when I was 19 years old.
  Today, there is broad agreement around the world that a test ban 
treaty is necessary and, I point out to my colleagues, we have not 
conducted a nuclear test since President Bush signed legislation to 
establish a moratorium on nuclear testing in 1992.
  Mr. President, 152 nations have signed this treaty. They are abiding 
by its terms, but if we vote against ratification, if we vote against 
advising and consenting, the Senate will abdicate our Nation's role as 
the world leader in support of nonproliferation. The 100 people in this 
body representing a quarter of a billion people will abdicate our 
Nation's responsibility to ourselves and the world.
  I am bewildered at the arguments made by some of my colleagues 
because the United States, which enjoys an immense global nuclear 
advantage over all other countries, will only find that position eroded 
if a global ban on testing is not realized.
  Treaty opponents make two main arguments: that it is unverifiable and 
that the safety and reliability of our own weapons will be endangered 
without testing. In my judgment, both arguments fail miserably.
  As I said before, no treaty is 100% verifiable, and the fact is that 
any nation bent on developing a nuclear weapon can fashion a crude 
device, with or without this treaty. But without the explosive testing 
that this treaty prohibits, it will be extremely difficult to build 
nuclear weapons small enough to be mounted on delivery vehicles.

[[Page 25116]]

  The critical question we should be asking is if this treaty will make 
it significantly harder for potential evaders to test nuclear weapons. 
The answer is a resounding yes. This treaty establishes a monitoring 
system that includes over 300 stations that will help locate the origin 
of a test. Last year, when India tested two nuclear devices 
simultaneously, the seismic waves that they created were recorded by 62 
of these prototype stations.
  Once a test has been detected, the treaty has a short-notice on-site 
inspection regime so questionable incidents can be resolved quickly. In 
short, the treaty makes it much more difficult for signatory nations to 
test nuclear weapons without alerting the international community and 
incurring their collective condemnation.
  The argument that the CTBT will somehow undermine the safety and 
reliability of our own stockpile is likewise flawed. We have conducted 
over 1,000 nuclear tests during the last 54 years, the most of any 
country in the world. We have extensive knowledge of how to build and 
maintain nuclear weapons reliably. Moreover, the Clinton Administration 
is planning a 10 year, $45 billion Stockpile Stewardship Program that 
will develop unprecedented supercomputing simulations that will further 
ensure the continued reliability of our weapons.
  I question whether we need to spend that much money, but I find it 
ironic that many of the voices who are questioning the technical merits 
of Stockpile Stewardship Program are the same people who want to spend 
tens of billions more on a National Missile Defense System that has 
shown modest technical progress, to say the least.
  We have a treaty before us which will curb the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. It should have been ratified years ago. I urge my 
colleagues to join me in setting aside short-term politics. Vote for 
the instruments of ratification. The Senate should be the conscience of 
our Nation, the conscience of the world. If we vote this down, it is 
not.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
Senator from Alaska, Mr. Stevens.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska is recognized.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am not opposed to the concept of a 
comprehensive test ban treaty.
  If we are able to maintain our own nuclear deterrent and the umbrella 
of nuclear protection we have extended to our allies, a ban on testing 
under a fair treaty could be very much in our national interest.
  Clearly we do not want other countries to develop sophisticated 
nuclear weapons, the sort that are light enough to go on ICBMs that 
could reach our country. A verifiable test ban would seriously hinder 
other countries from developing those sophisticated weapons.
  However, today we cannot indefinitely maintain with certainty the 
safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons. So while proponents of 
the treaty make valid points about the benefits that may be obtained 
with regard to nonproliferation, we are not yet prepared to assume the 
risks that would be imposed upon us if we give up the ability to test 
our own weapons.
  As Paul Robinson, the Director of the Sandia National Laboratory, put 
it:

       Confidence in the reliability and safety of the U.S. 
     nuclear weapons stockpile will eventually decline without 
     nuclear testing * * * Whether the risk that will arise from 
     this decline in confidence will be acceptable or not is a 
     policy issue that must be considered in light of the benefits 
     expected to be realized by a universal test ban.

  I have considered the risks on both sides of the this issue, and I 
come to the conclusion that a test ban should remain our goal, but we 
are not yet in a position to enter into an indefinite ban.
  We hope over time to reduce the risks of maintaining our stockpile 
without testing using a science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program. 
But that program is not yet ready.
  Our lab Directors believe it will take another 5 to 15 years to prove 
the program can be a success.
  As John Browne, the Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory 
has said, he is ``concerned about several trends that are reducing 
[his] confidence. These include annual shortfalls in the planned 
budgets, increased numbers of findings in the stockpile that need 
resolution, an augmented workload beyond our original plans, and 
unfunded mandates that cut into the program.''
  I hope the Senate can delay a vote on this treaty. It is in our 
national interest to ask others to abide by a ban as we are doing, and 
our ability to make that request will be reduced if we vote against 
ratification today.
  However, on whole, the risk to our national security is greater if we 
prematurely agree to an indefinite ban. For that reason, I hope we will 
put off the vote on this treaty, but, if we have to vote, in the 
interest of national security, I will vote against the ratification of 
this treaty at this time.
  I thank the Senator for the time.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes out of our time to the 
distinguished senior Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator.
  Mr. President, I regret that the Senate has arrived at this juncture, 
that we are forging ahead with a vote that many, if not most, of us 
believe is ill-timed and premature. The outcome is a foregone 
conclusion--the Senate will reject the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I 
sincerely hope that this vote is being driven by something other than 
pure partisan politics, but for the life of me, I fail to see it. 
Nevertheless, here we are, and vote, it appears, we will.
  In the consideration of a matter as important as a major arms control 
treaty, we need, at a minimum, sufficient time to examine the issue, 
sufficient opportunity to modify the treaty, and last, but not least, 
the answers to a few basic questions.
  First, do we support the objectives of the treaty? In the case of the 
CTBT, I think it is quite possible that a large majority of the Senate 
does support the goal of banning live nuclear weapons tests worldwide. 
I suspect that the 80 percent or more approval ratings that we hear in 
reference to this treaty are based on that question.
  Second, is the treaty in the national security interests of the 
United States? Would the security of the United States be enhanced if 
we could flash-freeze the practice of nuclear weapons testing 
worldwide, or are we leaving ourselves frozen in time while other 
nations march forward? Given our vast superiority in both numbers and 
technology over other nations, including Russia, it would seem that a 
freeze on testing could be an advantage to the United States, if--and 
it is a big if--other nations fully respect the treaty.
  Third, does the treaty accomplish its objectives? This is where the 
questions become more difficult. Verification is a legitimate issue, as 
is the security of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. What will the 
impact be on our national security if some countries cheat on the 
treaty, and others simply refuse to ratify it? Can we really trust an 
untested Stockpile Security Program to maintain our arsenal of nuclear 
weapons, and what signal will we be sending to the rest of the world if 
we find flaws in the program or in our weapons, flaws that mandate live 
testing to fix the weapons? These types of questions require time and 
research to fully explore. We have neither the time nor the information 
we need on this treaty.
  Finally, can the treaty be improved by the addition of amendments, 
reservations, understandings or the like? Few documents that come 
before this body are perfect, and treaties are no exception. It is easy 
to criticize, easy to find fault, easy to point out the flaws--it is 
much easier to renounce a piece of legislation or a treaty than to 
improve it. We have heard a fair amount of discussion about the 
safeguards to be attached to this treaty. That is all well and good, 
but I wonder if they are good enough. I wonder how much scrutiny 
Senators have really given those safeguards. Could they be improved, or 
perhaps expanded? Maybe we need more safeguards. The point is, under 
these circumstances, we do not have the ability to fully explore ways 
to strengthen this treaty, and perhaps make it acceptable to more 
Senators.

[[Page 25117]]

  A treaty of this nature--one that would bar the United States from 
testing its stockpile of nuclear weapons in perpetuity--deserves 
extensive study, careful debate, and a floor situation that allows for 
the open consideration of amendments, reservations, or other motions.
  Treaties of this importance, of this impact on the Nation, are not to 
be brushed off with a political wink and a nod. Treaties of this 
importance must be debated on the basis of their merits, not calibrated 
to the ticking of the legislative clock.
  As the distinguished ranking member of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, Senator Biden, noted on Friday, in comparison with Senate 
consideration of other national security treaties, the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty has been given short shrift indeed. The 1988 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which was considered 
during a time in which I served as Majority Leader, was the subject of 
20 hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 12 hearings 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, a number of hearings in the 
Intelligence Committee, and eventually, nine days of Senate floor 
debate. The SALT II Treaty, which again was considered when I was 
Majority Leader, was the subject of 21 hearings by the Foreign 
Relations Committee, and nine hearings by the Armed Services Committee 
before President Carter and I reached agreement in 1980 that, as a 
result of the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, consideration of 
the treaty should be suspended.
  The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is of equal importance and deserves 
the same consideration as those earlier treaties affecting our national 
security. Senator Warner and Senator Levin, the chairman and ranking 
member of the Senate Armed Services Committees, and their respective 
staffs, did a yeoman's job in scheduling three back-to-back days of 
hearings on the Treaty last week. They managed to wedge an enormous 
amount of information into a remarkably brief window of opportunity. 
They deserve our thanks and our commendations.
  But what are we left with at the end of the process? What we are left 
with is a cacophony of facts, assessments, and opinions. Few in this 
chamber are steeped in the intricacies of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty. I am not. Few of us have a full enough understanding of the 
treaty to sift the competing opinions that we have heard this week and 
to draw informed conclusions.
  It is often said that the devil is in the details. To accept or 
reject this treaty on the basis of such flimsy understanding of the 
details as most of us possess is a blot on the integrity of the Senate, 
and a disservice to the Nation.
  Mr. President, I refer now to the Federalist No. 75 by Alexander 
Hamilton. Let me quote a bit of what he says in speaking of the power 
of making treaties.

       Its objects are contracts with foreign nations, which have 
     the force of law, but derive it from the obligations of good 
     faith. They are not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the 
     subject, but agreements between sovereign and sovereign. The 
     power in question seems therefore to form a distinct 
     department, and to belong properly neither to the legislative 
     nor to the executive. . . .
       However proper or safe it may be in government where the 
     executive magistrate is an hereditary monarch, to commit to 
     him the entire power of making treaties, it would be utterly 
     unsafe and improper to entrust that power to an elective 
     magistrate of four years duration. . . . The history of human 
     conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue 
     which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of 
     so delicate and momentous a kind as those which concern its 
     intercourse with the rest of the world to the sole disposal 
     of a magistrate, created and circumstanced, as would be a 
     president of the United States.
       . . . It must indeed be clear to a demonstration, that the 
     joint possession of the power in question by the president 
     and senate would afford a greater prospect of security, than 
     the separate possession of it by either of them.

  In The Federalist Essays, Number 75, Alexander Hamilton lays out a 
compelling case for the fundamental and essential role that the Senate 
must play in the ratification of a treaty.
  Mr. President, in accordance with what Hamilton said, in these words 
that I just spoke, we should pause to take his words to heart. He 
leaves no room for quibble, no margin for question. The Senate is a 
vital part of the treaty-making equation. And yet, on this treaty, 
under this consent agreement, the Senate has effectively abdicated its 
duty.
  This is an extraordinary moment. The Senate is standing on the edge 
of a precipice, approaching a vote that is, by all accounts, going to 
result in the rejection of a nuclear arms control treaty. All of us are 
by now aware of a coup d'etat which has occurred in one of the more 
unstable nuclear powers in the world--Pakistan--a state that conducted 
underground tests of nuclear weapons just last year, but which in 
recent weeks, sent signals that it would sign the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty.
  While the two events are not necessarily related, the Senate's 
rejection of this treaty, coming on the heel of this coup d'etat, could 
send a powerful message to the as-yet-unfamiliar government in 
Pakistan. Would it not be prudent to assess this new situation, with 
all of its potential ramifications to our own security situation, 
before we act on this treaty? I believe all of us know that it would.
  But, Mr. President, I fear that what is driving the Senate at this 
moment instead of prudence or the security interests of the United 
States, is political agenda. Indeed, it is political agenda that has 
brought us to this uncomfortable place, and it is political agenda 
which blocks our exit from it, despite the desire of most members to 
pull back.
  Once we have disposed of this vote, if the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty is returned to the Senate at some future date, I urge the 
leaders to work together to re-examine it in a bipartisan fashion. We 
have a number of ready made vehicles to do so--the Foreign Relations 
Committee, the Armed Services Committee, the Intelligence Committee, 
and the National Security Working Group, of which both leaders are 
members. Our leaders should sit down with the experts whose opinions 
represent both sides of the Treaty debate. They should talk to the 
Russians, eyeball to eyeball. They should talk to our allies, eyeball 
to eyeball. An opinion piece in the New York Times is no substitute for 
face-to-face talks with the leaders of Britain, France and Germany. We 
have made the effort on other treaties, and we should do no less for 
this Treaty.
  And above all, we should undertake this examination of the treaty on 
a bipartisan basis. No treaty of this importance is going to receive 
the consideration that it deserves without the cooperation of the 
leaders of both parties. It is just that simple.
  Mr. President, I look forward to the day when we can deliberate the 
full implications of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. What we do on 
this treaty will affect national--and international--security for 
generations to come. We owe it to the Senate and to the Nation to give 
this Treaty thorough and informed scrutiny, to improve it if needed, to 
approve it if warranted, or to reject it if necessary. That is our 
charge under the Constitution, and that is the course of action that I 
hope we will be given another opportunity to pursue.
  In closing, Mr. President, I cannot vote today either to approve or 
to reject the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I will 
do something that I have never before done in my 41 years in the United 
States Senate. I will vote ``Present.'' I will do so in the hope that 
this treaty will sometime be returned for consideration, under a 
different set of circumstances, in which we can fully and 
dispassionately explore the ramifications of the treaty and any 
amendments, conditions, or reservations in regard to it.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. HELMS. I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished Senator from New 
Hampshire, Mr. Smith.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, the Senate now has acquired two documents which are 
very revealing in this debate, new information. I have a memorandum 
here which

[[Page 25118]]

makes clear that neither the Department of Defense nor the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff were privy to the Department of Energy's lobbying effort vis-
a-vis the White House to forgo all nuclear testing under the CTBT. This 
was never--in the words of a senior DOD official--coordinated with the 
Defense Department or the military.
  These documents make it very clear that the Clinton administration 
ignored national security concerns expressed directly to the President 
of the United States in negotiating the CTBT and a further reason that 
the treaty should be rejected.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
a memorandum, dated September 8, 1994, to the President of the United 
States from Hazel O'Leary.
  There being no objection, the memorandum was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:


                                      The Secretary of Energy,

                                Washington, DC, September 8, 1994.


                     Memorandum for: The President.

     From: Hazel R. O'Leary.
     Subject: Hydronuclear Experiments at the Nevada Test Site 
         Under the Moratorium on Nuclear Testing.
     I. Summary
       After careful and extended debate within the executive 
     agencies, you are to be presented with a decision memorandum 
     on whether the United States should conduct hydronuclear 
     experiments at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) under the 
     moratorium on nuclear testing. Although the views of the 
     Department of Energy on this matter are reflected in that 
     decision memorandum, I want to take this opportunity to 
     strongly urge you to decide that the U.S. should not conduct, 
     nor prepare to conduct, hydronuclear experiments during the 
     existing moratorium. At the very least, the U.S. should 
     decide to defer a decision on whether to conduct hydronuclear 
     experiments until after the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
     (NPT) Extension Conference next spring and not take any 
     actions which prejudice an ultimate decision on whether to 
     conduct these experiments.
     II. Discussion
       Under your leadership, the United States has taken a world 
     leadership role in enacting and maintaining a nuclear testing 
     moratorium and actively pursuing a test ban treaty. These 
     efforts are essential elements of the comprehensive approach 
     this Nation has undertaken to prevent the proliferation of 
     nuclear weapons. We must be vigilant to ensure that actions 
     are not taken which could undermine these essential 
     objectives.
       The reasons to, at a minimum, defer a decision on 
     conducting hydronuclear experiments are compelling.
       It is not technically essential to conduct hydronuclear 
     experiments at this time. The Department of Energy has 
     determined that the existing nuclear stockpile of the United 
     States is safe and reliable and; that technical means other 
     than hydronuclear testing can maintain the stockpile in this 
     robust condition for the near term. Additionally, the JASON 
     group, a high-level, independent technical evaluation team 
     assessing the Stockpile Stewardship program for the U.S. 
     Government, weighed the limited technical value of 
     hydronuclear experiments against the costs, the impact of 
     continuing an underground testing program at the NTS, and 
     U.S. non-proliferation goals and determined that on balance 
     they opposed these experiments.
       Publicly affirming the U.S. commitment to conduct 
     hydronuclear experiments would highlight the issue at the 
     Conference on Disarmament. This could undermine the 
     comprehensive nuclear test ban negotiations by providing 
     nations that are not fully committed to a comprehensive 
     nuclear test ban an opportunity to use U.S. conduct as a 
     convenient excuse for their opposition. Significant progress 
     on the test ban treaty is essential if the priority objective 
     of achieving an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty is to be successful in spring 1995.
       A request for funding in fiscal year 1996 to preserve the 
     hydronuclear experiment option will be difficult to defend to 
     the Congress since it is not technically essential to conduct 
     these experiments to preserve stockpile reliability and 
     safety. Additionally, because of the controversial nature of 
     hydronuclear experiments, a request for funding at this time 
     may invite the Congress to enact legislation restricting 
     funding for this purpose. This would tie the hands of the 
     Executive Branch in the negotiation of a comprehensive test 
     ban treaty and may force a change in the Administration's 
     current negotiating position and strategy. Alternatively, if 
     the Congress withheld its approval of funding, this will 
     create ambiguity concerning U.S. policy and intentions on 
     this sensitive issue, further complicating the comprehensive 
     test ban negotiations.
       As a member of your cabinet, with responsibility, with 
     others, for carrying out your non-proliferation and national 
     security agenda, I believe strongly that a decision to 
     conduct, or to prepare to conduct, hydronuclear experiments 
     under a nuclear testing moratorium is tactically unwise and 
     substantively unnecessary at this time. I urge you to decide 
     not to authorize preparations for these experiments in the 
     fiscal year 1996 budget request and also not to conduct these 
     experiments under a moratorium.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I further ask unanimous 
consent to print in the Record a memorandum for Dr. John Deutch, 
chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council, from Dr. Harold Smith, staff 
director of the Nuclear Weapons Council.
  There being no objection, the memorandum was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:


                               MEMORANDUM

     For: Dr. John Deutch, Chairman NWC.
     From: Dr. Harold Smith, Staff Director NWC.
     Subject: Secretary O'Leary's Letter to the President on 
         Hydronuclear Experiments (HN).


                               Background

       Letter dated September 8, 1994 from Secretary O'Leary to 
     the President was received in my office today by FAX as a 
     bootleg copy from Los Alamos National Laboratory--copies were 
     not distributed to OSD, DoD, JS, NSC or the Deputies.
       Letter clearly circumvents the established IWG process 
     being pursued through the NSC.


               The O'Leary Letter (sent as an attachment)

     Section I.
       ``. . . strongly urge you to . . . not conduct, or prepare 
     to conduct hydronuclear experiments during the existing 
     moratorium''--circumvents the IWG Deputies forum established 
     by NSC to decide this issue in an Interagency process
     Section II.
       ``. . . not technically essential to conduct hydronuclear 
     experiments at this time''--HNs must be conducted while the 
     stockpile is safe and reliable to acquire baseline data, 
     otherwise HN as a diagnostic for stockpile problems is of 
     limited value
       ``. . . technical means other than hydronuclear testing can 
     maintain the stockpile in this robust condition for the near 
     term''--HNs provide direct experimental testing of an 
     unaltered (real) pit--no other technique provides this 
     capability
       ``. . . the JASON group . . . opposed these 
     experiments.''--The JASON's draft report indicated that HN 
     experiments have limited technical value, but their 
     assessment was lacking in scope and depth--the JASONs 
     received one briefing and asked no questions in developing 
     their position--NRDC white paper was the basis for their 
     conclusions
       ``. . . could undermine the CTBT negotiations . . .''-- 
     speculative
       ``A request for funding in FY 1996 . . . difficult to 
     defend to the Congress . . .''--ability to justify funding 
     for HNs with Congress should be based on the need to maintain 
     a safe and reliable stockpile
       ``As a member of your cabinet with responsibility with 
     others for carrying out your nonproliferation and national 
     security agenda''--the national security agenda should 
     include Stockpile Stewardship that includes the ability to 
     conduct a meaningful experimental program
       AE opinion--HNs will provide unique data to be combined 
     with other experimental and analytical data to significantly 
     improve confidence in the safety and reliability of the 
     stockpile
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, in the summary of the 
document to the President of the United States from Hazel O'Leary, the 
Energy Secretary, she said:

       After careful and extended debate within the executive 
     agencies, you are to be presented with a decision memorandum 
     on whether the United States should conduct hydronuclear 
     experiments at the Nevada test site (NTS) under the 
     moratorium on nuclear testing. Although the views of the 
     Department of Energy on this matter are reflected in that 
     decision memorandum, I want to take this opportunity to 
     strongly urge you to decide that the U.S. should not conduct, 
     nor prepare to conduct, hydronuclear experiments during the 
     existing moratorium.

  In other words, the Secretary of Energy is asking the President of 
the United States to ignore the recommendations of the experts.
  She states further in this memorandum to the President:

       It is not technically essential to conduct hydronuclear 
     experiments at this time. The Department of Energy has 
     determined that the existing nuclear stockpile of the United 
     States is safe and reliable and that technical means other 
     than hydronuclear testing can maintain the stockpile in this 
     robust condition for the near term.

  She concludes in the memo to the President:

       As a member of your cabinet with responsibility, with 
     others, for carrying out your nonproliferation and national 
     security agenda, I believe strongly that a decision to 
     conduct, or to prepare to conduct, hydronuclear

[[Page 25119]]

     experiments under a nuclear testing moratorium is technically 
     unwise and substantively unnecessary at this time. I urge you 
     to decide not to authorize preparations for these experiments 
     in the fiscal year 1996 . . . .

  That is a very interesting memorandum from the Secretary of Energy to 
the President of the United States.
  Now let us hear what the experts had to say. This is very 
interesting. In a memorandum from Dr. Harold Smith to John Deutch, 
Nuclear Weapons Council: Background, letter dated September 8 from 
Secretary O'Leary to the President was received in my office today by 
fax as a bootleg copy from the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Copies 
not distributed to OSD, DOD, Joint Staff, NSC or the Deputies, not 
distributed and not copied.
  Then the subject, and it begins to analyze the O'Leary memo. Let me 
quote a couple of items. In the memo from O'Leary to the President, she 
says: Strongly urge you to not conduct or prepare to conduct 
hydronuclear experiments. They say: This circumvents the IWG deputies 
forum established by the NSC to decide this issue in an interagency 
process.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 4 minutes have expired.
  Mr. HELMS. One more minute.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I ask unanimous consent for 1 additional 
minute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has been yielded 1 additional 
minute.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. The second point in the O'Leary memo 
says: not technically essential to conduct hydronuclear experiments at 
this time. Hydronuclear experiments must be conducted while the 
stockpile is safe and reliable to acquire baseline data, otherwise HN, 
or hydronuclear, testing, as a diagnostic for stockpile problems, is of 
limited value.
  These are the experts saying this in response.
  Finally: Hydronuclear tests provide direct experimental testing of an 
unaltered real pit. No other technique provides that capability. This 
is what the experts in the Clinton administration believed. They were 
end run by the Secretary of Energy on a political decision, which 
basically said, don't worry about the science, just move forward with 
the policy.
  This is outrageous. It flies in the face of every single point the 
President has made in saying we should pass this treaty.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
Georgia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, I have a strong sense of deja vu today.
  On September 22, 1963, the Senate, on a bipartisan basis, ratified 
the Limited Test Ban Treaty by a vote of 80-19. I was present in the 
Chamber, in the gallery, as a young 21-year-old student observing my 
country in action and studying government and politics. I was very 
proud of the Senate on that day.
  I was very proud of President Kennedy when, on October 7, 1963, he 
signed the instruments of ratification of the Limited Test Ban Treaty 
in the treaty room at the White House.
  Today I am saddened. I am saddened by our rush to judgment. I am 
saddened that our Nation may see a rejection by this Senate of the 
first real treaty in terms of arms limitation in 70 years.
  We are in the strongest military posture I think we have been in as a 
nation. As such, we are certainly more secure today than when John F. 
Kennedy sought ratification of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, 
certainly more secure than when President Ronald Reagan sought approval 
of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1988, and certainly more 
secure than when President Bush submitted the START I treaty for Senate 
ratification in 1992. Of all the nations in the world, we have the most 
to gain from slowing the development of more capable weapons by others 
and the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries.
  The treaty cannot enter into force unless and until all 44 nuclear-
capable states, including China, India, Iran, North Korea, and 
Pakistan, have ratified it. Should any one of these nations refuse to 
accept the treaty and its conditions, all bets are off. Finally, even 
if all the required countries ratify, we will still have the right to 
unilaterally withdraw from the treaty if we determine that our supreme 
national interests have been jeopardized.
  President Kennedy said, when he signed our first real nuclear test 
ban treaty: In the first two decades, the age of nuclear energy has 
been full of fear, yet never empty of hope. Today the fear is a little 
less and the hope a little greater.
  Mr. President, it is my hope that at the end of today's work, this 
Senate can say the same.
  I thank the Chair.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished 
Senator from Alabama.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized for 4 
minutes.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Resolution of 
Advice and Consent to the Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty.
  Last Thursday, I testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, in my capacity as chairman of the Select Committee on 
Intelligence, to present my views on the ability of the Intelligence 
Community to monitor compliance with the CTBT. Today, I would like to 
make certain general observations, in addition to addressing issues 
involving CTBT monitoring and verification. By the way: monitoring and 
verification are different. Monitoring is objective. Verification is 
subjective; it involves determining the significance of information 
obtained through monitoring.
  First, as a general matter, I believe that the treaty will serve as a 
stalking horse for denuclearization. I do not accuse all of the 
treaty's supporters of seeking that goal. Yet, a test ban agreement 
whose first operative sentence appears on its face to outlaw the 
explosion of nuclear weapons, even in a war of self-defense, surely 
raises profound questions about the long-term viability of any nuclear 
deterrent.
  I fear that the treaty will both undermine and delegitimize our 
nuclear deterrent. When I say ``undermine,'' I refer to the effect of 
ratification of, and adherence to, this treaty on the weapons in our 
nuclear stockpile.
  Senators Kyl, Warner, and others have ably addressed this issue in 
the course of the debate. I will not belabor it further, other than to 
cite, as others have, the conclusion of former Secretaries of Defense 
Rumsfeld, Cheney, Schlesinger, Weinberger, Laird, and Carlucci. These 
highly regarded public servants have determined that ``over the decades 
ahead, confidence in the reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile 
would inevitably decline, thereby reducing the credibility of America's 
nuclear deterrent.'' This alone is reason for the Senate to withhold 
its advice and consent to the treaty.
  With respect to delegitimizing our nuclear deterrent, Article I of 
the treaty prohibits ``any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other 
nuclear explosion.'' I understand that the U.S. Government does not 
view that prohibition as applying to the use of nuclear weapons.
  The President's 1997 transmittal message to the Senate included an 
article-by-article analysis of the treaty. This analysis explains that 
the U.S. position in the negotiations was that ``undertakings relating 
to the use of nuclear weapons were totally beyond the scope'' of the 
CTBT. The analysis does not make clear whether all other signatories 
agreed with the U.S. view or whether they acquiesced in it or did 
something else. It is unfortunate that the CTBT text does not 
incorporate the U.S. understanding. We are asked to give our advice and 
consent to that text and only that text.
  Article 15 of the treaty bars reservations, even one clarifying the 
meaning of Article I. Because the U.S. understanding of the scope of 
the prohibition on other nuclear explosions cannot be incorporated in a 
reservation to the

[[Page 25120]]

treaty, the U.S. position may be subject to challenge as a matter of 
law. After all, one normally looks at negotiating history only if the 
treaty text is unclear. I hope the administration will address this 
issue to my satisfaction.
  In the meantime, along with many other concerns about this treaty, I 
question the wisdom of negotiating an agreement that relegates our 
right of self-defense to the fine print.
  I would also draw the attention of Senators to the language of the 
preamble to the CTBT. The administration points to the preamble for 
support for its narrow reading of the open-ended language of Article I. 
The administration notes, correctly, that the preamble does not refer 
to the ``use'' of nuclear weapons. In the administration's view, the 
treaty therefore cannot be read to apply to the use of nuclear weapons. 
Yet, a close reading of the preamble raises more questions than it 
answers over the ultimate purpose of the CTBT. I hope everybody shares 
my abhorrence of nuclear weapons. But merely wishing to put the nuclear 
genie back in the bottle will not accomplish that goal.
  The one certainty about the CTBT is that, if ratified, the United 
States will obey it to the letter. Other countries' record of deception 
and denial with respect to nuclear testing is such that we cannot have 
the same confidence. And, in the world of the blind, the one-eyed is 
king.
  I have supported well-negotiated, well-considered reductions in our 
nuclear forces. But it is a fact that the American nuclear deterrent 
has served our Nation well and has served the world well. The United 
States, under Democratic and Republican administrations, backed by a 
strong and credible nuclear deterrent, faced down the Soviet threat and 
served as a force for peace and stability around the world.
  Therefore, Mr. President, I would not start down this path. Even if 
the Senate approved the CTBT today, it would be years before the treaty 
took effect. And by then, decisions would have been made affecting the 
future of our nuclear deterrent that may be irrevocable.
  The second reason I intend to vote against advice and consent is that 
I am convinced that the treaty cannot achieve the goals its proponents 
have described: to prevent the nuclear powers from developing new 
nuclear weapons and to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
  While I cannot go into classified details, as my colleagues are 
aware, the Washington Post recently reported that Russia continues to 
conduct what may be low-yield nuclear tests at its Arctic test site. 
Russia reportedly is undertaking this action in order to develop a new 
low-yield weapon that will be the linchpin of a new military doctrine. 
These Russian activities are of particular concern. There is evidence, 
including public statements from the Russian First Deputy Minister of 
Atomic Energy, Viktor Mikhailov, that Russia intends to continue to 
conduct low-yield hydro-nuclear tests--that is, nuclear tests--and does 
not believe that these are prohibited by the treaty.
  With respect to proliferation, Acting Undersecretary of State John 
Holum has stated that, with the CTBT in effect, it will be ``very 
difficult for new countries to develop nuclear weapons.'' Yet, Director 
of Central Intelligence George Tenet has stated that ``[n]uclear 
testing is not required for the acquisition of a basic nuclear weapons 
capability . . . [and] is not critical for a first-generation weapon.'' 
North Korea, Iraq, and Iran are seeking this kind of weapon.
  Third, it is my considered judgment, as Chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee, that it is impossible to monitor compliance with this treaty 
with the confidence that the Senate should demand--I repeat, demand--
before providing its advice and consent to ratification.
  Simply put, I am not confident that we can now, or, in the 
foreseeable future will be able to, detect any and all nuclear 
explosions prohibited under the treaty.
  I have a great degree of confidence in our ability to monitor higher 
yield explosions at known test sites. I have markedly less confidence 
in our capabilities to monitor lower yield and/or evasively conducted 
tests, including tests that may enable states to develop new nuclear 
weapons or improve existing weapons.
  I should also repeat in this context North Korea, Iran, and Iraq can 
develop and deploy nuclear weapons without any nuclear tests at all.
  With respect to monitoring, in July 1997, the intelligence community 
issued a National Intelligence Estimate entitled ``Monitoring the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Over the Next 10 years.'' While I cannot 
go into classified details, I can say that the NIE was not encouraging 
about our ability to monitor compliance with the treaty--nor about the 
likely utility of the treaty in preventing countries like North Korea, 
Iran, and Iraq from developing and fielding nuclear weapons.
  The NIE identified numerous challenges, difficulties, and credible 
evasion scenarios that affect the intelligence community's confidence 
in its ability to monitor compliance.
  Because the details are classified, and because of the inherent 
difficulty of summarizing a highly technical analysis covering a number 
of different countries and a multitude of variables, I recommend that 
Members review this document with the following caution: I believe that 
newly acquired information and other developments require a 
reevaluation of the 1997 estimate's assumptions and underlying analysis 
on certain key issues. I believe such a new analysis will increase 
concern about monitoring the CTBT. A preliminary summary of the 
Intelligence community's revised judgment was provided to the committee 
late last Friday. This document, along with the NIE and the transcript 
from last week's hearing is available to Members in S-407.
  Proponents of the treaty argue, in essence, that we will miss no test 
of strategic significance. Despite the U.S. inability to monitor 
compliance at any test level, proponents place their faith in 
multilateral monitoring aids provided under the treaty: the 
International Monitoring System, a multinational seismic, infra-sound, 
hydro-acoustic, and radio-nucleide detection system; and the CTBT's on-
site inspection regime.
  Based on a review of the structure, likely capabilities, and 
procedures of these multilateral mechanisms, which will not be 
operational for a number of years, and based on the intelligence 
community's own analysis, I believe that these mechanisms will be of 
little value. For example, the IMS will be technically inadequate to 
monitor the most likely forms of noncompliance.
  The IMS seismic system was not designed to detect ``evasively'' 
conducted tests. These are precisely the kind of tests Iraq or North 
Korea are likely to conduct.
  In addition, the IMS suffers from having been designed with 
diplomatic sensitivities rather than effective monitoring in mind. 
Under the so-called ``non-discriminatory'' framework, no country will 
be singled out for attention. All countries--Iraq and Ireland, North 
Korea and Norway--will receive the same level of verification.
  Lastly, it will be 8 to 10 years before the system is complete.
  Because of these shortcomings, and for other technical reasons, I am 
afraid that the IMS is likely to muddy the waters by injecting 
questionable data into what will inevitably be highly charged debates 
over possible violations.
  With respect to OSI, I believe that the onsite inspection regime 
invites delay and deception. For example, U.S. negotiators originally 
sought an ``automatic green light'' for on-site inspections. Yet, 
because of the opposition of the People's Republic of China, the regime 
that was adopted allows inspections only with the approval of 30 of the 
51 countries on the Executive Committee. Proponents of ratification, 
especially, will appreciate the difficulty of rounding up the votes for 
such a super-majority.
  I am troubled by the fact that if the United States requested an 
inspection, no U.S. inspectors could participate in that inspection, 
and we could send an observer only if the inspected party approved. I 
am also disturbed by the

[[Page 25121]]

right of the inspected party to declare areas up to fifty square 
kilometers off-limits to inspection or to impose severe restrictions on 
inspectors in those areas.
  I understand that these provisions mirror limitations sought by 
Saddam Hussein on UNSCOM inspectors. This leads me to believe that OSI 
stands for ``Option Selected by Iraq.'' Even if inspectors do 
eventually get near the scene of a suspicious event, the evidence--
which is highly perishable--may well have vanished.
  The recently-reported activity at Russia's Arctic test site raises 
questions both as to our monitoring capabilities and Russian intentions 
under the CTBT. The Washington Post reported that Russia continues to 
conduct possible low-yield nuclear tests at its Arctic test site. The 
Washington Post also reported that the CIA cannot monitor such tests 
with enough precision to determine whether they are nuclear or 
conventional explosions.
  Mr. President, I have tried to convey some serious concerns about the 
practicality of this treaty, and that is extremely difficult to do in 
an unclassified forum and in such a short time.
  I urge my colleagues, as they consider their position on this treaty, 
to immerse themselves in the details. For further information on treaty 
monitoring and the reported activities at the Russian test site, I urge 
Members to review the materials available in S-407.
  In closing, Mr. President, I would like to make some general points.
  First, I believe that, when foreign and national security policies 
come before the Senate, we must put the Nation's interests first.
  Second, while arms control agreements may be useful to the extent 
they advance our national interests, they are not a substitute for 
sound policy. Good agreements are an instrument of good policy. Bad 
agreements, pursued for agreement's sake, do not serve our Nation's 
interests.
  Lastly, some of my colleagues have held out the option of withdrawal 
from the treaty, should it be ratified yet somehow fail to lead to the 
Golden Age that proponents envision.
  Let me be clear. If this treaty is ratified, there will be no turning 
back.
  The history of cold war arms control agreements is instructive. In 
1972, the United States signed the Interim Agreement on the Limitation 
of Strategic Offensive Arms, generally known as SALT I, together with 
the SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty.
  On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Gerard Smith unilaterally declared that 
``[i]f an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive 
arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme 
interests could be jeopardized.'' He continued, ``Should that occur, it 
would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.''
  In fact, no such agreement was reached in five years or in ten years 
or in 15 years. Not until 1991, almost 20 years after SALT I, when 
START I was signed, did the United States and the Soviet Union reach 
such an agreement. At no point did the United States invoke the Supreme 
Interest clause to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.
  It is difficult to imagine the circumstances in which an 
administration would withdraw from the CTBT.
  In closing, Mr. President, I believe that there are many reasons to 
oppose this treaty. The effect on our nuclear stockpile, the inability 
of the treaty to achieve its goals, and our inability to monitor 
compliance are each sufficient reason to withhold advice and consent to 
ratification.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes. Mr. 
President, I rise today to express my support for the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Unfortunately, the vote outcome today looks to 
be a tragedy of major proportions. It will leave the world a far less 
safe place and means the United States relinquishes its imperative as a 
leader in nuclear nonproliferation. I would like to take a few minutes 
to explain why I support this treaty, and to address some of the 
arguments presented by those who are opposed to this Treaty.
  I support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty because I believe it 
strengthens the U.S. ability to play a leadership role in global 
nuclear non-proliferation. The treaty is a key element of the global 
non-proliferation regime, and if the U.S. fails to ratify the CTBT, it 
sends a clear message around the world that the development and 
possession of nuclear weapons are acceptable. As former U.S. Ambassador 
to India Frank Wisner expressed in a letter earlier this year, if the 
U.S. walks away from the CTBT ``I do not want to contemplate treaty 
failure here followed by a breakdown with India and Pakistan and the 
effect these moves will have on rogue states like Iraq, Libya, Iran and 
North Korea.''
  Second, the CTBT will constrain the development of nuclear 
capabilities by rogue states, as well as the development of more 
advanced weapons by declared nuclear states. Any significant nuclear 
program requires extensive testing, and while a rogue state might 
develop a primitive first generation weapon without testing, that 
testing would not be adequate to develop a sophisticated weapon. And, 
because new types of weapons also require testing, the CTBT will also 
curb the ability of states which already possess nuclear weapons from 
developing more advanced designs. As John Holum, Acting Undersecretary 
of State and the former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, has noted, the United States does not need tests; proliferators 
need tests.
  Third, the CTBT will improve the U.S. ability to detect and deter 
nuclear tests. The American Geophysical Union and the Seismological 
Society of America, in a joint statement issued on October 6, found 
that when the International Monitoring System--with over 300 seismic, 
hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide monitoring stations--is in 
operation, no nation will be able to elude them, even with a small-
yield test.
  And, finally, the CTBT will make the world a safer place and 
safeguard U.S. national security interests. The treaty constrains the 
development of nuclear weapons by other states. That is good. It 
provides the United States with additional means to detect nuclear 
activities of other countries. It provides the United States with means 
and leverage to act if we discover that other states are, in violation 
of the treaty, developing nuclear weapons. And, given the size and 
sophistication of the U.S. nuclear arsenal--second to none in every 
respect--it preserves U.S. nuclear superiority and our deterrent 
capability. It will help make the world a safer place. It is in the 
national interest.
  The Joint Chiefs believe that this Treaty safeguards U.S. interests. 
Former Chiefs, including Generals Colin Powell, John Shalikashvili, 
David Jones, and Admiral Crowe all endorse the treaty. Presidents of 
both parties, from Eisenhower and Kennedy to President Clinton have 
worked for a ban on nuclear test explosions. The NATO alliance has 
endorsed the Treaty. And other leading U.S. military and diplomatic 
figures--including Paul Nitze, Admiral Turner, Admiral Zumwalt--all 
support this treaty and believe that it makes the U.S. more secure in 
the world, not less.
  Let me now address several of the arguments that have been raised by 
opponents of this treaty: That it is not verifiable; that it will 
compromise the reliability and integrity of the U.S. nuclear arsenal; 
that the U.S. needs to maintain the ability to improve our nuclear 
arsenal and that we can only do so with additional tests; and that 
others, such as North Korea and Iran, will develop nuclear weapons 
under the CTBT while our hands are tied.
  First, several opponents of this treaty have commented that it is 
impossible for the CTBT to offer a 100% fool-proof means of detecting 
low-yield tests.
  It is true that the CTBT will not provide the means for 100% 
verification of low-yield tests--those tests less than one kiloton in 
size. But it is undeniable that the additional seismic monitors, 
including a system that will be well-calibrated to pick up tests 
smaller than one kiloton (in areas of interest) and the treaty's on-
site verification provisions, will increase our current verification 
capabilities. As the statement of the American Geophysical

[[Page 25122]]

Union and the Seismological Society of America asserts, the CTBT will 
add significant capabilities to what we can now detect, and the 
increased likelihood of detection will serve as a real deterrent to any 
state contemplating a test.
  In addition, as physicist and arms control expert Sidney Drell has 
noted, ``very low yield tests are of questionable value in designing 
new nuclear weapons or confirming that a new design will work as 
intended.'' In other words, even if the CTBT is not 100% verifiable for 
small-yield tests, tests of this size are only of a limited utility to 
a state seeking to develop nuclear weapons.
  Second, questions have been raised about the adequacy of the Science 
Based Stockpile Stewardship Program to maintain the reliability and 
integrity of U.S. weapons systems.
  Simply put, according to General Shalikashvili in testimony before 
Congress, ``our warheads, having been adequately tested in the past, 
continue to be safe and reliable.'' With the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program, further nuclear testing is not necessary to maintain the 
safety and reliability of the U.S. arsenal. The U.S. has conducted over 
1,000 nuclear tests. We have a high level of knowledge and 
sophistication and sufficient data to maintain the safety and 
reliability of our weapons. The U.S. does not need to conduct further 
nuclear tests--it is other states that need to test if they seek to 
develop nuclear programs, and it is precisely tests by other states 
that the CTBT will constrain or prevent.
  In fact, because the U.S. does not need to continue to test, in 1992 
President Bush signed into law legislation that established a 
moratorium on U.S. testing, and we have not tested a weapon in six 
years.
  Each year the heads of Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore 
have certified that the U.S. stockpile is safe and reliable. There is 
every indication that, aided by sophisticated computer modeling and 
other stockpile stewardship initiatives, they will be able to continue 
to make these certifications. In fact, in a February 2, 1998 statement, 
the three lab heads stated that ``We are confident that the Stockpile 
Stewardship program will enable us to maintain America's nuclear 
deterrent without nuclear testing.''
  Critically--and this point should not be overlooked or ignored by 
opponents of the treaty--if at any point the United States finds that 
it can not continue to certify the safety and reliability of our 
nuclear weapons, under the President's safeguards package incorporated 
in the Democratic Amendment, the U.S. will maintain the prerogative to 
pull out of the CTBT and conduct tests or take whatever measures are 
necessary to maintain stockpile integrity. In other words, our very 
ability to maintain stockpile safety is a condition of U.S. 
participation in the CTBT.
  Third, questions have been raised as to whether the U.S. needs to 
continue to test to maintain the ability to improve our nuclear arsenal 
to face the security challenges that lie ahead.
  While the CTBT might constrain our ability to develop whole new 
classes of weapons, the CTBT does allow us to make modifications to our 
weapons, including casings, detonators, batteries, and arming systems. 
In a letter to President Clinton, Dr. Hans A. Bethe, head of the 
Manhattan Project's theoretical division and professor of physics 
emeritus at Cornell University, states that ``If any component shows 
signs of deterioration it will be refabricated. If the fuel itself is 
degrading, it will be refreshed.''
  Parts that wear out can be replaced, and modifications can be made 
that will improve the capabilities of our nuclear arsenal. Thus, for 
example, in 1996 a B-61-7 nuclear bomb was modified to a B-61-Mod V 
earth penetrating weapon by hardening the outer casing. Unlike the B-
61-7, the B-61-Mod V has additional capability to penetrate hardened 
targets.
  In other words, the CTBT, while effectively preventing other states 
from developing nuclear weapons, will still allow the United States to 
modify its arsenal to meet the challenges that we may face in the years 
ahead.
  Finally, there is the argument that under the CTBT other states--
especially such states as North Korea or Iran--will do what they want 
while our hands will be tied.
  In the final analysis some states will do what they want in violation 
of the norm established by the international community anyway. In other 
words, they will seek to develop nuclear weapons whether or not the 
CTBT is in force.
  The real question, then, is if the CTBT will make it easier or more 
difficult for these states to develop nuclear weapons.
  For example, with or without the CTBT the U.S. will face problems 
verifying small-yield tests. And the fact of the matter is that without 
the CTBT, relying only on national intelligence means, we will have 
greater difficulty in detecting any tests and less leverage to do 
anything about it if we do.
  Again, to quote General Shalikashvili,

       On the issue of verification we have concluded that a 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will actually put us in a 
     better position to obtain effective verification than we 
     would have without the Treaty. The Treaty does not provide 
     ``perfect verification,'' but that level of verification that 
     would allow us to detect, to identify and to attribute that 
     level of testing that could undercut our nuclear deterrent.

  The CTBT may thus deter some from going forward with nuclear 
developments entirely--India and Pakistan have indicated that they 
would adhere to a test ban, for example--and for those it will not 
deter, it will make the development of nuclear weapons that much more 
difficult, and perhaps impossible.
  I do not believe the CTBT, or any treaty for that matter, can prevent 
a determined state from doing what the treaty forbids. But that is 
neither the right nor the fair standard to measure the treaty against. 
One cannot let the perfect be the enemy of the good.
  The bottom line is that by any measure the CTBT will make the 
development of nuclear weapons by other states more difficult, will add 
to the U.S. ability to detect tests, and will enhance U.S. national 
security by preventing the spread of nuclear weapons while assuring 
that the U.S. maintains a strong and capable nuclear deterrent second 
to none. And we also know that failure of the U.S. to ratify the CTBT 
will have disastrous repercussion.
  The United States has led the international effort to keep the 
nuclear genie in the bottle for the past five decades. As we prepare to 
enter a new century we should not now uncork that bottle, and make our 
legacy to the twenty-first century the unleashing of a global nuclear 
weapons race.
  Although I do not believe that this is the appropriate time for this 
Senate to vote on this treaty, I urge my colleagues to support 
ratification of the CTBT.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from 
Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise today to explain why I intend to vote 
against the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). I think that the 
words of President Ronald Reagan serve as the most appropriate and 
powerful way to begin this discussion. President Reagan frequently 
reminded us, ``We must always remain strong, so that we will always be 
free.'' The first question we must ask ourselves as we consider this 
vote is whether the CTBT jeopardizes the strength that the American 
people have relied upon for 50 years to ensure that this Nation remains 
free and at peace. Unfortunately, after careful consideration, I have 
concluded that the CTBT does jeopardize our strength by causing real 
harm to the very backbone of America's security--its safe, reliable, 
and credible, nuclear deterrent.
  Some of my colleagues have argued that the Senate should postpone 
final action on the CTBT, that defeating the treaty today sends the 
wrong message to the world, that somehow the Senate would be signaling 
to rogue states and others that the United States thinks it is 
acceptable to develop nuclear weapons. I could not disagree more. The 
Senate will reject this treaty because it harms America's nuclear 
deterrent and because it does nothing meaningful

[[Page 25123]]

to ensure that the spread of nuclear weapons is halted. Regardless of 
the outcome of the CTBT vote, the world should know that this Senate 
remains committed to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and that 
we will continue to support the strongest possible actions against 
proliferant states.
  Nor should the rest of the world misinterpret another aspect of the 
Senate's rejection of the CTBT. The main message of the Senate's action 
today is that our constitutional democracy, with its cherished checks 
and balances, is alive and well. Through the wisdom of our Founding 
Fathers, the Constitution makes the treaty-making power a shared power. 
The Senate, through its obligation to provide advice and consent to 
treaties, acts as the ``quality control mechanism'' to ensure that the 
President does not bind the Nation to an international commitment that 
is not in its best interests. Before the United States is bound by the 
terms of an international agreement such as the CTBT, the President and 
the Senate must both agree to its terms. In rejecting the CTBT, the 
Senate is sending an explicit message that the United States does not 
have an international legal obligation to adhere to the provisions of 
the treaty. If the President were to determine that the United States 
must conduct tests to ensure the safety or reliability of our nuclear 
arsenal, the United States would be entitled to do so.
  Perhaps most importantly, the Senate's rejection of the CTBT will 
send a clear message that the United States will not sign up to flawed 
treaties that are not in the nation's interest. And the men and women 
who represent the United States in international negotiations will know 
that when they stand up to negotiating partners in order to protect 
America's interests in future treaty negotiations, the Senate will not 
only support them, it will expect them to forcefully advocate a 
position that protects those interests.
  Supporters of the CTBT would have the American people believe that to 
cast a vote against the treaty is merely a political act designed to 
embarrass the President. I do not see how anyone who has actually 
watched the Senate's careful deliberations--both in its committees and 
the floor--in recent weeks can honestly reach such a conclusion. I 
think that what the Senate had done through its thorough hearings and 
floor debate is to demonstrate beyond any reasonable doubt that this 
treaty faces certain defeat because of the substantive arguments 
against it that have been persuasively been presented to this body. The 
inescapable fact about the CTBT is that it is a fatally flawed treaty--
it jeopardizes this Nation's nuclear deterrent, it will not contribute 
to the cause of nonproliferation, and it is unverifiable and 
unenforceable.
  Although these arguments have already been made in depth here on the 
floor, they bear reinforcement as Senators prepare to cast their votes.
  First, the CTBT threatens the Nation's nuclear deterrent--the very 
backbone of America's security for the past 50 years. To have an 
effective nuclear deterrent, we must have absolute confidence in the 
safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons. This requires periodic 
nuclear tests to ensure that we understand, for example, the effects of 
aging on our weapons and the best way to mitigate those effects. Again, 
as with the maintenance of any complex weapon, we must be able to test, 
to detect technical or safety problems that arise in our nuclear 
stockpile.
  The administration's Stockpile Stewardship Program may well help the 
United States to better understand our nuclear arsenal, but it is 
unproven, it may never be an adequate substitute for actual tests, and 
it is already behind schedule.
  A week's worth of expert testimony bears this out. As C. Paul 
Robinson, the current Director of Sandia National Laboratory, testified 
before the Armed Services Committee last week:

       I and others who are, or have been, responsible for the 
     safety and reliability of the U.S. stockpile of nuclear 
     weapons have testified to this obvious conclusion [that 
     testing is the preferred methodology] many times in the past. 
     To forego that validation through testing is, in short, to 
     live with uncertainty.

  Second, the CTBT will not contribute to the cause of 
nonproliferation. Countries will make decisions about whether to pursue 
nuclear weapons based on hard-headed calculations of their security 
interests. This fact has been demonstrated time and again. The 
existence of an ``international norm'' against the pursuit of nuclear 
weapons, created by the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 
has not stopped a number of states, including Iran, Iraq, and North 
Korea from attempting to develop nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the 
United States has not tested in 8 years, yet in that same timeframe, 
five other nations have tested.
  Third, the CTBT is unverifiable, meaning that states who choose to 
violate the CTBT may never be caught, and it is unenforceable, meaning 
that violators who are caught will likely go unpunished. As the October 
3 Washington Post pointed out, a recent assessment by the Central 
Intelligence Agency concluded that the CIA ``cannot monitor low-level 
tests by Russia precisely enough to ensure compliance with the CTBT.''
  And as C. Paul Robinson, the Director of Sandia National Laboratory, 
said in testimony before the Armed Services Committee on October 7:

       . . . [c]ompliance with a strict zero-yield requirement is 
     unverifiable. The limitations of verifiability introduce the 
     possibility of inconsistent observance of the ban under the 
     threshold of detectability.

  Speaking to the issue of lack of enforceability, our colleague 
Richard Lugar recently noted:

       This treaty simply has no teeth . . . . The CTBT's answer 
     to illegal nuclear testing is the possible implementation of 
     sanctions. It is clear that this will not prove particularly 
     compelling in the decisionmaking processes of foreign states 
     intent on building nuclear weapons. For those countries 
     seeking nuclear weapons, the perceived benefits in 
     international stature and deterrence generally far outweigh 
     the concern about sanctions that could be brought to bear by 
     the international community.

  Mr. President, for all the reasons my colleagues and I have cited 
throughout this debate, I believe the only prudent course is for the 
Senate to demonstrate strength and good sense worthy of Ronald Reagan 
by rejecting this flawed CTBT.
   Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
a letter from Dr. Henry Kissinger to the chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                           Henry A. Kissinger,

                                                 October 13, 1999.
     Hon. Jesse Helms,
     Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: As you know, I--together with former 
     National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and former CIA 
     Director and Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch--had 
     recommended in a letter dated October 5th to Senators Lott 
     and Daschle and in an op-ed in the October 6th Washington 
     Post that a vote on ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear 
     Test Ban Treaty be postponed to permit a further discussion 
     and clarification of the issues now too controversial. This 
     having proved unachievable, I am obliged to state my 
     position.
       As a former Secretary of State, I find the prospect that a 
     major treaty might fail to be ratified extremely painful. But 
     the subject of this treaty concerns the future security of 
     the United States and involves risks that make it impossible 
     for me to recommend voting for the treaty as it now stands.
       My concerns are as follows.


                     importance of nuclear weapons

       For the entire postwar period, the American nuclear arsenal 
     has been America's ultimate shield and that of our allies. 
     Though we no longer face the same massive threat that we did 
     during the Cold War, new dangers have arisen. Our nuclear 
     arsenal is our principal deterrent to the possible use of 
     biological and chemical warfare against America, our 
     military, and our allies.


                              verification

       Almost all experts agree that nuclear tests below some 
     yield threshold remain unverifiable and that this threshold 
     can be raised by technical means. It seems to me highly 
     dangerous to leave such a vacuum regarding a matter 
     fundamentally affecting the security of the United States. 
     And the fact that this treaty is of indefinite duration 
     compounds the problem. The CIA's concerns about recent 
     ambiguous activities by Russia, as reported in the media, 
     illustrate difficulties that will only be compounded by the 
     passage of time.

[[Page 25124]]

       Supporters of the treaty argue that, because of their small 
     yield, these tests cannot be significant and that the treaty 
     would therefore ``lock in'' our advantages vis-a-vis other 
     nuclear powers and aspirants. I do not know how they can be 
     so sure of this in an age of rapidly exploding technology and 
     whether, on the contrary, this may not work to the advantage 
     of nations seeking to close this gap. After all, victory in 
     the Cold War was achieved in part because we kept increasing, 
     and not freezing, our technological edge.


                           nuclear stockpile

       I am not a technical expert on such issues as proof 
     testing, aging of nuclear material, and reworking existing 
     warheads. But I find it impossible to ignore the concern 
     about the treaty expressed by six former Secretaries of 
     Defense and several former CIA Directors and National 
     Security Advisers. I am aware that experts from the weapons 
     laboratories have argued that there are ingenious ways to 
     mitigate these concerns. On the other hand, there is a 
     difference between the opinion of experts from laboratories 
     and policymakers' confidence in the reliability of these 
     weapons as our existing stockpile ages. When national 
     security is involved, one should not proceed in the face of 
     such doubts.


                               sanctions

       Another fundamental problem is the weakness of the 
     enforcement mechanism. In theory, we have a right to abrogate 
     the treaty when the ``supreme national survival'' is 
     involved. But this option is more theoretical than practical. 
     In a bilateral treaty, the reluctance to resort to abrogation 
     is powerful enough; in a multilateral treaty of indefinite 
     duration, this reluctance would be even more acute. It is not 
     clear how we would respond to a set of violations by an 
     individual country or, indeed, what response would be 
     meaningful or whether, say, an Iranian test could be said to 
     threaten the supreme national survival.


                           non-proliferation

       I am not persuaded that the proposed treaty would inhibit 
     nuclear proliferation. Restraint by the major powers has 
     never been a significant factor in the decisions of other 
     nuclear aspirants, which are driven by local rivalries and 
     security needs. Nor is the behavior of rogue states such as 
     Iraq, Iran, or North Korea likely to be affected by this 
     treaty. They either will not sign or, if they sign, will 
     cheat. And countries relying on our nuclear umbrella might be 
     induced by declining confidence in our arsenal--and the 
     general impression of denuclearization--to accelerate their 
     own efforts.
       For all these reasons, I cannot recommend a vote for a 
     comprehensive test ban of unlimited duration.
       I hope this is helpful.
           Sincerely,
                                               Henry A. Kissinger.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I will read excerpts from the letter. It is 
instructive that Henry Kissinger has written the following:

       As a former Secretary of State, I find the prospect that 
     major treaty might fail to be ratified extremely painful. But 
     the subject of this treaty concerns the future security of 
     the United States and involves risks that make it impossible 
     for me to recommend voting for the treaty as it now stands.

  He then went on to talk about the experts who believe the treaty to 
be unverifiable, and then the concerns expressed by the CIA about 
recent ambiguous activities with respect to Russia; the impossibility, 
on his part, to ignore the concerns expressed by people such as the 
former Secretaries of Defense, CIA Directors, and National Security 
Advisers; and the weakness of the enforcement mechanism of the treaty.
  He concludes in the following fashion:

       I am not persuaded that the proposed treaty would inhibit 
     nuclear proliferation. Restraint by the major powers has 
     never been a significant factor in the decisions of other 
     nuclear aspirants, which are driven by local rivalries and 
     security needs. Nor is the behavior of the rogue states such 
     as Iraq, Iran, or North Korea likely to be affected by this 
     treaty. They either will not sign or, if they sign, will 
     cheat. And countries relying on our nuclear umbrella might be 
     induced by declining confidence in our arsenal--and the 
     general impression of denuclearization--to accelerate their 
     own efforts.
       For all these reasons, I cannot recommend a vote for a 
     comprehensive test ban of unlimited duration.

  Mr. COVERDELL. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. KYL. Yes.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I think this is a most important 
letter, but the date makes it unique.
  Mr. KYL. The date of the letter is today, October 13, 1999, on the 
eve of our vote.
  Mr. President, let me conclude by thanking all of the people who have 
testified on both sides of this, especially Dr. James Schlesinger, Jim 
Woolsey, and people who came early to the Senate and helped inform 
those of us who were eager to learn what we needed to know about this. 
I am especially grateful, as I said, to Dr. Schlesinger for his 
willingness to do that, as well as to testify before the committee.
  I also thank Senator John Warner and Senator Jesse Helms, both of 
whom have spent a great deal of time conducting extremely informative 
hearings. I also thank Senator Joe Biden from Delaware, who has 
conducted himself very well on his side of the debate.
  I reserve any additional time.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Iowa.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
  I strongly believe that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty--or CTBT--
is in our nation's national security interests. But before I discuss my 
reasons for supporting the Treaty, let me first say why the Senate--
even those who are unsure of the Treaty--should support the Resolution. 
The past week of debate over the issue has only underscored the 
arguments for its ratification.
  I have spoken before about the history of the CTBT. Let me reiterate 
some of its history and why it is important to Iowans.
  On October 11, 1963, the Limited Test Ban Treaty entered into force 
after being ratified by the Senate in an overwhelming, bipartisan vote 
of 80-14 just a few weeks earlier. This treaty paved the way for future 
nuclear weapons testing agreements by prohibiting tests in the 
atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. This treaty was signed by 
108 countries.
  Our nation's agreement to the Limited Test Ban Treaty marked the end 
of our nation's above ground testing of nuclear weapons, including 
those at the U.S. test site in Nevada. We now know, all too well, the 
terrible impact of exploding weapons over the Nevada desert. Among 
other consequences, these tests in the 1950's exposed millions of 
Americans to large amounts of radioactive Iodine-131, which accumulates 
in the thyroid gland and has been linked to thyroid cancer. ``Hot 
Spots,'' where the Iodine-131 fallout was the greatest, were identified 
by a National Cancer Institute report as receiving 5-16 rads of Iodine-
131. The ``Hot Spots'' included many areas far away from Nevada, 
including New York, Massachusetts and Iowa. Outside reviewers have 
shown that the 5-16 rad level is only an average, with many people 
having received much higher exposure levels, especially those who were 
children at the time.
  To put that in perspective, federal standards for nuclear power 
plants require that protective action be taken for 15 rads. To further 
understand the enormity of the potential exposure, consider this: 150 
million curies of Iodine-131 were released by the above ground nuclear 
weapons testing in the United States, about three times more than from 
the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster in the former Soviet Union.
  It is all too clear that outlawing above-ground tests were in the 
interest of our nation. I strongly believe that banning all nuclear 
tests is also in our interests. This is a view shared by many leading 
Iowans. I request unanimous consent that a recent editorial from the 
Des Moines Register be placed in the Record.
  October also marked some key steps for the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty or CTBT. On October 2, 1992, President Bush signed into law the 
U.S. moratorium on all nuclear tests. The moratorium was 
internationalized when, just a few years later, on September 24, 1996, 
a second step was taken--the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or CTBT, 
was opened for signature. The United States was the first to sign this 
landmark treaty.
  Mr. President, President Clinton took a third important step in 
abolishing nuclear weapons tests by transmitting the CTBT to the United 
States Senate for ratification. Unfortunately, the Senate has yet to 
take the additional step of ratifying the CTBT. I am

[[Page 25125]]

hopeful that we in the Senate will ratify the Treaty, and continue the 
momentum toward the important goal of a world wide ban on nuclear 
weapons testing.
  Many believed we had conquered the dangerous specter of nuclear war 
after the Cold War came to an end and many former Soviet states became 
our allies. Unfortunately, recent developments in South Asia remind us 
that we need to be vigilant in our cooperative international efforts to 
reduce the dangers of nuclear weapons. This weeks coup in Pakistan only 
makes clearer the need for a nuclear test ban treaty.
  The CTBT is a major milestone in the effort to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. It would establish a permanent ban on 
all nuclear explosions in all environments for any purpose. Its ``zero-
yield'' prohibition on nuclear tests would help to halt the development 
and deployment of new nuclear weapons. The Treaty would also establish 
a far-reaching verification regime that includes a global network of 
sophisticated seismic, hydro-acoustic and radionuclide monitoring 
stations, as well as on-site inspection of test sites to deter and 
detect violations.
  It is vital to our national security for the nuclear arms race to 
come to an end, and the American people recognize this. In a recent 
poll, more than 80 percent of voters supported the Treaty.
  It is heartening to know that the American people understand the 
risks of a world with nuclear weapons. It is now time for policymakers 
to recognize this as well. There is no better way to honor the hard 
work and dedication of those who developed the LTBT and the CTBT than 
for the U.S. Senate to immediately ratify the CTBT.
  It's ratification is clearly in America's and the worlds security 
interests. It would make the world a safer place for our children and 
grandchildren. Its defeat could well trigger a major new arms race in 
Asia--a prospect that should send chills down the backs of us all.
  The choice is clear.
  Mr. President, I have read through the treaty as best I could and 
looked at some of the annexes and protocols thereto. In there, there is 
a list of about 317 monitoring stations that would be put in place if 
we ratify this treaty. Right now, I understand there are about 100. So 
we will have three times more monitoring stations than we have right 
now. So to those who say we might not be able to absolutely detect 
every explosion over a certain amount, or under a certain amount, quite 
frankly, we will have a lot more monitoring stations by ratifying this 
treaty than we have right now.
  Secondly, if the explosions are so small as to be undetectable, there 
are provisions in the treaty that allow for a state to have an onsite 
inspection. So there is a whole process it goes through so we can have 
an onsite inspection to determine whether or not it was a nuclear 
explosion.
  Lastly, the treaty does contain a supreme interest clause in 
accordance with which a state party may withdraw from the treaty upon 6 
month's notice, et cetera, if it determines that extraordinary events 
related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its 
supreme interest. So, at any time, if the United States, or any other 
sovereign nation, decides it is in their supreme interest to withdraw 
from the treaty, they can do so by giving 6 month's notice.
  Lastly, if anybody ever had any doubt about why we ought to be 
ratifying this treaty, the headline in this morning's paper ought to 
say it all: Army Stages Coup In Pakistan. Troops Arrested Prime 
Minister.
  In part, it says:

       India expressed deep concern with the government's ouster 
     and put its army on high alert.

  If nothing else, this ought to tell us to ratify this treaty, or else 
we are going to have more nuclear explosions in South Asia. It is a 
powder keg waiting to happen. We ought to ratify the treaty.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from New 
Mexico, Mr. Domenici.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, as I said earlier this week, I oppose 
this treaty for two major reasons: (1) the treaty cannot be considered 
apart from other major arms control agreements into which the United 
States has entered; and (2) Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship has not 
yet been given enough time to prove whether or not it will give us the 
assurance we need in the reliability and safety of our nuclear weapons 
without physical testing.
  However, the vote by the Senate today to reject this treaty was ill-
timed and this poor timing could have adverse consequences in the 
world. No need exists now for a vote; after all, the United States is 
not now testing and has no plans in the immediate future to do so. This 
has been recognized by proponents and opponents of this treaty who have 
asked for delay in the vote.
  I have attempted, with many others, during the last 2 weeks to help 
forge some path out of the parliamentary impasse in which the Senate is 
currently involved. Nonetheless, that has not been successful. We have 
not found any such path. I think that is unfortunate. Nonetheless, I 
might say treaties don't really die, even when they are defeated; they 
are returned to the Executive Calendar of the Senate. Therefore, we 
will have another chance to debate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 
the next Congress, or years thereafter. It may very well be that, by 
then, my concerns about the overall strategic arms strategies and their 
relationship to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty can be alleviated. 
And if the potential for stockpile stewardship during that decade can 
be realized, perhaps I will be able to vote for the treaty in the 
future.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to my friend from 
Minnesota.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, my father, over a half century ago, 
wrote an article the day after Hiroshima, and he focused on the problem 
of a proliferation of atomic bombs and nuclear weaponry. He was worried 
about his children, and he was worried about his grandchildren to come.
  Today I come to the floor of the Senate, and I say I really was 
hoping this Senator would be a part of a vote that would ratify the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I think it would be an enormous step 
forward for our children and our grandchildren in our effort to put a 
stop to the proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction.
  I will say very honestly and truthfully to my colleagues that I don't 
understand why we didn't put this vote off. I don't understand why 
Senators, on a procedural vote, voted to essentially go forward with 
this vote today. I think the defeat of this agreement is an enormous 
step backward for humankind. I think it is a profound mistake.
  I think now I have to say to the people in Minnesota and to the 
people in our country I am saddened that this treaty is going to be 
defeated. I don't think we should have this vote. But to the American 
people and Minnesotans, hold each and every Senator accountable.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
Senator from Virginia, the Old Dominion State, Mr. Warner.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hagel). The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman. I 
thank the distinguished ranking member.
  This has been, under the limitations, an excellent debate for the 
Senate. This is my 21st year in the Senate, and I can think of few 
debates in that time that have been as informed as this one. I strongly 
disagree with a very dear friend, Brent Scowcroft, who described this 
debate otherwise. While not a Member of the Senate, he is one whom I 
respect. His remarks were reported widely in the newspapers this 
morning.
  This has been a good debate. Senators on both sides have stood up and 
displayed courage. Our two leaders, Senator Lott and Senator Daschle, 
have displayed the courage of their convictions. In the many 
consultations over the past week that I have had

[[Page 25126]]

with the distinguished chairman and ranking member, and our leadership, 
I have always left with the belief that they placed the security 
interests of this country foremost, as each day decisions had to be 
made regarding this treaty.
  I also say to my dear friend, Senator Moynihan, I thank him for the 
leadership he has shown. We embarked together on a bipartisan effort, 
and we were joined by a very significant number of our colleagues--
whose names will be a part of the Record at a later time--in an effort 
simply to recognize that in the course of the hearings and in the 
course of conversations and consultations with so many people not only 
here in the United States but across the seas, that there were clearly 
honest differences of opinion from individuals who have spent much of 
their lifetime on this subject--honest differences of opinion.
  But lacking is that burden of proof, some would say beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that this treaty would not put at risk the security 
of this country by virtue of the terms of the treaty as presently 
written.
  This treaty requires that we put at risk in perpetuity--not just 
today, not just tomorrow, but in perpetuity--a stockpile which today is 
safe and credible, which tomorrow will be safe and credible--for the 
foreseeable next few years to come. Let there be no doubt in anyone's 
mind of that fact. But can we say that that will be the case forever?
  As our military examined this treaty, it is clear that they said we 
support the treaty, but only if the safeguard is in place which says we 
can get out of the treaty if the President makes that determination, 
and only if the Stockpile Stewardship Program--the computer simulations 
which are to replace actual testing--can be put in place and proven to 
ensure that our nuclear stockpile remains credible and safe.
  The record before the Senate today does not justify that support. It 
does not say that each of the components of the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program will be in place and will work in a way that will put our 
stockpile, in the future, in the same category that it is in today. We 
do not know. There is a reasonable doubt. We simply do not know. For 
that reason, regrettably, I shall have to vote--that vote occurs 
shortly--against this treaty.
  But I say that honest individuals have done their very best in this 
Senate, and I thank all those beyond the Senate who have made very 
valuable contributions to this debate.
  I shall put in the Record, by unanimous consent, further 
documentation on the laboratory directors. Of all the testimony that 
came before the Armed Services Committee, the testimony of the lab 
directors was the most compelling. And indeed, that of the intelligence 
community, which, in a sense, asked for more time to do the work they 
thought necessary in assessing our ability to monitor this treaty. And 
many former Secretaries of Defense had an honest difference of opinion.
  As Senator Kyl, who has worked so hard on this treaty and probably 
knows it better than anyone else, has said clearly--Secretary 
Kissinger, one of several Secretaries of State who have expressed their 
opinions--has now indicated his opposition. These are men and women who 
have spent their lifetime on this subject. Reasonable doubt is to be 
found there.
  Lastly, the laboratory Directors: I would like to respond to some of 
my colleagues and the media's mis-portrayal of the testimony given at 
last Thursday's hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee by 
the Directors of the three National Labs--Dr. Paul Robinson of Sandia 
National Laboratory, Dr. C. Bruce Tarter of the Lawrence Livermore 
Laboratory, and Dr. John C. Browne of Los Alamos National Laboratory. 
It is important to have a full picture of what was said at our hearing 
last week Many of these statements used by my colleagues and the media 
were taken out of context. For instance, the line of questioning that 
the Ranking Member engaged in with the Lab Directors on whether they 
were ``on board'' with the treaty, I believe has been mis-
characterized. I'd like to read from the transcript the exchange that 
occurred between the Ranking Member and the Lab Directors.

       Senator Levin. What you are telling us is that if this 
     safeguard and the other safeguards are part of this process 
     that you can rely on, that in your words, Dr. Robinson, you 
     are on board in terms of this treaty; is that correct?
       Dr. Robinson. I am on board that science-based stockpile 
     stewardship has a much higher chance of success and I will 
     accept it as the substitute.
       Senator Levin. For what?
       Dr. Robinson. I still had other reservations about the 
     treaty----

  At this point, Dr. Robinson was cut off and was unable to finish his 
answer. In response to this line of questioning, a Senator from the 
minority side, said that he ``detected an uneasiness on the part of 
some of those who testified'' and expressed concern that Dr. Robinson's 
response that he had other concerns with the treaty was ``blurred''.
  Senator Levin then asked Dr. Tarter, Director of Lawrence Livermore 
Labs, to respond to the same question, Dr. Tarter responded:

       A simple statement again: It is an excellent bet, but it is 
     not a sure thing.
       Senator Levin. My question is, are you on board, given 
     these safeguards?
       Dr. Tarter. I can only testify to the ability of stockpile 
     stewardship to do the job. It is your job about the treaty.
       Senator Levin. Are you able to say that, providing you can 
     rely on safeguard F and at some point decide that you cannot 
     certify it, that you are willing under that condition to rely 
     on this stewardship program as a substitute for actual 
     testing?
       Dr. Tarter. Yes.

  Dr. Tarter never said that he was ``on board with the treaty.'' In 
fact, he attempted to avoid directly answering Senator Levin's 
question. Clearly, Dr. Tarter was uncomfortable with this line of 
questioning. It was only after Senator Levin significantly modified the 
question by adding certain qualifications that Dr. Tarter finally 
responded affirmatively.
  Senator Levin asked Dr. Browne whether he was on board with the 
treaty and Dr. Browne responded:

       Senator Levin, if the government provides us with the 
     sustained resources, the answer is yes, and if safeguard F is 
     there, yes.

  Dr. Browne said that he was ``on board with the treaty'' but only if 
certain conditions were met.
  In examining the complete record and considering the manner in which 
the responses were elicited, it is clear that the labs directors had 
reservations about the treaty. They were clearly uneasy with the 
question and the manner in which they were questioned. They were 
certainly not enthusiastic in indicating any support for the treaty--
even with the qualifications (i.e., safeguards) that were added.
  In addition to the previous line of questioning the transcript 
includes numerous statements by the Lab Directors which I believe, 
taken together, indicate that these experts have serious issues with 
this treaty as well as the Stockpile Stewardship program. I note that 
the endorsement in January 1998 of the CTBT by Generals Colin Powell, 
John Shalikashvili, David Jones, and Admiral William Crowe, former 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was conditioned, like that of 
the Lab Directors, on the six safeguards submitted by the President 
along with the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent which 
included a Stockpile Stewardship program to ensure a high level of 
confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the 
stockpile.
  Here are some of the statements by the Lab Directors on the Stockpile 
Stewardship program:
  Dr. Browne, Director of Los Alamos stated:

       Each year, through a comprehensive program of surveillance 
     of the stockpile, we find one or more problems in each 
     weapons system that may require attention. . . . we have 
     identified several issues that, if they had occurred when 
     testing was active, most likely would have been resolved by 
     nuclear testing.'' He went on to state: ``The issue that we 
     face is whether we will have the people, the capabilities, 
     and the national commitment to maintain . . . confidence in 
     the stockpile in the future, when we expect to see more 
     significant changes. Although we are adding new tools each 
     year, the essential tool kit for stockpile stewardship will 
     not be complete until some time in the next decade.

  Dr. Tarter, Director of the Lawrence Livermore stated:


[[Page 25127]]

       I think we have a challenging program [stockpile 
     stewardship], one that is very difficult to achieve. I think, 
     although both the administration and the Congress have had 
     increasing levels of support for the stewardship program over 
     these past years, they have not quite met what we said was 
     necessary to achieve the program on the time scale that we 
     believed was necessary in view of the aging of the designers 
     and of the weapons. I think we all feel under a great deal of 
     stress to try to make those deadlines with the current 
     resources. . . . So I think to date I would give the program 
     a--I think we have done a good job. I think we have learned 
     things. It is not a perfect job, but I think it has been a 
     very, very good start. I think the challenge lies in the 
     longer term, and I think . . . if I had one simple phrase I 
     think that the stewardship program with sustained support is 
     an excellent bet, but it ain't a sure thing.

  Dr. Robinson, Director of Sandia, stated:

       I question the expectations many claim for this treaty. . . 
     . I think we have got to specify with a lot more character 
     what is the real purpose of the treaty. I secondly discuss 
     [in his written statement] a lot of the important technical 
     considerations as we have tried to substitute other 
     approaches, which has come to be known as the science-based 
     Stockpile Stewardship Program, for the value that tests had 
     always provided us in previous decades. I can state with no 
     caveats that to confirm the performance of high tech 
     devices--cars, airplanes, medical diagnostics, computers, or 
     nuclear weapons--testing is the preferred methodology. . . . 
     My statement describes the work involved in attempting to 
     substitute science-based stockpile stewardship. It is an 
     enormous challenge, but I agree, much very good work has been 
     done. Much has been accomplished. But we still cannot 
     guarantee that we will ultimately be successful. Science-
     based stockpile stewardship is the best way we know of to 
     mitigate the risk to the extent that is possible.
       . . . But the question and where we (those who support or 
     oppose testing and the treaty) differ the greatest is what is 
     the best way to achieve that peace with stability. At least 
     two very dichotomous approaches. Is the world better off with 
     nuclear weapons in the hands of those who value peace the 
     highest, who will maintain their nuclear arsenals in order to 
     deter aggression and to prevent major wars, or would the 
     world be better off it there were no more nuclear weapons, 
     and is there really a sound plan for how you might ever 
     achieve that?

  In addition, an exchange between Senator Reed and Dr. Robinson on the 
Stockpile stewardship Program occurred as follows:

       Senator Reed. Let me just ask another question, which, as I 
     understand it, part of the effort on the Stockpile 
     Stewardship Programs is massive computational projects. 
     Which, if carried out, will allow you to go back and analyze 
     data that we have accumulated for years and years and years, 
     which has never been fully analyzed. Does that offer any 
     additional sort of opportunities to increase your sense of 
     reliability that, without testing, we can go ahead and more 
     accurately protect the stockpile?
       Dr. Robinson. You are quite correct. The legacy data that 
     we have, the correct statement is not that it has not been 
     analyzed, it has not been successfully predicted by the 
     models. We have gaps in our understanding. As we improve the 
     codes, as we add the third dimension--we are presently going 
     from two dimensional calculations to three-dimensional 
     calculations--a key test of the success of these simulation 
     codes will be how well does it predict those things we could 
     not understand in the past. So that is a very key part of the 
     science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program.

  There were also statements on the value of testing. One of the most 
powerful statements was given by Dr. Robinson from Sandia. He said:

       . . . there are black issues, white issues, but mostly a 
     lot of gray. But, I can say from my own experience over the 
     years, I have seen that same kind of scientific debate. But 
     when you then carried out a test and looked at the 
     predictions of various people in the debate, the answer 
     became very clear. The test has a way of crystallizing 
     answers into one or the other and ending that grayness. And 
     that is something that will be missing in a future state.
       . . . the President presented to you with the treaty and 
     which he and certainly we believe are conditions for 
     ratification. The most important of those by far is Safeguard 
     F. We kept stressing to the White House, we cannot be sure 
     that science-based stockpile stewardship will mature in time 
     to handle a serious safety or reliability problem as these 
     weapons age. Without it, without the ability at that point to 
     test, we would be powerless to maintain the U.S. first line 
     of defense, its strategic deterrent force.

  After hearing their testimony first hand, I do not know how anyone 
could state that the Lab Directors vigorously supported this treaty. 
When you examine the entire record it is clear that the Lab Directors--
the experts on the safety and reliability of America's nuclear 
stockpile--have reservations about the treaty and the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program. Their support for this treaty is tempered by 
specific qualifications and stipulations. I urge each and every one of 
you to review the full testimony of these most important witnesses.
  Lastly, the laboratory Directors:
  The lab Directors have said, based on their careers of 15 or 20 
years, they cannot guarantee that the present Stockpile Stewardship 
Program will match or even approach in, say, 5, 10, or 15 years the 
sound data that we have gotten through 50 years of testing--actual 
testing. We are not about to resume actual testing. We don't have to at 
this point in time, but we might in the future.
  But every Senator should think about the fact that they are casting a 
vote that commits the United States in perpetuity. The road to arms 
control, whatever the goal is at the end--peace in the world--building 
blocks and steps have been laid both by Republicans and Democrats. 
Every President, and others, has worked on these agreements. Neither 
side should take the majority of the credit; it has been shared 
equally. And a hope and a prayer of this Senator is that we continue as 
a nation to lead in taking positive, constructive steps in arms 
control.
  So it is with regret that I believe this treaty has that degree of 
reasonable doubt, imposing restriction in perpetuity on one of our most 
valued strategic assets, and I cannot support it.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from New York 1 
minute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I rise to thank, above all Members in 
this body, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator 
Warner, who is opposed to this treaty, as I am in support.
  Together we have addressed a letter to our distinguished leaders, 
Senator Lott and Senator Daschle, asking that the matter be put off 
until the next Congress, as the President has requested be done.
  Sir, this morning I don't think we had a handful of signatures on 
that letter. At this moment, we have more than half the Members of this 
body--as the day has gone by, the realization of what an enormous 
decision we are making with so very little consideration has sunk in.
  Sir, we spent in my time in this body 38 days debating the Panama 
Canal Treaty. The Treaty of Versailles--equally important--was debated 
31 days in 1919 and 24 days in 1920.
  Note that it was passed over, because a treaty does not die once it 
has simply been voted down; it remains on the calendar.
  But I would like to express the hope that before the debate is over, 
the distinguished Senator from Virginia might place in the Record the 
letter which we addressed to the leaders and perhaps, if he wishes, the 
signatures we have so far received. He indicates he would be willing to 
do that. I thank him and I thank my leader, Senator Biden.
  Mr. BIDEN. After consultation with the chairman of the committee, 
they are going to reserve the remainder of their time so we will not go 
back and forth with proponents and opponents until they indicate they 
want to.
  I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. I thank my colleague from Delaware for yielding. I 
support the treaty because I think the balance of risks are in favor of 
ratifying this treaty. It is not without risk, but it is not in 
perpetuity. The United States may withdraw at any time that it chooses. 
If we reject this treaty, it is an open invitation to other nations to 
test. I think that is a greater risk than the risks involved in 
ratifying the treaty. The events of the last 24 hours in Pakistan show 
the undesirability of having the Pakistanis test in their race with the 
nation of India, not to speak of the other nations, Iran, Iraq, North 
Korea.
  I suggest the President of the United States call the majority leader 
of the Senate and try to work this out. More

[[Page 25128]]

than that, of the Senators here, many who are opposed to the treaty 
think we should not vote it down. It is not over until it is over. I 
believe it is possible for the President to say to the majority leader 
what would satisfy the majority leader to take this treaty out of the 
next Congress. And I believe the majority leader could convene the 
Republican caucus--and we can do that yet this afternoon or into the 
evening on this momentous matter. I think it is still possible to avoid 
this vote to give extra time for security measures, to give extra time 
for testing, but not to cast a vote which will be a vote heard around 
the world to the detriment of the United States.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I support the Comprehensive Test-Ban 
Treaty, CTBT, a treaty which I believe is in our national security 
interests.
  Although it appears regrettably that the required votes of two-thirds 
of the Senate do not exist at this point, I nonetheless hope that as 
many of my colleagues as possible will vote to ratify this treaty since 
we cannot procedurally seem to be able to set the treaty aside.
  Since 1992, the United States has abided by a unilateral moratorium 
on nuclear weapons testing. Despite the absence of testing during these 
past 7 years, our nuclear weapons stockpile has been maintained, our 
nuclear deterrent has remained formidable, and our national security 
has not been threatened. Because our nuclear arsenal remains safe and 
reliable today, the United States has no plans to test these weapons 
any time soon.
  Also during these past 7 years of our moratorium on nuclear testing, 
the United States negotiated and signed the CTBT. We signed this treaty 
recognizing that discouraging other nuclear powers and would-be nuclear 
powers from testing these weapons would lessen the unthinkable 
possibility that the nuclear option would ever be employed. In fact, 
halting advancement in nuclear weapons development and limiting the 
number of nuclear-capable military states, locks in a status quo in 
which the United States has an enormous military advantage. This treaty 
makes the United States militarily stronger, not weaker.
  One of the wisest aspects of the CTBT is its requirement that all of 
the world's 44 nuclear capable nations ratify the treaty for it to 
enter into force. This means that North Korea, Iran, and others that 
pose the greatest potential threat to the United States and our allies 
must join us in being a party to this treaty before the United States 
relinquishes the option of nuclear testing.
  Another strong aspect of the CTBT is that it is accompanied by 6 
critical safeguards that the Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted upon before 
agreeing to support it. I would note that the sixth and most 
significant to these safeguards is included in the resolution which is 
before us today. It requires the United States to withdraw from the 
CTBT under the supreme national interests clause if the Secretaries of 
Energy and Defense cannot certify the reliability of our nuclear 
arsenal. This safeguard gives Americans the assurance that they will 
continue to be protected by a robust and credible and nuclear deterrent 
under the CTBT.
  I believe this treaty is very much in the interests of the United 
States. It will help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons worldwide, 
while ensuring a huge U.S. advantage in nuclear weaponry that has 
deterred would-be aggressors for many years. I urge my colleagues to 
support ratification of this treaty.
  Mr. KYL. Might I inquire of the distinguished chairman of the 
committee if I could make a brief statement.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from 
Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, deterrence has long been a primary component 
of U.S. security policy. In the cold war, nuclear weapons were the 
backbone of our national deterrent. The threat of unacceptable damage 
in response to aggression was central to inhibiting the Soviet Union's 
expansionist aims. Moreover, the credibility of the U.S. nuclear 
guarantee provided for ``extended deterrence'' against attacks on our 
friends and allies.
  While the conditions today are much different from the past, our 
nuclear weapons continue to serve as an essential hedge against a very 
uncertain future with both Russia and China, two states that highly 
value their own nuclear forces. Equally important, deterrence--backed 
by credible nuclear forces--remains the first line of defense against 
an even broader range of threats than in the past, including rogue 
states armed with weapons of mass destruction.
  The nuclear balance of terror that once defined our relationship with 
the Soviet Union is no longer central in our relations with Russia. 
Yet, even as we work to achieve a more democratic and open Russia, 
nuclear weapons appear to play a growing role in Moscow's security 
strategy, including declaratory policy and defense planning. Whether to 
overcome conventional weakness or as a means to retain one of its last 
vestiges of superpower status, Russia is continuing to modernize its 
nuclear forces. The retention of thousands of theater nuclear weapons, 
the deployment of the new mobile SS-27 ICBM, and the continuing 
investment in its massive nuclear weapons infrastructure demonstrate 
how important these weapons are to Moscow and lend credence to the 
concerns that Russia may have recently tested new nuclear weapons to 
provide the foundation for its future security strategy.
  There are many fundamental questions about Russia's political and 
economic future that today can not be answered with certainty. What is 
clear, however, is that Russia will continue to possess formidable, 
modern nuclear forces no matter how these questions are answered over 
time. For this reason, it remains imperative for us to retain a 
credible nuclear deterrent capability to guard against the reversal of 
our relations with a potentially hostile and nuclear-armed Russia.
  The strategic uncertainties associated with China are even greater 
than those with Russia. There are clear indications of qualitative 
improvements and quantitative increases to the Chinese nuclear arsenal. 
The Cox committee found that China is actively pursuing miniaturized 
nuclear warheads and MIRV technology, developing more accurate and 
ballistic missiles, and building a larger arsenal. Recent Chinese tests 
of a new medium-range ballistic missile, the DF-31 and public 
declarations of its development of enhanced radiological weapons serve 
to reinforce these findings. Similarly, a recent National Intelligence 
Estimate forecasts increases in the Chinese strategic arsenal and 
investment in technologies, such as penetration aids, designed to 
defeat any United States missile defense.
  Perhaps most disturbing, the strategic intentions of both Russia and 
China appear increasingly antagonistic toward the United States. This 
past August they jointly announced a strategic partnership as a 
counterweight to what they termed U.S. ``hegemonic ambitions.'' As he 
met with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, President Yeltsin declared 
himself ``in fighting form, ready for battle, especially with 
Westerners,'' and complained that ``some nations are trying to build a 
world order that would be convenient only for them, ignoring that the 
world is multi-polar.'' Given the uncertainties surrounding the future 
political and military developments in these two states, experience and 
prudence suggest the need for a hedge that only credible nuclear forces 
can provide.
  While deterrence of rogue states armed with weapons of mass 
destruction is very different than deterrence as we understood it in 
the cold war, an overwhelming retaliatory capability--and the fear of a 
possible nuclear repsonse--remains critical to countering this new set 
of ever more dangerous threats. Despite sustained and determined 
efforts to de-legitimize our nuclear weapons, and assertions that their 
utility ended with the cold war, our nuclear weapons are essential in 
this context. Conventional superiority alone is not sufficient. Looking 
at the

[[Page 25129]]

only real world experience we have in deterring the use of chemical and 
biological by rogue leaders--the Desert Storm case--it appears that the 
threat of a nuclear response was a major factor in the Iraqi decision 
to forego the use of their weapons of mass destruction.
  An in-depth study of United States security policy in the 21st 
century, conducted last year by the National Defense University and 
Livermore National Laboratory, concluded that nuclear weapons would 
remain critical both to hedge against Russia and China, as well as to 
deter rogue states that will seek to challenge us in regions of vital 
interest. This same study concluded that: ``Retaining the safety, 
reliability, security, and performance of the nuclear weapons stockpile 
in the absence of underground nuclear testing is the highest-risk 
component of the U.S. strategy for sustaining deterrence.'' For over 40 
years, testing was seen as essential to the credibility of our 
deterrent forces and our commitments to friends and allies. The CTBT, 
if ratified by the United States, would call into question the 
effectiveness and reliability of this essential component of our 
national security strategy.
  In the annual statement of U.S. National Strategy, President Clinton 
has affirmed the view of his predecessors for more than half a 
century--nuclear weapons are vital to the security interests of the 
United States. It is not surprising then that one of the safeguards 
offered by the White House to diminish the risk inherent in accepting a 
permanent ban on nuclear weapons testing through the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty CTBT is to attempt to sustain the existing inventory of 
nuclear weapons through what is known as the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program, SSP. The aim of the SSP is to utilize the data from more than 
1,000 U.S. atmospheric and underground nuclear tests legacy code 
combined with advanced diagnostic and experimental facilities now under 
development in the SSP to assess the aging properties of nuclear 
weapons. It is hoped that the SSP will enable U.S. nuclear weapon 
scientists and engineers to model and simulate nuclear phenomena with 
sufficient fidelity and reliability to permit judgements to be made 
about whether or not a particular weapon or class of weapons will 
continue to be safe and reliable. In short, whether or not U.S. nuclear 
weapons will remain a credible deterrent.
  The administration's approach is an extraordinarily risky one--far 
more so than can be discerned from administration statements on the 
subject. This is so because the way risks are multiplied in the 
program. First, the CTBT prevents the United States from using the 
technique for assuring the reliability of stockpile--the detonation of 
the nuclear weapon to be confident that the aging of the nuclear 
components have not diminished confidence in its safety and 
reliability. Second, the CTBT prevents the United States from testing 
new weapon designs--the approach we have taken over the past half 
century to make sure our nuclear weapon stockpile kept pace with what 
was required to deter. Third, the CTBT offers as an alternative to 
testing, the SSP. Let's examine each of these elements of risk in turn.
  First, the design of nuclear weapons is a highly empirical process. 
Vast computer networks and theoretical physicists notwithstanding, 
testing has been an indispensable dimension of nuclear weapon 
development, production, and deployment. This is so because the 
environment within a nuclear weapon is unlike anything in nature. 
Materials exposed to decades of nuclear radiation behave in ways 
scientists do not know how to predict. Gold, for example, corrodes in a 
nuclear environment--a property not evident in nature. We do know know 
what will happen over time to the nuclear components of a weapon and 
how the aging process will affect the weapon. This has been addressed 
in the past by detonating weapons after a fix has been installed in a 
weapon that appears to be adversely affected by age. Because there is 
no theoretical basis that has been validated through testing to certify 
weapon safety and reliability, testing has been indispensable. The 
United States ceased its nuclear weapon testing program in 1992, but 
had never undertaken an effort to ascertain whether or not it could 
model and simulate the aging properties of nuclear weapons with 
sufficient reliability to permit the certification of the weapons in 
the stockpile.
  Nuclear weapons now in the stockpile--eight types plus one additional 
type in reserve--means that we have concentrated our deterrent in 
relatively few weapon designs. In the mid-1980s, we had 32 types of 
nuclear weapons in the stockpile. The average age of the weapons in the 
stockpile is 15 years--more than has ever been the case in the past, 
and well beyond U.S. experience. We simply do not know what the long-
term implications of aging are on nuclear weapons. We do know that 
there are consequences from the aging process, because problems 
resulting from aging have been identified in the past. However, as we 
were able to conduct underground tests, the aging process did not 
degrade the safety and reliability of the stockpile. If the CTBT is 
ratified, we may not have an opportunity to do this in the future 
because the process for utilizing the supreme national interest 
provisions of the treaty to withdraw are themselves an impediment to 
sustaining deterrence.
  Second, the CTBT will prevent the United States from testing new 
nuclear weapon designs should the need to sustain deterrence call for 
new designs. Many new designs were required during the cold war to 
sustain deterrence. Identifying some circumstances that could give rise 
to a requirement for new weapon designs is not difficult. The weapons 
retained in the U.S. inventory after the cold war are primarily 
designed to strike urban-industrial targets (reflecting the policy of 
mutual assured destruction) and hardened targets on or near the earth's 
surface. The change in the technology of underground construction has 
fundamentally changed the economics of locating military targets in 
deep underground locations. In Russia, for example, despite its 
severely depressed economic circumstances, has invested $6 billion 
since 1991 in a deep underground military facility in the southern end 
of the Ural Mountains. The underground facility at the site is located 
under nearly 1,000 feet of granite--one of scores of deep underground 
sites--that could not be held at risk with the current nuclear weapon 
stockpile. Similar underground facilities exist in other declared or 
undeclared nuclear weapon states. It is possible that some future 
President may decide that new weapon design(s) are needed to sustain 
deterrence. He will be prevented from doing so if the CTBT is ratified.
  Third, the alternative to testing, the SSP, is an extraordinarily 
risky approach to sustaining deterrence. The United States has not 
conducted a testing program to verify that the modeling and simulation 
of the existing stockpile or new designs can be maintained or 
implemented using the experimental and diagnostic facilities of the 
SSP. No testing has taken place since 1992, but the SSP will not be 
fully operational until 2010 or beyond. One of the most important of 
these facilities--the National Ignition Facility, NIF--has proven to be 
both a technical and cost challenge. Last month the Congress was 
confronted by a one-third jump in the cost of this program. The entire 
SSP--budgeted at $4.5 billion--is certainly underfunded, as the NIF 
experience demonstrates. For the SSP to be successful, all of its 
numerous experimental and diagnostic facilities have to work perfectly 
to assure that the safety and reliability of the stockpile can be 
certified indefinitely. It is one thing to take such a technical and 
financial risk in an environment where testing is unconstrained. It is 
quite another to bet on the enduring success of a program--the SSP--
that has already been shown to have unforeseen cost, technical, and 
schedule difficulties. The extent of these difficulties has not yet 
even been ascertained by the executive branch--much less an independent 
determination by the Congress. The risks to the ability to sustain 
deterrence under the CTBT are simply too large for the Congress to 
accept. The CTBT should not be ratified.

[[Page 25130]]

  CTBT proponents claim that the treaty is an important tool in the 
fight against nuclear proliferation. This is simply inaccurate.
  A test ban will provide no obstacle to a proliferator who seeks a 
first-generation-or even a second-generation-nuclear weapon. One of the 
two bombs the United States dropped on Japan to end WWII was an 
untested design. South African built and deployed six nuclear weapons 
without testing the design. Pakistan obtained a workable design from 
China, and thus needed no nuclear tests of its own.
  Faced with these facts, treaty proponents often resort to the claim 
that the CTBT will establish an international norm against nuclear 
proliferation. Again, history teaches us differently. There is already 
an international norm against proliferation embodied in the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty--the NPT. Over 130 nations have signed the NPT 
and, by doing so, have forsworn nuclear weapons development. As an 
aside here, I guess we can say the CTBT is to get nations to promise 
not to test the weapons that they promised not to develop under the 
NPT.
  The international norm of nuclear nonproliferation-the one supposedly 
established by the NPTB was broken by Iraq, which tried to develop 
nuclear weapons clandestinely. And, the norm is violated even today by 
North Korea, which remains in noncompliance with the NPT. Two nations 
not party to the NPT, India and Pakistan, also broke the international 
norm.
  Other arms control norms are readily and repeatedly broken as well. 
There are too many examples to cite here today, but let me give you 
one. The United States forswore biological weapons and led the world in 
signing the Biological Weapons ban. The Soviet Union signed too, but 
secretly kept inventing and manufacturing ever more potent biological 
weapons. Other nations, including Iraq, have also made such weapons.
  The point here is that norms do nothing to prevent development of 
heinous weapons by nations that view it in their security interests to 
do so. They are driven by their own perceptions of threat, not by a 
desire to adhere to a norm established by the United States or the 
international community.
  Ironically, the CTBT might actually promote nuclear proliferation. I 
say this for two reasons.
  First, it my promote proliferation by damaging the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella. United States allies such as Japan, South Korea, Germany, and 
Italy have long depended on United States nuclear strength to provide 
them the ultimate protection. Indeed, the United States persuaded South 
Korea and Taiwan to give up their own nuclear weapons programs by 
promising them protection.
  U.S. nuclear testing has signaled to allies, and to potential 
enemies, that the United States nuclear arsenal is effective and that 
the United States is committed to using such weapons if absolutely 
necessary. Without nuclear testing, there is no question that United 
States confidence in the stockpile will decline. Our enemies and allies 
alike will read this silent signal as a local of commitment to 
maintaining-and using, if necessary-the nuclear deterrent.
  As U.S. confidence in the stockpile declines over time, it is likely 
that our allies confidence in the nuclear umbrella will similarly 
decline. This could head to allies reevaluating their own security 
needs. (If the U.S. umbrella appears insufficient, might they not 
consider developing their own nuclear deterrents?
  The second reason that I say that the CTBT may promote proliferation 
is that it will result in significantly increased interactions between 
the U.S. weapons design community and the international academic 
community. This could, and probably will, result in the transfer of 
weapons-relevant data. Let me explain.
  The U.S. stockpile stewardship program, the one intended to take the 
place of nuclear testing, relies on markedly increased collaboration 
between nuclear weapons specialists and the open scientific community. 
The program encourages open exchange of new nuclear research between 
the U.S. weapons laboratories and the international scientific 
community. The role that the stewardship program envisions for 
unclassified researchers extends far beyond peer review and the 
occasional preventatives meeting. Bit involves U.S. highly likely that 
these Occasional presentations meeting energy the quit involves 
Program, to participate in attempt to develop tool sot replace
  There will be five university research centers and a host of other 
researchers funded by 5 year grants totaling tens of millions of 
dollars. It is highly likely that these researchers in the unclassified 
world, working closely with nuclear weapons scientists on the 
stewardship program, will gain an improved understanding of nuclear 
explosives phenomena. And, of course, there will be no way to prevent 
the further dissemination this understanding.
  In summary, the CTBT will not further the cause of nuclear 
nonproliferation. Quite the opposite, it will likely result in 
promoting nuclear proliferation.
  The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty submitted to this Senate by 
President Clinton is not verifiable. This means that, despite the vast 
array of expensive sensors and detection technology being established 
under the treaty, it will be possible for other nations to conduct 
militarily significant nuclear testing with little or no risk of 
detection.
  What is militarily significant nuclear testing? Our definitions of 
the term might vary, but I think we'd all agree that any nuclear test 
that gives a nation information to develop newer, more effective 
weaponry is militarily significant.
  In the case of the United States, nuclear tests with yields between 
1,000 tons and 10,000 tons are generally large enough to provide 
``proof'' data on new weaponry designs. Other nations might have 
weaponry that could be assessed at even lower yields. For the sake of 
argument, however, let's be conservative and assume that other nations 
would also need to conduct tests at a level above 1,000 tons to develop 
a new nuclear weapon design.
  The verification system of the CTBT is supposed to detect nuclear 
blasts above 1,000 tons, so it would seem at first glance that it will 
be likely that most cheaters would be caught. We need to look at the 
fine print, however. In reality, the CTBT system will be able to detect 
tests of 1,000 tons or more if they are nonevasive. This means that the 
cheater will be caught only if he does not try to hide his nuclear 
test. But, what if he does want to hide it? What if he conducts his 
test evasively?
  It is a very simple task for Russia, China, or others to hide their 
nuclear tests. One of the best known means of evasion is detonating the 
nuclear device in a cavity such as a salt dome or a room mined below 
ground. This technique called ``decoupling'' reduces the noise, or the 
seismic signal, of the nuclear detonation.
  The change in the signal of a decoupled test is so significant--it 
can be by as much as a factor of 70--that it will be impossible for any 
known technology to detect it. For example, a 1,000-ton evasive test 
would have a signal of a 14-ton non-evasive test. This puts the signal 
of the illicit test well below the threshold of detection.
  Decoupling is a well-known technique and is technologically simple to 
achieve. In fact, it is quite possible that Russia and China have 
continued to conduct nuclear testing during the past 7 years, while the 
United States has refrained from doing so. They would have been able to 
test, without our knowing, by decoupling.
  There are also other means of cheating that can circumvent 
verification. One is open-ocean testing. A nation could put a device on 
a small seaborne platform, tow it to the middle of the ocean, and 
detonate it anonymously. It would be virtually impossible to attribute 
the test to the cheater.
  If the CTBT were not going to affect U.S. capabilities, it would not 
be important whether the treaty is verifiable or not. The fact is, 
however, the CTBT will freeze the U.S. nuclear weapons program and will 
make it impossible to assess with high confidence whether

[[Page 25131]]

the current stockpile is reliable. And, because the treaty is not 
verifiable, it will not effectively constrain other nations in the same 
way. That means that they will ultimately be able to gain advantage.
  Let me stress here that my assessment is not based on partisan 
opinions. The non-verifiability of the CTBT is well-known and has been 
affirmed by the U.S. intelligence community. We have no business 
signing up to an unverifiable treaty, particularly one that could so 
adversely affect the strength and effectiveness of our nuclear 
deterrent.
  Mr. President, seismology has come a long way in the past half-
century, but it still measures only earth vibrations, not Treaty 
compliance. Let's save time by stipulating that earth vibrations caused 
by most nuclear explosions will be detected by the CTBT's International 
Monitoring System (IMS). Then we can focus discussion on the political 
process by which detection of ``events'' lead to identification of 
nuclear tests, and by which identification of tests leads to 
verification of noncompliance with a Treaty.
  In combination, the United States and IMS will reliably detect 
thousands of seismic events every year. But that does not mean that 
either system, independently or in combination, can reliably identify 
low yield nuclear explosions.
  Seismic networks are scientific tools that must be calibrated against 
real world occurrences of what they measure. Once seismologists know 
that a given seismic signal was a nuclear test of a given yield at a 
given location, their network is calibrated for nuclear explosions of 
comparable magnitude at that location. For events of different 
magnitudes and/or in different locations, seismic signal identification 
is subjective. Like a few dozen CPAs interpreting the same IRS rule, 
each event will be interpreted differently depending on who is making 
the judgment and who their client is. This is particularly true, of 
course, for smaller events and those that occur in parts of the world--
where nuclear explosions have not previously been recorded.
  The fact of such uncertainty is not in dispute. No one can specify 
now, or in the foreseeable future, how large a nuclear test must be 
before it can be reliably identified as a nuclear test by the IMS. The 
best case would involve fully decoupled tests in locations where 
seismologists know both the precise magnitude of previous tests and the 
consequent seismic reading generated by those tests. The worst case 
would involve clandestine tests in uncalibrated regions that are 
decoupled. Even in best case circumstances no one disputes the 
uncertainty of identifying low yield nuclear events--no matter where 
they are conducted. Some believe these uncertainties extend to events 
of several kilotons, fully decoupled. In any case, no improvements of 
the United States and IMS systems that can be expected in the 
foreseeable future will alter those judgments.
  Mr. President, that is why CTBT proponents stress seismic 
capabilities in terms of detection capability, which, unlike 
identification capabilities, can be calculated. But detection relates 
exclusively to the seismic network's ability to sense events, and again 
I stress it is identification, not detection that underpins 
verification.
  A violator can decrease even a detected seismic magnitude by 
``decoupling''--that is, conducting a nuclear test in an underground 
cavity that muffles an explosion. Treaty proponents will argue that 
construction of such cavities is a nontrivial engineering task. It is 
hard to measure such difficulty because our experience in decoupling is 
more limited than, say, Russia's. But to decouple a 10-kiloton 
explosion so that it cannot be identified requires a cavity that 
countries of greatest concern are certainly capable of constructing.
  To help resolve such uncertainties, the CTBT includes the right to 
conduct on-site inspections (OSI). But decisions to exercise that right 
will be based on the level of voting countries' confidence in events 
identified by the IMS seismic network.
  Thirty current members of the rotating 51-member CTBT Executive 
Council must agree that an OSI should be conducted. It is clear from 
the negotiating record that some countries, including China, would view 
a request for OSI as a hostile act.
  The fact, coupled with identification uncertainties for low yield 
events, makes it very unlikely that the Executive Council will ever get 
the votes needed to request OSI for lower yield tests. For larger 
yields, in calibrated regions, where event-identification would be less 
ambiguous, OSI requests would be more likely to get the required 
support, but hardly needed to identify the event.
  For seismic events that could be low yield tests, the precise 
location of that event will be very uncertain, and the area that would 
need to be examined with OSI would be prohibitively large. Impression 
in locating an event, coupled with the inspected state's rights under 
the CTBT's ``managed access'' principle, assures that an approved OSI 
will never conclusively identify an event.
  Past experience has shown that to achieve consensus--even within the 
United States--on the identification of low yield events will be very 
difficult. Past experience has also shown that other countries--most of 
whom do not have the detection resources the United States has--will 
weigh OSI decisions against the political reality that target state 
will perceive OSI as a hostile action.
  The bottom line, Mr. President, is that OSI approval will be most 
likely in cases where they are needed least, least likely in cases 
where they are needed most, and of marginal utility when they are 
conducted.
  Even if a detected seismic event is categorized as a nuclear test, it 
still has to be attributed to a CTBT party. What if it takes place in 
international waters? What if a suspected government feigns surprise 
and attributes the undertaking to a non-state actor, known or unknown, 
acting within its borders? What if the precise location cannot be 
specified and the suspect state has sensitive facilities in the area 
surrounding the event's apparent epicenter? In short, the IMS is 
designed to support a bulletproof CTBT regime. It will generate lots of 
suspecting, very little detecting, still less identifying, little or no 
attributing, and a virtual absence a verified noncompliance.
  Mr. President, none of this would matter except that the United 
States will never conclude that the accumulated uncertainties are 
sufficient to justify our abrogation of the treaty. Anti-nuclear 
interests, knowing full well that a foreign nuclear test has occurred, 
will always be able to obscure the evidence or moderate the U.S. 
response. That is true already, of course, but Treaties reside in a 
rarefield political and legal atmosphere in the U.S. from which 
abrogation is never taken lightly.
  These are the weapons the United States relied on defeat two 
monstrous twentieth century tyrannies and to deter threats for over a 
half-century. I do not wish to subordinate their deterrent power, their 
safety, their modernization, or their reliability to the vagaries of 
this detection-identification-verification conundrum. The IMS system 
was not, and could not have been, designed to verify clandestine tests. 
Thus, to whatever extent our ratification of the CTBT relies on the 
integrity of verification it should be soundly defeated.
  CTBT proponents are fond of saying that this treaty is the longest 
sought, hardest fought arms control agreement. They point out that 
negotiation of a nuclear test ban first began with President 
Eisenhower, and continued on-and-off through the administrations of 
several presidents.
  In truth, the Clinton CTBT is very different from the test bans 
sought by past presidents. An old name has been put on a new treaty. We 
need only look at history to see that what President Clinton's 
administration negotiated is not at all consistent with the treaty 
sought by his predecessors.
  When President Eisenhower undertook negotiations for a test ban, he 
purposefully excluded low-yield nuclear testing for at least two 
reasons. First, he knew that the United States would need to conduct 
such low-level

[[Page 25132]]

tests to assure that the U.S. stockpile was as safe and reliable as 
possible. Second, he knew that such testing is readily concealed, so 
banning them would not be verifiable. And, like Eisenhower, subsequent 
U.S. Presidents held fast to the position that any test ban must allow 
for low-yield testing.
  President Clinton, separating himself from past presidents, declared 
that the United States would undertake a zero-yield nuclear test ban. 
He made this decision against the advice of the majority of his 
cabinet, including the Secretaries of Defense and State, and against 
the advice of the leaders of the national laboratories. That is, 
President Clinton unilaterally determined that the U.S. would deny 
itself the ability to conduct the low-level testing necessary to assure 
us that the weapons in our stockpile are functional and usable.
  President Clinton's decision is particularly astounding when you 
realize that other nations will not be similarly constrained. They will 
be able to test low-yield devices. Why? Because the CTBT does not 
define what is meant by a nuclear test. In other words, the treaty does 
not say that it is a zero-yield ban. That is something that President 
Clinton imposed on the United States as its own interpretation of the 
treaty. Thus, when Russia conducts low-yield tests to assure 
reliability of its own arsenal, it will not be technically in violation 
of the CTBT.
  A second reason that Clinton's CTBT is quite different from the test 
bans sought by past presidents is duration. Clinton's treaty is of 
unlimited duration. All previous presidents understood that it was very 
important to limit the length of the treaty to a few years, thus 
requiring renewal periodically. This would place the burden upon those 
who want a test ban to prove that it is in the security interests of 
the United States to continue the ban. Instead, Clinton's treaty does 
the opposite: it makes getting out of the treaty very difficult. And, 
as we have seen from the ABM Treaty, it is politically very difficult 
to leave a treaty, even when it is no longer relevant or in your 
security interests.
  A third major difference that makes Clinton's CTBT different from 
past test bans is its lack of verifiability. All past presidents stated 
that they would only support a treaty that is effectively verifiable.
  Verifiability may not seem to be a very significant issue, but it is 
indeed terribly important. We all know that the United States will 
adhere scrupulously to the CTBT is we in the Senate give our advice and 
consent to ratification. Other nations, however, have repeatedly 
demonstrated that they are willing to violate their arms control 
commitments. North Korea is currently in violation of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, under which it promised not to pursue nuclear 
weapons. Russia has violated a host of arms agreements, including the 
ban on production of biological weapons.
  If the United States abides by a test ban, whereas other nations are 
able to continue testing undetected, the United States will ultimately 
be disadvantaged. Others will be able to assure confidence in their 
stockpiles, but the United States will not. Others will be able to 
continue to develop newer, more modern nuclear weapons, whereas the 
U.S. program will be frozen. Others will be able to test any fixes to 
problems that develop with their stockpiles, whereas the United States 
will not be able to do so.
  This treaty is not well-thought-out and contains provisions that will 
ultimately harm the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Furthermore, the zero-yield 
interpretation by President Clinton is unacceptable. We should reject 
this treaty in the interests of our own security.
  CTBT proponents assert that the DOE's Science Based Stockpile 
Stewardship Program (SSP) can maintain the safety and reliability of 
the nation's nuclear weapon stockpile without nuclear testing. I 
emphasize that this is an assertion, an unproven, undemonstrated 
assertion. Dr. Seigfried Hecker, as Director of Los Alamos National 
Laboratory in 1997, in response to a question from Senator Kyl, has 
stated ``. . . we could not guarantee the safety and reliability of the 
nuclear stockpile indefinitely without nuclear testing.'' By agreeing 
to ratification of the CTBT the Senate would accept abandoning nuclear 
testing, the only proven method for assuring the safety and reliability 
of our nuclear deterrent, to embrace the unproven, unvalidated SSP.
  Nuclear deterrence is a vital element of our national security 
structure. President Clinton, in sending us this treaty reaffirmed that 
he views the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile to be 
a supreme national interest of the United States. If this is the case, 
how we can accept an unproven SSP as the basis for our confidence in 
the nuclear stockpile? If SSP were an established capability, and a not 
a set of research programs, most of which will not reach fruition for 
years, and the predictions of SSP had been thoroughly compared with the 
results of nuclear tests specifically designed to validate the new SSP, 
with positive results, then and only then could I consider abandoning 
nuclear testing in favor of SSP.
  Can you imagine any reputable company abandoning one accounting 
systems for another without making sure that the new system's results 
agreed with the old? Can you imagine any reputable laboratory 
abandoning one calibration tool for another before ensuring that the 
new tool agreed with the old tool? But this is what we are being asked 
to do if we give our advice and consent to the CTBT. In an area where 
the supreme national interest of the United States is at stake we are 
being asked to endorse SSP as a replacement for nuclear testing without 
knowing if SSP works. Clearly the sensible course of action is to 
pursue SSP but calibrate its predictions, validate its new computer 
models, step-by-step, year-by-year by direct comparison with the 
results of nuclear tests specifically designed to test SSP. Then, if 
the SSP is shown to be a reliable replacement for nuclear testing, we 
could consider whether we would wish to be a party to a treaty banning 
nuclear testing. We must retain the ability to conduct underground 
nuclear tests to ensure the reliability and safety of our existing 
weapons and to establish whether SSP works.
  I would like to remind my colleagues that this body, in 1987, 
required the Department of Energy to design a program very like what I 
have described, but even more encompassing. The Senate Armed Services 
Committee language for the fiscal year 1998 authorization bill required 
that DOE prepare a report on a program which would prepare the country 
for further limitations on nuclear testing beyond the 150 kiloton yield 
cap then in place. The committee recognized that the sophisticated 
weapons in the U.S. inventory might not be sustainable under further 
test limitations and required DOE to describe a program that would ``. 
. . prepare the stockpile to be less susceptible to unreliability 
during long periods of substantially limited testing.'' DOE was also 
required to ``. . . describe ways in which existing and/or new types of 
calculations, non-nuclear testing, and permissible but infrequent low 
yield nuclear testing might be used to move toward these objectives.'' 
This latter requirement might be viewed as the progenitor of SSP. DOE 
responded to this requirement by designing a test-ban readiness program 
which anticipated a ten year, ten nuclear test per year program which 
would address the objectives required by the Senate, which included the 
development and validation, by comparison with nuclear tests, of new 
calculational tools and non-nuclear testing facilities. I must hasten 
to add that this program described by DOE was never fully funded 
because throughout the Reagan and Bush administrations further 
limitations on nuclear testing were not viewed as necessary or 
desirable. A CTBT was stated to be a long term goal.
  The stark differences between the Senate's requirement and the DOE 
response and the path taken by the Clinton administration could not be 
more stark. There was no period of preparation for this CTBT before us. 
The DOE was not instructed to implement the

[[Page 25133]]

design and testing of robust replacement warheads. The DOE was not 
funded to procure and validate new calculational and non-nuclear 
testing facilities. Instead, nuclear testing stopped without warning. 
Even the few nuclear tests that might have allowed some preparation 
were denied. Dr. Hecker wrote to Senator Kyl, ``We favored conducting 
such tests with the objective of preparing us better for a CTBT.'' 
However all tests were ruled out by the Clinton administration for 
policy reasons. This was years before the President signed the CTBT.
  Nuclear weapon safety has always been a paramount concern of the 
United States. Throughout the history of its nuclear weapons program 
the United States has made every effort to ensure that even in the most 
violent of accident situations there would be the minimum chance of a 
nuclear explosion or radioactive contamination. The adoption of the 
CTBT will abandon this important commitment.
  I am very concerned that a CTBT will stand in the way of improving 
the safety of U.S. nuclear weapons. All experts agree that nuclear 
weapon safety cannot be improved without the ability to conduct nuclear 
tests to confirm that the weapons, once new safety features are 
incorporated, are reliable. The CTBT makes pointless any attempts to 
invent new, improved safety feature because they could never be adopted 
without nuclear testing. Of even greater concern is that the CTBT even 
eliminates the possibility of improving the safety of current weapons 
through the incorporation of existing, well understood safety features.
  Unfortunately, few people know that many of our current weapons do 
not contain all the safety features that already have been invented by 
the DOE Laboratories. A White House Backgrounder issued July 3, 1993, 
in conjunction with President Clinton's decision to stop all u.S. 
testing, acknowledges ``Additional nuclear tests could help us prepare 
for a CTBT and provide some additional improvements in safety and 
reliability.'' President Clinton thought it was more important not to 
undercut his nonproliferation goals!
  I am less ready to ignore the safety of the American people. If we 
accept the CTBT, we will be accepting a stockpile of nuclear weapons 
that is less safe than it could be. I, for one, want no part in 
settling for less than the best safety that can be had. Should a U.S. 
nuclear weapon become in evolved in a violent accident which results in 
deaths and damage due to the spread of radioactive plutonium, I do not 
want to be in the position of explaining how I, by consenting to 
ratification of the CTBT, prevented the incorporation of safety 
measures that would have prevented these tragic consequences.
  CTBT proponents will cite certifications of safety by the laboratory 
directors and the administration that the stockpile is safe. They 
apparently believe that procedures will make up for the lack of safety 
features. The Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident provides us with an 
example of what happens when procedures are counted on to ensure safety 
rather than putting safety mechanisms in place. Chernobly is not the 
only example where counting on human operators to follow procedure for 
ensuring safety has failed. It had been DOE's objective to install 
safety features which were inherent to guarantee, to the maximum extent 
possible, that neither through accident nor malevolent intent could 
human actions cause unacceptable contamination. Has this policy been 
abandoned because it is inconvenient to an administration determined to 
have a CTBT at any cost?
  We have spent considerable money to incorporate advanced safety 
features in some existing weapons. Were we wasting our money? Is there 
some reason why it is OK to have some weapons less safe than others? I 
am not challenging that each weapon may be as safe as it could have 
been made at the time it was built. But safety standards change and now 
we may have to live without current weapon systems for a very long 
time. The American people deserve the safest weapons possible. We have 
gone from expecting seat belts, to expecting antilocking brakes and air 
bags in our automobiles. We know we could have insensitive high 
explosive and fire-resistant pits and enhanced nuclear detonation 
safety devices in every stockpile weapon. But we do not! We know each 
additional safety features decreases the probability of catastrophic 
results from an accident involving a nuclear weapon. We have no 
business entering into a CTBT until every weapon in our inventory is as 
safe as we know how to make it. I cannot justify a lesser standard and 
I hope you join me in this view and not give advice and consent to the 
ratification of the CTBT.
  Mr. President, there are numerous reasons to oppose this treaty, many 
of which have been discussed here already. But I would like to focus on 
one feature of this agreement that is, in my view, sufficient reason by 
itself for rejecting ratification, and that is the treaty's duration.
  This is an agreement of unlimited duration. That means that, if 
ratified, the United States will be committing itself forever not to 
conduct another nuclear test.
  Think of that--forever. Are we so confident today that we will never 
again need nuclear testing--so certain that we are willing to deprive 
all future commanders-in-chief, all future military leaders, all future 
Congresses, of the one means that can actually prove the reliability of 
our nuclear deterrent?
  Now, proponents of this treaty will say that this is not the case--
that this commitment is not forever--because the treaty allows for 
withdrawal if our national interest requires it. And proponents of the 
treaty promise that if we reach a point where the safety and 
reliability of our nuclear deterrent cannot be guaranteed without 
testing, well then all we need do is exercise our right to withdraw and 
resume testing. This so-called ``supreme national interest'' clause, 
along with Safeguard F, in which President Clinton gives us his solemn 
word that he will consider a resumption of testing if our deterrent 
cannot be certified, is supposed to reassure us.
  But the fact, Mr. President, is that this reassurance is a hollow 
promise, and supporters of the treaty know it.
  The fact is that if the critical moment arrives and there is 
irrefutable evidence that we must conduct nuclear testing to ensure our 
deterrent is safe, reliable, and credible, those same treaty supporters 
will be shouting from the highest mountain that the very act of 
withdrawing from this treaty would be too provocative to ever be 
justified, that no narrow security need of the United States could ever 
override the solemn commitment we made to the world in agreeing to be 
bound by this treaty.
  And if you don't believe that will happen, Mr. President, you need 
only look at our current difficulties with the 1972 ABM Treaty. It 
provides a chilling glimpse of our nuclear future, should we ratify 
this ill-conceived test ban.
  Like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the ABM Treaty is of 
unlimited duration. It, too, includes a provision allowing the United 
States to withdraw if our national interests so demand. It's difficult 
to imagine a situation in which national security interests and treaty 
obligations are more clearly mismatched than with the ABM Treaty today, 
but its supporters insist that withdrawal is not just ill-advised but 
actually unthinkable. And the voices wailing loudest about changing 
this ossified agreement are the same ones urging us today to entangle 
ourselves in another treaty of unlimited duration.
  Think of the ways in which the ABM Treaty is mismatched with our 
modern security needs. The treaty was conceived in a strategic context 
utterly unlike today's, a bipolar world in which two superpowers were 
engaged in both global rivalry and an accompanying buildup in strategic 
nuclear forces. Today, one of those superpowers no longer exists, and 
what remains of it struggles to secure its own borders against poorly 
armed militants.

[[Page 25134]]

  The arms race that supposedly justified the ABM Treaty's perverse 
deification of vulnerability has not just halted, it's reversed, and no 
thanks to arms control. Today Russian nuclear forces are plummeting due 
not to the START II agreement--which Russia has refused to ratify for 
nearly 7 years--but to economic constraints and the end of the cold 
war. In fact, their forces are falling far faster than treaties can 
keep up; arms control isn't controlling anything--economic and 
strategic considerations are. Similar forces have led the United States 
to conclude that its forces can also be reduced. Thus, despite a 
strategic environment completely different from the one that gave birth 
to the ABM Treaty, its supporters stubbornly insist that we must remain 
a party to it.
  In 1972, only the Soviet Union had the capability to target the 
United States with long-range ballistic missiles. Today, numerous rogue 
states are diligently working to acquire long-range missiles with which 
to coerce the United States or deter it from acting in its interests, 
and these weapons are so attractive precisely because we have no 
defense against them--indeed, we are legally prohibited from defending 
against them by the ABM Treaty.
  Technologically, too, the ABM Treaty is obsolete. The kinetic kill 
vehicle that destroyed an ICBM high over the Pacific Ocean on October 2 
was undreamed of in 1972. So was the idea of a 747 equipped with a 
missile killing laser, which is under construction now in Washington 
state, or space-based tracking satellites like SBIRS-Low, so precise 
that they may make traditional ground-based radars superfluous in 
missile defense. Yet this ABM Treaty, negotiated three decades ago, 
stands in the way of many of these technological innovations that could 
provide the United States with the protection it needs against the 
world's new threats.
  These new threats have led to a consensus that the United States must 
deploy a National Missile Defense system, and a recognition that we are 
behind the curve in deploying one. The National Missile Defense Act, 
calling for deployment of such a system as soon as technologically 
feasible, passed this body by a vote of 97-3, with similar support in 
the House. Just as obvious as the need for this capability is the fact 
that the ABM Treaty prohibits us from deploying it. Clearly, the ABM 
Treaty must be amended or jettisoned; the Russians have so far refused 
to consider amending it so withdrawal is the obvious course of action 
if United States security interests are to be served.
  But listen to the hue and cry at even the mention of such an option. 
From Russia to China to France and even to here on the floor of the 
United States Senate, we have heard the cry that the United States 
cannot withdraw from the ABM Treaty because it has become too important 
to the world community. Those who see arms control as an end in itself 
inveigh against even the consideration of withdrawal, claiming 
passionately that the United States owes it to the world to remain 
vulnerable to missile attack. Our participation in this treaty 
transcends narrow U.S. security interests, they claim; we have a higher 
obligation to the international community. After all, if the United 
States is protected from attack, won't that just encourage others to 
build more missiles in order to retain the ability to coerce us, thus 
threatening the great god of strategic stability? That phrase, 
translated, means that citizens of the United States must be vulnerable 
to incineration or attack by biological weapons so that other nations 
in this world may do as they please.
  Even though the ABM Treaty is hopelessly outdated and prevents the 
United States from defending its citizens against the new threats of 
the 21st century, supporters of arms control insist that withdrawal is 
unthinkable. Its very existence is too important to be overridden by 
the mere security interests of the United States.
  Absurd as such a proposition sounds, it is the current policy of this 
administration and it is supported by the very same voices who now urge 
us to ratify this comprehensive test ban. The Clinton administration 
has been reluctantly forced by the Congress into taking serious action 
on missile defenses. It admits that the system it needs to meet our 
security requirements cannot be deployed under the ABM Treaty. Yet, so 
powerful are the voices calling on the United States to subjugate its 
own security interests to arms control that the administration is 
proposing changes to the ABM Treaty that--by its own admission--will 
not allow a missile defense system that will meet our requirements. It 
has declared what must be done as ``too hard to do'' and intends to 
leave the mess it has created for another administration to clean up. 
All because arms control becomes an end in itself.
  That sorry state of affairs, Mr. President, is where we will end up 
if the Senate consents to ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty. Those treaty supporters who are saying now, ``don't worry, 
there's an escape clause'' will be the same ones who, 5 or 10 years 
from now--when there's a problem with our stockpile and the National 
Ignition Facility is still not finished and we find out that we 
overestimated our ability to simulate the workings of a nuclear 
weapon--will be saying we dare not withdraw from this treaty because we 
owe a higher debt to the international community.
  Mr. President, I don't represent the international community, I 
represent the people of my state. Our decision here must serve the best 
interests of the United States and its citizens. Our experience with 
the ABM Treaty is a perfect example of how arms control agreements 
assume an importance well beyond their contribution to the security of 
our nation. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty's unlimited duration is a 
virtual guarantee that this agreement will prevent us from conducting 
nuclear testing long past the point at which we decide such testing is 
necessary, should we so decide. As our ABM experience shows, we should 
take no comfort from the presence of a so-called ``supreme national 
interest'' clause.
  I urge the defeat of this treaty.
  Mr. President, the CTBT is nothing less than an ill-disguised attempt 
to unilaterally disarm the U.S. nuclear arsenal. We have repeatedly 
confirmed the need for nuclear weapons in the U.S. defense force 
posture. According to this administration's Secretary of Defense, 
``nuclear forces are an essential element of U.S. security that serve 
as a hedge against an uncertain future and as a guarantee of U.S. 
commitments to allies.'' Most of us recognize this as a necessary, but 
awful, responsibility. Unfortunately, the CTBT actively undermines the 
Secretary of Defense's stated rationale for the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
  For nuclear weapons to serve as a hedge against an uncertain future, 
they must be relevant to the threats we may face. As Iraq demonstrated 
during the gulf war, that threat is often a rogue regime armed with 
weapons of mass destruction. Hopefully, the threat of nuclear 
retaliation will deter a rogue regime from using WMD against United 
States forces and allies in the theater, as it did in the Iraqi case. 
However, some rogue regimes may not be moved by such concerns. Would 
North Korea, which appears otherwise content to let its people starve, 
balk at the prospect of United States nuclear retaliation/ and for that 
matter, is a United States threat to kill hundreds of thousands of 
oppressed North Korean civilian the proper response to North Korean WMD 
use? Is it a proportionate, morally acceptable threat to make? If it is 
not a threat we would carry out, how credible can it be? The answer to 
these questions lies in making sure that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is 
and remains relevant to the sorts of threats we will encounter in the 
``uncertain future.''
  Making the U.S. nuclear arsenal relevant to a world of rogue actors 
with dug-in, hardened shelters and WMD capabilities will likely require 
new weapons designs. In addition to improving the safety and 
reliability of our arsenal, new weapons designs tailoring explosive 
power to the threat will be crucial. For example, in some settings, 
biological weapons can be even more

[[Page 25135]]

deadly than nuclear weapons. By releasing the agent into the 
atmosphere, a conventional attack on a biological weapons storage 
facility might cause more innocent deaths than it averted. It is 
possible that only a nuclear weapon is capable of assuring the 
destruction of a biological agent in some circumstances. The U.S. 
development of the B61-11 bunker buster nuclear weapon is evidence 
that, absent the political pressure for arms control, the U.S. arsenal 
needs these capabilities.
  The CTBT will stop the United States from developing and deploying 
fourth generation nuclear weapons. Further, it will slowly degrade and 
destroy the nuclear weapons design infrastructure needed to produce new 
weapons designs. Thus any promise to withdraw from the CTBT in time of 
need becomes irrelevant; the capabilities we need won't be there. 
Without these new designs, nuclear weapons will ultimately cease to be 
a credible option for U.S. decisionmakers in all but a few very 
specific cases. Denying the United States the nuclear option is the 
true intent of the CTBT.
  Do other countries recognize the utility of new weapons designs? 
Certainly. Russia increasingly relies on its nuclear weapons for 
national security because its conventional forces are failing. Russia 
is almost certainly interested in developing what one Russian senior 
academic identified as ``ultralow-yield nuclear weapons with little 
effect on the environment.'' Our ability to detect and identify these 
sorts of test, which may resemble conventional explosions or small 
seismic events, with any degree of certainty is limited, and the cost 
of evading detection through decoupled underground tests, masking 
chemical explosions, etc., is not prohibitive. While the CTBT's 
proposed International Monitoring System (IMS) will add to the 
capabilities available through U.S. national technical means (NTM), it 
will still not provide definitive answers.
  While less sophisticated than the Russian program, China has 
demonstrated that modernized and new weapons designs are on its agenda. 
Its aggressive intelligence-gathering operation aimed at the U.S. 
nuclear weapons complex should be clear evidence of that. China's 
willingness to freeze its nuclear modernization program simply to 
comply with a treaty should also be suspect--China has repeatedly 
demonstrated that it is willing to act contrary to its international 
commitments in areas of keen United States interest like the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). ``Norms'' and diplomatic peer 
pressure will not dissuade China from nuclear testing. Based on these 
observations, what the CTBT will create is a frozen, degrading U.S. 
nuclear weapons program, improving Russian and Chinese arsenals, and a 
host of rogue regimes increasingly aware that the United States nuclear 
threat is deficient.
  Let me conclude my remarks. I think as we close this debate, it is 
important to reflect for a moment on what the constitutional 
responsibilities of the Senate are. In binding the American people to 
international treaties, the Senate is a coequal partner with the 
President of the United States, whose people negotiate treaties which 
he signs and then sends to the Senate for its advice and consent.
  It would help if he asked the Senate's advice before he requested our 
consent, but in this particular case his negotiators tried in certain 
circumstances to gain provisions in this treaty which eventually they 
concluded they could not get, and as a result, negotiated what Senator 
Lugar of this body has called a treaty not of the same caliber as 
previous arms control treaties; a treaty that is flawed in a variety of 
ways he pointed out, including the fact it is not verifiable and it 
lacks enforceability.
  My view is that the Senate can fulfill its constitutional 
responsibility not by being a rubber stamp to the administration but by 
in effect being quality control by sending a message that the U.S. 
Government, embodied in the Senate, will insist on certain minimum 
standards in treaties that will bind the American people. Particularly 
with respect to our national security, when we are talking about arms 
control, we will insist on those standards regardless of world opinion 
or what the lowest common denominator of nations may request.
  This administration had the opportunity to negotiate a treaty of less 
than permanent duration. They originally tried a 10-year, opt-out 
provision but failed in that. They originally, at the request of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, were trying not to agree to a zero yield but to 
permit hydronuclear tests. But eventually they agreed to a zero yield. 
There were requests for better monitoring sites around the world, but 
our negotiators gave up on that as well.
  My point is, in rejecting this treaty tonight the Senate will be 
strengthening the hand of our future negotiators who, in talking to 
their counterparts in the world, will be able to say the Senate is 
going to insist on certain minimum standards: That it be verifiable, it 
be enforceable, that it take the U.S. security interests seriously, and 
unless that is done we cannot possibly agree to these terms.
  By rejecting this treaty this evening, I believe we will be sending a 
very strong message that as the leader of the world, the United States 
will insist on certain minimal standards to the treaties. Our 
negotiators in the future will be better able to negotiate the 
provisions. And in the future, the Senate will be in a position to 
ratify a treaty rather than having to reject what is clearly an 
inferior treaty.
  I urge my colleagues to reject this treaty.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
Connecticut.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized for 
2 minutes.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, the good-faith efforts of people on 
both sides of the aisle to avoid a vote, knowing that there were not 
votes in the Senate to ratify this treaty, have obviously failed. The 
vote will occur soon, and the votes are not there to ratify the treaty. 
That, in my opinion, is profoundly unfortunate. There is plenty of 
blame to be passed all around for that result.
  I think at this moment we all should not look backward but look 
forward, and particularly say to our friends and allies and enemies 
around the world that this vote tonight does not send a signal that the 
majority of the American people and their Representatives in Congress 
and in the Senate are not profoundly concerned about nuclear 
proliferation and are not interested in arriving at a treaty that 
genuinely will protect future generations from that threat.
  At times in this debate I was heartened by statements, including 
those made by the current occupant of the Chair, the Senator from 
Nebraska, saying if the vote occurred, you would vote against the 
ratification tonight, but more work ought to be done and more thought 
ought to be given. I hope in the days ahead we will be able to reach 
across the partisan aisle, work together without time limitation or 
even timeframe, to see if we can find a way to build adequate support 
for the ratification of this treaty, or a treaty which will control the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons by prohibiting the testing of those 
weapons. I invite my colleagues from both parties to join with us in 
that effort in working together with our administration. I hope we can 
take from this experience the lessons of what we did not do this time 
and should do next time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. The 
Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much time remains in my control?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 16 minutes 54 
seconds remaining.
  Mr. BIDEN. How much time remains in control of my friend?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina has 10 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. HELMS. Will the Senator forgive me; I overlooked Senator Warner.
  Mr. BIDEN. Surely.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my distinguished colleagues.

[[Page 25136]]

  My dear friend and partner in the venture for a letter, Senator 
Moynihan, addressed the letter in his remarks. First, we expressed it 
was an effort in bipartisanship by a large number of Senators--I but 
one; Senator Moynihan two. This letter will be printed in the Record 
following the vote.
  I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have spoken to our leader. I am going to 
close the debate on our side. I will use any time up to the amount of 
time that I have available.
  My friend from North Carolina knows--I guess when people listen to us 
on the air they must wonder. We go through this, ``my friend from North 
Carolina'' and ``distinguished Senator from.'' I imagine people, 
especially kids or youngsters in high school and college, must look at 
us and say: What are they talking about, unless they understand the 
need for good manners in a place where there are such strong 
differences, where we have such deep-seated differences on some issues, 
where I must tell you--and I am not being melodramatic--my heart aches 
because we are about to vote down this treaty. I truly think, I 
honestly believe that, in the 27 years I have been here, this is the 
most serious mistake the Senate has ever made--or is about to make.
  But that does not detract from my respect for the Senator from North 
Carolina, who not only is against the treaty, but wants to bring it up 
now, now, and vote it down. So I think it is important for the American 
people to understand. We have deep differences on this floor. In other 
places they have coups and they shoot each other. Because of the 
traditions of this body and the rules of the Senate, we live to fight 
another day.
  My friend knows we came the same year; we came the same date; we came 
at the same time. I will promise him, and he will not be surprised, I 
will use every remaining day of this Congress to try to fight him on 
this issue--even though I am about to lose, we are about to lose, my 
position is about to lose--to try to bring this back up, try to push 
it, try to keep it alive. Because as the Parliamentarian pointed out, 
when you vote this treaty down today, it doesn't die; it goes to sleep. 
It goes back to bed. It jumps over that marble counter there, back over 
the desk to the Executive Calendar to be called up again.
  I warn you all, I am going to be a thorn in your side, not that it 
matters much, but I am going to keep harping at it. I am going to keep 
beating up on you; I am going to keep talking about it; I am going to 
keep at it, keep at it, keep at it.
  When we started this off, my objective was to get the kind of 
hearings--I know my friend says we have had hearings--the kind of 
hearings we have had on other significant treaties--10, 12, 15, 18 days 
of hearings. The ``sense of the Senate'' amendment that I was prepared 
to introduce two weeks ago called for Foreign Relations Committee 
hearings beginning this fall and final action by March 31, 2000.
  That is what I was looking for because I truly believe that, were the 
American people and our colleagues able to hash this out in the way we 
designed this body to work, we would, in fact, find accommodation for 
all those concerns that 67 Senators might have; not 90, but probably 
67, 68--70. I truly believe that. I truly believe that.
  Instead, we got one quick week of hearings, with the Committee on 
Foreign Relations holding only one day of hearings dedicated to this 
treaty, the day after the committee was discharged of its 
responsibility.
  That abdication of committee responsibility was perhaps only fitting, 
as most Republicans appear prepared to force this great country to 
abdicate its responsibility for world leadership on nuclear non-
proliferation.
  But let me say that in this floor debate, I have attempted at least 
to answer attacks leveled by treaty opponents. Neither side has been 
able to delve very deeply, however, given the time constraints and lack 
of balanced, I think, detailed knowledge on the part of our Senate.
  For example, the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island and the 
Senator from Virginia are both friends. They are World War II vets. 
They have served a long time and they are among the two most honorable 
people I know. Senator Chafee--I assume he will forgive me for saying 
this--came up to me and said: Joe, check what I have here. Is this 
accurate, what I have here?
  I said what I am about to say: It is absolutely accurate.
  He said: But it is different from what my friend from Virginia said, 
Senator Warner said.
  I said: I love him, but he is flat wrong. He is flat wrong.
  I don't think anybody is intentionally misleading anybody. I do think 
we haven't hashed this out.
  For example, there is a condition that we have adopted by unanimous 
consent, part of this resolution of ratification we are about to vote 
on, the last section of which says:

       Withdrawal from the treaty: If the President determines 
     that nuclear testing is necessary to assure with a high 
     degree of confidence the safety and reliability of the United 
     States nuclear weapons stockpile, the President shall consult 
     promptly with the Senate and withdraw from the treaty.

  He has no choice. He must withdraw.
  My friend from Virginia characterizes this treaty as having no way 
out. If, however, the President is told by the National Laboratory 
Directors, by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, ``We 
can't guarantee any more, boss,'' he must inform us and he must 
withdraw.
  That is an illustration of what I mean. Here are two honorable men, 
two men of significant experience, asking one another and asking each 
of their staffs: Which is right?
  In one sense, it is clear what is right: we haven't had much time to 
talk about it. We haven't had much time to talk about it.
  The debating points and counterpoints are too many to summarize in a 
short statement in the probably 12 minutes I have left. But the themes 
of this debate are clear and so are the fallacies that underlie the 
arguments of those who oppose the treaty, at least the arguments made 
most repeatedly on the floor.
  The first theme of the treaty opponents is that, while our nuclear 
weapons stockpile may be--they don't say ``may'', they say ``is''--safe 
and is reliable today, there is no way to do without nuclear testing 
forever. That is the first theme that is promoted by the opponents.
  This argument is based on a fallacy rooted in our nuclear weapons 
history. The history is that our nuclear testing has supported a trial-
and-error approach to correcting deficiencies, rather than rooting our 
weapons in detailed scientific knowledge of how a nuclear reaction 
works.
  The fallacy is that nuclear weapons must be subjected to full-up, 
``integrated'' testing. That is a fallacy. The truth is, rarely do we 
fully test major systems. Rather, we test components or conduct less 
than full tests of complete systems.
  As my colleagues know, a truly full test of a nuclear weapon would 
require that it be tested as a bomb or as a warhead, as it is intended 
to be, and exploded in the atmosphere. All the experts tell you that. 
That is the only true, absolute way you know what is going to happen: 
test it in the atmosphere.
  As the Presiding Officer knows, we have done without atmospheric 
testing for 36 years. We accepted the supposedly degraded confidence in 
our nuclear stockpile that results from this lack of full-blown 
testing.
  Why have we accepted that? Because we balanced the benefits of full-
up atmospheric testing against its disadvantages, and it was clear that 
the benefits outweighed the negatives.
  When listing the benefits, we also noted how well we could assure the 
systems performance without these full-up tests. When listing the 
disadvantages, we included cost, risk of collateral damage, 
environmental risk, radioactive fallout, and the diplomatic or military 
costs that would have been incurred if we had rejected or withdrawn 
from the Limited Test-Ban Treaty which was signed in 1963.

[[Page 25137]]

  Similarly today, we have to consider both the benefits and the 
disadvantages of insisting upon the right to conduct underground 
nuclear testing. We should include in our calculus the fact that the 
Resolution of Ratification of this treaty requires the President to 
withdraw from the treaty if he ``determines that nuclear testing is 
necessary to assure, with a high degree of confidence, the safety and 
reliability of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile.''
  Guess what? Every year now, under the law, the Secretary of Energy 
and the Secretary of Defense must not only go to the President, but 
must come to the Senator from Nebraska, the Senator from Delaware, the 
Foreign Relations Committee, the Armed Services Committee, and they 
must tell us, as well as the President, whether they can certify the 
continued safety and reliability of the stockpile. If they cannot 
certify, and if we adopt this Resolution of Ratification, the President 
has to withdraw from the treaty.
  We will likely differ in our calculations of the balance between 
advantages and disadvantages of foreswearing underground nuclear 
testing. But we should all reject the fallacy that there is no 
substitute for continuing what we did in the past.
  The second theme that opponents of the treaty keep putting out is 
that we have to reject this treaty because it is not perfectly 
verifiable. This argument is based upon a fallacy rooted in slogans and 
fear. The fear relates to the history of arms control violations by the 
Russians and the Soviet Union. The slogans are Ronald Reagan's 
election-year demand: Effective verification. And his later catch 
phrase: Trust but verify.
  This body has never demanded perfect verification.
  Consider the vote we had on the INF Treaty that eliminated land-based 
intermediate-range missiles. That treaty was signed by President 
Reagan. President Reagan, the same man who signed the treaty, also 
coined the phrase ``trust but verify.''
  Was the INF Treaty perfectly verifiable? No. Nobody in the world 
suggested it was perfectly verifiable. Listen to what the Senate 
Intelligence Committee said before we voted on Ronald Reagan's INF 
Treaty. They said:

       Soviet compliance with some of the treaty's provisions will 
     be difficult to monitor. The problem is exemplified by the 
     unresolved controversy between the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency and other intelligence agencies over the number of SS-
     20s in the Soviet inventory.

  We did not even know how many SS-20s, intermediate-range missiles, 
they had. The Intelligence Committee went on to say:

       Ground-launched cruise missiles pose a particular difficult 
     monitoring problem as they are interchangeable long-range, 
     sea-based launch cruise missiles.

  Which the INF Treaty did not ban. This was not verifiable. Where were 
all you guys and women when the Reagan treaty was up here? God love 
him: Trust but verify. I challenge anyone to come to the floor in the 
remaining minutes and tell me that the INF Treaty was perfectly 
verifiable.
  I love this double standard. You wonder why some of us on this side 
of the aisle think this is about politics.
  The fallacy is clear: Nobody really believes in perfect verification. 
The Senate approved Ronald Reagan's INF Treaty by a vote of 93-5, 
despite the fact that we knew the INF Treaty was far from verifiable. 
The legitimate verification questions are how well can we verify 
compliance and whether our national security will be threatened by any 
undetected cheating that could occur.
  I say to my colleagues, we should end the pretense that only a 
perfectly verifiable treaty is acceptable. The only perfectly 
verifiable treaty is one that is impossible to be written.
  Each side in this debate has agreed that the approval or rejection of 
this treaty could have serious consequences. I suggest that we pay some 
attention to each side's worst-case scenarios.
  Opponents of the treaty have warned that a permanent ban on nuclear 
weapons tests could result in degraded confidence in the U.S. 
deterrent, perhaps leading other countries to develop their own nuclear 
weapons. Treaty supporters have warned that rejection of this treaty 
could lead to a more unstable world in which all countries were freed 
of any obligation to obey the Test-Ban Treaty.
  Neither of these worst-case outcomes is very palatable. Any degraded 
foreign confidence in the U.S. deterrent would be limited, however, 
either by annual certification of our own high confidence in our 
nuclear weapons, or by prompt action to fix any problems--including 
mandatory withdrawal from this treaty if the President determined that 
testing was necessary.
  Rejection of this treaty would not greatly increase the speed with 
which a nuclear test could be conducted, if one were necessary. The 
nuclear stockpile certification process already forces an annual 
decision on whether to resume testing, and the treaty would impost only 
a six-month delay after notice of our intent to withdraw. That means a 
total lag of 6 to 18 months between discovering a problem and being 
free to test--roughly what officials say is the minimum time that it 
takes to mount a serious nuclear weapons test, anyway.
  By contrast, however, the worst-case scenario of Treaty supporters 
might not be so limited. As Larry Eagleburger, who served as Secretary 
of State at the end of the Bush Administration, wrote in Monday's 
Washington Times:

       The all-important effort of the United States to stem the 
     spread of nuclear weapons around the world is about to go 
     over a cliff unless saner heads in Washington quickly 
     prevail.

  Eighty years ago, this body rejected the Treaty of Versailles that 
ended the First World War. Woodrow Wilson's vision of a League of 
Nations to keep the peace was turned down by a Senate that did not want 
to accept such a U.S. responsibility in the world. While that vote was 
understood to be significant at the time, nobody could foresee that our 
refusal to take an active role in Europe's affairs would help lead to a 
Second World War only two decades later.
  Today, eight years after the Cold War's end, the Senate is presented 
with a different kind of collective security proposition--an 
international treaty that can meaningfully reduce the danger that 
nuclear weapons will spread, a treaty enforced by an army of inspectors 
and a global system of sensors.
  We cannot tell what the precise consequences of our actions are going 
to be this time, but the world will surely watch and wonder if we once 
again abdicate America's responsibility of world leadership, if we once 
again allow the world to drift rudderless into the stormy seas of 
nuclear proliferation.
  World War II was a time of horror and heroism. A world of nuclear 
wars will bring unimagined horror and little room for the heroism of 
our fathers. We all pray that our children and grandchildren will not 
live in such a world.
  Will the votes today have such a major, perhaps awful, consequence? 
We cannot say for sure, but I end by suggesting to all that the chance 
being taken by those who are worried about our ability to verify 
compliance and our ability to verify the stockpile is far outweighed by 
the chance we take in rejecting this treaty and saying to the entire 
world: We are going to do testing and we do not believe that you can 
maintain your interests without testing, so have at it.
  We should all consider that this may be a major turning point in 
world affairs. If we should reject this treaty, we may later find that 
``the road not taken,'' in Robert Frost's famous phrase, was, in fact, 
the last road back from the nuclear brink.
  I heard, in closing--the last comment I will make--my friend say: Our 
allies will lose confidence in us if we ratify this treaty. The fact 
is, however, that Tony Blair called today and, to paraphrase, said: For 
God's sake, don't defeat this treaty. He is the Prime Minister of 
England, our No. 1 ally.
  The German Chancellor said: Please ratify, in an open letter. The 
President of France, Jacques Chirac, said: Please ratify. So said our 
allies.

[[Page 25138]]

  Larry Eagleburger's conclusion is one with which I shall end. His 
conclusion was:

       The whole point of the CTBT from the American perspective 
     is get other nations to stop their testing activities and 
     thereby lock-in--in perpetuity--the overwhelming U.S. 
     advantage in weaponry. There is no other way to interpret a 
     vote against this treaty than as a vote in favor of nuclear 
     testing of other nations. It would stand on its head the 
     model of U.S. leadership on nonproliferation matters we have 
     achieved for over 40 years.
       If the Senate cannot bring itself to do the right thing and 
     approve the treaty, then senators should do the next best 
     thing and pull it off the table.

  As I used to say in a former profession, I rest my case, but in my 
former profession, when I rested my case, I assumed I would win. I know 
I am going to lose here, but I will be back. I will be back. I yield 
the floor and reserve the remainder of time, if I have any.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, how much time do we have left on this side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina has 9 minutes 
30 seconds.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, my friend, Senator Biden, began with an 
allusion to the young people listening by television about how we call 
each other distinguish Senators and various other good things, and that 
is called courtesy. I call him a distinguished Senator, and I admire 
Joe Biden. He knows I do. I cannot outshout him. He has far more volume 
than I. I have used my windpipes a little bit longer than he has.
  Let me tell you about Joe. He is a good guy. He is a good family man. 
He goes home to Delaware every night. He comes back in the morning. 
Sometimes he is not on time for committee meetings and other things, 
but we take account of that. But you can bank on Joe Biden in terms of 
his vote. He is going to vote liberal every time. I have never known 
him--and I say this with respect--to cast a conservative vote. And that 
is the real difference.
  I believe it is essential that the Senate withhold its consent and 
vote to defeat the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.
  Mr. President, in the post-cold-war world, many of us have assumed 
that the U.S. nuclear deterrent is less relevant than before. I contend 
that it is more important than ever.
  The level of threat posed by another nation has two parts--the 
nation's capabilities to inflict damage upon us, and the intent to do 
so. Since the end of the cold war, Russia's intent, clearly, is 
peaceful. This has not changed Russian nuclear capabilities, however. 
If Russia's government were to change to a hostile one tomorrow, the 
level of threat posed by Moscow would be even greater than it was 
during the cold war.
  Unlike the United States, Russia has not stopped improving on its 
nuclear arsenal. The Russians have continued to modernize their nuclear 
arsenal with new warheads and new delivery systems, despite the end of 
the cold war. This modernization has been at tremendous economic 
expense and has probably entailed continued nuclear testing. I might 
also add that Russian nuclear doctrine has continued to evolve since 
the end of the cold war, and now Moscow relies even more on its nuclear 
deterrent for defense than it did before.
  But, Russian is not the only potential threat. The greater danger may 
come, ultimately, from China. As you know, Chinese espionage has 
yielded great fruit, including United States nuclear weapons designs 
and codes, as well as intelligence on our strategic nuclear submarine 
force. China continued nuclear testing long after the United States 
undertook a self-imposed nuclear test moratorium in 1992. And, 
undoubtedly, it can continue secret nuclear testing without our being 
able to detect it.
  Other threats also abound. One of the most serious is from North 
Korea, which remains in noncompliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty and is continuing to build missiles that can be used for nuclear 
weapons delivery.
  In this uncertain world, it is not enough to simply retain a nuclear 
arsenal. We need a true nuclear deterrent. A nuclear arsenal becomes a 
nuclear deterrent only when we have convinced potential enemies that we 
will use that arsenal against them if they attack us or our allies with 
weapons of mass destruction. This means we must do two things. First, 
we must maintain the arsenal in workable, reliable condition. Second, 
we must clearly communicate our willingness to use the arsenal. We must 
not forget: a weapon does not deter if your enemy knows that you won't 
use the weapon.
  Nuclear testing, historically, has performed both the maintenance and 
communications functions. Testing kept the arsenal reliable and modern. 
Very importantly, it also signaled to potential enemies that we were 
serious about nuclear deterrence.
  Some people might argue that our nuclear arsenal is as modern as it 
will ever need to be. I am not willing to make that argument because I 
know I can't predict the future. I have no way of knowing what 
technological advances our potential enemies may make. Perhaps they 
will make discoveries of countermeasures that make our delivery systems 
outmoded. Or, perhaps they will acquire ever more potent offenses, just 
as Iraq, Russia, and North Korea have acquired highly virulent 
biological weapons.
  If the future does bring new challenges to our existing arsenal, I 
think we ought to be in a position to modernize our stockpile to meet 
those challenges. The directors of our nuclear weapons design 
laboratories have told us that we cannot modernize our weapons, for 
example, to take on the threat of biological weapons unless we can 
test. It therefore seems reasonable that we not deny ourselves the 
ability to test.
  Again, some people may argue that we should join the CTBT and then 
pull out if we need to test. That would be terribly foolish. We all 
know how politically difficult it is to pull out of a treaty, no matter 
how strong the arguments are for doing so. It is better to not join in 
the first place.
  In conclusion, let me reiterate my support for keeping our nuclear 
deterrent strong. The nuclear arsenal protects us against attacks from 
other nations that might use weapons of mass destruction against us. It 
tells them silently that the cost of any aggression is too high. We 
need to keep sending that signal to them, and nuclear testing will help 
us do that.
  Mr. President nuclear deterrence was crucial to U.S. and allied 
security throughout the cold war, and it will be no less important in 
the future. The enormous benefit of America's nuclear deterrent is that 
it protects U.S. interests and safeguards the peace without the use of 
force.
  It is clear that on several occasions, notably during the Cuban 
missile crisis, nuclear deterrence kept the cold war from becoming a 
shooting war. Now that the cold war is over, has nuclear deterrence 
become less important? The answer is no. During the first conflict of 
the post-cold-war period, the 1991 gulf war with Saddam Hussein, 
nuclear deterrence undoubtedly saved thousands, possibly tens of 
thousands of lives. How? Saddam Hussein was deterred from using his 
chemical and biological weapons because he feared the United States 
would retaliate with nuclear weapons. That is not my interpretation of 
the gulf war; it is what senior Iraqi leaders have said. The gulf war 
experience illustrates that as chemical, biological and nuclear weapons 
continue to proliferate, the U.S. nuclear deterrent will become even 
more vital to our security.
  While Washington must be prepared for the possibility that nuclear 
deterrence will not always safeguard the peace, we must safeguard our 
capability to deter. President Clinton recognized this continuing value 
of nuclear deterrence in the White House's most recent presentation of 
U.S. national security strategy. A National Security Strategy for A New 
Century, I quote: ``Our nuclear deterrent posture is one of the most 
visible and important examples of how U.S. military capabilities can be 
used effectively to deter aggression and coercion . . .'' And, quote 
``The United States must

[[Page 25139]]

continue to maintain a robust triad of strategic forces sufficient to 
deter any hostile foreign leadership . . .''
  The strategy of nuclear deterrence that for decades has played such a 
crucial role in preserving peace without resort to war would be 
damaged, perhaps beyond repair, in the absence of nuclear testing. Make 
no mistake, the CTBT would harm U.S. security by undermining the U.S. 
nuclear deterrent.
  For the nuclear stockpile to underwrite deterrence it must be 
credible to foes. That credibility requires testing. To deter hardened 
aggressors who are seemingly impervious to reason, there is no 
substitute for nuclear testing to provide the most convincing 
demonstration of the U.S. nuclear stockpile and U.S. will to maintain 
nuclear deterrence.
  The strategy of nuclear deterrence also requires that U.S. leaders 
have confidence that the nuclear stockpile will work as intended, is 
safe and reliable. Only testing can provide that confidence to U.S. 
leaders, and to our European and Asian allies who depend on the U.S. 
nuclear deterrent for their security. In the past, nuclear testing has 
uncovered problems in given types of weapons, and also assured that 
those problems were corrected, permitting confidence in the reliability 
of the stockpile.
  The absence of testing would undermine both the credibility of the 
U.S. nuclear deterrent in the eyes of would-be aggressors and the 
confidence of U.S. leaders in the strategy of nuclear deterrence.
  In addition, an effective strategy of nuclear deterrence requires 
that the nuclear stockpile be capable of deterring a variety of 
aggressors and challenges. New and unprecedented threats to United 
States security are emerging as a variety of hostile nations, including 
North Korea and Iran, develop mass destruction weapons and their 
delivery means. The U.S. nuclear deterrent must be capable against a 
wide spectrum of potential foes, including those who are desperate and 
willing to take grave risks. The nuclear stockpile inherited from the 
cold war is unlikely to be suited to effective deterrence across this 
growing spectrum of potential challengers. America's strategy of 
nuclear deterrence will become increasingly unreliable if the U.S. 
nuclear arsenal is limited to that developed for a very different time 
and challenger. Nuclear weapons of new designs inevitably will be 
necessary; and as the directors of both nuclear weapons design 
laboratories have affirmed, nuclear testing is necessary to provide 
confidence in the workability of any new design. In short, nuclear 
testing is the key to confidence in the new weapons design that 
inevitably will be necessary to adapt our nuclear deterrent to a 
variety of new challengers and circumstances.
  Finally, the U.S. strategy of nuclear deterrence cannot be sustained 
without a cadre of highly trained scientists and engineers. That 
generation of scientists and engineers that served successfully during 
the cold war is passing rapidly from the scene. Nuclear testing is 
critical to recruit, train, and validate the competence of a new 
generation of expert to maintain America's nuclear deterrent in the 
future.
  Mr. President, there is no credible evidence that the CTBT will 
reduce nuclear proliferation. None of the so-called ``unrecognized'' 
nuclear states--India, Pakistan and Israel--will be convinced by this 
Treaty to give up their weapons programs. Most important, those states 
that are currently seeking nuclear weapons--including Iran, Iraq and 
North Korea a state that probably already has one of two nuclear 
weapons--will either not sign the Treaty or, equally likely, will sign 
and cheat. These countries have demonstrated the value they ascribe to 
all types of weapons of mass destruction and are not going to give them 
up because others pledge not to test. They also know that they do not 
need to test in order to have confidence in first generation weapons. 
The United States did not test the gun-assembly design of the ``little 
boy'' weapon in 1945; and the South Africans and other more recent 
proliferators did not test their early warhead designs.
  Contrary to its advertised purpose, and in a more perverse and 
bizarre way, the CTBT could actually lead to greater proliferation not 
only by our adversaries but also by several key allies and friends who 
have long relied on the American nuclear umbrella as a cornerstone of 
their own security policy. In other words, if the CTBT were to lead to 
uncertainties that called into question the reliability of the U.S. 
nuclear deterrent, which it certainly will, the result could well be 
more rather than less proliferation.
  The United States has for many years relied on nuclear weapons to 
protect and defend our core security interests. In the past, our 
nuclear weapons were the central element of our deterrent strategy. In 
today's world--with weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles 
increasingly available to rogue states--they remain an indispensable 
component of our national security strategy. While serving as a hedge 
against an uncertain future with Russia and China, United States 
nuclear weapons are also essential in meeting the new threat of 
regional states armed with weapons of mass destruction. In fact, in the 
only contemporary experience we have with an enemy armed with chemical 
and biological weapons, there is strong evidence that our nuclear 
weapons played a vital role in deterring Saddam from using these 
weapons in a way that would have changed the face of the gulf war, and 
perhaps its outcome.
  While the U.S. nuclear deterrent today inspires fear in the minds of 
rogue-type adversaries, U.S. nuclear capabilities will erode in the 
context of a CTBT. Inevitably, as both we and they watch this erosion, 
the result will be to encourage these states to challenge our 
commitment and resolve to respond to aggression. Much less concerned by 
the U.S. ability--and therefore its willingness--to carry out an 
overwhelming response, they will likely pursue even more vigorously 
aggression in their own neighborhoods and beyond. To support their 
goals, these states will almost certainly seek additional and ever more 
capable weapons of mass destruction--chemical, biological and nuclear--
to deter American intervention with our conventional superiority. They 
may also be more willing to employ weapons of mass destruction on the 
battlefield in an effort to disrupt, impede, or deny the United States 
the ability to successfully undertake military operations.
  By calling into question the credibility of the ``extended 
deterrent'' that our nuclear weapons provided for key allies in Europe 
and Asia, the CTBT could also spur proliferation of nuclear weapons by 
those states who have long relied on the U.S. nuclear guarantee. For 
over half a century, the United States has successfully promoted non-
proliferation through the reassurance of allies that their security and 
ours were inseparable. U.S. nuclear weapons have always been a unique 
part of this bond. Formal allies such as Germany, Japan and South Korea 
continue to benefit from this protection. Should the U.S. nuclear 
deterrent become unreliable, and should U.S. allies begin to fear for 
their security having lost faith in the U.S. guarantee, it is likely 
that these states--especially those located in conflict-laden regions--
would revisit the question of whether they need their own national 
deterrent capability.
  Maintaining a reliable and credible nuclear deterrent has also 
contributed to the reassurance of other important friends in regions of 
vital interest. For instance, Taiwan and Saudi Arabia have to date 
shown considerable restraint in light of the nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons proliferation in their region, in large part because 
they see the United States as committed and capable of coming to their 
defense. While strong security relations have encouraged Taipei and 
Riyadh to abstain from their own nuclear programs, an unreliable or 
questionable U.S. nuclear deterrent might actually encourage nuclear 
weapons development by these states.
  In summary, by prohibiting further nuclear testing--the very 
``proof'' of our arsenal's viability--the CTBT would call into question 
the safety, security, and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons, as well 
as their credibility and operational utility. Consequently,

[[Page 25140]]

should the United States move forward with ratification of the Treaty, 
it is likely to have the profound adverse effect of encouraging further 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This would be in the most 
fundamental way detrimental to U.S. national security objectives.
  Mr. President, a cornerstone of arms control is the ability of the 
U.S. government to verify compliance. In U.S. bilateral agreements such 
as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, and the Intermediate Nuclear 
Forces Treaty, the Senate has insisted on provisions in the treaty that 
would provide for a combination of cooperative measures including on-
site inspection, as well as independent national technical means of 
verification to monitor compliance. Such provisions have been almost 
entirely absent in multinational arms control agreements. It is not 
surprising that international agreements such as the Biological Weapons 
Convention, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Missile 
Technology Control Regime, and the Chemical Weapons Convention are 
ignored by nations whose security calculation drives them to acquire 
weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The CTBT is 
likely to sustain the tradition of non-compliance we have so widely 
observed with other multilateral arms control agreements. The problem 
with the CTBT is particularly acute because national technical means of 
verification do not exist to verify compliance. There is some relevant 
arms control history on this point.
  In the 1980's, the United States negotiated a threshold test ban 
treaty with the former Soviet Union, FSU. This agreement limited 
nuclear tests to a specific yield measured in equivalent explosive 
energy in tons of TNT. Compliance with this agreement could not be 
verified by national technical means of verification. Very specific 
cooperative measures were required to render the agreement vulnerable 
to verification of compliance. Specifically, underground nuclear tests 
were limited to designated sites, and each side was required to permit 
the deployment of sensors in the region where tests were permitted to 
monitor such testing. These extraordinary measures emphasize the 
limitations of underground nuclear test monitoring. Tests that were not 
conducted at designated sites could not be reliably monitored. 
Moreover, even when we are confident we know where a test will be 
conducted, unless we have detailed knowledge of the local geological 
conditions and are able to deploy our own sensors near the site, the 
limits of modern science--despite the billions of dollars invested in 
various technologies for nearly half a century--cannot verify 
compliance with national undertakings concerning underground nuclear 
testing.
  Since the early 1990's, Russian nuclear weapons scientists and 
engineers have been conducting experiments at a test site on the Novaya 
Zemlya Island in the Russian Arctic. Because these tests are conducted 
in underground cavities, it is beyond the limits of modern scientists 
to be certain that a nuclear test has not been conducted. Two such 
tests were carried out in September according to the Washington Post in 
its report on Sunday, October 3, 1999. No one in the Department of 
Energy, the Department of Defense, the CIA, or the White House knows 
what those tests were. Nor can they know. These could have been nuclear 
tests using a technique for emplacing the nuclear device in 
circumstances that will deny us the ability to know whether or not a 
nuclear test has been carried out.
  A technique known as ``decoupling'' is a well understood approach to 
concealing underground nuclear tests. By suspending a nuclear device in 
a large underground cavity such as a salt dome or hard rock, the 
seismic ``signal'' produced by the detonation is sharply reduced as the 
energy from the detonation is absorbed by the rock or salt. The 
resulting ``signal'' produced by the blast of the detonation becomes 
difficult to distinguish from natural phenomena. Because decoupling is 
a simple, cheap, and reliable means of concealing nuclear tests, the 
United States insisted on a provision in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty 
that underground nuclear tests could only be undertaken in specific 
agreed-upon sites. The unfeasibility of monitoring compliance with a 
CTBT if a nation decides to use decoupling techniques to conceal 
nuclear tests. This has been acknowledged by the Intelligence 
Community. The Community's chief scientist for the Arms Control 
Intelligence Staff, Dr. Larry Turnbull stated last year.
  The decoupling scenario is credible for many countries for at least 
two reasons: First, the worldwide mining and petroleum literature 
indicates that construction of large cavities in both hard rock and 
sale is feasible with costs that would be relatively small compared to 
those required for the production of materials for a nuclear device; 
second, literature and symposia indicate that containment of 
particulate and gaseous debris is feasible in both sale and had rock.
  The reduction in the seismic ``signal'' can diminish the apparent 
yield of a nuclear device by as much as a factor of 70. The 
effectiveness of concealment measures means that potential 
proliferators can develop the critical primary stage of a thermonuclear 
(hydrogen) weapon. It can do so with the knowledge that science does 
not permit detection of a decoupled nuclear test in a manner that will 
permit verification of compliance with a CTBT or any other bilateral or 
multilateral arms control agreement intended to restrain nuclear 
testing.
  How much risk must the United States continued to be exposed by these 
ill-thought out multilateral arms control agreements? We have been 
reminded of this problem recently. The Biological Weapons Convention 
has been advertised by the same people now advocating the CTBT to be a 
successful example of a universally subscribed codification of the 
rejection of biological weapons by the international community. What 
has happened in the three decades since its ratification? The treaty 
has in fact, been widely violated. Two dozen nations have covert 
biological weapons programs. The arms control community--recognizing 
the treaty's fundamentally flawed character--is now seeking to ``put 
toothpaste back in the tube'' by attempting to negotiate verification 
provisions 30 years after the fact. We know from the report of the 
Rumsfeld Commission last year that the technology of nuclear weapons 
has been widely disseminated--abetted by the declassification policies 
of the Department of Energy. The problem of nuclear proliferation is 
now beyond the grasp of arms control. Other measures to protect 
American security and the security of its allies from its consequences 
now must be identified, considered, and implemented. We simply have to 
face the fact that compliance with the CTBT cannot be verified and no 
``fix'' is possible to save it. The scope and pace of the consequences 
of nuclear proliferation will be magnified if the CTBT is verified.
  Mr. President, when Ronald Reagan said ``trust but verify'' he 
expressed what most Americans feel about arms control treaties that 
limit the tools of U.S. national security. They know we will abide 
scrupulously by our legal obligations and would like to live in a world 
where others do the same. But since we do not live in such a world, 
they expect us to avoid treaties whose verification standards are less 
demanding than our own compliance standards.
  The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty now before us for advice and 
consent would be a radical departure from traditional U.S. approaches 
to the cessation of nuclear testing. Despite its superficial 
attractiveness there are two enduring reasons why no previous 
administration has ever advocated a permanent, zero-yield test ban. The 
first is that we've never apologized for relying on low yield 
underground tests to assure the safety and reliability of our nuclear 
deterrent.
  Others and I will have more to say about that issue, but right now I 
will focus on the second reason we've never catered to the anti-nuclear 
sentiments behind a zero-yield test ban. In the 1950's--when 
international nuclear disarmament really was a stated objective

[[Page 25141]]

of U.S. policy--President Eisenhower's ``comprehensive'' test ban 
applied to tests above four or five kilotons. But after studying it for 
a few years he turned instead to nonproliferation and limited test ban 
proposals because he realized he could not assure verification of a 
test ban even at that threshold.
  We understood back then that cheating would allow an adversary to 
modernize new weapons and confirm the reliability of existing ones. We 
knew we would never exploit verification loopholes for military 
advantage but were less sanguine about the forbearance of others. We 
knew that monitoring, detecting, and identifying noncompliance, let 
alone verifying it under international legal standards, was beyond our 
technical, diplomatic, and legal limits, and we were honest enough to 
say so.
  And yet today we are told verification methods are good enough to 
enforce compliance by others with a permanent zero-yield test ban while 
we pursue unconstrained nuclear weapons modernization by other means 
ourselves. Mr. President, I know that science has not stood still over 
the past 40-plus years. Our monitoring methods have no doubt improved. 
But does that mean that from now until forever we can verify any 
nuclear test of any magnitude, conducted by anyone, anywhere? And--if 
we could--that we would be equipped to do something about it? The 
administration wisely stops short of such absolute claims, but asserts 
nevertheless that international verification methods are adequate for 
this treaty.
  So I have to ask is it our means of detection and verification or our 
standards of foreign compliance that have ``evolved'' over the past 44 
years? I realize that perfect verification is unachievable. The U.S. is 
party to many treaties--some good, some bad--that are less than 100% 
verifiable. But the administration's belief--that this CTBT is so 
important that we should bind ourselves forever to its terms anyway--
does not flow logically from that premise.
  Previous administration have proposed bans on nuclear tests above 
certain yields despite sub-optimal means of monitoring compliance by 
appealing to their ``effective'' rather than ``foolproof'' verification 
provisions. The Carter administration employed that standard to promote 
a ten-year ban on tests above two kilotons. They knew a lower threshold 
would stretch credulity despite the seemingly infinite elasticity of 
``effective verification.''
  Mr. President, ``effective verification'' is an intentionally vague 
political term-of-art, but as the old saying goes, we all ``know it 
when we see it.'' for the CTBT, it should mean we have high confidence 
that we can detect within hours or days any clandestine nuclear test 
that would provide a cheater with militarily significant weapons 
information.
  If the administration attaches a different meaning to the term, we 
are entitled to know that. If not, we are entitled to know precisely 
what nuclear tests yields do provide militarily significant 
information, and whether the CTBT's verification system can detect them 
down to that level.
  As they are pondering those questions, permit me to offer some 
assistance. Those who test new weapons and track the deterioration of 
old ones will tell you that Carter's two-kiloton threshold would have 
permitted scientifically valuable U.S. nuclear tests (which Clinton's 
CTBT would disallow) bearing directly on the reliability of our nuclear 
deterrent.
  So, let me rephrase the question. Let's say evidence suggests a 
foreign test in, say, Novaya Zemlya, North Korea, Iran's territorial 
waters, or somewhere near the Tibetan mountains. Let's say it indicates 
an explosion of five kilotons--250 percent of what Carter would have 
allowed. Let's say the test did not take place in a ``decoupled'' 
cavity and, unlike the Pakistani test of May 1998, that the suspect 
state did not disable in-country seismic stations.
  Now, will the IMS reliably detect that test within hours or days with 
high confidence? Will is promptly identify the test and its precise 
location? Will it quickly differentiate it from mining excavations and 
plant disasters?
  And if it does: Will the requisite 30 members of the 51-member CTBT 
Executive Council immediately support an on-site inspection on the 
basis of that IMS input?
  Will the Executive Council issue an inspection request even if the 
state in question was the last one inspected and cannot be challenged 
consecutively?
  With the alleged cheater welcome a team of top caliber experts and 
escort them to the suspected location promptly on the basis of that 
input?
  Will inspectors be allowed to use state-of-the-art inspection 
equipment in and around all suspect facilities on the basis of that 
input?
  Let's say the IMS and Executive Council overcome all of those 
impediments and call for an on site inspection of the suspected state. 
Now, do you suppose a state that conducted a clandestine nuclear test 
might be prepared to exercise any of the following rights explicitly 
granted under the CTBT's ``managed access'' principle:
  Deny entry to the inspection team [88(c)]? Refuse to allow 
representatives of the United States (as the challenging state) to 
accompany the inspectors [61(a)]? Delay inspectors' entry for up to 72 
hours after arrival [57]? Permanently exclude a given individual from 
any inspections [22]? Veto the inspection team's use of particular 
equipment [51]? Declare buildings off-limits to inspectors [88(a); 
89(d)]? Declare several four-square-kilometer sites off-limits to 
inspectors? [89(e); 92; 96]? Shroud sensitive displays, stores, or 
equipment [89(a)]? Disallow collection/analysis of samples to determine 
the presence or absence of radioactive products [89(c)]?
  Mr. President, even if we truly believe that in certain cases, 
working diligently under CTBT rules, each of these impediments can be 
surmounted, I must ask:
  Would it really be worth it for 5 kilotons? What if comparable events 
arise days, weeks, or months apart? What if new information bearing on 
the event arises after the elaborate inspection process has run its 
course? What if we develop comparable suspicions of the same state 
frequently? How many of these would it take before the United States is 
branded as a ``pest'' by the anti-nuclear crowd that is pushing this 
treaty? What if only our friends agree with our judgments? Or, perish 
the thought, if even our ``friends'' don't? How many pointless, 
frustrating, inconclusive OSI exercises would have to proceed our 
exercise of ``Safeguard F'' withdrawal rights?
  In short, Mr. President, the CTBT is long on President Reagan's 
``trust'' requirement, but fatally short on his ``verify'' requirement. 
I don't see how a single Senator can vote in favor of its ratification.
  Mr. President, I want to clarify a point in regard to the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and to set the record straight 
concerning the heritage of the treaty that the Senate is now 
considering.
  The treaty before the Senate is not, as some have led us to believe, 
the product of nine administrations. Certainly Ronald Reagan, George 
Bush, Gerald Ford, Richard Nixon, and Dwight D. Eisenhower have no ties 
to this treaty. And, the administrations of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon 
Johnson and Jimmy Carter's never proposed this treaty. The fact is, no 
other administration has any tie whatsoever to the treaty that is being 
considered by the Senate. The administration would like you to think 
that the treaty has had decades of support. Not so. This treaty is all 
Bill Clinton's. No other administration has ever supported a zero 
yield, unlimited duration nuclear test ban treaty barring all tests.
  Well, they'll say, the idea of limiting nuclear testing has been 
endorsed since the Eisenhower administration. Well, that may be, but 
supporting an idea and endorsing the specifics of a concrete proposal 
are two different things. President Clinton and I both support tax 
cuts. We both support missile defense. We even both say we're for 
maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent. It's in examining the specific 
tax cuts, missile defense proposals, and methods of

[[Page 25142]]

maintaining our nuclear security that we differ.
  President Eisenhower's name has been invoked here a number of times 
by Members supportive of the treaty. The implication is that Eisenhower 
is somehow the father of the CTBT. A review of the historical record 
reveals that President Eisenhower's administration proposed a test ban 
only of limited duration. Eisenhower only supported the test moratorium 
that began in 1958 because he was assured that the moratorium would 
retain American nuclear superiority and freeze the Soviets in an 
inferior position. He was very clear that the United States had to 
maintain a nuclear edge both in quality and quantity. I believe 
President Eisenhower would not have supported a treaty that gave others 
an advantage, as this treaty clearly does.
  President Kennedy's views of a nuclear test ban were much the same as 
Eisenhower's. He did not support a zero yield test ban. In fact, 
hydronuclear tests were conducted secretly in the Nevada desert during 
President Kennedy's administration. He also did not support a ban of 
unlimited duration. Kennedy broke out of the testing moratorium after 
the Soviet Union tested on September 1, 1961. At that time the world 
was shocked that the Soviets were able to begin an aggressive series of 
60 tests within 30 days. Equally shocking was the realization that the 
Soviets had been planning for the tests for at least six months, while 
at the same time negotiating with the United States to extend the test 
moratorium. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations did agree to the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty which banned nuclear blasts in the atmosphere, 
space, or under water, but not underground as the CTBT does.
  President Nixon did not seek to ban nuclear tests, although he agreed 
to limit tests above 150 kilotons.
  James Schlesinger, President Jimmy Carter's Secretary of Energy tell 
us that President Carter only sought a 10-year treaty and sought to 
allow tests of up to two kilotons.
  Presidents Reagan and Bush did not pursue a comprehensive test ban of 
any kind or duration. Some point to President Bush's signing of the 
Hatfield/Exon/Mitchell legislation limiting the United States to a 
series of 15 underground tests before entering a ban on testing as 
evidence that President Bush supported this comprehensive test ban 
treaty. This is not correct. On the day he left office, President Bush 
repudiated the Hatfield legislation and called for continuation of 
underground nuclear testing. He said, I quote,

       The administration strongly urges Congress to modify this 
     legislation urgently in order to permit the minimum number 
     and kind of underground nuclear tests that the United States 
     requires, regardless of the action of other states, to retain 
     safe, reliable, although dramatically reduced deterrent 
     forces.

  That brings us to the Clinton administration. Only President Clinton 
has sought a zero yield, unlimited duration treaty, and he has not even 
held that position for the entirety of his administration. For the 
first 2\1/2\ years, this administration pursued a treaty that would 
allow some level of low yield testing. As recently as 1995, the 
Department of Defense position was that it could support a CTBT only if 
tests of up to 500 tons were permitted. As a concession to the non-
nuclear states, the Clinton administration dropped that proviso and 
agreed to a zero yield test ban.
  This treaty has no historical lineage. It is from start to finish 
President Clinton's treaty.
  Mr. President, proponents of the CTBT are fond of pointing out that 
public opinion is strongly in favor of the treaty. This is not 
particularly a surprise because, in general, Americans support treaties 
that have been signed by their President. They assume that the U.S. 
Government would not participate in a treaty that is not in the 
nation's interest.
  In this regard, I would like to make two points. First, the American 
public overwhelmingly supports maintenance of a strong U.S. nuclear 
deterrent. If people are given the facts about the importance of 
nuclear testing to that deterrent, I believe that their view of the 
CTBT would change dramatically. Second, the CTBT indeed is not in the 
nation's interests and it is up to us, as leaders, to explain to the 
people why. Let me first address Americans' attitudes toward their 
nuclear deterrent.
  In June, 1998, the Public Policy Institute of the University of New 
Mexico truly non-partisan and professional groups conducted a 
nationwide poll on public views on security issues. Let me give you a 
few results of that poll:
  Seventy-three percent view it as important or extremely important for 
the U.S. to retain nuclear weapons today.
  Sixty-six percent view U.S. nuclear weapons as integral to 
maintaining U.S. status as a world leader.
  Seventy percent say that our nuclear weapons are important for 
preventing other countries from using nuclear weapons against our 
country.
  More than 70 percent say that it is important for the U.S. to remain 
a military superpower, with 45 percent saying that it is extremely 
important that we remain so.
  Now, we all know that the measure of commitment to a given aim can 
sometimes best be gauged by willingness to spend money to achieve it. 
The poll asked, ``Should Government increase spending to maintain 
existing nuclear weapons in reliable condition?'' Fifty-seven percent 
support increased spending and 15 percent support present spending 
levels.
  I will return to the subject of public opinion in a moment, but let 
me turn briefly to the issue of whether this treaty is in the nation's 
interest. If there were a test ban, we would not be able to know with 
certainty whether our nuclear weapons are as safe and reliable as they 
can be. On the other hand, Russia, China, and others might be able to 
continue nuclear testing without being detected. This is because the 
CTBT is simply not verifiable. What do you think the American people 
would think about that? Well, we have some data to tell us.
  The University of New Mexico's poll asked: ``If a problem develops 
with U.S. nuclear weapons, is it important for the United States to be 
able to conduct nuclear test explosions to fix the problem?'' Fifty-
four percent of the people said yes. Only 15.5 percent said no. The 
rest were undecided.
  The poll also asked, ``How important do you think it is for the 
United States to be able to detect cheating by other countries on arms 
control treaties such as the comprehensive nuclear test ban? Over 80 
percent said that it was important, with 40 percent saying that it is 
extremely important.
  The bottom line here is that the American people want us to retain a 
strong nuclear deterrent. While they will also support good arms 
control measures, they expect the American leadership to do whatever is 
necessary to keep the deterrent strong. Let's not be fooled by 
simplistic yes-or-no answers to questions about the CTBT. This issue is 
more complex than that. We must simply give people the facts about this 
treaty. The CTBT would imperil our security.
  I urge a vote against this treaty.
  I yield back the remainder of my time.
  I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Does the Senator from Delaware have any time remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 1 minute 6 
seconds remaining.
  Mr. BIDEN. I do not wish to be the last to speak. I would like to use 
that 1 minute and ask unanimous consent that my friend be allowed to 
use any additional time he may want to use after that, because it is 
appropriate he should close.
  I want to make a point in the minute I have.
  This is about, as the Senator has honestly stated, more than the CTBT 
Treaty. It is about ending the regime of arms control. That is what 
this is about. If this fails, I ask you the question: Is there any 
possibility of amending the ABM Treaty? Is there any possibility of the 
START II or START III

[[Page 25143]]

agreements coming into effect with regard to Russia? Is there any 
possibility of arms control surviving?
  I think this is about arms control, not just about this treaty. I 
appreciate my friend's candor. That is one of the reasons I think it is 
such a devastating vote.
  I yield back the remainder of our time. And I ask unanimous consent 
that the Senator from North Carolina be given an appropriate amount of 
time to respond, if he wishes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the yeas and nays have been ordered; is 
that right?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, they have.
  Mr. HELMS. Let's vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the resolution 
to advise and consent to ratification of Treaty Document No. 105-28, 
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. On this question, the yeas 
and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. BYRD (when his name was called). Present.
  The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 48, nays 51, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 325 Ex.]

                                YEAS--48

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Conrad
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Graham
     Harkin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Mikulski
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Smith (OR)
     Specter
     Torricelli
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--51

     Abraham
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Campbell
     Cochran
     Collins
     Coverdell
     Craig
     Crapo
     DeWine
     Domenici
     Enzi
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Kyl
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Roberts
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Snowe
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Voinovich
     Warner

                        ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--1

       
     Byrd
       
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 48, the nays are 
51, and one Senator responding ``present.'' Not having received the 
affirmative votes of two-thirds of the Senators present, the resolution 
is not agreed to, and the Senate does not advise and consent to the 
ratification of the treaty.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. ABRAHAM. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Warner-
Moynihan letter to the Majority and Minority leaders dated October 12, 
1999, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:


                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                 Washington, DC, October 12, 1999.
     Hon. Trent Lott
     Majority Leader.
     Hon. Tom Daschle
     Democratic Leader.

     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Leaders: The Senate Leadership has received a 
     letter from President Clinton requesting ``that you postpone 
     consideration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on the 
     Senate Floor.'' We write in support of putting off final 
     consideration until the next Congress.
       Were the Treaty to be voted on today, Senator Warner and 
     Senator Lugar would be opposed. Senator Moynihan and Senator 
     Biden would be in support. But we all agree on seeking a 
     delay. We believe many colleagues are of a like view, 
     irrespective of how they would vote at this point.
       We recognize that the Nation's best interests, the Nation's 
     vital business, is and must always be the first concern of 
     the Presidency and the Congress.
       But we cannot foresee at this time an international crisis 
     of the magnitude, that would persuade the Senate to revisit a 
     decision made now to put off a final consideration of the 
     Treaty until the 107th Congress.
       However, we recognize that throughout history the Senate 
     has had the power, the duty to reconsider prior decisions.
       Therefore, if Leadership takes under consideration a joint 
     initiative to implement the President's request--and our 
     request--for a delay, then we commit our support for our 
     Leaders taking this statesmanlike initiative.


                              republicans

       Warner, Lugar, Roth, Domenici, Hagel, Gordon Smith, 
     Collins, McCain, Snowe, Sessions, Stevens, Chafee, Brownback, 
     Bennett, Jeffords, Grassley, DeWine, Specter, Hatch, 
     Voinovich, Gorton, Burns, Gregg, Santorum.


                               democrats

       Moynihan, Biden, Lieberman, Levin, Feingold, Kohl, Boxer, 
     Cleland, Dodd, Wyden, Rockefeller, Bingaman, Inouye, Baucus, 
     Hollings, Kennedy, Harry Reid, Robb, Jack Reed.
       Mikulski, Torricelli, Feinstein, Schumer, Breaux, Bob 
     Kerrey, Evan Bayh, John Kerry, Landrieu, Murray, Tim Johnson, 
     Byrd, Lautenberg, Harkin, Durbin, Leahy, Wellstone, Akaka, 
     Edwards.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the Senate can and should always act as the 
conscience of the Nation. Historians may well say that we did not vote 
on this treaty today.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, today the United States Senate fulfilled its 
constitutional responsibility by voting on the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test Ban Treaty. Under the Constitution, the President and the Senate 
are co-equal partners when it comes to treaty-making powers. Positive 
action by both branches is required before a treaty can become the 
supreme law of the land. All Americans should know that I and my 
colleagues take this solemn responsibility with great pride, and we are 
very diligent in making sure that our advice and consent to treaties is 
treated with the utmost consideration and seriousness.
  The Senate does not often refuse to ratify treaties, as borne out by 
the historical record. But the fact that the Senate has rejected 
several significant treaties this century underscores the important 
``quality control'' function that was intended by the Framers of the 
Constitution. The Founding Fathers never envisioned the Senate would be 
a rubber stamp for flawed treaties. I and my colleagues would never 
allow this venerable institution to be perceived as--much less actually 
become--a mere rubber stamp for agreements negotiated by this or any 
other President. Instead, the Senate must dissect and debate every 
treaty to ensure that it adequately protects and promotes American 
security interests. The American people expect no less.
  As has been pointed out by numerous experts before the Foreign 
Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence Committees, and by many 
Senators in extended floor debate, this treaty does not meet even the 
minimal standards of previous arms control treaties. That is, it is 
ineffectual--even dangerous, in my judgment; it is unverifiable; and it 
is unenforceable. As one of my distinguished colleagues put it: ``the 
CTBT is not of the same caliber as the arms control treaties that have 
come before the Senate in recent decades.''
  This treaty is ineffectual because it would not stop other nations 
from testing or developing nuclear weapons, but it could preclude the 
United States from taking appropriate steps to ensure the safety and 
reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. That it is not effectively 
verifiable is made clear by the intelligence community's inability to 
state unequivocally the purpose of activities underway for some number 
of months at the Russian nuclear test site. Just last week, it was 
clear that they could not assure us that low-level testing was not 
taking place. The CTBT simply has no teeth.
  Had the President consulted with more Senators before making the 
decision in 1995 to pursue an unverifiable, unlimited-duration, zero-
yield ban on testing, he would have known that such a treaty could not 
be ratified. If he had talked at that time to Senator Warner, to 
Senator Kyl, to Senator Lugar, to any number of Senators, and

[[Page 25144]]

to Senator Helms, he could have been told that this was not a 
verifiable treaty and that it was not the safe thing to do for our 
country.
  I know some will ask, so what happens next? The first thing that must 
be done is to begin a process to strengthen U.S. nuclear deterrence so 
that no one--whether potential adversary or ally--comes away from these 
deliberations with doubts about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear 
arsenal.
  To this end, I have written to Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen asking 
that he initiate a comprehensive review of the state of the U.S. 
nuclear weapons stockpile, infrastructure, management, personnel, 
training, delivery systems, and related matters. The review would 
encompass activities under the purview of the Department of Defense and 
the new, congressionally mandated National Nuclear Security 
Administration. The objective of this review would be to identify ways 
the administration and Congress jointly can strengthen our nuclear 
deterrent in the coming decades, for example, by providing additional 
resources to the Stockpile Stewardship Program on which Senator 
Domenici is so diligently working, and that exists at our nuclear 
weapons labs and production plants. I have offered to work with 
Secretary Cohen on the establishment and conduct of such a review, and 
I hope Secretary Cohen will promptly agree to my request.
  Second, the Senate should undertake a major survey of the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated means of 
delivery as we approach the new millennium. A key aspect of this review 
should be an assessment of whether or to what extent U.S. policies and 
actions (or inactions) contributed to the heightened proliferation that 
has occurred over the past 7 years. We know that from North Korea to 
Iran and Iraq, from China to Russia, and from India to Pakistan, the 
next President will be forced to confront a strategic landscape that in 
many ways is far more hostile and dangerous than that which President 
Clinton inherited in January, 1993. I call upon the relevant committees 
of jurisdiction in the Senate to properly initiate such a survey and 
plan to complete action within the next 180 days.
  Finally, I am aware that the administration claims that rejection of 
the CTBT could damage U.S. prestige and signal a blow to our 
leadership. American leadership is vital in the world today but with 
leadership comes responsibility. We have a responsibility to ensure 
that any arms control agreements presented to the Senate for advice and 
consent are both clearly in America's security interests and 
effectively verifiable. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty failed on 
both of these crucial tests.
  Today, among many other telephone conversations I had, I talked to 
former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, a man for whom I have the 
highest regard, a man who gave real leadership when he was at the 
Department of Defense, a man who would never advocate a position not in 
the best national security interests of the United States or in support 
of our international reputation. He told me he was convinced the treaty 
was fatally flawed, that it should be defeated, and in fact it would 
send a clear message to our treaty negotiators and people around the 
world that treaties that are not verifiable, that are not properly 
concluded, will not be ratified by the Senate. We will take our 
responsibility seriously and we will defeat bad treaties when it is in 
the best interest of our country, our allies, and more importantly for 
me, our children and their future.
  I think we have taken the right step today. I note that this vote 
turned out to be a rather significant vote: 51 Senators voted against 
this treaty. Not even a majority was for this treaty. To confirm a 
treaty or ratify a treaty takes, of course, a two-thirds vote, 67 
votes. They were not here. They were never here. This treaty should not 
have been pushed for the past 2 years. It was not ready for 
consideration and it was unverifiable and therefore would not be 
ratified.
  I thank my colleagues on both sides of the aisle for their 
participation. I thought the debate was spirited. It was good on both 
sides of the aisle. I appreciate the advice and counsel I received on 
all sides as we have gone through this process. It has not been easy 
but it is part of the job. I take this job very seriously. I take this 
vote very seriously. For today, Mr. President, we did the right thing 
for America.
  I yield the floor.

                          ____________________