[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 17]
[Senate]
[Pages 24827-24906]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                           EXECUTIVE SESSION

                                 ______
                                 

                 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
go into executive session and resume consideration of Executive 
Calendar No. 3, which the clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       Resolution to Advise and Consent to the Ratification of 
     treaty document No. 105-28, Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban 
     Treaty.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Will the Chair inform the two managers what time is 
remaining for both sides on the debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator from Nevada that 
the majority has 2 hours 53 minutes; the minority, 3 hours 23 minutes.
  Mr. REID. I say to my friends from Arizona and Virginia that we will 
try to speak now and even out the time.
  Mr. President, I give myself such time as I may consume.
  We have heard a lot about nuclear testing recently, but no one has 
experienced nuclear testing as has the State of Nevada. Just a few 
miles from Las Vegas is the Nevada Test Site. There we have had almost 
1,000 tests, some above ground and some below ground. You can travel to 
the Nevada Test Site now and go and look at these test sites. You can 
see where the above-ground tests have taken place. You can drive by one 
place where bleachers are still standing where people--press and 
others--would come and sit to watch the nuclear tests in the valley 
below. You can see some of the buildings that still are standing 
following a nuclear test. You can see large tunnels that are still in 
existence where scores and scores of tests were set off in the same 
tunnels. You can go and look at very deep shafts where underground 
tests were set off.
  The State of Nevada understands nuclear testing. At one time, more 
than 11,000 people were employed in the Nevada desert dealing with 
nuclear testing. Now, as a result of several administrations making a 
decision to no longer test nuclear weapons, there are only a little 
over 2,000 people there. Those 2,000 people are there by virtue of an 
Executive order saying we have to be ready if tests are deemed 
necessary in the national interest. So the Nevada Test Site is still 
there. The people are standing by in case there is a need for the test 
site to again be used.
  The cessation of testing caused the largest percentage reduction of 
defense-related jobs in any Department of Energy facility. Today, as I 
indicated, there are a little over 2,000 of those jobs.
  The State of Nevada is very proud of what we have done for the 
security of this Nation. Not only have we had the above-ground nuclear 
tests and the below-ground nuclear tests, but we have Nellis Air Force 
Base which is the premier fighter training center for the U.S. Air 
Force--in fact, it is the premier fighter training center for all 
allied forces around the world. I had a meeting recently with the 
general who runs Nellis Air Force Base. He was preparing for the German 
Air Force to come to Las Vegas to be involved in the training systems 
available for fighting the enemy in fighter planes.
  Also, 400 miles from Las Vegas and Nellis Air Force Gunnery Range, 
you have Fallon Naval Air Station. It is the same type of training 
facility, not for the Air Force but the Navy. Virtually every pilot who 
lands on a carrier has been trained at Fallon. It is the premier 
fighter training center for naval aircraft--Fallon Naval Air Station.
  There are many other facilities that have been used over the years. 
Today, we have Indian Springs Air Force Base which is 50 miles out of 
Las Vegas--actually less than that--where they are testing drones, the 
unmanned aircraft. So we have given a lot to the security of this 
Nation; we continue to do so.
  When we talk about nuclear testing, I can remember as a young boy, I 
was raised 60 miles from Las Vegas.
  We were probably 125 miles from where the actual detonations took 
place. We would get up early in the morning at my home in Searchlight 
and watch these tests. They would announce when the tests were coming.
  We always saw the flash of light with the above-ground tests. 
Sometimes we

[[Page 24828]]

did not hear the sound because it would sometimes bounce over us.
  We were the lucky ones, though, because the winds never blew toward 
Searchlight or Las Vegas. The winds blew toward southern Utah and 
Lincoln County in Nevada.
  As a result of these above-ground tests, many people developed 
radiation sickness. They did not know it at the time. People did not 
understand what fallout was all about.
  Yes, in Nevada, we understand nuclear testing as well as anyone in 
the world.
  Nevada is going to continue its national service whether this treaty 
is ratified or not. We have already stopped testing in the traditional 
sense.
  I want everyone to understand that even though I am a supporter of 
this treaty, I believe it would be much better, rather than having 
everyone march in here tonight and vote up or down on this treaty, that 
we spend some more time talking about it. I am convinced it is a good 
thing for this country, a good thing for this Nation, but I have some 
questions. We should answer some questions.
  I have the good fortune of serving on the Energy and Water 
Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee. I am the ranking Democrat 
on that subcommittee, with the head Republican on the subcommittee, 
Senator Domenici of New Mexico. It is our responsibility to appropriate 
the money for the nuclear defense capabilities of this country. We do 
that. We spend billions of dollars every year.
  One of the things we have tried to do, recognizing we do not have 
traditional testing--that is underground testing or above-ground 
testing; of course, we do not do above-ground testing--is to provide 
other ways to make sure our nuclear stockpile is safe and reliable. No 
matter what we have done in the past, we have to make sure our weapons 
are safe and reliable.
  How can we do that? We are attempting in this country to do the right 
thing. We have the Stockpile Stewardship Program under which we are 
conducting tests now. They are not explosions. We are doing it through 
computers. We have some names for some of our tests.
  One of them is subcritical testing. What does that mean? It means we 
set off an explosion involving nuclear materials, but before the 
material becomes critical, we stop it. There is no nuclear yield. Then 
through computerization, in effect, we try to determine what would have 
happened had this test gone critical. That is an expensive program, but 
it is a program that is absolutely necessary, again, for the safety and 
reliability of our nuclear stockpile.
  About 2 years ago, I gave a statement before our subcommittee. This 
was a statement on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on which we had a 
hearing. In that statement, I wrote about the loss of confidence in new 
weapons that could not be tested under the treaty and how this loss of 
confidence would prevent recurrence of the costly and dangerous nuclear 
arms race of the past 50 years.
  I wrote about the confidence between former adversaries that would 
come from the treaty because no longer would we or they have to worry 
about significant new imbalances in deterrent forces, because no new 
weapons could be built.
  I wrote about how that confidence would lead to more and more 
reductions in nuclear stockpiles and move the world even further away 
from nuclear annihilation.
  I wrote about how the international example of refraining from 
nuclear testing, along with stockpile reductions, would reduce the 
incentives for non-nuclear states to develop nuclear weapons.
  I did not write 2 years ago about the upcoming Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty review conference in which only states that have ratified the 
treaty will have effective membership.
  That review conference will be able to change the conditions under 
which the treaty goes into force, and the United States, I am sorry to 
report, will have no place at that table unless the treaty is ratified 
by this Senate before that conference.
  I wrote about more than the benefits of this treaty. I also wrote 
about some of its uncertainties and some of the concerns, I believe, we 
need to study and review, and about the debate that is needed for their 
resolution.
  I pointed out that a prohibition against any and all nuclear 
explosions would reduce confidence in stockpile reliability and safety 
unless some other means was developed to maintain that confidence.
  I noted that the Stockpile Stewardship Program was conceived to 
provide that other means. We have had 2 years of experience with this 
program, but I wrote about the uncertainties faced by science-based 
stockpile stewardship. I noted the plan depends critically on dramatic 
increases in computational capability. That is why in our subcommittee 
we have worked very hard to spend hard-earned tax dollars to develop 
better computers. The development of computers is going on around the 
world, but no place is it going on at a more rapid pace than with the 
money we have provided through this subcommittee. We are doing it 
because we believe through computerization, we can have a more safe and 
more reliable stockpile.
  It is only through, as I wrote, these dramatic increases in 
computational capability and equally dramatic increases in resolution 
with which non-nuclear experiments can be measured that we can go 
forward with certainty of having a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile.
  I noted persistent support by Congress and the administration was 
absolutely necessary, not on a short-term basis but on a long-term 
basis. I noted Congress and the administration had to support the 
science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program; that we must set the 
pattern for the world; it can be done, and we can do it.
  I did say that the support of Congress and the administration was 
absolutely necessary but not necessarily sufficient because the 
stewardship program is being developed at the same time that its 
architects are learning more about it. It is a study in progress. I 
wrote then, and I believe now, the learning process will continue.
  I pointed out that the test ban treaty would not prevent nuclear 
weapons development. It would only inhibit the military significance of 
such development. We are not going to develop new weapons. We have not 
developed new weapons.
  Let's talk, for example, about what can be done. You can have the 
development of crude nuclear explosives that are difficult to deliver, 
but these could be developed with confidence without testing. We know, 
going back to the early days of things nuclear, that ``Fat Man'' had 
not been tested. That was the bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima. There 
was no test. It was a huge weapon, as large as the side of a house. 
They had to build a pit in the runway to load it. They had to 
reconfigure the B-29 so it could drop this huge weapon, but it was not 
tested.
  Stopping testing is not going to stop the development of nuclear 
weapons. Rogue nations and other nations can develop these weapons if 
they see fit. But these crude weapons will not upset the deterrent 
balance.
  Also, some say the treaty would prevent the introduction of new 
modern weapons that could weaken strategic deterrence. For example, 
nations could not build sophisticated new weapons; they would be stuck 
with what they have. What they have may be good, may be bad.
  I pointed out the treaty could not guarantee total cessation of 
nuclear testing because very low-yield tests and higher yield 
``decoupled'' tests might not be detected with confidence. You could 
have small, very small tests. It would be very hard to detect.
  You could also have the situation where a signatory nation could 
execute a high-yield ``unattended'' explosion. What does that mean? 
What it means is that for a high-yield ``unattended'' explosion in a 
clandestine operation--nobody could identify the signatory nation that 
was being noncompliant.
  For example, let's say someone developed a nuclear device and 
secretly

[[Page 24829]]

dropped it in the ocean and then left. When the device went off 
someplace deep in the ocean, the country that dropped it in the ocean 
could certainly know that it exploded. But others could not identify 
who did it. It would be very hard to develop or make a new stockpile 
doing it this way, but it is possible. There are ways around 
everything.
  But in spite of all these things that you could throw up as ways to 
get around the treaty--the ``decoupled'' tests and dropping them in the 
ocean, of course, you can do those kinds of things--but in spite of 
that, the positive nature of this treaty far outweighs any of these 
things that I have mentioned.
  I did say in that statement I made before our subcommittee that the 
United States takes its treaty obligations seriously. We would not in 
any manner do what I have just outlined. But other nations might 
conduct themselves in that fashion. You cannot conduct your foreign 
policy believing that everybody is going to do everything the right 
way.
  I do say that in all of these areas of uncertainty, I wrote about the 
need of the United States for a prolonged, comprehensive investigation 
and debate. That is where we have failed. We should have had hearings 
that went over a period of years, not a few days.
  It is through consultation and the testimony of experts, and debate 
among Members of this body and the other body, that the issues and 
questions can be properly framed, examined, and resolved.
  I was overly optimistic when I wrote in the conclusion of my 
statement to the hearing as follows:

       These uncertainties and their associated issues will be the 
     subject of intense debate by the Senate as we move toward a 
     policy decision that will define an appropriate balance 
     between the treaty's costs, its risks, and its promised 
     benefits.

  There has been no intense debate. I was too optimistic because we did 
not ``move'' toward a policy decision; we did not do anything. We 
stumbled, lurched perhaps. I was too optimistic because intense debate 
has not been conducted by the Senate. There have been a few little 
things that have gone on. For example, in my subcommittee we have done 
a few things. But we have needed extensive debate.
  What have we had in the last few days, literally? We have had some 
experts come in. We have had some hurriedly conducted hearings. That 
isn't the way you approach, perhaps, one of the most important treaties 
this country has ever decided.
  I think the chairmen and the ranking members of both the Armed 
Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, during the last 
few days, have done the best they could under the circumstances. I 
commend them for trying. But I do not think we should base this treaty 
on what has gone on in the last few days.
  I was too optimistic because I did not realize we would enter a time 
agreement to debate this most important issue for 14 hours. I do not 
think it is appropriate. I think it prevents amendments that may be 
necessary.
  I indicate that I rise in support of this treaty. I do it without any 
reluctance. I do say, however, that we should have more debate. We 
should have more consultation. We should have more hearings. That would 
allow us to arrive at a better, more informed decision.
  I have heard some people speak on this floor saying they want more 
information. They are entitled to that. I think we are rushing forward 
on a vote on this. We should step back. I think if there is an 
opportunity today to avoid the vote this afternoon or tomorrow, we 
should do that. I do not think we need to rush into this.
  The President has written a letter indicating, for the good of the 
country, this vote should be put off. I agree with that. I am not 
afraid to cast my vote. I have indicated several times this morning 
that I will vote in favor of the treaty. I do not, for a moment, 
believe that there are others who feel any differently than I in our 
responsibility. Our job is to cast votes. I only wish Members were 
given the time and opportunity to become as informed as possible so 
that all Members are given an opportunity to improve this treaty--
through debate, through dialogue, and perhaps even through amendment.
  Again, I rise in support of this treaty, not because I had an 
opportunity to consider all the issues and the expert opinion on these 
issues. I rise in support of the treaty because on the whole we are 
much, much, much better off with it than without it.
  I have only a partial list of prominent individuals and national 
groups in support of this test ban treaty: Current and former Chairmen 
and Vice Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; former Secretaries of 
Defense; former Secretaries of State; former Secretaries of Energy; 
former Members of Congress; Directors of the three National 
Laboratories; we have other prominent national security officials; arms 
control negotiators; we have many prominent military officers who have 
been members of the Chiefs of Staff; scientific experts from all over 
the United States with the greatest academic institutions; we have 
Nobel laureates--more than a score of Nobel laureates who support this 
treaty--former senior Government officials and advisors; ambassadors; 
national groups; medical and scientific groups; public interest groups; 
religious groups.
  I have eight or nine pages of prominent individuals and national 
groups in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty that I 
ask unanimous consent be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

Partial List of Prominent Individuals and National Groups in Support of 
                       the CTBT--October 9, 1999


 current and former chairmen/vice-chairmen of the joint chiefs of staff

       General Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff.
       General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff.
       General Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
     of Staff.
       General David Jones, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff.
       Admiral William Crowe, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
     of Staff.
       General Joseph Ralston, Vice Chairman.
       Admiral William Owens, former Vice Chairman.


                     former secretaries of defense

       Robert McNamara.
       Harold Brown.
       William Perry.


                      former secretaries of state

       Warren Christopher.
       Cyrus Vance.


                      former secretaries of energy

       Hazel O'Leary.
       Federico Pena.


                         former acda directors

       Ambassador Ralph Earle II.
       Major General William F. Burns.
       Lt. General George M. Seignious II.
       Ambassador Paul Warnke.
       Kenneth Adelman.


                       former members of congress

       Senator Dale Bumpers.
       Senator Alan Cranston.
       Senator John C. Danforth.
       Senator J. James Exon.
       Senator John Glenn.
       Senator Mark O. Hatfield.
       Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum.
       Senator George Mitchell.
       Representative Bill Green.
       Representative Thomas J. Downey.
       Representative Michael J. Kopetski.
       Representative Anthony C. Bellenson.
       Representative Lee. H. Hamilton.


              directors of the three national laboratories

       Dr. John Browne, Director of Los Alamos National 
     Laboratory.
       Dr. Paul Robinson, Director of Sandia National Laboratory.
       Dr. Bruce Tarter, Director of Lawrence Livermore National 
     Laboratory.


              other prominent national security officials

       Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, arms control negotiator, Reagan 
     Administration.
       Admiral Stansfield Turner, former Director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency.
       Charles Curtis, former Deputy Secretary of Energy.
       Anthony Lake, former National Security Advisor.


              prominent military officers--service chiefs

       General Eric L. Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff.
       General Dennis J. Reimer, former Army Chief of Staff.
       General Gordon Russell Sullivan, former Army Chief of 
     Staff.

[[Page 24830]]

       General Bernard W. Rogers, former Chief of Staff, U.S. 
     Army; former NATO Supreme Allied Commander.
       General Michael E. Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff.
       General Merrill A. McPeak, former Air Force Chief of Staff.
       General Ronald R. Fogleman, former Air Force Chief of 
     Staff.
       General James L. Jones, Marine Corps Commandant.
       General Charles C. Krulak, former Marine Corps Commandant.
       General Carl E. Mundy, former Marine Corps Commandant.
       Admiral Jay L. Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations.
       Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, former Chief of Naval 
     Operations.
       Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., former Chief of Naval 
     Operations.
       General Eugene Habiger, former Commander-in-Chief of 
     Strategic Command.
       General John R. Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
       Admiral Noel Gayler, former Commander, Pacific.
       General Charles A. Horner, Commander, Coalition Air Forces, 
     Desert Storm, former Commander, U.S. Space Command.
       General Andrew O'Meara, former Commander U.S. Army Europe.
       General Bernard W. Rogers, former Chief of Staff, U.S. 
     Army; former NATO Supreme Allied Commander.
       General William Y. Smith, former Deputy Commander, U.S. 
     Command, Europe.
       Lt. General Julius Becton.
       Lt. General John H. Cushman, former Commander, I Corps 
     (ROK/US) Group (Korea).
       Lt. General Robert E. Pursley.
       Vice Admiral William L. Read, former Commander, U.S. Navy 
     Surface Force, Atlantic Command.
       Vice Admiral John J. Shanahan, former Director, Center for 
     Defense Information [19].
       Lt. General George M. Seignious II, former Director Arms 
     Control and Disarmament Agency.
       Vice Admiral James B. Wilson, former Polaris Submarine 
     Captain.
       Maj. General William F. Burns, JCS Representative, INF 
     Negotiations, Special Envoy to Russia for Nuclear 
     Dismantlement.
       Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr., Deputy Director, 
     Center for Defense Information.
       Rear Admiral Robert G. James.


                        Other Scientific Experts

       Dr. Hans Bethe, Nobel Laureate; Emeritus Professor of 
     Physics, Cornell University; Head of the Manhattan Project's 
     theoretical division.
       Dr. Freeman Dyson, Emeritus Professor of Physics, Institute 
     for Advanced Study, Princeton.
       Dr. Richard Garwin, Senior Fellow for Science and 
     Technology, Council on Foreign Relations; consultant to 
     Sandia National Laboratory, former consultant to Los Alamos 
     National Laboratory.
       Dr. Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, Director Emeritus, Stanford 
     Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University.
       Dr. Jeremiah D. Sullivan, Professor of Physics, University 
     of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
       Dr. Herbert York, Emeritus Professor of Physics, University 
     of California, San Diego; founding director of Lawrence 
     Livermore, National Laboratory; former Director of Defense 
     Research and Engineering, Department of Defense.
       Dr. Sidney D. Drell, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, 
     Stanford University.


                            Nobel Laureates

       Philip W. Anderson.
       Hans Bethe.
       Nicolaas Bloembergen.
       Owen Chamberlain.
       Steven Chu.
       Leon Cooper.
       Hans Dehmelt.
       Val F. Fitch.
       Jerome Friedman.
       Donald A. Glaser.
       Sheldon Glashow.
       Henry W. Kendall.
       Leon M. Lederman.
       David E. Lee.
       T.D. Lee.
       Douglas D. Osheroff.
       Arno Penzias.
       Martin Perl.
       William Phillips.
       Norman F. Ramsey.
       Robert C. Richardson.
       Burton Richter.
       Arthur L. Schawlow.
       J. Robert Schrieffer.
       Mel Schwartz.
       Clifford G. Shull.
       Joseph H. Taylor, Jr.
       Daniel C. Tsui.
       Charles Townes.
       Steven Weinberg.
       Robert W. Wilson.
       Kenneth G. Wilson.


            Former Senior Government Officials and Advisors

       Ambassador George Bunn, NPT Negotiations and former General 
     Counsel of ACDA.
       Ambassador Jonathan Dean, MBFR negotiations.
       Ambassador James E. Goodby, Ambassador to Finland and to 
     U.S.-Russian Nuclear negotiations.
       Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., Special Representative of 
     the President for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and 
     Disarmament.
       The Honorable Paul Ignatius, Secretary of the Navy.
       The Honorable Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy Director of ACDA.
       The Honorable Lawrence Korb, Assistant Secretary of 
     Defense.
       Ambassador Steven Ledogar, CTBT negotiations.
       Ambassador James Leonard, Deputy U.N. Representative.
       Jack Mendelsohn, senior arms control negotiator.
       Lori Murray, Assistant Director of ACDA.
       Ambassador Michael Newlin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
     State for Export Controls and Policy.
       Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan.
       Daniel B. Poneman, Senior Director, National Security 
     Council.
       The Honorable Stanley Resor, Secretary of the Army and 
     Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.
       The Honorable John Rhinelander, Legal Adviser to SALT I 
     Delegation.
       Elizabeth Rindskopf, General Counsel of CIA and National 
     Security Agency.
       Ambassador Robert Gallucci, DPRK Agreed Framework 
     negotiations.
       The Honorable Lawrence Scheinman, Assistant Director of 
     ACDA.
       Ambassador James Sweeney, Special Representative of the 
     President for Non-Proliferation.
       Ambassador Frank Wisner, U.S. Ambassador to India.


                       former government advisers

       Paul Doty.
       Richard Garwin.
       John Holdren.
       Wolfgang Panokfsky.
       Frank Press.
       John D. Steinbruner.
       Frank N. von Hippel.

                            National Groups


                  Medical and Scientific Organizations

       American Association for the Advancement of Science.
       American Geophysical Union.
       American Medical Students Association/Foundation.
       American Physical Society.
       American Public Health Association.
       American Medical Association.


                         Public Interest Groups

       20/20 Vision National Project.
       Alliance for Nuclear Accountability.
       Alliance for Survival.
       Americans for Democratic Action.
       Arms Control Association.
       British American Security Information Council.
       Business Executives for National Security.
       Campaign for America's Future.
       Campaign for U.N. Reform.
       Center for Defense Information.
       Center for War/Peace Studies (New York, NY).
       Council for a Livable World.
       Council for a Livable World Education Fund.
       Council on Economic Priorities.
       Defenders of Wildlife.
       Demilitarization for Democracy.
       Economists Allied for Arms Reduction (ECAAR).
       Environmental Defense Fund.
       Environmental Working Group.
       Federation of American Scientists.
       Fourth Freedom Forum.
       Friends of the Earth.
       Fund for New Priorities in America.
       Fund for Peace.
       Global Greens, USA.
       Global Resource Action Center for the Environment.
       Greenpeace, USA.
       The Henry L. Stimson Center.
       Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (Saugus, MA).
       Institute for Science and International Security.
       International Association of Educators for World Peace 
     (Huntsville, AL).
       International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.
       International Center.
       Izaak Walton League of America.
       Lawyers Alliance for World Security.
       League of Women Voters of the United States.
       Manhattan Project II.
       Maryknoll Justice and Peace Office.
       National Environmental Coalition of Native Americans 
     (NECONA).
       National Environmental Trust.
       National Commission for Economic Conversion and 
     Disarmament.
       Natural Resources Defense Council.
       Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.
       Nuclear Control Institute.
       Nuclear Information & Resource Service.
       OMB Watch.
       Parliamentarians for Global Action
       Peace Action.
       Peace Action Education Fund.
       Peace Links.
       PeacePAC.
       Physicians for Social Responsibility.

[[Page 24831]]

       Plutonium Challenge.
       Population Action Institute.
       Population Action International.
       Psychologists for Social Responsibility.
       Public Citizen.
       Public Education Center.
       Saferworld.
       Sierra Club.
       Union of Concerned Scientists.
       United States Servas, Inc.
       Veterans for Peace.
       Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation.
       Volunteers for Peace, Inc.
       War and Peace Foundation.
       War Resistors League.
       Women Strike for Peace.
       Women's Action for New Directions.
       Women's Legislators' Lobby of WAND.
       Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.
       World Federalist Association.
       Zero Population Growth.


                            religious groups

       African Methodist Episcopal Church.
       American Baptist Churches, USA.
       American Baptist Churches, USA, National Ministries.
       American Friends Service Committee.
       American Jewish Congress.
       American Muslim Council.
       Association General Secretary for Public Policy, National 
     Council of Churches.
       Catholic Conference of Major Superiors of Men's Institutes.
       Church Women United.
       Coalition for Peace and Justice.
       Columbian Fathers' Justice and Peace Office.
       Commission for Women, Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
     America.
       Covenant of Unitarian Universalist Pagans.
       Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) in the United States 
     and Canada.
       Christian Methodist Episcopal Church.
       Church of the Brethren, General Board.
       Division for Church in Society, Evangelical Lutheran Church 
     in America.
       Division for Congregational Ministries, Evangelical 
     Lutheran Church in America.
       Eastern Archdiocese, Syrian Orthodox Church of Antioch.
       The Episcopal Church.
       Episcopal Peace Fellowship, National Executive Council.
       Evangelicals for Social Action.
       Evangelical Lutheran Church in America.
       Fellowship of Reconciliation.
       Friends Committee on National Legislation.
       Friends United Meeting.
       General Board Members, Church of the Brethren.
       General Board of Church and Society, United Methodist 
     Church.
       General Conference, Mennonite Church.
       General Conference of the Seventh Day Adventist Church.
       Jewish Peace Fellowship.
       Lutheran Office for Governmental Affairs, Evangelical 
     Lutheran Church in America.
       Mennonite Central Committee.
       Mennonite Central Committee, U.S.
       Mennonite Church.
       Methodists United for Peace with Justice.
       Missionaries of Africa.
       Mission Investment Fund of the ELCA, Evangelical Lutheran 
     Church in America.
       Moravian Church, Northern Province.
       National Council of Churches.
       National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA.
       National Council of Catholic Women.
       National Missionary Baptist Convention of America.
       NETWORK: A National Catholic Social Justice Lobby.
       New Call to Peacemaking.
       Office for Church in Society, United Church of Christ.
       Orthodox Church in America.
       Pax Christi.
       Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.).
       Presbyterian Peace Fellowship.
       Progressive National Baptist Convention, Inc.
       Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism.
       The Shalom Center.
       Sojourners.
       Union of American Hebrew Congregations.
       United Church of Christ.
       United Methodist Church.
       United Methodist Council of Bishops.
       Unitarian Universalist Association.
       Washington Office, Mennonite Central Committee.
       Women of the ELCA, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America.

  Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thought it was understood that we would 
alternate sides as we proceeded this morning.
  Mr. REID. I would only say to my friend from Virginia, I am happy to 
alternate. The only thing is, you will have to speak less than we do. 
Your speeches will have to be shorter because you have less time. I 
spoke with the Senator from Arizona. What is the time now?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority has 2 hours 53 minutes; the 
minority, 3 hours 2 minutes.
  Mr. REID. So it has narrowed down to about the same time. Fine, we 
will alternate back and forth.
  Mr. WARNER. The time--
  Mr. REID. Is very close to being equal.
  Mr. WARNER. As an opponent to the treaty, I would like to proceed, 
Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is that all right with the Senator from 
Wisconsin?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. My understanding is, I would be next in line after the 
Senator from Virginia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator from Wisconsin.
  During the period of last week, a number of Senators sought to obtain 
from the President a letter addressing his views on the timing of a 
vote on this treaty. Over the weekend, in consultation with the White 
House staff, I learned that this letter would be delivered. It was 
delivered to the Senate leadership yesterday afternoon.
  I shall now read it and place it in the Record:

     Dear Mr. Leader:
       Tomorrow, the Senate is scheduled to vote on the 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I firmly believe the Treaty is 
     in the national interest. However, I recognize that there are 
     a significant number of Senators who have honest 
     disagreements. I believe that proceeding to a vote under 
     these circumstances would severely harm the national security 
     of the United States, damage our relationship with our 
     allies, and undermine our historic leadership over 40 years, 
     through administrations Republican and Democratic, in 
     reducing the nuclear threat.
       Accordingly, I request that you postpone consideration of 
     the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on the Senate floor.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Bill Clinton.

  Throughout this debate, the hallmark has been differing views, 
differing views by honestly motivated colleagues on both sides of the 
aisle. I am not suggesting everyone on this side, in other words, is 
opposed to the treaty, but the practical matter is, there seems to be a 
division along this aisle.
  In addition, as recited by my good friend, the deputy leader of the 
Democrat side, the Senate has received communications from a wide range 
of individuals, again, on both sides of this issue. The Armed Services 
Committee held three consecutive hearings. Secretary Schlesinger came 
forward with a very clear statement in opposition to the treaty and 
expressed, on behalf of five other former Secretaries of Defense, the 
same viewpoint. That occurred immediately following the current 
Secretary of Defense, Secretary Cohen, appearing before the Armed 
Services Committee, together with General Shelton, and taking the view 
in support of the treaty. All through last week intermittently these 
communications came to the Senate in writing, orally or otherwise--
former Secretary of State Kissinger, former National Security Adviser 
Brent Scowcroft, again, communicating their desire to see that the 
treaty not be voted upon at this time.
  I mention that because of the seriousness of the treaty, one that 
lasts in perpetuity--theoretically, in perpetuity--asking this Nation 
to take certain steps with regard to our ability to monitor the 
effectiveness and the safety of our nuclear arsenal. To me, it is clear 
such a treaty should only be voted on when those types of conflicting 
opinions have been, as nearly as possible, resolved. The laboratory 
Directors, likewise, came before our committee; they are not involved 
in the political arena. But one after the other in testimony tried to 
indicate where they are in the test program. We are not there yet. It 
could be anywhere from 5 and, one even said, 20 years before the 
milestones now scheduled are put in place for this substitute 
scientific, largely computerized test program will take the place of 
the actual tests.
  Against that background--and I speak only for myself--I have joined 
with Senator Moynihan and, hopefully, others in preparing a Dear 
Colleague

[[Page 24832]]

letter, which will be circulated this morning, with the Senator from 
Virginia opposed to the treaty, prepared tonight to vote against it or 
tomorrow, whenever the case may be, and my distinguished colleague, the 
senior Senator from New York, who spent much of his lifetime in foreign 
affairs, a recognized expert, steadfastly in favor of the treaty and 
prepared to vote in support of it. I find on both sides of the aisle 
there are Senators of a like mind who believe that in the interest of 
national security, today is not the time to vote for that treaty.
  The letter from the President, it was hoped by some, would refer to 
his belief as to the scheduling of when this treaty should next be 
addressed in terms of a vote by the Senate. It is clear; his last 
paragraph does not address that issue. He simply says: Accordingly, I 
request that you postpone consideration on the Senate floor.
  Given that situation, it seems to me it is incumbent upon, hopefully, 
a majority of Senators, hopefully 25 or more from each side, to come 
forward and state that they firmly believe the final consideration of 
this treaty should be laid at a time beyond the current Congress and 
that final vote should not take place until the convening of the 107th 
Congress. The Senate at that time would review the entirety of the 
record. A new President will be in office, and the combination of a new 
President and his perspective, the Senate constituted, as it will be in 
the 107th, and that point in time is the critical moment for this 
Senate to determine the merits and demerits of this treaty to the 
extent that, through reservations and other means, changes could be 
brought about and then, if it is the desire of the majority of the 
Senate, to move towards a vote.
  That, to me, is a reasonable course of action. Next year 
constitutional elections of the United States take place. We all are 
very familiar with the dynamics of that critical period in American 
history, particularly in the months preceding the election. Should this 
treaty be subjected to the rifts of the dynamics of an election year, 
given its importance to our national security? Clearly in this 
Senator's mind, I say no. My distinguished colleague from New York has 
joined me in the same conclusion. This country has exercised a 
leadership role in arms control for 40 years. Indeed, this treaty has--
not in my judgment in its present form--in the minds of others a 
potential to be another milestone in our progress towards arms control 
and the reduction of the threat of nuclear weapons.
  In fairness to all sides, would it not be wiser to delay the vote and 
make certain it is the consensus of a majority of this Chamber, before 
that decision is finalized today or tomorrow, the majority of this 
Chamber saying we concur in the observation for a number of reasons, 
one of which clearly came before the Armed Services Committee, and that 
is, that the Intelligence Committee, on its own initiative, has 
initiated a new study of the capabilities of the United States to 
monitor low-level tests of actual weapons, should some nation, a 
signatory to this treaty or otherwise, decide to test live weapons.
  We are at a crossroads in history which will affect this Nation for 
decades to come. What possible rush to judgment compels a vote tonight 
or tomorrow? Would it not be more prudent that such a vote now be by a 
majority of the Senate in support of the two leaders, Senator Lott and 
Senator Daschle, both of whom have handled this matter, in my judgment, 
conscientiously, always foremost in mind the security interests of this 
country today, tomorrow, and the indefinite future? I salute both 
leaders.
  That is my brief opening. I wish to continue and summarize what our 
committee did last week. We received over 15 hours of testimony from a 
wide range of witnesses, from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs to current and former National Laboratory Directors 
and career professionals in the field of nuclear weapons. We also 
received letters from many public officeholders, former Secretaries of 
Defense, State, Secretaries of Energy, Chairmen of the Joints Chiefs, 
Directors of Central Intelligence, and former lab Directors on the 
merits and the pitfalls of the CTB Treaty. Other public officeholders 
came forward in favor, but there is a strong division.
  I don't think anyone, the President or, indeed, the Senate, could 
have foreseen the outpouring of conscientious opinion, opinions 
directed solely in the best interests of this country, not politics, by 
these former officials. They are in the Record for all to see. These 
are people with decades of experience in national security. Their 
statements reflect honest disagreements, disagreements primarily with 
the stance taken by the President and senior members of his 
administration.
  In my view, the body of facts that the Armed Services Committee has 
accumulated over the past several days clearly puts the arguments of 
many of the administration officials in serious question. We have 
learned we do not have the full confidence in the United States' 
technical capability to verify this treaty to the zero-yield threshold 
that President Clinton unilaterally imposed, more or less, on this 
country. And other countries can conduct military-significant live bomb 
tests at levels below our detection capability. That is the essence of 
it. We do not have all of the seismic equipment, in the judgment of the 
Intelligence Committee, in place and ready to meet the deadlines of 
this treaty so we could detect another nation that desired to use live 
tests in violation of their commitments under this treaty.
  We have learned that our nuclear weapons will, to some degree, 
deteriorate over time. That is pure science. The physical properties of 
the materials deteriorate over a period of time. We cannot guarantee 
the safety and reliability of our highly sophisticated nuclear weapons 
in perpetuity--always remember, in perpetuity. Testing is needed.
  The Stockpile Stewardship Program is the concept of a substitute for 
the live testing that we have had these 50 years. That 50-year record 
of testing gives us the confidence today, and for a number of years 
forward, in the reliability and safety of our stockpile. But there is 
some point in time, due to the deterioration of weapons, and other 
factors, that we will have to shift to a new means of testing. The 
administration's proposal under this treaty is the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program. It is a computer simulation substitute for actual 
testing. The scientists tell us this will not be proven--this 
substitute--for perhaps 5, 10, maybe up to 20 years. I repeat, 
milestones are being put in place, but there is no certainty as to 
when, collectively, those milestones will constitute a system to 
replace actual testing. The estimates vary from 5, 6, 7 years, perhaps 
out to 20.
  Yet we are being asked to ratify a treaty affirming that we shall 
never again, in perpetuity, actually test any of our nuclear weapons. 
We have learned the CTBT will do nothing--not a single thing--to stop 
proliferation by rogue nations and terrorists. Iraq and Iran will sit 
back and laugh. Right now, Iraq is defying the world over similar arms 
control agreements, similar U.N. sanctions, and the United Nations is 
entangled in what appears to be a hopeless debate over how to resolve 
the need to continue to monitor Saddam Hussein's program of weapons of 
mass destruction. A clear example of how the most well-intentioned 
international agreements have failed is right there, today.
  Rogue nations can easily develop and field, with a high degree of 
confidence, a single stage device--a ``dirty old bomb,'' as they refer 
to it--without any testing. Ironically, the first weapon dropped by the 
United States was never tested with an actual test.
  Many of my colleagues, again, honestly disagree on the conclusions, 
pointing out that reasonable people can examine the same body of facts 
and reach different conclusions. That is my grave concern. We should 
not be ratifying a treaty as long as reasonable doubt to that degree 
exists as to whether the treaty is in the national security interest of 
the United States. The stakes are far too high.

[[Page 24833]]

  The Armed Services Committee began its hearings with a closed 
hearing, where we heard from career professionals and experts with 
decades of experience, from the Department of Energy, the National 
Laboratories, and the Intelligence Committee. Their testimony focused 
on recent facts--facts that were not fully known at the time this 
treaty was signed by the President some 2 years ago. Their assessment 
is they would have to go back and reexamine a lot of facts to determine 
the viability, or lack of viability, of the capability of this Nation 
to monitor low-level tests.
  Much of that information we learned was developed over the last 18 
months. Therefore, those facts were not available to the Congress or 
the President when the CTBT was signed in 1996. The information 
presented to the Armed Services Committee on Tuesday is highly 
classified and, of course, cannot be discussed in open session. But one 
fact is very relevant. Because of disturbing new information, the 
Intelligence Committee--on its own initiative--decided to revisit and 
update the 1997 NIE, national intelligence estimate, on the U.S. 
ability to monitor the CTBT. I have been informed, as have other 
members of the committee, that it will take until next year to complete 
that work. That is a clear, credible basis for not moving forward today 
or tomorrow on a vote.
  I advised Secretary Cohen and General Shelton on the following day, 
Wednesday morning, when they testified before the Armed Services 
Committee that they had the opportunity to make their case for this 
treaty before the elected representatives of the American people, and 
that they did. I believe the burden is on the administration to prove--
maybe beyond a reasonable doubt--that ratification of this treaty is in 
the national security interest of our Nation. They simply did not make 
that case. And I say that with all due respect to my good friend and 
former colleague, Secretary Cohen.
  We are being asked to give up--permanently--our tried and true, 
proven ability to maintain the safety and reliability of our nuclear 
stockpile and to rely instead on a computer simulation and modeling 
capability that will not be fully developed or proven for many years--
if at all. We are being asked today to put at some degree of risk our 
nuclear deterrent capability, in exchange for the promise that we may 
have a way to adequately certify that capability at some uncertain 
future date. The question before the Senate is, Can we afford to take 
such a gamble? This Senator believes the answer is no.
  For more than 50 years, one of the top national security priorities 
of every American President has been to maintain a credible nuclear 
arsenal and deterrent to aggression against ourselves and our allies, 
and it has worked. The credibility of the United States in the world is 
a direct reflection of our military capability. If that credibility is 
ever called into question by our inability to ensure the safety and 
reliability of nuclear weapons--a vital segment of our military 
capability--then we have done our Nation a great disservice. The stakes 
for this debate are very high.
  For 50 years, our nuclear umbrella--the deterrent provided by the 
U.S. nuclear arsenal--has kept peace in Europe. Unquestionably, the 
threats in Europe following World War II were deterred by this 
capability. Yet it is that very deterrent that could be jeopardized by 
this treaty. Dr. Schlesinger stated it clearly when he asked, ``Do we 
want a world that lacks confidence in the U.S. deterrent or not?''
  I hope all Members will take the time to examine carefully the body 
of facts that the Armed Services Committee and, indeed, the Foreign 
Relations Committee have accumulated and recorded for Senators.
  Simply put, the CTBT, at this time, jeopardizes our ability to 
maintain the safety and reliability of our nuclear arsenal--perhaps not 
right away but almost certainly over the long run. According to Dr. 
James Robinson, Director of Sandia National Laboratory: ``To forego 
testing is to live with uncertainty.''
  Much has been said about what other Presidents have done. They have 
all examined the possibility of entering into some type of 
international treaty. But no previous President has ever opposed a test 
ban of zero yield and unlimited duration. President Eisenhower insisted 
that nuclear tests of less than 4.75 kilotons be permitted and, in 
fact, continued low-yield testing through his administration's test ban 
moratorium. President Kennedy terminated a 3-year moratorium on testing 
when the adverse consequences of the moratorium were realized, and he 
declared that ``never again'' would the United States make such a 
mistake. President Kennedy then embarked on the most aggressive series 
of nuclear tests in the history of the U.S. nuclear weapons program. 
President Carter also opposed a zero-yield test ban while in office.
  To have an effective nuclear deterrent, we must have confidence in 
the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons. These weapons are 
the most sophisticated designs in the world. It is a certainty that, 
over time, these arsenals, high explosives, and electronic components 
contained in these weapons will experience some level of deterioration. 
That is simple science. The nature of our nuclear weapons program over 
the past five decades provides little practical experience in 
predicting the effects of these changes.
  What do we say to our sailors, soldiers, airmen, and marines who live 
and work in close proximity with these nuclear weapons? What do we say 
to the people of our Nation, and indeed nations around the world, who 
live in the vicinity of our nuclear weapons? These are weapons that are 
stored in various locations around the world, that rest in missile 
tubes literally several feet away from the bunks of our submarine 
crews, that are regularly moved across roads and airfields around the 
world. How can we take any action which in any way jeopardizes or calls 
into question the safety of these weapons? As Dr. Bob Barker, former 
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, told the Armed 
Services Committee on Thursday, ``to leave in place weapons that are 
not as safe as they could be is unconscionable.''
  History tells us that weapons believed to be reliable and thoroughly 
tested, nevertheless, develop problems which, in the past were only 
discovered, and could only be fixed, through nuclear testing. As 
President Bush noted in a report to Congress in January 1993: ``Of all 
U.S. nuclear weapons designs fielded since 1958, approximately one-
third have required nuclear testing to resolve problems arising after 
deployment.'' In three-quarters of these cases, the problems were 
identified and assessed only as a result of nuclear testing, and could 
be fixed only through testing. Let me emphasize, most of these problems 
were related to safety.
  The Clinton administration has proposed remanufacturing aging weapons 
rather than designing and building new ones. The problem is that we 
simply don't know if this new approach is possible. Almost every 
weapons designer we have heard from over the past 3 years has raised 
concerns with any attempts to change components, such as plutonium and 
high explosives, in the heart of the weapon. Many of the materials and 
methods used in producing the original weapons are no longer available. 
To assure that the remanufactured weapons work as intended most agree 
the new weapons would have to be validated through underground nuclear 
testing.
  Every system will become obsolete at some point in time--if for no 
other reason, for deterioration due to aging. CTBT will not allow us to 
replace aging or unsafe systems in the future.
  Supporters of the treaty, argue that if a problem with the stockpile 
is identified, the President can always exercise ``Safeguard F'' and 
withdraw from the treaty and test. The military leaders and the three 
lab directors have all conditioned their support for CTBT on the 
guarantee that the President would exercise ``Safeguard F'' and 
withdraw from the treaty if a problem develops with our nuclear 
stockpile. But how realistic is that? It is highly unlikely that this 
safeguard would ever be used by the United States to withdraw from

[[Page 24834]]

the treaty even if serious problems should occur in the stockpile. Has 
the United States ever withdrawn from a treaty? We are struggling today 
under the weight of the ABM Treaty which was signed in 1972 with a 
nation that no longer exists: withdrawing from the treaty is simply 
without precedent.
  And what would the international ramifications be of such a 
withdrawal from the treaty? Wouldn't it be worse to withdraw years down 
the road, after other nations have presumably followed our lead, than 
to simply not ratify in the first place?
  In addition, the notion of being able to test quickly in an emergency 
is unrealistic. Even if the United States should decide to withdraw 
from CTBT, the lab directors report that it would take at least 2 to 3 
years of preparation before a test could be conducted, and our testing 
infrastructure continues to deteriorate. By withdrawing, the United 
States would be announcing to the world that we have such a serious 
problem with our nuclear deterrent that we have lost confidence in the 
reliability of our nuclear stockpile, and that we must initiate a 
program to repair or replace the weapon or weapons and conduct tests to 
confirm the results. Such an action would be highly destabilizing.
  Proponents of the CTBT have asserted that the treaty will have no 
adverse impacts on U.S. national security, that we will be able to 
confidently maintain and modernize U.S. strategic and theater nuclear 
forces to the extent necessary without ever conducting another nuclear 
explosive test. In fact, the CTBT will force the United States to forgo 
any number of important initiatives that may be required to ensure the 
long-term viability and safety of our strategic and theater nuclear 
deterrent forces.
  The CTBT will lock the United States into retention of a nuclear 
arsenal that was designed at the height of the cold war. Many of the 
nuclear systems that we developed to deter the Soviet Union are simply 
not suited to the subtle, and perhaps more difficult, task of deterring 
rogue states from using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Such 
deterrence will require the United States to possess nuclear weapons 
that pose a credible threat to targets such as rogue state biological 
weapon production facilities that may be located deep underground in 
hardened shelters. At the same time, for such weapons to be credible 
deterrents, they must not threaten to create significant collateral 
damage or radioactive fallout. Such weapons do not exist today in the 
U.S. arsenal.
  I am also concerned that this treaty's zero yield test ban is not 
verifiable. It is difficult, if not impossible, to detect tests below a 
certain level. And testing at yields below detection may allow 
countries, such as Russia, to develop new classes of low-yield, 
tactical nuclear weapons. This possibility makes recent statements by 
senior Russian officials claiming that they are now developing tactical 
nuclear weapons especially troubling. For example, this August, the 
Russian Deputy Minister for Atomic Energy, Lev Ryabev, stated that a 
key Russian objective was the development of a tactical nuclear system. 
This April, President Yeltsin reportedly approved a blueprint for the 
development and use of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Would we be able 
to detect tests of such tactical weapons? The development of any 
nuclear weapon, regardless of its yield, is militarily significant to 
this Senator.
  Further, countries that want to evade detection can do so by masking 
or muffling tests in mines, underground cavities, salt domes, or other 
geological formations. I am convinced that the United States and the 
international community cannot now, and will not in the foreseeable 
future, be able to detect such cheating or testing below a certain 
level.
  Proponents of the CTBT argue that the International Monitoring System 
established under the treaty will put in place capabilities exceeding 
those that the United States and its allies can field today. These 
monitoring sites will be owned and operated by the host countries, 
which I believe calls into serious question the reliability of the 
information collected and, thus, its value to our ability to detect a 
nuclear test.
  Proponents of CTBT also argue that although the treaty may not be 
verifiable through detection methods, the on-site inspections make the 
CTBT verifiable. I disagree. The treaty requires an affirmative vote of 
30 of 51 members of the Executive Council to initiate an inspection. 
The likelihood of obtaining that number, which could include such 
countries as Iran and North Korea, is remote, if not impossible. 
Further, the United States would have to present a case to the 
Executive Council which would most likely compromise sensitive U.S. 
intelligence sources and methods. The timelines imposed by the treaty 
for on-site inspections permit considerable coverup and deterioration 
of evidence. In addition, there is no guarantee that Americans will be 
on the inspection teams. In fact, any state is explicitly permitted to 
block inspectors from countries it does not like. The treaty gives the 
inspected state the final say in any dispute with inspectors.
  Finally, ambiguities in the CTBT may allow other nations to legally 
circumvent the clear intent of the treaty. The treaty does not define 
what constitutes a nuclear test. However, President Clinton has said 
that the United States will interpret nuclear test to mean any nuclear 
explosion, thus all tests are banned unless they are zero-yield. 
However, if other signatory nations interpret a less restrictive 
definition, they could conduct very low-yield tests and argue that they 
are not violating the language of the treaty.
  I am concerned that while the United States would adhere to the CTBT, 
thereby losing confidence over time in our nuclear deterrent, other 
countries would capitalize upon U.S. deficiencies and vulnerabilities 
created by the CTBT and violate the treaty, by escaping detection and 
building new weapons.
  I believe the risk the CTBT poses to U.S. national security by far 
outweighs any of the benefits that have been identified.
  Mr. President, I shall reengage in this debate as the day progresses. 
I will pursue with Senator Moynihan the final presentation of our Dear 
Colleague letter in the hopes that a number of Senators will see the 
wisdom in giving the leadership of the Senate the support they deserve 
should a decision be made not to go forward today. That decision should 
embrace very clearly that it would be in the Senate's interest, in the 
Nation's interest, and our security interest to revisit this treaty in 
terms of a final vote in the balance of this Congress.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I rise today in strong support of Senate advice and 
consent to the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty.
  As a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, I have 
advocated for consideration of this treaty since President Clinton 
submitted it to this body for advice and consent on September 22, 1997. 
Now, more than 2 years later, this important treaty is being considered 
on the Senate floor. While I am pleased that we are having this debate, 
I am concerned about the manner in which we reached this point. I 
regret that the Foreign Relations Committee, of which I am a member, 
had only one day of hearings on this important arms control agreement 
and that the committee did not consider and mark up a resolution of 
ratification.
  I am concerned that this debate is too limited in duration and scope. 
This is obviously serious business. And I hope that the manner in which 
this treaty was brought to the floor does not doom it to failure. This 
treaty should be fully debated on its merits. And this body should have 
the opportunity to offer any statements, declarations, understandings, 
or conditions that we deem necessary. But this treaty should not be 
defeated simply because the Senate has backed itself into a corner in 
which the choice is to vote up or down now without the option to 
postpone this important vote in

[[Page 24835]]

favor of further consideration. Some of our colleagues have expressed 
their desire for further consideration. But they have said that if they 
are forced to vote today, they will oppose this treaty--not necessarily 
because they do not support the treaty, but rather because they feel 
they cannot yet fully support it without further study.
  I think putting Senators in this position is an irresponsible course 
of action.
  As my colleagues know, I support this treaty. And I will vote in 
favor of it today should it come to that. But I hope we will consider 
the consequences of defeating this treaty, not on its merits, but 
because of the political box in which we find ourselves. This treaty 
must not fall victim to politics. The consequences of its defeat will 
be felt from Moscow to New Delhi to Beijing to Baghdad. And this body, 
the greatest deliberative body in the world, would be sending the 
message that we did not want to spend more time on one of the most 
important issues facing the world today.
  We do live in dangerous times, Mr. President. Weapons capable of mass 
destruction have replaced more conventional weapons in our world. New 
threats continue to emerge. But we have the power to stem the tide of 
nuclear proliferation. Perhaps we cannot stop it completely. But we can 
make sure that the nuclear arms race is stopped in its tracks and we 
can make it extremely difficult for those with nuclear aspirations to 
develop a weapon in which they can have high confidence.
  And we should do everything in our power to make the world safer for 
future generations. And if that includes delaying the vote on this 
treaty, then we should swallow our political pride and do that.
  As a number of my colleagues have already said, both in committee and 
on this floor, the idea of a nuclear test ban dates back to the 
Eisenhower administration. For more than 40 years, Presidents of both 
parties have advocated for such a treaty.
  In a speech delivered on June 10, 1963, President John F. Kennedy 
discussed his support for the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban 
treaty. He said--and I quote:

       The conclusion of such a treaty, so near and yet so far, 
     would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most 
     dangerous areas. It would place the nuclear powers in a 
     position to deal more effectively with one of the greatest 
     hazards which man faces in 1963, the further spread of 
     nuclear arms. It would increase our security--it would 
     decrease the prospects of war. Surely this goal is 
     sufficiently important to require our steady pursuit, 
     yielding neither to the temptation to give up the whole 
     effort nor the temptation to give up our insistence on vital 
     and responsible safeguards.

  Mr. President, those words are as relevant today as they were when 
President Kennedy spoke them 36 years ago. Nuclear weapons are still 
one of the greatest hazards on the planet. And they have been joined by 
chemical, biological, and other weapons of mass destruction. President 
Kennedy spoke from the perspective of the cold war and the still 
escalating arms race with the Soviet Union. Now, in 1999, the cold war 
is over and the Soviet Union is no more. But we are on the brink of 
another nuclear arms race, this time in south Asia. India and Pakistan 
are watching, Mr. President. And we have the opportunity to end their 
nuclear aspirations once and for all. Or to give them the cover they 
need to continue testing.
  We have the opportunity today at long last to become a party to a 
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty that will both stop the nuclear 
arms race in its tracks and maintain our option to withdraw from its 
provisions if our national security is threatened.
  I hope that will be our paramount consideration in the coming hours 
as we decide whether to put this treaty up for a vote today or 
tomorrow.
  Mr. President, as many of my colleagues have noted throughout this 
debate, there are many reasons why the United States should become a 
party to this important treaty. I will address three of them here.
  First, this treaty will allow the United States to maintain our 
strong nuclear deterrent. This treaty does not require the parties to 
dismantle their existing nuclear stockpiles. It does not prevent them 
from maintaining those stockpiles through scientific means. Rather, 
this treaty prohibits further nuclear testing. The United States has 
not conducted any nuclear tests for 7 years, and the administration has 
testified that we have no intention of performing any further tests. 
The Departments of Defense and Energy already have a substantial 
database of information on the more than 1,000 nuclear tests that we 
have already performed. And this information has been the basis for the 
development of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, which the high-
ranking administration officials have testified is an effective 
mechanism for maintaining the safety and reliability of our nuclear 
arsenal.
  Second, this treaty will help to create a worldwide nuclear status 
quo. Parties to the CTBT will be unable to conduct nuclear explosive 
tests to improve their existing weapons or develop stronger ones. This 
means that the nuclear arms race will be literally frozen where it is. 
This is beneficial to the United States for several reasons. It will 
allow us to maintain our nuclear superiority. It will protect us from 
the threat of stronger weapons in the future. And, in fact, it ensures 
that we will have the dubious distinction of having won the nuclear 
arms race.
  The third point in favor of this treaty I will make is this: the CTBT 
is effectively verifiable. Some have argued that this treaty is not 
verifiable. It seems that argument echoes in these halls every time we 
debate an arms control treaty. But, again, that argument rings hollow. 
Verification is a tricky thing. All treaties, including arms control 
treaties, are largely based on good faith among the parties to them. 
Good faith in the sense that the parties who have ratified the treaty 
have promised to comply with the treaty's provisions. Collectively, the 
parties have agreed to a set of provisions, in the case of the CTBT to 
not perform nuclear tests. Alone, a country can decide to no longer 
perform nuclear tests--as the United States has already done--but no 
other nation knows for sure if that country is living up to its 
promise.
  Under a multilateral treaty such as the CTBT, all parties have agreed 
to the provisions and are subject to a verification regime that 
otherwise would not exist. The CTBT says that if one party to the 
treaty has evidence that a test has occurred, that party can request an 
onsite inspection. This inspection will occur if 30 of the 51 members 
of the CTBT's Executive Council agree that the evidence warrants such 
an inspection. This type of onsite inspection cannot occur outside the 
CTBT regime, Mr. President. And this inspection will allow the parties 
to the treaty to obtain information that cannot be obtained outside the 
treaty regime.
  No one here will claim that any treaty is 100 percent verifiable or 
that some countries may try to cheat. But the Pentagon has said that 
this treaty is effectively verifiable. And that is the key. The 
International Monitoring System created by this treaty includes 230 
data gathering stations around the world in addition to those already 
operating in the United States. Last week, Secretary of Defense William 
Cohen told the Senate Armed Services Committee that ``the information 
collected by these sensor stations would not normally be available to 
the U.S. intelligence community.'' In addition to this enhanced 
capability, the United States is also permitted, under the provisions 
of the treaty and in accordance with international law, to use our own 
national technical means to detect nuclear tests.
  Mr. President, some people say that, because the United States has 
already made the decision not to do any further nuclear testing--and 
indeed that we have not tested in seven years--that this treaty is 
unnecessary. They claim that the CTBT merely reinforces what we have 
already done and that there is no real benefit to our ratification. In 
fact, as many of my colleagues have already addressed during this 
debate, and as I have already noted, there are many benefits to this 
treaty. We retain our leadership in the arms control

[[Page 24836]]

arena. We maintain our nuclear superiority. And, importantly, we gain 
the ability to request and participate in onsite inspections of 
suspected nuclear testing abroad. And, if the President is unable to 
certify that our nuclear arsenal is sound, we have the option to 
withdraw from the treaty.
  Mr. President, in urging my colleagues to support this important 
treaty, I will again quote President Kennedy:

       The United States, as the world knows, will never start a 
     war. We do not want a war. We do not now expect a war. This 
     generation of Americans has already had enough--more than 
     enough--of war and hate and oppression. We shall be prepared 
     if others wish it. We shall be alert to try to stop it. But 
     we shall also do our part to build a world of peace where the 
     weak are safe and the strong are just. We are not helpless 
     before that task or hopeless of its success. Confident and 
     unafraid, we labor on--not toward a strategy of nuclear 
     annihilation but toward a strategy of peace.

  Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Arizona such 
time as he may consume.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. President, a number of us have concluded that we cannot support 
ratification of the CTBT, that it will be defeated. But some have urged 
that we put the vote off out of concern that rejection would send an 
undesirable message to the world.
  I believe, however, that we should vote precisely because the world 
would get a desirable message that the Senate took a stand that 
treaties such as this must meet at least minimum standards for sensible 
arms control. The CTBT fails that test. It is a sloppy, altogether 
substandard piece of work, and it deserves rejection.
  Our colleague, Dick Lugar, opposes the CTBT ratification, as he has 
explained, because he does not believe the treaty is of the same 
caliber as arms control agreements that have come before the Senate in 
recent decades. He cites two of the CTBT's many deficiencies: ``an 
ineffective verification regime and a practically nonexistent 
enforcement process.''
  Contrary to what treaty supporters have argued, the CTBT's rejection 
would strengthen the hands of U.S. diplomats on such matters in future 
negotiations. When they insist on more effective provisions, citing the 
need to satisfy a rigorous U.S. Senate, their warnings would become 
credible and influential. Such warnings would help free the United 
States from having to go along with wrong-headed treaty terms dictated 
by countries that lack U.S. responsibilities around the world.
  I note that as a good example of our negotiators changing their 
position from that originally supported by the administration to go 
directly to the heart of key objections to this particular treaty. As 
you know, no President had ever sought a zero-yield test ban treaty in 
perpetuity. In this case, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that we 
should not have such a treaty.
  The original position of the administration in the negotiations was 
to grant the United States an option without having to invoke the 
supreme national interest clause to retire from the treaty after 10 
years and not to insist upon a zero-yield but, rather, to permit low-
yield, what are called hydronuclear tests. Over time, our negotiators' 
position was undercut, and in the end, according to the very people who 
negotiated the treaty, in order to reach an agreement with other 
countries, the United States conceded on those and other important 
points. Those are two of the critical deficiencies in this treaty.
  By rejecting the treaty now, the Senate would strengthen the hands of 
our future diplomats who negotiate these arms control agreements to 
enable them to make the point to their counterparts that the United 
States is serious about treaties at least achieving minimal standards; 
we consider these to be the kinds of minimal standards that are 
necessary to bind the American people; and those negotiators would know 
that Senate ratification would not occur unless the terms were as 
proposed by the United States.
  As I said, no other President ever supported a zero-yield treaty, let 
alone one that would bind the United States forever, and neither should 
the Senate.
  If we proceed today to reject the CTBT, future U.S. negotiators will 
be more inclined to seek the Senate's advice before the deal is 
finalized and the administration demands our consent. This will serve 
the U.S. national interests in various ways.
  First, the Senate was never intended to be a rubber stamp, approving 
any ill-advised treaty negotiated by an administration. Our 
constitutional duty in treaty-making is to perform the equivalent of 
quality control. Under the Constitution, the Senate's role is of equal 
stature with the President's. We in the Senate are entitled--indeed, we 
are obliged--to second guess the President's national interest 
calculations regarding treaties.
  There would inevitably be complaints from abroad, including from 
friends, if we upset the CTBT apple cart. But that unpleasantness would 
be minor and transitory, especially in light of the permanent harm the 
CTBT would do to our national security. The embarrassment of the 
President for buying into such a flawed treaty in the first place is 
not desirable, but the Senate cannot avert it at any price.
  Consider again Senator Lugar's words:

       [The CTBT] is problematic because it would exacerbate risks 
     and uncertainties related to the safety of our nuclear 
     stockpile.

  Those are the stakes, and they are serious. That crucial observation 
should put into perspective the issue of likely complaints from foreign 
foes and friends.
  The Senate must fulfill its constitutional duty to ensure that 
treaties meet at least minimum standards. We do the Presidency no 
favors by shirking, and we do the Senate and the Nation harm if we 
accede to the President's diplomatic recklessness simply to spare him 
the chore of mollifying the other states that forged the flawed treaty.
  A query to my colleagues who are interested in delaying this vote to 
avoid the embarrassment of rejecting a treaty negotiated by the 
administration: Will the Senate defer to the President on the Kyoto 
Global Warming Treaty or the ABM multilateralization or demarcation 
treaties?
  Some administration spokesmen have used the offensive argument that 
Senate rejection of the CTBT would be a message to the world that we 
are not serious about arms control. To the contrary, rejecting this 
treaty will help establish that we demand real arms control--not the 
show, not the empty symbols, not the flimflam treaties that cannot 
accomplish their purposes. In rejecting the CTBT, we will be asking the 
world to join in real antiproliferation measures, such as enforcement 
of the nonproliferation treaty which Russia, China, and North Korea 
violate every time they spread nuclear weapons technology.
  I quote again from Senator Lugar:

       If a country breaks the international norm embodied in the 
     CTBT, the country has already broken the norm associated with 
     the nonproliferation treaty.

  Mr. President, that is because 185-some nations have agreed not to 
possess these nuclear weapons, except for the nuclear powers. The 
testing is simply a redundant violation of the possession in the first 
place, which is already a violation of the NPT. So this treaty won't 
accomplish its minimal objective.
  Second, enforcement of the United States resolutions requiring 
inspection of Iraq: It would be very helpful if our allies would help 
in this very meaningful and important activity rather than undercutting 
the United States at every turn.
  Again, Senator Lugar hit the point squarely:

       The CTBT verification regime seems to be the embodiment of 
     everything the United States is fighting against in the 
     UNSCOM inspection process in Iraq . . . [which is] best not 
     repeated under the CTBT.

  Third, perhaps we could get their support in our efforts to free U.S. 
policy from the dead hand of the ABM Treaty and to deploy missile 
defenses.

[[Page 24837]]

  These are real, meaningful actions against the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction rather than empty symbolic gestures.
  In asking the Senate to postpone the vote on this treaty until he has 
the votes, the President is asking, first, to spare him personal 
embarrassment; and, second, to give him a chance to bind the United 
States to a treaty that most do not think should ever go into force. 
The CTBT will not improve with age.
  Most Senators would have been content never to have voted on the 
treaty. But the President has now denied the Senate that option. He 
will not agree to forbear demanding consideration of the treaty next 
year when he hopes to have the votes to pass it. Republicans have not 
politicized this debate, but it is clear that unless we defeat this 
treaty now, it will be a political issue next year when allegedly 
changed circumstances--created, for example, by a new test by India or 
Pakistan--will give the President the pretext to revive the debate.
  It has become clear that the assurances we may now get from the 
President and our Democratic colleagues will not be the ironclad 
commitments we recently agreed were necessary to induce the Senate to 
defer this vote. Therefore, to avoid the President politicizing the 
issue next year, we should vote now.
  Sometimes it is necessary to say or do the right thing and just let 
the chips fall where they may. Ronald Reagan knew he would ruffle lots 
of foreign feathers--including some of our respected allies--when he 
called the Soviet Union an evil empire and when he stood his ground 
against Gorbachev in Reykjavik in favor of strategic defense. These 
messages he sent were criticized by many as disruptive. They were 
sound. They served our national interests and the interests of decent 
people around the world, and history has judged them favorably.
  The Senate now has a chance to demonstrate strength and the good 
sense worthy of Ronald Reagan. If we do it, we will be flouting much 
conventional thinking, but we will, in fact, enhance our Nation's 
diplomatic strength, protecting our national security and vindicating 
the wisdom of America's founding fathers who assigned to the Senate the 
duty to protect the country from ill-conceived international 
obligations.
  Let the Senate vote to reject the CTBT.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, in the waning days of his administration, 
President Eisenhower proposed a test ban treaty to end all nuclear 
tests in the atmosphere, in the oceans, and under the ground. Nearly 
four decades later, the Senate stands on the verge of a vote on 
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I will vote in favor 
of ratification. I regret the move to postpone a vote because I am of 
the firm conviction this treaty will help end the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and increase the safety of the American people.
  President Eisenhower proposed the test ban having recognized the 
increasing danger posed by nuclear weapons. At that time, the threat 
was very real. The American people had a vivid understanding of the 
devastating consequences of nuclear weapons.
  Those of us in our fifties remember the threat and the fear that we 
had as children--the duck and cover drills, the constant reminders of 
the devastation that a single nuclear weapon could produce to our 
cities and to our communities. In many ways, the problem we have today 
comes from our success because the fear we once had has been displaced 
by a false sense of complacency, a sense of security that, in my view, 
is not justified, given the facts.
  I would like to illustrate this danger by a realistic scenario, in my 
view, with a single Russian nuclear weapon. It is possible for a small 
band of discontented or terroristic members of either the Russian 
society or some other nation to raid a silo of Russian missiles in the 
Russian wilderness. Soldiers who are poorly trained, sparsely equipped, 
and irate at not having been paid in a year are easily overtaken or are 
willing to cooperate.
  Let's pick one city to illustrate the damage. I, again, call to my 
colleagues' attention that this kind of game playing, this kind of 
example was quite common as recently as 10 years ago. But today, when 
you ask what kind of damage could occur as a result of a single nuclear 
blast, you are apt to have people scratching their heads, wondering 
what could happen. So let me take Chicago as an example.
  First of all, unlike many of the other threats in the world, if a 
rocket left Russia, it would arrive in Chicago within an hour, probably 
taking a trajectory over the top of the world across the Arctic pole. 
It would detonate in Chicago within an hour, and on a bad day it would 
hit a target within a few hundred yards off Lake Michigan.
  We spent a great deal of time assessing the danger of the nation of 
China. Their missiles are not connected to their warheads. Their 
warheads are disconnected; they are not together. It would take them 
several days and they are not targeted with the accuracy and would not 
arrive with the same swiftness as an unauthorized or accidental launch 
coming from Russia.
  The first effect of the blast would be the nuclear flash. The air 
would be heated to 10 million degrees Celsius. The blast would move out 
at a few hundred kilometers a second and its heat would be sufficient 
to set fire to anything combustible at a distance of 14 kilometers. 
People within 80 kilometers would be blinded. The blast effect would 
follow. It would travel out from ground zero. Within 3 kilometers, 
those who had not already been killed would die from this percussive 
force.
  The details of this kind of a blast needs to be understood by the 
American people as this debate goes forward, because the good news of 
the end of the cold war has been replaced with the bad news that we are 
increasingly at risk of individuals or nonnation state people who 
choose to do damage to the United States of America and do not care if 
they die in the execution of their mission. They are willing to attack 
the United States of America and they are willing to take American 
lives without regard to the fact that they may die in the execution of 
their mission.
  A single Russian nuclear weapon launched accidentally, or a single 
nuclear weapon assembled by some rogue nation and delivered by whatever 
the means to the United States of America, would do more damage than 
any other threat we currently have on the horizon. A single Russian 
submarine that was taken over by a similar sort of dissident faction 
could launch 64 one-hundred-kiloton weapons at the United States. I do 
not come here to alarm anybody about this. I come simply to remind 
people that nuclear weapons are still the only threat that could kill 
every single American. It would not take thousands to bring the United 
States of America to its knees. It would not take the kind of total 
attack we once feared from the Soviet Union to bring America from being 
the most powerful economic and military force on the Earth to being 
somewhat short of No. 1, not only putting us at increasing risk but 
putting the rest of the world at risk as well.
  CTBT is by no means the only thing we must do in order to reduce the 
risk of proliferation. I would like to go through a few ideas prior to 
talking about both our capacity to verify and the confidence I have 
that we can maintain our stockpile without the need to test.
  First, we have to maintain our intelligence capabilities: our ability 
to collect intelligence, to process, to disseminate, to deliver that 
intelligence to warfighters is far and away the best in the world. Talk 
to our allies in Kosovo, in Bosnia, in Desert Storm; talk to any of 
those whose lives were at risk and were allied with the United States 
of America in a military effort and they will tell you our intelligence 
collection and dissemination capability gave us the capacity to do the 
impossible.
  Our intelligence agencies, from time to time, make very highly 
publicized mistakes. Unfortunately, the publicity given to those 
mistakes gives some a

[[Page 24838]]

lack of confidence in our capability of doing our mission. That lack of 
confidence is misplaced. We are an open society. As a consequence, we 
tend--correctly so--to examine the things we do when we make mistakes. 
Unfortunately, at times it produces a situation where we are afraid of 
doing things because we are worried we are going to make a highly 
publicized mistake and therefore that mistake is going to ruin our 
career or make it difficult for us to advance. As a consequence, we 
sometimes are a little too cautious.
  Americans should not suffer the illusion we currently have the 
intelligence capacity to know everything that is going on in the world; 
we simply do not. Indeed, we should not. We are not, as well, 
allocating enough resources, in my view, to make certain policymakers 
of the future are informed so conflicts that might occur can be avoided 
and so nuclear threats can be confronted before they emerge to be 
challenges.
  The second tool that must be maintained to confront the emerging 
nuclear threat is not only a strong military but an intent to use that 
military to meet any individual or nation state that threatens the 
United States of America. Our military is the envy of the world. While 
we must avoid the temptation of using our military forces in situations 
not vital to U.S. interests, we must also continue to maintain the will 
to use military force in instances in which our national security is at 
risk.
  The third tool is national missile defense. I support the creation of 
a limited national missile defense designed to protect the United 
States of America from rogue state ballistic missile launches and 
accidental launches. While the success of the recent test of a 
prototype missile defense system demonstrates that limited national 
missile defense is possible, we must also realize it is not a panacea 
for the dangers we will confront.
  The fourth tool in our effort to secure the post-cold-war peace is 
further reductions in the American and Russian nuclear arsenals. I have 
argued on the Senate floor previously the President should immediately 
take bold action to restart the arms control process. If we do not 
drastically reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, the danger of 
their accidental use or proliferation will increase exponentially. I 
recognize that deep reductions--while decreasing the chance of 
unauthorized or accidental launch--could actually increase the danger 
of material proliferation. Therefore, any such parallel reductions in 
our nuclear forces must include arrangements and a U.S. commitment to 
provide funding to secure and manage the resultant nuclear material. 
This is the fifth tool. We are fortunate we will not begin from scratch 
on this problem. We can build on one of the greatest acts of the post-
cold-war statesmanship, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program.
  The final piece of the nuclear safety puzzle is the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty. I support the CTBT because I believe it will enhance 
U.S. national security, reduce nuclear dangers, and keep the American 
people safe. Let me explain how.
  First, a fully implemented CTBT will all but halt the ability of 
threshold states from establishing an effective and reliable strategic 
nuclear force. The inability of nations such as Iran and North Korea to 
conduct nuclear tests will make it much less likely for them to become 
nuclear powers. Along the same line, the inability of existing nuclear 
states to conduct further nuclear tests will impede, if not stop, their 
efforts to make technological advances in yields and miniaturization, 
advances already achieved by the United States.
  Bluntly speaking, we have the most effective and deadly nuclear force 
in the world. Therefore, to maintain our existing nuclear edge, it is 
in our interest to ratify the CTBT and to halt the nuclear development 
advancement of other nations.
  In addition, we all have experienced coming to this Chamber to vote 
on a sanction imposed upon an individual nation as a consequence of us 
judging correctly that that nation poses a threat and, in many cases, a 
potential nuclear threat to the United States of America.
  We struggle with that vote because we know a unilateral sanction by 
the United States of America will oftentimes be used by our allies as a 
means for them to capture the market share of some product we were 
selling to that nation. With this treaty, it is far more likely the 
Security Council will support multilateral sanctions that will enable 
us to get the desired effect without us having to suffer adverse 
consequences as a consequence of unilateral sanctions.
  In the post-cold-war era, nuclear weapons have become the Rolex 
wristwatch of international security, a costly purchase whose real 
purpose is not the service it provides but the prestige it confers. 
Ratification and implementation of the CTBT is in our national security 
interest precisely because it will help slow the expansion of the 
nuclear club and make it more difficult for nations to acquire these 
deadly weapons.
  Opponents of the CTBT focus their criticisms on two main points: 
verifiability of the treaty and the safety of our nuclear stockpile. 
Let me address each of these issues separately.
  First, we can effectively monitor and verify CTBT. I purposely say 
``effectively monitor and verify'' because absolute verification is 
neither attainable nor a necessary standard. But it is the standard 
that some have attempted to establish as a benchmark for ratification. 
No treaty is absolutely verifiable.
  My support for this treaty comes from my firm conviction that by 
using existing assets, the United States can effectively monitor and 
verify this treaty. I base my convictions on the testimony of Gen. John 
Gordon, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and on the briefings 
on this topic received by the Intelligence Committee over the years 
and, most important, the performance of those men and women who work in 
a variety of agencies whose task it is to collect, to process, to 
evaluate, to analyze, and to disseminate intelligence to national 
customers, as well as war fighters who are defending the people of the 
United States of America.
  The United States has the capability to detect any test that can 
threaten our nuclear deterrence. The type of test that could be 
conducted without our knowledge could only be marginally useful and 
would not cause a shift in the existing strategic nuclear balance. In 
addition, the United States has the capability to detect the level of 
testing that would be required for another country to develop and to 
weaponize an advanced thermonuclear warhead.
  Our intelligence community is the best in the world. This gives us an 
enormous lead over every other signatory. Public disclosures of 
intelligence community problems may have shaken confidence in our 
intelligence capabilities, but let me assure my colleagues that their 
confidence should not be shaken. U.S. intelligence has the ability to 
know what is occurring around the world regarding the development of 
nuclear weapons. It is our intelligence community that largely gives 
Secretary Cohen and General Shelton their confidence to say the treaty 
should be ratified because it is in our national interest to do so.
  I will briefly describe how we will know what is happening when 
someone tries to cheat. I will use all caution to make certain I give 
away nothing that will provide our enemies with indications of what our 
sources or our methods are, but I urge colleagues who doubt this to get 
full briefings on what our collection capability is and what we are 
able to do to determine whether or not somebody is in violation of this 
treaty.
  I will briefly describe, as I said, and because the existence of this 
highly secretive organization, the National Reconnaissance Office, has 
finally been declassified--we are able now to admit that from space, 
the United States can see you and can gather signals intelligence. I 
urge colleagues to get a full briefing on what the NRO can do in a 
classified fashion. I believe my colleagues fully understand the 
significance of what I just said.

[[Page 24839]]

  Every part of the globe is accessible from space. There you will find 
satellite reconnaissance either watching or collecting electrical 
signals from those who would do damage to the United States of America. 
That is a tremendous capability that no one else can equal. This global 
accessibility from space is just one feature of a very complicated and 
complex system of collecting and analyzing information.
  The National Security Agency is a second feature. They exploit 
foreign communications. That is the official unclassified description 
of its mission: NSA exploits foreign communications. Recently, 
Hollywood has enjoyed making a couple of movies showing how NSA is a 
threat to our Nation. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is a 
Hollywood make-believe story that is completely inaccurate and false. 
NSA is not a threat to us. If you are an unfriendly foreign government 
wanting to cheat on CTBT, NSA is certainly a threat to you.
  To quote from their official unclassified agency description: ``They 
are on the cutting edge of information technology.'' They know what is 
going on in the explosion of information technology.
  There is a third area beyond NSA, and that is called MASINT. It is a 
pretty strange term for most people. It means measurement and 
signatures intelligence, the recognition that in addition to being seen 
and being heard, objects, especially electronic objects, have other 
signatures. Like your personal signature--if we collect enough 
information about someone's signature, it is not like anything else, it 
is unique, and we know exactly what it is, and we are collecting 
MASINT.
  The Central Intelligence Agency gives us a fourth important feature. 
The CIA employs a network of agents around the world who constantly 
provide what is called HUMINT, human intelligence. HUMINT is a term of 
art which simply recognizes people tend to talk, and when they do talk, 
we try to have an agent listening. If an agent hears something, it is 
fed into a fifth and important feature of the agency, and that is the 
CIA Directorate of Intelligence.
  The men and women of the CIA DI sift through enormous amounts of data 
every day and separate fact from fiction, truth from lies. Through 
their analysis of all intelligence sources, they provide policymakers 
with crisp statements of what our potential adversaries are doing and 
not doing. If information is out there to get, we will get it. If it is 
important, we will analyze it and understand it. Once we understand it, 
policymakers will make sound decisions if someone decides to cheat on 
the CTBT.
  I am trying to paint a picture of just how sophisticated our 
intelligence community is. It is a community that on occasion has been 
fooled, but it has not been fooled often, and it has rarely been fooled 
for very long. We have a world-class intelligence capability. We can 
count on the intelligence community to monitor the CTBT and effectively 
verify it.
  A second argument that has been used against the treaty by some is 
based upon the suspension of nuclear testing required by the CTBT and 
the argument that this will jeopardize the safety and reliability of 
the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. I have an extremely high level of 
confidence in the nuclear stockpile even without continued testing.
  The science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program, on which the United 
States is spending $4.5 billion a year, is maintaining our 
technological edge without the need for further testing for the 
foreseeable future. This program is based on the most advanced science 
in the world. It is based on over 50 years of nuclear experience. It is 
based on the results of over 1,000 American nuclear tests. It is a 
program that relies on the ability and ingenuity of U.S. scientists to 
maintain our nuclear edge. But it is also a program that recognizes the 
need to build in adequate safeguards to ensure safety and reliability.
  The Stockpile Stewardship Program requires a rigorous annual review 
of the entire nuclear stockpile. As a part of this regime, both the 
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy must certify to the 
President on an annual basis the stockpile is safe and is reliable. 
Should either Secretary be unable to offer this certification, the 
President, in consultation with Congress, is prepared to exercise the 
right of the United States to withdraw from the treaty and to resume 
testing.
  The United States has not conducted a nuclear test for over 7 years, 
but the American people should understand our nuclear stockpile is 
safe. Both the safeguards and the science exists to continue to assure 
its safety well into the future. And since we have made the decision we 
do not need to test, it only makes sense that we use the CTBT to end 
testing throughout the world.
  Reflecting on his time in office, and his failure to achieve the goal 
of a nuclear test ban, President Eisenhower stated: ``Disarmament . . . 
is a continuous imperative. . . . Because this need is so sharp and 
apparent, I confess I lay down my official responsibilities in this 
field with a definite sense of disappointment.''
  The Senate now has the opportunity to ratify the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty. We should ratify this treaty because, just as when it was 
first proposed nearly 4 decades ago, it is a positive step toward 
reducing nuclear dangers and improving the safety of the American 
people.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I see my friend from the great State of 
Montana is up to speak. I ask the chairman of the----
  Mr. SPECTER. Will the Senator from Delaware yield for a question?
  Mr. BIDEN. Yes, I would be happy to yield.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, the question that I have for the Senator 
relates to the letter from President Clinton to our distinguished 
majority leader, Senator Lott, where President Clinton has asked that 
the Senate not consider consideration of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty.
  I believe it is very much in the national interest that we not vote 
on the treaty today because it would undermine national security by 
sending a message to the world that we are not for this treaty. I think 
it would encourage nations such as India and Pakistan, and perhaps 
rogue nations such as Libya, Iraq, and Iran, to test.
  But the first of two questions which I have for the Senator from 
Delaware is whether the President might go further. The Senator and I 
attended a dinner last Tuesday night with the President. We both had 
occasion to talk to the majority leader and have heard the public 
pronouncements. The majority leader has set a threshold, asking that 
the President commit in writing that he would not ask to have the 
treaty brought up next year. I believe we have to find a way to work 
this out so the treaty is not voted on.
  The first question I have of the Senator from Delaware is, What are 
the realities of getting the President to make that request? He has 
come pretty close in this letter. Why not make that additional request?
  Mr. BIDEN. In response to my friend from Pennsylvania, I will say 
that I, obviously, cannot speak for the President. But he has gone 
awfully far. He says: ``I believe that proceeding to a vote under these 
circumstances would severely harm the national security of the United 
States, damage our relationship with our allies, and undermine our 
historic leadership,'' et cetera. ``Accordingly, I request that you 
postpone consideration of [this] Test Ban Treaty on the Senate floor.''
  Unless there is something incredible that is likely to happen in the 
next 8 months, the President is not going to be--and I realize this is 
a legitimate worry on the part of some; that the President will wait 
until the middle of an election year and raise a political issue by 
forcing people to vote for or against this treaty--but the likelihood 
of changing the votes of 22 Republican Senators between now and the 
election is zero, I would respectfully suggest.
  So what the President has done here is done the only thing I think a 
chief executive--Democrat or Republican--

[[Page 24840]]

should do; that is, he did just as Jimmy Carter did when he asked for 
SALT II to be taken down. He did not make a commitment he would not try 
to have it brought up. That is not what his letter said. What he said 
is: Bring it down. Don't vote on it now. It is not in the national 
interest.
  To have a President of the United States say, the treaty I, in fact, 
negotiated--I want to go on record as saying you should not consider it 
at all during the remainder of my term in office, surely damages his 
ability to deal internationally.
  So I think he is observing the reality of the circumstance, which 
means that there will be no vote next year on the floor of the Senate--
for if that were the case, you might as well go ahead and have the vote 
now.
  The letter Jimmy Carter sent--and I shall read it--said:

       In light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I request 
     that you delay consideration of the SALT II Treaty on the 
     Senate floor.
       The purpose of this request is not to withdraw the Treaty 
     from consideration, but to defer the debate so that the 
     Congress and I as President can assess Soviet actions and 
     intentions, and devote our primary attention to the 
     legislative and other measures required to respond to the 
     crisis.
       As you know, I continue to share your view that the SALT II 
     Treaty is in the national security interest of the United 
     States and the entire world, and that it should be taken up 
     by the Senate as soon as these more urgent issues have been 
     addressed.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Jimmy Carter.

  This letter of the President of the United States--this President--
goes a lot further than President Carter went in pulling down SALT II. 
But for the President to go beyond that, it seems to me, is to be 
beyond what we should be asking any executive.
  The Senator from Virginia has worked mightily to try to resolve this. 
He has gone so far as to draft a letter which a number of Senators are 
likely to sign, if they have not already signed, saying: In addition to 
the President asking this be brought down, we the undersigned Senators 
ask that it be brought down. And we have no intention of bringing that 
treaty up next year. We do not think the treaty should be brought up in 
the election year.
  To make the President, from an institutional standpoint, guarantee 
that he is now against the treaty that he ratified, it seems to me, is 
to be going beyond institutional good taste.
  Mr. HELMS. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BIDEN. For a question, I would be happy to yield.
  Mr. HELMS. I want to ponder a question to the Chair.
  Mr. BIDEN. Surely.
  Mr. HELMS. It was my understanding--perhaps mistakenly--that we were 
to go from side to side in our discussions. If that is not the case, I 
ask unanimous consent that it be the case, when both sides are on the 
floor seeking the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will respond. There has been a 
unanimous consent request that has been agreed to that to the extent 
possible that will be done. In this case, the ranking member sought 
recognition, and no other person sought recognition.
  Mr. HELMS. The Senator has been on his feet 20 minutes here. And two 
Senators have taken the floor from him. I want it to be understood I do 
not want that to happen again.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, it was not my intention--I thought the 
Senator from North Carolina, in effect, acknowledged that I should take 
the question from the Senator from the State of Pennsylvania. I 
apologize.
  Mr. HELMS. I did not think it would be four questions.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am not propounding the questions. I am 
just trying to answer the question. I hope I answered the Senator's 
question.
  Mr. SPECTER. I believe I asked one question.
  Mr. BIDEN. Yes.
  Mr. SPECTER. I had one more.
  I believe I asked one question. I had one more. I would like leave to 
ask one more question.
  The question I have for Senator Biden is, Is there any other way 
procedurally that this vote can be put off? We are considering the 
treaty. There is a unanimous consent request, and while I do not agree 
with what the Senator said in his first response--I believe the 
President can say more without being against the treaty. And I believe 
there are political considerations which are behind not having the 
matter brought up in fair consideration to Senator Lott's request there 
be a commitment not to take it up all year. I think it highly unlikely 
that there would be a shift among Republicans on a procedural matter to 
find 51 votes--50 votes plus the Vice President. But we are dealing 
here with matters of extraordinary gravity. I hope this matter can be 
worked out short of a procedural vote.
  But I direct this question to the Senator from Delaware, whether 
there is any other procedural alternative to getting this vote off the 
Senate agenda.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will respond very briefly and then yield 
to my friend from North Carolina.
  My knowledge of Senate procedure pales in comparison to the Senator 
from North Carolina. I am not being solicitous. That is a statement of 
fact. But it is my understanding that the only procedural means by 
which we could move from this treaty to other business without a vote 
would be if there were a motion to move from the Executive Calendar to 
the legislative calendar. That would, as I understand it, require 51 
votes. That is the only thing of which I know. I do not know if anyone 
is going to do that.
  Mr. HELMS. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield the floor to my friend.
  Mr. HELMS. I ask the Parliamentarian for his views on it now, to get 
that settled.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Parliamentarian advises that the Senator's 
statement is correct.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, that may be the first time my procedural 
judgment has ever been ruled to be correct on the floor of the Senate. 
I am very happy the Senator suggested I ask that.
  Mr. HELMS. I think the Senator has forgotten many times when he was 
correct.
  Mr. BIDEN. The Senator is very nice to say that. Seldom procedurally. 
I yield the floor.
  Mr. HELMS. I ask the distinguished Senator from Montana, who has been 
awaiting a chance to speak, be recognized for such time as he may 
require.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana.
  Mr. BURNS. I thank the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee 
and the Chair.
  I listened to the exchange. It is very interesting. Why we are in 
this debate was not initiated by this side of the aisle. This whole 
process was not initiated by this side of the aisle. It was a reaction 
that was initiated by our friends on the other side. That is irrelevant 
right now. What is relevant is our Nation's security and the merits of 
this treaty and how it affects us and our national security. We have 
but one deterrent for the safety of the people who live in this 
country, and that is our reliable nuclear capability. Once it is 
questioned, then our ability to deter in this world of uncertainty 
would be damaged.
  I rise to record my opposition to Senate passage of the Comprehensive 
Test Ban treaty. This treaty bans all nuclear testing forever. Thus, it 
is a ban on ``bang'' for all time; it is not a ban on bombs. No one 
ought to be under the illusion that this treaty ends nuclear weapons 
development by America's foes. At home, an essential part of the 
administration's plan to implement the treaty is a ``safeguards 
package''. The mere existence of the safeguards package speaks for 
itself: without them, the treaty poses too many risks. Unfortunately, 
the treaty we are asked to vote upon contains none of the safeguards 
because the terms of the treaty expressly preclude making the 
safeguards package part of the treaty. In other words, the treaty 
prohibits meaningful reservations. Consequently, we are asked to bet on 
the come that the administration can deliver all that is promises in 
the safeguards package, not only in the next few years but far into the 
future. We are told that the

[[Page 24841]]

Joint Chiefs of Staff support the treaty with the safeguards and is 
unable to comment on the merits of the treaty without the safeguards. I 
fully understand the Chain of Command. Our leaders also understand the 
Chain of Command. We do not have to read too much between the lines to 
conclude that without the safeguards package, this treaty poses 
unacceptable risks to our national security.
  A total ban on all nuclear testing for all time has never been 
supported by prior Presidents-and for sound reasons. This 
administration's best sales pitch for a total ban on bangs for all time 
is that it is an important step in the direction of doing away with the 
threat of nuclear war. This is a nice dream and a great idea for 
another planet. But on earth it is a downright dangerous false hope. 
The complete ban treaty has a fatal flaw in the real world: the treaty 
is unenforceable. In one sentence, the fatal flaw is that violations 
cannot be verified.
  The best intentions humans can conceive are of no use if the treaty 
is not implemented not only by us but also by the other nuclear 
players. And what is the score? Well Russia and China have not ratified 
this treaty and they are unlikely to do so. Even if they did, either 
one could veto any attempts at enforcement by the U.N. Security 
Council. North Korea did not even participate in the negotiations about 
the treaty. India and Pakistan have not signed on to the treaty. The 
score on rogue nations such as Iraq and Libya varies but we have to ask 
whether they could be trusted to keep their commitments anyway. The 
administration has, once again, gone off and negotiated a deal that is 
not acceptable to the Senate. I suppose the White House media spin will 
again be that the United States will suffer a loss of world leadership 
if the Senate does not buy this pig in a pike treaty. Well maybe the 
negotiators should have thought of that before they put American's 
credibility on the line. The spinmeisters should re-read our 
Constitution. Treaties must be acceptable to two thirds of the 
Senators. That requirement has been there since the founding of the 
Republic. The White House should not pretend to be shocked when the 
Senate turns down a treaty that it does not like because the treaty has 
no teeth. there are too many undefined characters in the world who are 
unaffected by this treaty.
  This treaty is not a good idea for a number of other reasons. The 
agreement puts international handcuffs on nuclear technology testing by 
the United States. Our country needs to have access to the testing of 
current and possible future nuclear weapons, defensive as well as 
offensive. We know that some nations play fast and loose with nuclear 
weapons technology. This is not the case generally in the United States 
and is not the case specifically in Montana where we maintain many 
Minutemen III missiles. Part of the Safeguard Stewardship and 
Management Program proposed by the Administration to sell this treaty 
is to assure us that the nuclear stockpile remains safe and reliable. 
But tests needed to create the data base and methodologies for 
stockpile stewardship have not been done during the seven year 
moratoria our nation has voluntarily followed on testing and would not 
be done under the mandatory terms of the treaty before us. Simply 
stated, the technology for stockpile stewardship is unproven. Key 
safety and reliability data can only be obtained from the actual 
testing of weapons. We cannot take a chance on when or whether our 
nuclear weapons will go off. Can you imagine putting all your faith in 
an airplane flying right without making actual flight tests.? The 
pilots I know still think an aircraft has to be flown before they are 
convinced of its safety and reliability. Likewise, data from past tests 
cannot adequately predict the impacts of ongoing problems such as aging 
taking into account the highly corrosive nature of materials with a 
shelf life of 20 years. What do we do in 25 years? The administration's 
answer is to rely upon computer simulations or, as a last resort, to 
withdraw from the treaty. The stakes are too high to depend upon 
theoretical models and any treaty can be killed by a later law. But I 
submit these actions are closing the barn door after the horses are 
gone. Montanans as well as all Americans must have confidence in the 
safety and reliability of the refurbished nuclear warheads remaining in 
our country. Our troops in the field must also have confidence in the 
nuclear weapons they carry. This test ban treaty precludes us from 
undertaking the technology testing that is essential for keeping 
confidence in our nuclear deterrent capability.
  The cold war may be over but the threat posed to the United States 
from nuclear weapons in hostile hands is far from over. Russia refuses 
to ratify Start II and continues to insist (along with the 
administration) on strict compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty. If ever 
there was a lesson about not freezing nuclear technology in time, the 
ABM Treaty is the model. Most Americans still do not know that our 
country is absolutely defenseless against ballistic missile attack not 
only from Russia but also from any where else. There is mounting 
evidence that China has stolen priceless nuclear secrets from our 
national laboratories. Only a complete fool would think that the 
actions of the Chinese indicate that they would curtail their rapid 
advancement towards being a nuclear power, with or without this test 
ban treaty. Neither India nor Pakistan have signed on to this treaty 
and I suppose the administration will try to blame that on the Senate 
somehow. I submit, however, that the positions of Pakistan and India on 
their nuclear status have nothing whatsoever to do with this debate in 
the Senate. We are aware that there are half dozen rogue nations out 
there. They must really lick their lips when they think about America 
not testing nuclear weapons anymore. Who seriously thinks this treaty 
will slow down despots who pose current and future irresponsible and, 
perhaps, irrational nuclear threats to the United States? The 
administration is making a serious error in judgment in mixing up what 
States say at diplomatic conferences with what they go back home. This 
is not the time to handicap ourselves by assuming test ban obligations 
that we would keep but others would either violate or ignore.
  I have been called by many representatives of other states and heads 
of states. I asked one question: Will the signing of this test ban 
treaty change the attitude of the Russians? Answer: No. By the PRC, the 
Chinese? No. Will it change the attitude in India or Pakistan or North 
Korea or other suspected rogue entities? No. Then why do we put 
ourselves in jeopardy by not testing?
  In conclusion, I believe this treaty is fatally flawed because it is 
not enforceable and will be ignored by the very nations we distrust. 
Moreover, to retain a credible nuclear deterrent capability, we must 
retain our ability to test our weapon systems for safety and 
reliability. Therefore, this treaty hurts us while helping our 
potential enemies. My vote is to oppose advice and consent.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise to express my support for the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I believe the real question before us is 
whether or not the world will be safer with or without the nuclear test 
ban treaty. I believe we are safer.
  From a very self-interested standpoint, if this treaty is adopted, it 
gives us the very real potential of locking all of our potential 
adversaries into permanent nuclear inferiority because they will not be 
able to conduct the sophisticated tests necessary to improve their 
technology, particularly when it comes to the miniaturization of 
nuclear warheads. It will, also, I think, contribute to an overall 
spirit which is advancing the cause of nuclear disarmament and also 
ending the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
  On the other side of the coin, if we step back from this treaty today 
and vote it down, I think we will set back this progress in trying to 
reduce nuclear arms throughout the world. All of us have come to this 
floor with different viewpoints, but I suspect we would all say the 
process we have undertaken is somewhat suspect. I spent 12 years in the 
Army, and I learned to

[[Page 24842]]

grow up under the rule of ``hurry up and wait.'' Well, this process 
resembles ``wait and hurry up.'' The President submitted this treaty to 
the Senate over 2 years ago. Yet for months, no action was taken. Then 
last week, suddenly it was announced that we would conduct a very 
limited debate, that we would have hastily constructed hearings, and 
that we would move to a vote.
  I think that process alone suggests that we wait, at least--as we 
consider more carefully this treaty to discharge our obligations under 
the Constitution--for a thorough and detailed analysis of all the 
consequences. Indeed, this is a very complex subject matter, as the 
debate on the floor today and preceding days has indicated.
  I believe we need to take additional time. I hope we can take 
additional time. But if the measure were to come before this body for a 
vote, I would vote to support the treaty because, as I have said, I 
think passing this treaty would provide a safer world. Rejecting this 
treaty would, I think, disrupt dramatically any further attempts at a 
significant comprehensive reduction of nuclear weapons throughout the 
world.
  I think it is somewhat naive to suggest that if this Senate rejected 
the treaty, we could simply go back next week and begin to negotiate 
again on different terms. I think we would be sending a very strong and 
dangerous signal to the world that we, rather than carefully 
considering this treaty, have rejected it almost outright. I think, 
also, together with other developments, such as our genuine attempts to 
look for a relaxation of the ABM Treaty, rejection could be construed 
as not suggesting we are serious about nuclear disarmament but, quite 
the contrary, that we ourselves are beginning to look at nuclear 
weapons and nuclear technology in a different light, a light less 
favorable.
  Let me suggest something else. This treaty will not prevent us from 
testing our nuclear technology. It will prevent us, though, from 
conducting tests involving nuclear detonation. We can in fact go on and 
test our technology. We have been testing our technology constantly 
over the last 7 years without a nuclear detonation.
  This treaty would not ban nuclear weapons. This treaty also would 
provide for an extensive regime of monitoring sites--over 300 in 90 
countries. It would allow for onsite inspection if, in fact, a 
significant number of signatories to the treaty were convinced that a 
violation took place. These additional monitoring sites, together with 
the onsite inspections, are tools that do not exist today to curb the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and the development of new nuclear 
weapons.
  There has been some discussion about our ability to monitor the 
development of nuclear weapons and, indeed, to monitor clandestine 
tests of nuclear devices. I think the suggestion has been made--and I 
think it is inaccurate--that a nuclear detonation could take place 
without anybody knowing anything at all about it. That is not the case 
at all. Just last week, there was an article in the Washington Post 
entitled ``CIA Unable To Precisely Track Testing.'' If you read the 
article, it is clear that the CIA was able to detect two suspicious 
detonations at a Russian test site in the Arctic from seismic data and 
other monitoring devices. What they could not determine is whether this 
detonation was high explosives of a nonnuclear category or a nuclear 
detonation. But certainly we will have indications, if there is a 
clandestine test, that the possibility of a nuclear detonation has 
taken place. That alone will give us, I believe, the basis to go 
forward and ask for onsite inspections and for an explanation, to use 
the levers of this treaty which we do not have at this moment.
  So the issue of verification, I think, is something that is quite 
obvious and prominent within this treaty, and the means of verification 
were discussed at length by my colleague from Nebraska who pointed out 
all the different techniques our intelligence service has to identify 
possible violations of this treaty and, with this treaty, to be able to 
press those violations in a world forum so we can ascertain whether the 
treaty has been adhered to or violated.
  The whole notion of controlling nuclear testing is not new. 
Throughout this debate, my colleagues have discussed the initiatives 
that began as early as the 1950s with President Eisenhower. Then, in 
1963, President Kennedy was able to sign, and the Senate ratified, the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty which outlawed nuclear explosions in the sea, 
atmosphere, and in outer space. In 1974, we entered into a treaty with 
the Soviet Union--the Threshold Test Ban Treaty--which prohibited 
underground testing with yields greater than 150 kilotons. In 1992, 
Congress passed the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment which called for a 
moratorium on testing. We are still observing today.
  Also, I think it would be appropriate to point out that in fact for 
the last 7 years, we have not detonated nuclear devices. Yet each and 
every year, our scientists, the experts in the Department of Defense 
and Department of Energy, have certified that our nuclear stockpile is 
both safe and reliable. So the assertion that we can never assure the 
reliability and safety of our nuclear stockpile without testing has 
been disproven over the last 7 years. We have done that.
  Now, I believe we can in fact maintain a nuclear stockpile that is 
both safe and reliable. We can do it using the new technology we are 
developing, including but not exclusively related to, computer 
simulations. We can do it by investing, as we are each year, billions 
of dollars--over $4 billion--so we can ensure that we have a safe 
nuclear stockpile and that these weapons would be reliable if we were 
forced to use them.
  There is something else I think should be pointed out. This treaty 
has been endorsed and recommended to us by the Secretary of Defense, 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Energy. 
These are individuals who take very seriously their responsibility for 
the national security of the United States. But some might suggest, 
well, they are part of this administration and we really know that, 
reading between the lines, their recommendation might not be as 
compelling as others.
  But such logic would not suggest or explain why individuals such Gen. 
John Shalikashvili, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 
Gen. Colin Powell; Gen. David Jones; or Adm. William Crowe would in 
fact be supportive of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Nobody would 
suggest why other prominent military officers, such as John Galvin, 
former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe; Gen. Charles Horner, who 
commanded the air forces in Desert Storm; Bernard Rogers, another 
former Commander of NATO and Supreme Commander in Europe, would also 
recommend and support this treaty. These individuals are concerned 
about security and have spent their lives in uniform dedicated to the 
security of this Nation and the protection of our people. They believe, 
as I do, that this will be a safer world with this treaty rather than 
if we reject this treaty. With this treaty, I think we can curtail 
dramatically the development of nuclear weapons by opposing powers to 
the United States.
  It is true that you can develop a nuclear weapon without a test. You 
can develop the unsophisticated rudimentary weapons that were used in 
World War II. But you cannot develop the sophisticated technology which 
is the key to strategic nuclear power without nuclear testing.
  If we accept this treaty, if we join with other nations, then we will 
be in a much stronger position, and the world will be in a much 
stronger position, to ensure that countries such as India, Pakistan, 
and North Korea will be very challenged to develop the kind of 
sophisticated nuclear weapons that will alter the strategic balance 
throughout the world. That in and of itself, I believe, will make it a 
safer world.
  Of course, the elimination of testing will have a positive 
environmental effect. Even though our tests now throughout the world 
are restricted underground, there is always the possibility of leakage 
of radioactive material. And we know how devastating that can be.

[[Page 24843]]

  There are those who have been here today who argued that we should 
reject this treaty because it is not 100 percent verifiable. I would 
suggest that we can, in fact, verify this treaty--that 100 percent is 
not the standard we would reasonably use. As I have indicated 
previously, we have already detected what we suspect are suspicious 
detonations in Russia. We would be even better prepared to do that with 
300 more monitoring stations in 90 countries around the world. In fact, 
we would then have an international forum to take our complaints and to 
force an explanation, and, if necessary, an onsite inspection of a 
test.
  I think we have an obligation to carefully review and consider this 
treaty. I believe that we do. And that consideration would be enhanced 
by additional time. I think it would be appropriate to take additional 
time. But it would be a terrible, I think, disservice to the process of 
nuclear disarmament, of nuclear nonproliferation, and of a saner world 
if we were to reject this treaty out of hand. And the world is 
watching.
  President Clinton was the first head of state to sign this treaty. 
One-hundred and fifty nations followed. Forty-one nations have ratified 
the treaty, and several more, including Russia, are waiting again for 
our lead in ratifying. Unless we are part of this treaty, this treaty 
will never go into effect because it requires all of the nuclear 
powers--those with nuclear weapons or with nuclear capabilities--to be 
a party to the treaty before it can go into effect. I hope we either in 
our wisdom consider this more, or in our wisdom accept ratifying this 
treaty.
  Thirty-six years ago when the Limited Test Ban Treaty came to this 
floor, a great leader of this Senate, Senator Everett Dirksen, was one 
of the forces who decided to take a very bold step that was as equally 
daunting and challenging as the step we face today. His words were:

       A young President calls this treaty the first step. I want 
     to take a first step, Mr. President. One my age should think 
     about his destiny a little. I should not like to have written 
     on my tombstone, ``He knew what happened at Hiroshima, but he 
     did not take a first step.''

  The treaty is not the first step. But it is, I believe, the next 
logical step that we must take. I believe none of us want to look back 
and say that we were hesitant to take this step, that we were hesitant 
to continue the march away from the nuclear apocalypse to a much saner 
and a much safer world.
  I yield my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield time to the Senator from Kentucky.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. BUNNING. Thank you, Mr. President. I thank Senator Helms.
  Mr. President, this whole debate reminds me of what the great 
philosopher Yogi Berra once said: It is like ``deja vu all over 
again.''
  I thought we pretty well settled this argument years ago--back in the 
1970s and the 1980s--when the idea of unilateral disarmament through a 
nuclear freeze was proposed as the only way to end the nuclear arms 
race between the United States and Russia. We rejected the nuclear 
freeze concept. We put national security first. We won the cold war, 
not through unilateral disarmament and symbolic gestures but through 
strength, and we defeated the evil empire. The world is safer and we 
have been able to substantially reduce the number of nuclear warheads 
and the threat of nuclear conflict.
  So it is difficult to understand why this argument is back before the 
Senate today. It is difficult to understand why a U.S. President is 
back before us asking us to ratify an agreement which would tie this 
Nation's hands behind its back and jeopardize our national security.
  None of us support nuclear war. We are all against nuclear 
proliferation. But agreeing to forego all future testing of nuclear 
weapons is not the way to get there. It is a matter of national 
security, of safety, and of common sense.
  Because we refused to accept the siren call of the nuclear freeze 
movement in the 1970s, we won the cold war, and we have subsequently 
been able to reduce our arsenal of nuclear warheads from 12,000 to 
6,000 under the START II treaty. The number is expected to be reduced 
further to 3,000 warheads by the year 2003. But despite these 
reductions and this progress, the United States must maintain a 
reliable nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future.
  Although the cold war is over, significant threats to our country 
still exist. At present, our nuclear capability provides us a deterrent 
that is critical to our Nation and is relied on as a safety umbrella by 
most countries around the world.
  As long as our national security and our own nuclear deterrent rely 
on the nuclear capability, we must be able to periodically test our 
existing weapons as necessary to ensure their reliability and their 
safety.
  Reliability is essential. If our nuclear weapons are not reliable, 
they are not much of a credible deterrent, and the nuclear umbrella 
that we and our allies count on for our mutual defense will have gaping 
holes in it.
  We have to face reality. Our nuclear stockpile is aging. Our nuclear 
inventory is older than it has ever been, and nuclear materials and 
components degrade in unpredictable ways--in some cases causing the 
weapons to fail. Without testing, those potential problems will go 
undetected. Upgrades will not be possible. Reliability will suffer.
  Safety is also essential. A permanent ban on testing would jeopardize 
the safety of our nuclear arsenal by preventing us from integrating the 
most modern advanced safety measures into our weapons. Even now our 
nuclear arsenal is not as safe as we can make it. Of the nine weapons 
systems currently on hand, only one employs all of the most modern and 
secure measures available. Safety modifications of this kind would 
require testing to make sure they worked as intended.
  Sure, advocates of this treaty argue there are some other measures of 
testing a weapon--safety and reliability. The Clinton administration 
has proposed an ambitious program known as the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program which would use computer modeling and simulations to detect 
reliability and safety. However, many of the components of this system 
are unbuilt and untested. The National Ignition Facility, which is the 
centerpiece of this program, is not scheduled to be completed until the 
year 2003. There are already reports that it is years behind schedule. 
It would be foolhardy to entrust our nuclear security to an unproven 
program which probably won't even be fully operational by the year 
2010. Reliability and safety: There must be certainty; at this point 
only live testing provides that kind of certainty.
  This treaty is based on a very noble, well-intentioned goal. There is 
no question that if the Senate were to ratify this treaty, it would be 
a grand symbolic gesture, but noble goals and symbolic gestures are no 
substitute for good policy and hard reality.
  I have already talked about a couple of reasons why this treaty is 
not good policy--safety and reliability. But there are a couple of 
other reasons this treaty fails the hard-reality test, as well: 
Verification and enforcement. The hard reality is that the United 
States usually tries to live up to the agreements it signs. If we 
ratify this treaty, we will live by it; we have no guarantee other 
nations will be so inclined to follow the letter of the law.
  Under this treaty, verification would be very difficult and 
enforcement would be impossible. It has no teeth. It is difficult now 
to detect nuclear tests with any confidence, and the verification 
monitoring provisions in this treaty don't add to that confidence level 
at all. Yes, we could request onsite inspections if we thought someone 
had been cheating, but that request would have to be approved by a 
supermajority in the 51-member executive council. In addition, each 
country under the treaty has the right to declare 50-square-kilometer 
areas off limits to any inspection.
  Even if we did catch a cheater, the treaty has almost no teeth--
possible trade sanctions. That's it, possible trade sanctions. And we 
know how difficult it is to maintain multilateral

[[Page 24844]]

trade sanctions against Iraq, a country that blatantly invaded and 
looted a neighboring country and which consistently defies 
international inspection teams. No one can believe we would be more 
effective at enforcing sanctions against more responsible nations of 
greater commercial importance such as India and Pakistan. There are no 
teeth.
  That brings us back to the hard reality. Would we obey the treaty? 
Yes, we would obey the treaty because that is the way we are. And 
others would obey the treaty if it suited their whims of the moment. 
The hard reality is if we ratify this treaty, we sacrifice our national 
security, jeopardize the safety and reliability of our nuclear arsenal. 
And what do we get in return? A noble, symbolic gesture. Nothing more. 
It is not worth it.
  I urge my colleagues to vote no. Unilateral disarmament was a bad 
idea in the 1970s and 1980s; it is a bad idea for the 21st century.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield to the Senator from Montana.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I strongly support the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty. Why? Various reasons.
  First, we have an opportunity to vote this week. I will cast my vote 
in favor of ratification because I believe to do otherwise would be a 
tragic mistake with extremely dire consequences for our Nation and 
equally dire consequences for the world. However, given the likelihood 
the Senate will fall short of the two-thirds majority required under 
the Constitution for ratification, I will support efforts to postpone 
this vote. We cannot tell the world the United States of America, the 
leader of the free world, opposes this treaty. It would be a travesty.
  The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty gives America a unique opportunity 
to leave a safer world for our children and for our grandchildren. We 
cannot prevent earthquakes; we can't prevent hurricanes or tornadoes, 
not yet. I hope over time our ability to predict them--minimizing the 
destruction of human life and property--will improve. But we can 
prevent nuclear war. We can halt the spread of nuclear weapons. We can 
prevent nuclear fallout and environmental destruction caused by nuclear 
testing. And we can reduce the fear of a nuclear holocaust that all 
Americans have lived with since the start of the cold war 50 years ago. 
We can do all this, and we should.
  Let me review some of the benefits we get from the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty, and let me explain why this treaty will make the world 
safer for our children and grandchildren. First, under the CTBT, there 
is an absolute prohibition against conducting nuclear weapon test 
explosions by the signators. This would include all countries that 
possess nuclear weapons, as well as those countries that have nuclear 
power or research reactors. It would also include countries that do not 
yet have nuclear facilities. This absolute prohibition of testing makes 
it much harder for countries that already have advanced nuclear weapons 
to produce new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons. Russia and China 
are prime examples.
  The CTBT prevents the kind of arms competition we had during the cold 
war. For example, without nuclear tests the Chinese will be unable to 
MIRV ICBMs with any degree of reliability. The Chinese have no 
assurance of the effectiveness of putting multiple warheads on missiles 
because they would not be able to test. Many believe China has made 
enormous strides in their nuclear weapons capability because of decades 
of espionage, but the CTBT provides one way to limit further 
sophisticated development.
  The absolute prohibition on nuclear testing also helps prevent 
countries with smaller and less advanced nuclear weapons from 
developing more advanced nuclear warheads. This applies especially to 
India and to Pakistan. The strategy of using advanced nuclear weapons 
depends on confidence. It depends on reliability. India and Pakistan 
would not be able to build reliable and sophisticated nuclear weapons 
under the treaty.
  The treaty's terms also help prevent nations that are seeking nuclear 
arms from ever developing them into advanced sophisticated weapons. I 
refer to countries such as Iran and Iraq.
  The second major reason for adopting this treaty is that ratification 
is critical to our ability to enforce and maintain the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, another treaty. The NPT is the bedrock of our 
efforts to stop the spread of nuclear arms to non-nuclear weapon 
states. Many of the nations that signed the NPT, the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, and agreed to its indefinite extension did so on the 
understanding that there would be a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  The third reason for support is the CTBT will improve the ability of 
the United States to detect nuclear explosions. Let me repeat that. It 
will improve our ability to detect current explosions, the status quo 
compared with today. The international monitoring system will have 321 
monitoring stations, including 31 in Russia, 11 in China, and 17 in the 
Middle East. These stations will be able to detect explosions down to 
about 1 kiloton, the equivalent of 1,000 tons of TNT--much lower than 
the kinds of explosions we are talking about in this Chamber. In the 
case of a suspicious event--that is, a report of an explosion that 
could be nuclear, a mine site, or even an earthquake--any party can 
request an onsite inspection. With or without a treaty, we must 
continue all efforts at monitoring nuclear developments worldwide, but 
the treaty provides a system that far exceeds current capabilities of 
inspection.
  Now, turning to two of the major objections to those who oppose the 
treaty: First, they claim actual nuclear tests--that is, explosions--
are necessary to ensure that our stockpile of weapons works. We have 
put in place a science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program. Its purpose 
is to provide a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability 
of America's inventory of nuclear weapons. Under this program, our 
National Weapons Laboratories spend $4.5 billion each year to check and 
to maintain these weapons. We can still test; we do test. We just 
cannot explode. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy, with the help of 
the Directors of the National Laboratories, the Commander of the U.S. 
Strategic Command, and the Nuclear Weapons Council, must certify every 
year to the President that the necessary high level of confidence 
exists.
  Do not forget, $4.5 billion a year is spent on this. If they cannot 
give that certification to the President, the President can then use 
the so-called Safeguard F. What is that? That is the United States will 
be able to withdraw from the treaty and test the weapon that is in 
doubt; that is, if the President is not confident, the President can 
withdraw.
  The Directors of our weapons labs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, along with four of his predecessors, and an impressive array 
of Nobel Prize winners believe the Stewardship Program will provide 
appropriate protection for our national security.
  The second objection against the treaty is that it is impossible to 
verify that all nations are complying with the treaty. That is true. It 
is true we cannot detect every conceivable explosion at low yields. But 
our defense agencies have concluded--the Department of Defense--that we 
will be able to detect tests that will have an impact on our national 
security, and that is the threshold of concern to us.
  Let me go through a few likely scenarios that would occur if we 
reject the treaty. First and most immediate would be on the Indian 
subcontinent. India and Pakistan matched each other with nuclear tests. 
Kashmir remains one of the world's most dangerous trigger points. U.S. 
rejection of the test ban treaty would destroy our ability to pressure 
those two countries to halt further nuclear tests. Those countries 
would likely begin to develop more sophisticated nuclear weapons, 
heightening the probability of their actual use in the region.
  The second adverse consequence of rejection is this: China would 
certainly prepare for more tests to increase the sophistication of its 
nuclear arsenal.

[[Page 24845]]

At present, Chinese nuclear weapons do not pose a strategic threat to 
the United States. Our rejection of the CTBT would allow them to begin 
a long-term development program with testing that would make them such 
a threat.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 8 minutes have expired.
  Mr. BAUCUS. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2 more minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BAUCUS. The third adverse consequence is American efforts to 
promote nuclear nonproliferation would become much more difficult 
because other nations would believe America's moral authority and its 
leadership were destroyed by our rejection of the CTBT.
  The United States has been the world's leader in promoting arms 
control. If we do not lead, no one else will. It is that simple. Our 
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention led to its approval by 
Russia, by China, and others. Our ratification of the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty will lead other countries to agree to a complete ban on 
nuclear explosions.
  As a footnote, let me add the American people, by an overwhelming 
margin, understand the need to control nuclear testing. In a recent 
poll, 82 percent of Americans responded that they would like to see the 
treaty approved. That is not a sufficient reason to vote for 
ratification, but we should take note the public well understands the 
dangers of nuclear testing.
  President Eisenhower began the first comprehensive test ban 
negotiations in 1958 with the goal of constraining the nuclear arms 
race and halting the spread of nuclear weapons. Mr. President, 31 years 
later we have an opportunity to make this goal a reality. That is the 
legacy I want to leave my son and all the children of Montana, of the 
United States, and of the world.
  In sum, I think each of us has a moral obligation to leave this world 
in as good shape or better shape than we found it, and certainly 
ratification of the test ban treaty fulfills that moral obligation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from North 
Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Maine is 
here. I yield 15 minutes to the gracious Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Maine.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee for his effort and cooperation.
  With this debate on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the 
Senate discharges one of its most fundamental and solemn duties, the 
stewardship of our national defense. I think there is little question 
among us that a world free of nuclear weapons would be a world more 
secure. Obviously, we all look forward to the day when we do not have 
to rely on our nuclear stockpile as a necessary deterrent. We know full 
well over 80 percent of the American people share that point of view. 
But the fact is, that day has not yet arrived. Until it does, as the 
world's last remaining superpower, we walk a line both fine and 
blurred. This debate must be about how we walk that line. It should be 
about how we balance our clear and shared interests in a nuclear-free 
planet within the reality of a post-cold-war world.
  The reality is this: At the same time the world looks to us to 
provide leadership in stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
so, too, does it rely upon us for a credible nuclear deterrent that 
will keep in check international aggressors, nations that seek to 
undermine democracy and freedom. That is the challenge before us, to 
move towards our shared goal in a responsible and measured manner, ever 
mindful that a post-cold-war world does not mean a world devoid of 
duplicity or danger. That is the dynamic we can neither escape nor 
ignore. That is the dynamic that must inform each and every one of us 
as we consider the ramification of a zero-yield treaty of unlimited 
duration.
  The question is not whether we support nonproliferation measures. We 
obviously make that as one of our key national security objectives. The 
question is, Are we going to support a treaty that is a significant 
departure from what every Chief Executive of the atomic age, except 
President Clinton, has laid down for criteria in any test ban treaty? 
Are we going to support a treaty predicated on a program that is yet to 
be tested and may remain unproven for decades? Are we going to support 
a treaty that assumes reliable verification when we know we cannot 
always detect low-level tests, when we know that rogue nations such as 
North Korea, Iraq, or Iran could develop crude first-generation nuclear 
devices with no testing at all? In fact, the CIA Director George Tenet 
stated, back in 1997, in response to questions submitted to him by the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence:

       Nuclear testing is not required for an acquisition of a 
     basic nuclear weapons capability. Tests using high explosive 
     detonations only could provide reasonable confidence in the 
     performance of a first generation device. Nuclear testing 
     becomes critical only when a program moves beyond basic 
     designs, incorporating more advanced concepts.

  We cannot even verify what is going on in Iraq with Saddam Hussein. 
We all recall we set up an onsite inspection program as a condition for 
his surrender in the Persian Gulf war. Today he has systematically and 
unilaterally dismantled the U.N. weapons inspection system regime.
  So these are the pressing issues that confront us about the 
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. That is why I am 
disappointed, regretting that we have had politics permeate both sides 
of the political aisle, both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue with respect 
to this debate. Because the ratification of any treaty, and certainly 
this one, is a solemn and unique responsibility for the Senate, and we 
should accord this debate the level of gravity it deserves. It is not 
just about process and procedure. It is certainly not about politics. 
It is about policy; what is in the best interests of this country as 
well as the security interests of the world. What is at stake is no 
less than our ability to stop proliferation and to ensure at the same 
time the continued viability of our stockpile.
  When we get into debates about procedure and process, I think it 
ignores the overwhelming magnitude and gravity of the centerpieces of 
this treaty. We should not be making this agreement a political 
football. Duty, a constitutional duty, compels us to look at the facts 
before us.
  I can tell you, after I sat through hours of deliberations and 
testimony on the Armed Services Committee last week, the facts are not 
reassuring. I know there is an honest difference of opinion among 
experts, among former Secretaries of Defense. But you have to look at 
the honest difference of opinion and take pause when you have six 
former Secretaries of Defense, two former Clinton administration CIA 
Directors, four former National Security Advisers, and three former 
National Weapons Lab Directors, all opposing the treaty before us.
  Why? Because they believe a no-testing, unlimited duration policy at 
this time would fatally undermine confidence in the reliability of the 
U.S. nuclear stockpile as a sturdy hedge against the aggressive intent 
of once and future tyrants. That is a risk we simply cannot afford to 
take.
  Consider the backdrop of the Rumsfeld Commission report in 1998. We 
are all too familiar with the stark fact that North Korea, Iran, and 
Iraq, to name a few, would be able to inflict major destruction on the 
United States within 5 to 10 years of making a decision to acquire 
ballistic missile capabilities.
  Thanks to the testimony last week of three current National Weapons 
Laboratory Directors, we also know full well that the very program the 
administration proposes to rely on to monitor the safety, 
effectiveness, efficiency, and accuracy of the arsenal is between 10 
and 20 years away from being fully validated and operational, and that 
is assuming it will work. That is 10 to 20 years. We could have weapons 
in our stockpile left untested and

[[Page 24846]]

unproven for decades while rogue states acquire the means of mass 
destruction.
  That is what we are addressing today fundamentally: a treaty that has 
ultimately been negotiated by this administration with a noble long-
range goal that almost everyone accepts but one which requires this 
country to accept an unproven and incomplete computer-model-based 
system for the security of our nuclear deterrent in this age of weapons 
proliferation. In other words, we put the cart before the horse. We 
ought to know that our Stockpile Stewardship Program works first before 
we commit to any zero-yield, unlimited-duration treaty.
  As the Director of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Dr. Tarter, 
testified to the committee last week, the program is an approach that 
the country must pursue ``short of a return to a robust schedule of 
nuclear testing.'' By closing the door entirely, we would be making a 
question mark of our nuclear stockpile.
  As President Bush reminded us in 1993, one-third of all U.S. nuclear 
weapons designs fielded since 1958--one-third--have required nuclear 
testing to correct deficiencies after deployment.
  In his words:

       The requirement to maintain and improve the safety of our 
     nuclear stockpile and to evaluate and maintain the 
     reliability of U.S. forces necessitates continued nuclear 
     testing for those purposes, albeit at a modest level, for the 
     foreseeable future.

  Even within the Clinton administration, these conditions found a 
voice. According to Mr. Robert Bell, a member of the National Security 
Council staff, soon before President Clinton released his August 1995 
statement of support for the treaty, Defense Department officials 
argued that the United States should continue to reserve the right to 
conduct underground nuclear tests at a threshold of 150 kilotons or 
below.
  That would seem to be the prudent course on what we know at this 
moment in time. It is yet another fact today that we face a real danger 
of fewer and fewer scientists with the first-hand knowledge that comes 
from a testing process. Indeed, of the 85 remaining nuclear weapons 
experts at the Los Alamos and Livermore Laboratories today, only 35 
have coordinated live underground tests.
  Even as early as 1994, barely 18 months after the United States 
stopped underground nuclear testing, a report from the Congressional 
Research Service sounded an alarm, and my colleagues would be wise to 
read it. Back in 1994, it sounded the alarm that:

       These trends . . . threaten to undercut U.S. ability to 
     maintain the safety, reliability, and performance of its 
     warheads; to correct defects that are discovered or that 
     result from aging; and to remanufacture warheads. They also 
     work at cross-purposes with President Clinton's declaration 
     that the United States will maintain the capability to resume 
     testing if needed.

  Again, we must remember that these considerations must be made in the 
context of a treaty that raises the bar by allowing absolutely no 
testing at any level in perpetuity.
  As Dr. John Nuckolls, the former Director of the Lawrence Livermore 
Laboratory, put it, even an ``extended duration test ban'' would 
trigger the loss of all nuclear trained expert personnel as well as 
``major gaps in our understanding of scientific explosives.''
  Again, the CRS in 1994 in its report said:

       This skills loss is in its greatest jeopardy.

  Director Tarter, the current Director of Lawrence Livermore 
Laboratory, testified before our committee last week. What did he say 
in his testimony?

       It is a race against time. Before long, our nuclear test 
     veterans will be gone.

  We are counting on our current cadre of experienced scientists to 
help develop and install the new tools that are only now starting to 
come online.
  We have now heard from our Directors: A minimum of 10 years and maybe 
as high as 20 years from now, the Stockpile Stewardship Program will be 
determined to be workable.
  We have the loss of our nuclear scientists trained in the testing 
field. That is a safety net we cannot do without as we walk the 
tightrope of sustaining a credible strategic nuclear deterrent and 
aggressively promoting global arms control. Consider that our 
successive agreements with the Soviet Union, and now Russia, will 
eventually reduce the entire American nuclear warhead stock to about 25 
percent of its peak size in the cold war. Consider also that we 
maintain only 9 categories of nuclear weapons today from a level of 
more than 30 in 1985.
  We are making remarkable strides, as we should, on our priorities in 
the arms control arena. But knowledge about the arms we must sustain as 
bulwarks against future military conflicts cannot be lost, and this 
fact suggests that time has not ripened for the United States to 
sacrifice a 50-year, fool-proof position to keep the testing option 
open as unprecedented arms reductions have occurred and must continue. 
Indeed, the administration itself agrees we need a viable strategic 
nuclear arsenal to deter conflicts that could arise in critical areas 
such as the Middle East, the western Pacific, or northern Asia.
  In the view of the vast majority of treaty opponents and supporters 
alike who submitted opinions and testimony to the Armed Services 
Committee last week, the Stockpile Stewardship Program will produce low 
levels of confidence in many aspects of nuclear warhead capability for 
at least a decade to come and perhaps more.
  Perhaps Dr. Robinson, the Director of the Sandia National Laboratory, 
put it best and simplest when he told the committee:

       Confidence on the reliability and safety of the nuclear 
     weapons stockpile will eventually decline without nuclear 
     testing.

  It was expert scientists, not politicians, who told the committee 
that the Stockpile Stewardship Program brings the U.S. nuclear weapons 
complex into uncharted waters of reliability.
  So, too, is confidence key when it comes to another vital component 
of this treaty, and that is verification. At first glance, the 
technology behind the treaty's verification regime seems airtight. 
Article IV of the accord establishes a joint international monitoring 
system and international data center with a total of 337 facilities 
around the world. If these installations detect a potentially illegal 
underground explosion that subsequent diplomacy cannot resolve, the 
accusing state may request an onsite inspection.
  Fair enough, you might say, until you read the fine print. Then you 
discover that the onsite inspection provision requires an affirmative 
vote by 30 of the 51 members of the Executive Council of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization authorized under 
article II, an awfully high threshold. Article II does not give the 
United States or any of its allies permanent or rotating seats on the 
Council.
  That is not all. Science itself throws a wrench into the treaty's 
verification mechanism.
  According to a 1995 study by the Mitre Corporation, an established 
scientific research center, neither the National Technical Means of the 
United States nor the Monitoring System envisioned by the treaty can 
detect very low-yield or zero-yield tests.
  Finally, article V of the treaty establishes ``measures to ensure 
compliance.'' The most important of these measures entrusts the 
Conference of States Parties, the treaty's ratifying governments, to 
refer urgent cases to the United Nations Security Council, a forum in 
which Russia or China could exercise a unilateral veto.
  In other words, article V could mean if the United States diagnosed 
an imminent nuclear danger in a strategic region of the world, Moscow 
or Beijing might emerge as the final courts of appeal for sanctions or 
other punitive acts.
  The day for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty may come where we could 
have a zero-nuclear testing regime for an unlimited period of time. It 
may arrive. And we may be confident that we will be able to verify that 
level, as well as the low-level detections of other countries when it 
comes to explosions. But I think we have to consider the facts as we 
know them now.
  I think we have to look very carefully at the troubling aspects of 
the Stockpile Stewardship Program and

[[Page 24847]]

whether it is a viable alternative to nuclear testing. In the strategic 
and scientific communities many say it is not, and maybe we will not 
know for 10 to 20 years. That is what we are predicating our nuclear 
deterrent strategy on.
  So we have to vote--if we do vote today or tomorrow--on what we know 
today. We may know something differently in the future. But I submit 
that we cannot subject our security interests to what we might know 20 
years from now.
  I hope we will defer the vote on ratification because of all the 
current concerns that I and others have cited. We would do well to heed 
the advice of the letter that was submitted to the majority leader 
asking for deferral, the letter that was written by Henry Kissinger; 
John Deutch, a former CIA Director for the administration; and Brent 
Scowcroft, that we should defer until we can give more consideration to 
all of the issues that are before the Senate with respect to this 
treaty.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.
  I respect the Senator from Maine very much, as I do the Senator from 
Indiana, who put out the five-page statement on why he opposes the 
treaty. I want to speak to some of the things that some Senators have 
spoken to.
  First of all, the Senator from Maine says we have to deal with the 
facts as we know them. I hope she will keep that in mind when she votes 
on missile defense. I hope the rest of my colleagues, who say we have 
to deal with the facts as we know them, keep that in mind when we vote 
on missile defense.
  I find it fascinating some of the very people who push the missile 
defense and the abandonment of the ABM Treaty--where we have only had 
basically one successful test, which is a far cry from what we are 
going to need to be able to develop a missile defense initiative--are 
the same ones saying: But we can't go ahead with this treaty because we 
don't know everything.
  I respectfully suggest the ability of the scientific community to 
shoot multiple nuclear weapons out of the sky in the stratosphere and 
make sure not a single one gets through is an even more daunting and 
challenging program than the Stockpile Stewardship Program. But they 
seem to have no problem to be ready to abandon the ABM Treaty, which 
has been the cornerstone, since Nixon was President, for our arms 
control regime. But they have no faith. I find that fascinating, No. 1.
  No. 2, I also find it very fascinating that everybody keeps talking 
about nonverifiability. I have heard more than once this morning--not 
from the Senator from Maine but from others --the dictum of President 
Ronald Reagan: Trust, but verify. That is constantly brought up: There 
is a reason why we can't be for this treaty. We can't verify it.
  They say this treaty is not perfectly verifiable. That is true. But 
it is a red herring. This body has never demanded perfect verification.
  Consider Ronald Reagan's treaty, the INF Treaty, that eliminated 
land-based intermediate-range missiles. That treaty was signed by 
President Reagan, the same man who coined the phrase: Trust, but 
verify.
  Was the INF Treaty verifiable? Give me a break. No; it was not 
verifiable. It was not.
  Listen to what the Senate Intelligence Committee said in response to 
Ronald Reagan's assertion: Trust, but verify my INF Treaty. The 
Intelligence Committee said at the time:

       Soviet compliance with some of the Treaty's provisions will 
     be difficult to monitor. This problem is exemplified by the 
     unresolved controversy between DIA [the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency] and other intelligence agencies over the number of 
     SS-20's in the Soviet inventory.
       Ground-launched cruise missiles pose a particularly 
     difficult monitoring problem as they are interchangeable with 
     long-range Soviet sea-launched cruise missiles.

  This the INF Treaty did not ban.

       We are concerned that the Soviets could covertly extend the 
     range capability of a cruise missile, or covertly develop a 
     new ground-launched cruise missile which prohibited long-
     range capability. . .
       In an INF/START environment. . .the Soviet incentive to 
     cheat could increase because of a greater difficulty in 
     meeting targeting requirements.

  Still, this Senate and my Republican colleagues--from Dick Lugar, who 
quotes that he fought for the INF Treaty, and others, had no problem 
saying that was a verifiable treaty. The ability to hide these things 
in barns, to hide them in haystacks, was greater than the ability of 
someone to muffle a nuclear explosion.
  But no, I did not hear anything over on that side. I did not hear 
anybody saying: No, that's not verifiable. I guess that was a 
Republican treaty. Maybe this is a Democrat's treaty. Maybe that is how 
they think about it.
  But I find this absolutely fascinating. It really--if my staff gives 
me one more suggestion, I am going to kill them. It says: The INF was 
approved 93-5. I thought I kind of made that point clear.
  But at any rate, let me point out what else the Intelligence 
Committee said about that INF Treaty. It said:

       Since no verification and monitoring regime can be 
     absolutely perfect--

  Let me read it again:

       Since no verification and monitoring regime can be 
     absolutely perfect, a central focus for the Committee--

  That is the Intelligence Committee--

       has been to determine whether any possible infractions 
     would be of sufficient military significance to constitute a 
     threat to our national security interests. This calculus is 
     one which the Senate should bear in mind in its consideration 
     of the treaty.

  The Senate Intelligence Committee was right in 1988, and their 
standard is right today, even though this is pushed forward by a 
Democratic President instead of a Republican President.
  To impose this utterly unrealistic standard of verifiability on Bill 
Clinton's test ban treaty, when no such standard was imposed on Ronald 
Reagan's INF Treaty, may be an effective ``gotcha'' in politics, but it 
clearly does not look to the national interest of the United States.
  No inspection--no inspection--by the way, for onsite inspections in 
the INF Treaty, unless it was on prearranged sites. By the way, those 
of my colleagues who point out that we have to get 30 or 50 votes, our 
negotiators are pretty smart. We have 30 to 50 votes based on 
categories.
  Let me tell you how membership on that committee would be determined.
  The Executive Council is the decisionmaking body of the Treaty 
Organization. Among other things, it authorizes on-site inspections.
  There are 51 seats on the Council, divided geographically. Ten seats 
are allocated to parties from North America and Western Europe.
  Of these, the treaty provides that ``at least one-third of the seats 
allocated to each geographical region shall be filled taking into 
account political and security interests, by States Parties in that 
region designated on the basis of the nuclear capabilities relevant to 
the Treaty. . . .
  The chief negotiator, Stephen Ledogar, told the Foreign Relations 
Committee on Thursday that ``this is diplomatic language'' that assures 
that the United States gets a de facto permanent seat on the Council.
  Moreover, he said that there was an agreement among the Europeans and 
us that we would always have a seat.
  Makeup of the Council is: Africa, 10 seats; Eastern Europe, 7 seats; 
Latin America, 9 seats; Middle East/South Asia, 7 seats; N. America/W. 
Europe, 10 seats; East Asia/Pacific, 8 seats.
  There are 2-year terms.
  A quick review of the candidates for seats that we should expect, in 
almost all instances, to get all the votes of the West Europe/North 
America group. So we start with 10.
  Aside from Yugoslavia, Russia, and one of two others, the Eastern 
Europe group comprises strong United States allies. So that's another 
5-7 votes.
  Similarily, many of the Latin American states are either: (1) strong 
allies or (2) strongly favor the test ban. So we should usually get 
most of those 9 votes.

[[Page 24848]]

  That gets us very quickly to the low-mid-20s, in most instances--even 
being conservative and assuming that we don't get all the votes in the 
above 3 groups.
  That leaves Africa, 10 seats; Middle East/South Asia group, 7 seats; 
and the East Asia, 8 seats. There is where our work, depending on the 
makeup of the Council at the particular time, could get a little 
harder.
  But even there the rosters have U.S. allies, or proponents of non-
proliferation.
  It is hard to see how we will not get to 30 in most instances.
  In truth, it is more likely that most U.S. inspection requests, based 
on our intelligence and the data from the International Monitoring 
System, will be easily approved.
  It should also be noted that, unlike the U.N., Israel is a member of 
a regional group, and will automatically get a seat on the Council 
under a special rule that guarantees that one seat within each region 
be filled on a rotational basis.
  We can get 30 votes. We can get 30 votes any time we want. The reason 
why is we set up the committees the way we did. The flip side of that 
is, it will be hard for them to get 30 votes because the fact is that 
our intelligence community is saying we do not want onsite inspections 
in the United States. I don't know what treaty these folks are reading.
  Let me make a second point. Here is the one lately that really gets 
me: The Soviet Union is going to be able to develop very small tactical 
nuclear weapons that, in fact, will lead to a different strategy in 
terms of their conventional defense. Guess what. We should all be 
standing up on this floor going hooray, we did it, because I remember 
last time we debated this issue of strategic weapons. What were we 
saying?
  I watched, by the way, with great interest Dr. Edward Teller last 
night. I watched a long documentary because I used to have to debate 
him around the country on SALT. He was wrong then; he is wrong now.
  We used to argue that the real concern--I have been here for 27 
years--was the Soviets seeking a first strike capability. Remember? The 
Soviets are seeking a first strike capability. And all of their actions 
were designed to do that. That is why they were building these new 
massive SS-18s with 10 nuclear warheads, independently targeted, et 
cetera, et cetera. Through the leadership of a Republican President, we 
have an agreement whereby they are going to dismantle those if we get 
the treaty, the START treaty, passed. So guess what we are worried 
about now. The exact opposite. We are worried now that they don't have 
a first strike capability, that they aren't seeking nuclear 
predominance, but they are acknowledging their conventional forces are 
so bad they need tactical nuclear defense on their territory.
  As they say in my church, examine your conscience, folks. Take a look 
at what this is. We hear this thing, and the public says: Is it true, 
Joe, they really are developing a new tactical weapon? My response is, 
it probably is true. But guess what. They now have 10,000 tactical 
nuclear weapons.
  I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  They are worried now that they are going to be able to develop 
another smaller tactical nuclear weapon, as if this treaty has anything 
to do with that. Come on. Come on. What we should be doing is rejoicing 
in the fact that the whole emphasis in the Soviet program has shifted 
to a recognition that they have to defend their homeland--their 
judgment--and they do not have the conventional forces capable of doing 
that--their judgment--and so they are developing, allegedly, a very 
small tactical nuclear weapon--their judgment. Does that shift the 
strategic balance? Give me a break. Give me a break.
  I find this one of the most fascinating debates in which I have ever 
been engaged. I don't know what we are talking about. When my friend 
from Kentucky stands up and says, I thought we decided against 
unilateral disarmament, me, too--an are-you-still-beating-your-wife 
kind of question. Who is talking about unilateral disarmament? Where is 
that anywhere in this treaty? Where does it say that? Where does it 
imply that? That is like my standing up and saying: I am very surprised 
my friends who oppose this treaty want to go to nuclear war; I am very 
surprised they are advocating nuclear war. That would be equally as 
unfounded and outrageous a statement as the assertion this treaty is 
unilateral disarmament.
  I will repeat this time and again, and I will yield the floor in a 
moment. My problem is, we have a President of the United States of 
America who has sent a formal message to the Republican leader asking 
that a vote on this treaty be delayed. Apparently, there is a consensus 
on the other side, thus far at least, not to allow it to be delayed. 
This is the total politicization of a national security debate. Could 
anyone have imagined before this came up, if a President of the United 
States of any party said: This issue, which is of the gravest 
consequence to the United States of America, I respectfully ask that 
you delay a vote on it, could anyone have imagined anything other than 
a response that says: Mr. President, we will concur with the delay, 
unless it was for stark political reasons? I can't fathom this one. I 
can't fathom this. I wasn't sure the President should have sent the 
letter in the first place.
  If this treaty is defeated and India and Pakistan test, we are going 
to find ourselves in the ugliest political brawl we have seen in this 
place since Newt Gingrich left the House. You are going to have 
Democrats standing up on the floor saying: The reason why India and 
Pakistan have tested is because the Republicans defeated this treaty 
and gave a green light. That is not a provable assertion, but mark my 
words, we are going to hear it. Then the response is going to be even 
more political.
  We ought to take a deep breath. My mom always said, when you lose 
your temper, take a deep breath, count to 10. Not that I have ever lost 
my temper in my life. You can tell I am not at all passionate about any 
of these issues. But let us count to 10. The President of the United 
States has asked this treaty vote be delayed. It seems to me it is 
common courtesy and totally consistent with national interests to grant 
that request.
  I will speak to other aspects of this. Let me conclude by saying two 
things: One, to move to a very small tactical nuke on the part of the 
Russians is an absolute outward admission that they lack the capability 
in their minds for fighting the conventional war. Twenty years ago, we 
would have paid billions of dollars, if the Russians had come to us--I 
say to my friend from Massachusetts who knows a great deal about this--
we would have been prepared to vote to pay them $10-, $20 billion if 
they would stop developing intercontinental range missiles that had the 
capacity to penetrate our airspace and in all probability hit hardened 
targets here. If they had said to us, we won't do that but we are going 
to build a very small tactical nuke, we would have paid them to do 
that. Now we hear on this side, if we pass this treaty, they are going 
to build tactical nuclear weapons that are very small, smaller than the 
10,000 they now have and are able to have and legally can have. That is 
a very bad thing. That is why we should reject this treaty. So we 
encourage the Chinese to go from 18 to 800 or 8,000 nuclear weapons 
that have MIRV capability and are thermonuclear in capacity. That is 
wonderful reasoning.
  There are legitimate arguments against this treaty, which I believe 
do not rise to the level of being against a treaty, but I haven't heard 
them made this morning, with all due respect.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I want 30 seconds to respond to the challenge 
of my friend from Delaware with respect to unilateral disarmament. I 
think the point the Senator from Kentucky was making was that the 
United States will consider itself bound to the zero-yield standard. We 
will abide. But we know that certain other countries don't see the 
treaty that way, don't interpret the language that way. We suspect they 
have reason to and probably will

[[Page 24849]]

be conducting so-called hybrid nuclear tests and, second, couldn't 
verify whether those kinds of tests are conducted. As a result, the 
United States would not be conducting any kind of nuclear tests, 
whereas other countries would have the capability and, indeed, the 
motivation to do so.
  I believe that is what the Senator was talking about when he talked 
about the concept of unilateral disarmament.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will take a minute to respond. I 
understand the point made. We have 6,000 intercontinental ballistic 
missiles that are on line right now. The Russians have a similar 
number. After you get by that, the numbers drop off precipitously. 
China is down in the teens. This unilateral disarmament notion or, as 
explained by the distinguished Senator from Arizona, I understand his 
point, but what are we doing? Are we going to give up? Are we freezing 
in place the fact that we stay at 6,000, and if they take the worst 
case of a stockpile that is in atrophy versus the dozen or more that 
the Chinese have? I mean, come on. Come on. You know, if you told me 
the Chinese had 6,000 nuclear weapons, MIRV capability, thermonuclear 
yield, or if you told me the Koreans and Libyans had that and the 
Russians had that, then you would have an argument. After the Soviet 
Union and then our allies, it drops off precipitously into double 
digits, max--max.
  Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Massachusetts, Mr. Kerry.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I want to thank the Senator from Delaware 
for his terrific leadership on this issue over the last few days, and 
for a long period of time.
  Let me quickly address, if I may, one point. The Senator from 
Delaware a few moments ago referred to the strange dynamic that has set 
in here in the Senate. I just want to underscore that, if I may, for a 
moment.
  I grew up, as many of us did, looking at the Senate with a sense of 
great respect and awe for the capacity of the Senate to come together 
around the most significant national security issues that faced the 
country. I think all of us always looked at this institution as the 
place that, hopefully, could break through the emotions and find the 
most common sense solution that is in the interests of the American 
people.
  Some of the great history of the Senate has been written about those 
moments where Senators crossed the aisle and found commonality in 
representing the interests of the Nation. I must say that in the 15 
years I have been privileged now to serve here, representing 
Massachusetts, I have never seen the Senate as personally and 
ideologically and politically divided and willing to subvert what we 
most easily can define as the common national interest for those pure 
ideological or political reasons. And I don't think that is mere 
rhetoric when I say that.
  I noticed when Presidents Reagan and Bush were in office, there was a 
considerable thirst on the other side of the aisle for adventures in 
Granada, Panama, and Somalia, and the obvious need to respond to the 
threat in Iraq and the Middle East. But suddenly, with President 
Clinton, we saw those very people who were prepared to support those 
efforts, even in a Granada or in a Panama, suddenly people argued that 
Kosovo didn't have any meaning, Bosnia didn't have meaning, and even 
Haiti, where there was an incredible influx of refugees and chaos right 
off our shore, failed to elicit the same kind of responsible 
international reaction as we had seen in those prior years. Now, 
regrettably, this treaty finds itself being tossed around as the same 
kind of ``political football,'' to a certain degree. And I think that 
is unfortunate, and it certainly does not serve the best interests of 
the Nation.
  Mr. President, preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is one 
of the most important issues facing the United States today. Since the 
end of the Cold War, we have made great strides in reducing the danger 
to the American people of the vast nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet 
Union. But the nuclear danger persists, and the job of nuclear arms 
control is far from finished. Multiple nuclear tests detonated by India 
and Pakistan emphasize the need for greater U.S. leadership on this 
critical issue--not less.
  In the last week, we have been told by critics of the CTBT that, for 
a variety of reasons, it will increase, rather than reduce the danger 
from nuclear proliferation. I believe that a careful examination of the 
criticism of this treaty will show that, on balance, it will enhance--
not undermine--U.S. national security interests.
  First, critics argue that, in their desire to conclude a 
comprehensive test ban, the Clinton administration made key concessions 
resulting in a flawed Treaty that is worse than no Treaty at all. Let 
me say at the beginning that I believe the CTBT is far from perfect. I 
am not going to argue with my colleagues on the other side that you 
can't find a legitimate point of disagreement about the Treaty. I'm not 
going to argue with those who don't like the way a particular 
compromise was arrived at in the treaty, or that think a particular 
principle might have been fought for harder and the absence of victory 
on that particular principle somehow weakens the overall implementation 
of the Treaty.
  The negotiating record--which has been subject to great scrutiny in 
recent days--reflects as many compromises from the original U.S. 
position as triumphs in achieving our objectives. There are legitimate 
reasons for concern that we did not achieve all of the original goals 
of the United States in negotiating this Treaty. I certainly take to 
heart Secretary Weinberger's admonition that you should not want the 
end goal so much that you give up certain substance in arriving at that 
end goal. I think that is a laudable and very important principle 
around which one ought to negotiate.
  But my colleagues in this body understand better than most the 
necessity of compromise in finding pragmatic solutions to the many 
difficult problems we face. And the compromises we agreed to in the 
CTBT will allow us to achieve the nonproliferation goals we seek.
  What has often been lost throughout this debate is that the United 
States enjoys a tremendous technological advantage over the other 
nuclear powers in both the sophistication of our weapons and our 
ability to maintain them reliably. The Administration and the Congress 
initially agreed to seek a test ban that would permit only the lowest-
yield nuclear tests, which was soundly rejected by our negotiating 
partners because it would essentially ensure that only the United 
States, with the technical capacity the others lack to conduct those 
low-yield tests, would be permitted to continue testing its nuclear 
stockpile.
  As Ambassador Stephen Ledogar--the head of the U.S. negotiating 
team--testified before the Foreign Relations Committee last Thursday, 
the other four nuclear powers argued that they needed a higher 
threshold in order to gain any useful data. Russia argued that, if a 
testing threshold were to be established for the five nuclear powers, 
it should allow for nuclear yields of up to ten tons of TNT equivalent, 
hardly a level that constituted an effective testing restriction.
  Our negotiators quickly rejected that idea, and President Clinton 
decided the best way to resolve the impasse and protect U.S. interests 
would be to pursue a policy of zero-yield--a ban should be a ban. The 
Russians were not happy with this proposal, but eventually were 
persuaded to accept a total ban on any nuclear test that produced any 
nuclear yield.
  Clearly, the United States would have been better off if we had been 
able to negotiate a test ban that allowed us to continue testing. But 
it is ridiculous to argue that, because the CTBT does not protect the 
U.S. advantage it represents a dangerous capitulation on our part. To 
implement and verify a zero-yield test ban, we need not be worried 
about distinguishing between a low-yield test and a medium-yield test 
to determine if the Treaty has been violated. Any test of any yield is 
a violation. In this regard, the Treaty's strength is in its 
simplicity.

[[Page 24850]]

  Second, critics argue that we shouldn't ratify the CTBT because we 
can't verify compliance. There has never been an arms control treaty 
that is 100% verifiable, and the CTBT is no exception. We will not be 
able to detect nuclear tests down to the most minute level of nuclear 
yield. But we will be able to verify that the Test Ban is accomplishing 
what it is meant to accomplish: an end to nuclear testing that advances 
the sophistication of current nuclear stockpiles or the development of 
new nuclear stockpiles.
  The key to a successful verification system is that a potential 
violator must believe that the risk of getting caught is greater than 
the benefit of the violation. The lower the yield of the nuclear test, 
the smaller the chance of detection by seismic means. But at the same 
time, the amount of useful information a nation would get by conducting 
a low-yield clandestine test would be limited. As a result, a potential 
violator would likely decide that the risk of getting caught is greater 
than the benefit of conducting the test. In addition, clandestine 
testing will not allow any developing weapons program to approach 
current U.S. capabilities.
  For those who are concerned about the danger from low-yield nuclear 
testing, I would also argue that defeating this treaty will make it 
more difficult, not less, for the United States to detect those tests 
by denying us the benefits of the International Monitoring System that 
will verify the CTBT. The International Monitoring System will include 
50 primary seismic monitoring stations and an auxiliary network of 120 
stations, 80 radionuclide stations for atmospheric measurements, 11 
hydroacoustic stations to detect underwater signals, and infrasound 
monitoring as well. This system will be augmented by the very powerful 
national intelligence-gathering technologies currently operated by the 
U.S. and others.
  The CTBT also allows any state party to request an on-site inspection 
of a questionable seismic event. The Treaty calls for on-site 
inspection requests to be submitted to the Executive Council of the 
CTBT Organization--the body charged with implementing the Treaty--along 
with supporting data, collected either from the monitoring and data 
mechanisms established under the Treaty or from national technical 
means. The Executive Council will have representatives from every 
region, and nations within each region will rotate membership on the 
Executive Council on a set schedule. The United States has reached 
agreement with the nations in our region that we will always be one of 
the 10 nations representing our region, so we will always have a vote 
on the Executive Council.
  Thirty of the 50 members of the Executive Council must approve an on-
site inspection request. Critics have argued that it will be very 
difficult for the United States to garner the support of 30 nations to 
allow for an on-site inspection. They argue that our traditional 
adversaries will use the Executive Council to block inspections that 
are necessary to protecting the U.S. national interest.
  It is true that countries such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq and their 
few supporters can be counted on to block U.S. and other requests for 
on-site inspections. However, most of the nations of the world have no 
interest either in pursuing nuclear weapons or allowing their neighbors 
to pursue them unchecked, which is why this Treaty enjoys such strong 
support throughout the international community.
  Rogue nations would have to find support among more than 40 percent 
of the Executive Council to block our request for an on-site 
inspection. But it is unlikely that the United States would not be able 
to persuade at least 30 members of the merits and importance of our 
inspection request.
  The CTBT will give us access to tools we otherwise would not have for 
monitoring nuclear tests, and an option for on-site inspection of 
seismic events that we do not fully understand. Defeating the treaty 
would deny our intelligence community the additional benefits of those 
additional tools.
  Third, critics argue that the CTBT will not end nuclear 
proliferation, because key countries of proliferation concern will not 
sign or ratify. This is an important argument, because it goes to 
whether this Treaty can accomplish the fundamental purpose for which it 
is designed--stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
  It is true that countries will halt nuclear testing, or not, based on 
a calculation of their own national interest. But by creating an 
international norm against nuclear testing, the CTBT will add a 
powerful factor in a rogue nation's assessment of whether its national 
interest will be helped or harmed by the conduct of a nuclear weapon. A 
nation that chooses to test will face considerable costs to its 
political, economic and security interests. U.S. ratification of the 
CTBT will lay the basis for universal enforcement of the Treaty, even 
against the few nations that may not sign.
  The CTBT is a critical component of broader U.S. strategy on nuclear 
non-proliferation, which has the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
at its core. In 1995, states parties to the NPT agreed to extend that 
Treaty indefinitely, in large part based on the commitment of the 
declared nuclear weapons states to conclude a CTBT. The failure of the 
United States to ratify the CTBT will seriously undercut our ability to 
continue our critical leadership role in the global nuclear non-
proliferation regime.
  Formal entry-into-force of the Treaty requires ratification by the 44 
countries that have nuclear power reactors or nuclear research reactors 
and are members of the Conference on Disarmament. And in my mind, it is 
altogether appropriate that a treaty banning the testing of nuclear 
weapons requires the participation of all the nuclear-capable states 
before it can enter into force. Of those 44, 41 have signed the CTBT, 
and 23 have ratified. All of our allies have signed the Treaty. Russia 
and China have signed the Treaty. Only India, Pakistan and North Korea 
have not signed.
  Now, some have argued that the United States should be in no hurry to 
ratify the Treaty, that we should wait until Russia, China, India, 
Pakistan and North Korea have ratified. They worry that the United 
States will forfeit its ability to conduct nuclear tests with no 
guarantee that the countries we are most concerned about will make the 
same commitment. But the United States has already concluded that we do 
not need to conduct nuclear tests to maintain our vast nuclear 
superiority.
  No one on the other side of the aisle is arguing we should go out and 
test tomorrow. Why? Because we don't need to test tomorrow. We don't 
need to test next year. We don't need to test for the foreseeable 
future, according to most scientists in this country, because we don't 
test the nuclear explosion itself for the purpose of safety and for 
making judgments about the mechanics of both the electrical and 
mechanical parts of a nuclear warhead.
  The CTBT binds us to a decision we have already made, because it is 
in our national interests to stop testing. And if, at some point down 
the line, it becomes necessary to resume testing to preserve the 
reliability of our nuclear deterrent, we can withdraw from the Treaty 
to do so.
  Clearly, we want countries like India and Pakistan to ratify the 
Treaty and commit themselves to refraining from nuclear testing. Aren't 
we more likely to convince them to do this if we ourselves have already 
ratified the Treaty? As Secretary Albright correctly pointed out on 
Thursday, waiting is not a strategy. During the debates on the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, there were those who advocated taking this passive 
approach to protecting our interests. But in fact, after the United 
States ratified the CWC, Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran and Cuba 
followed our lead. The best chance for achieving the nonproliferation 
goals of the CTBT is for the United States to lead. If the Senate were 
to reject the Treaty, international support for the test ban would be 
gravely undermined, and countries like India and Pakistan would have no 
reason to refrain from continued testing.
  Aren't we better off with a treaty that gives us the capacity to 
monitor,

[[Page 24851]]

the capacity to continue to show leadership with India and Pakistan, 
the capacity to set up a process with China before the Chinese test in 
a way that gives them the ability to translate the information stolen--
referred to in the Cox commission report--into a real threat to the 
United States?
  That seems to me to be a very simple proposition. The Cox Report, and 
others, all acknowledge that at this point in time China has not 
created a new weapon or changed its nuclear capacity, using our 
information. And we know that, in order to do so, using on our 
information, they have to test. China has signed the treaty, and is 
prepared to adopt the restraints of this treaty. Those who argue that 
we are better off allowing China the window to go out and test and now 
profit from what it has stolen elude all common sense, in my judgment. 
How would the United States be better off with a China that is allowed 
to test and translate the stolen information into a better weapons 
system? That is not answered on the floor of the Senate. But some argue 
that that is the way they would like to proceed.
  U.S. ratification of the CTBT won't end nuclear proliferation, but 
U.S. rejection of the Treaty undermine the credibility of U.S. 
leadership on nonproliferation, which will jeopardize U.S. work to 
prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, to eliminate 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and to block the sale of sensitive 
technologies that could contribute to proliferation.
  Finally, critics argue that the United States will not be able to 
maintain a reliable nuclear deterrent without nuclear tests. I take 
very seriously the argument that, without nuclear testing, the 
credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent will be undermined. The 
security of the American people--and the security of our friends and 
allies around the world--depends on maintaining the credible perception 
that an act of aggression against us will be met with an overwhelming 
and devastating response. If I thought for a minute that U.S. 
ratification of the CTBT would undermine this deterrent, I would not--I 
could not--support it.
  In fact, the United States has today and will continue to have in the 
future high confidence in the safety, reliability and effectiveness of 
our nuclear stockpile. This confidence is based on over 50 years of 
experience and analysis of over 1,000 nuclear tests, the most in the 
world.
  Most of the nuclear tests the United States has conducted have been 
to develop new nuclear weapons; for the most part, we use non-nuclear 
tests to ensure the continued reliability of our nuclear arsenal.
  This is a key point--even with no test ban, the United States would 
not rely primarily on detonating nuclear explosions to ensure the 
safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile. Most of the problems 
associated with aging nuclear weapons will relate to the many 
mechanical and electrical components of the warhead, and the CTBT does 
not restrict testing on these non-nuclear components. Moreover, we have 
already proven that we can make modifications to existing designs 
without nuclear testing. In 1998, we certified the reliability of the 
B-61 Mod 11, which replaced an older weapon in the stockpile, without 
conducting a nuclear test.
  Looking to the future, the center of U.S. efforts to maintain our 
nuclear stockpile is the Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program, 
initiated by President Clinton in 1992. This 10 year, $45 billion 
program has four major objectives: to maintain a safe and reliable 
stockpile as nuclear weapons age; to maintain and enhance capability to 
replace and certify nuclear weapons components; to train new weapon 
scientists; and to maintain and further develop an operational 
manufacturing capability.
  And it is already working. Since our last test in 1992, the 
Secretaries of Defense and Energy and the Commander-in-Chief of 
Strategic Command have certified 3 times (and are about to certify for 
the fourth time) that the U.S. nuclear stockpile is safe and reliable. 
It is only in the distant future--2010 perhaps, but we don't know the 
answer to this yet--that conceivably the physics package of a nuclear 
weapon might provide the level of deterioration that might not be able 
to be replaced with totally new parts and therefore might somehow 
lessen our nuclear deterrent capacity. To enable us to respond to such 
a situation, President Clinton has established six Safeguards that 
define the conditions under which the U.S. will remain a party to the 
CTBT.
  Presidential Safeguards A through F, as they are known, outline the 
U.S. commitment to maintaining a science-based stockpile stewardship 
program to insure a high degree of confidence in the reliability of the 
U.S. nuclear stockpile. The final safeguard, Safeguard F, states U.S. 
policy--as embodied in the official negotiating record of the CTBT--
that, if the President is advised that the safety or reliability of the 
U.S. nuclear stockpile can no longer be certified, the President, in 
consultation with the Congress, will withdraw from the CTBT under the 
``supreme national interests'' clause of the Treaty.
  Now, critics of this Treaty have suggested that a future President, 
upon learning from his Secretaries of Defense and Energy that the 
nuclear stockpile can not be certified, and upon confronting all the 
scientific data that tells him our nuclear deterrent is eroding, will 
somehow fail to act--fail to invoke the ``supreme national interest'' 
clause--and withdraw the United States from the Treaty. I ask my 
colleagues, Is there one among us who, when confronted with this 
information, would hesitate to act? When the Congress is informed of 
the status of the nuclear arsenal--and those reports are given in full 
to the Congress--is there anyone who doubts that the Congress would 
immediately demand that the White House take action to protect our 
nuclear deterrent?
  Surely, the critics of this Treaty who doubt that a President could 
find the political will to withdraw the United States from the CTBT 
when our ``supreme national interests'' are at stake aren't suggesting 
that there is a confluence of political factors that could possibly 
place the sanctity of a treaty above the sanctity of the lives of the 
American people. No one can tell me that any President of the United 
States is going to diminish the real national security interests of 
this country against some desire to keep a treaty in effect for the 
sake of having a treaty if, indeed, doing so will threaten the real 
interests of this Nation.
  U.S. ratification of, and adherence to, the CTBT will not jeopardize 
our nuclear deterrent, because the United States does not today, and 
will not tomorrow, rely on nuclear explosions to ensure the safety and 
reliability of our nuclear stockpile. We have embarked on a high-tech, 
science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program that will allow the United 
States to maintain the superiority of its nuclear arsenal. And in the 
event that we can not certify the reliability of our nuclear deterrent, 
we have given notice to our negotiating partners that we will not 
adhere to the CTBT at the expense of our supreme national interests.
  So, in effect, we are talking about what we could achieve by passing 
this treaty and showing leadership on the subject of implementing an 
international regime of monitoring and of nonproliferation, versus 
continuing the completely uncontrolled capacity of nations to provide a 
true threat to the United States.
  Mr. President, critics of this Treaty argue that the United States 
today faces too many uncertainties in the realm of nonproliferation to 
commit ourselves to a leadership position on the CTBT. I can not speak 
to those uncertainties, but of the following, I am absolutely certain: 
if the Senate rejects the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, there will be 
more nuclear tests conducted around the world, not fewer, and we will 
be no better equipped than we are today to detect and monitor those 
tests; the U.S. nuclear arsenal will not be made more reliable--and 
other nuclear nations will have the freedom to conduct the necessary 
tests to bring their weapons on a technological par with our own, 
undermining the strength of our nuclear

[[Page 24852]]

deterrent; and finally, the American people will be more vulnerable, 
not less, to the nuclear danger, because we will have undercut more 
than 30 years of work to build and fortify international norms on 
nuclear nonproliferation.
  The Senate has before it today an opportunity to send a signal to the 
world that the United States will continue to lead on international 
efforts to reduce the nuclear danger. We also face the prospect of 
acting too soon, after too little time for deliberation, and sending a 
signal that the United States can no longer be counted on to stand 
against the forces of nuclear proliferation.
  It seems to me that when the President of the United States makes a 
request in the interest of our Nation to the Senate to delay a vote, it 
is only politics that would drive us to have that vote notwithstanding 
that request.
  My plea would be to my colleagues in the Senate that we find the 
capacity to cool down a little bit, to have a vote that delays the 
consideration of this treaty so that we may proceed to answer properly 
each of the questions raised by those who oppose it, and, if need be, 
make changes that would not send the message that the United States of 
America is rejecting outright this opportunity to embrace a policy that 
from Eisenhower on we have fought to try to adopt.
  I hope that the leadership of the Senate on both sides of the aisle 
can be prevailed upon to prevent a tragic misstep that I fear will have 
grave consequences for the strategic interests of the United States and 
our friends and allies.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry, please. Somewhere 
down the line we are going to find it wise to yield back time. That 
would not forbid a Senator on this side from suggesting the absence of 
a quorum or any other routine motion of the Senate. Is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is not correct. The Senator would have to 
have debatable time left or there would have to be a nondebatable 
motion. There would have to be debatable time left or there would have 
to be a nondebatable motion before a Senator would be able to suggest 
the absence of a quorum.
  Mr. HELMS. Very well. I thank the Chair for the information.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I say to my colleagues on the Democratic 
side who want to speak on this treaty, if I am not mistaken, there is 
less than 1 hour--approximately 1 hour--left under the control of the 
Senator from Delaware, and 13 Members wish to speak to it; and, 
further, if my Republican colleagues conclude that they wish to yield 
back their time, the time is going rapidly as we approach this vote. I 
urge Senators, if they wish to speak, to be prepared, as my friend from 
the State of Connecticut is, to speak for 5 minutes.
  I yield 5 minutes to my friend from Connecticut.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Delaware.
  As I have listened to my colleagues during this debate, I feel as if 
the Senate has backed itself at least into a procedural corner in the 
midst of a policy disagreement.
  This is not the first time this has happened in the history of the 
Senate--not even in the 10\1/2\ years I have been here. But this is one 
of the most consequential times we have done so. For it seems to be a 
combination of reasons that are part ideological, part partisan, and 
part just plain personal. I hope we can find a way to work ourselves 
out of this corner because the stakes here are high.
  As the debate has been going on, I have been thinking about the two 
big debates that have occurred here in the decade that I have been 
privileged to serve in this body. One was the gulf war debate and the 
other was the Middle East peace accords, the Oslo accords.
  I think of the gulf war debate because I remember as President Bush 
dispatched a half million troops to the gulf that I was dismayed at how 
the reaction to that act by President Bush was dividing along partisan 
lines. It didn't seem like a partisan question to me. People could have 
good faith opinions on both sides, but the opinions were not based on 
party affiliation.
  I have the same feeling as I listen to this debate, and watch the 
lines harden. Something unusual and unsettling has happened to our 
politics when party lines divide us so clearly and totally on a matter 
of national security. That is not the way it used to be in the Senate. 
And that is not the way it ought to be.
  The same is true of the procedural dilemma to which we have come. We 
have a President--and those of us who support this treaty--
acknowledging that the votes are not there to ratify it now. That says 
that the opponents of the treaty have won for now.
  So why push for the vote? If the President of the United States has 
asked that it be delayed because of his fear of the consequences of a 
vote failing to ratify on nuclear proliferation, this is not political. 
This goes to the heart of our security and the hopes and fears we have 
for our future and our children's future.
  But I will say if there is one thing, in my opinion, that would be 
worse than going ahead and voting, even though we know those who oppose 
ratification of the treaty have won. That would be for us as a majority 
to voluntarily say that we will prohibit the President or ourselves 
from raising the question of this critical and progressive treaty again 
for the next year and a half. I think to do that would send an even 
worse signal to India, to Pakistan, to China, and to Russia.
  Let's keep the hope of a more secure world alive. Let's acknowledge 
that we have a common goal.
  Is anybody for nuclear proliferation? Don't we all agree that the 
atmosphere is cleaner and the likelihood of nuclear proliferation less 
if nations can't test? Can't we find a way across party lines to do 
what we have done with other treaties--to adopt reservations or 
safeguards or conditions which allow enough of us to come together to 
ratify this treaty? Why are we heading toward a wall from which there 
will be no good return and no good result?
  I have also been thinking of the Middle East peace accords and the 
Oslo accords because I remember what Prime Minister Rabin said.

       If you are strong you can take risks for peace.

  We are the strongest nation today in the history of the world. When 
it comes to strategic nuclear weapons, we are dominant. We have more 
than 6,000. If, tragically, for whatever reason, a few of them don't 
work we have such--in the marvelous term of the Pentagon--
``redundancy'' that we have thousands of others that we can rely on in 
the dreadful occasion that we might need to use them.
  This treaty promises to freeze our advantage in nuclear weapons. 
Since we are the strongest nation in history and this treaty may well 
make us more dominant in the crucial, terrible arena of nuclear 
weapons, why would we not want to take the risk of ratifying this 
treaty? It is, in my opinion, a very small risk for increasing peace 
and security for all--for our children, for our grandchildren. If we 
decide that testing is once again required by the United States in 
pursuit of our national interests, that option is protected. The treaty 
language is very clear: We can--and I am sure we will--withdraw.
  My appeal in closing is to say, Can't we find a way to come back to 
some sense of common purpose and shared vision of a future? Both sides 
have said on the floor that nuclear proliferation is one of the great 
threats to our future. We are hurtling down a path, as this dreadful 
power spreads to other countries of the world, many of them rogue 
nations, where we cannot rely on the bizarre system of mutual assured 
destruction that saved the United States from nuclear war during the 
cold war. If an accident becomes more likely, the consequences will be 
dreadful. Can't we find a way to avoid good

[[Page 24853]]

old-fashioned gridlock, which is survivable on most occasions in this 
Senate, but I think potentially devastating on this occasion?
  I appeal to my colleagues on the other side, whether there is or is 
not a vote now on this treaty, let's get together and figure a way we 
can sit, study the matter, talk to people in the Pentagon and people in 
allied countries, and see if we cannot find a way to agree on enough 
reservations, safeguards, and conditions to come back, hopefully next 
year, and ratify this treaty.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BIDEN. Parliamentary inquiry: If we go into a quorum call at this 
point, the time is taken out equally from the opponents and proponents; 
is that right or wrong?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. It takes unanimous consent to be charged 
equally. Otherwise, the time will be charged against the side which 
suggests the absence of a quorum.
  Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts, 
Mr. Kennedy.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, this may be one of the most important 
debates the Senate will have in this recent time. In my view, the 
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is the single most 
important step we can take today to reduce the danger of nuclear war. 
Surely we are in no position to hold a premature vote today or tomorrow 
on this.
  After 2 years of irresponsible stonewalling, the Senate has finally 
begun a serious debate on this treaty. This debate should be the 
beginning--not the end--of a more extensive and thoughtful discussion 
of this extremely important issue. The stakes involved in whether to 
ratify or reject this treaty are clear. Our decision will reverberate 
throughout the world, and could very well determine the future of 
international nuclear weapons proliferation for years to come.
  We have a unique opportunity to help end nuclear testing once and for 
all. The United States is the world's premiere nuclear power. The 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty locks us into that position. No other 
nations have the capability to assure that their nuclear arsenals are 
safe and reliable without testing. We have that capability now, and the 
prospects are excellent that we can retain that capability in the 
future.
  Over the past 40 years, we have conducted over 1,000 nuclear tests. 
We currently have extensive data available to us from these tests--data 
that would provide us with an inherent advantage under the Treaty. As 
Hans A. Bethe, the Nobel Prize winning physicist and former Director of 
the Theoretical Division at Los Alamos Laboratory, stated in an October 
3 letter to President Clinton,

       Every thinking person should realize that this treaty is 
     uniquely in favor of the United States. We have a substantial 
     lead in atomic weapons technology over all other countries. 
     We have tested weapons of all sizes and shapes suitable for 
     military purposes. We have no interest in and no need for 
     further development through testing. Other existing nuclear 
     powers would need tests to make up this technological gap. 
     And even more importantly, a test ban would make it 
     essentially impossible for new nuclear powers to emerge.
  As the foremost nuclear power, other nations look to us for 
international leadership. We led the negotiations for this treaty. We 
were the first of the declared nuclear powers to sign the Treaty. Yet, 
now, because of our inaction and irresponsibility, we have made it 
necessary for the leaders of three of our closest allies to plead with 
us not to defeat the Treaty.
  These three leaders--Prime Minister Chirac of France, Prime Minister 
Blair of Britain, and Chancellor Schroeder of Germany--wrote in an OpEd 
article in the New York Times last Friday that, ``Failure to ratify the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will be a failure in our struggle against 
proliferation. The stabilizing effect of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
extended in 1995, would be undermined. Disarmament negotiations would 
suffer.'' They also go on to say that, ``Rejection of the treaty in the 
Senate would remove the pressure from other states still hesitating 
about whether to ratify it. Rejection would give great encouragement to 
proliferators. Rejection would also expose a fundamental divergence 
within NATO.''
  Our relationship with our most valuable allies is on the line. It 
would be the height of irresponsibility for the United States Senate to 
send the world a message that we don't care if other nations test 
nuclear weapons, or develop their own nuclear arsenals. Surely, the 
risks of nuclear proliferation are too great for us to send a message 
like that.
  The United States stopped conducting nuclear tests in 1992. Doing all 
we can to see that other nations follow suit is critical for our 
national security. Russia and China have both indicated that they are 
prepared to ratify the Treaty if the U.S. ratifies it. If the Senate 
fails to ratify it, the likely result is a dangerous new spiral of 
nuclear testing and nuclear proliferation.
  Many of my colleagues have spoken about the fact that there is no 
guarantee about this Treaty. I argue that there is one guarantee--if we 
fail to ratify the Treaty, the consequences are grave, and could be 
catastrophic for our country and for all nations.
  Last week, we held hearings in the Armed Services Committee on the 
Treaty, and I commend the distinguished Chairman and Ranking Member of 
that Committee for taking the lead on this extremely important issue. 
We listened to expert witnesses on both sides of the aisle, as they 
presented testimony on the Treaty and the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program.
  General Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified 
that it was the unanimous conclusion of all of the Joint Chiefs, that 
the Treaty is in our national interest. General Shelton said, ``The 
CTBT will help limit the development of more advanced and destructive 
weapons and inhibit the ability of more countries to acquire nuclear 
weapons. In short, the world will be a safer place with the treaty than 
without it, and it is in our national security interests to ratify the 
CTBT.''
  Some of my colleagues have referred to the Treaty as ``unilateral 
disarmament.'' This characterization is grossly inaccurate, both in 
policy and in practice. A key element of our adherence to the Treaty, 
with the Administration's safeguards, is the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program.
  Last Thursday, in the Armed Services Committee, each of the directors 
of our nuclear labs testified about that program. John Browne, the 
director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, said, ``Through the 
Stockpile Stewardship program, we intend to demonstrate a technical 
excellence in weapons-relevant science and engineering that will 
project confidence in our nuclear capability. This technical excellence 
will be evident in our unclassified publications and presentations at 
scientific conferences. Other countries will see these accomplishments 
and will understand their connection to the quality of our weapons 
programs.'' With the Stockpile Stewardship Program, we will still be 
able to maintain a powerful nuclear deterrent.
  Critics argue that the Treaty's not 100 percent verifiable. In 
reality, the Treaty enhances our current ability to monitor nuclear 
testing worldwide. It establishes an International Monitoring System, 
which creates a global network of 321 testing monitors. We would get 
all of the benefits of this larger system and only have to pay 25 
percent of its total cost. The Treaty also establishes an on-site 
inspection system. Perhaps most important, it will hold other nations 
accountable for their actions, and require them to provide explanations 
for suspicious conduct.
  We also have a safety valve in the Treaty--Safeguard F. The 
Administration didn't send this Treaty to the Senate as a stand-alone 
document. They sent it here with six Safeguards under which, and only 
under which, the United States will adhere to the Treaty.
  As Safeguard F states, adherence to the Treaty is explicitly 
conditioned on:

       . . . the understanding that if the President of the United 
     States is informed by the Secretary of Defense and the 
     Secretary of Energy that a high level of confidence in the 
     safety or reliability of our nuclear weapons

[[Page 24854]]

     can no longer be certified, the President, in consultation 
     with Congress, can withdraw from the Treaty.

  The importance of this safeguard cannot be overstated. It ensures 
that we will be able to do what is necessary to maintain our nuclear 
arsenal.
  President Kennedy, in his address to American University on June 10, 
1963, spoke about the issue of verification while discussing the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty. He said,

       No treaty, however much it may be to the advantage of all, 
     however tightly it may be worded, can provide absolute 
     security against the risks of deception and evasion. But it 
     can--if it is sufficiently effective in its enforcement and 
     if it is sufficiently in the interests of its signers--offer 
     far more security and far fewer risks than an unabated, 
     uncontrolled, unpredictable arms race.

  These words still hold true today. The risks posed by ratification of 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty pale in comparison to the risks posed 
if we reject it. We have the opportunity, with this treaty, to open the 
door to a world without nuclear testing--a world that will be far safer 
from the danger of nuclear war.
  Voting on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is one of the most 
important decisions that many of us will ever make. This vote holds 
profound implications not only for our generation, but for all the 
generations in the future. It makes no sense to risk a premature vote 
now that could result in rejection of the Treaty. As the poet Robert 
Frost pointed out, ``Two roads diverged in a wood''--and the one we 
take may well make all the difference between peace and nuclear war.
  I reserve the remainder of my time and yield it back to Senator 
Biden.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will yield myself 5 minutes.
  The argument has been made that the United States will not be able to 
modernize its deterrent arsenal to meet new threats or encounter new 
technologies under the Strategic Stockpile Stewardship Program, and 
that is why some of my colleagues are saying we cannot go ahead with 
this treaty.
  I want to make it clear, the test ban treaty does not prevent us from 
adapting most operational characteristics of a nuclear weapons system 
to changing military missions, should we determine we have to do that. 
Many important parts of a nuclear weapon can confidently be developed, 
tested, and integrated into nuclear weapons without any nuclear tests 
because they do not involve changes in the primary or secondary 
components of the warhead; that is, the so-called physics package.
  Dr. Paul Robinson, the Director of the Sandia National Laboratory, 
told the Armed Services Committee on Thursday night:

       Adapting deployed nuclear designs to new delivery systems, 
     or even other delivery modes, is not constrained by the 
     elimination of nuclear yield testing.

  Let me put this in ordinary English. We keep being told here what has 
happened is, if we sign on to this treaty without this Stockpile 
Stewardship Program being fully completed, we are going to put 
ourselves at great disadvantage, amounting to nuclear disarmament; we 
will not be able to modernize our systems, and our systems are going to 
atrophy.
  Dr. Robinson, the Director of Sandia, went on to describe a prominent 
success in the Stockpile Stewardship Program that is working now. We 
have nine deployed systems, nine different kinds of nuclear bombs. One 
of them is the B61 Mod-7 strategic bomb. That was adapted without any 
nuclear tests.
  I have a photograph of that I will hold up now. That is a B-1 bomber. 
That red missile that is being dropped out of the belly of that bomber 
is a change in the B61 Mod-7 to a B61 Mod-11, in response to a 
different requirement.
  What was the different requirement? The military said they needed a 
nuclear weapon that could destroy targets that were buried very deeply 
in the ground, and that Mod-7 version of the B61 nuclear warhead could 
not do that. So without any nuclear test, they tested a new system. It 
is called the Mod-11. That can penetrate the Earth deeply and destroy 
deeply buried targets.
  This picture illustrates an important fact. You can test nearly 
everything in a nuclear weapon so long as you do not put enough nuclear 
material in it to cause an uncontrolled chain reaction. We did not set 
off this bomb, but we did test the bomb. You can take the plutonium out 
of the bomb, and put uranium in the bomb, and you can test it. It just 
doesn't set off this uncontrolled chain reaction. So this idea that we 
cannot change anything in our arsenal if we sign on to this is simply 
not correct.
  By the way, the JASON Group, which is the most prestigious group of 
nuclear scientists in the United States of America, studied this, and 
they said the Strategic Stockpile Stewardship Program can maintain all 
of our systems. One particular member of that group, testifying before 
the committee, Dr. Garwin, points out that we can even exchange entire 
physics packages; that is the plutonium and that secondary package, 
that device that explodes it, that blows up. In my visual image of it, 
the best way to explain it, as I was trying to explain it to my 
daughter who is a freshman in college, what happens is you get this 
plutonium, and you have to have something to ignite it, set it off. So 
there is a secondary explosion that takes place, and it shoots all 
these rods into this plutonium at incredible speeds.
  I yield myself 2 more minutes.
  What happens is it detonates the weapon, this chain reaction starts, 
and you have a thermonuclear explosion.
  The question has been raised whether or not, if we figured out that 
this plutonium was no longer either stable or functional or was not 
reliable, could you take out of the warhead the thing that makes it go 
boom, the thing that causes the chain reaction, the thermonuclear 
explosion, and put a new package in? Dr. Garwin says you sure can do 
that, without testing, without nuclear tests.
  This year, the first W-87--that is another warhead--life extension 
unit was assembled in February for the Air Force at the Y12 plant in 
Oak Ridge. It met the first production milestone for the W-87 life 
extension.
  These are major milestones and successes in the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program. I might add, as my friend from Massachusetts knows, nobody is 
suggesting we start to test now--nobody that I am aware of. I should 
not say nobody. Nobody I am aware of. There may be somebody suggesting 
it.
  Preservation of the option of modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons to 
counter emerging defensive technologies, the phrase you hear, does not 
require ongoing nuclear testing. The most likely countermeasures would 
involve changes to the missile and its reentry system, not to the 
nuclear explosive.
  It is a red herring to suggest if we sign on to this treaty, we are 
locking ourselves into a system that is decaying and moving into 
atrophy and we are going to find ourselves some day essentially 
unilaterally disarmed. That is a specious argument.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. BIDEN. I will be happy to yield.
  Mr. KENNEDY. There were some questions raised in the Armed Services 
Committee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 2 minutes have expired.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield time to the Senator.
  Mr. KENNEDY. What assurances will we have that there will be 
continued funding for the Stockpile Stewardship Program? I imagine that 
the Senator agrees, if this is indeed a concern, that we would be glad 
to make funding for the Stockpile Stewardship Program mandatory. And, I 
doubt that there would be any hesitancy, on the part of our colleagues, 
to get broad support for this in the Senate, if that was what was 
needed so that ensuring funding for this important program wasn't an 
issue or a question.
  Many of the witnesses at the hearings said: ``How do we know there 
will be continued funding? They may very well cut back that program.'' 
Is this another area about which the Senator is concerned, that we 
don't know whether, year-to-year, the funds will be

[[Page 24855]]

available for the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
  Can he give us some insight about his own thinking on how we can give 
assurances to the lab directors that there will be adequate funding for 
that program in the future?
  Mr. BIDEN. The Senator, as usual, puts his finger on one of the 
incredible flaws in our opponents' reasoning. They engage in circular 
reasoning. It goes like this: Without spending money on the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program, roughly $4.5 billion a year for 10 years, we will 
not be able to attain, when the shelf life of these weapons is reached 
10 years out or more, a degree of certainty that they are reliable and 
safe.
  You say: OK, we will fund it; we are for it, and the President sends 
up that number.
  Then they say: But we have a problem. Our Republican friends in the 
House won't vote for that much money, and we had to fight too hard to 
get it and they probably won't do it next year. The reason why, they go 
on to say, I am against this, although I think if we funded it, it 
would work and it would make sense, is my Republican colleagues in the 
House probably won't fund it; therefore, I can't be for this treaty 
because you guys are not funding the stockpile.
  I find that absolutely fascinating, but it is the circular reasoning 
which is being engaged. It strings together a group of non sequiturs 
that end up leading to a conclusion that makes no sense.
  The Senator has been here longer than I. Can he imagine, if we vote 
this treaty down and other nations begin to test, and those who voted 
it down are saying, by doing that, we think the United States should be 
able to test, can you imagine this or future Congresses coming up with 
$45 billion to perfect a Stockpile Stewardship Program which purpose 
and design is to avoid nuclear testing, to spend $45 billion for the 
redundancy? Can the Senator imagine us doing that?
  Mr. KENNEDY. I certainly cannot. The Senator has put his finger on 
one of the many reasons for supporting the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program which is to give the necessary assurances that funding for 
maintaining our weapons stockpile will be there year after year. This 
was something I noted was a concern during the course of our hearings--
this question about the need for adequate funding. And, the Senator has 
responded to that concern. There is broad support, certainly on our 
side or for those who support this treaty, for giving the assurance 
that funding would be there. It is just one more of the arguments made 
by those who oppose this treaty that has now been rebutted. I thank the 
Senator.
  Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Senator for his response. I will raise this 
when we get to the amendments. I wish to point out there is one other 
ultimate safeguard. The ultimate safeguard is in the amendment, our 
last provision, which says, if, in fact, we do not fund the stockpile 
and that causes the laboratory Directors to say, ``We cannot certify,'' 
and that means the Secretary of Energy says, ``We cannot certify,'' the 
President of the United States, upon that determination, must withdraw 
from the treaty and allow us to begin to test. I am amazed at the 
arguments that are being made on the other side.
  Mr. KENNEDY. If the Senator will yield on that question, so the 
amendment makes a change to the safeguards and makes this a mandatory 
requirement on the President to exercise the Supreme National Interest 
if the stockpile cannot be certified?
  Mr. BIDEN. Yes.
  Mr. KENNEDY. And, that is the measure that is going to be advanced by 
the leadership, yourself included, to be a part of the Resolution of 
Ratification?
  Mr. BIDEN. That is correct. By the way, it is much stronger than any 
President wants. It is section (E) of the amendment we sent. I will 
read it to the Senator:

       Withdrawal from Treaty.--If the President determines that 
     nuclear testing is necessary--

  The antecedent to that is the lab Directors say it--

     to assure, with a high degree of confidence, the safety and 
     reliability of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile, 
     the President shall consult promptly with the Senate and 
     withdraw from the Treaty pursuant to Article IX (2) of the 
     Treaty in order to conduct whatever testing might be 
     required.

  It is pretty strong.
  Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Senator. It is about as clear as can be. I 
see our ranking member of the Armed Services Committee ready to speak, 
but I welcome again the comments of the Senator from Delaware about the 
risks to our international position if we fail to ratify or defeat the 
CTBT in terms of security and stability around the world and the 
continued possibility of nuclear testing over time.
  As a member of the Armed Services Committee, I am pleased that we 
held narrowly focused hearings on the many national security 
implications of this treaty. It is important that we narrowly focused 
our attention on our own national security issues. But, these broader 
international security issues are powerful, and in rereviewing and 
reading again the letters, statements, and editorials sent in 
opposition to the Treaty, I think the importance of the broader 
international security issues, of further testing by other countries, 
and what the implications are going to be has been missed. I know the 
Senator addressed those, but I hope before we get into the final hours 
of this debate the Senator from Delaware will review that for the 
benefit of the membership.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I say to my friend from Massachusetts, this 
is another part of the circular reasoning. What I heard this morning on 
the floor and heard all day on Friday went like this: Without us being 
able to test, our 6,000 strategic nuclear weapons are going to become 
unreliable--which is ridiculous in my view. I strike the word 
``ridiculous.'' Which is highly unlikely. I am trying to be polite. It 
is hard.
  Then they say because it is going to become unreliable, two things 
are going to happen. One is that our allies are going to conclude that 
our deterrent is no longer credible and, therefore, they are going to 
lose faith in us. What they are then going to do is decide--Japan and 
Germany, which are nonnuclear powers--to become nuclear powers, and we 
are going to be escalating the arms race by passing this treaty.
  The same day in an unprecedented move, to the best of my knowledge, 
the leader of Germany, the leader of France, and the leader of Great 
Britain sent an open letter to the Senate saying: We, Germany, Japan, 
and France, have ratified this treaty. We strongly urge you, the 
Senate, to ratify this treaty in the interest of your country as well 
as ours.
  One of those signatories was the Chancellor of Germany, the very 
country my friends on the other side say, if we pass this treaty, 
Germany will go nuclear. I guarantee--I cannot guarantee anything. I 
will bet--I guess I am betting my career on this one--I will bet you 
anything that if we turn down this treaty and it is clear that it 
cannot be revived, within a decade Germany and Japan are likely to be 
nuclear powers, particularly Japan, because what is going to happen is, 
India and Pakistan are going to continue testing. They will not sign 
this treaty. They say they will sign it now if we do. They will not 
sign the treaty. As India tests more and they move to deployment, China 
will test more.
  China will test in order to determine whether or not they can build 
smaller, lighter thermonuclear devices where multiple numbers can be 
put on missiles. They will move from 18 nuclear weapons to God knows 
how many. Then Japan, sitting there in the midst of that region, is 
going to say, mark my words: We, Japan, have no choice but to become a 
nuclear power.
  We have spent 50 years of our strategic and foreign policy 
initiatives to make sure that does not happen. But that is what will 
happen. So now, at the end of the day, are we likely to be more secure 
15 years from now with the scenario I paint? Which is more likely? Is 
it more likely that turning down this treaty is going to turn Japan and 
Germany into nuclear powers, increase the total nuclear capacity of 
China, and move India and Pakistan further

[[Page 24856]]

along the nuclear collision path? Is that more likely?
  Or is it more likely--which is their worst case scenario--that what 
is going to happen is we are not going to fund the stockpile, we are 
not going to be able, in 10 years, to count on the reliability of our 
weapons, the weapons lab Directors are going to come to the Secretary 
of Energy, the Secretary of Defense and say, we can't certify any more 
Messieurs Secretaries, and they go to the President of the United 
States and say, we can't certify, and the President is going to say, 
oh, that is OK; don't worry about it. We are going to be bound by the 
treaty.
  Which is a more likely scenario? What do you think? Which is more 
likely, that even if the stockpile degrades, any country, from China to 
our allies, is going to say, gee, their B-60 M-11 may not function as 
they thought it would, and maybe they will only be able to fire off 
4,900 strategic hydrogen bombs. Maybe they will only be able to do 
that; therefore, they have lost their deterrent capacity. They no 
longer have credibility.
  That is what you have to accept. You have to accept those kinds of 
arguments to sign on to the notion that most of our Republican friends 
are arguing.
  Which is the more likely scenario? I would respectfully suggest that 
85 percent or 80 percent of the American people are right. They figured 
it out. They figured it out.
  So I hope I have responded, in part at least, to the Senator's 
question.
  Mr. KENNEDY. You did. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield to the ranking member of the Armed Services 
Committee, the Senator from Michigan, Mr. Levin.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank my good friend from Delaware. I thank him also for 
the leadership he has shown, both on the floor and off the floor, in 
trying to bring this treaty to hearings before the Foreign Relations 
Committee, so that the full Senate could look at the pros and cons of 
this in a deliberative way.
  I start with a reference that Senator Biden made to three of our good 
allies--France, Germany, and Great Britain. The chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee is here and perhaps he will recollect otherwise; 
and I would trust his recollection on this, if he does--but I cannot 
remember when three of our closest allies' leaders have addressed a 
direct plea to the Senate. At least in the 20 years I have been here, I 
do not remember a letter coming in from the Chancellor of Germany and 
the President of France, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain 
pleading with us to ratify a treaty. That is how serious the stakes are 
in this debate.
  The world is looking to the Senate. Sometimes we say that and believe 
it is true; but in this case we say it and know it is true. Because the 
world has signed on both to a nonproliferation treaty and to a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  There are a few exceptions, obviously. There are some states which 
will not sign any such treaty. But except for a few rogue nations, the 
world has signed on to a nonproliferation treaty and a Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty. The world is looking at us, expecting our leadership.
  Even though the world is looking to us to ratify, that does not mean 
we should ratify this treaty if it makes us less secure. We should do 
what is in our security interests. But unless all of our allies and the 
rest of the world are wrong, the world will be a much more secure place 
if we stop testing nuclear weapons and if other countries stop testing 
nuclear weapons as well.
  How do we tell India ``don't test'', if we ourselves want to test? 
How do we tell Pakistan, ``don't test; for God's sake, for your 
security and the world, don't test'', if we say, oh, but we want to 
continue to test?
  What does that do to our argument? I would suggest it destroys it. It 
destroys our standing to try to persuade countries that want to become 
nuclear powers, that want to add to their inventories, that want to 
improve their inventories--it wipes out our standing to make the 
argument, if we say everybody else ought to stop testing but us.
  We are the only superpower in this world. That gives us certain 
responsibilities. But one of those responsibilities is that we should 
be not just a superpower, but we should be superwise as well. We should 
realize that we are not always going to be the world's only 
superpower--nuclear or otherwise. We should behave with the realization 
that our actions today are going to affect the rest of the world, 
including the direction they go in terms of nonproliferation.
  As I said, I would not care if every country in the world signed or 
ratified this treaty if it was not in our security interests. I think 
we ought to listen, we ought to understand what the rest of the world 
is saying to us, we ought to remember our own commitments. We signed up 
to the indefinite extension of the nonproliferation treaty, and made a 
commitment to the world to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty. We 
should remember our own commitments. We should consider what our allies 
and the rest of the world are saying to us. But if it were not in our 
own security interest, I would not recommend that we ratify the treaty.
  But we should surely listen to our top military leaders as to what 
they recommend to this Senate? What does the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff recommend strongly to the Senate? He says:

       The test ban treaty will help limit the development of more 
     advanced and destructive weapons and inhibit the ability of 
     more countries to acquire nuclear weapons. It is true that 
     the treaty cannot prevent proliferation or reduce current 
     inventories, but it can restrict nuclear weapons progress and 
     reduce the risk of proliferation.

  General Shelton said:

       In short, the world will be a safer place with the treaty 
     than without it. And it is in our national security interest 
     to ratify the CTBT.

  Secretary Cohen said the following:

       By banning nuclear explosive testing, the treaty removes a 
     key tool that a proliferator would need in order to acquire 
     high confidence in its nuclear weapons designs.

  Secretary Cohen said:

       Furthermore, the treaty helps make it more difficult for 
     Russia, China, India, and Pakistan to improve existing types 
     of nuclear weapons and to develop advanced new types of 
     nuclear weapons.

  Secretary Cohen said:

       In this way, the treaty contributes to the reduction of the 
     global nuclear threat. Thus, while the treaty cannot prevent 
     proliferation or reduce the current nuclear threat, it can 
     make more difficult the development of advanced new types of 
     nuclear weapons and thereby help cap the nuclear threat.

  What the three world leaders, to whom I referred before and to whom 
Senator Biden referred earlier, said in their article and in their 
letter to us was the following:

       Rejection of the treaty in the Senate would remove the 
     pressure from other states still hesitating about whether to 
     ratify it. Rejection would give great encouragement to 
     proliferators. Rejection would also expose a fundamental 
     divergence within NATO. The United States and its allies have 
     worked side by side for a comprehensive test ban since the 
     days of President Eisenhower. This goal is now within our 
     grasp. Our security is involved as well as America's. For the 
     security of the world we will leave to our children, we urge 
     the U.S. Senate to ratify the treaty. We have President 
     Chirac, Prime Minister Blair, Chancellor Schroeder of 
     Germany, from their perspective, pleading with us to ratify 
     this treaty. We have our top military leadership, uniformed 
     and civilian, urging us to ratify this treaty. That is the 
     kind of assessment which has been made of the value of this 
     treaty. That is the kind of analysis which has been made.

  We should think carefully before we reject it; before we defeat a 
treaty that is aimed at reducing the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
in the world; before we give up our leadership in the fight against 
proliferation; and our efforts to go after proliferators. We keep 
saying the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the greatest 
threat this Nation faces; our military leaders tell us this treaty is 
an important step in the fight against proliferation. Before we give up 
that leadership and defeat a treaty which is adding momentum to the 
battle against proliferators, we surely should stop and assess what it 
is this Senate is about to do.

[[Page 24857]]

  It has been argued that we need testing for the safety of our 
stockpile. The answer is that the stewards of the stockpile, the lab 
Directors, for the last 7 years have been certifying safety and 
reliability of the stockpile based not on testing, which we have given 
up for 7 years already, but based on a Stockpile Stewardship Program 
which has allowed them to certify with a high degree of confidence that 
our stockpile is safe and reliable, without one test in the last 7 
years.
  Will they be able to do that forever? They think they can, but they 
are not sure. They told us they believe they will be able to continue 
to certify the safety and reliability of our stockpile without testing. 
They have also told us something else. Here I want to read a letter 
from them because there has been such a misunderstanding about what 
these three lab Directors have told us at our hearing. After the 
hearing, they wrote a joint statement from which I want to read:

       While there can never be a guarantee that the stockpile 
     will remain safe and reliable indefinitely without nuclear 
     testing, we have stated that we are confident that a fully 
     supported and sustained stockpile stewardship program will 
     enable us to continue to maintain America's nuclear deterrent 
     without nuclear testing. If that turns out not to be the 
     case, Safeguard F--which is a condition for entry into the 
     Test Ban Treat by the U.S.--provides for the President, in 
     consultation with Congress, to withdraw from the treaty under 
     the standard ``supreme national interest'' clause in order to 
     conduct whatever testing might be required.

  People can quote different parts of the lab Directors' testimony. I 
was there for it. The bottom line is, while they cannot guarantee that 
the Stockpile Stewardship Program will always allow them to certify 
safety and reliability, they believe it will be able to do so, and 
therefore they are, in the words of one of them, ``signed onto'' this 
treaty. That is because if they can't certify the safety and 
reliability of our nuclear stockpile in some future year they have the 
assurance in safeguard F, by which we can withdraw from the treaty if 
we need to conduct a nuclear test. We have incorporated that safeguard 
and, indeed, strengthened it in the amendment to this resolution, that 
we will withdraw from this treaty and begin nuclear testing again if 
necessary. We do not want our stockpile to be unsafe or unreliable. 
Nobody does--none of us.
  The question then is, Can we join the rest of the world, at least the 
civilized world, in a comprehensive test ban to fight the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons, and at the same time assure ourselves that if we 
need to test again, we will be able to do so by notifying the rest of 
the civilized world in advance that we retain the right to withdraw 
from the treaty and test if our security requires it? In other words, 
in the event the day comes when testing is needed to certify safety and 
reliability, we are putting the world on notice now that we intend to 
exercise that withdrawal clause.
  Could somebody cheat? That is the other argument which has been used, 
that somebody could cheat at a very low level of testing, that somebody 
might be able to get away with it, that our seismic detection 
capability is not such that we would be certain we would catch a very 
low level test.
  This is what Secretary Cohen says about the cheating question:

       Is it possible for states to cheat on the treaty without 
     being detected? The answer is yes. We would not be able to 
     detect every evasively conducted nuclear test. And from a 
     national security perspective, we do not need to. But I 
     believe that the United States will be able to detect a level 
     of testing, the yield and number of tests, by which a state 
     could undermine the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

  So the Secretary of Defense is testifying that militarily significant 
cheating would be caught, that a low-level test by a power would be 
taking a huge risk in cheating, because there are other means besides 
seismic detection to get evidence of a cheating. But most importantly, 
if a signatory to this treaty decided to cheat and take that risk, they 
could not undermine our nuclear deterrent. It would not be a militarily 
significant cheating that could occur without our knowing it 
seismically. We would not have to rely on other means in order to 
discover a militarily significant act of cheating. Plus, General 
Shelton and Secretary Cohen have both told us that the treaty, if it 
comes into effect, will increase our ability to observe and monitor 
tests because it will create over 300 additional monitoring stations in 
90 countries specifically in order to detect nuclear testing.
  I will conclude with two points. One, this Senate is not ready to 
ratify this treaty. Indeed, maybe it never will ratify the treaty. But 
it is clear now that this Senate will not ratify the treaty at this 
time. I believe at a minimum we should do no damage, do no harm.
  There are many of us who have not focused adequately on these issues, 
by the way. This has been a very truncated period of time for 
consideration, with very few hearings focused directly on the treaty. I 
know we had three hearings in the Armed Services Committee, and there 
was one in Foreign Relations last week that focused directly on this 
treaty.
  We are here under a unanimous consent agreement which allows only one 
amendment by the majority leader and one by the Democratic leader to 
this treaty, an unusual restriction for consideration and deliberation 
of a treaty. No other amendments are in order; no other restrictions, 
conditions on a resolution of ratification, but the one. So we are here 
in a very restricted circumstance and a very short time limit. It is 
not a deliberative way to address a treaty. This Senate should do 
better.
  At a minimum, my plea is, do no harm. Do no harm to the cause of 
antiproliferation. The way to avoid doing harm, regardless of where 
people think they are on the merits of the treaty, is to delay 
consideration of this treaty.
  My final point has to do with the delay issue. There is a precedent 
for delaying a vote on a treaty even though a vote had actually been 
scheduled. The precedent is the most recent arms control treaty we 
looked at, I believe, which is the Chemical Weapons Convention. There 
was a vote actually scheduled on the Chemical Weapons Convention. There 
was a vote that was scheduled on the Chemical Weapons Convention for 
September 12, 1996. Shortly before that vote, Senator Dole, who was 
then a candidate for President, announced his opposition to the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. It was decided on the 12th, which I 
believe was the actual day scheduled by unanimous consent for a vote on 
the convention, it was decided to vitiate that unanimous consent 
agreement and to delay the vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. A 
vote was set, by unanimous consent agreement, but given the opposition 
of one of the Presidential candidates--similar to what we have going on 
now, by the way, where we have opposing positions taken by Presidential 
candidates of both parties--it was decided then that it was the wiser 
course for the Senate to delay the vote on the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.
  I said before on this floor last week that I think we are in an 
analogous situation to what occurred back in September of 1996. I raise 
it again for a very specific point. At that time, there were no 
conditions attached to the decision to delay the vote. The Senate 
agreed to vitiate the unanimous consent agreement, to delay the vote; 
but there was no requirement, no condition attached as to when it would 
be brought up or not brought up. It was simply to vitiate. People 
decided--we decided in this body--that it was a wiser course of action 
not to proceed under the circumstances--one similar to what exists now, 
but there are different circumstances now that are, I think, additional 
reasons not to vote at this time, including the very narrow UC under 
which we are operating, with the strict consideration of a total of two 
amendments.
  I suggest we look back--and we are going to do what each of us always 
does, which is follow our own consciences as to what is best for this 
Nation. In my judgment, ratification is best, but, clearly, that is not 
where the Senate is now. I hope there is a majority of us who believe, 
for various reasons, the better course of wisdom is that we not proceed 
to defeat this treaty at this time--whether it is because that defeat 
would constitute a blow to our leadership in the battle against

[[Page 24858]]

proliferation in this world, as three major allies have told us, or 
whether it is because this institution has not had adequate time yet to 
fully understand and consider and deliberate over this very complicated 
treaty; for whatever reason--and many exist--I hope we will delay this 
vote. I cannot foresee a circumstance, as I have told my good friend 
from Virginia, where I would want to see this treaty brought up next 
year, given the fact that the election is at the end of next year. 
However, I can't preclude any circumstance from existing. I can't 
predict every world circumstance that would exist, where I would be 
comfortable saying we should under no circumstances consider this 
treaty, no matter what happens.
  But I can, in good conscience, say I can't foresee any such 
circumstances because I can't. Will the world situation change? Will 
India and Pakistan begin testing because we fail to ratify? Will that 
then lead to China to begin their testing again? Will that have an 
impact on Russia? Will the political situation change in the United 
States where candidates of both parties will possibly decide that this 
treaty is in our best interest? Can I foresee any of that happening? 
No. Do I believe any of that will happen? No. But it could.
  Circumstances can change. So I would not want to see us saying there 
are no circumstances under which anybody could even raise the question 
of consideration of this treaty next year. It is a very straightforward 
statement and, again, I conclude by saying, personally, I hope we delay 
the vote. Personally, I can foresee no circumstances under which this 
should be brought up next year. We should wait until after the 
Presidential elections, in the absence of some unforeseeable 
circumstance. But I hope that is what the Senate, in its deliberative 
wisdom, decides to do.
  At this time, I have been authorized to yield 5 minutes to Senator 
Dorgan. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). The Senator from North Dakota is 
recognized.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, who will acquire nuclear weapons in the 
months and years ahead? Which countries? Which groups? Which 
individuals, perhaps, will acquire nuclear weapons? Many would like to 
acquire nuclear weapons. Terrorist groups would like access to nuclear 
weapons. Rogue countries would like access to nuclear weapons.
  The cold war is over, the Soviet Union is gone, the Ukraine is 
nuclear free; the two nuclear superpowers are Russia and the United 
States. Between us, we have 30,000 nuclear weapons. What responsibility 
do we have as a country to try to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons 
to other countries and to reduce the nuclear weapons that now exist? 
Well, we have a lot of responsibility. It is our requirement as a 
country to exercise the moral leadership in the world, to reduce the 
dangers of nuclear war, and stop the spread of nuclear weapons.
  Some have never supported any arms control agreements. I respect 
that. They have a right to do that. I don't agree with it. I think it 
is wrong. Nonetheless, there are those who have never supported any 
arms control agreements. Yet, arms control agreements work. We know 
they work.
  I ask unanimous consent to show a piece of a Russian Backfire bomber 
wing on the floor of the Senate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. This is a piece of a wing sawed off of a Russian Backfire 
bomber. This bomber wasn't brought down from the skies with hostile 
fire. This bomber wasn't destroyed because of conflict. This piece of 
wing came from a Russian bomber because this country and the Russians 
have an agreement to reduce the number of bombers, missiles, and 
submarines in our arsenal, and reduce the number of nuclear warheads.
  This other item is copper wiring, ground up from a Russian submarine 
that used to carry missiles with nuclear warheads aimed at the United 
States of America. Did we sink that submarine in hostile waters? No, it 
was destroyed and the wiring ground up by the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program, under which the United States assists in the 
destruction of bombers, missiles, and warheads in Russia. We bring down 
the number of weapons in our stockpile; they bring down the weapons in 
theirs. The delivery systems are brought down as well.
  Does arms control work? Of course, it works. We know it works. That 
is why I am able to hold the part of a Russian bomber here in the U.S. 
Senate. Of course, it works. There are some who have never supported 
any of this. They have that right. But, in my judgment, the decision 
not to support aggressive arms control efforts is inappropriate and 
wrong.
  Now we are debating the issue of whether we will have a Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty--something that was aspired to by President 
Eisenhower nearly 40 years ago. A Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty 
was something that President Eisenhower lamented he was not able to 
accomplish. Forty years later--after years of negotiation--2 years ago, 
it was sent to the Senate, signed by the President, and asked to be 
ratified in the Senate. It was sent to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. I know there have been debates about it, but there was not 
one hearing in that Foreign Relations Committee in 2 years on the CTBT. 
And then, with 10 days' notice, it is brought to the floor of the 
Senate for a vote. Some say, well, that is fine. That is a 
consideration. That is not thoughtful consideration; that is a 
thoughtless way to handle this issue.
  This is a serious issue, a big issue, an issue with great 
consequence. Ten days, no comprehensive hearings--that is a thoughtless 
way to handle this issue. India and Pakistan have detonated nuclear 
weapons literally under each other's chin. They don't like each other. 
That is an ominous development for the world. The question of whether 
it could result in a nuclear exchange or a nuclear war is a very real 
question. Can we as a country intervene to say, do not explode these 
nuclear weapons, do not test nuclear weapons? Do we have the ability to 
say to India and Pakistan that this is a dangerous step?
  Mr. President, we had better have that resolve. That resolve must 
come from us.
  I have heard a lot of reasons on the Senate floor why this should not 
be ratified all from the same folks who have never supported 
ratification of any treaty that would lead in the direction of arms 
control. All of the arguments I have heard, in my judgment, are not 
relevant to this treaty. It is proposed that somehow this treaty would 
weaken our country.
  Here is what would happen when this treaty is ratified. The number of 
monitoring stations across the world will go to well over 300. We will 
substantially enhance our capability to monitor whether anyone explodes 
a nuclear weapon.
  Here is what we have now. Here is what they will have if the CTBT 
enters into force.
  How on Earth can anyone credibly argue that this doesn't strengthen 
our ability to detect nuclear explosions anywhere on the Earth? It is 
an absurd argument to suggest that somehow ratifying this treaty will 
weaken our country.
  The last four Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all the senior 
military leadership now serving in this country, including Gen. Colin 
Powell, and previously retired Joint Chiefs of Staff support this 
treaty. Would they do so because they want to weaken this country? Of 
course not. They support this treaty because they know and we know this 
treaty will strengthen this country. It will strengthen our resolve to 
try to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
say in a very real sense that one of the best ways to protect our 
troops and our interests is to promote arms control, in both the 
conventional and nuclear realms, arms control can reduce the chances of 
conflict.
  Gen. Omar Bradley said, ``We wage war like physical giants and seek 
peace like ethical infants.''
  There is not nearly the appetite that, in my judgment, must exist in 
this

[[Page 24859]]

country--and especially in this Senate--to stand up for important 
significant issues--serious issues. That is what we have here.
  The military leaders say this treaty is in this country's security 
interest. The scientists, 32 Nobel laureates, the chemists, physicists, 
support ratification. Dr. Garwin, who I was out on the steps of the 
Capitol with last week, who worked on the first nuclear bomb in this 
country, says this treaty is in this country's interest. We can 
safeguard this country's nuclear stockpile, the scientists say; we can 
do that, they say. And the detractors say, no, you can't. These 
detractors--let me talk for a minute about this.
  National missile defense: They say: Let's deploy a national missile 
defense system right this minute. The Pentagon and the scientists say 
we can't, we don't have the capability. Our friends say: No. We don't 
agree with you. You can and you have the capability. They say: We 
demand you do it, and we want you to deploy it.
  On the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the detractors say: 
Well, it would weaken this country because we can't detect nuclear 
tests and we can't maintain our stockpile. And the military leaders and 
the scientists say: You are wrong. We can safeguard our stockpiles. We 
can detect nuclear explosions.
  This selective choosing of when you are willing to support the 
judgment of the best scientists in this country or the military leaders 
of this country is very interesting.
  Last week, Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac, and Gerhard Schroeder, the 
leaders of England, France, and Germany, sent an op-ed piece to the New 
York Times asking this country to ratify this treaty. That ought not be 
the position this country is in. This country ought to be a leader on 
this issue. Now, we are being asked by our allies to please lead. We 
ought not have to be asked to provide leadership to stop the spread of 
nuclear weapons. What are we thinking of?
  Last week, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee referenced 
comments from the Governor of my State on the floor of the Senate, 
saying he is worried that the nuclear stockpile is not safe and 
pointing out that we have nuclear weapons in our State.
  It is an interesting and brand new argument that I hear. I have not 
heard anyone stand on the floor of the Senate in recent months saying 
we have a real problem with the safety of the nuclear stockpile. This 
is just a straw man. That is what this is.
  I know the majority leader thought it was probably an interesting 
strategy to bring up the treaty without comprehensive hearings, without 
comprehensive discussions and debate, and without much of an 
opportunity for the American people to be involved in the debate on a 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, and then say we want to vote on 
it. We are going to kill this thing.
  You know those who think that way I guess can grin all the way to the 
vote tally. But there won't be smiles on the faces of those around the 
world who rely on this country to be a leader in stopping the spread of 
nuclear weapons. This country has a greater responsibility in this 
area, and we can exercise that responsibility by voting to ratify this 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Voinovich). The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Parliamentary inquiry: How much time is under the control 
of the Senator from Delaware?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Twenty minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. Is there time on the amendment once the amendment is 
called up?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will be 4 hours equally divided on each 
of the two amendments that may be called up.
  Mr. BIDEN. One last parliamentary inquiry. Am I able to call up the 
Democratic leader's amendment now, and would the time begin to run on 
that amendment now?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator may proceed.


                           Amendment No. 2291

(Purpose: To condition the advice and consent of the Senate on the six 
                 safeguards proposed by the President)

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, on behalf of the Democratic leader, I call 
up amendment No. 2291.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Delaware (Mr. Biden), for Mr. Daschle, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2291.

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       Strike all after the resolved clause and insert the 
     following:

     SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS.

       The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the 
     Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, opened for signature 
     and signed by the United States at New York on September 24, 
     1996, including the following annexes and associated 
     documents, all such documents being integral parts of and 
     collectively referred to in this resolution as the 
     ``Treaty,'' (contained in Senate Treaty document 105-28), 
     subject to the conditions in section 2:
       (1) Annex 1 to the Treaty entitled ``List of States 
     Pursuant to Article II, Paragraph 28''.
       (2) Annex 2 to the Treaty entitled ``List of States 
     Pursuant to Article XIV''.
       (3) Protocol to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.
       (4) Annex 1 to the Protocol.
       (5) Annex 2 to the Protocol.

     SEC. 2. CONDITIONS.

       The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of 
     the Treaty is subject to the following conditions, which 
     shall be binding upon the President:
       (1) Stockpile Stewardship Program.--The United States shall 
     conduct a science-based Stockpile Stewardship program to 
     ensure that a high level of confidence in the safety and 
     reliability of nuclear weapons in the active stockpile is 
     maintained, including the conduct of a broad range of 
     effective and continuing experimental programs.
       (2) Nuclear laboratory facilities and programs.--The United 
     States shall maintain modern nuclear laboratory facilities 
     and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear 
     technology that are designed to attract, retain, and ensure 
     the continued application of human scientific resources to 
     those programs on which continued progress in nuclear 
     technology depends.
       (3) Maintenance of nuclear testing capability.--The United 
     States shall maintain the basic capability to resume nuclear 
     test activities prohibited by the Treaty in the event that 
     the United States ceases to be obligated to adhere to the 
     Treaty.
       (4) Continuation of a comprehensive research and 
     development program.--The United States shall continue its 
     comprehensive research and development program to improve its 
     capabilities and operations for monitoring the Treaty.
       (5) Intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities.--
     The United States shall continue its development of a broad 
     range of intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities 
     and operations to ensure accurate and comprehensive 
     information on worldwide nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons 
     development programs, and related nuclear programs.
       (6) Withdrawal under the ``supreme interests'' clause.--
       (A) Safety and reliability of the u.s. nuclear deterrent; 
     policy.--The United States--
       (i) regards continued high confidence in the safety and 
     reliability of its nuclear weapons stockpile as a matter 
     affecting the supreme interests of the United States; and
       (ii) will regard any events calling that confidence into 
     question as ``extraordinary events related to the subject 
     matter of the Treaty'' under Article IX(2) of the Treaty.
       (B) Certification by secretary of defense and secretary of 
     energy.--Not later than December 31 of each year, the 
     Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, after 
     receiving the advice of--
       (i) the Nuclear Weapons Council (comprised of 
     representatives of the Department of Defense, the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of Energy),
       (ii) the Directors of the nuclear weapons laboratories of 
     the Department of Energy, and
       (iii) the Commander of the United States Strategic Command, 
     shall certify to the President whether the United States 
     nuclear weapons stockpile and all critical elements thereof 
     are, to a high degree of confidence, safe and reliable. Such 
     certification shall be forwarded by the President to Congress 
     not later than 30 days after submission to the President.
       (C) Recommendation whether to resume nuclear testing.--If, 
     in any calendar year, the Secretary of Defense and the 
     Secretary of Energy cannot make the certification required by 
     subparagraph (B), then the Secretaries shall recommend to the 
     President

[[Page 24860]]

     whether, in their opinion (with the advice of the Nuclear 
     Weapons Council, the Directors of the nuclear weapons 
     laboratories of the Department of Energy, and the Commander 
     of the United States Strategic Command), nuclear testing is 
     necessary to assure, with a high degree of confidence, the 
     safety and reliability of the United States nuclear weapons 
     stockpile.
       (D) Written certification; minority views.--In making the 
     certification under subparagraph (B) and the recommendations 
     under subparagraph (C), the Secretaries shall state the 
     reasons for their conclusions, and the views of the Nuclear 
     Weapons Council, the Directors of the nuclear weapons 
     laboratories of the Department of Energy, and the Commander 
     of the United States Strategic Command, and shall provide any 
     minority views.
       (E) Withdrawal from the treaty.--If the President 
     determines that nuclear testing is necessary to assure, with 
     a high degree of confidence, the safety and reliability of 
     the United States nuclear weapons stockpile, the President 
     shall consult promptly with the Senate and withdraw from the 
     Treaty pursuant to Article IX(2) of the Treaty in order to 
     conduct whatever testing might be required.

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, to put this in context, one of the 
unfortunate ways in which this debate has developed, in my view, on 
this very important treaty is that the President of the United States 
when he put his signature on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty 
attached to it a number of conditions when he referred the treaty to 
the Senate. He sent up, along with the treaty, a total of six 
conditions that he said he wanted added to the treaty before we 
ratified the treaty.
  As we all know, in previous arms control agreements, it has been our 
practice in the Senate to add conditions to treaties. When it was 
agreed that we were given essentially an ultimatum that if we wanted to 
debate this treaty at all, we had to agree to the following time 
constraints.
  I was under the impression that the starting point for this debate 
would be what the President said he wanted, which was he wanted us to 
ratify the treaty itself and the six conditions. I found out later it 
was only the treaty.
  Although we were entitled to an amendment on each side, the 
Democratic side, or in this case the Democratic leader's amendment 
would have to be what the President said he wanted as part of the 
package to begin with in order to be for the treaty.
  Usually what has happened, as the chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee knows, we debated at length, for instance the treaty on the 
Chemical Weapons Convention we had extensive hearings in the Foreign 
Relations Committee. The outcome of those hearings was that we voted 
on, or agreed upon, or we negotiated a number of conditions. There were 
28 conditions before we brought it to the Senate floor.
  That is the usual process. But since we didn't have the first formal 
hearing on this treaty until after it was discharged--that is a fancy 
word for saying we no longer had any jurisdiction--and it was sent to 
the floor, here we are in the dubious position of having to use 2 hours 
on the one amendment we have available to us, an amendment to ask that 
the President's whole package be considered. That is where we are.
  The amendment that has been submitted by the Democratic leader 
contains six conditions that corresponded to the six conditions that 
the President of the United States said were needed in order for him to 
be secure with the Senate ratifying this treaty. These conditions were 
developed in 1995 before the United States signed the treaty. They were 
critical to the decision by the executive branch to seek the test ban 
treaty in which the standard would be a zero yield; that is, zero yield 
resulting from an uncontrolled chain react--a nuclear explosion.
  We in turn think it is critical that in providing the advice and 
consent to this treaty, the Senate codify these six safeguards that the 
President of the United States said were conditions to the Resolution 
of Ratification. Let me explain why.
  The safeguards were announced by President Clinton in August of 1995. 
They were merely statements of policy by the President, and there is no 
way for President Clinton to bind future Presidents with such 
statements. However, we can.
  Conditions in a Resolution of Ratification, by contrast--which is 
what I am proposing now--are binding upon all future Presidents. 
Therefore, approval of these conditions will lock them in for all time, 
so that any future President or future Congress, long after we are 
gone, will understand that these safeguards are essential to our 
continued participation in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  Administration witnesses who testified before the Armed Services 
Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee underscored the 
importance of these safeguards during the Senate hearings last week. I 
suspect that is why our Republican friends didn't allow Members to 
bring these up as part of the original instruments. So we started off 
as we would had it come out of committee, with the actual treaty, plus 
the conditions attached. I expect the reason they didn't want this side 
to do that is it would strengthen the hands of those who were for the 
treaty.
  I understand the tactical move, but I think it is unfortunate 
because, as we all know, the witnesses who testified from the 
administration, others from the laboratories, and others who were with 
the laboratories and were in former administrations, all those people 
who testified underscored the importance of these safeguards. In other 
words, they didn't want the treaty without these safeguards.
  During the testimony before the Armed Services Committee, Dr. Paul 
Robinson, Director of Sandia Laboratory, testified:

       The President's six safeguards should be formalized in the 
     resolution of ratification.

  General Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated:

       The Joint Chiefs support ratification of CTBT with the 
     safeguards package.

  Of the six conditions, the first, the third, and the last are 
interrelated and probably the most important. The first condition 
relates to the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Anyone who has listened 
to this debate now understands what that is. The Stockpile Stewardship 
Program will be essential to ensuring the safety and reliability of our 
nuclear weapons in the future. It requires this condition: That the 
United States shall conduct a science-based Stockpile Stewardship 
Program to ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and the 
reliability of nuclear weapons in our active stockpile.
  As we have all heard over the course of this debate, this Stockpile 
Stewardship Program is a 10-year, $45 billion, or $4.5 billion-a-year, 
project that is designed to maintain the nuclear stockpile, and it will 
involve cutting-edge science, as it already has. It is already 
underway, and the Directors of the three National Laboratories have 
testified they believe they can maintain the stockpile of our nuclear 
weapons if the funding is provided.
  Already there have been difficulties, particularly in the other body, 
in securing this level of funding. This first condition our amendment 
contains will assure that the funding will be there. The third 
condition which is in the amendment before the Senate requires that the 
United States ``maintain the basic capability to resume nuclear test 
activities prohibited by the treaty in the event that the United States 
ceases to be obliged to adhere to the committee.'' That means countries 
have to have a place to test the weapons underground.
  We could let our underground test facilities go to seed and not 
maintain them, so that when the time came that we ever did have to pull 
out of this treaty, we would not be prepared to be able to resume 
testing. So we say as a further safeguard against the remote 
possibility that we will not be able to, through the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program, guarantee the reliability and safety of our 
weapons, a condition of the United States staying in this treaty is 
that the Congress appropriate the money and the President and future 
Presidents use the money to maintain the facilities necessary to be 
able to resume this testing if that event occurs.
  The effort to maintain this capacity is also well underway, I might 
add. It is also tied to the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Subcritical 
experiments--and we use certain phrases so much around

[[Page 24861]]

here, sometimes it is easy to forget that most Members don't have 
nuclear weapons as their primary responsibility, and people listening 
on C-SPAN or the press aren't--although many are--required to spend 
time to know what certain phrases mean. A subcritical experiment means 
a country can set off an explosion that doesn't start a chain reaction. 
It only becomes critical when there is a chain reaction, which makes it 
a nuclear explosion. Subcritical means before the rods go banging into 
the plutonium and something is started. That is a chain reaction.
  The subcritical experiments at the Nevada Test Site, which are a 
vital part of our stockpile stewardship, also enable test site 
personnel to keep and hone their skills and practice the procedures for 
actual nuclear weapons tests. Translated, that means we have 
specialized scientists who in the past have participated in the over 
1,000 nuclear detonations we have used over the history of our program, 
and that without having detonated a nuclear explosion since 1992, these 
skilled scientists still keep their skills honed by going into this 
test site facility and doing subcritical tests; for example, using 
uranium instead of plutonium or performing other tests that don't 
require a nuclear explosion.
  We are not only maintaining the capability of being able to do a 
nuclear explosion; we are maintaining the necessary personnel. The fact 
that subcritical experiments are scientifically valid and challenging 
also serves to make work at the test site worthwhile and attractive to 
skilled personnel.
  The reason I bother to mention that, in an argument against the 
treaty by one of the scientists who testified, I think before Senator 
Helms' and my committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, he said: We 
really like to make things go boom. He said: I'm a scientist; I like to 
make them go to the end of the experiment. I like to conduct them that 
way. But I can do it without making them go boom.
  What people worry about now, if you are not going to ``make 'em go 
boom,'' if you are not going to explode them, some will say scientists 
won't want to be involved in that; it is not as exciting as if they 
could actually test. That is an argument that says we will lose a whole 
generation of nuclear scientists who know how to conduct these tests 
and know how to read them.
  Other scientists come along and, with the laboratories, say: No, no, 
no; we can keep all the interest we need to keep in a group of young 
scientists who will replace the aging scientific community who have 
been performing the tests because we will do what we call subcritical 
tests at the sites where we used to do the critical tests.
  Part of the agreement, part of the understanding, the requirement, is 
these facilities have to be maintained as opposed to saying we have a 
treaty now, we will not do nuclear explosions, so why spend the money 
on maintaining these facilities?
  The answer is: To keep scientists interested and to bring a whole new 
next generation of brain power into this area so they will have 
something they believe is worthwhile to do, as opposed to them going 
out and inventing new widgets, or deciding they are going to develop a 
commercial product or something. That is one of the legitimate 
concerns.
  The second concern has been: Once you pass this treaty, you know what 
you are going to do; you are going to stop funding the hundreds of 
millions of dollars it takes over time to maintain this place to be 
able to explode a nuclear weapon if we need to.
  We said: Do not worry about that; we are going to pass a treaty, and 
we commit to spend money to continue to do it. If we do not, it is a 
condition not met and the President can leave the treaty. That is the 
third condition.
  The sixth condition is a failsafe mechanism, available to future 
Presidents in case the critics of the stockpile program turn out to be 
right. Again, I might point out the critics of the stockpile program, 
including my good friend, and he is my good friend, are the very ones 
who have great faith in the Star Wars notion, great faith in the 
ability to put this nuclear umbrella over the United States so not a 
single nuclear weapon could penetrate and blow up and kill 5, 10, 20 
million Americans. They have faith in that scientific capability, 
whether it is laser-based space weapons or whether it is land-based 
systems. But they do not have faith in the ability to be able to test a 
weapon that has not been exploded.
  I understand that. It is a bit of a non sequitur for me to suggest 
you can have faith in one and not the other. I point out, as a 
nonscientist, as a plain old lawyer, it seems to me it takes a lot more 
to guarantee if somebody flies 2, 10, 20, 50, 100 nuclear weapons at 
the United States, you will be able to pick them all out of the sky 
before they blow up and America will be held harmless, than it would be 
to determine the reliability of this bomb you take out of a missile, 
sit on a table at a test site, and test whether or not it still works 
or not without exploding it. One seems more complicated than the other 
to me. But maybe not. At any rate, after spending $45 billion and all 
this scientific know-how, we have to continue to be able to guarantee 
the reliability of our weapons. We have a sixth condition.
  Article IX of the treaty, I remind everyone, contains a standard 
withdrawal clause. I am talking not about the condition; I am talking 
about the treaty itself now. Article IX has a standard withdrawal 
clause, permitting any party who signs the treaty the right to withdraw 
6 months after giving notice; that is, start testing.
  We could ratify this tomorrow. We still have to wait for another 23 
nations to ratify it, but we could reach the critical mass--no pun 
intended--where enough nations sign and the treaty is in effect, and 6 
months after that the President of the United States says: I no longer 
think this is in the national interest of the United States of America. 
I am notifying you within 6 months we are going to start testing 
nuclear weapons and withdraw. That is what this article IX does.
  But what we do is, if the President--and this is a quote:

       . . . decides that extraordinary events related to the 
     subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme 
     interests[,]

--he can withdraw from the treaty.
  Every year pursuant to the safeguard--I am back on the safeguards 
now--every year, we are saying, if this amendment is adopted, pursuant 
to safeguard 6, the National Laboratories' Directors at Las Alamos, 
Sandia and Lawrence Livermore, all three of them have to go to the 
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy and certify that the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program is still working and they, the scientists 
at our three National Laboratories say: We certify the reliability and 
safety of our nuclear weapons.
  The President, then, certifies to the Congress that there is a high 
degree of confidence in a safe and reliable stockpile.
  If any one of those National Laboratory Directors--and there is a 
redundancy in what they check. By the way, do you know how it works 
now? The way it works now, we have nine deployed systems, nine 
different types of hydrogen bombs located in the bellies of airplanes, 
on cruise missiles, in the bellies of submarines, on longer range 
missiles, or in a silo somewhere in the United States of America. Every 
year these National Laboratory Directors go out and get 11 of these 
warheads from each of those nine deployed systems. They take them back 
to the laboratories and they dissect them, they open them up, they look 
at them--to overstate it--to see if there is any little corrosion there 
in the firing pin, that sort of thing. It is much more complicated, but 
they check it out.
  They take one of them and they dissect it, similar to what a medical 
student does with a cadaver. They bring in 11 people, 10 of whom they 
give a thorough physical, the 11th they kill, cut up, and see if 
everything is working when they look inside. They do that now, and 
there is redundancy in the system. The three laboratories do that.
  Then they have to go to the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of 
Defense and say: We can certify that our arsenal out there is reliable 
and safe.
  But, if, under our condition 6, any one of those lab Directors says, 
``No, I

[[Page 24862]]

don't think I can certify this year, I don't think I can do that,'' 
then the Secretary of Energy has to be told that, and the Secretary of 
Energy, who is their immediate boss, has to then tell the President: 
No, no, we can't certify, Mr. President. And under No. 6, safeguard No. 
6, the President shall consult with us and must withdraw from the 
treaty.
  Let me read the exact language. It says this under E, page 5 of the 
amendment, ``Withdrawal from the treaty.'' ``If the President 
determines,'' and I just explained how he determines--if it is sent to 
him by the lab Directors and the Secretaries of Energy and Defense who 
say we can't certify:

       . . . if the President determines that nuclear testing is 
     necessary to assure with a high degree of confidence the 
     safety and reliability of the United States nuclear weapons 
     stockpile, the President shall consult promptly with the 
     Senate and withdraw from the treaty pursuant to article IX.

  He doesn't have a choice. He has to withdraw. That is the ultimate 
safeguard.
  So for those over there who say if it turns out this Stockpile 
Stewardship Program doesn't work, they have to assume one of two things 
if that conclusion is reached. They have to assume the lab Directors 
are going to lie and they are going to lie to the Secretary of Energy. 
They are going to say: We can't verify this, we can't certify it, but 
we are going to do it anyway. They then have to assume the Secretary of 
Defense and the Secretary of Energy will say: Although we know we can't 
certify, we are going to lie to the President, and we are going to tell 
the President our nuclear stockpile is no longer reliable, but don't 
say anything, Mr. President.
  And they have to assume, then, that the President, knowing that this 
stockpile is no longer reliable, would look at the U.S. Congress and 
say: I, President Whomever, next President, certify that we can rely on 
our stockpile.
  They either have to assume that or they have to assume their concern 
about our stockpile is not a problem because the moment the President 
is told that, he has to call us and tell us and withdraw from the 
treaty, which means he can begin nuclear testing.
  Remember condition 3. We said you have to keep those big old places 
where they do the nuclear tests up to date. So he can begin to test.
  So what is the big deal? What are we worried about, unless you assume 
future Presidents are going to lie to the American people, they are 
going to lie, they are going to say we can rely on this when we cannot?
  At the end of the process, if the President determines resumption of 
testing is necessary, then he has to start testing. That is what 
section 6 says. So we put the world on notice that we have a program in 
place to maintain a reliable stockpile.
  If that does not work and we need to test, we put the world on notice 
as well today that we will and are prepared, politically and in 
practical terms, to withdraw from this treaty. I should emphasize that 
the certification process, as I have said, is extremely rigorous: For 3 
years running, the lab Directors have certified to the safety and 
reliability of our stockpile, but only after detailed review by 
thousands of people at our labs.
  The other three conditions involve the need to maintain several key 
elements of our national infrastructure. They require us to maintain 
modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and 
exploratory nuclear technology and infrastructure of equipment and 
personnel, if you will--that is required--the continuation of a robust 
research and development program for monitoring, and, finally, our 
amendment requires the development of a broad range of intelligence 
gathering and analytical capabilities and operations to ensure accurate 
information about nuclear programs around the world.
  These six conditions should have been part of the treaty anyway, but 
they would not let us add them. We are going to add them now, with the 
grace of God and goodwill of our neighbors and 51 votes. These six 
conditions are essential to ratification of the treaty. If you do not 
want this treaty to work, then you will vote against this amendment.
  I acknowledge if these safeguards are not there, nobody wants the 
treaty. The President does not want the treaty. The lab Directors do 
not want the treaty. No one wants the treaty. There may be others that 
would be useful to add or even necessary for ratification of the 
treaty, but the leadership has said we can only have one amendment.
  They will recall that my own resolution, which led to this process, 
proposed only hearings and final adoption by March 31 of next year. I 
want to put that in focus. I see others want to speak, so I will yield, 
but I want to make it clear it has been said time and again on the 
floor by the leader himself--and I am sure he unintentionally 
misspoke--he said he received a letter from 45 Democratic Senators 
saying they wanted a vote.
  Mr. HELMS. I don't want the Senator to yield at an improper time----
  Mr. BIDEN. I will finish this one point, and I will be delighted to 
yield the floor.
  Mr. HELMS. I have been following the amendment.
  Mr. BIDEN. I know the Senator has, and I appreciate that. I 
appreciate the respect he has shown for the efforts I have been making, 
notwithstanding we disagree on this considerably.
  I want to make this closing point at this moment, and that is, it has 
been said by the Republican leader, Senator Lott, that 45 Senators 
demanded a vote on this treaty now. But 45 Senators signed a letter, 
including me. It was a Biden resolution--one that was about to be voted 
on when we were on another piece of legislation--that we have extensive 
hearings this year and that final action not occur until the end of 
March of next year, so everybody could have a chance to go through all 
of these hearings, so everybody could have a chance to debate what we 
are talking about at much greater length than today.
  There has not been the bipartisan negotiation on conditions to this 
Resolution of Ratification that usually occurs during consideration of 
treaties.
  Mr. President, I see my friend from North Carolina is seeking 
recognition. I will be delighted to yield the floor to him.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. If the Senator will yield.
  Mr. BIDEN. I will be delighted to.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I compliment the Senator on the explanation 
of his amendment. I have been following him as he has been going along. 
We are far from being opposed to the amendment. We do not have any 
problem with the safeguards.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment No. 
2291 be agreed to and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object--and I 
obviously do not want to object to my own amendment--we do have a time 
problem. I would be delighted to do that if the Senator would allow the 
remainder of the time on this amendment to be used on the Resolution of 
Ratification, so we do not use up--I have a number of Senators who wish 
to speak. That means I will only have 20 minutes left to debate this 
entire issue. I will be delighted to have it accepted. I probably have 
about an hour or 20 minutes or 30 minutes or 40 minutes left on the 
amendment; is that correct?
  Parliamentary inquiry: How much time is left on the amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Ninety-one minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous-consent that the Senator's 
unanimous consent request be agreed to, with the condition that the 
remaining 91 minutes and the 2 hours remaining on the side of the 
Republican leadership be added to the time remaining on the Resolution 
of Ratification.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I have no objection to that.
  Mr. BIDEN. I have no objection to the unanimous-consent request. I 
thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there an objection to the request of the 
Senator from North Carolina with the proposed modification?

[[Page 24863]]

  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 2291) was agreed to.
  Mr. SARBANES addressed the Chair.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, we have been going back and forth. Senator 
Sarbanes is seeking recognition, but I see our friend Senator Brownback 
is here. It is his turn if he wishes to speak.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. I am willing to yield to Senator Sarbanes if he wishes 
to speak.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. BIDEN. How much time does the Senator need?
  Mr. SARBANES. Ten or 12 minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Maryland.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Inhofe). The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. The amendment was 
adopted; is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. SARBANES. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. BIDEN. There was a motion to reconsider made as part of the 
unanimous consent agreement and the motion to table.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the CTBT, to which the Senate has been asked 
to give its advice and consent. This is a landmark agreement that will 
help stem the tide of nuclear proliferation and reduce the risk of 
nuclear confrontation. In my view, it is a treaty that, on balance, 
will serve U.S. interests and strengthen U.S. security.
  The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a product of nearly 40 years of 
labor. The idea was first endorsed in 1958 by President Eisenhower, who 
recognized that the most effective way of controlling the development 
and spread of nuclear weapons was to ban their testing.
  In 1963, the United States took the first step toward this end by 
signing and ratifying the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits 
nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water.
  Further limitations were established through the Threshold Test Ban 
Treaty, signed in 1974, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty, 
signed in 1976. Under those treaties, the United States and the Soviet 
Union agreed to halt underground explosions larger than 150 kilotons.
  When the cold war came to an end, sentiment began to build for a 
comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. President Bush signed legislation 
establishing a moratorium on such testing that was joined by France and 
Russia and continues to this day.
  In January 1994, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament began 
negotiations on a treaty to forbid all nuclear explosions. An agreement 
was concluded in August of 1996, and the following month, President 
Clinton became the first world leader to sign the new treaty. It was 
submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification just 
over 2 years ago, on September 24, 1997.
  The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is relatively simple and 
straightforward.
  First, it prohibits all explosions of nuclear devices. It does not 
ban the development or production of nuclear materials, nor does it 
affect activities to maintain a secure and reliable stockpile. By 
establishing a zero threshold on nuclear yield that affects all 
countries equally, the treaty draws a clear and consistent line between 
what is permitted and what is not.
  Second, the treaty sets up a regime of verification and inspections, 
consultation and clarification, and confidence-building measures. An 
International Monitoring System of 321 monitoring facilities is to be 
established, and all data will be stored, analyzed, and disseminated by 
an International Data Center. In addition, information that the United 
States obtains through its own intelligence can be used as the basis 
for a short-notice, on-site inspection request.
  Let me emphasize that. Information that the United States obtains 
through its own intelligence can be used as the basis for a short-
notice, on-site inspection request.
  Third, the treaty creates an organization to ensure proper 
implementation and compliance, and to provide a forum for consultation 
and cooperation among States Parties. The new body will have a 
Technical Secretariat responsible for day-to-day management and 
supervision of the monitoring and data-collection operations, as well 
as a 51-Member Executive Council, on which the United States would have 
a seat. Both the Technical Secretariat and the Executive Council are to 
be overseen by a Conference of States Parties, which will meet at least 
annually.
  Finally, the treaty provides for measures to redress a situation and 
ensure compliance, including sanctions, and for settlement of disputes. 
Violations may result in restriction or suspension of rights and 
privileges under the treaty, as well as the recommendation of 
collective measures against the offending party and the referral of 
information and conclusions to the United Nations.
  As Stephen Ledogar, who was the Chief Negotiator of the treaty for 
the U.S., testified before the Foreign Relations Committee, the United 
States objected to the inclusion of specific sanctions because of 
concerns about appointing an international organization ``to be not 
just the investigator and special prosecutor, but also the judge, jury, 
and jailer.'' He explained, ``we reserve for a higher body, the United 
Nations Security Council in which we have a veto, the authority to levy 
sanctions or other measures.''
  The CTBT, which has been signed by some 154 countries and ratified by 
48, has drawn broad support not only from among the American 
population, but from key U.S. military and intelligence officials and 
from our key allies.
  It has been endorsed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Gen. Hugh Shelton, as well as former Chairmen Gen. John Shalikashvili, 
Gen. Colin Powell, Gen. David Jones, and Adm. William Crowe, and the 
directors of all three national laboratories that conduct nuclear 
weapons research and testing.
  NATO's Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group called 
for ratification and entry into force ``as soon as possible.'' Thirty-
two Nobel laureates in physics have written to the Senate stating that 
``it is imperative that the CTBT be ratified,'' and noting that ``fully 
informed technical studies have concluded that continued nuclear 
testing is not required to retain confidence in the safety, reliability 
and performance of nuclear weapons in the United States' stockpile, 
provided science and technology programs necessary for stockpile 
stewardship are maintained.''
  Despite the importance of the CTBT for U.S. national security, formal 
consideration of the treaty has not taken place over the last 2 years. 
Now we are suddenly called upon to register a judgment without the 
benefit of proper hearings and committee debate. While I have come to 
the conclusion that the merits of this treaty outweigh its risks, and 
that it is therefore deserving of Senate advice and consent to 
ratification, I do regret that an issue of such significance should be 
taken up without the normal course of hearings and proceedings leading 
up to the consideration of a measure of this magnitude.
  Let me outline a few of the reasons why I support this treaty. First, 
it will help reduce threats to U.S. national security. A complete ban 
on testing makes it harder for countries already possessing nuclear 
weapons to develop and deploy more sophisticated new designs, and for 
those seeking nuclear capability to initiate a nuclear weapons program. 
As we know, relatively simple bombs can be built without testing, but 
creating smaller, lighter weapons that are easier to transport and 
conceal and that require less nuclear material is difficult without 
explosive tests.
  With a global ban in place, a nation intent on conducting tests would 
take on the burdens not only of increased expenses and technical 
dangers, but also the risk of detection and imposition of international 
sanctions. In a

[[Page 24864]]

very real sense, the CTBT locks in U.S. nuclear superiority while 
preventing reignition of arms races that constitute serious threats to 
our national security.
  The CTBT also promotes U.S. security by strengthening the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT, which entered into force in 1970 and 
was extended indefinitely in 1995. The NPT is the bedrock of 
international arms control policy, representing a bargain in which non-
nuclear weapons states promised to foreswear the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons and accede to a permanent inspection regime so long as the 
nuclear powers agreed to reduce their arsenals. In order to gain 
approval for permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, the five declared nuclear powers promised to negotiate and 
ratify a test ban treaty.
  The CTBT further advances U.S. interests by providing additional 
tools to enhance our current monitoring and detection capability. The 
International Monitoring System will record data from 321 sensor 
stations--262 beyond what the United States possesses today.
  The new facilities include 31 primary and 116 auxiliary seismic 
monitoring stations, 57 radionuclide stations to pick up traces of 
radioactivity, 8 hydroacoustic stations to detect explosions on or in 
the oceans, and 50 infrasound stations to detect sound pressure waves 
in the atmosphere. Thirty-one of the new or upgraded monitoring 
stations are in Russia, 11 in China, and 17 in the Middle East, all 
areas of critical importance to the United States.
  And one of the burden-sharing advantages of the treaty is that the 
United States will have access to 100 percent of the information 
generated by these 321 sensor stations but will pay only 25 percent of 
the bill for obtaining it.
  Since the United States has not conducted a nuclear explosion in 7 
years, and is unlikely to test with or without this treaty, the major 
effect of the CTBT is to hold other countries to a similar standard. It 
includes surveillance to identify warhead problems, assessment to 
determine effects on performance, replacement of defective parts, and 
certification of remanufactured warheads. Our policy is to ensure 
tritium availability and retain the ability to conduct nuclear tests in 
the future, should withdrawal from the test ban regime be required.
  Thus, under the treaty, the United States will be able to depend on 
its nuclear deterrent capability, while other nations will find it much 
more difficult to build weapons with the degree of confidence that 
would be needed to constitute an offensive military threat. Any country 
that should test would find itself the subject of international 
response; whereas in the absence of a treaty, such behavior carries no 
penalty.
  It has been suggested that the United States should wait until more 
of the nuclear capable countries--whose ratification is essential for 
the treaty to go into effect--have ratified before moving forward on 
the treaty ourselves. Yet what incentive have the countries with only 
peaceful nuclear reactors to proceed, when the one country with the 
greatest number of deployed strategic warheads is unwilling to do so?
  Just as with the Chemical Weapons Convention, where U.S. approval 
facilitated ratification by Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran, U.S. 
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will create increased 
momentum and pressure for others to come along. The treaty cannot enter 
into force without us, but it needs our support to convince others to 
join.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I yield myself 4 additional minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SARBANES. Indeed, all of our major allies have weighed in with 
their strong support for this treaty, which is particularly significant 
since they rely on our nuclear deterrent for their own defense.
  An article in the Washington Post on October 8 reported that:

       The world's major powers, including America's closest 
     allies, warned the United States today that failure to ratify 
     the multinational nuclear test ban treaty would send a 
     dangerous signal that could encourage other countries to 
     spurn arms control commitments.

  German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer was quoted as saying:

       What is at stake is not just the pros and cons of the test 
     ban treaty, but the future of multilateral arms control.

  I ask unanimous consent the full text of that article be printed in 
the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 1.)
  Mr. SARBANES. Perhaps as compelling as the case in favor of the 
treaty are the potential consequences of a negative vote. Senate 
rejection of the treaty could severely weaken the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, for which a review conference is scheduled next 
April.
  It is entirely possible, as the Washington Post reported, that ``some 
nonnuclear countries might regard failure to ratify the treaty as a 
broken promise that would relieve them of the obligation to comply with 
key parts'' of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Such a result 
would not only undercut U.S. leadership and credibility on 
nonproliferation, threatening our policy objectives in Iraq and North 
Korea, among other places, but could increase the likelihood of resumed 
testing and aggravate the situation in South Asia.
  Resumed testing would not only threaten regional security and U.S. 
strategic interests but could pose new challenges to public health and 
the natural environment. According to the Energy Department, more than 
one out of seven underground U.S. nuclear tests since 1963 vented 
radioactive gases into the atmosphere, and the problem will obviously 
be much worse in countries that do not take or cannot afford the same 
level of environmental protections.
  Some have objected that the treaty will be difficult to verify, that 
it will prevent the United States from maintaining a safe and reliable 
nuclear arsenal. While no treaty is completely verifiable, I believe 
the CTBT will increase, rather than decrease, our ability to monitor 
the development of nuclear weapons and preserve, not forfeit, our 
nuclear superiority.
  In his statement before the Armed Services Committee on October 6, 
Secretary of Defense William Cohen addressed this point at length. I 
will quote the Secretary because I think his observations are extremely 
important.

       CTBT evasion is not easy; it would require significant 
     efforts in terms of expertise, preparations and resources. In 
     the end, the testing party has no guarantees that its 
     preparation or its nuclear test will escape detection and 
     possible on-site inspection, despite its best efforts. In 
     addition, detection capability varies according to the 
     location of the clandestine test and the evasion measures 
     employed; a potential evader may not understand the full U.S. 
     monitoring capability, thus adding to his uncertainty. 
     Further, detection of a nuclear explosion conducted in 
     violation of the CTBT, would be a very serious matter with 
     significant political consequences. . . . Under CTBT, I 
     believe the U.S. will have available sufficient resources to 
     deter or detect, with confidence, the level of clandestine 
     nuclear testing that could undermine the U.S. nuclear 
     deterrent and take timely and effective counteraction to 
     redress the effects of any such testing.

  I yield myself 2 additional minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SARBANES. Moreover, to the extent Members are concerned with the 
adequacy of procedures for onsite inspections, I would remind them 
that, as with the Chemical Weapons Convention, these procedures were 
crafted with an eye not only to gaining access to other countries' 
facilities, but also to guarding against overly intrusive inspections 
within the United States. The lead U.S. treaty negotiator, Stephen 
Ledogar, explained to the committee how those procedures were 
developed:

       This Treaty provides for on-site inspections on request by 
     any Treaty party and with the approval of the Executive 
     Council. No state can refuse an inspection. The U.S. position 
     from the start was that on-site inspections were critical to 
     provide us with added confidence that we could detect 
     violations. And, if inspections were to be effective, they 
     had to be conducted absolutely as

[[Page 24865]]

     quickly as possible after a suspicion arose, using a range of 
     techniques with as few restrictions as possible. However, the 
     U.S. also had to be concerned with its defensive posture, as 
     well as an offensive one. It was necessary to ensure that 
     sensitive national security information would be protected in 
     the event of an inspection on U.S. territory. The U.S. 
     crafted a complicated, highly detailed, proposal that 
     balanced our offensive and defensive needs. There was 
     resistance from some of our negotiating partners. However, by 
     the time we were through, the Treaty read pretty much like 
     the original U.S. paper put together jointly by the 
     Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, the Intelligence 
     Community, and the then-existing Arms Control Agency.

  With regard to the security of our nuclear arsenal, the President has 
proposed six safeguards which will define the conditions under which 
the United States enters into the CTBT, and which, as I understand it, 
have been incorporated into the Resolution of Ratification. I ask the 
ranking member, these have now been adopted; is that correct?
  Mr. BIDEN. That is correct, with some modifications making them even 
stronger.
  Mr. SARBANES. And those dealt with the conduct of the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program, the maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory 
facilities, the maintenance of a basic capability to resume testing, 
should it become necessary, the continuation of a comprehensive 
research and development program to improve our monitoring 
capabilities, the continued development of a broad range of 
intelligence gathering, and the ability to withdraw from the CTBT if 
the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type critical to our 
nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified.
  I believe these safeguards will ensure that U.S. national security 
interests can be met within the context of the treaty.
  Mr. President, I support ratification, but there do not appear to be 
enough votes to approve it. The President, in his letter requesting 
that action be delayed, stated that

       . . . proceeding to a vote under these circumstances would 
     severely harm the national security of the United States, 
     damage our relationship with our allies, and undermine our 
     historic leadership over 40 years, through administrations 
     Republican and Democratic, in reducing the nuclear threat.

  I agree with the President's assessment. Therefore, I urge my 
colleagues to join in voting to postpone consideration of the treaty 
while we undertake to build the necessary understanding and political 
support that will lead to its ultimate ratification.
  If we cannot approve the treaty, ratify it, then surely we should 
delay its consideration, postpone its consideration while we continue 
to explore the matter further, rather than, in my judgment, doing the 
grave harm that would come to the national security, as the President 
has outlined.
  I ask unanimous consent that two editorials from the New York Times 
in support of the treaty be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the New York Times, Oct. 12, 1999]

                    Fighting for the Test Ban Treaty

       Despite the important contribution it would make to a safer 
     world, the nuclear Test Ban Treaty stands virtually no chance 
     of mustering enough support to win Senate ratification this 
     week. Allowing it to be voted down would deal a damaging blow 
     to America's foreign policy and military security. The wiser 
     course is to delay Senate action for at least a few months, 
     as President Clinton requested yesterday, giving the White 
     House more time to overcome the arguments of treaty critics.
       But Republican senators are recklessly insisting on an 
     immediate vote unless Mr. Clinton agrees to withdraw the 
     treaty for the rest of his term. That is something he should 
     avoid, because it would signal to the rest of the world that 
     the White House, not just the Senate, is edging away from the 
     Test Ban Treaty.
       Mr. Clinton refuses to be bound by such conditions. 
     Nevertheless some Senate treaty supporters, including Daniel 
     Patrick Moynihan of New York, are trying to put together a 
     deal under which Mr. Clinton would not give up on the treaty, 
     while Senate Democrats would refrain from pushing it in this 
     Congress. The White House suggests it could accept such an 
     arrangement.
       The message that Washington sends to the world matters a 
     lot. One audience consists of countries like India and 
     Pakistan, which are still trying to decide whether to sign 
     the treaty and would be unlikely to do so if the Clinton 
     White House gave up on eventual Senate ratification. For 
     these countries to remain outside the test ban would 
     encourage a dangerous nuclear arms race in south Asia that 
     could easily draw in nearby countries like Iran and China. It 
     could also fuel the ambitions of other intermediate powers, 
     like Saudi Arabia and Taiwan, to join an expanding nuclear 
     club.
       Another group of countries includes established nuclear 
     nations such as China and Russia. Like Washington, Beijing 
     and Moscow have signed the treaty but not yet ratified it, 
     and are observing a voluntary moratorium on nuclear tests.
       As long as Mr. Clinton continues to campaign for the Test 
     Ban Treaty and there remains a reasonable chance that 
     Washington will someday ratify it, these countries are likely 
     to refrain from further testing. But if hopes for eventual 
     American ratification recede, China or Russia might be 
     tempted to test again in an effort to improve their bomb 
     designs and narrow America's present lead in nuclear weapons 
     technology.
       These considerations argue strongly for delaying the vote 
     rather than giving up on it for this Congress. The treaty is 
     backed by America's military leaders, public opinion and 
     Washington's main allies. Good answers are available to the 
     objections so far raised by Senate critics. True, the 
     election-year political calculus is not favorable, and 
     ultimately it may be necessary to wait until a new President 
     and a new Senate take office early in 2001. But American 
     interests are best protected if in the interim Washington 
     does not disavow the treaty.
                                  ____


                [From the New York Times, Oct. 8, 1999]

                   Keeping the Test Ban Treaty Alive

       If the nuclear Test Ban Treaty fails to win ratification 
     next week, as it probably will, Senate Republicans will 
     deserve much of the blame. The Republican leadership has 
     behaved in a narrowly partisan fashion that paid little heed 
     to America's international interests and trivialized the 
     Senate's constitutional role in evaluating treaties. But the 
     White House failed to put together a coherent strategy for 
     assembling the needed two-thirds Senate majority, and then 
     allowed itself to be outmaneuvered into a compressed 
     timetable that left too little time for an intensive lobbying 
     campaign.
       The resulting failure will weaken American security. India 
     and Pakistan will be more likely to develop their nuclear 
     arsenals and China will be increasingly tempted to resume 
     testing to exploit new weapons designs, some of which may 
     have been stolen from the United States. The goal now should 
     be to try to limit the damage by keeping open the possibility 
     that the Senate can be persuaded to ratify the treaty in the 
     months to come.
       To that end, the White House must reject the terms the 
     Republicans now offer for canceling next week's vote. These 
     include the outrageous requirement that President Clinton not 
     seek ratification during his remaining 15 months in office. 
     That would make things worse than they already are, leaving 
     other countries wondering whether Mr. Clinton has abandoned 
     the treaty he signed three years ago. Unless the Republicans 
     agree to a postponement without this timetable, the White 
     House should let the Senate proceed toward a vote next week--
     trying, between now and then, to win as many extra Republican 
     votes as possible. If that effort falls short, Mr. Clinton 
     should concentrate his Presidential energies on building 
     enough support to justify a new ratification effort as soon 
     as possible.
       Republican senators have raised several arguments against 
     the treaty, most of which evaporate on close inspection. Some 
     doubt whether American intelligence agencies can detect very-
     low-yield nuclear tests. Others worry that America's nuclear 
     stockpile might deteriorate without testing. Some mistakenly 
     believe that missile defenses will make arms control treaties 
     unnecessary.
       The Administration has answered these objections 
     convincingly. Approving the treaty would speed creation of a 
     stronger worldwide monitoring system. Despite doubts 
     expressed yesterday by the heads of America's nuclear labs, 
     Washington's stockpile stewardship program, based on computer 
     simulations, can keep existing weapons reliable and nurture 
     the scientific skills that could create new ones if the 
     treaty ever broke down. Missile defense can at best 
     supplement arms control, not replace it.
       There is every reason for Republicans of conscience to vote 
     for this treaty, but little chance that they will. Mr. 
     Clinton's challenge now will be to sway enough Senate votes 
     to make ratification possible before he leaves the White 
     House.

                               Exhibit 1

                [From the Washington Post, Oct. 8, 1999]

               U.S. Allies Urge Senate To Ratify Test Ban

                         (By William Drozdlak)

       VIENNA, Oct. 7--The world's major powers, including 
     America's closest allies, warned the United States today that 
     failure to ratify the multinational nuclear test ban treaty 
     would send a dangerous signal that could encourage other 
     countries to spurn arms control commitments.

[[Page 24866]]

       With the Senate scheduled to begin debating the treaty 
     Friday, envoys from nearly 100 nations at a conference here, 
     including Russia, China, Britain and Germany, expressed alarm 
     that the United States appears to be on the brink of 
     rejecting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The pact, which 
     President Clinton signed in 1996, would prohibit nuclear test 
     explosions world-wide.
       Diplomats said British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French 
     President Jacques Chirac will soon make rare personal appeals 
     to the United States to approve the accord, prior to a 
     possible Senate vote next week.
       In Washington, it was unclear if a compromise would be 
     reached to postpone a vote on the treaty. Both sides agree 
     that the pact will be defeated if it comes to a vote on 
     Tuesday or Wednesday as scheduled. In the latest blow to the 
     accord's prospects, Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), an 
     influential arms control advocate, declared his opposition.
       Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) was sticking to his 
     position late today that a vote can be delayed only if the 
     Clinton administration promises not to try to revive the 
     treaty before the president leaves office. The White House 
     has rejected that proposal, and Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-
     Del.), the ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations 
     Committee, said he is ``not hopeful'' that the vote could be 
     postponed.
       Here in Vienna, diplomats said that Blair and Chirac will 
     urge American treaty opponents to forgo partisan politics and 
     weigh the damaging impact a negative vote would have on U.S. 
     leadership in the effort to halt the spread of weapons of 
     mass destruction.
       There was particular concern here that some non-nuclear 
     countries would regard failure to ratify the treaty as a 
     broken promise that would relieve them of the obligation to 
     comply with key parts of another accord, the Nuclear Non-
     proliferation treaty. That pact is considered the linchpin of 
     international efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.
       International anxiety also has been compounded by new 
     worries over U.S. efforts to escape constraints imposed by 
     the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which limits the 
     ability of the United States to build systems to defend 
     against missile attack.
       Russia and China say it would destabilize the strategic 
     balance if the United States built a missile defense system, 
     because Washington could be tempted to attack others if it 
     felt invulnerable to retaliation. That could trigger a new 
     arms race as other nations sought ways to overwhelm missile 
     defenses.
       Many nations are surprised by the Senate's hesitation to 
     approve the test ban treaty, in part because the accord is 
     widely regarded abroad as locking in American nuclear 
     superiority. Until recently, the treaty had gained strong 
     momentum as the ratification process moved ahead and a world-
     wide sensor system was deployed to detect even the tiniest 
     indication of a nuclear explosion.
       More than half of the 44 nations with nuclear facilities 
     whose ratification is necessary for the treaty to take effect 
     have already done so. U.S. approval is deemed critical to 
     persuade other nations, including Russia and China, to 
     ratify. Even more important, India and Pakistan, who pledged 
     to sign the test ban treaty under enormous international 
     pressure, are said to be awaiting Senate action before making 
     their final decision.
       ``It would be a highly dangerous step for the Senate to 
     reject this treaty,'' said Peter Hain, Britain's minister of 
     state for foreign affairs. ``If the test ban treaty starts to 
     unravel, all sorts of undesirable things could happen. It 
     would send the worst possible signal to the rest of the world 
     by giving a green light to many countries to walk away from 
     promises not to develop nuclear arsenals.'' Hain and other 
     delegates here spoke at a long-planned conference organized 
     to discuss how to put the test ban treaty into effect.
       German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said the rest of 
     the world would be watching the Senate test ban vote closely 
     because of its possible effect in eroding support for the 
     non-proliferation treaty. ``What is at stake is not just the 
     pros and cons of the test ban treaty, but the future of 
     multilateral arms control,'' Fischer said.
       Diplomats fear that a failure to put the test ban treaty 
     into effect soon would discourage some ``threshold'' 
     countries--those close to developing nuclear weapons--from 
     cooperating with intrusive inspections under the non-
     proliferation treaty. Such inspections are designed to 
     prevent them from cheating and secretly developing nuclear 
     weapons.
       Jayantha Dhanapala, the U.N. undersecretary for disarmament 
     affairs, said many countries agreed to a permanent inspection 
     regime four years ago only on the basis of a written 
     guarantee by the nuclear powers to negotiate and ratify a 
     worldwide test ban as one of several key steps toward nuclear 
     disarmament.
       In a grand diplomatic bargain struck in 1995, the 
     inspection program was made permanent for some 175 nations 
     that have promised to forswear nuclear weapons. In exchange, 
     the powers--the United States, France, Britain, Russia and 
     China--pledged to reduce nuclear arsenals and approve a 
     treaty that would ban test explosions that help upgrade their 
     weapons.
       ``If the Senate rejects ratification, it would send a very 
     negative signal that will act as a brake on the momentum we 
     have achieved to control the nuclear threat, because some 
     countries would see this vote as a betrayal of a promise,'' 
     Dhanapala said.
       The head of the U.S. delegation, Ambassador John B. Ritch 
     III, said a main theme of the Vienna conference has been 
     international alarm over isolationist thinking that has 
     spurred Senate opposition to the treaty. He said foreign 
     delegates found it difficult to understand how the Senate 
     could consider backtracking from a ban on nuclear explosions 
     even though polls show as much as 80 percent of the American 
     public support the treaty.
       China's representative here said that U.S. failure to 
     ratify the test ban treaty would be ``a very negative 
     development'' and joined others in expressing concern that 
     the United States is shunning its obligations on global arms 
     control.
       ``I don't like to talk about any country exercising world 
     leadership, but in this case we see that the United States 
     must play a special role,'' Sha Zukang, China's top arms 
     control official, said in an interview. Sha added that China 
     is even more alarmed by U.S. efforts to develop a regional 
     missile defense system than by the Senate's reluctance to 
     approve the test ban treaty.
       Boris Kvok, Russia's deputy chief of disarmament issues, 
     said the U.S. decision on the test ban treaty would not 
     affect the deliberations of Russia's parliament on the pact 
     or alter his country's test moratorium. ``But if the U.S. 
     moves ahead with ballistic missile defense, it would be a 
     disaster for strategic stability in Europe and the world. And 
     we would have to start developing new weapons to correct this 
     imbalance,'' Kvok said.

  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. BROWNBACK addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas is recognized.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I yield myself up to 10 minutes to 
speak on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  Mr. President, there have been a number of arguments put forward 
against and for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We have heard, most 
recently, arguments for ratification of the treaty. I join my colleague 
from Maryland in noting that I think there would be a wide basis of 
support saying we should not bring it up at this time. But neither 
should we bring it up next year. I know a number of my colleagues on 
this side of the aisle would say it would be a good thing if we could 
agree not to go ahead and go forward with a vote now, but not to do 
that during this session of Congress, either the rest of this year or 
next year, so we won't constantly be going back and visiting this issue 
during this Congress. We have it on the floor and it is time to discuss 
it. I think people can agree that we won't hear it again this Congress, 
and we can move forward with that discussion and have this debate and 
not proceed to a vote if people think that would do more harm than 
good.
  I want to address a number of arguments put forward by the President 
and by others on this Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I note the 
President stated in his weekly radio address that every President since 
Eisenhower--a Kansan--has supported this treaty. The reality of this is 
actually that no previous administration, either Republican or 
Democrat, has ever supported the zero-yield test ban now in this treaty 
before the Senate. Eisenhower insisted that nuclear tests with a 
seismic magnitude of less than 4.75 be permitted. Kennedy terminated a 
3-year moratorium on nuclear tests, declaring that ``never again'' 
would the United States make such a mistake. He then embarked upon the 
most aggressive series of nuclear tests in the history of the weapons 
program. Carter, Reagan, and Bush all opposed a zero-yield test ban 
while in office. Even the present administration initially opposed a 
permanent zero-yield test ban before signing onto the CTBT.
  It has been claimed that the CTBT hasn't been given enough Senate 
floor time. The unanimous-consent agreement provides for 22 hours of 
debate on the CTBT. By contrast, the START treaty had 9.5 hours; START 
II had 6 hours; the Chemical Weapons Convention had 18 hours. We are 
going to put a lot of time in on this. The White House insisted for 2 
years that the Senate vote on the CTBT, using terms

[[Page 24867]]

such as ``now,'' ``immediately,'' ``right away.'' Now when we are ready 
to vote, they don't seem to be willing to enter into that debate and 
vote.
  Another thing the President said in his news conference in Canada was 
this was being ``politically motivated.'' I reject that, Mr. President. 
You do not consider items such as this with any consideration for 
political motivation. This is nuclear testing we are talking about. 
This is a critical issue to the world--to my four children. That is 
something you don't interject any bit of politics into. I reject that 
notion altogether.
  There are a couple of other arguments bantered about quite a bit--one 
that I have taken most note of because it causes me the most pause to 
think is what would other countries think if we voted down the treaty? 
Would that cause more proliferation? I cannot read the minds of the 
leaders in China, Russia, Pakistan, or India, but there are people with 
a great deal of wisdom and experience who did hazard a guess in that 
area and have put forward thoughtful statements. One was put forward by 
former Secretaries of Defense Weinberger, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Laird, 
Carlucci, and Schlesinger. All of them signed this quote:

       We also do not believe the CTBT will do much to prevent the 
     spread of nuclear weapons.

  Now, you have six former Secretaries of Defense saying that.

       The motivation of rogue nations like North Korea and Iraq 
     to acquire nuclear weapons will not be affected by whether 
     the U.S. tests. Similarly, the possession of nuclear weapons 
     by nations like India, Pakistan, and Israel depends on the 
     security environment in their region, not by whether or not 
     the U.S. tests. If confidence in the U.S. nuclear deterrent 
     were to decline, countries that have relied on our protection 
     could well feel compelled to seek nuclear capabilities of 
     their own. Thus, ironically, the CTBT might cause additional 
     nations to seek nuclear weapons.

  That was a quote from the six former Defense Secretaries--Weinberger, 
Cheney, Rumsfeld, Laird, Carlucci, and Schlesinger.
  This is a quote from General Vessey, former Chairman of the Joint 
Chief of Staff:

       Supporters of the CTBT argue that it reduces the chances 
     for nuclear proliferation. I applaud efforts to reduce the 
     proliferation of nuclear weapons, but I do not believe that 
     the test ban will reduce the ability of rogue states to 
     acquire nuclear weapons in sufficient quantities to upset 
     regional security in various parts of the world. ``Gun-type'' 
     nuclear weapons can be built with assurance they'll work 
     without testing. The Indian and Pakistani ``tests'' 
     apparently show that there is adequate knowledge available to 
     build implosion type weapons with reasonable assurance that 
     they will work. The India/Pakistan explosions have been 
     called ``tests,'' but I believe it to be more accurate to 
     call them ``demonstrations,'' more for political purposes 
     than for scientific testing.

  A letter signed by John Deutch, Henry Kissinger, and Brent Scowcroft 
says:

       Supporters of the CTBT claim that it will make a major 
     contribution to limiting the spread of nuclear weapons.

  It is the same argument we hear time and time again, which I wish to 
be true because I want this to be a nuclear-free world. They say:

       This cannot be true if key countries of proliferation 
     concern do not agree to accede to the treaty. To date, 
     several of these countries, including India, Pakistan, North 
     Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, have not signed and ratified 
     the treaty. Many of these countries may never join the CTBT 
     regime, and ratification by the United States, early or late, 
     is unlikely to have any impact on their decisions in this 
     regard. For example, no serious person should believe that 
     rogue nations like Iran or Iraq will give up efforts to 
     acquire nuclear weapons if only the U.S. signs the CTBT.

  If you think about that, they are not going to respond to what we do.
  This is a letter from Edward Teller to Senator Helms. He says this in 
the letter, dated February 4, 1998:

       The point I must make is that, in the long run, knowledge 
     and ability to produce nuclear weapons will be widely 
     available. To believe that, in the long run, proliferation of 
     nuclear weapons is avoidable is wishful thinking and 
     dangerous. It is the more dangerous because it is a point of 
     view that the public is eager to accept. Thus, politicians 
     are tempted to gain popularity by supporting false hopes.

  This is a former Assistant Director, ACDA, Fred Eimer. He says this:

       In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the proposed treaty will put 
     our nuclear deterrent at risk without significant arms 
     control or nonproliferation benefits. Other nations will be 
     able to conduct militarily significant nuclear tests well 
     below the verification threshold of the Treaty's monitoring 
     system, and our own unilateral capability.

  I make these statements simply because this is a big issue. It is an 
important issue, and a lot of people have thought a great deal about 
it. I think it to be an inappropriate time to enter into such a treaty 
that would so limit the United States, given all the great concerns and 
testing and things going on around the world.
  I want to give some final quotes of former Directors of the National 
Weapons Laboratories. They also oppose the CTBT.
  Roger Batzel, Director Emeritus, sent this letter on October 5:

       I urge you to oppose the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. No 
     previous administration, either Democrat or Republican, ever 
     supported the unverifiable, zero yield, indefinite duration 
     CTBT now before the Senate. The reason for this is simple. 
     Under a long-duration test ban, confidence in the nuclear 
     stockpile will erode for a variety of reasons. I don't think 
     it can be put forward any clearer than that. This is a key 
     part of our deterrence. We simply cannot go ahead and enter 
     into this treaty at this time at our own great loss and our 
     own great peril.

  I note again for my colleagues on the other side of the aisle that a 
number of us are very willing and interested that this not go forward 
for a vote. We don't want it to go forward for a vote in this session 
of Congress, either this year or next year.
  The notion that it would be pulled down now, then somehow come back 
next year during the middle of a Presidential election, and be used as 
some sort of political tool at that time seems to many of us to be far 
more frightening, with what might happen in the political debate, with 
the atmosphere and the use of this treaty in its discussions for 
political purposes.
  That is why we continue to support not voting on this now. Let's also 
agree that we will not do it during this session of Congress.
  I have used up my allotted period of time. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I know that earlier the Democratic side 
proposed an amendment which was accepted by this side. I did want to 
speak to that for just a moment because I don't believe anyone should 
suffer any illusions that the so-called safeguards that are part of 
this amendment are going to in any way enhance the treaty and make it 
more palatable. We accepted it because it is what is being done anyway. 
It wouldn't have to be added to the treaty. The President theoretically 
is pursuing these things. He should pursue them. But they are not going 
to make the treaty any better or worse.
  For example, the first item is the Stockpile Stewardship Program. It 
has been assumed all along that there would be a Stockpile Stewardship 
Program. We don't have to amend this in order to achieve that.
  The problem is, the Stockpile Stewardship Program is very troublesome 
even if you assume there would be assurance at the end of the day that 
it could do the job it was designed to do because some people are 
assuming that design is a total replacement of testing. It was never 
designed to totally replace testing but merely to give us a greater 
degree of confidence in the reliability and safety of our nuclear 
weapons, not that it could totally replace testing.
  But even if you laid that aside, the notion was that the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program would be ready in a decade. This was announced 
about 3 years ago. Now we are being told it will be ready by the year 
2010.
  There are slips along the way that suggest problems with the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program. It is behind budget. We haven't been 
budgeting the amount of money that was indicated as necessary to 
maintain it--the $4.5 billion a year. We have also not indexed for 
inflation. So each year that we supply the $4 billion or so, we are 
getting further behind because we are not indexing that to inflation.

[[Page 24868]]

  We have also included other programs within the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program that were never intended to be funded out of it, such as the 
tritium production facility for our nuclear weapons. That was to be a 
separate area of funding. This administration has folded that into the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program, with the result that even more of the 
money necessary for the ASCI Program and other key parts of the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program will be shorted if we have to spend that 
money for tritium.
  In addition to that, let me quote a letter I received from the former 
Director of one of our National Laboratories. This is a letter sent to 
me in September of this year from John Nuckolls who is the former 
Director at Livermore. Here is what he said:

       A post-CTBT or other funding reduction would increase the 
     uncertainty in long-term stockpile reliability. Current and 
     projected funding is inadequate. Substantial additional 
     funding is needed for SSP experimental efforts including 
     construction of an advanced hydro facility.

  I also note that the so-called ignition facility, which is planned as 
a part of this, is also behind schedule and over budget.
  As Mr. Nuckolls pointed out, we are already behind. We are getting 
further behind, and I don't think anyone should put that much reliance 
as a result in the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
  Another safeguard is the nuclear laboratory facilities and programs. 
Of course, we are going to maintain our nuclear laboratories and 
facilities. I don't think anybody would ever assume we were not going 
to do that. So this adds nothing to the treaty. The question is, Can 
you maintain these without nuclear testing? It turns out it is much 
more difficult to do so.
  Again, quoting from Mr. Nuckolls' letter to me, I will quote the 
first part of his answer:

       In an extended duration nuclear test ban, confidence in the 
     stockpile would be adversely affected by loss of all nuclear 
     test trained and validated expert personnel, major gaps in 
     our scientific understanding of nuclear explosives, nuclear 
     and chemical decay of warheads, accidents and inadequate 
     funding of the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
       All nuclear test trained/validated expert personnel would 
     eventually be lost. Training of the replacement workforce 
     would be seriously handicapped without nuclear testing, and 
     expert judgment could not be fully validated. A serious 
     degradation of U.S. capabilities to find and fix stockpile 
     problems, and to design and build new nuclear weapons would 
     be unavoidable.

  In other words, what is perceived as a good thing--these nuclear 
laboratory facilities and programs--is actually being allowed to 
deteriorate without testing. We simply won't have the people available 
in order to maintain those facilities and to be prepared to do the 
things he says are necessary to be done. A serious degradation of U.S. 
capabilities would be unavoidable.
  We are not talking about something hypothetical and unimportant. We 
are talking about the U.S. nuclear stockpile. This is the person who 
used to run this National Laboratory. He is telling us we had better be 
careful putting our reliance on that program.
  The third of the so-called safeguards is the maintenance of nuclear 
testing capability. That is fine, except that we are not doing it. This 
President should be doing it. He claims to be doing it. But it is not 
being done. We now know it would take 2 or 3 years to get back to the 
point where we could test.
  I again quote from Mr. Nuckolls' letter:

       In an extended duration nuclear test ban, the nuclear test 
     site infrastructure is likely to decay or become obsolete. 
     Nuclear test experienced personnel would be lost. A series of 
     nuclear tests to diagnose complex reliability problems and to 
     certify a fix, or to develop new weapons could take several 
     years. . . .
       Nuclear testing has been essential to the discovery and 
     resolution of many problems in the stockpile.

  The point he is making is that you can't just say you are going to be 
able to resume testing unless you take active and take serious steps to 
maintain that readiness. We are not doing it. And he says in a test ban 
of this kind, we would not be able to do it.
  The fourth item is the continued comprehensive research and 
development program. Of course, we are going to be doing that. 
Intelligence gatherings, analytical capabilities--we will do the best 
we can on that, although, as has been pointed out, it is inadequate.
  Senator Richard Lugar, an arms control advocate and an expert in this 
body, has concluded reluctantly that this treaty is not verifiable and 
enforceable and, as a matter of fact, it cannot be made so.
  Let me quote from the Washington Times of today because it talks 
about how we negotiated this treaty and how we negotiated the 
provisions for verification and enforcement. Let me read from the story 
which is headlined, ``Moscow, Beijing balk at monitors. Testing sites 
not included in nuke treaty.'' I am quoting now:

       Russia and China refused to permit seismic monitoring near 
     their nuclear weapons test sites that could have resolved 
     some verification problems now troubling the Comprehensive 
     Test Ban Treaty, according to U.S. government officials.
       Clinton administration officials and congressional aides 
     said the failure of U.S. negotiators to win the cooperation 
     of Moscow and Beijing was a ``negotiating failure'' that 
     undermined the treaty. It also is a key reason U.S. 
     intelligence agencies said both nations could conduct hidden 
     nuclear tests without detection.

  Before I finish this quotation, let me point out why this is 
important.
  Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield, from what document is he 
reading?
  Mr. KYL. The Washington Times, Tuesday, October 12.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that The Washington Times 
article be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                    Moscow, Beijing Balk at Monitors

                            (By Bill Gertz)

       Russia and China refused to permit seismic monitoring near 
     their nuclear weapons test sites that could have resolved 
     some verification problems now troubling the Comprehensive 
     Test Ban Treaty, according to U.S. government officials.
       Clinton administration officials and congressional aides 
     said the failure of U.S. negotiators to win the cooperation 
     of Moscow and Beijing was a ``negotiating failure'' that 
     undermined the treaty. It also is a key reason U.S. 
     intelligence agencies said both nations could conduct hidden 
     nuclear tests without detection.
       The officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity 
     because of sensitive intelligence issues, said the treaty's 
     international monitoring system that includes 50 ``primary'' 
     seismic stations and 120 ``auxiliary'' seismic stations does 
     not include stations close to China's remote northwestern Lop 
     Nur testing site in Xinjiang province, or Russia's arctic 
     Novaya Zemlya.
       U.S. intelligence agencies suspect the two locations were 
     used recently for small nuclear test blasts.
       China's test on June 12 may have been part of efforts by 
     Beijing to build smaller warheads for its short-range 
     missiles, or multiple warheads for its intercontinental 
     ballistic missiles (ICBMs), U.S. intelligence officials said.
       Two suspected nuclear tests detected near Novaya Zemlya on 
     Sept. 8 and Sept. 23 are believed to be part of Russia's 
     secret nuclear testing program.
       U.S. intelligence agencies reported recently to policy-
     makers and members of Congress that Russia and China are the 
     two nations are most interested and capable of conducting 
     covert tests. ``Both have locations where they could conduct 
     secret tests that would not be detected,'' said one 
     intelligence official.
       The official said that during treaty negotiations from 1994 
     to 1996 at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, U.S. 
     negotiators failed to press for Russian and Chinese agreement 
     to tougher monitoring provisions in the treaty that would 
     satisfy the concerns of U.S. spy agencies about cheating.
       According to the official, ``if Russia had been convinced 
     to have one facility at Novaya Zemlya and China agreed to 
     have one near Lop Nur, the level of verification would have 
     improved greatly.''
       Russia and China also blocked a treaty provision that would 
     have required treaty signatories to allow small explosive 
     tests that would have ``calibrated'' regional seismic 
     stations so they accurately measure underground blasts, the 
     officials said.
       Without the calibration, the regional stations will provide 
     misleading or confusing data that undermines more accurate 
     data provided by primary stations, they said.
       A National Intelligence Estimate, the consensus judgment of 
     all U.S. intelligence agencies, presented a finding in 1997 
     that said verifying the test-ban treaty will be difficult.
       That estimate is currently being revised and is expected to 
     conclude that because of

[[Page 24869]]

     the lack of verification and the possibility that states 
     could conduct secret tests without detection, the treaty is 
     even more difficult to verify, said officials close to the 
     intelligence community.
       Under the treaty, Russia will have six primary seismic 
     stations and 13 secondary stations; China will have two 
     primary seismic posts and four secondary facilities.
       None of these stations, however, is located close enough to 
     the main Russian and Chinese testing facilities to be able to 
     detect tests conducted covertly inside underground caves, or 
     tests of very small nuclear blasts, the officials said.
       By contrast, the United States has five primary seismic 
     monitoring facilities under the treaty, including one in 
     Nevada, where the main U.S. nuclear testing site is located. 
     It will also have 11 secondary sites.
       Michael Pillsbury, a former acting director of the U.S. 
     Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said China would have 
     agreed to better seismic monitoring if Beijing were pushed 
     into it.
       ``Chinese officials have told me that if the Clinton 
     administration had pushed harder they would have agreed to a 
     primary site near the test site,'' said Mr. Pillsbury, who 
     also took part in a recent Defense Science Task Force study 
     on nuclear weapons, ``but the Chinese had the impression the 
     Clinton administration didn't place as a high priority on 
     treaty verification as they did on maintaining good trade 
     relations.
       A Senate defense specialist said Russia agreed to allow 
     more sensitive seismic monitors to be placed near Novaya 
     Zemlya, but only if the United States agreed to provide 
     Moscow with advanced computers and U.S. nuclear weapons 
     testing data. The administration refused.
       On Russia, the aide said the administration faces a 
     dilemma. ``Either they accuse the Russians of violating the 
     treaty or concede the treaty cannot be verified,'' the aide 
     said.
       U.S. intelligence agencies are now saying that ``you can 
     have militarily significant developments below the [seismic] 
     detection threshold,'' the aide said.
       Administration officials have said verification is not as 
     important as promoting the agreement itself as a deterrent to 
     nuclear weapons proliferation.
       ``The CIA has indicated that they cannot verify to a 
     hundred percent whether or not someone has conducted a 
     nuclear test,'' Defense Secretary William S. Cohen said 
     Sunday on NBC's ``Meet the Press.''
       ``But we believe with this treaty, you're going to have at 
     least an additional 320 sites that will help monitor testing 
     around the world,'' he said. ``. . . We are satisfied we can 
     verify adequately, not a hundred percent, but satisfy 
     ourselves that there is no testing doing on that would put us 
     at any kind of a strategic disadvantage.''
       Asked about the fact, that the United States cannot detect 
     unclear blasts below a few kiloton yield, Secretary of State 
     Madeleine K. Albright said: ``We can detect what we need 
     to.''
       ``Those that are below a certain level, we do not think 
     would undercut our nuclear deterrent because they would be so 
     small that they would not affect our nuclear deterrent 
     capacity,'' Mrs. Albright said on ABC's ``This Week.''
       A Pentagon official, however, said the Clinton 
     administration is supporting anti-nuclear-weapons activists 
     by supporting the test ban.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, the Senate has a solemn obligation under our 
Constitution to be a backstop. We are not supposed to be a rubber stamp 
to treaties. If we were simply to rubber stamp whatever the President 
sent to us, our founding fathers wouldn't have provided a separate 
advice and consent responsibility for the Senate. As a matter of fact, 
we would be doing the Office of the Presidency a big favor by 
exercising that responsibility in a responsible way, saying that when 
we find treaties that lack even minimal standards, then we need to say 
no, so that our negotiators in the future will be able to negotiate 
stronger provisions--provisions that we seek because we understand 
their importance and necessity for sensible arms control.
  If we simply ratify what is acknowledged to be a flawed treaty, then 
our negotiators are never going to be able to say no to bad terms and 
we are always going to have to then go to the lowest common denominator 
in these treaties--treaties which then become bad for the United 
States; treaties which are unverifiable and unenforceable. Those are 
concepts that used to cause the Senate to say no, to say we won't 
approve a treaty that doesn't have good verification or enforcement 
provisions. Those are minimally necessary for sensible treaties.
  Our negotiators tried to avoid a zero-yield basis in this treaty but 
they couldn't so they gave up. They tried to have a 10-year limit 
rather than having this treaty be in effect in perpetuity, but they 
couldn't get it done. So in order to make a deal, they said: All right, 
we will agree to something less. If they knew and if their counterparts 
understood that the Senate at that point would say: No, we are not 
going to ratify such a treaty, they would more likely have stood firm 
and been able to hold their ground.
  The same thing is true with respect to these monitors. Administration 
officials have tried to suggest that actually we will have a better 
chance of monitoring in the future than we do today, while many of the 
experts have debunked that. The fact that the treaty calls for 
monitoring sites around the world is irrelevant if the sites are not 
placed in the positions that are best for detection of nuclear weapon 
explosions. What this article is pointing out is that when the United 
States tried to interpose that requirement on Russia and China, the 
Russians and Chinese said no, and we backed down. So now we don't have 
monitoring stations in key locations in the world near the Chinese and 
Russian test sites that would enable the United States to understand 
whether or not they have violated the treaty by engaging in nuclear 
tests.
  Let me quote further from the article, while it points out that 
Russia and China will have some seismic stations:

       None of these stations, however, is located close enough to 
     the main Russian and Chinese testing facilities to be able to 
     detect tests conducted covertly inside underground caves, or 
     tests of very small nuclear blasts, the official said.
       By contrast, the United States has five primary seismic 
     monitoring facilities under the treaty, including one in 
     Nevada, where the main U.S. nuclear testing site is located. 
     It will also have 11 secondary sites.
       Michael Pillsbury, a former acting director of the U.S. 
     Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said China would have 
     agreed to better seismic monitoring if Beijing were pushed 
     into it.
       ``Chinese officials have told me that if the Clinton 
     administration had pushed harder they would have agreed to a 
     primary site near the test site,'' said Mr. Pillsbury, who 
     also took part in a recent Defense Science Task Force study 
     on nuclear weapons, ``but the Chinese had the impression the 
     Clinton administration didn't place as high a priority on 
     treaty verification as they did on maintaining good trade 
     relations.''
       A Senate defense specialist said Russia agreed to allow 
     more sensitive seismic monitoring to be placed near Novaya 
     Zemlya, but only if the United States agreed to provide 
     Moscow with advanced computers and U.S. nuclear weapons 
     testing data. The administration refused.

  I think the point of this article and the point of the testimony of 
several of the people who came before the committees was that the 
people who negotiated this treaty gave up too soon on too many 
important provisions, and because they wanted a treaty more than they 
were concerned about the specific provisions--such as verification and 
enforcement--they were willing to commit the United States to a series 
of obligations that will have a profound negative impact on our nuclear 
stockpile and yet do very little, if anything, to ensure that other 
nations in the world will not proliferate nuclear weapons.
  The President has signed the treaty. That doesn't mean the United 
States needs to ratify it. We should exercise our independent judgment, 
our constitutional prerogative, to provide, as I said, before the 
quality control. If we do that, this President and future Presidents' 
hands will be strengthened when they go to the negotiating sessions to 
talk about such things as where to place the monitors. Maybe the 
Chinese and the Russians and others at that time will understand they 
are not going to bamboozle our negotiators. Because the Senate provides 
a backstop, we will say no. That is the way the Founding Fathers 
understood we could ensure that the United States did not take on 
inadequate or offensive international arms obligations or limitations.
  I have mentioned all the safeguards but the last one. These 
safeguards add nothing to the status quo. In fact, I hope they will be 
more robustly pursued than this administration has pursued.
  Last is the withdrawal under the supreme interest clause. Even this 
was something that the administration sought to avoid when it 
negotiated the

[[Page 24870]]

treaty initially. The negotiators understood how very difficult--in 
fact, how almost impossible--it is to invoke the supreme interest 
clause. There are two reasons for that. They are very simple. First, if 
a country hasn't tested for a decade and all of a sudden this clause is 
invoked, that country is, in effect, telling all the rest of the world, 
whoops, we have a problem; please excuse us while we test.
  That is not a good message to send to the rest of the world. As 
difficult as the political inability to invoke this clause, if we think 
it is hard now to reject this treaty--which most on this side believe 
should be rejected--if we think it is difficult now because world 
opinion will react badly to a negative vote by the Senate, what do 
Members think world opinion will be after the treaty has been in effect 
for a decade and all of a sudden the United States tries to withdraw 
from it because we need to test?
  That is real pressure. It is a virtual impossibility. In fact, 
President John F. Kennedy said exactly that in speaking about the 
moratorium that he inherited from the Eisenhower administration. He 
said never again should we do that because it is not only difficult, it 
is impossible to go back to testing without political ramifications 
after having had a moratorium condition.
  The supreme interest clause is certainly something that would be part 
of any administration's options; whether or not it is added to the 
treaty is irrelevant. The administration always has that option. It 
adds nothing.
  The reason we were happy to accept the amendment offered by the 
Senator from Delaware is that it adds nothing to the treaty. We assume 
those provisions would be extant and therefore there is no reason to 
object to it. There is also no reason to celebrate because it adds 
nothing to what we already have.
  As I said, unless we are a lot more serious about providing the 
funding that is called for under the amendment and doing the science 
that is required, we are going to find ourselves getting further and 
further behind, especially with respect to the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program.
  I don't think we should say that the safeguard package has made the 
treaty any better than it was to begin with.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a letter from 
John H. Nuckolls.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                             John H. Nuckolls,

                                 Livermore, CA, September 2, 1999.
     Hon. Jon Kyl,
     U.S. Senate, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Kyl: This letter responds to your April 1, 
     1999 request for my answers to five questions concerning the 
     effects of a nuclear test ban on the reliability and safety 
     of the nuclear stockpile. My views do not represent LLNL.
       1. To maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of 
     the U.S. nuclear stockpile in absence of nuclear testing, the 
     United States intends to rely on the Stockpile Stewardship 
     Program to accomplish the goals previously achieved through 
     nuclear testing. Setting aside the controversial issue of 
     sustained funding for the Program, how confident should we be 
     that the Program will achieve its goals? In your answer, 
     please address not only the level of certainty we should have 
     regarding the Program's technical goals, but also the goal of 
     attracting and training nuclear weapons experts who could fix 
     problems that may develop in the existing stockpile or design 
     and build new nuclear weapons.
       In an extended duration test ban, confidence in the 
     stockpile would be adversely affected by loss of all nuclear 
     test trained and validated expert personnel, major gaps in 
     our scientific understanding of nuclear explosives, nuclear 
     and chemical decay of warheads, accidents and inadequate 
     funding of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP).
       All nuclear test trained/validated personnel would 
     eventually be lost. Training of the replacement workforce 
     would be seriously handicapped without nuclear testing, and 
     expert judgment could not be fully validated. A serious 
     degradation of U.S. capabilities to find and fix stockpile 
     problems, and to design and build new nuclear weapons would 
     be unavoidable.
       There are major gaps in our scientific understanding of 
     critically important processes essential to the operation of 
     nuclear explosives. These gaps create a serious vulnerability 
     to undetected problems. Uncertainties in performance margins 
     increase this vulnerability. Consequently, there will be a 
     growing uncertainty in long-term reliability.
       It cannot be assured that the powerful computational and 
     experimental capabilities of the Stockpile Stewardship 
     Program will increase confidence in reliability. Improved 
     understanding may reduce confidence in estimates of 
     performance margins and reliability if fixes and validation 
     are precluded by a CTBT.
       Key components of nuclear warheads are ``aging'' by 
     radioactive decay and chemical decomposition and corrosion. 
     Periodic remanufacture is necessary, but may copy existing 
     defects and introduce additional defects. Some of the 
     remanufactured parts may differ significantly from the 
     original parts--due to loss of nuclear test validated 
     personnel who manufactured the original parts, the use of new 
     material and fabrication processes, and inadequate 
     specification of original parts. There are significant risks 
     of reducing stockpile reliability when remanufactured parts 
     are involved in warhead processes where there are major gaps 
     in our scientific understanding.
       In spite of extraordinary efforts to prevent accidents, 
     sooner or later ``accidents will happen.'' Accidents (very 
     probably those of foreign nuclear forces) are likely to 
     generate requirements for incorporating modern damage 
     limitation technologies in our nuclear warhead systems which 
     lack these safety features. Without nuclear tests, confidence 
     in reliability would be substantially reduced by the 
     introduction of some safety technologies.
       A post-CTBT or other funding reduction would increase the 
     uncertainty in long-term stockpile reliability. Current and 
     projected funding is inadequate. Substantial additional 
     funding is needed for SSP experimental efforts including 
     construction of an advanced hydro facility.
       The uncertainty in long-term stockpile reliability may be 
     reduced somewhat by increasing performance margins. Depending 
     on national security requirements, operational measures may 
     be feasible which compensate for uncertain stockpile 
     reliability, e.g., limit arms control agreements so that 
     large and diverse reserves of warheads and delivery systems 
     can be maintained, use multiple independent forces on each 
     target and maximize use of shoot-look-shoot.
       2. Certification of U.S. nuclear weapons, once achieved 
     through nuclear testing, is now accomplished through a 
     process of review by experts. How crucial is the nuclear 
     testing experience of those experts to their ability to 
     perform the certification task? What level of risk would you 
     associate with having a certification process in the future 
     that utilizes only individuals who have had no nuclear 
     testing experience?
       Stockpile confidence would be reduced if certification were 
     performed by experts lacking nuclear test experience. The 
     level of risk would be high unless arms control agreements 
     were restrained, and substantially reserve forces maintained 
     so that the capabilities of our nuclear forces substantially 
     exceeded national security requirements.
       3. Current U.S. plans are to maintain ``the basic 
     capability to resume nuclear test activities.'' In your view, 
     is it technically possible to maintain the nuclear test site, 
     together with the requisite skilled personnel, in a state 
     whereby nuclear testing can readily be resumed if needed? How 
     quickly do you believe that testing can be resumed?
       In an extended duration nuclear test ban, the nuclear test 
     site infrastructure is likely to decay and become obsolete. 
     Nuclear test experienced personnel would be lost. A series of 
     nuclear tests to diagnose complex reliability problems and 
     certify a fix, or to develop new weapons could take several 
     years.
       4. In your experience, how vital has nuclear testing been 
     to the discovery and resolution of problems with the U.S. 
     stockpile?
       Nuclear testing has been essential to the discovery and 
     resolution of many problems in the stockpile.
       5. Experts agree that nuclear testing can be conducted by 
     other nations at low yields without its being detected. If 
     other nuclear weapons states were to continue clandestine 
     nuclear testing at low levels, do you believe that they could 
     obtain significantly greater confidence in the reliability of 
     their nuclear arsenals?
       With a series of clandestine nuclear tests, Russia could 
     increase confidence in the reliability of its nuclear 
     stockpile. Advanced low-yield nuclear weapons could also be 
     developed, e.g., tactical and BMD warheads.
       China and other nations could improve their nuclear forces 
     by clandestine tests of nuclear weapons, including tests of 
     U.S. designs obtained through espionage? and Russian designs 
     obtained through various means?
       A ``CTBT'' with clandestine nuclear tests would incentivize 
     and facilitate espionage. Achieving qualitative parity with a 
     static U.S. stockpile would be a powerful incentive. 
     Espionage is facilitated when U.S. progress is frozen, and 
     classified information is being concentrated and organized in 
     electronic systems.
       These views are my own and do not represent LLNL.
           Sincerely,


                                             John H. Nuckolls,

                                          Director Emeritus, LLNL.


[[Page 24871]]

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Senator from Virginia would be next, 
but he has kindly yielded to the Senator from New Mexico.
  My friend from Arizona keeps saying the ``acknowledged flawed 
treaty.'' It is not acknowledged to be flawed by 32 Nobel laureates in 
physics. It is not acknowledged to be flawed by four of the last five 
Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is not acknowledged to be 
flawed by the weapons lab Directors, et cetera.
  I want to make it clear, he states some believe it is flawed. The 
majority of the people who are in command and have been in command--the 
Secretaries of Defense who have been mentioned--if we balance it out, 
clearly think this is not a flawed treaty.
  I yield on the Republican time to my friend from New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, there can be no question that this 
debate and the vote which might occur are very significant and historic 
events for the United States. I very much want to be in favor of the 
treaty but I cannot favor the treaty because I believe essentially it 
jeopardizes U.S. security.
  I wish every Senator had the opportunities I have had for the last 
5\1/2\ years. I say that knowing full well my friend from Arizona, 
while he is not on the committee that funds the stockpile stewardship, 
is one of the rare exceptions in that he and a few other Senators have 
learned and worked very diligently to understand what we have been 
doing since we decided on behalf of the Senate in a Mark Hatfield 
amendment that we would not test nuclear weapons.
  What has been the U.S. response to our scientific and nuclear 
community?
  Essentially, what we have been busy doing can be encapsulated in the 
words ``science-based stockpile stewardship.'' One might say, since 
that pertains to the safety of the weapons system, what we used to do 
could be called nuclear testing stockpile stewardship. That occurred 
since the beginning of our nuclear weapons programs. The United States 
had a formidable, perhaps the world's best, system of underground 
testing.
  Testing became very important to those laboratories--there are now 
three that are principally called nuclear deterrent or stockpile 
stewardship laboratories. I am privileged to have two of them in my 
State. When I come to the floor, go to meetings, and talk about the 
fact this is an important program and these laboratories are important, 
it hardly ever comes into focus like it is today, like it was in our 
conference at noon, and like it has been for the last week as Senator 
Jon Kyl and others have spoken to the fact that what the United States 
has been trying to do is develop a science-based system. This system 
means supercomputer simulation and other techniques and skills to see 
what is going on in a nuclear weapon without any testing to assure the 
parts that might be wearing out are discernible and can be replaced and 
that the weapon, indeed, is safe.
  Frankly, if nothing else, I pray this debate will cause Senators and 
Representatives, in particular in the important committees of 
jurisdiction, to understand the importance of this program if the 
United States continues on a path of no testing, for whatever period of 
time--and who knows, we may do that in spite of this treaty not being 
ratified by the United States. I do not want to engage in a maybe-and-
maybe-not discussion on that, but the United States is trying hard. 
Nonetheless, my principal concerns about this Treaty--and there are 
many--center around four reasons, and three of them have to do with 
science-based stockpile stewardship.
  First, the science-based stockpile stewardship is new; it is nascent; 
it is just starting. It is not finished. It has not been completed. It 
is not perfected. As a matter of fact, to the Senators who are on the 
floor, probably some of the most profound testimony regarding America's 
stockpile of nuclear weapons occurred in the Armed Services Committee 
last week when sitting at the witness table was the Secretary of 
Energy, surrounded by the three National Laboratory Directors.
  It goes without saying that our country owes them a high degree of 
gratitude and thanks for what they do, for they oversee the safety of 
our weapons under this new approach which is very different for them, 
and that is, no testing; they must certify that everything is OK 
without testing. Scientists and physicists steeped in knowledge about 
nuclear weapons--one of them is a nuclear weapons expert of the highest 
order--testified, and I will quote in a while some of the difficulties 
they see with reference to their responsibility.
  Secondly, I do not know what to do about it, but the difficulty, as 
they testified, in securing the funding they need without new mandates 
imposed upon them is very uncertain. The difficulty is real and it is 
uncertain as to whether they will continually over time get sufficient 
resources.
  Third is, and I say this with a clear hope that the Secretary of 
Energy and the President will listen, the unknown impact of the failure 
on the part of this administration to proceed with reorganizing the 
Department of Energy on stewardship efforts. I do not want to belabor 
in this speech the efforts that many of us went to in streamlining 
accountability of the nuclear weapons programs within the Energy 
Department. We called it a semiautonomous agency--so that Department, 
which is in charge of the nuclear weapons, including the profound 
things we are talking about with respect to their safety, will not be 
bogged down by rules, regulations, personnel, and other things from a 
Department as diverse as the Department of Energy.
  As a matter of fact, the more I think about it, the more I am 
convinced they should get on with doing what Congress told them to do 
instead of this waffling out of it by putting Secretary Richardson in 
charge of both the Energy Department and a new independent agency--
which was supposed to be created so it would be semiautonomous, and he 
will head them both under an interpretation that cannot be legal--just 
indicates to me that they are not quite willing in this Department of 
Energy to face up to the serious problems of our nuclear stockpile and 
such things as science-based stockpile stewardship.
  Lastly, and for many who talked on the floor, the most important 
issue is the ambiguities and threats to our international security at 
the present time. I will talk about that a bit because some Senators 
are asking: How can you be against the treaty and at the same time say 
we ought to put it off?
  Let me repeat, my last concern is the ambiguities and threats to our 
international security at present.
  I will proceed quickly with an elaboration.
  When the United States declared a unilateral moratorium in 1992, the 
onus was on the scientists and National Laboratories to design and 
implement a program that would ensure the safety, reliability, and 
performance of our nuclear arsenal without testing. This is an onerous, 
complicated task that has yet to be fully implemented and validated, 
and I just stated that.
  Science-based stockpile stewardship was designed to replace nuclear 
tests through increased understanding of the nuclear physics in 
conjunction with unprecedented simulation capabilities. This requires a 
lot of money. In fact, full implementation of the stewardship program 
is more expensive than reliance on nuclear tests, and I do not say this 
as an excuse for moving back to testing. The truth of the matter is it 
proves we are very willing to keep our stockpiles safe, reliable, and 
sound, even if it costs us more money, so long as we do not do 
underground testing on the other side of the ledger.
  There is no question that in addition, the validity of this approach 
remains unproven, and key facilities, such as the National Ignition 
Facility, are behind schedule and over budget, and it is supposed to be 
one of the integral parts of being able to determine the stockpile 
confidence.
  This program will attempt to preserve the viability of existing 
weapons indefinitely. We no longer possess the production capabilities 
to replace the weapons, and maybe Senator Kyl has referred to that. We 
have already gotten rid of our production facilities.

[[Page 24872]]

Currently, seven highly sophisticated warhead designs comprise our 
arsenal. Each weapon contains thousands of components, all of which are 
subject to decay and corrosion over time. Any small flaw in any 
individual component would render the weapons ineffective. In addition, 
because we intend to preserve, rather than replace, these weapons with 
new designs, aging effects on these weapons remains to be seen.
  I quote Dr. Paul Robinson of Sandia National Laboratory in his 
testimony last week:

       Confidence in the reliability and safety of the nuclear 
     weapons stockpile will eventually decline without nuclear 
     testing. . . . Whether the risk that will arise from this 
     decline in confidence will be acceptable or not is a policy 
     issue that must be considered in light of the benefits 
     expected to be realized [if you have a] test ban.

  Are we ready today to accept a decline in confidence of our nuclear 
deterrent? Can we today accurately weigh the benefits on either side of 
the issue? I do not think so. On the other hand, we risk complete 
collapse of ongoing disarmament initiatives by prematurely rejecting 
this treaty. That is why I believe it is not inconsistent that I am not 
for it, but I would not like it to be voted on.
  There are substantial risks with unknown consequences. Success of the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program requires recruiting the brightest young 
scientists. We have to begin to substitute for the older heads who know 
everything there is about it and contain all of the so-called corporate 
memory with reference to the science testing and the like.
  My colleagues all know that I have fought very hard to get the money 
for the Stockpile Stewardship Program. We came perilously close this 
year to having this part of our budget cut by as much as $1 billion by 
the House. I think after weeks of saying we would not go to 
conference--it is not worth going to conference to fight--it was 
believed it would be better to stay at last year's level. They finally 
came to the point where we have a Stockpile Stewardship Program funded, 
but in an almost irreverent way.
  Dr. Browne of Los Alamos said:

       I am confident that a fully supported and sustained program 
     will enable us to continue to maintain America's nuclear 
     deterrent without nuclear testing. However, I am concerned 
     about several trends that are reducing my confidence level 
     each year. These include annual shortfalls in planned 
     budgets, increased numbers of findings in the stockpile that 
     need resolution, an augmented workload beyond our original 
     plans, and unfunded mandates that cut into the program.

  It is pretty clear that it is not what they would like it to be.
  He also said he was

       concerned about other significant disturbances this year in 
     the stability of the support from the government, partially 
     in response to concerns about espionage. This has sent a 
     mixed message to the Laboratory that will make it more 
     difficult to carry out

the stewardship program. According to this good doctor who heads Los 
Alamos, the task of recruiting and training the requisite talent is 
hindered by the current security climate at the laboratories.
  I strongly believe that the establishment of a semi-independent 
agency for nuclear weapons activities will significantly enhance 
efforts to ensure the success of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. At 
the same time, this reorganization will require many months to 
accomplish. I ask my colleagues the following question: Should we make 
an international declaration regarding U.S. nuclear tests in the midst 
of a complete overhaul of the Department responsible for those weapons? 
I don't think so. Such an action would be premature.
  Lastly, today we cannot clearly define the direction the world will 
take on nuclear issues. This concern speaks both for and against the 
treaty. Treaty proponents believe that U.S. ratification and the 
treaty's entry into force will curb proliferation. This treaty, if 
fully implemented, would enhance our ability to detect nuclear tests 
and create a deterrent to nations that may aspire to possess nuclear 
weapons capabilities.
  However, others say, without question, this treaty is not a silver 
bullet. The administration has touted it as such. This treaty is only 
one measure of many that should comprise a solid nonproliferation 
agenda. For example, this treaty would be acceptable if accompanied by 
substantive bilateral commitments with Russia and multilateral 
commitments among the declared nuclear powers. A framework for 
international disarmament, nonproliferation, and stability may very 
well include a Test Ban Treaty, but it should also be accompanied by 
binding commitments on future disarmament objectives, such as the 
Fissile Materials Cutoff Regime, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
  We have only one treaty--one facet of a complex picture--before us 
today. It may contribute to achieving other disarmament objectives, but 
we are being asked to wager our nuclear deterrent on the hope that 
formal commitments from other nuclear powers and threshold states will 
be forthcoming. We sign on the dotted line that we will not utilize 
testing to maintain our stockpile, and we plead with the world to 
follow suit.
  Or we reject the Treaty now and eliminate others' potential 
hesitation regarding future tests.
  Only 23 of the 44 nations required for the Treaty's entry into force 
have ratified it. India, Pakistan, North Korea, Russia and China have 
not ratified it. Neither India nor Pakistan have even signed the 
treaty.
  We should not rush to vote on this matter.
  Regardless of the vote count, we risk either permanent damage to our 
non-proliferation objectives or the safety and reliability of the U.S. 
nuclear arsenal. Continuing our moratorium on nuclear testing and not 
acting on this Treaty is the best course of action for now.
  We have time. Time to observe international changes and formulate a 
nuclear posture suitable for a new era. Time to evaluate the future of 
our bilateral relations with Russia and China. And time to first ensure 
the success of Stockpile Stewardship.
  U.S. ratification would provide a positive signal and increase our 
leverage at the negotiating table in our pursuit of many non-
proliferation objectives. If the Senate does not ratify this Treaty, 
which appears highly likely at the present, many of our current foreign 
policy initiatives will unravel.
  Most importantly, a negative vote on the CTBT will further erode the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, itself. We secured indefinite 
extension of the NPT in 1995 by committing to lead negotiations, sign 
and ratify the Test Ban Treaty. There is an explicit link between our 
Article VI commitments to disarm and the CTBT.
  Many other steps could be taken to demonstrate a good faith effort 
toward nuclear disarmament. The Test Ban Treaty is just one element of 
a comprehensive strategy to reduce nuclear dangers. The U.S. and Russia 
have already radically reduced stockpiles from their Cold War levels. 
Progress has been made in the negotiations for a fissile materials 
cutoff regime. Currently, all of the declared nuclear powers have a 
moratorium on testing, and two of those, Britain and France, have 
signed and ratified the Test Ban Treaty.
  If the Senate votes against this Treaty, we will send the signal to 
the world that the U.S. has no intent to make good on its earlier 
commitments. START II will wither in the Duma; negotiations with Russia 
on START III and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty will most likely 
falter. We would most likely witness a rash of nuclear tests in 
response. Killing this Treaty would inevitably also impact upcoming 
elections in Russia. To the Russians our actions in Kosovo underscored 
NATO's willingness to engage in out-of-area operations, even in 
violation of sovereignty. Anti-U.S. sentiments in Russia soared. Not 
only would a down vote on this Treaty play into the hands of the 
Communists and Nationalists, U.S. actions would essentially give Russia 
the go-ahead to begin testing a new generation of tactical nuclear 
weapons to secure its border against NATO.
  We risk little by postponing consideration of this Treaty. We put our 
most vital security interests at stake by rushing to judgement on it.

[[Page 24873]]

  In sum, defeat of this Treaty at this point will have a devastating 
impact on numerous current foreign policy initiatives that are clearly 
in the U.S. national interest. We can anticipate an unraveling of 
initiatives toward bilateral disarmament with Russia, and we will 
forfeit any remaining hope of preventing a nuclear arms race between 
India and Pakistan. We will open wide the door for China to proceed 
with tests to validate any nuclear designs based on the alleged stolen 
W-88 blueprints.
  At the same time, Stockpile Stewardship is as yet unproven. We still 
do not fully understand the aging effects on our nuclear arsenal. Such 
aging effects relate both to the components which comprise the nuclear 
weapons and the scientific experts who initially designed and tested 
them. Also, as witnessed again this year, the budget for the full 
implementation of Stockpile Stewardship is anything but secure. In 
light of the current situation, ratification of this Treaty may put us 
at risk.
  The timing of this debate is such that I have to weigh very carefully 
between the negative impact of this Treaty's possible defeat and the 
annual budgetary struggles for Stockpile Stewardship in combination 
with the scientific community's own doubts about the Stockpile 
Stewardship program.
  We should maintain the moratorium on testing and postpone the vote on 
this matter.
  It is irresponsible and dangerous to proceed now with the debate and 
vote on this Treaty. We have nothing to lose by maintaining our current 
status of a unilateral moratorium and having signed but not yet 
ratified the Test Ban Treaty. But we have everything to lose regardless 
of the outcome of this vote.
  I thank the Senate for listening and the leadership for granting me 
this time. I yield the floor.
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield 10 minutes to my friend from Virginia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. ROBB. I thank the Chair and thank the distinguished Senator from 
Delaware.
  Mr. President, on balance I personally believe the arguments for 
ratification of the CTBT are far more persuasive than the arguments 
against ratification. But I recognize the legitimacy of some of the 
arguments made against ratification. I recognize the credibility of 
some of those making those arguments. I respect the sincerity of 
colleagues who believe that ratification would be a mistake.
  Having said that, I will not repeat all of the reasons that I would 
vote for ratification, if we are, indeed, forced to go ahead with the 
vote scheduled for later this afternoon. I would simply appeal to 
colleagues who oppose ratification not to let their feelings--their 
personal feelings--toward our Commander in Chief or their desires for a 
decisive political victory to weaken the role of the U.S. leadership in 
the international community or encourage additional testing by nations 
that might not otherwise do so, and thus make the world less secure and 
more dangerous.
  On the politics, opponents of ratification at this time have already 
won. No one contends that 67 Senators are prepared to vote for 
ratification. No one is suggesting that this President or any future 
President is going to bring the treaty up for ratification again unless 
and until they have those 67 votes.
  I happen to be one of the 10 Senators who engaged in an extended 
discussion of this treaty with the President and his national security 
team last Tuesday evening. Many others have been actively engaged in 
the debate from the very beginning. As I recall, there were six 
Republicans and four Democrats; and we were equally divided on the 
question of ratification.
  I wish to commend all of the Senators involved in that process and 
throughout, but particularly those Republicans who stated during that 
meeting, very forcefully, why they oppose the treaty and why a 
ratification vote would fail but nonetheless were willing to help find 
a way to pull us back from the brink--for the good of the country and 
in the interest of a safer world.
  In this instance, the President has acknowledged that if we go ahead 
with the vote, he will lose. But he is asking us not to defeat our own 
national interest as well by voting down this treaty.
  The Senate, in pressing its case, however, for an up-or-down vote at 
this point, in my judgment, injures the country's ability to lead and 
strikes a blow at American leadership around the world. Far more is at 
stake than defeating the policy and agenda of this particular 
President. Make no mistake, allies, friends, and enemies would view the 
defeat of the CTBT as a green light for more nuclear testing and 
further development of nuclear weapons, either strategic or tactical.
  Defeat of the treaty will not be perceived as a signal of restraint. 
Just the opposite. Delay of consideration of the matter at least gives 
us the opportunity to address continuing concerns about monitoring and 
verification, as best we can, while delivering the message to other 
nations that we should proceed with yellow-light caution in regard to 
testing and development of their programs.
  I have carefully reviewed the intelligence community's analysis of 
our CTBT monitoring capabilities--including the 1997 national 
intelligence estimate and the updating of that document--and 
admittedly, there are no absolutes when it comes to our ability to 
detect and identify some tests at low yields with high confidence. The 
more critical issue at hand, however, is the significance of possible 
evasion and the rationale that underlies such action and what it means 
for the inherent advantage we currently maintain with our nuclear 
arsenal.
  I urge our colleagues to weigh very carefully the views of the 
intelligence community. The intelligence community believes we can 
effectively monitor the CTBT. We approved the Chemical Weapons 
Convention aware of the fact that denial and deception techniques would 
prevent us from confirming absolutely that production, development, and 
stockpiling were not going on. But as with the CTBT, we were able to 
approach the subject of monitoring with a high degree of confidence 
that signatories were not violating the CWC. As a result, 
implementation of that pact is contributing to our national security.
  Senate hearings this past week suggest an emerging story at Novaya 
Zemlya but not outright violations of CTBT provisions. Transparency is 
lacking there, and perhaps a delay in consideration of the treaty will 
aid our efforts to sort out ongoing developments in this particular 
location. But defeating the CTBT on the concerns we have about this one 
site would represent a failure to understand what is in our broad 
national interest. Creating a normative global standard not to test 
will do enormous good and will act as a powerful force to stop would-be 
cheaters in their tracks.
  It is reasonably clear to our intelligence community that Russia and 
perhaps others would not necessarily make gains in their thermonuclear 
weapons program through an evasive low-yield testing program without 
risking exposure of such tests to the international community. Given 
that reality, it simply begs the question: Under what substantive 
rationale would Russia or another country proceed in light of the 
outcry and condemnation that would surely follow?
  I believe this matter is ripe for an agreement we can negotiate among 
ourselves in the Senate, through unanimous consent, that delays CTBT 
consideration until the next Congress. I am prepared to support CTBT 
regardless of the political affiliation of the Commander in Chief. But 
due to the untenable circumstances in which we now find ourselves, we 
should honor the request of this Commander in Chief and delay a vote.
  With that, Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. HUTCHINSON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.

[[Page 24874]]


  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I yield myself 15 minutes to speak in 
opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  I also sat through a week of hearings last week. I also, as a member 
of the Armed Services Committee, had the opportunity to hear our 
intelligence community, to hear representatives from the Department of 
Defense, and to hear the Directors of our laboratories. I respectfully 
reached a different conclusion as to what the evidence is. In fact, in 
my estimation, the evidence is strong enough to raise serious doubts 
about the wisdom of ratifying this treaty. The evidence, I believe, 
indicates that in fact Russia is currently testing low-level nuclear 
weapons and is seeking to develop, from their own public statements and 
the Russian media, a new type of tactical weapon, and there were 
suspected Russian tests as recently as September 8, 1999, and September 
23, 1999.
  I believe when we have these kinds of issues of the gravest weight to 
our Nation and to our Nation's security, when there are doubts about 
verification--and I think it is overwhelmingly clear from what I heard 
from the intelligence community--we cannot have assurance that we will 
be able to verify a zero-yield treaty. That was very plain and very 
clear from the testimony we heard. Verification is not possible. 
Therefore, it is not in the best interests of our Nation to ratify this 
treaty.
  There are numerous reasons to oppose the treaty. We have heard many 
of them during the debate on the floor of the Senate. Many have been 
discussed very clearly. I will focus on one particular feature of this 
agreement which, in my view, is sufficient in and of itself to reject 
ratification of this treaty. That is the issue of the treaty's 
duration.
  This is an agreement of unlimited duration. It is an agreement that 
is in perpetuity. That means if it is ratified, the United States will 
be committing itself forever not to conduct another nuclear test. It 
would make us dependent upon, totally reliant upon, the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program. From what we heard from the Directors of the labs 
last week, the Stockpile Stewardship Program is, by all accounts, a 
work in progress. Some said it would take 5 years to reach the point 
where we could have confidence in the program; some said 10. One said 
it would be as long as 15 to 20 years before we could know whether or 
not this program was going to be of a sufficient confidence level that 
we could count upon it without reliance upon tests.
  There are two major questions about this program. One is, Will it 
work? We are not going to know that for many years. Will it work 
sufficiently that we can rely upon high-speed computers and modeling 
and annual examinations without any kind of test to have the confidence 
that they are reliant and safe and that, should they tragically ever 
need to be used, we could count on them actually working?
  The second very big issue is whether it will be funded adequately so 
the program can be developed to that level of confidence. We have every 
indication that this will be an area in which Congress in the future 
will seek to cut, an area in which there will not be the kind of 
commitment, the kind of resources to ensure the development of this 
Stockpile Stewardship Program to a point we can have absolute 
confidence in it.
  I want Members to think about the duration of this treaty--forever. 
Are we so confident today that we will never again need nuclear 
testing, so certain that we are willing to deprive all future 
Commanders in Chief, all future military leaders, all future Congresses 
of the one means that can actually prove the safety and reliability of 
our nuclear deterrent? Are we that confident? I suggest we are not.
  Proponents of the treaty will say that that is not the case, that 
this commitment is not forever. They will point to the fact that the 
treaty allows for withdrawal if our national interest requires it. 
Proponents of the treaty promise that if we reach a point where the 
safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent cannot be guaranteed 
without testing, then all we need to do is exercise our right to 
withdraw and we would, at that point, resume testing.
  This so-called ``supreme national interest'' clause, along with 
safeguard F, in which President Clinton gives us his solemn word that 
he will ``consider'' a resumption of testing if our deterrent cannot be 
certified, is supposed to give us a sense of reassurance.
  The fact is, this reassurance is a hollow promise. I think supporters 
of the treaty realize it. The fact is, if the critical moment arrives 
and there is irrefutable evidence that we must conduct nuclear testing 
to ensure our deterrent is safe, reliable, and credible, those same 
treaty supporters will be shouting from the highest mountain that the 
very act of withdrawing from this treaty would be too provocative to 
ever be justified, that no narrow security need of the United States 
could ever override the solemn commitment we made to the world in 
agreeing to be bound by this treaty.
  If Members don't believe that will happen, they need only to look at 
our current difficulties with the 1972 ABM Treaty. I believe it 
provides a chilling glimpse of our nuclear future should we ratify an 
ill-conceived test ban at this time. As is the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, the ABM Treaty is of unlimited duration. There are many 
parallels. That is one of them. The ABM Treaty includes a provision 
allowing the United States to withdraw if our national interests so 
demand, another very clear parallel and treaty obligations are more 
clearly mismatched than with the ABM Treaty today. It is very difficult 
to imagine a situation in which the national security interests we have 
could be more clearly mismatched than with the ABM Treaty. Its 
supporters insist, though, that withdrawal is not just ill advised, but 
supporters would say it is unthinkable. The voices wailing loudest 
about changing this obsolete agreement are the same ones urging us 
today to entangle ourselves in another treaty of unlimited duration.
  Earlier, Senator Kyl rightly pointed out that the negotiators for 
this treaty originally wanted a 10-year treaty. Previous Presidents 
wanted a treaty of limited duration, but we have before us one that 
would lock us into a commitment in perpetuity.
  Think of the ways in which the ABM Treaty is mismatched with our 
modern security needs. Yet we confront our absolute unwillingness to 
consider any option to withdraw. The treaty was conceived in a 
strategic context utterly unlike today's, a bipolar world in which two 
superpowers were engaged in both a global rivalry and an accompanying 
buildup in strategic nuclear forces. Now, today, is a totally different 
context and situation. One of those superpowers no longer exists at 
all. What remains of that superpower struggles to secure its own 
borders against poorly armed militants.
  The arms race that supposedly justified the ABM Treaty's perverse 
deification of vulnerability has not just halted, it has reversed, no 
thanks to arms control. Today, Russian nuclear forces are plummeting 
due not to the START II agreement--which Russia has refused to ratify 
for nearly 7 years--but to economic constraints and the end of the cold 
war. In fact, their forces are falling far faster than treaties can 
keep up with; arms control isn't ``controlling'' anything; economic and 
strategic considerations are. Similar forces have led the United States 
to conclude that its forces can also be reduced. Thus, despite a 
strategic environment completely different from the one that gave birth 
to the ABM Treaty, its supporters stubbornly insist we must remain a 
party to it.
  In 1972, only the Soviet Union had the capability to target the 
United States with long-range ballistic missiles. Today, numerous rogue 
states are diligently working to acquire long-range missiles with which 
to coerce the United States or deter it from acting in its interests, 
and these weapons are so attractive precisely because we have no 
defense against them; indeed, we are legally prohibited from defending 
against them by the ABM Treaty of 1972.
  Technologically, too, the ABM Treaty is obsolete. The kinetic kill 
vehicle

[[Page 24875]]

that destroyed an ICBM high over the Pacific Ocean on October 2 was 
undreamed of in 1972. So was the idea of a 747 equipped with a missile-
killing laser, which is under construction now in Washington State, or 
space-based tracking satellites like SBIRS-Low, so precise that they 
may make traditional ground-based radars superfluous in missile 
defense. Yet this ABM Treaty, negotiated almost three decades ago, 
stands in the way of many of these technological innovations that could 
provide the United States with the protection it needs against the 
world's new threats.
  Now proponents of this new treaty will say we can always pull out, 
that if situations and circumstances change, we can always invoke our 
national security provision and we can withdraw from this treaty. If in 
the future we find we must test in order to ensure the stability and 
reliability and safety of our nuclear deterrent, we can pull out and do 
that. I suggest that that is not even a remote possibility. Once we 
make this commitment, just as we did on the 1972 ABM Treaty, there will 
be no withdrawing, there will not even be consideration of the 
possibility that it might be in our national interest to withdraw from 
a treaty to which we have made a commitment.
  These new threats today have led to a consensus that the United 
States must deploy a national missile defense system and a recognition 
that we are behind the curve in deploying one. The National Missile 
Defense Act, calling for deployment of such a system as soon as 
technologically feasible, passed this body by a vote of 97-3, with a 
similar ratio of support in the House.
  Just as obvious as the need for this capability is the fact that the 
ABM Treaty prohibits us from deploying the very system we voted to 
deploy. But does anybody talk about withdrawing from the ABM Treaty 
because it is in our national security interests? Absolutely not. I 
suggest we will be in the same kind of context should we ratify the 
treaty that is before us today.
  Clearly, the ABM Treaty must be amended or jettisoned. The Russians 
have so far refused to consider amending it, so withdrawal is the most 
obvious course of action if United States security interests are to be 
served.
  Listen to the hue and cry at even the mention of such an option 
today. From Russia to China to France, and even to here on the floor of 
the Senate, we have heard the cry that the United States cannot 
withdraw from the ABM Treaty because it has become too important to the 
world community. Those who see arms control as an end in itself oppose 
even the consideration of withdrawal, claiming passionately that the 
United States owes it to the world to remain vulnerable to missile 
attack. Our participation in this treaty transcends narrow U.S. 
security interests, they claim; we have a higher obligation to the 
international community, they claim. After all, if the United States is 
protected from attack, won't that just encourage others to build more 
missiles in order to retain the ability to coerce us, thus threatening 
the simplistic ideal of ``strategic stability''? That phrase, 
translated, means that citizens of the United States must be vulnerable 
to incineration or attack by biological weapons so other nations in the 
world may do as they please.
  Even though the ABM Treaty is hopelessly outdated--almost 30 years 
old--and prevents the United States from defending its citizens against 
the new threats of the 21st century, supporters of arms control insist 
that withdrawal is unthinkable. Its very existence is too important to 
be overridden by the mere security interests of the United States.
  Absurd as such a proposition sounds, it is the current policy of this 
administration, and it is supported by the very same voices who now 
urge us to ratify this comprehensive test ban.
  The Clinton administration has been reluctantly forced by the 
Congress into taking serious action on missile defenses--thankfully. It 
admits that the system it needs to meet our security requirements 
cannot be deployed under the ABM Treaty. Yet so powerful are the voices 
calling on the United States to subjugate its own security interests to 
arms control that the administration is proposing changes to the ABM 
Treaty that, by its own admission, will not allow a missile defense 
system that will meet our requirements. It has declared what must be 
done as ``too hard to do'' and intends to leave the mess it created for 
another administration to clean up. All because arms control becomes an 
end in itself.
  That sorry state of affairs is where we will end up if the Senate 
consents to ratification of the CTBT. Those treaty supporters who are 
saying now, ``Don't worry, there is an escape clause,'' will be the 
same ones who, 5 or 10 years from now--when there is a problem with our 
stockpile and the National Ignition Facility is not finished and we 
find out we overestimated our ability to simulate the workings of a 
nuclear weapon--will be saying we dare not withdraw from this treaty 
because we owe a higher debt to the international community. That is 
what we will hear.
  I don't represent the international community; I represent the people 
of the State of Arkansas. Our decision here must serve the best 
interests of the United States and its citizens. Our experience with 
the ABM Treaty is a perfect example of how arms control agreements 
assume an importance far beyond their contribution to the security of 
our Nation. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty's unlimited duration is a 
virtual guarantee that this agreement will prevent us from conducting 
nuclear testing long past the point at which we decide such testing is 
necessary. As our ABM experience shows, we should take no comfort from 
the presence of a so-called ``supreme national interest'' clause.
  Now, should we just put it off or should we vote on it? I believe our 
responsibility is not the world opinion. Our responsibility is, 
frankly, not the public opinion polls of the United States. The 
American people, as a whole, have not had the benefit of hearing the 
Directors of our National Labs or the DOD come and testify before us as 
to the difficulties of verification and the difficulties of developing 
our Stockpile Stewardship Program. If it is a flawed treaty--and I 
believe it is--if it is a defective treaty--and I believe it is--if it 
is not in our national security interest--and I believe it is not--then 
we should vote, and we should vote to defeat the treaty and not ratify 
it.
  This is a treaty that I believe will not get better with age. It will 
not get better by putting it on a shelf for consideration at some 
future date. I believe it is flawed. I believe it is defective. I 
believe it is not in our national security interest. I believe it is 
our constitutional responsibility not to put it off but to vote our 
conscience.
  I urge the defeat of what I believe is a flawed treaty.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brownback). The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes, and then I would 
be happy to yield to the Senator.
  I want my colleagues to note--they may not be aware of it, and I 
wasn't until a few minutes ago--as further consideration of how this 
may or may not affect the events around the world there apparently has 
been a coup in Pakistan where the Sharif government fired their chief 
military chief of staff when he was out of the country. He came back 
and decided he didn't like that. He surrounded the palace and 
surrounded the Prime Minister's quarters. The word I received a few 
moments ago--I suggest others check their own sources--was that there 
is going to be a civilian government installed that is not Sharif, and 
that the military will do the installing. I cite that to indicate to 
you how fluid world events are. We should be careful about what we are 
doing.
  I also point out that today before the Foreign Relations Committee, 
Dr. William Perry, the President's Korean policy coordinator and former 
Secretary of Defense, testified that failure to ratify the CTBT will 
give North Korea ``an obvious reason not to ratify the CTBT.''

[[Page 24876]]

  Dr. Perry, the Secretary of Defense in President Clinton's first 
term, endorsed ratification of the treaty. He said it serves well the 
security interests of the United States.
  I cite that only because it is current.
  Lastly, I would say that listening with great interest to the last 
several speakers I find it again fascinating that this is a lot more 
than about CTBT. It is about ABM. It is about what our nuclear strategy 
should be.
  My friend from Arkansas, as well as others who have spoken, has great 
faith in our ability to erect a nuclear shield that can keep out 
incoming nuclear weapons in the scores, dozens, or potentially 
hundreds, which is a monumental feat, if it can be accomplished--we may 
be able to accomplish it--but don't have the confidence that those same 
scientists could figure out a way to take a weapon off the nose of a 
missile, look and determine whether or not it has deteriorated. I would 
suggest one is considerably more difficult to do than the other. But it 
is a little bit about where you place your faith.
  Lastly, I, point out for those who are talking about verification--my 
friend from Arizona heard me say this time and again, and I would 
suggest you all go back and look at, if you were here, how you voted on 
the INF Treaty, the Reagan INF Treaty, or if you weren't here, what 
President Reagan said because many of my friends on the Republican side 
quote Ronald Reagan when he says ``trust but verify.'' Nobody can 
verify the INF Treaty. The intelligence community--and I will not read 
again all of the detail; it is in the Record--indicated we could not 
verify the INF Treaty, and we said and the Reagan administration said 
and President Reagan said in his pushing the INF Treaty that no 
verification was possible completely. Yet with the fact that we didn't 
even know how many SS-20s they had, it was concluded that they could 
adapt those to longer range, interchange them with shorter-range 
missiles and longer-range missiles, and hide them in silos. But my 
Republican colleagues had no trouble ratifying that treaty, which was 
not verifiable, or was considerably less verifiable than this treaty.
  If you quote President Reagan, please quote him in the context that 
he used the phrase ``trust but verify.'' And he defined what he meant 
by ``verify'' by his actions.
  The military under President Reagan said the INF Treaty was 
verifiable to the extent that they could not do anything that would 
materially alter the military balance. No one argues that we cannot 
verify to the extent as well. But it seems as though we apply one 
standard to Republican-sponsored treaties by Republican Presidents and 
a different standard to a treaty proposed by a Democratic President. I 
find that, as you might guess, fascinating. I will remind people of it 
now and again and again and again. But I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
  The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I think my colleague from New Hampshire 
wishes to speak. Let me take a minute before he does to respond to two 
things that the Senator from Delaware said.
  I find it interesting that North Korea would be used as the example 
of a country that will pursue nuclear weapons if we don't ratify the 
test ban treaty, according to Secretary Perry.
  Mr. BIDEN. That is not what he said, if I may interrupt, if I could 
quote what he said.
  Mr. KYL. Please do.
  Mr. BIDEN. He said it will give North Korea ``an obvious reason not 
to ratify CTBT.'' He did not say it will give them reason to produce 
nuclear weapons.
  Mr. KYL. I think that is a very important distinction. I thank my 
colleague for making it because, clearly, North Korea is not going to 
be persuaded to eschew nuclear weapons by the United States ratifying 
the CTBT. North Korea will do whatever it wants to do regardless of 
what we do. That is pretty clear. To suggest that we need to ratify 
this treaty in order to satisfy North Korea is absurd.
  North Korea is a member of the nonproliferation treaty right now. By 
definition, North Korea is in violation of that treaty if it ever 
decides to test a nuclear weapon because it would be affirming the fact 
that it possesses a nuclear weapon which is in violation of the NPT. 
North Korea is not a country the behavior of which we can affect one 
way or the other by virtue of a moratorium on testing. If that were the 
case, then North Korea would have long ago decided to forego the 
development of nuclear weapons because the United States hasn't tested 
for 8 years. Clearly, our actions have had no influence on North Korea, 
except to cause North Korea to blackmail the United States by 
threatening to develop nuclear weapons and by threatening to develop 
missiles unless we will pay them tribute. I don't think North Korea is 
a very good example to be citing as a reason for the United States to 
affirm the CTBT.
  Moreover, I remember this argument a couple of years ago when the 
chemical weapons treaty was being brought before the body. They said 
this was the only way to get North Korea to sign up to the CWC, and we 
certainly wanted North Korea to be a signatory to that treaty because 
they might use chemical weapons someday. We ratified it. They still 
haven't signed up--2 years later. I don't think North Korea is going to 
care one way or the other whether the United States ratifies the CTBT.
  To my friend's other point on the comparison between nuclear weapons 
and missile defense, I think it makes our point. Missile defenses can 
work. They are not easy to develop. We have seen several tests that 
failed with the THAAD system. What it demonstrated to us was that 
testing is required to know that missile defense will work, just as the 
experts have all indicated testing is the preferred method of knowing 
whether our nuclear weapons will work.
  So I think it makes the point that either for missile defense or for 
nuclear weapons testing it is the best way to know whether it will 
work. That is why we need to test both the missile defense systems that 
we have in development right now, and that is why we need the option of 
being able to test our nuclear weapons as well.
  Mr. BIDEN. I wish to respond, if I may. I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. KYL. We may put off the Senator from New Hampshire for a good 
time.
  Mr. BIDEN. I hope not.
  My friend from Arizona, as I said, is one of the most skillful 
debaters and lawyers in here. He never says anything that is not true. 
But sometimes he says things that do not matter much to the argument.
  For example, he said nuclear testing is the preferred method. It sure 
is. Flying home is a preferred method to get there. But I can get there 
just as easily and surely by taking the train. It is preferred to fly 
home. I get home faster when I fly home. But the train gets me home. In 
fact, I can drive home. All three methods can verify for my wife that I 
have come from Washington to my front door. They are all verifiable. 
They all get the job done. It is the preferred method.
  By the way, it is the preferred method to have underground testing. 
It is the preferred method to have above-ground testing. That is the 
preferred method to make sure everything is working.
  If I took the logic of his argument to its logical extension, I would 
say, well, you know, my friend from Arizona wanting underground testing 
is, in fact, denying the scientists their total capacity to understand 
exactly what has happened by denying atmospheric testing. The preferred 
method is atmospheric testing. What difference does it make if we can 
guarantee the reliability of the weapon?
  The question with regard to North Korea I pose this way: If we ratify 
the treaty, and my friend from Arizona is correct that North Korea does 
not, so what. There is no treaty. It does not go into force. They have 
to ratify the treaty for it to go into force. What is the problem? If a 
country is certain it will not matter, they are not going to ratify or 
abide. Then (a) they don't ratify, we are not in, we are not bound; (b) 
if they are in and they do a nuclear explosion underground, we are out, 
according to the last paragraph of our

[[Page 24877]]

amendment. The President has to get out of the treaty. Must--not may, 
must. These are what we used to call in law school red herrings. They 
are effective but red herrings.
  The last point, I heard people stand up on the floor and say: This 
country is already or is about to violate the NPT, the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, by exploding a nuclear weapon. Guess what. They 
are allowed, under the NPT, to blow up things: nuclear bombs, nuclear 
weapons, nuclear explosions. They don't call them ``weapons''; they say 
it is a nuclear explosion, as long as it is for peaceful means. How 
does one determine whether or not an underground test which has 
plutonium imploded and has set off a chain reaction was for peaceful, 
as opposed to nonpeaceful, means? That is a nuclear test.
  We ought to get our facts straight. The distinctions make a 
difference. It is true; it is hard to verify whether or not anybody 
violated the NPT because if they are caught, that country says it was 
for peaceful reasons, dealing with peaceful uses of their nuclear 
capability.
  I have heard a lot of non sequiturs today. My only point in raising 
North Korea was the idea that anybody who thinks we are going to be in 
a position that if we turn this treaty down there is any possibility we 
will stop testing anywhere in the world is kidding themselves.
  I say to my colleagues, ask yourself the rhetorical question. Do you 
want to be voting down a treaty on the day there is a coup in Pakistan. 
Good luck, folks. I am not suggesting that a vote one way or another is 
dispositive of what Pakistan would or wouldn't do. But I will 
respectfully suggest we will be answering the rest of the year, the 
rest of the decade, whether or not what we did at that critical moment 
and what is going on between India and Pakistan and within Pakistan was 
affected by our actions.
  I conclude by saying, in the middle of the Carter administration 
there was a little debate about this notion of a neutron bomb. The 
American Government put pressure on Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of 
Germany at the time, to agree to deployment of the neutron bomb in 
Europe--a difficult position for him to take as a member of the SPD. He 
made the decision, and then President Carter decided not to deploy the 
neutron bomb. I remember how upset the Chancellor of Germany was. The 
Chancellor of Germany was not inclined to speak to the President of the 
United States.
  I was like that little kid in the commercial with the cereal sitting 
on the table. There are two 10-year-olds and a 6-year-old. The 10-year-
old asks: Who eats that? Mom and dad. Is it any good? You try it. The 
other kid says: No, you try it. They both turn to the 6-year-old and 
say: Mikey will try it.
  I was ``Mikey.'' I got sent to Germany to meet with Schmidt, to sit 
down at the little conference table in the Chancellor's office to 
discuss our relationship. I will never forget something Chancellor 
Schmidt said--and I will not violate any security issue; it is probably 
long past a need to be secure--in frustration, while he was smoking his 
19th cigarette similar to Golda Meir, a chain-smoker, he pounded his 
hand on the table and said: You don't understand, Joe; when the United 
States sneezes, Europe catches a cold. When the United States sneezes, 
Europe catches a cold.
  When we act on gigantic big-ticket items such as a treaty affecting 
the whole world and nuclear weapons, whether we intend it or not, the 
world reacts. This is not a very prudent time to be voting on this 
treaty, I respectfully suggest.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask my colleague from New Hampshire to 
delay his remarks for a moment so I can make a point and perhaps ask 
Senator Biden, if he could answer a question regarding something he has 
said.
  I think it is, first of all, dangerous to suggest that the Senate 
cannot do its business with respect to a treaty because a coup is 
occurring in another country. I fail to see, if the coup is occurring 
today and tomorrow, and we reject the CTBT, how anyone could argue our 
action precipitated this coup. Or somehow by failing to approve this 
treaty we caused unrest in Pakistan.
  I ask the Senator to answer that question on his own time. First, I 
make another point. I wasn't trying to make a debater's point but 
trying to be absolutely conservative in what I said a moment ago.
  Mr. BIDEN. I never thought the Senator was liberal in what he said.
  Mr. KYL. And I appreciate that more than you know.
  When I say that testing was the preferred method, what the lab 
Directors and former officials who have had responsibility for this 
have said with these highly complex weapons is that testing is the 
preferred method.
  They have also said in contradiction to the Senator from Delaware 
that there is no certainty with respect to the other method, which is 
the Stockpile Stewardship Program, which is not complete and has not 
gone into effect and cannot provide certainty, in any event.
  Dr. John Foster, who chairs the congressional committee to assess the 
efficacy of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, said this in his 
testimony last week:

       I oppose ratification of the CTBT because without the 
     ability to perform nuclear weapons tests the reliability and 
     safety of our Stockpile Stewardship Program will degrade.

  There is nobody who is more respected in this field than Dr. John 
Foster.
  He further said the testing, which has been performed over the years, 
``has clearly shown our ability to calculate and simulate their 
operation is incomplete. Our understanding of their basic physics is 
seriously deficient. Hence, I can only answer that a ban on testing of 
our nuclear weapons can only have a negative impact on the reliability 
of the stockpile.''
  Dr. Robert Barker, former assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 
Atomic Energy, who reported the certification of the stockpile to three 
Secretaries of Defense, said:

       Sustained nuclear testing is the only demonstrated way of 
     maintaining a safe and reliable deterrent. Our confidence in 
     the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons has already 
     declined since 1992, the year we deprived ourselves of the 
     nuclear testing tool. It should be of grave concern to us 
     that this degradation in confidence cannot be quantified.

  The point is that the reason testing is preferred is because it is 
the only demonstrable way of assuring ourselves of the safety and 
reliability of our nuclear stockpile. There could be, may be, in a 
decade or so, some additional confidence or assurance through a 
successful Stockpile Stewardship Program but we won't know that until 
the time. Until then, that is why testing is the preferred method. It 
is the only way to assure the safety and reliability of our stockpile.
  To respond to that and to respond to the first question I asked, I am 
happy to yield to the Senator.
  Mr. BIDEN. I will try to respond briefly.
  No. 1, to suggest our actions would affect the international 
community should not be taken in the context and consideration of what 
is happening in the international community is naive in the extreme. It 
is not suggesting anyone should dictate what we should or should not 
do. It is suggesting that it makes sense to take into consideration 
what is happening around the world and what appropriate or 
inappropriate conclusion from our action will be drawn by other 
countries. We have always done that in our undertakings around the 
world. It is just responsible stewardship of our national security.
  The suggestion was not that because there is a coup, failure to 
ratify this treaty, turning it down or ratifying it would have affected 
that coup. That is not the issue. The issue is there is a struggle 
today within Pakistan, evidenced by the coup, as there was within 
India, as evidenced by their recent elections, about what they should 
do with their nuclear capacity, whether they should test further, 
enhance it, and deploy it, or whether or not they should refrain from 
testing and sign the treaty.
  The only point I am making is that our actions will impact upon that 
debate within those countries. The debate happens to be taking place in 
the

[[Page 24878]]

context of a military coup right now in Pakistan. It took place in the 
context of an election where the BJP won and made significant gains in 
India just last week, but it does impact upon that.
  We lose any leverage we have to impose upon Pakistan, which still 
wants to deal with us, still relies upon us or interfaces with us in a 
number of areas in terms of food, trade, and aid all the way through to 
military relationships. It does make a difference if we are able to say 
to them, I posit: We want you to refrain from testing and sign on to 
this treaty if, in fact, we have done it. If we say: We want you to 
refrain from testing and sign on to the treaty, but by the way, we 
already have 6,000 of these little things and we are going to test 
ourselves, it makes it very difficult to make that case.
  Lastly, I say with regard to Pakistan, it is not so much what anyone 
will be able to prove; it will be what will be asserted. We all know in 
politics what is asserted is sometimes more important than what is 
provable. It should not be, but it is. It does have ramifications 
domestically and internationally, I suggest.
  Also, with regard to this issue of the preferred versus the only 
method by which we can guarantee the reliability of our stockpile, 
nobody, including the present lab Directors, suggests that our present 
stockpile is, in fact, unreliable or not safe.
  We have not tested since 1992. The issue is, and my colleague knows 
this, the intersection--and it is clear if we do not test, if we do 
nothing to the stockpile, it will over time degrade, just like my 
friend and I as we approach our older years, as a matter of medical 
fact, our memories fade. It is a medical fact.
  To suggest that because our memories fade we should not listen to 
someone on the floor who is 8 years older than someone else would be 
viewed by everyone as mildly preposterous because when that older 
person was younger, their memory may have been so far superior to the 
person who is younger now that they still have a better memory. It does 
not make a point. It is a distinction without a difference.
  It is the same way with regard to our stockpile degrading. At what 
point does the degradation occur that it is no longer reliable? I asked 
that of Secretary Schlesinger. He said he thinks we are down from 99 
percent to about 85 percent now, and he thinks there is no worry at 
that 85-percent level. But what he worries about, and then he held up a 
little graph and the graph showed based on years and amount of 
reliability this curve going down like this, at the same time there was 
a dotted line showing the Stockpile Stewardship Program and how that 
mirrored that ability to intersect with where we would intersect our 
confidence that our Stockpile Stewardship Program would be able to 
assure that the stockpile was reliable.
  It comes around where the shelf life of these weapons occur about 10 
years out. Everyone has said that between now and then, the 
overwhelming body of opinion is, from the Jason Group to other leading 
scientists, including these 32 Nobel laureates in physics, the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program is working now and will if we make the 
commitment to intersect at a point where the shelf life begins to 
change where it continues to guarantee.
  We are never going to be in that line where it is so degraded that 
any lab Director will have to say: Mr. President, I cannot certify 
anymore.
  But as a fail safe, no pun intended, for that possibility--that is 
why the amendment was just adopted--the amendment says in the last 
paragraph, if that happens and a lab Director tells the President that 
has happened and it cannot certify in terms of reliability, the 
President must get out of the treaty.
  It is true; we are stringing together a lot of true statements that 
are not particularly relevant to the question, and the question is: Is 
our stockpile now reliable and safe? Is it a deterrent still? Do other 
people believe it? Is it a deterrent so that our allies believe it and 
they do not go nuclear, such as Japan and Germany? And is it a 
deterrent so that our potential enemies, such as China and Russia and 
others, believe it so they will not try to do anything that will 
jeopardize our security? That is the second question.
  The third question is: Are we able to verify this?
  My answer to all three of those questions is, yes, yes, yes. And the 
answer of the overwhelming body of opinion is yes, yes, yes. But just 
in case it is no, the President has to get out. He has to get out. We 
just adopted a condition, so he has to get out.
  By the way, I listened to people being quoted, like Edward Teller. 
God love him. I had the great honor of debating him around the country 
on four setup debates. It was intimidating because he would stand there 
with those bushy eyelashes and say: My young friend from Delaware does 
not know--here is the guy who invented the hydrogen bomb. What am I 
going to say? Yeah, right?
  I would listen to him, and he would even get me thinking he was right 
for a while. Then I would listen to what he said. Last night, I watched 
a documentary that is 7 or 8--actually, it is older than that; it was 
President Reagan's last year--on the Star Wars notion. Dr. Teller was 
sitting there, a very distinguished man, saying things like--and I will 
get the exact quote for the Record tomorrow--but he said things like: 
We must act now because the Russians are on the verge of having a 
missile defense capability.
  On the verge; they were on the verge of collapsing. He is never right 
about his predictions, so far. But he did invent the hydrogen bomb. 
That is a big deal. I cannot argue with that. As my mother would say, 
just because you can do one thing well does not mean you can do 
everything well. If I need to blow somebody up, I want him with me. If 
I need somebody to predict to me what is going to happen in terms of 
our interest, of our adversaries, or us, he ``ain't'' the guy I am 
going to because he has not been right.
  Here we are, we are going to do this weight of authority--we all 
learned, and, again, I am not kidding when I say this. Senator Kyl is 
not only a first-rate lawyer, he has a first-rate mind. We both went to 
undergraduate school and took courses in logic. We learned about the 13 
logical falacies. We engage in them all the time. One is the appeal of 
authority. I will take my authority and trump your authority. I have 32 
Nobel laureates. Are you going to raise me with six Secretaries of 
Defense? I have four of the last five Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, with what are you going to raise me? This is crazy.
  What is true is that it is better to test if you want to know for 
certain whether weapons are reliable. I hope if I acknowledge that, he 
will acknowledge it is better not to test on one area: If you want to 
discourage others from testing. Just discourage. He does not have to 
agree that it would do everything, just discourage. It is better not to 
test.
  If you tell your kid he cannot smoke and you are standing there 
smoking and saying: By the way, you can't smoke, it kind of undermines 
your credibility.
  On the other hand, if you do not smoke--like I don't--and say to your 
kid, you can't smoke, they may smoke anyway; but one thing is for 
certain: If you are smoking--as my friend who is presiding would say in 
a different context--you might lose your moral authority to make the 
case.
  I think we lose our moral authority to make the case internationally 
when we say: By the way, we are unquestionably the most powerful 
nuclear nation in the history of the world, and in relative terms we 
are far in excess of anyone else, including the former Soviets--now the 
Russians--that the Chinese are not, as they say where I come from, a 
``patch on our trousers,'' that the Libyans and others may be able to 
get themselves a Hiroshima bomb, but they are going to have to carry it 
in a suitcase--it ``ain't'' close.
  But I tell you what: Because we worry about our reliability--even 
though we are going to spend $45 billion, even though we have the best 
scientists in the world, the best scientists that we can attract from 
other parts of the world--we know we can put up a shield around America 
that can stop 10,

[[Page 24879]]

20, 100, 1,000 hydrogen bombs from dropping on the United States--but 
we believe that we have to test our nuclear weapons now or be able to 
test them in the near term in order to be able to assure that we are 
safe and secure and that you believe we are credible.
  I will end where I began this debate a long time ago. When the 
Senator from New Hampshire and I were college kids, you used to ride 
along--he was heading off to Vietnam--and there used to be a bumper 
sticker which said: One hydrogen bomb can ruin your day. It just takes 
one. One hydrogen bomb can ruin your day.
  We are not talking about one hydrogen bomb. No one is doubting that 
1,000 people and 15 nations in the world can develop not a hydrogen 
bomb but a nuclear bomb like the one dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
No doubt about that. This is not going to stop that. This isn't going 
to guarantee that because you do not, everyone has to test that. They 
can do that without testing. We dropped it without testing it. The 
second one we did not test. So they can test; they cannot test.
  But, folks, this is high-stakes poker. All I am saying to you is, you 
take the worst case scenario my friends lay out, that we have the 
stockpile, but we cannot guarantee it, and we cannot detect testing, 
and we have an escape clause--you get out of it because the treaty is 
not working. That is their worst case scenario. The escape clause is we 
have to get out because it says we must get out.
  Let me tell you my worst case scenario. My worst case scenario is we, 
in fact, do not sign this treaty, and the Chinese decide all moral 
restraints are off--even though they are not particularly a moral 
country--we can now, with impunity, go and test and not be buffeted by 
world opinion in terms of affecting our trade or our commerce and the 
rest. We can go from 16, 18, 20--however many intercontinental 
ballistic missiles they have--we can now test to build lighter, smaller 
ones with that information we stole from the laboratories. We can now 
MIRV our missiles.
  The Pakistanis and the Indians agree that: Look, what we have to do 
is now deploy nuclear weapons because the restraints are off.
  I do not know what we do with that worst case scenario. There is 
nothing the President can say, such as: By the way, stop. Out. I want 
to pull out. You all can't do that. China, you can't do that. There is 
no way out of that one.
  This is not like us making the mistake on a tax bill. This is not 
like us making a mistake on a piece of welfare or social legislation. 
We can correct that in a day. I have been here when we passed reforms 
on health care that within 6 months we repealed because we thought it 
was a mistake.
  You cannot legislate on this floor of the Senate a course of action 
that the world is engaged in, a road that has been been taken down away 
from nonproliferation to proliferation by a piece of legislation. I 
cannot guarantee the Presiding Officer that if this passes there will 
not be more proliferation of nuclear weapons.
  But I am prepared to bet you anything, if we reject this treaty, 
there will be significantly more proliferation of nuclear capability 
than there was before because there would be no restraint whatsoever on 
the one thing every nation has to do to become a nuclear power that is 
not already a significant nuclear power--and that is to test.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Collins). The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Madam President, let me make a couple comments and then I 
will yield to the Senator from New Hampshire.
  I appreciate the Senator from Delaware making a slight concession, 
and asking for one in return. His concession, of course, is that it is 
better to test. I think we would all agree it is better to test. The 
question is whether or not there is an adequate substitute if we do not 
test. And upon that the jury is still out.
  He also asked the question: Isn't it also better not to test if we 
can persuade others not to do so by our own willingness to forego 
testing? I think that question has actually been answered because for 8 
years we have had a moratorium seeking to persuade others not to test. 
During that time, we know of at least five countries that have tested: 
France, China, Russia, Pakistan, and India. So it is clear that our 
foregoing testing has not created the norm against testing that 
proponents of the treaty would like to see.
  It is also not better to forego testing in an effort to get others to 
do so as well if, in fact, our own stockpile would be unduly 
jeopardized as a result. On that, there has been a variety of expert 
opinion testifying this past week suggesting that the reason it is 
better to test is precisely because we cannot confirm the safety and 
reliability of our stockpile to an adequate degree of certainty without 
that.
  To the question of whether or not it is a fallacy of logic to quote 
experts, I would simply suggest that while it may not be the most 
persuasive argument in the world to quote experts in support of your 
position, it is at least some weight of evidence. Both sides have 
engaged in that. It is true that on many of these issues there are 
opinions on both sides of the issue.
  Dr. Edward Teller certainly is an expert in nuclear weapons design 
and on many other matters that relate to it. But let's assume he does 
not know what he is talking about here and go to people whose job it 
was to verify a compliance with arms control treaties.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a letter dated 
October 1, 1999, from Fred Eimer, Former Assistant Director of ACDA, 
the Arms Control Agency Verification and Implementation Office, to 
Senator Helms.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                  October 1, 1999.
     Senator Jesse Helms,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
     U.S. Senate.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I write to express my opposition to the 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Numerous experts have 
     noted that this treaty raises serious questions regarding the 
     ability of the United States to maintain our nuclear 
     deterrent. I am particularly concerned, however, that the 
     United States will be disproportionately harmed by the test 
     ban. Other nations will be able to conduct militarily 
     significant nuclear test well below the verification 
     threshold of the Treaty's monitoring system, and our own 
     unilateral capability.
       I have listened with concern to the various claims being 
     made regarding the CTBT's International Monitoring System 
     (IMS). It is important to note that the IMS will have serious 
     limitations. While many in the U.S. recognize the IMS' 
     technical limitations, it is being oversold internationally 
     as a comprehensive, effective monitoring regime.
       Supporters of the CTBT have sought to divert attention from 
     the IMS' limitations by emphasizing that the United States 
     will have its own national technical means (NTM) of 
     verification and would have the right under the Treaty to 
     request an on-site inspection. The United States cannot take 
     comfort in these claims.
       The U.S. has stated that an effective verification system 
     ``should be capable of identifying and attributing with high 
     confidence evasively conducted nuclear explosions of about a 
     few kilotons yield in broad areas of the globe''. That degree 
     of verifiability is a goal that is not achieved now, and it 
     is far from certain that it will be met in the foreseeable 
     future. It is very unlikely that the verification system will 
     provide evidence sufficient for U.S. or collective action 
     should tests of a few kilotons yield take place.
       The capability of the U.S. and of the International 
     Monitoring System (IMS) to detect seismic signals of possible 
     nuclear test origin can be quantified. Charts can show what 
     that capability is for the U.S. network, the current IMS and 
     a possible future IMS for all areas of the world. Thousands 
     of seismic events will be detected yearly by these systems. 
     The verification task will be to determine which, if any, of 
     these signals can be identified as being from nuclear tests.
       The large underground tests conducted in past decades were 
     easily verified as being of nuclear origin. However, 
     identification of possible future tests in the kiloton yield 
     range in violation of a CTBT will be a daunting task in most, 
     if not all instances.
       The relationship between detection and identification 
     depends on a number of factors that will not be known. If 
     charts are produced that purport to show the identification 
     capability for areas of interest throughout the world, those 
     charts would be a result of subjective judgements that are 
     likely to of limited and uncertain dependability.
       You may recall that over the decades of the TTBT that there 
     was much controversy

[[Page 24880]]

     about the yields of tests that were deduced from seismic 
     signal magnitudes. This was true even though the Soviet test 
     sites were studied more than almost any other part of the 
     world and the signals in question came from relatively large 
     tests.
       It is certain that whatever the minimum detectable yield 
     capability is of a seismic network, the verification 
     capability, that is, the ability for identification is 
     substantially worse, by as much as a factor of ten or more in 
     some instances.
       Furthermore, possible Treaty violators can take steps to 
     make detection and identification more difficult. For 
     example, the technique of ``decoupling'', that is, testing in 
     a sufficiently large cavity, can reduce the seismic magnitude 
     of a test. Every country of concern to the United States is 
     technically capable of decoupling at least its small nuclear 
     explosions.
       While in the past primary reliance for obtaining 
     verification related intelligence was placed on systems that 
     collected photographic, seismic and other data, the CTBT's 
     verification system includes on-site inspection (OSI). I 
     believe that the value of OSI is very limited for the CTBT.
       The CTBT's on-site inspection regime is unlikely to provide 
     evidence of noncompliance. However, it may permit a country 
     falsely accused of a CTBT violation to help clear its name. 
     Tests large enough to be unambiguously identified do not need 
     OSI. For small tests the location of the source of the 
     seismic signals would be so uncertain, that OSI would need to 
     cover an impractical large area. Furthermore, it is highly 
     dubious that the United States would get diplomatic approval 
     for an on-site inspection since the treaty has a ``red-
     light'' requirement that 30 of 51 members must endorse such a 
     step. The CTBT's negotiating record makes clear that an OSI 
     request would be viewed as a hostile action.
       Furthermore, the OSI regime associated with the Treaty has 
     a number of as yet unsettled procedural and implementation 
     issues. It is possible that some of these can be fixed. 
     However, OSI has very little to offer for confirming that a 
     nuclear test has been conducted, even if these issues are 
     resolved.
       In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the proposed treaty will put 
     our nuclear deterrent at risk without significant arms 
     control or nonproliferation benefit. Other nations will be 
     able to conduct militarily significant nuclear test well 
     below the verification threshold of the Treaty's monitoring 
     system, and our own unilateral capability.
           Best regards.

                                                   Fred Eimer,

                                  Former Assistant Director, ACDA,
                                  Verification and Implementation.

  Mr. KYL. In this letter he said:

       Other nations will be able to conduct militarily 
     significant nuclear tests well below the verification 
     threshold of the Treaty's monitoring system, and our own 
     unilateral capability.

  In other words, the treaty is not verifiable.
  Testifying last week, one of the experts acknowledged by Senator 
Biden, Dr. Paul Robinson, who is the Director of the Sandia National 
Laboratories, said:

       The treaty bans any ``nuclear explosion,'' but 
     unfortunately, compliance with the strict zero-yield 
     requirement is unverifiable.

  Finally, the third and most prominent of all experts that I would 
like to suggest we pay some attention to with respect to verification 
is our own colleague, Senator Richard Lugar from Indiana. I ask 
unanimous consent that his press release, dated October 7, 1999, be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

              Lugar Opposes Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

       Senator Dick Lugar, a senior member of the Senate 
     Intelligence Committee, Foreign Relations Committee and 
     National Security Working Group, released the following 
     statement today announcing his position on the Comprehensive 
     Test Ban Treaty:
       The Senate is poised to begin consideration of the 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty under a unanimous consent 
     agreement that will provide for 14 hours of general debate, 
     debate on two amendments, and a final vote on ratification.
       I regret that the Senate is taking up the treaty in an 
     abrupt and truncated manner that is so highly politicized. 
     Admittedly, the CTBT is not a new subject for the Senate. 
     Those of us who over the years have sat on the Foreign 
     Relations, Armed Services, or Intelligence Committees are 
     familiar with it. The Senate has held hearings and briefings 
     on the treaty in the past.
       But for a treaty of this complexity and importance a more 
     sustained and focused effort is important. Senators must have 
     a sufficient opportunity to examine the treaty in detail, ask 
     questions of our military and the administration, consider 
     the possible implications, and debate at length in committee 
     and on the floor. Under the current agreement, a process that 
     normally would take many months has been reduced to a few 
     days. Many Senators know little about this treaty. Even for 
     those of us on national security committees, this has been an 
     issue floating on the periphery of our concerns.
       Presidential leadership has been almost entirely absent on 
     the issue. Despite having several years to make a case for 
     ratification, the administration has declined to initiate the 
     type of advocacy campaign that should accompany any treaty of 
     this magnitude.
       Nevertheless, the Senate has adopted an agreement on 
     procedure. So long as that agreement remains in force, 
     Senators must move forward as best they can to express their 
     views and reach informed conclusions about the treaty.
       In anticipation of the general debate, I will state my 
     reasons for opposing ratification of the CTBT.
       The goal of the CTBT is to ban all nuclear explosions 
     worldwide: I do not believe it can succeed. I have little 
     confidence that the verification and enforcement provisions 
     will dissuade other nations from nuclear testing. 
     Furthermore, I am concerned about our country's ability to 
     maintain the integrity and safety of our own nuclear arsenal 
     under the conditions of the treaty.
       I am a strong advocate of effective and verifiable arms 
     control agreements. As a former Vice-Chairman of the Senate 
     Arms Control Observer Group and a member of the Foreign 
     Relations Committee, I have had the privilege of managing 
     Senate consideration of many arms control treaties and 
     agreements.
       I fought for Senate consent to ratification of the INF 
     Treaty, which banned intermediate range nuclear weapons in 
     Europe; the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, which 
     created limits on the number of tanks, helicopters, and 
     armored personnel carriers in Europe; the START I Treaty, 
     which limited the United States and the Soviet Union to 6,500 
     nuclear weapons; the START II Treaty, which limited the U.S. 
     and the former Soviet Union to 3,500 nuclear weapons; and the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention, which outlawed poison gas.
       These treaties, while not ensuring U.S. security, have made 
     us safer. They have greatly reduced the amount of weaponry 
     threatening the United States, provided extensive 
     verification measures, and served as a powerful statement of 
     the intent of the United States to curtail the spread of 
     weapons of mass destruction.
       I understand the impulse of the proponents of the CTBT to 
     express U.S. leadership in another area of arms control. 
     Inevitably, arms control treaties are accompanied by 
     idealistic principles that envision a future in which 
     international norms prevail over the threat of conflict 
     between nations. However, while affirming our desire for 
     international peace and stability, the U.S. Senate is charged 
     with the constitutional responsibility of making hard 
     judgments about the likely outcomes of treaties. This 
     requires that we examine the treaties in close detail and 
     calculate the consequences of ratification for the present 
     and the future. Viewed in this context, I cannot support the 
     treaty's ratification.
       I do not believe that the CTBT is of the same caliber as 
     the arms control treaties that have come before the Senate in 
     recent decades. Its usefulness to the goal of non-
     proliferation is highly questionable. Its likely 
     ineffectuality will risk undermining support and confidence 
     in the concept of multi-lateral arms control. Even as a 
     symbolic statement of our desire for a safer world, it is 
     problematic because it would exacerbate risks and 
     uncertainties related to the safety of our nuclear stockpile.


                         STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP

       The United States must maintain a reliable nuclear 
     deterrent for the foreseeable future. Although the Cold War 
     is over, significant threats to our country still exist. At 
     present our nuclear capability provides a deterrent that is 
     crucial to the safety of the American people and is relied 
     upon as a safety umbrella by most countries around the world. 
     One of the most critical issues under the CTBT would be that 
     of ensuring the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons 
     stockpile without testing. The safe maintenance and storage 
     of these weapons is a crucial concern. We cannot allow them 
     to fall into disrepair or permit their safety to be called 
     into question.
       The Administration has proposed an ambitious program that 
     would verify the safety and reliability of our weapons 
     through computer modeling and simulations. Unfortunately, the 
     jury is still out on the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The 
     last nine years have seen improvements, but the bottom line 
     is that the Senate is being asked to trust the security of 
     our country to a program that is unproven and unlikely to be 
     fully operational until perhaps 2010. I believe a National 
     Journal article, by James Kitfield, summed it up best by 
     quoting a nuclear scientist who likens the challenge of 
     maintaining the viability of our stockpile without testing to 
     ``walking an obstacle course in the dark when your last 
     glimpse of light was a flash of lightning back in 1992.''
       The most likely problems facing our stockpile are a result 
     components degrade in unpredictable ways, in some cases 
     causing weapons to fail. This is compounded by the

[[Page 24881]]

     fact that the U.S. currently has the oldest inventory in the 
     history of our nuclear weapons programs.
       Over the last forty years, a large percentage of the weapon 
     designs in our stockpile have required post-deployment tests 
     to resolve problems. Without these tests, not only would the 
     problems have remained undetected, but they also would have 
     gone unrepaired. The Congressional Research Service reported 
     last year that: ``A problem with one warhead type can affect 
     hundreds of thousands of individually deployed warheads; with 
     only 9 types of warheads expected to be in the stockpile in 
     2000, compared to 30 in 1985, a single problem could affect a 
     large fraction of the U.S. nuclear force.'' If we are to put 
     our faith in a program other than testing to ensure the 
     safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent and thus our 
     security, we must have complete faith in its efficacy. The 
     Stockpile Stewardship Program falls well short of that 
     standard.
       The United States has chosen to re-manufacture our aging 
     stockpile rather than creating and building new weapon 
     designs. This could be a potential problem because many of 
     the components and procedures used in original weapon designs 
     no longer exist. New production procedures need to be 
     developed and substituted for the originals, but we must 
     ensure that the re-manufactured weapons will work as 
     designed.
       I am concerned further by the fact that some of the weapons 
     in our arsenal are not as safe as we could make them. Of the 
     nine weapon designs currently in our arsenal, only one 
     employs all of the most modern safety and security measures. 
     Our nuclear weapons laboratories are unable to provide the 
     American people with these protections because of the 
     inability of the Stockpile Stewardship Program to completely 
     mimic testing.
       At present, I am not convinced the Stockpile Stewardship 
     Program will permit our experts to maintain a credible 
     deterrent in the absence of testing. Without a complete, 
     effective, and proven Stockpile Stewardship Program, the CTBT 
     could erode our ability to discover and fix problems with the 
     nuclear stockpile and to make safety improvements.
       In fact, the most important debate on this issue may be an 
     honest discussion of whether we should commence limited 
     testing and continue such a program with consistency and 
     certainty.


                              verification

       President Reagan's words ``trust but verify'' remain an 
     important measuring stick of whether a treaty serves the 
     national security interests of the United States. The U.S. 
     must be confident of its ability to detect cheating among 
     member states. While the exact thresholds are classified, it 
     is commonly understood that the United States cannot detect 
     nuclear explosions below a few kilotons of yield. The 
     Treaty's verification regime, which includes an international 
     monitoring system and on-site inspections, was designed to 
     fill the gaps in our national technical means. Unfortunately, 
     the CTBT's verification regime will not be up to that task 
     even if it is ever fully deployed.
       Advances in mining technologies have enabled nations to 
     smother nuclear tests, allowing them to conduct tests with 
     little chance of being detected. Similarly, countries can 
     utilize existing geologic formations to decouple their 
     nuclear tests, thereby dramatically reducing the seismic 
     signal produced and rendering the test undetectable. A recent 
     Washington Post article points out that part of the problem 
     of detecting suspected Russian tests at Novaya Zemlya is that 
     the incidents take place in a large granite cave that has 
     proven effective in muffling tests.
       The verification regime is further bedeviled by the lack of 
     a common definition of a nuclear test. Russia believes hydro-
     nuclear activities and sub-critical experiments are permitted 
     under the treaty. The U.S. believes sub-critical experiments 
     are permitted but hydro-nuclear tests are not. Other states 
     believe both are illegal. A common understanding or 
     definition of what is and what is not permitted under the 
     treaty has not been established.
       Proponents point out that if the U.S. needs additional 
     evidence to detect violations, on-site inspections can be 
     requested. Unfortunately, the CTBT will utilize a red-light 
     inspection process. Requests for on-site inspections must be 
     approved by at least 30 affirmative votes of members of the 
     Treaty's 51-member Executive Council. In other words, if the 
     United States accused another country of carrying out a 
     nuclear test, we could only get an inspection if 29 other 
     nations concurred with our request. In addition, each country 
     can declare a 50 square kilometer area of its territory as 
     off limits to any inspections that are approved.
       The CTBT stands in stark contrast to the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention in the area of verifiability. Whereas the CTBT 
     requires an affirmative vote of the Executive Council for an 
     inspection to be approved, the CWC requires an affirmative 
     vote to stop an inspection from proceeding. Furthermore, the 
     CWC did not exclude large tracts of land from the inspection 
     regime, as does the CTBT.
       The CTBT's verification regime seems to be the embodiment 
     of everything the United States has been fighting against in 
     the UNSCOM inspection process in Iraq. We have rejected 
     Iraq's position of choosing and approving the national origin 
     of inspectors. In addition, the 50 square kilometer 
     inspection-free zones could become analogous to the 
     controversy over the inspections of Iraqi presidential 
     palaces. The UNSCOM experience is one that is best not 
     repeated under a CTBT.


                              enforcement

       Let me turn to some enforcement concerns. Even if the 
     United States were successful in utilizing the laborious 
     verification regime and non-compliance was detected, the 
     Treaty is almost powerless to respond. This treaty simply has 
     no teeth. Arms control advocates need to reflect on the 
     possible damage to the concept of arms control if we embrace 
     a treaty that comes to be perceived as ineffectual. Arms 
     control based only on a symbolic purpose can breed cynicism 
     in the process and undercut support for more substantive and 
     proven arms control measures.
       The CTBT's answer to illegal nuclear testing is the 
     possible implementation of sanctions. It is clear that this 
     will not prove particularly compelling in the decision-making 
     processes of foreign states intent on building nuclear 
     weapons. For those countries seeking nuclear weapons, the 
     perceived benefits in international stature and deterrence 
     generally far outweigh the concern about sanctions that could 
     be brought to bear by the international community.
       Further, recent experience has demonstrated that enforcing 
     effective multilateral sanctions against a country is 
     extraordinarily difficult. Currently, the United States is 
     struggling to maintain multilateral sanctions on Iraq, a 
     country that openly seeks weapons of mass destruction and 
     blatantly invaded and looted a neighboring nation, among 
     other transgressions. If it is difficult to maintain the 
     international will behind sanctions on an outlaw nation, how 
     would we enforce sanctions against more responsible nations 
     of greater commercial importance like India and Pakistan?
       In particularly grave cases, the CTBT Executive Council can 
     bring the issue to the attention of the United Nations. 
     Unfortunately, this too would most likely prove ineffective, 
     given that permanent members of the Security Council could 
     veto any efforts to punish CTBT violators. Chances of a 
     better result in the General Assembly are remote at best.
       I believe the enforcement mechanisms of the CTBT provide 
     little reason for countries to forego nuclear testing. Some 
     of my friends respond to this charge by pointing out that 
     even if the enforcement provisions of the treaty are 
     ineffective, the treaty will impose new international norms 
     for behavior. In this case, we have observed that ``norms'' 
     have not been persuasive for North Korea, Iraq, Iran, India 
     and Pakistan, the very countries whose actions we seek to 
     influence through a CTBT.
       If a country breaks the international norm embodied in the 
     CTBT, that country has already broken the norm associated 
     with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Countries other than 
     the recognized nuclear powers who attempt to test a weapon 
     must first manufacture or obtain a weapon, which would 
     constitute a violation of the NPT. I fail to see how an 
     additional norm will deter a motivated nation from developing 
     nuclear weapons after violating the longstanding norm of the 
     NPT.


                               conclusion

       On Tuesday the Senate is scheduled to vote on the 
     ratification of the CTBT. If this vote takes place, I believe 
     the treaty should be defeated. The Administration has failed 
     to make a case on why this treaty is in our national security 
     interests.
       The Senate is being asked to rely on an unfinished and 
     unproven Stockpile Stewardship Program. This program might 
     meet our needs in the future, but as yet, it is not close to 
     doing so. The treaty is flawed with an ineffective 
     verification regime and a practically nonexistent enforcement 
     process.
       For these reasons, I will vote against ratification of the 
     CTBT.

  Mr. KYL. Let me quote three or four lines from it.
  He said:

       If we are to put our faith in a program other than testing 
     to ensure the safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent 
     and thus our security, we must have complete faith in its 
     efficacy. The Stockpile Stewardship Program falls well short 
     of that standard. . . .
       At present, I am not convinced the Stockpile Stewardship 
     Program will permit our experts to maintain a credible 
     deterrent in the absence of testing.

  He goes on the say:

       Unfortunately, the CTBT's verification regime will not be 
     up to that task even if it is ever fully deployed.

  He concludes his statement with this paragraph:

       The Senate is being asked to rely on an unfinished and 
     unproven Stockpile Stewardship Program. This program might 
     meet our needs in the future, but as yet, it is not close to 
     doing so. The treaty is flawed with an ineffective 
     verification regime and a practically nonexistent enforcement 
     process.
       For these reasons, I will vote against ratification of the 
     CTBT.


[[Page 24882]]


  So spoke Senator Richard Lugar. I do not suggest that any of us here 
in the Senate are as expert as other people I have quoted, but 
certainly Senator Lugar has a reputation for being a very serious and 
well-informed student of arms control issues, a proponent of arms 
control treaties. When he says, as he did with respect to this treaty, 
that it is simply not of the same caliber as other arms control 
treaties for the variety of reasons he expresses in his release, I 
think all of us should pay serious attention to that.
  Madam President, it is now my pleasure, at long last, to turn to the 
Senator from New Hampshire, who has been very patient in waiting for 
Senator Biden and me to conclude.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I won't take the time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona has the floor.
  Mr. KYL. I yield to Senator Biden and then have a unanimous consent 
request.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I want to print in the Record, without 
taking the time from the Senator from New Hampshire, some other quotes 
from Dr. Robinson from his testimony on October 7, 1999. I ask 
unanimous consent they be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

Written Testimony of Dr. Paul Robinson to the Armed Services Committee, 
                              Oct. 7, 1999

       Nuclear effects tests carried out in underground test 
     chambers were always a compromise to the actual conditions 
     that warheads would experience in military use. Thus, this is 
     not the first time that we have been challenged to do the 
     best job simulating phenomena which cannot be achieved 
     experimentally.

  Mr. BIDEN. As well, I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record 
quotes from the October 7 testimony of Dr. Robinson, Dr. Tarter, Dr. 
Tarter again, Dr. Browne, Dr. Robinson, Mr. Levin, Dr. Robinson, Dr. 
Robinson, Dr. Tarter, Dr. Tarter and Dr. Browne; it is an exchange.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

Lab Directors' Written Testimony--Key Quotes on Stockpile Stewardship, 
           October 7, 1999, Armed Services Committee Hearing

       Dr. Robinson, Page 5:
       I believed then, as I do now, that it may be possible to 
     develop the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship approach as a 
     substitute for nuclear testing for keeping previously tested 
     nuclear weapons designs safe and reliable.
       Dr. Tarter, Page 1:
       The bottom line remains the same as it has been in my 
     previous testimonies before this Committee. Namely, that a 
     strongly supported, sustained Stockpile Stewardship Program 
     has an excellent chance of ensuring that this nation can 
     maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the 
     stockpile without nuclear testing.
       Dr. Tarter, Page 4:
       In December 1998, we completed the third annual 
     certification of the stockpile for the President and were 
     able to conclude that nuclear tests were not required at this 
     time to assure the safety and reliability of the nation's 
     nuclear weapons.
       Dr. Brown, Page 1:
       I am confident that a fully supported and sustained program 
     will enable us to continue to maintain America's nuclear 
     deterrent without nuclear testing.
       Senator Levin. . . . what you are telling us is that if 
     this safeguard and the other safeguards are part of this 
     process that you can rely on . . ., Dr. Robinson, you are on 
     board in terms of this treaty; is that correct?
       Dr. Robinson. I am on board that science-based stockpile 
     stewardship has a much higher chance of success and I will 
     accept it as the substitute.
       Senator Levin. For what?
       Dr. Robinson. I still had other reservations about the 
     treaty--
       Senator Levin. As a substitute for what?
       Dr. Robinson. As a substitute for requiring yield tests for 
     certification.
       Senator Levin. Dr. Tarter?
       Senator Tarter. A simple statement again: It is an 
     excellent bet, but it is not a sure thing.
       Senator Levin. My question is are you on board, given these 
     safeguards?
       Senator Tarter. I can only testify to the ability of 
     stockpile stewardship to do the job. It is your job about the 
     treaty.
       Senator Levin. Are you able to say that, providing you can 
     rely on safeguard F and at some point decide that you cannot 
     certify it, that you are willing under that condition to rely 
     on this stewardship program as a substitute for actual 
     testing?
       Senator Tarter. Yes.
       Senator Levin. Dr. Browne?
       Senator Browne. Senator Levin, if the government provides 
     us with the sustained resources, the answer is yes, and if 
     safeguard F is there, yes.

  Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Chair, my colleagues, and my friend from New 
Hampshire.
  Mr. KYL. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to print in the 
Record a series of decision briefs and newspaper articles on the 
subject of the test ban treaty.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

          [From the Center for Security Policy, Oct. 11, 1999]

                      Decision Brief No. 99-D 107


 c.t.b.t. truth or consequences #1: a safe, reliable nuclear deterrent 
            demands periodic, realistic underground testing

       (Washington, D.C.): In various series settings over the 
     past few days, President Clinton has made a number of 
     pronouncements about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the 
     hope of selling it to an unreceptive U.S. Senate. Many of his 
     statements are misleading, some simply inaccurate; not a few 
     fall into both categories.
       Fortunately, the hearings held in the Senate Armed Services 
     and Foreign Relations Committees last week provided needed 
     rebuttals from respected former Cabinet and sub-Cabinet 
     officers and other authorities. As a contribution to the 
     Senate's deliberations, the Center offers highlights of these 
     expert witnesses' testimony and other relevant information to 
     help correct the record.
       President Clinton: ``Our experts have concluded that we 
     don't need more tests to keep our own nuclear forces 
     strong.''
       The Truth: The ``experts'' President Clinton cites may feel 
     as he claims they do, but if so, they are ignoring historical 
     experience and indulging in wishful thinking of the most 
     dangerous kind. The more responsible among them make clear 
     that their ``confidence'' in being able to keep the U.S. 
     nuclear forces not only ``strong'' but safe and reliable is 
     highly conditional--dependent upon an as-yet incomplete, 
     unproven Stockpile Stewardship Program being fully funded for 
     at least a decade (at a total cost of $45 billion or more) 
     and no problems that would require testing to correct 
     developing in the meantime. For example, Dr. John Browne, the 
     current Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory told 
     the Armed Services Committee last week:
       ``The issue that we face is whether we will have the 
     people, the capabilities and the national commitment to 
     maintain this confidence in the stockpile in the future, when 
     we expect to see more significant changes. Although we are 
     adding new tools each year, the essential tool kits for 
     stockpile stewardship will not be complete until sometime in 
     the next decade.''
       Last week's testimony, moreover, made clear the views of 
     other ``experts'' who believe that the American deterrent 
     cannot be kept safe and relialbe--let alone strong--without 
     periodic, realistic underground nuclear tests. These include 
     the following:
       Dr. James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Energy under 
     President Carter (as well as former Secretary of Defense, 
     Director of the CIA and Chairman of the Atomic Energy 
     Commission): ``In the absence of testing, confidence in the 
     reliability of the stockpile will inevitably, ineluctably 
     decline. In the seen years since our last test, confidence 
     has declined. It is declining today and will continue to 
     decline. . . .
       ``Why is such a decline in confidence unavoidable? Our 
     nuclear weapons are highly sophisticated devices composed of 
     thousands of components that must operate with split-second 
     timing and with scant margin for error. Weapons are also 
     radioactive, and thus subject to radioactive decay and 
     chemical decomposition. Other components will age and will 
     fail. All of the components must ultimately be replaced due 
     to changes in material, changes in regulations, the 
     disappearance of manufacturers, the changing of processes. 
     That replacement can never be perfect.''
       Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger: ``If we need 
     nuclear weapons, we have to know that they will work. That is 
     the essence of their deterrence. If there is uncertainty 
     about that, the deterrent capability is weakened. The only 
     assurance that you could have that they will work is to test 
     them, and the only way to test them is the most effective way 
     to test them.''
       ``Since [U.S.] testing ended [in 1992] there have been no 
     weapons ``red-lined'' [i.e., removed from operational status 
     for safety and/or reliable reasons]. The assumption seems to 
     be that since we stopped testing everything's fine. Well, I 
     can't share that assumption, I don't think that's correct, 
     and I don't want to take a chance. You just aren't allowed 
     any margin for error in this business. And this treaty gives 
     a very large margin for error.''
       ``And all of the discussion in other committees and a great 
     deal of the discussion in public has been an attempt to show 
     that the stockpile stewardship program will be an effective 
     way of testing them, although everyone agrees it's not as 
     effective as testing

[[Page 24883]]

     them in the way that we have done in the past with 
     underground explosions, with all precautions to prevent any 
     of the escape of the material into the atmosphere.
       ``You will have all kinds of statements made that the 
     stewardship stockpile program will be able to be tested by 
     computer modeling. We've had some less than reassuring 
     statements that the computers that can do this best will be 
     available in 2005 or 2008, which is a tacit admission that in 
     the meantime, the stockpile stewardship program, as it's 
     presently constituted, is not an effective way of testing. 
     And the only way to be sure that these weapons will work and 
     will be able to do their horribly lethal task is to test them 
     and test them in the most effective way possible.''
       Admiral Henry Chiles, President Clinton's former Commander-
     in-Chief, U.S. Strategic Forces Command: `'We are going to 
     have to remove and replace almost all, if not all, of the 
     non-nuclear components in those weapons with newly designed 
     components. The older components are not available. They were 
     originally manufactured by technologies that are obsolete, 
     and they are not supported in our evolving industrial base. 
     And without testing I know of no other engineering unit of 
     comparable complexity that anyone would consider safe and 
     reliable in a modern world.''
       Dr. Paul Robinson, the current Director of the Sandia 
     National Laboratory: ``I can state with no caveats that to 
     confirm the performance of high-tech devices--cars, 
     airplanes, medical diagnostics, computers or nuclear 
     weapons--testing is the preferred methodology . . . actually 
     nuclear testing of the entire system. . . . To forego testing 
     is to live with an uncertainty. And the question is, what is 
     the risk, can one bound the uncertainty, and how does that 
     work out?''
       ``In the past, we used to change out the nation's nuclear 
     weapons about eight to 10 years; we would replace an old 
     design with a completely new design at that point in time. 
     And so we had really very little effects due to aging of the 
     system sitting in there. Today the stockpile is the oldest 
     one we've ever had in the 54-year history of the program, so 
     we're watching for new effects due to aging that we haven't 
     seen before.''
       Dr. John Nuckles, former Director of the Lawrence Livermore 
     National Laboratory under President Clinton: ``It cannot be 
     assured that the powerful computational and experimental 
     capabilities of the Stockpile Stewardship program will 
     increase confidence and reliability. Improved understanding 
     may reduce confidence in the estimates to performance margins 
     and reliability if fixes and validations are precluded by the 
     CTBT.''
       ``The SSP will probably succeed in finding undetected 
     stockpile defects and in narrowing the major gaps in our 
     understanding of nuclear weapons which have eluded 50 years 
     of nuclear testing. Nuclear testing would then be required to 
     confirm this new understanding and validate the resulting 
     stockpile fixes.''
       Dr. Troy Wade, former Assistant Secretary of Energy for 
     Defense Programs and nuclear bomb designer: ``Nuclear weapons 
     are not like artillery shells. You cannot store them in a 
     bottle or building and then get them whenever the exigencies 
     of the situation prompt you to do so. Nuclear weapons are 
     very complicated assemblies that require continued vigilance 
     to assure reliability and safety.
       ``It is, therefore, a first-order principle that nuclear 
     weapons that are now expected to be available in the enduring 
     stockpile for much longer than was contemplated by the 
     designers, will require enhanced vigilance to continue to 
     ensure safety and reliability.
       ``I am a supporter, only because I believe it is a way to 
     develop the computational capability to assure the annual 
     certification process for warheads, that have not changed, or 
     for which there is no apparent change. For nuclear weapons 
     that do not fit that category, stockpile stewardship is 
     merely--as we say in Nevada--a crap shoot. Nuclear testing 
     has always been the tool necessary to maintain, with high 
     confidence, the reliability and safety of the stockpile. I 
     believe this treaty would remove the principle tool from the 
     tool chests of those responsible for assuring safety and 
     reliability.''
       ``Maintaining the nuclear deterrence of the United States, 
     without permitting needed testing, is like requiring the 
     local ambulance service to guarantee 99 percent reliability 
     any time the ambulance is requested, but with a provision 
     that the ambulance is never to be started until the call 
     comes. I believe this is a patently absurd premise.''
       Dr. Robert Barker, former Assistant for Atomic Energy to 
     Secretaries of Defense Weinberger, Carlucci and Cheney and a 
     nuclear weapon designer: ``There are nine weapons in the 
     continuing inventory; only three of those weapons have the 
     three modern safety features of enhanced nuclear detonation 
     safety, the fire resistant pit and insensitive high 
     explosive. Three of the systems in the continuing inventory 
     have only one of those features.
       ``Now, I believe to freeze an inventory in place in which 
     every weapon is not as safe as it could be is unconscionable. 
     I think that is a decision that the Senate really needs to 
     take on and ask itself whether it is comfortable with making 
     a decision to freeze the stockpile in a situation in which it 
     is less safe than it could be. Should an accident happen, the 
     loss of life, loss of property, as a result of not having 
     included--it could have been precluded by the inclusion of 
     one of these features--who is it that will take the credit or 
     take the blame for that? I think any prudent program that 
     called for a cessation in testing would have made sure that 
     every weapon in the inventory was as safe as it could be 
     before such a step was taken.

                            The bottom line

       In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services 
     Committee, Secretary Schlesinger cited remarks made by Dr. 
     Victor Reis, President Clinton's erstwhile Assistant 
     Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs and architect of the 
     Stockpile Stewardship Program, in a speech delivered before 
     he left office to the Sandia National Laboratory:
       ``Think about [the challenge of the Stockpile Stewardship 
     Program]. We are asking to maintain forever an incredibly 
     complex device no larger than this podium, filled with exotic 
     radioactive materials, that must create, albeit briefly, 
     temperatures and pressures only seen in the nature of the 
     center of stars. Do it without an integrating nuclear test 
     and without any reduction in extraordinarily high standards 
     of safety and reliability. And while you're at it, downsize 
     the industrial complex that supports this enterprise by a 
     factor of two and stand up critical new manufacturing 
     processes; this, within an industrial system that was 
     structured to turn over new designs every 15 years and for 
     which the nuclear explosive testing was the magic tool for 
     demonstrating success.''
       Dr. Schlesinger observed dryly: ``Now, this challenge was 
     laid down by the architect of the SSP. He understood the 
     risks. The only thing that he might add to that statement is 
     that, in order to validate the SSP, we would require nuclear 
     testing.''
       The ineluctable reality is that the United States has 
     already run potentially grave risks by not testing its aging 
     arsenal for the past seven years. It perpetuates this 
     moratorium--let alone making it a permanent, international 
     obligation--at its peril.
                                  ____


                      Decision Brief No. 99-D 108


c.t.b.t. Truth or Consequences #2: This Treaty is Unverifiable--It May 
          Make Monitoring Others' Nuke Programs More Difficult

       (Washington, D.C.): In a daily drumbeat of remarks aimed at 
     selling the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to an 
     unreceptive Senate, President Clinton has repeatedly made the 
     claim that this treaty is ``effectively verifiable.'' While 
     he and his subordinates acknowledge that all testing will not 
     actually be detectable, they insist that any that would 
     undermine our nuclear deterrent would be picked up by U.S. 
     and/or international monitoring systems--the latter, the 
     CTBT's proponents assert, representing a significant 
     augmentation of the former. For example, Mr. Clinton recently 
     declared: ``The treaty will also strengthen our ability to 
     monitor if other countries are engaged in suspicious 
     activities through global chains of sensors and on-site 
     inspections, both of which the treaty provides for.''

                               The truth

       Fortunately, authoritative testimony in the Senate 
     Intelligence, Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees 
     last week provided needed rebuttals to such claims. While the 
     most sensitive of that testimony was taken by the 
     Intelligence Committee in closed session, an invaluable 
     summary was provided by the Chairman of the Senate Select 
     Committee on Intelligence, Sen. Richard Shelby (R-AL), in an 
     appearance before the Foreign Relations Committee on 7 
     October. Highlights of Chairman Shelby's authoritative 
     statement include the following:
       ``It's my considered judgment, as chairman of the 
     Intelligence Committee, based on a review of the intelligence 
     analysis and on testimony this week from the intelligence 
     community's senior arms control analyst, that it's impossible 
     to monitor compliance with this treaty with the confidence 
     that the Senate should demand before providing its advice and 
     consent for ratification.
       ``I'm not confident that we can now or can in the 
     foreseeable future detect any and all nuclear explosions 
     prohibited under the treaty. While I have a greater degree of 
     confidence in our ability to monitor higher-yield explosions 
     in known test sites, I have markedly less confidence in our 
     capabilities to monitor lower-yield and/or evasively 
     conducted tests, including tests that may enable states to 
     develop new nuclear weapons or improve existing weapons.
       ``At this point, I should point out too that while the 
     proponents of the treaty have argued that it will prevent 
     nuclear proliferation, the fact is that some of the countries 
     of most concern to us--North Korea, Iran and Iraq--can 
     develop and deploy nuclear weapons without any nuclear tests 
     whatsoever.
       ``With respect to monitoring, in July of '97, the 
     intelligence community issued a national intelligence 
     estimate entitled: `Monitoring the Comprehensive Test Ban 
     Treaty Over the Next 10 Years.' . . . The NIE was not 
     encouraging about our ability to monitor compliance with the 
     treaty or about the likely utility of the treaty in 
     preventing

[[Page 24884]]

     countries like North Korea, Iran and Iraq from development 
     and fielding nuclear weapons. The NIE identified numerous 
     challenges, difficulties and credible evasion scenarios that 
     affect the intelligence community's confidence in its ability 
     to monitor compliance.
       ``Because the details are classified and because of the 
     inherent difficulty of summarizing a very highly technical 
     analysis covering a number of different countries and a 
     multitude of variables, I recommend that members, including 
     the members of this committee, review this document with the 
     following caution: Based on testimony before the committee 
     this week, I believe that newly acquired information requires 
     reevaluation of the 1997 estimate's assumptions and 
     underlying analysis on certain key issues. The revised 
     assumptions and analysis appear certain to lead to even more 
     pessimistic conclusions.''
       ``Many proponents of the treaty place their faith, in 
     monitoring aids provided under the treaty such as the 
     International Monitoring System--IMS--a multinational seismic 
     detection system, and the CTBT's On-Site Inspection regime--
     OSI. Based on a review of the structure, likely capabilities 
     and procedures of these international mechanisms, neither of 
     which will be ready to function for a number of years, and 
     based on the intelligence community's own analysis and 
     statements, I'm concerned that these organizations will be of 
     at best limited, if not marginal margin.
       ``I believe this IMS will be technically inadequate. For 
     example, it was not designed to detect evasively conducted 
     tests which, if you are Iraq or North Korea, are precisely 
     the kind you're going to conduct. It was designed, as you 
     know with diplomatic sensitivities rather than effective 
     monitoring in mind. And it will be eight to 10 years before 
     the system is complete.
       ``Because of these factors and for other technical reasons, 
     I'm afraid that the IMS is more likely to muddy the waters by 
     injecting questionable data into what will inevitably be 
     highly charged political debate over possible non-compliance. 
     As a result, the value of more accurate, independently 
     obtained U.S. information will be undermined, making it more 
     difficult for the U.S. to make its case for noncompliance if 
     it were to become necessary.
       ``And with respect to on-site inspection, I believe that 
     the on-site inspection regime invites delay and confusion. 
     For example, while U.S. negotiators originally sought an 
     automatic green light for on-site inspections as a result of 
     the opposition of the People's Republic of China, now, the 
     regime that was adopted allows inspections only with the 
     approval of 30 of the 51 countries on the executive 
     committee. Members of the Committee will appreciate the 
     difficulty of rounding up the votes for such a supermajority.
       ``I am also deeply troubled by the fact that the inspected 
     party has a veto, a veto over including U.S. inspectors on an 
     inspection team and the right of the inspected party to 
     declare areas up to 50 kilometers off limits to inspection. I 
     understand these provisions mirror limitations sought by 
     Saddam Hussein on the UNSCOM inspectors, which leads me to 
     believe that some of the OSI standards could be what's cut 
     out for Iraq. As a result of these and other hurdles even if 
     inspectors do eventually get near the scene of a suspicious 
     event, the evidence, which is highly perishable, may well 
     have vanished.
       In addition to Sen. Shelby's summary of the information 
     available to the Intelligence Committee, Dr. Kathleen 
     Bailey--a highly respected former Associate Director of the 
     Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--added the following 
     points in her testimony before the Senate Armed Services 
     Committee:
       ``The international monitoring system of the CTBT is 
     designed or is capable of detecting greater than one kiloton 
     of nuclear yield for a non-evasively conducted test. So, if 
     Russia or someone else decides to conduct a test evasively, 
     the IMS system will probably not be able to detect it.
       ``This is because there are various techniques that can be 
     used to basically mask the fact that you tested. One of the 
     most widely known is called decoupling, and I would here rely 
     on an unclassified paper I heard a CIA official present last 
     year in which he described the fact that a nation could put a 
     nuclear device in a cavity, detonate it, and essentially the 
     space around it in this cavity would muffle or mitigate the 
     sound, so that the seismic signal is reduced by as much as a 
     factor of 70. This means that a one-kiloton explosion could 
     look like only 14 tons. So it would be well below the 
     threshold of the international monitoring system.''

                            The bottom line

       The fact is that militarily significant covert nuclear 
     testing can--and almost certainly will--be conducted at low-
     yields or in other ways aimed at masking the force of an 
     explosion. Unfortunately, the history of arms control is 
     riddled with examples of treaties where even clear-cut 
     violations are excused or ignored by the other parties. Just 
     as President Clinton has acknowledged a tendency on the part 
     of his Administration to ``fudge'' the facts when the 
     alternative of telling the truth will have hard policy 
     implications, the Comprehensive Test Ban will prompt this 
     government and others to take the most charitable view of 
     ambiguous data, rather than conclude the treaty has been 
     violated.
       If anything, as Sen. Shelby has noted, the very fact that a 
     treaty is at stake will probably make it more likely, not 
     less, that U.S. intelligence will be discouraged from 
     ascertaining the true status of potentially hostile powers' 
     nuclear weapons programs and behavior that may contravene the 
     CTBT and/or the ``international norm'' it is supposed to 
     establish and promote. Far from contributing to American 
     security, the Comprehensive Test Ban would--in this fashion, 
     among others--degrade that security.
                                  ____


                      Decision Brief No. 99-D 109


 C.T.B.T. Truth or Consequences #3: President Bush Did Not `Impose' a 
                 Test Moratorium--It was Imposed on Him

       (Washington, DC): One of the more pernicious misstatements 
     being served up by Clinton Administration officials 
     desperately trying to induce Republican Senators to agree to 
     the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
     is to the effect that former President George Bush ``imposed 
     a moratorium'' on U.S. nuclear testing before leaving office. 
     The most recent such misrepresentation was made on ABC News' 
     ``This Week'' program on Sunday by Secretary of State 
     Madeleine Albright. By so doing, they transparently hope to 
     lend an otherwise almost wholly lacking patina of 
     bipartisanship to this accord.
       The fact is that President Bush was euchred on the eve of 
     the 1992 election into accepting legislative restrictions on 
     nuclear testing that he vehemently opposed. This point was 
     made clear in testimony before the Senate Armed Services 
     Committee last week by Dr. Robert Barker, a nuclear weapon 
     designer who served as the Pentagon's top nuclear weapons 
     expert during the Reagan and Bush Administrations.
       There should be no doubt whatsoever that President Bush and 
     the entire administration that stood behind him believed that 
     nuclear testing was necessary for the maintenance of a safe 
     and reliable stockpile. I don't believe the technical facts 
     have changed since 1993. I believe we are faced with a 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty not because the technical facts 
     have changed but because some political issues are different 
     now than were true in 1993.

                        President Bush's legacy

       President Bush's attitude towards nuclear testing is made 
     express in an unclassified passage from a classified report 
     he submitted to the Congress on his Administration's last 
     full day in office. This report was written to explain why 
     the Bush Administration found a statute mandating an end to 
     all U.S. nuclear testing, following a final series of 
     underground tests, to be incompatible with the national 
     security. It read, in part:
       ``. . . The Administration has concluded that it is not 
     possible to develop a test program within the constraints of 
     Public Law 102-377 that would be fiscally, militarily and 
     technically responsible. The requirement to maintain and 
     improve the safety of U.S. forces necessitates continued 
     nuclear testing for those purposes, albeit at a modest level, 
     for the foreseeable future. The Administration strongly urges 
     the Congress to modify this legislation urgently, in order to 
     permit the minimum number and kind of underground nuclear 
     tests that the United States requires--regardless of the 
     action of other states--to retain safe and reliable, although 
     dramatically reduced, nuclear deterrent forces.''
       The reasons for President Bush's adamant position on the 
     need to continue nuclear testing in order to assure the 
     safety and reliability of the U.S. deterrent is not hard to 
     comprehend in light of the experience described by Dr. Barker 
     in his testimony on 7 October:
       ``During my six years in the Pentagon, from 1986 and 1992, 
     the people in the nuclear weapons laboratories were even more 
     experienced [than they are today since they] were doing 
     nuclear testing. Well, every day of any year I could go to 
     them and they would tell me my stockpile was safe, my 
     stockpile was reliable--I could count on their judgment.
       ``Five times during that six-year period I was faced with 
     catastrophic failures in the stockpile. The Department of 
     Energy came to me on five occasions, and I found myself going 
     to Secretaries Weinberger or Carlucci or Cheney, and telling 
     them that a weapon in the inventory could not be trusted to 
     do its job. And until we did further tests those weapons were 
     basically non-operational, and we were faced with trying to 
     deal with the situation of instantaneously having a weapons 
     system not available to us . . . . In every case where a 
     change had to be made in order to fix the problem, a nuclear 
     test was required to be sure that the fix worked.''

                       President Clinton's Legacy

       Dr. Barker also pointed out to Senate how the Clinton 
     Administrations' ideological attachment to the idea of 
     banning all nuclear testing--without regard to the 
     implications for the safety and reliability of the 
     stockpile--had a singularly perverse effect:
       ``It's one of the great ironies that there was a thing in 
     existence back in 1993 called

[[Page 24885]]

     a test ban readiness program, which called for a significant 
     number of tests each year for a decade in order to prove 
     whether or not a scheme of calculation and non-nuclear 
     simulation would provide a reliable replacement for nuclear 
     testing. . . . That is the reliable, scientific even business 
     approach. You do not change your calibration tool without 
     comparing the results.
       ``No business would change its accounting system without 
     verifying that the new system gave the same results of the 
     new. No scientist would change the calibration tool in his 
     laboratory without validating that the new tool gave the same 
     result as the old. And in 1993 we were embarked upon a 
     process of developing a set of tools that we could assess 
     whether or not they would prove to be a reliable replacement 
     for nuclear testing.
       ``The cessation of nuclear testing cut that whole thing 
     off, and instead we jumped into the replacement and have 
     denied ourselves the ability to ever calibrate it if we 
     ratify this Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.''

                            The bottom line

       No President since John F. Kennedy has voluntarily imposed 
     the kind of unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing upon 
     which Bill Clinton has insisted over the past seven years--
     and for good reason. And President Kennedy declared when he 
     ended the three year testing moratorium he had adopted:
       ``We know enough now about broken negotiations, secret 
     preparations and the advantages gained from a long test 
     series never to offer again an uninspected moratorium. Some 
     may urge us to try it again, keeping our preparations to test 
     in a constant state of readiness. But in actual practice, 
     particularly in a society of free choice, we cannot keep top 
     flight scientists concentrating on the preparation of an 
     experiment which may or may not take place on an uncertain 
     date in the undefined future.
       ``Nor can large technical laboratories be kept fully alert 
     on a stand-by-basis waiting for some other nation to break an 
     agreement. This is not merely difficult or inconvenient--we 
     have explored this alternative thoroughly and found it 
     impossible of execution.''
       The fact is that President George Bush, many of those who 
     served in senior ranks of his administration--notably, his 
     Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, his National Security 
     Advisor Brent Scowcroft and his Secretary of Energy James 
     Watkins have all expressed their opposition to this treaty--
     and his son, George W. Bush, have formally counseled the 
     Senate against permanent unilateral and/or multilateral bans 
     on nuclear testing. This counsel should be heeded--not 
     misrepresented or ignored.
                                  ____


                      Decision Brief No. 99-D 110


c.t.b.t. Truth or consequences #4: the zero-yield, permanent test ban's 
          pedigree is hard left, not bipartisan or responsible

       (Washington, D.C.): President Clinton is fond of saying 
     that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is the 
     ``longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in the history of arms 
     control.'' He and his subordinates and other CTBT proponents 
     try, however, to confuse by whom the present, zero-yield, 
     permanent ban on all nuclear tests has been so long sought 
     and hard fought. This is not an accident. After all, as it 
     has become clear that this arms control initiative has been 
     the agenda not, as the CTBT's champions contend, for every 
     President since Dwight Eisenhower, but rather for radical, 
     left-wing anti-nuclear ideologies, its prospects for approval 
     by the Republican Senate dwindle.
       The fact is, as Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman 
     Jesse Helms has observed ``not a single president before the 
     current one has ever sought a zero-yield, indefinite duration 
     CTBT.'' Actually, every one of his predecessors rejected such 
     an approach.

                       President Reagan's legacy

       Particularly instructive is the forceful 1988 rejection of 
     nuclear test bans and other limitations on nuclear testing 
     beyond those currently on the books that was sent by 
     President Reagan to the Congress in September of that year. 
     The highlights of this carefully prepared, interagency-
     approved report entitled, The Relationship between Progress 
     in Other Areas of Arms Control and More Stringent Limitations 
     on Nuclear Testing should be required reading for Senators 
     now confronting the decision whether to advise and consent to 
     the CTBT:

                      The Requirement for Testing

       ``Nuclear testing is indispensable to maintaining the 
     credible nuclear deterrent which has kept the peace for over 
     40 years.''
       ``Thus we do not regard nuclear testing as an evil to be 
     curtailed, but as a tool to be employed responsibly in 
     pursuit of national security.''
       ``The U.S. Tests neither more often nor at higher yields 
     than is required for our security.''
       ``As long as we must depend on nuclear weapons for our 
     fundamental security, nuclear testing will be necessary.''

              Why the United States Tests Nuclear Weapons

       ``First, we do so to ensure the reliability of our nuclear 
     deterrent.''
       ``Second, we conduct nuclear tests in order to improve the 
     safety, security, survivability, and effectiveness of our 
     nuclear arsenal. Testing has allowed the introduction of 
     modern safety and security features on our weapons. It has 
     permitted a reduction by nearly one-third in the total number 
     of weapons in the stockpile since 1960, as well as a 
     reduction in the total megatonnage in that stockpile to 
     approximately one-quarter of its 1960 value.''
       ``Third, the U.S. tests to ensure we understand the effects 
     of a nuclear environment on military systems.''
       ``Finally, by continuing to advance our understanding of 
     nuclear weapons design, nuclear testing serves to avoid 
     technological surprise and to allow us to respond to evolving 
     threat.''
       ``These four purposes are vital national security goals. As 
     companion reports by the Departments of Defense and Energy 
     indicate, they cannot currently be met without nuclear 
     testing.''

 Reductions in Nuclear and/or Conventional Arms May Actually Increase 
                       U.S. Testing Requirements

       ``. . . It is important to recognize that there is no 
     direct technical linkage between the size of the nuclear 
     stockpile and the requirements for nuclear testing.''
       ``Indeed, under [an agreement providing for] deep 
     reductions in strategic offensive arms the reliability of our 
     remaining U.S. strategic weapons could be even more important 
     and the need for testing even greater. . . .''
       ``Similarly, neither reductions in strategic offensive arms 
     themselves nor success in conventional arms reductions will 
     eliminate the third reason for U.S. nuclear testing, the 
     requirement to ensure we understand, from both an offensive 
     and defensive standpoint, the effects of the environment 
     produced by nuclear explosions on military systems. . . . 
     Even in a world with reduced strategic arms and an improved 
     balance in conventional forces, nuclear arms will exist. In 
     such a world, understanding nuclear effects would be no less 
     important.''

                         Further Policy Caveats

       ``. . . The U.S. recognizes that neither nuclear testing 
     nor arms control per se are ends in themselves. They are 
     tools to be employed in the interests of enhancing national 
     security.''
       ``. . . It is clear that limitations as stringent as a 
     complete ban on tests above either 1 kiloton- or 10 kilotons-
     yield pose serious risks and will almost certainly not prove 
     to be compatible with our overall security interests. As the 
     companion reports by the Departments of Defense and Energy 
     make clear, such limitations have exceptionally severe 
     effects on U.S. programs. In addition, we do not know how to 
     verify such yield limitations.''

                            The Bottom Line

       The Reagan Administration report declared in closing that 
     ``A comprehensive test ban remains a long-term objective of 
     the United States.'' It makes clear, however, that the 
     circumstances under which such a ban might be acceptable are 
     very different from those that applied at the time, or today: 
     ``We believe such a ban must be viewed in the context of a 
     time when we do not need to depend on nuclear deterrence to 
     ensure international security and stability, and when we have 
     achieved broad, deep, and effectively verifiable arms 
     reductions, substantially improved verification capabilities, 
     expanded confidence-building measures, and greater balance in 
     conventional forces.''
       Senators being asked to consider postponing a final vote on 
     the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty should understand that the 
     practical effect of doing so would effectively be to agree 
     that--despite its incompatibility with U.S. national security 
     interests and its consistency with the sort of woolly-headed, 
     radical disarmament notions Ronald Reagan eschewed--the 
     CTBT's restraints would continue to bind the United States. 
     For, under international legal practice, unless and until a 
     nation formally gives notice of its intention not to ratify a 
     treaty, it is obliged to refrain from actions that would 
     undercut its object and purpose. Such notice should be given, 
     and promptly.
                                  ____


                      Decision Brief No. 99-D 111


    c.t.b.t. truth or consequences #5: opposition to a zero-yield, 
        permanent test ban is rooted in substance, not politics

       (Washington, D.C.).--Advocates for the Comprehensive Test 
     Ban Treaty (CTBT) have recently engaged in a form of 
     political contortionism that would impress Houdini. Having 
     insisted on the Senate's immediate consideration of this 
     accord in time for a CTBT review conference held last week in 
     Vienna, they were initially surprised, then seemingly pleased 
     when Senate Republicans agreed two weeks ago to a fixed 
     period for debate and a near-term vote. Accordingly, every 
     single Democratic Senator and those relatively few 
     Republicans who have declared their support for the CTBT 
     agreed--obviously with the Clinton White House's blessing--to 
     a ``unanimous consent'' agreement designed to do just that. 
     In other words, when they thought they had (or could get) the 
     necessary votes, the CTBT's proponents were quite content 
     with this arrangement.
       As it became clear that the treaty's opponents had easily 
     the 34 votes needed to defeat President Clinton's permanent, 
     zero-

[[Page 24886]]

     yield Comprehensive Test Ban, however, the Administration and 
     its allies began to complain that the arrangement they had 
     agreed to was no longer satisfactory. Suddenly, they claimed 
     the CTBT was in danger of falling victim to ``partisan 
     politics'' and that only by delaying the vote would that 
     accord receive the deliberate consideration due it.
       Unfortunately for the pro-CTBT contortionists, the 
     announcement on 7 October by Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) of 
     his adamant opposition to the present Comprehensive Test Ban 
     Treaty makes such arguments untenable. Sen. Lugar is, after 
     all, a man with a record of unwavering support for arms 
     control and unfailing willingness to pursue bipartisan 
     approaches to foreign policy issues. His closely reasoned and 
     well-researched grounds for his declared intention to vote 
     against this CTBT makes it clear that he and other like-
     minded Senators will do so for legitimate, substantive 
     reasons.
       Reduced to its essence, Sen. Lugar's critique--which is 
     likely to prove highly influential with other centrist 
     Senators--reads as follows:
       ``The goal of the CTBT is to ban all nuclear explosions 
     worldwide: I do not believe it can succeed. I have little 
     confidence that the verification and enforcement provisions 
     will dissuade other nations from nuclear testing. 
     Furthermore, I am concerned about our country's ability to 
     maintain the integrity and safety of our own nuclear arsenal 
     under the conditions of the treaty.
       ``. . . While affirming our desire for international peace 
     and stability, the U.S. Senate is charged with the 
     constitutional responsibility of making hard judgments about 
     the likely outcomes of treaties. This requires that we 
     examine the treaties in close detail and calculate the 
     consequences of ratification for the present and the future. 
     Viewed in this context, I cannot support the treaty's 
     ratification.''
       Highlights of Senator Lugar's critique should be required 
     reading for Senators and their constituents alike:
       Bad Arms Control: ``I do not believe that the CTBT is of 
     the same caliber as the arms control treaties that have come 
     before the Senate in recent decades. Its usefulness to the 
     goal of non-proliferation is highly questionable. Its likely 
     ineffectuality will risk undermining support and confidence 
     in the concept of multi-lateral arms control. Even as a 
     symbolic statement of our desire for a safer world, it is 
     problematic because it would exacerbate risks and 
     uncertainties related to the safety of our nuclear 
     stockpile.''
       No Safety Net on the SSP: ``At present our nuclear 
     capability provides a deterrent that is crucial to the safety 
     of the American people and is relied upon as a safety 
     umbrella by most countries around the world. One of the most 
     critical issues under the CTBT would be that of ensuring the 
     safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile 
     without testing. The safe maintenance and storage of these 
     weapons is a crucial concern. We cannot allow them to fall 
     into disrepair or permit their safety to be called into 
     question.
       ``. . . Unfortunately, the jury is still out on the 
     Stockpile Stewardship Program. The last nine years have seen 
     improvements, but the bottom line is that the Senate is being 
     asked to trust the security of our country to a program that 
     is unproven and unlikely to be fully operational until 
     perhaps 2010.
       ``. . . The Congressional Research Service reported last 
     year that: `A problem with one warhead type can affect 
     hundreds of thousands of individually deployed warheads; with 
     only 9 types of warheads expected to be in the stockpile in 
     2000, compared to 30 in 1985, a single problem could affect a 
     large fraction of the U.S. nuclear force.' If we are to put 
     our faith in a program other than testing to ensure the 
     safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent and thus our 
     security, we must have complete faith in its efficacy. The 
     Stockpile Stewardship Program falls well short of that 
     standard.
       ``. . . I am concerned further by the fact that some of the 
     weapons in our arsenal are not as safe as we could make them. 
     Of the nine weapon designs currently in our arsenal, only one 
     employs all of the most modern safety and security measures. 
     Our nuclear weapons laboratories are unable to provide the 
     American people with these protections because of the 
     inability of the Stockpile Stewardship Program to completely 
     mimic testing.
       ``At present, I am not convinced the Stockpile Stewardship 
     Program will permit our experts to maintain a credible 
     deterrent in the absence of testing. Without a complete, 
     effective, and proven Stockpile Stewardship program, the CTBT 
     could erode our ability to discover and fix problems with the 
     nuclear stockpile and to make safety improvements.''
       An Unverifiable CTBT: ``The U.S. must be confident of its 
     ability to detect cheating among member states. While the 
     exact thresholds are classified, it is commonly understood 
     that the United States cannot detect nuclear explosions below 
     a few kilotons of yield. The Treaty's verification regime, 
     which includes an international monitoring system and on-site 
     inspections, was designed to fill the gaps in our national 
     technical means. Unfortunately, the CTBT's verification 
     regime will not be up to that task even if it is ever fully 
     deployed.''
       ``The verification regime is further bedeviled by the lack 
     of a common definition of a nuclear test. Russia believes 
     hydro-nuclear activities and sub-critical experiments are 
     permitted under the treaty. The U.S. believes sub-critical 
     experiments are permitted but hydro-nuclear tests are not. 
     Other states believe both are illegal. A common understanding 
     or definition of what is and what is not permitted under the 
     treaty has not been established.''
       ``The CTBT's verification regime seems to be the embodiment 
     of everything the United States has been fighting against in 
     the UNSCOM inspection process in Iraq. We have rejected 
     Iraq's position of choosing and approving the national origin 
     of inspectors. In addition, the 50 square kilometer 
     inspection-free zones could become analogous to the 
     controversy over the inspections of Iraqi presidential 
     palaces. The UNSCOM experience is one that is best not 
     repeated under a CTBT.''
       Mission Impossible--Enforcement of the CTBT: ``Even if the 
     United States were successful in utilizing the laborious 
     verification regime and non-compliance was detected, the 
     Treaty is almost powerless to respond. This treaty simply has 
     no teeth. Arms control advocates need to reflect on the 
     possible damage to the concept of arms control if we embrace 
     a treaty that comes to be perceived as ineffectual. Arms 
     control based only on a symbolic purpose can breed cynicism 
     in the process and undercut support for more substantive and 
     proven arms control measures.
       ``The CTBT's answer to illegal nuclear testing is the 
     possible implementation of sanctions. It is clear that this 
     will not prove particularly compelling in the decision-making 
     processes of foreign states intent on building nuclear 
     weapons. For those countries seeking nuclear weapons, the 
     perceived benefits in international stature and deterrence 
     generally far outweigh the concern about sanctions that could 
     be brought to bear by the international community.''
       Fraudulent ``Norm'': ``I believe the enforcement mechanisms 
     of the CTBT provide little reason for countries to forego 
     nuclear testing. Some of my friends respond to this charge by 
     pointing out that even if the enforcement provisions of the 
     treaty are ineffective, the treaty will impose new 
     international norms for behavior. In this case, we have 
     observed that ``norms'' have not been persuasive for North 
     Korea, Iraq, Iran, India and Pakistan, the very countries 
     whose actions we seek to influence through a CTBT.
       ``If a country breaks the international norm embodied in 
     the CTBT, that country has already broken the norm associated 
     with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Countries other than 
     the recognized nuclear powers who attempt to test a weapon 
     must first manufacture or obtain a weapon, which would 
     constitute a violation of the NPT. I fail to see how an 
     additional norm will deter a motivated nation from developing 
     nuclear weapons after violating the long-standing norm of the 
     NPT.''

                            The Bottom Line

       The Clinton Administration's transparent intent to use the 
     CTBT as a political weapon against its critics makes Senator 
     Lugar's statesmanship and courage in opposing this treaty as 
     a matter of principle all the more commendable. Although the 
     Indiana Senator has made clear his preference not to vote on 
     the CTBT in the coming days, the substantive case he has made 
     against this accord should be dispositive to his colleagues 
     in deciding to reject the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty now, 
     rather than be subjected to endless political attacks until 
     such time as the Treaty is once again placed on the Senate 
     calendar.
                                  ____


                      Decision Brief No. 99-D 112


   c.t.b.t. truth or consequences #6: Heed Past and Present Military 
             Opposition to a Zero-Yield, Permanent Test Ban

       (Washington, D.C.): As the prospects for Senate rejection 
     of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on its merits 
     have grown in recent days, the Treaty's proponents have 
     become more reliant than ever on celebrity endorsements--
     especially those it has received for retired and serving 
     senior military officers. Indeed, few advocates for the 
     present, zero-yield, permanent test ban make their case for 
     the CTBT without referring to the support it enjoys from past 
     and present members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including a 
     number of former JCS Chairmen (notably, Gen. Colin Powell).
       Most recently, President Clinton declared in his Saturday 
     radio address: ``So I say to the Senators who haven't 
     endorsed [the CTBT], heed the best national security advice 
     of our military leaders.'' The trouble is, the best national 
     security advice of our military leaders is to reject this 
     permanent, all-inclusive test ban, not approve it.

                             Which Advice?

       Setting aside the singularly unimpressive job the serving 
     Chairman, Gen. Hugh Shelton, has done in his advocacy for the 
     CTBT--at his reconfirmation hearing a few weeks ago, his 
     endorsement was unintelligible; on NBC's Meet the press on 10 
     October, he gave a statement of support for the Treaty that 
     was more articulate, but wholly inappropriate to the question 
     he was asked, not once but twice--fans of the CTBT should

[[Page 24887]]

     be careful in relying too heavily upon their favorite 
     officers to sell this Treaty.
       Consider, for example, statements that three of the most 
     prominent of these officers--General Powell, Admiral William 
     Crowe and General David Jones--during their respective stints 
     as chairmen of the Joint Chief of Staff
       General Colin Powell, 30 September 1991: [In response to a 
     question by Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-Wy) as to how Gen. 
     Powell would respond to a Soviet proposal to halt testing.] I 
     would recommend to the Secretary and the President [that] 
     it's a condition we couldn't meet. I would recommend against 
     it. We need nuclear testing to ensure the safety, [and] 
     surety of our nuclear stockpile. As long as one has nuclear 
     weapons, you have to know what it is they will do, and so I 
     would recommend continued testing.''
       Gen. Powell, 1 December 1992: ``With respect to a 
     comprehensive test ban, that has always been a fundamental 
     policy goal of ours, but as long as we have nuclear weapons 
     we have a responsibility for making sure that our stockpile 
     remains safe. And to keep that stockpile safe, we have to 
     conduct a limited number of nuclear tests to make sure we 
     know what a nuclear weapon will actually do and how it is 
     aging and to find out a lot of other physical characteristics 
     with respect to nuclear phenomenon.
       ``So I would like ultimately to go to a comprehensive test 
     ban, but I don't think we'll get there safely and reliably 
     until we also get rid of nuclear weapons. As long as we have 
     to conduct testing.''
       Admiral William Crowe, 8 May 1986: [According to a 
     contemporary press report] ``Admiral William Crow, Chairman 
     of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said a comprehensive test ban--
     which many members of Congress have urged President Reagan to 
     negotiate with Moscow--would `introduce elements of 
     uncertainty that would be dangerous for all concerned.
       ``Given the pressure from lawmakers for conventional 
     weapons testing, `I frankly do not understand why Congress 
     would want to suspend testing on one of the most critical and 
     sophisticated elements of our nuclear deterrent--namely the 
     warhead's he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.''
       General David Jones per an Aviation Week article dated 29 
     May 1978: ``General David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chief 
     of Staff, told a Senate Armed Services Committee meeting last 
     week that he could not recommend an indefinite zero-yield 
     test ban.
       ``He added that it is not verifiable, and that the U.S. 
     stockpile reliability could not be assured. Gen. Jones said 
     he is concerned over asymmetries that could develop through 
     an unverifiable agreement with the USSR. He told Senators he 
     is not convinced by the safeguards he has seen to date, and 
     that it would not be difficult to overcome them.''
       Gen. Jones, according to a 27 May 1978 Washington Post 
     article: Air Force Gen. David Jones, selected by [President] 
     Carter to be chairman of the Joints chiefs, told the Senate 
     Armed Services Committee at his recent confirmation hearing 
     that ``I would have difficulty recommending a zero[-yield] 
     test ban for an extended period.''
       It falls to these individuals and those who are interested 
     in their views to establish which position--their former ones 
     opposing an open-ended, zero-yield test ban or their present 
     ones endorsing it--actually reflect their ``best national 
     security advice.'' Suffice it to say that when they actually 
     held positions of responsibility, all three went on record in 
     favor of continued testing. Will their serving counterpart 
     and his fellow members of the JCS undergo a reverse 
     transformation after leaving office, in which capacity they 
     have endorsed the CTBT? If so, which view will represent 
     their best professional military advice (i.e., advice not 
     influenced by political judgments or considerations)?

           Leading Retired Military Officers Oppose the CTBT

       Senators would do well to consider the views of other 
     distinguished retired military officers. For example, in an 
     open letter to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott dated 9 
     September, ten retired four-star combat commanders (Marine 
     Corps Commandant Gen. Louis H. Wilson and Assistant 
     Commandants Gens. Raymond G. Davis and Joseph J. Went; 
     Commander-in-Chief Strategic Air Command Gen. Russell E. 
     Dougherty; Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic Adm. Wesley 
     McDonald; Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe Gen. 
     Frederick J. Kroesen; Commander of U.S. Air Combat Command 
     Gen. John M. Loh; Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Lawrence 
     A. Skantze; Commander-in-Chief, Army Readiness Command Gen. 
     Donn A. Starry; Commanding General, Army Material Command 
     Gen. Louis C. Wagner, Jr.) joined more than forty other 
     experienced civilian and retired military policy 
     practitioners in opposition to the CTBT. They wrote, in part:
       ``We consider the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty signed by 
     President Clinton in 1996 to be inconsistent with vital U.S. 
     national interests. We believe the Senate must reject the 
     permanent ban on testing that this treaty would impose so 
     long as the Nation depends upon nuclear deterrence to 
     safeguard its security.''
       Importantly, in a 5 October letter to Senate Armed Services 
     Committee Chairman John Warner, one of the most highly 
     regarded JCS Chairman in history, Gen. John Vessey, 
     forcefully urged the Senate to reject the present CTBT. 
     Highlight of Gen. Vessey's letter include the following:
       ``Supporters of the CTBT argue that it reduces the chances 
     for nuclear proliferation. I applaud efforts to reduce the 
     proliferation of nuclear weapons but I do not believe that 
     the test ban will reduce the ability of rogue states to 
     acquire nuclear weapons in sufficient quantities to upset 
     regional stability in various parts of the world.''
       ``If the United States is to remain the preeminent nuclear 
     power and maintain a modern, safe, secure, reliable and 
     useable nuclear deterrent force, I believe we need to 
     continue to develop new nuclear weapons designed to 
     incorporate the latest in technology and to meet the changing 
     security situation in the world. . . . The United States, the 
     one nation most of the world looks to for securing peace in 
     the world, should not deny itself the opportunity to test the 
     bedrock building block of its security, its nuclear 
     deterrence force, if conditions require testing.''
       ``I . . . believe that the more demonstrably modern and 
     useable is our nuclear deterrent force, the less likely are 
     we to need to use it, but we must have modern weapons, and we 
     ought not deny ourselves the opportunity to test if we deem 
     it necessary.

                            The Bottom Line

       The case for the Clinton Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
     fundamentally comes down to a question of ``confidence''--in 
     the judgments of those who say that they are ``confident'' in 
     the future viability of the U.S. deterrent or, alternatively, 
     in the judgment of those who warn that history suggests such 
     confidence is unwarranted in the absence of periodic, 
     realistic underground testing.
       It should, at a minimum, shake the confidence of Senators 
     whose support for the Treaty rests substantially upon the 
     endorsement of prominent retired military leaders that those 
     leaders previously held a far more dire (not to say, 
     realistic) view of the implications of such an accord for the 
     U.S. deterrent and security.
                                  ____


          [From the Center for Security Policy, Oct. 12, 1999]

                      Decision Brief No. 99-D 112


   C.T.B.T. Truth or Consequences #7: Realistic Explosive Testing is 
          Required to `remanufacture' Existing Nuclear Weapons

       (Washington, D.C.): One of the most pernicious 
     misrepresentations being served up in recent days by the 
     proponents of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is the 
     claim that the U.S. deterrent stockpile can be maintained for 
     the indefinite future without further underground tests. 
     Since they explicitly rule out modernization of the nuclear 
     arsenal, however, the only way a stockpile comprised of 
     weapons having the highest average age in history could 
     possibly be preserved in a safe and reliable condition would 
     be if existing weapons types were to be substantially (if not 
     virtually completely) remanufactured.
       While advocates of the zero-yield, permanent CTBT deny it, 
     neither historical experience and common sense support the 
     proposition that U.S. nuclear weapons--comprised as they are 
     of as many as 6,000 exactingly manufactured parts, made of 
     exotic and often dangerous materials and constantly exposed 
     for years to high levels of radiation--will not undergo 
     substantial changes over time. In fact as a result of such 
     factors, former Assistant Secretary of Energy Victor Reis 
     declared in congressional testimony in October 1997 that: 
     ``Just about all the parts [of those obsolescing devices] are 
     going to have to be remade.''

    Why `Remaking' of the Arsenal Cannot be Effected Without Testing

       There a numerous, serious problems with undertaking such a 
     program in the absence of nuclear testing. First, the 
     production lines for building the stockpile's existing bombs 
     and warheads were disassembled long ago. Reconstitution and 
     recertifying them would take quite some time, would be very 
     costly and probably won't be possible to effect with 
     confidence absent realistic, explosive nuclear testing.
       Second, it will not be possible to replicate some of the 
     ingredients in weapons designed two decades or more ago; key 
     components are technologically obsolete and no one would 
     recommend using them when smaller, lighter, cheaper, more 
     reliable and carcinogenic materials are now the state-of-the-
     art. In addition, federal safety and health guidelines 
     prohibit the use of some of the materials utilized in the 
     original designs.
       Third, virtually everybody who was involved in designing 
     and proving the original designs has left the industrial and 
     laboratory complex, taking with them irreplaceable corporate 
     memory that may spell the difference between success and 
     failure in reproducing their handiwork.

                   An Authoritative Historical Review

       These points were underscored in an authoritative report to 
     Congress issued by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
     in 1987. Among its relevant highlights are the following 
     (emphasis added throughout):

[[Page 24888]]

       ``It has frequently been stated that non-nuclear and very-
     low yield (i.e., less than 1 kiloton) testing and computer 
     stimulation would be adequate for maintaining a viable 
     nuclear deterrent. A recent variant of this argument asserts 
     that while such testing and computer stimulation may be 
     insufficient for the development of new warheads, they would 
     be adequate for indefinite maintenance of a stockpile of 
     existing weapons. We believe that neither of these assertions 
     can be substantiated.
       ``The major problem is that a nuclear explosive includes 
     such a wide range of processes and scales that it is 
     impossible to include all the relevant physics and 
     engineering in sufficient detail to provide an accurate 
     representation of the real world.''
       ``A final proof test at the specified low-temperature 
     extreme of the W80 (Air-Launched Cruise Missile) was done as 
     the weapon was ready for deployment. The test results were a 
     complete surprise. The primary gave only a small fraction of 
     its expected yield, insufficient to ignite the secondary.
       ``Our experience with the W80 illustrates the inadequacy of 
     non-nuclear and low-yield testing and the need for full-scale 
     nuclear tests to judge the effects of small changes. Even 
     though it has been argued that such a ``thorough'' test 
     should have occurred earlier, the critical point is that 
     computer simulation, non-nuclear testing, and less-than-full-
     scale nuclear testing are not always sufficient to assess the 
     effects of deterioration, changes in packaging, or 
     environmental conditions on weapons performance.''
       ``Testing of newly produced stockpiled systems has shown a 
     continuing need for nuclear tests. Even an ``identical'' 
     rebuild should be checked in a nuclear test if we are to have 
     confidence that all the inevitable, small and subtle 
     differences from one production run to the other have not 
     affected the nuclear performance. The current stockpile is 
     extremely reliable, but only because continued nuclear 
     testing at adequate yields has enabled us to properly assess 
     and correct problems as they occur.''
       ``Although tests of a complex system are expensive and 
     time-consuming, one is hard-put to find an example anywhere 
     in U.S. industry where a major production line was reopened 
     and requalified without tests. Exact replication, especially 
     of older systems, is impossible. Material batches are never 
     quite the same, some materials become unavailable, and 
     equivalent materials are never exactly equivalent. Different 
     people--not those who did the initial work--do the 
     remanufacturing.
       ``Documentation has never been sufficiently exact to ensure 
     replication. A perfect specification has never yet been 
     written. We have never known enough about every detail to 
     specify everything that may be important.
       ``Tests, even with the limitations of small numbers and 
     possibly equivocal interpretation of results, are the final 
     arbiters of the tradeoffs and judgments that have been made. 
     We are concerned that, if responsible engineers and 
     scientists were to refuse to certify a remanufactured weapon, 
     pressures could produce individuals who would. The Challenger 
     accident resulted from such a situation and highlights an 
     all-too-common tendency of human nature to override judgment 
     in favor of expediency.''
       ``Remanufacture of a nuclear warhead is often asserted to 
     be a straightforward exercise in engineering and material 
     science, and simply involves following well-established 
     specifications to make identical copies. In the real world, 
     however, there are many examples where weapon parts cannot be 
     duplicated because of outmoded technologies, health hazards, 
     unprofitable operations, out-of-business vendors, 
     reproducible materials, lack of documentation, and myriad 
     other reasons. . . . Not only must remanufacturing attempt to 
     replicate the construction of the original weapon, it must 
     also duplicate the performance of the original weapon.''
       ``It is important to emphasize that in weapon remanufacture 
     we are dealing with a practical problem. Idealized proposals 
     and statements that we `should be able to remanufacture 
     without testing because expertise is not essential' are a 
     prescription for failure.''

                            The Bottom Line

       Senators concerned about the Nation's ability to perform 
     the needed modifications essential to any effort to 
     ``remanufacture'' stockpiled weapon types should bear in mind 
     a comment by one of the prominent scientists usually cited by 
     CTBT proponents: Dr. Richard Garwin. In testimony before the 
     Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week, Dr. Garwin 
     declared: ``I oppose modifying our nuclear weapons under the 
     moratorium or under the CTBT.''
       Given historical experience and the scientific insights 
     gleaned from it, no one who is serious about maintaining the 
     U.S. deterrent for the indefinite future would argue that the 
     existing inventory can be perpetuated without nuclear 
     testing. Remanufactured weapons will have to be realistically 
     tested, at least at low-yield levels, if we--and those we 
     hope to deter--are to have confidence in their effectiveness.
                                  ____


          [From the Center for Security Policy, Oct. 7, 1999]

                       Security Forum No. 99-F 23


           six secretaries of defense urge defeat of c.t.b.t.

       (Washington, D.C.): In an unprecedented public statement of 
     opposition to a signed arms control agreement, six former 
     Secretaries of Defense--one of whom, Dr. James R. Schlesinger 
     was also (among other things) a Secretary of Energy in the 
     Carter Administration--have written the Republican and 
     Democratic leaders of the U.S. Senate urging the defeat of 
     the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
       This authoritative description of the CTBT's defects and 
     the deleterious repercussions its ratification would have for 
     America's nuclear deterrent should be required reading for 
     every Senator and every other participant in what is shaping 
     up to be a momentous debate over the Nation's future security 
     posture. In particular, this letter--which clearly benefits 
     from Dr. Schlesinger's vast experience as a former Chairman 
     of the Atomic Energy Commission, former Director of Central 
     Intelligence as well as a former Secretary of Defense and 
     Energy (in the latter capacity, he was instrumental in 
     dissuading President Carter from pursuing the sort of 
     permanent, zero-yield CTBT that the incumbent President hopes 
     to ratify)--does much to rebut the putative ``military'' 
     arguments being made on behalf of this accord.

                                                  October 6, 1999.
       Dear Senators Lott and Daschle: As the Senate weighs 
     whether to approve the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 
     we believe Senators will be obliged to focus on one dominant, 
     inescapable result were it to be ratified: over the decades 
     ahead, confidence in the reliability of our nuclear weapons 
     stockpile would inevitably decline, thereby reducing the 
     credibility of America's nuclear deterrent. Unlike previous 
     efforts at a CTBT, this Treaty is intended to be of unlimited 
     duration, and though ``nuclear weapon test explosion'' is 
     undefined in the Treaty, by America's unilateral declaration 
     the accord is ``zero-yield,'' meaning that all nuclear tests, 
     even of the lowest yield, are permanently prohibited.
       The nuclear weapons in our nation's arsenal are 
     sophisticated devices, whose thousands of components must 
     function together with split-second timing and scant margin 
     for error. A nuclear weapon contains radioactive material, 
     which in itself decays, and also changes the properties of 
     other materials within the weapon. Over time, the components 
     of our weapons corrode and deteriorate, and we lack 
     experience predicting the effects of such aging on the safety 
     and reliability of the weapons. The shelf life of U.S. 
     nuclear weapons was expected to be some 20 years. In the 
     past, the constant process of replacement and testing of new 
     designs have some assurance that weapons in the arsenal would 
     be both new and reliable. But under the CTBT, we would be 
     vulnerable to the effects of aging because we could not test 
     ``fixes'' of problems with existing warheads.
       Remanufacturing components of existing weapons that have 
     deteriorated also poses significant problems. Manufacturers 
     go out of business, materials and production processes 
     change, certain chemicals previously used in production are 
     now forbidden under new environmental regulations, and so on. 
     It is a certainty that new processes and materials--
     untested--will be used. Even more important, ultimately the 
     nuclear ``pits'' will need to be replaced--and we will not be 
     able to test those replacements. The upshot is that new 
     defects may be introduced into the stockpile through 
     remanufacture, and without testing we can never be certain 
     that these replacement components will work as their 
     predecessors did.
       Another implication of the CTBT of unlimited duration is 
     that over time we would gradually lose our pool of 
     knowledgeable people with experience in nuclear weapons 
     design and testing. Consider what would occur if the United 
     States halted nuclear testing for 30 years. We would then be 
     dependent on the judgment of personnel with no personal 
     experience either in designing or testing nuclear weapons. In 
     place of a learning curve, we would experience an extended 
     unlearning curve.
       Furthermore, major gaps exist in our scientific 
     understanding of nuclear explosives. As President Bush noted 
     in a report to Congress in January 1993, ``Of all U.S. 
     nuclear weapons designs fielded since 1958, approximately 
     one-third have required nuclear testing to resolve problems 
     arising after deployment.'' We were discovering defects in 
     our arsenal up until the moment when the current moratorium 
     on U.S. testing was imposed in 1992. While we have uncovered 
     similar defects since 1992, which in the past would gave let 
     to testing, in the absence of testing, we are not able to 
     test whether the ``fixes'' indeed work.
       Indeed, the history of maintaining complex military 
     hardware without testing demonstrates the pitfalls of such an 
     approach. Prior to World War II, the Navy's torpedoes had not 
     been adequately tested because of insufficient funds. It took 
     nearly two years of war before we fully solved the problems 
     that caused our torpedoes to routinely pass harmlessly under 
     the target or to fail to explode on contact. For example, at 
     the Battle of

[[Page 24889]]

     Midway, the U.S. launched 47 torpedo aircraft, without 
     damaging a single Japanese ship. If not for our dive bombers, 
     the U.S. would have lost the crucial naval battle of the 
     Pacific war.
       The Department of Energy has structured a program of 
     experiments and computer simulations called the Stockpile 
     Stewardship Program, that it hopes will allow our weapons to 
     be maintained without testing. This program, which will not 
     be mature for at least 10 years, will improve our scientific 
     understanding of nuclear weapons and would likely mitigate 
     the decline in our confidence in the safety and reliability 
     of our arsenal. We will never know whether we should trust 
     Stockpile Stewardship if we cannot conduct nuclear tests to 
     calibrate the unproven new techniques. Mitigation is, of 
     course, not the same as prevention. Over the decades, the 
     erosion of confidence inevitably would be substantial.
       The decline in confidence in our nuclear deterrent is 
     particularly troublesome in light of the unique geopolitical 
     role of the United States. The U.S. has a far-reaching 
     foreign policy agenda and our forces are stationed around the 
     globe. In addition, we have pledged to hold a nuclear 
     umbrella over our NATO allies and Japan. Though we have 
     abandoned chemical and biological weapons, we have threatened 
     to retaliate with nuclear weapons to such an attack. In the 
     Gulf War, such a threat was apparently sufficient to deter 
     Iraq from using chemical weapons against American troops.
       We also do not believe the CTBT will do much to prevent the 
     spread of nuclear weapons. The motivation of rogue nations 
     like North Korea and Iraq to acquire nuclear weapons will not 
     be affected by whether the U.S. tests. Similarly, the 
     possession of nuclear weapons by nations like India, 
     Pakistan, and Israel depends on the security environment in 
     the region not by whether or not the U.S. tests. If 
     confidence in the U.S. nuclear deterrent were to decline, 
     countries that have relied on our protection could well feel 
     compelled to seek nuclear capabilities of their own. Thus, 
     ironically, the CTBT might cause additional nations to seek 
     nuclear weapons.
       Finally, it is impossible to verify a ban that extends to 
     very low yields. The likelihood of cheating is high. ``Trust 
     but verify'' should remain our guide. Tests with yields below 
     1 kiloton can both go undetected and be militarily useful to 
     the testing state. Furthermore, a significantly larger 
     explosion can go undetected--or mistaken for a conventional 
     explosion used for mining or an earthquake--if the test if 
     ``decoupled.'' Decoupling involves conducing the test in a 
     large underground cavity and has been shown to dampen an 
     explosion's seismic signature by a factor of up to 70. The 
     U.S. demonstrated this capability in 1966 in two tests 
     conducted in salt domes at Chilton, Mississippi.
       We believe that these considerations render a permanent, 
     zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty incompatible with 
     the Nation's international commitments and vital security 
     interests and believe it does not deserve the Senate's advice 
     and consent. Accordingly, we respectfully urge you and your 
     colleagues to preserve the right of this nation to conduct 
     nuclear tests necessary to the future of our nuclear 
     deterrent by rejecting approval of the present CTBT.
           Respectfully,
     James R. Schlesinger.
     Richard B. Cheney.
     Frank C. Carlucci.
     Caspar W. Weinberger.
     Donald H. Rumsfeld.
     Melvin R. Laird.
                                  ____


          [From the Center for Security Policy, Oct. 7, 1999]

                             Security Forum


              senator lugar delivers kiss-of-death to ctbt

       (Washington, DC): As the Senate prepares to open debate on 
     the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), arms control's 
     preeminent Republican champion in the Senate, Sen. Richard 
     Lugar (R-IN) has delivered what is surely the kiss-of-death 
     for this accord. In a lengthy and detailed memorandum 
     released today, Sen. Lugar declared ``I will vote against the 
     ratification of the CTBT.''
       The Senator's reasons for reaching what was clearly a 
     wrenching decision are characteristically thoughtful and 
     powerful explained in the following excerpts of his 
     memorandum. The Center applauds Senator Lugar for his 
     courageous leadership in this matter and commends his 
     arguments to his colleagues--and to the American people on 
     behalf of whose security they are made.

  [Press Release from U.S. Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, a Senior 
Member of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees and 
             the Senate's National Security Working Group]

       The Senate is poised to begin consideration of the 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty under a unanimous consent 
     agreement that will provide for 14 hours of general debate, 
     debate on two amendments, and a final vote on ratification. . 
     . . In anticipation of the general debate, I will state my 
     reasons for opposing ratification of the CTBT.
       The goal of the CTBT is to ban all nuclear explosions 
     worldwide: I do not believe it can succeed. I have little 
     confidence that the verification and enforcement provisions 
     will dissuade other nations from nuclear testing. 
     Furthermore, I am concerned about our country's ability to 
     maintain the integrity and safety of our own nuclear arsenal 
     under the conditions of the treaty.
       I am a strong advocate of effective and verifiable arms 
     control agreements. As a former Vice-Chairman of the Senate 
     Arms Control Observer Group and a member of the Foreign 
     Relations Committee, I have had the privilege of managing 
     Senate consideration of many arms control treaties and 
     agreements.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       I understand the impulse of the proponents of the CTBT to 
     express U.S. leadership in another area of arms control. 
     Inevitably, arms control treaties are accompanied by 
     idealistic principles that envision a future in which 
     international norms prevail over the threat of conflict 
     between nations. However, while affirming our desire for 
     international peace and stability, the U.S. Senate is charged 
     with the constitutional responsibility of making hard 
     judgments about the likely outcomes of treaties. This 
     requires that we examine the treaties in close detail and 
     calculate the consequences of ratification for the present 
     and the future. Viewed in this context, I cannot support the 
     treaty's ratification.
       I do not believe that the CTBT is of the same caliber as 
     the arms control treaties that have come before the Senate in 
     recent decades. Its usefulness to the goal of non-
     proliferation is highly questionable. Its likely 
     ineffectuality will risk undermining support and confidence 
     in the concept of multi-lateral arms control. Even as a 
     symbolic statement of our desire for a safer world, it is 
     problematic because it would exacerbate risks and 
     uncertainties related to the safety of our nuclear stockpile.

                         Stockpile Stewardship

       The United States must maintain a reliable nuclear 
     deterrent for the foreseeable future. Although the Cold War 
     is over, significant threats to our country still exist. At 
     present our nuclear capability provides a deterrent that is 
     crucial to the safety of the American people and is relied 
     upon as a safety umbrella by most countries around the world. 
     One of the most critical issues under the CTBT would be that 
     of ensuring the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons 
     stockpile without testing. The safe maintenance and storage 
     of these weapons is a crucial concern. We cannot allow them 
     to fall into disrepair or permit their safety to be called 
     into question.
       The Administration has proposed an ambitious program that 
     would verify the safety and reliability of our weapons 
     through computer modeling and simulations. Unfortuantely, the 
     jury is still out on the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The 
     last nine years have seen improvements, but the bottom line 
     is that the Senate is being asked to trust the security of 
     our country to a program that is unproven and unlikely to be 
     fully operational until perhaps 2010. I believe a National 
     Journal article, by James Kitfield, summed it up best by 
     quoting a nuclear scientist who likens the challenge of 
     maintaining the viability of our stockpile without testing to 
     ``walking an obstacle course in the dark when your last 
     glimpse of light was a flash of lightning back in 1992.''
       The most likely problems facing our stockpile are a result 
     of aging. This is a threat because nuclear materials and 
     components degrade in unpredictable ways, in some cases 
     causing weapons to fail. This is compounded by the fact that 
     the U.S. currently has the oldest inventory in the history of 
     our nuclear weapons programs.
       Over the last forty years, a large percentage of the weapon 
     designs in our stockpile have required post-deployment tests 
     to resolve problems. Without these tests, not only would the 
     problems have remained undetected, but they also would have 
     gone unprepaired. The Congressional Research Service reported 
     last year that: ``A problem with one warhead type can affect 
     hundreds of thousands of individually deployed warheads; with 
     only 9 types of warheads expected to be in the stockpile in 
     2000, compared to 30 in 1985, a single problem could affect a 
     large fraction of the U.S. nuclear force.'' If we are to put 
     our faith in a program other than testing to ensure the 
     safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent and thus our 
     security, we must have complete faith in its efficacy. The 
     Stockpile Stewardship Program falls well short of that 
     standard.
       The United States has chosen to re-manufacture our aging 
     stockpile rather than creating and building new weapon 
     designs. This could be a potential problem because many of 
     the components and procedures used in original weapon designs 
     no longer exist. New production procedures need to be 
     developed and substituted for the originals, but we must 
     ensure that the remanufactured weapons will work as designed.
       I am concerned further by the fact that some of the weapons 
     in our arsenal are not as safe as we could make them. Of the 
     nine weapons designs currently in our arsenal, only one 
     employs all of the most modern safety and security measures. 
     Our nuclear weapons laboratories are unable to provide

[[Page 24890]]

     the American people with these protections because of the 
     inability of the Stockpile Stewardship Program to completely 
     mimic testing.
       At present, I am not convinced the Stockpile Stewardship 
     Program will permit our experts to maintain a credible 
     deterrent in the absence of testing. Without a complete, 
     effective, and proven Stockpile Stewardship program, the CTBT 
     could erode our ability to discover and fix problems with the 
     nuclear stockpile and to make safety improvements.
       In fact, the most important debate on this issue may be an 
     honest discussion of whether we should commence limited 
     testing and continue such a program with consistency and 
     certainty.

                              Verification

       President Reagan's words ``trust but verify'' remain an 
     important measuring stick of whether a treaty serves the 
     national security interests of the United States. The U.S. 
     must be confident of its ability to detect cheating among 
     member states. While the exact thresholds are classified, it 
     is commonly understood that the United States cannot detect 
     nuclear explosions below a few kilotons of yield. The 
     treaty's verification regime, which includes an international 
     monitoring system and on-site inspections, was designed to 
     fill the gaps in our national technical means. Unfortunately, 
     the CTBT's verification regime will not be up to that task 
     even if it is ever fully deployed.
       Advances in mining technologies have enabled nations to 
     smother nuclear tests, allowing them to conduct tests with 
     little chance of being detected. Similarly, countries can 
     utilize existing geologic formations to decouple their 
     nuclear tests, thereby dramatically reducing the seismic 
     signal produced and rendering the test undetectable. A recent 
     Washington Post article points out that part of the problem 
     of detecting suspected Russian tests at Novaya Zemlya is that 
     the incidents take place in a large granite cave that has 
     proven effective in muffling tests.
       The verification regime is further bedeviled by the lack of 
     a common definition of a nuclear test. Russia believes hydro-
     nuclear activities and sub-critical experiments are permitted 
     under the treaty. The U.S. believes sub-critical experiments 
     are permitted but hydro-nuclear tests are not. Other states 
     believe both are illegal. A common understanding or 
     definition of what is and what is not permitted under the 
     treaty has not been established.
       Proponents point out that if the U.S. needs additional 
     evidence to detect violations, on-site inspections can be 
     requested. Unfortunately, the CTBT will utilize a red-light 
     inspection process. Requests for on-site inspections must be 
     approved by at least 30 affirmative votes of members of the 
     Treaty's 51-member Executive Council. In other words, If the 
     United States accused another country of carrying out a 
     nuclear test, we could only get an inspection if 29 other 
     nations concurred with our request. In addition, each country 
     can declare a 50 square kilometer area of its territory as 
     off limits to any inspections that are approved.
       The CTBT stands in stark contrast to the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention in the area of verifiability. Whereas the CTBT 
     requires an affirmative vote of the Executive Council for an 
     inspection to be approved, the CWC requires an affirmative 
     vote to stop an inspection from proceeding. Furthermore, the 
     CWC did not exclude large tracts of land from the inspection 
     regime, as does the CTBT.
       The CTBT's verification regime seems to be the embodiment 
     of everything the United States has been fighting against in 
     the UNSCOM inspection process in Iraq. We have rejected 
     Iraq's position of choosing and approving the national origin 
     of inspectors. In addition, the 50 square kilometer 
     inspection-free zones could become analogous to the 
     controversy over the inspections of Iraqi presidential 
     palaces. The UNSCOM experience is one that is best not 
     repeated under a CTBT.

                              Enforcement

       Let me turn some enforcement concerns. Even if the United 
     States were successful in utilizing the laborious 
     verification regime and non-compliance was detected, the 
     Treaty is almost powerless to respond. This treaty simply has 
     no teeth. Arms control advocates need to reflect on the 
     possible damage to the concept of arms control if we embrace 
     a treaty that comes to be perceived as ineffectual. Arms 
     control based only on a symbolic purpose can breed cynicism 
     in the process and undercut support for more substantive and 
     proven arms control measures.
       The CTBT's answer to illegal nuclear testing is the 
     possible implementation of sanctions. It is clear that this 
     will not prove particularly compelling in the decision-making 
     processes of foreign states intent on building nuclear 
     weapons. For those countries seeking nuclear weapons, the 
     perceived benefits in international stature and deterrence 
     generally far outweigh the concern about sanctions that could 
     be brought to bear by the international community.
       Further, recent experience has demonstrated that enforcing 
     effective multilateral sanctions against a country is 
     extraordinarily difficult. Currently, the United States is 
     struggling to maintain multilateral sanctions on Iraq, a 
     country that openly seeks weapons of mass destruction and 
     blatantly invaded and looted a neighboring nation, among 
     other transgressions. If it is difficult to maintain the 
     international will behind sanctions on an outlaw nation, how 
     would we enforce sanctions against more responsible nations 
     of greater commercial importance like India and Pakistan?
       In particularly grave cases, the CTBT Executive Council can 
     bring the issue to the attention of the United Nations. 
     Unfortunately, this too would most likely prove ineffective, 
     given that permanent members of the Security Council could 
     veto any efforts to punish CTBT violators. Chances of a 
     better result in the General Assembly are remote at best.
       I believe the enforcement mechanisms of the CTBT provide 
     little reason for countries to forego nuclear testing. Some 
     of my friends respond to this charge by pointing out that 
     even if the enforcement provisions of the treaty are 
     ineffective, the treaty will impose new international norms 
     for behavior. In this case, we have observed that ``norms'' 
     have not been persuasive for North Korea, Iraq, Iran, India 
     and Pakistan, the very countries whose actions we seek to 
     influence through a CTBT.
       If a country breaks the international norm embodied in the 
     CTBT, that country has already broken the norm associated 
     with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Countries other than 
     the recognized nuclear powers who attempt to test a weapon 
     must first manufacture or obtain a weapon, which would 
     constitute a violation of the NPT. I fail to see how an 
     additional norm will deter a motivated nation from developing 
     nuclear weapons after violating the long-standing norm of the 
     NPT.

                               Conclusion

       On Tuesday the Senate is scheduled to vote on the 
     ratification of the CTBT. If this vote takes place, I believe 
     the treaty should be defeated. The Administration has failed 
     to make a case on why this treaty is in our national security 
     interests.
       The Senate is being asked to rely on an unfinished and 
     unproven Stockpile Stewardship Program. This program might 
     meet our needs in the future, but as yet, it is not close to 
     doing so. The treaty is flawed with an ineffective 
     verification regime and a practically nonexistent enforcement 
     process.
       For these reasons, I will vote against ratification of the 
     CTBT.
                                  ____


          [From the Center for Security Policy, Oct. 12, 1999]

                       Security Forum No. 99-F25


 richard Perle Discounts Allies' Objections to Senate Rejection of the 
                     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

       (Washington, D.C.): In an op.ed. article slated for 
     publication in a major British daily newspaper tomorrow, 
     former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle puts in 
     perspective recommendations made last week by the leaders of 
     Britain, France and Germany that the Senate agree to the 
     ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Mr. 
     Perle--an accomplished security policy practitioner widely 
     respected on both sides of the Atlantic and, indeed, around 
     the world--powerfully argues that the objections heard from 
     Messrs. Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder in 
     an op.ed. article published in the New York Times on 8 
     October should not dissuade the United States Senate for 
     doing what American national security and interests dictate: 
     defeating the CTBT.


                      Passion's Slave and the CTBT

                           (By Richard Perle)

       Always generous with advice, a chorus of European officials 
     has been urging the United States Senate to ratify the 
     ``Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.'' Last Friday, Tony Blair, 
     Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder (BC&S for short) issued 
     what Will Hutton, writing in the Observer, called ``a 
     passionate appeal'' to the American Senator whose votes will 
     decide whether the United States signs up to the fanciful 
     conceit that the CTBT will halt the testing of nuclear 
     weapons.
       Advice giving is contagious, and Hutton has some of his 
     own: to encourage the U.S. to ratify the CTBT, he urged 
     Britain and France to phase out their nuclear weapons 
     entirely--a suggestion they will passionately reject.
       Now, the prospect of crowning the Western victory in the 
     Cold War with a piece of international legislation that will 
     stop the spread of nuclear weapons is certainly appealing. 
     After all, a signature on a piece of paper would be a 
     remarkably cheap and efficient way to keep nuclear weapons 
     out of the hands of Kim Jong-il, Saddam Hussein and the other 
     44 regimes now deemed capable of developing nuclear weapons.
       So what explains the need for passionate appeals from 
     politicians and strident comment from leader writers? Why 
     doesn't the Senate congratulate its friends on their wise and 
     timely counsel and vote to ratify the treaty?
       I suspect that one reason is the Senators--or at least the 
     more responsible among them--have actually read the treaty 
     and understand how deeply flawed it is, how unlikely it is to 
     stop nuclear proliferation or even nuclear testing, and how 
     it has the potential to leave the United States with an 
     unsafe, unreliable nuclear deterrent.

[[Page 24891]]

       Arms control agreements--especially ones affecting matters 
     as sensitive as nuclear weapons--must be judged both in broad 
     concept and in the details of their implementation. As a 
     device for ending all nuclear tests, the CTBT fails on both 
     counts.
       It is characteristic of global agreements like the CTBT 
     that they lump together, under a single set of constraints, 
     states that can be counted upon to comply and those which 
     intend either to find and use loopholes--the CTBT is full of 
     them--or to cheat to defeat the constraints of the agreement. 
     To make matters worse, states joining global conventions, 
     even if they do so in bad faith, obtain the same treatment as 
     those who join in order to advance the proper purposes of the 
     agreement.
       There can be little doubt that Indian participation in the 
     ``atoms for peace program'' facilitated New Dehli's 
     acquisition of nuclear weapons by legitimating the 
     construction of a Canadian designed reactor from which India 
     extracted the nuclear material to make its first bomb. We now 
     know that Saddam Hussein made full use of the information 
     provided by Iraqi inspectors on the staff of the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency (set up to police the Non-
     Proliferation Treaty) to conceal his clandestine nuclear 
     weapons program. With knowledge of the sources and methods by 
     which the IAEA attempts to ferret out cheating, Iraqis 
     ensconced there (by virtue of Iraq's having signed the NPT) 
     were better able to circumvent treaty's essential purpose.
       In domestic affairs, no one would seriously propose that 
     the police and criminals come together and sign agreements 
     according to which they accept the same set of constraints on 
     their freedom of action. Yet that is the underlying logic of 
     the CTBT: a compact among nation states, some of which are 
     current or likely criminals, others--the majority--respectful 
     of international law and their treaty obligations. Because 
     there can be no realistic hope of verifying compliance with 
     the DTBT, this fundamental flaw, which is characteristic of 
     global agreements, is greatly magnified. The net result of 
     ratification of the CTBT would be (a) American compliance, 
     which could leave the U.S. uncertain about the safety and 
     reliability of its nuclear deterrent; and (b) almost certain 
     cheating by one or more rogue states determined to acquire 
     nuclear weapons.
       Among the leaders in Congress who have taken a keen 
     interest in arms control is Senator Richard Lugar from 
     Indiana, a senior member of the Intelligence and Foreign 
     Relations Committees. A frequent floor manager in favor of 
     arms control legislation, he has supported every arms control 
     treaty to come before the Senate and has often led the 
     proponents in debate. Last week he announced that he would 
     vote against ratification of the CTBT.
       I would be willing to bet that Senator Lugar has spent more 
     time studying this treaty than Blair, Chirac, Schroeder and 
     Hutton combined--which may explain why his view of the treaty 
     is one of reason and not passion. Senator Lugar opposes 
     ratification--not because he shares my view that the treaty 
     is conceptually flawed--but because he believes it cannot 
     achieve its intended purpose but it could ``risk undermining 
     support and confidence in the concept of multi-lateral arms 
     control.''
       Arguing that the CTBT is ``not of the same caliber as the 
     arms control treaties that have come before the Senate in 
     recent decades.'' Lugar concludes that the treaty's 
     usefulness is ``highly questionable,'' and that it would 
     ``exacerbate risks and uncertainties related to the safety of 
     our nuclear stockpile.'' He rightly points to the treaty's 
     ``ineffective verification regime'' and ``practically 
     nonexistent enforcement process.''
       Senator Lugar's careful, detailed assessment of the treaty 
     contrasts sharply with the rugby cheering section coming from 
     the London, Paris and Berlin offices of BC&S. Do BC&S know 
     that the treaty actually lacks a definition of the term 
     ``nuclear test?'' Rushed to completion before the 1996 
     Presidential election, Clinton abandoned in mid-stream an 
     effort to negotiate a binding definition. Do they know that 
     advances in mining technology permit tests to be smothered so 
     they cannot be detected? Do they understand the composition 
     and complexities of the U.S. nuclear stockpile or the 
     importance of future testing to overcome any potential 
     problems? Can they get beyond their passion?
       ``Give me that man/That is not passion's slave, and I will 
     wear him/In my heart's core . . .'' Sound advice from Will 
     (Shakespeare, not Hutton).
                                  ____


              [From the Washington Times, Sept. 14, 1999]

                          The Company You Keep

                         (By Frank Gaffney Jr.)

       Today has been designated by proponents of the 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to be the ``CTBT Day of 
     Action.'' The plan apparently is to use this occasion to flex 
     the muscles of the unreconstructed anti-nuclear movement with 
     phone calls barraging the Capitol Hill switchboard, a 
     demonstration on the Capitol grounds, Senate speeches and 
     other agitation aimed at intimidating Majority Leader Trend 
     Lott and Foreign Relations Chairman Jesse Helms into clearing 
     the way for this treaty's ratification.
       An insight into the strategy was offered last Friday by 
     Sen. Byron Dorgan, North Dakota Democrat, who suggested in 
     the colloquy with Mr. Lott that he intended to tie the Senate 
     into knots if hearings and action on the CTBT's resolution of 
     ratification were not promptly scheduled. The Majority leader 
     responded by indicating he had already spoke to Sen. Helms 
     about scheduling such hearings. He added portentously, 
     however, that ``I cannot wait to hear how Jim Schlesinger 
     describes the CTBT treaty. When he gets through damning it, 
     they may not want more hearings.''
       Mr. Dorgan responded: ``Mr. Schlesinger will be standing in 
     a mighty small crowd. Most of the folks who are supporting 
     this treaty are the folks who Sen. Lott and I have the 
     greatest respect for who have served this country as 
     Republicans and Democrats, and military policy analysts for 
     three or four decades, going back to President Dwight D. 
     Eisenhower.''
       This, then, is how the fight over the Comprehensive Test 
     Ban Treaty is shaping up. It will be one in which the pivotal 
     block of senators--mostly Republicans but possibly including 
     a number of ``New Democtats''--decide how they will vote less 
     on the basis of the merits of this accord than on the company 
     they will be keeping when they choose sides.
       This is not an unreasonable response to a treaty that deals 
     with a matter as complex as nuclear testing. Such testing is, 
     after all, an exceedingly esoteric field, mostly science but 
     with a fair measure of art thrown in. For the best part of 
     the past 55 years, it has been recognized to be an 
     indispensable methodology for ensuring the reliability, 
     safety and effectiveness of America's nuclear deterrent.
       Now, though, the Clinton administration would have us 
     accept that it is no longer necessary, that our nuclear 
     arsenal can continue to meet these exacting standards even if 
     none of its weapons are tested via underground explosions 
     ever again. This represents a stunning leap of logic (if not 
     of faith), given the contrary argument made by many CTBT 
     advocates in other contexts--notably, with respect to the F-
     22 and missile defenses. These weapons, we are told, cannot 
     be tested enough; they should not be procured, let alone 
     relied upon, the party line goes, unless and until the most 
     exacting test requirements have been satisfied.
       Whom is a senator to believe? The answer will not only 
     determine his or her stance on the CTBT. It will also say a 
     lot about the senator is question.
       My guess--like Sen. Lott's--is that, at the end of the day, 
     sufficient numbers of senators will be guided by James 
     Schlesinger on a matter that threatens to propel the United 
     States inexorably toward unilateral nuclear disarmament. Few 
     people in the nation have more authority and credibility on 
     this topic than he, the only man in history to have held the 
     positions of chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, 
     director of central intelligence, secretary of defense and 
     secretary of energy. Mr. Schlesinger's career has been made 
     even more influential in the Senate by virtue of his service 
     in both Republican and Democratic Cabinets.
       Then there are the 50 or so senior security policy 
     practitioners who last week wrote Mr. Lott an open letter 
     advising him that ``the nation must retain an arsenal 
     comprising modern, safe and reliable nuclear weapons, and the 
     scientific and industrial base necessary to ensure the 
     availability of such weapons over the long term. In our 
     professional judgment, the zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban 
     Treaty is incompatible with these requirements and, 
     therefore, is inconsistent with America's national security 
     interests.
       Among the many distinguished signatories of this letter 
     are: former U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick; two of 
     President Reagan's National Security Advisers (Richard Allen 
     and William Clark); former Attorney General Edwin Meese; and 
     10 retired four-star generals and admirals (including the 
     former commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. Louis Wilson). 
     When these sorts of men and women challenge the zero-yield 
     CTBT, as Mr. Schlesinger has done, on the grounds it will 
     contribute to the steady erosion of our deterrent, will be 
     impossible to verify and will make no appreciable 
     contribution to slowing proliferation, responsible senators 
     cannot help but be concerned.
       To be sure, the Clinton administration and its arms control 
     allies have generated their own letters offering 
     ``celebrity'' endorsements of the CTBT. Senators weighing 
     these endorsements, however, would be well-advised to 
     consider the following, obviously unrehearsed statement of 
     support for the Treaty given by one such prominent figure--
     the serving chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Hugh 
     Shelton. It came last week in a congressional hearing in 
     response to a softball question from Sen. Carl Levin, 
     Michigan Democrat, about why Gen. Shelton thought the CTBT is 
     in our national interest. The chairman responded by saying:
       ``Sir, I think from the standpoint of the holding back on 
     the development of the testing which leads to wanting a 
     better system, developing new capabilities, which then leads 
     you into arms sales or into proliferation. Stopping that as 
     early as we can, I

[[Page 24892]]

     think, is in the best interest of the international community 
     in general, and specifically in the best interest of the 
     United States.''
       Stripped of the veneer of this sort of support, the zero-
     yield Comprehensive Test Ban can be seen for what it is: the 
     product primarily of the decades-long agitation of the looney 
     left who, in their efforts to ``disarm the ones they're 
     with,'' have made themselves the kind of company few 
     thoughtful senators should want to keep--on CTBT Day of 
     Action or when the votes on this treaty ultimately get 
     counted.
                                  ____


          [From the Investor's Business Daily, Sept. 13, 1999]

               Test Ban or Unilateral Disarmament Treaty?

                       (By Frank J. Gaffney Jr.)

       The utopians in the Clinton camp have set their sights on 
     another nuclear weapons treaty. It's not designed to preserve 
     U.S. military capability, but rather to disarm it.
       A major campaign is on to press the U.S. Senate to approve 
     ratification of the controversial arms control accord, the 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It's intended to ban 
     permanently all nuclear weapons tests.
       For the better part of 50 years, such testing has been 
     relied upon by successive Republican and Democratic 
     administrations to assure the safety, reliability and 
     effectiveness of the nation's nuclear deterrent.
       Now we are told by the Clinton team and its allies that our 
     arsenal will be able to continue to meet this exacting 
     standard for the indefinite future without conducting another 
     underground detonation.
       What is extraordinary is that the claim is being made by 
     many of the same people who regularly rail that the Pentagon 
     is not doing enough to test its weapons systems to ensure 
     that they will perform as advertised.
       For example, such critics challenge the realism of the two 
     successful intercepts recently achieved by the Theater High 
     Altitude Area Defense missile defense system. Then there is 
     the complaint that too much computer modeling and too little 
     rigorous pre-production testing has been done to permit 
     further procurement of the Air Force's impressive next-
     generation fighter, the F-22.
       So one might ask of CTBT proponents: Which is it going to 
     be? Can we settle for computer modeling and simulations? Or 
     is realistic testing essential if we are to trust our 
     security and tax dollars to sophisticated weaponry?
       Their answer? It depends: As long as the CTBT remains 
     unratified, the administration position seems likely to 
     remain that we can rely upon the current nuclear inventory, 
     and simulations will assure their reliability. But 
     simulations won't allow us to develop new weapons.
       Thus, it would be hard to modernize the inventory as 
     strategic circumstances change. For instance, how could we 
     know if a new, deep-penetrating warhead will take out a 
     hardened underground bunker if we can't test it?
       Should the Senate give its advice and consent to this 
     accord, however, that line seems sure to change. Then the 
     CTBT's proponents will revert to form, free to acknowledge 
     the obvious: The existing stockpile--comprised increasingly 
     obsolescing weapons--cannot be maintained without testing, 
     either. So by their logic, the next move would be to just 
     retire all the weapons.
       Consider the October 1997 congressional testimony of then-
     Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs Victor 
     Reis: ``Just about all the parts of our present nuclear 
     weapons) are going to have to be remade.'' No responsible 
     scientists could promise, in the absence of explosive 
     testing, that completely remanufactured thermonuclear devices 
     will work as advertised. And no one will be arguing that 
     point more vociferously than the antinuclear activists who 
     are pushing the CTBT.
       When challenged on this score, the White House blithely 
     asserts it is pursuing a $40 billion Stockpile Stewardship 
     Program (SSP) to address such quality-control issues down the 
     road.
       Unfortunately, this capability will materialize--if at 
     all--a long way down the road. It will take some 10 years to 
     construct new facilities to house the various exotic 
     experimental diagnostic technologies that are supposed to 
     provide the same confidence about the performance of our 
     nuclear stockpile as does nuclear testing.
       Plus, no one knows for sure whether the SSP will actually 
     pan out. Even before the CTBT is ratified, many of the 
     treaty's supporters are urging Congress to delete the 
     billions being sought each year for Lawrence Livermore 
     Laboratory's National Ignition Facility and its counterpart 
     facilities at the other nuclear labs.
       Even if properly funded and brought on line as scheduled, 
     though, it is unclear that the simulations provided by these 
     experimental devices will be as accurate as underground 
     detonations. And, of course, a test ban will preclude the one 
     scientifically rigorous way of proving the simulations' 
     accuracy.
       The bottom line is that U.S. national security demands that 
     we filed nothing but systematically and rigorously tested 
     military systems, both conventional and nuclear. To be sure, 
     computer simulations can contribute significantly to reducing 
     the cost and the length of time it takes to develop and 
     deploy such weapons. But we cannot afford to let any weapon--
     least of all the most important ones in our arsenal, our 
     nuclear deterrent--go untested and unproven.
                                  ____


        [From the Worldwide Weekly Defense News, Sept. 27, 1999]

         Truth About Nuclear Testing Would Sink Test Ban Treaty

                           (By Frank Gaffney)

       In the course of a Sept. 9 hearing before the U.S. Senate 
     Armed Services Committee called to consider the nomination of 
     Gen. Hugh Shelton to a second term as chairman of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff, Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) asked the general 
     to explain why the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was 
     in the national interest.
       He responded in a halting, almost tortured fashion, saying: 
     ``Sir, I think from the standpoint of the holding back on the 
     development of the testing which leads to wanting a better 
     system, developing new capabilities, which then leads you 
     into arms sales or into proliferation. Stopping that as early 
     as we can, I think, is in the best interest of the 
     international community in general, and specifically in the 
     best interest of the United States.''
       Translation: Unless my staff gives me a written text, I 
     can't begin to explain the logic of this arms control 
     agreement, which would make it permanently illegal to test 
     any U.S. nuclear weapons, even though we are going to rely 
     upon such arms as the ultimate guarantor of our security for 
     the foreseeable future. Still, the party line is that we 
     support this treaty and I am going to do so, no matter what.
       The administration of President Bill Clinton established in 
     1993, long before Shelton became Joint Chiefs chairman, that 
     there would be no further testing of U.S. nuclear weapons, 
     with or without a CTBT.
       The general inherited a position adopted on his 
     predecessor's watch and with the latter's support that would 
     be politically costly at this late date to repudiate. The 
     fact remains, however, that the idea of trying to ban all 
     nuclear tests (the so-called zero-yield test ban) was opposed 
     by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, among other relevant U.S. 
     government agencies, before Clinton decided to embrace it.
       The reason the U.S. military counseled against such an 
     accord was elementary: It is widely understood that a zero-
     yield treaty cannot be verified. Other countries can, and 
     must be expected to, exploit the inability of U.S. national 
     technical means and international seismic monitors to detect 
     covert, low-yield underground tests.
       Since the United States would scrupulously adhere to a 
     zero-yield ban, it would be enjoined from conducting 
     experimental detonations necessary to maintaining the safety 
     and reliability of its nuclear deterrent.
       U.S. military leaders are not expected to be experts on 
     nuclear nonproliferation or arms control. The government 
     hires lots of other people to do those jobs. Unfortunately, 
     many of the policy-makers responsible for those portfolios 
     lack the integrity or common sense one expects of men and 
     women in uniform, hence their claims that the CTBT will 
     contribute to curbing the spread of nuclear weapons.
       This is, of course, fatuous nonsense in a world in which a 
     number of countries have acquired such weaponry without 
     conducting known nuclear tests, and others seek to buy proven 
     nuclear devices or the necessary know-how and equipment from 
     willing sellers in Russia, China and Pakistan.
       Neither should the leadership of the American armed forces 
     be seen as adjuncts to an administration's political 
     operation. Rather, what is expected from such leaders is 
     their best professional military judgment, the unvarnished 
     truth, no matter how politically incorrect or inconvenient it 
     may be.
       The United States cannot afford to allow its nuclear 
     arsenal to continue to go untested (it has already been seven 
     years since the last underground detonation occurred) any 
     more than it could permit its national security to depend on 
     untested conventional planes, tanks, missiles or ships.

                           *   *   *   *   *

                                  ____


               [From the Washington Post, Sept. 10, 1999]

                       A Test Ban That Disarms Us

       When it comes to nuclear testing, nations will act in their 
     perceived self-interest.

                        (By Charles Krauthammer)

       Some debates just never go away. The Clinton administration 
     is back again pressing Congress for passage of the 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This is part of a 
     final-legacy push that includes a Middle East peace for just-
     in-time delivery by September 2000.
       The argument for the test ban is that it will prevent 
     nuclear proliferation. If countries cannot test nukes, they 
     will not build them because they won't know if they work. 
     Ratifying the CTBT is supposed to close the testing option 
     for would-be nuclear powers.
       We sign. They desist, How exactly does this work?
       As a Washington Post editorial explains, one of the ways to 
     ``induce would-be

[[Page 24893]]

     proliferators to get off the nuclear track'' is ``if the 
     nuclear powers showed themselves ready to accept some 
     increasing part of the discipline they are calling on non-
     nuclear others to accept.'' The power of example of the 
     greatest nuclear country is expected to induce other 
     countries to follow suit.
       History has not been kind to this argument. The most 
     dramatic counterexamples, of course, are rogue states such as 
     North Korea, Iraq and Iran. They don't sign treaties and, 
     even when they do, they set out to break them clandestinely 
     from the first day. Moral suasion does not sway them.
       More interesting is the case of friendly countries such as 
     India and Pakistan. They are exactly the kind of countries 
     whose nuclear ambitions the American example of restraint is 
     supposed to mollify.
       Well, then. The United States has not exploded a nuclear 
     bomb either above or below ground since 1992. In 1993, 
     President Clinton made it official by declaring a total 
     moratorium on U.S. testing. Then last year, India and 
     Pakistan went ahead and exploded a series of nuclear bombs. 
     So much for moral suasion. Why did they do it? Because of 
     this obvious, if inconvenient, truth: Nuclear weapons are the 
     supreme military asset. Not that they necessarily will be 
     used in warfare. But their very possession transforms the 
     geopolitical status of the possessor. The possessor acquires 
     not just aggressive power but, even more important, a 
     deterrent capacity as well.
       Ask yourself: Would we have launched the Persian Gulf War 
     if Iraq had been bristling with nukes?
       This truth is easy for Americans to forget because we have 
     so much conventional strength that our nuclear forces appear 
     superfluous, even vestigial. Lesser countries, however, 
     recognize the political and diplomatic power conveyed by 
     nuclear weapons.
       They want the nuclear option. For good reason. And they 
     will not forgo it because they are moved by the moral example 
     of the United States. Nations follow their interests, not 
     norms.
       Okay, say the test ban advocates. If not swayed by American 
     example, they will be swayed by the penalties for breaking an 
     international norm.
       What penalties? China exploded test after test until it had 
     satisfied itself that its arsenal was in good shape, then 
     quit in 1996. India and Pakistan broke the norm on nuclear 
     testing and nonproliferation. North Korea openly flouted the 
     Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
       Were any of these countries sanctioned? North Korea was 
     actually rewarded with enormous diplomatic and financial 
     inducements--including billions of dollars in fuel and food 
     aid--to act nice. India and Pakistan got slapped on the wrist 
     for a couple of months.
       That's it. Why? Because these countries are either too 
     important (India) or too scary (North Korea). Despite our 
     pretensions, for America too, interests trump norms.
       Whether the United States signs a ban on nuclear testing 
     will not affect the course of proliferation. But it will 
     affect the nuclear status of the United States.
       In the absence of testing, the American nuclear arsenal, 
     the most sophisticated on the globe and thus the most in need 
     of testing to ensure its safety and reliability, will degrade 
     over time. As its reliability declines, it becomes unusable. 
     For the United States, the unintended effect of a test ban is 
     gradual disarmament.
       Well, maybe not so unintended. For the more extreme 
     advocates of the test ban, nonproliferation is the ostensible 
     argument, but disarmament is the real objective. The Ban the 
     Bomb and Nuclear Freeze movements have been discredited by 
     history, but their adherents have found a back door. A 
     nuclear test ban is that door. For them, the test ban is part 
     of a larger movement: the war against weapons. It finds 
     expression in such touching and useless exercises as the land 
     mine convention, the biological weapons convention, etc.

                           *   *   *   *   *

                                  ____


                [From the Washington Post, June 7, 1998]

                             Paper Defense

                          (By George F. Will)

       In the meadow of the president's mind, in the untended 
     portion where foreign policy thoughts sprout randomly, this 
     flower recently bloomed concerning the Indian and Pakistani 
     nuclear tests: ``I cannot believe that we are about to start 
     the 21st century by having the Indian subcontinent repeat the 
     worst mistakes of the 20th century.''
       What mistakes did he mean? Having nuclear weapons? Were it 
     not for them, scores of thousands of Americans would have 
     died in 1945 ending the fighting in the Pacific. And nuclear 
     weapons were indispensable ingredients of the containment of 
     the Soviet Union and its enormous conventional forces.
       Perhaps the president meant that arms competitions were the 
     ``mistakes.'' But that thought does not rise to the level of 
     adult commentary on the real historical contingencies and 
     choices of nations.
       This president's utterances on foreign policy often are 
     audible chaff, and not even his glandular activities are as 
     embarrassing as his sub-sophomoric pronouncement to India and 
     Pakistan that ``two wrongs don't make a right.'' That bromide 
     was offered to nations weighing what they consider questions 
     of national life and death.
       U.S. policy regarding such tests has been put on automatic 
     pilot by Congress's itch to micromanage and to mandate 
     cathartic gestures, so the United States will now 
     evenhandedly punish with economic sanctions India for its 
     provocation and Pakistan for responding to it. Because India 
     is stronger economically, the sanctions will be 
     disproportionately injurious to Pakistan.
       India has an enormous advantage over Pakistan in 
     conventional military forces. (It has the world's fourth 
     largest military establishment, although China's army is 
     three times larger than India's.) That is one reason Pakistan 
     believes it needs nuclear weapons. Economic sanctions will 
     further weaken Pakistan's ability to rely on non-nuclear 
     means of defense.
       This should be a moment for Republicans to reassert their 
     interest in national security issues, one of the few areas in 
     which the public still regards them as more reassuring than 
     Democrats. But the Republican who could be particularly 
     exemplary, isn't. Arizona Sen. John McCain says the first 
     thing to do is impose ``sanctions which hurt'' and the second 
     is ``to get agreements that they will not test again.''
       So, automatic sanctions having failed to deter either 
     nation, Washington's attention turns, robotically, to an even 
     more futile ritual--the superstition of arms control, 
     specifically the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which the 
     United States signed in 1996, but which the Senate has 
     prudently not ratified. The designation ``superstition'' fits 
     because the faith of believers in arms control is more than 
     impervious to evidence; their faith is strengthened even by 
     evidence that actually refutes it.
       Far from demonstrating the urgency of ratification, India's 
     and Pakistan's tests demonstrate the CTBT's irrelevance. 
     India had not tested since 1974. Pakistan evidently had never 
     tested. Yet both had sufficient stockpiles to perform 
     multiple tests. So the tests did not create new sabers, they 
     were the rattling of sabers known to have existed for years. 
     Indeed, in 1990, when fighting in the disputed territory of 
     Kashmir coincided with Indian military exercises, the Bush 
     administration assumed that both Pakistan and India had built 
     weapons with their nuclear technologies and worried about a 
     possible nuclear exchange.
       The nonproliferation treaty authorizes international 
     inspections only at sites declared to be nuclear facilities. 
     Nations have been known to fib. The CTBT sets such a low-
     yield standard of what constitutes a test of a nuclear 
     device, that verification is impossible.
       Various of the president's policies, whether shaped by 
     corruption, in competence of naivete, have enabled China to 
     increase the lethality of its ICBMs. The president and his 
     party are committed to keeping America vulnerable to such 
     weapons: 41 senators, all Democrats, have filibustered 
     legislation sponsored by Sens. Thad Cochran (R-Miss.) and 
     Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii) declaring it U.S. policy ``to deploy 
     effective anti-missile defenses of the territory of the 
     United States as soon as technologically possible.''
       Instead, the administration would defend the nation with 
     parchment--gestures like the CTBT, which is a distillation of 
     liberalism's foreign policy of let's pretend. Let's pretend 
     that if we forever forswear tests, other nations' admiration 
     will move them to emulation. Diagnostic tests are 
     indispensable for maintaining the safety and reliability of 
     the aging U.S. deterrent inventory. So the CTBT is a recipe 
     for slow-motion denuclearization. But let's pretend that if 
     we become weaker, other nations will not want to become 
     stronger.
       Seeking a safer world by means of a weaker America and 
     seeking to make America safe behind the parchment walls of 
     arms control agreements, is to start the 21st century by 
     repeating the worst fallacies of the 20th century.

             [From the Wall Street Journal, Oct. 12, 1999]

               . . . Would Be Even Worse if It Succeeded

                          (By Kathleen Bailey)

       It appears the Senate will either vote down the 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or postpone a vote 
     indefinitely. The treaty's supporters, led by President 
     Clinton, argue that the CTBT is necessary to constrain 
     nations that seek to acquire a workable nuclear weapons 
     design. But the treaty would accomplish none of its 
     proponents' nonproliferation goals. It would, however, 
     seriously degrade the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
       No treaty can stop a nation from designing and building a 
     simple nuclear weapon with confidence that it will work. To 
     do so doesn't require testing. One of the U.S. bombs dropped 
     on Japan in 1945 was of a design that had never been tested, 
     and South Africa built six nuclear weapons without testing.
       By contrast, the U.S. today needs to test its nuclear 
     weapons because they are more complex. They are designed to 
     make pinpoint strikes against small targets such as silos. 
     This dictates high-performance delivery systems, which, in 
     turn, requires tight parameters on the allowable weight, 
     size, shape, safety measures and yield.
       Today's would-be proliferators are likely to target cities, 
     not silos. The delivery vehicles may be ships, barges, trucks 
     or Scud-

[[Page 24894]]

     type missiles. The exact yield of the weapon will not matter, 
     and there will be no tight restrictions imposed by advanced 
     delivery systems. Safety standards will not be a crucial 
     issue.
       CTBT proponents also contend that the treaty will promote 
     nonproliferation by creating an international norm against 
     nuclear weapons. But there is already a norm against 
     additional nations acquiring nuclear weapons: the Nuclear 
     Nonproliferation Treaty, signed by every major country except 
     India, Israel and Pakistan.
       The NPT norm against the pursuit of nuclear weapons, 
     established when the treaty went into effect in 1970, has 
     been broken repeatedly, and not just by the three countries 
     that refused to sign it. The list of states that have broken 
     or are thought to have broken the norm includes Argentina, 
     Brazil, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, South Africa, South Korea 
     and Taiwan.
       It is true, as treaty proponents argue, that the CTBT will 
     inhibit nuclear-weapons modernization. But this is not a 
     plus. It would keep the U.S. from modernizing its nuclear 
     arsenal to make it as safe as possible. Already there are new 
     safety measures that could be incorporated into the American 
     stockpile, making it less likely that weapons will explode 
     accidentally--but the U.S. is not incorporating these new 
     safety technologies because they would require low-yield 
     nuclear testing.
       Modernization is also needed to make U.S. weapons more 
     effective against the ever-evolving countermeasures by 
     opponents. We know that deeply buried targets are a new 
     problem, as are biological weapons. America may need to 
     tailor its arsenal to a totally different type of targets in 
     the future, which would require nuclear testing.
       While the treaty would inhibit U.S. modernization, it would 
     not affect those that choose to cheat. It would be easy for 
     Russia, China, and others to conduct nuclear tests without 
     being detected. This is because the CTBT is not even 
     minimally verifiable.
       Effective verification entails having high confidence that 
     militarily significant cheating will be detected in a timely 
     manner. In the case of the CTBT, we need to know the answers 
     to two questions: What yield nuclear test can provide 
     militarily significant information? Can the CTBT verification 
     system detect to that level?
       Five hundred tons of yield is a very useful testing level, 
     although not sufficient to gain full confidence in all 
     aspects of an existing weapon's performance or to develop 
     sophisticated new nuclear weapons. The latter goals could be 
     achieved for most designs with tests at yields between one 
     and 10 kilotons. Tests at levels as low as 500 tons may be 
     militarily significant.
       The International Monitoring System of the CTBT is expected 
     to provide the ability to detect, locate and identify non 
     evasive nuclear testing of one kiloton or greater. But most 
     cheaters are likely to be evasive. By taking some relatively 
     simple measures, they could test several kilotons with little 
     risks of detection. One method by which they may do so is 
     through energy decoupling--detonation of the device 
     underground--that can reduce the seismic signal by as much as 
     a factor of 70. Thus, a fully decoupled one-kiloton explosion 
     would look seismically like at 14-ton explosion, or a 10-
     kiloton explosion like a 140-ton one.
       On-site inspection will not solve the verification problem. 
     Even if we knew that a test would conducted, we almost 
     certainly would not know exactly where it took place. Without 
     knowing the precise location, the search area would be too 
     large for a meaningful inspection.
       If the Senate ratified the CTBT, it's certain that the U.S. 
     would comply with it, foreclosing America's ability to 
     modernize its nuclear forces. But other nations have a 
     history of noncompliance with arms-control treaties. Thus the 
     limited political benefits of the CTBT are not worth the high 
     cost to America's national security.
                                  ____


               [From The New Republic, October 25, 1999]

                 The Flawed Test Ban Treaty--Poor Pact

                       (By Frank J. Gaffney Jr.)

       If current vote-counts prove accurate and no last-minute 
     postponement is agreed to, the Senate will not provide the 
     two-thirds support necessary to ratify the Comprehensive Test 
     Ban Treaty (CTBT). Although the Clinton administration acts 
     as if this would be disastrous for the struggle against 
     nuclear proliferation, defeat of the CTBT would actually be a 
     victory for American national security.
       As the administration has implicitly conceded by sending 
     Energy Secretary Bill Richardson on a last-minute trip to 
     Russia to negotiate better verification procedures, many 
     senators harbor deep concerns about the treaty's 
     verifiability. They are right to do so. U.S. intelligence 
     suspects (but cannot prove) that both the Russians and the 
     Chinese have conducted covert nuclear tests in recent months. 
     In fact, it is impossible to verify a total, or ``zero-
     yield,'' ban on all nuclear testing, since foreign monitors 
     cannot reliably differentiate covert low-yield explosions 
     from earthquakes or conventional explosions.
       This would be true even if the sort of worldwide seismic 
     monitoring system to be established under the CTBT (thanks 
     largely to the administration's decision to put U.S. 
     intelligence assets at the service of a multilateral 
     organization) were in place. For political, if not technical, 
     reasons, the data compiled by the ``international community'' 
     will probably be even less conducive to a finding of 
     noncompliance than the iffy information the United States 
     often gets on its own.
       Treaty proponents point to the CTBT's provision for on-site 
     inspections. Such inspections are far from automatic and can 
     be stymied by U.N. Security Council members determined to 
     block them. If nations exploit well-understood techniques for 
     muffling the seismic shocks that such events precipitate 
     (``decoupling''), they can increase the yield of their tests 
     without getting caught--as the United States proved in its 
     own 1960 experiment.
       Even if the CTBT were fully verifiable, it would be 
     irrelevant to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Explosive 
     testing is simply no longer the sine qua non of a nuclear 
     development and acquisition program. From Israel to North 
     Korea, countries have acquired atomic devices without 
     conducting identified nuclear tests. (Pakistan and India 
     conducted their recent tests for political, not 
     technological, reasons, and the tests took place years after 
     each of them had gotten the bomb.) Even Clinton's CTBT point 
     man, National Security Council staffer Steve Andreason, has 
     publicly stated that this treaty will not prevent countries 
     from obtaining ``simple'' weapons--which can be all too 
     useful for terrorism and blackmail.
       While the CTBT will not have the benefits the 
     administration claims, it will cost the United States dearly 
     by making it impossible to maintain the U.S. nuclear 
     deterrent over time. That will be the practical and 
     ineluctable effect of denying those responsible for ensuring 
     the safety, reliability, and effectiveness of this deterrent 
     the tool that they have relied upon for the vast majority of 
     the past 55 years: realistic, explosive testing. The 
     exceedingly sophisticated nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal 
     cannot prudently be kept ``on the shelf'' indefinitely. The 
     current average age of these weapons is 14 years; they were 
     only designed to be in service for 20. And none were planned 
     or manufactured to remain viable in a no-test environment.
       Indeed, experience suggests that problems with the nuclear 
     deterrent probably exist already, going undetected ever since 
     Congress voted to adopt a testing cutoff in 1992. On his last 
     day in office, President Bush formally appealed for relief 
     from this legislation, warning that ``the requirement to 
     maintain and improve the safety of our nuclear stockpile and 
     to evaluate and maintain the reliability of the U.S. forces 
     necessitates continued nuclear testing for those purposes, 
     albeit at a modest level, for the foreseeable future.'' 
     Although President Clinton tends to dissemble on this point, 
     every administration until his recognized that periodic 
     underground testing--at least at low levels of explosive 
     ``yield''--was necessary to detect and fix problems that 
     unexpectedly, but chronically, appear even in relatively new 
     weapons. Hence, no other president since World War II was 
     prepared to accept the sort of permanent, zero-yield ban 
     Clinton has embraced.
       Moreover, the older the weapon, the more problematic it 
     becomes to certify its safety and reliability through 
     computer simulations alone. As complex nuclear arms age, 
     their exotic metals, chemicals, and highly radioactive 
     materials undergo changes that are exceedingly difficult to 
     predict and model via computer methods. At a minimum, if such 
     weapons are to be retained for the foreseeable future, they 
     must be updated. As then-Assistant Secretary of Energy for 
     Defense Programs Victor Reis told Congress in October 1997, 
     ``Just about all the parts [of the current arsenal's weapons] 
     are going to have to be remade.''
       There are serious challenges to such a wholesale 
     refurbishing program that even new experimental devices such 
     as those being developed under the administration's more than 
     $45 billion Stockpile Stewardship Program will not be able to 
     address with certainty, at least not for the next decade or 
     so. First, the production lines for building the stockpile's 
     existing bombs and warheads were dismantled long ago. 
     Reconstituting them would require a lot of time and money. 
     And, even if the original designs could be faithfully 
     replicated, one could never be certain they would work 
     according to their specifications without realistic, 
     explosive testing to validate the product.
       Second, it is impossible to replicate some of the 
     ingredients in weapons designed two decades ago or earlier; 
     key components have become technologically obsolete, and no 
     one would recommend using them when smaller, lighter, 
     cheaper, and more reliable materials and equipment are now 
     readily available. In addition, federal safety and health 
     guidelines now prohibit the use of some of the components 
     utilized in the original designs.
       Third, most of those who were involved in designing and 
     proving these weapons have left the industrial and laboratory 
     complex, taking with them irreplaceable corporate memory. 
     With continuing nuclear testing, all these problems could 
     presumably be overcome. Without such testing, the United

[[Page 24895]]

     States will be able neither to modernize its nuclear arsenal 
     to meet future deterrent requirements nor to retain the high 
     confidence it requires in the older weapons upon which it 
     would then have to rely for the foreseeable future.
       It is precisely for these reasons that the CTBT has been, 
     to use Clinton's phrase, the ``longest-sought, hardest-
     fought'' goal of the anti-nuclear movement. Fortunately, more 
     than 34 senators have figured out that, were it to be 
     ratified, the CTBT would set the United States on the 
     slippery slope to unilateral nuclear disarmament. Whenever 
     the votes are finally tallied on this accord, will the 
     ``nays'' include any of the Senate's self-described New 
     Democrats--whose partisans brought Clinton and Al Gore to 
     power on a platform that prominently featured a more tough-
     minded approach to national security and defense issues?
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Times, Oct. 12, 1999]

                          Time for a CTBT Vote

                        (By Frank Gaffney, Jr.)

       In 23 years of working on nuclear weapons policy and 
     related arms control matters, I have never seen anything like 
     what happened last Thursday. That was the day Sen. Richard 
     Lugar, Indiana Republican, released a six-page press release 
     detailing the myriad and compelling reasons that would cause 
     him to vote against the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
       What makes this development so extraordinary, of course, is 
     that Dick Lugar has an unparalleled reputation in Washington 
     for his commitment to arms control in particular and his 
     willingness more generally to rise above politics in the 
     interest of lending bipartisan heft to foreign policy 
     initiatives he believes to be in the national interest. With 
     apologies to the Smith Barney marketeers, when Mr. Lugar 
     speaks on treaties, people listen.
       Rarely has it been more important that his Senate 
     colleagues do so. Indeed, the Indiana senator has offered a 
     critique of the CTBT that should be required reading for 
     anyone being asked to vote on this treaty. He summarizes the 
     reasons why he will vote against this treaty as follows:
       The goal of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is to ban all 
     nuclear explosions worldwide: I do not believe it can 
     succeed. I have little confidence that the verification and 
     enforcement provisions will dissuade other nations from 
     nuclear testing. Furthermore, I am concerned about our 
     country's ability to maintain the integrity and safety of our 
     own nuclear arsenal under the conditions of the treaty.
       The impact of so withering an assessment--backed up by 
     pages of painstaking analysis--was evident on Sunday as 
     syndicated columnist George Will accomplished the 
     intellectual equivalent of rope-a-dope in an interview with 
     Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on ABC News' ``This 
     Week'' program. Mrs. Albright was reduced to sputtering as 
     Mr. Will read from one section of Sen. Lugar's indictment 
     after another, unable either to challenge the authority of 
     the indicter or effectively to rebut his damning conclusions.
       Instead, she worked rather tendentiously and unconvincingly 
     through her talking points about how Senate opposition to the 
     CTBT signals that ``We are not as serious about controlling 
     nuclear weapons as we should be.'' Nonsense. To the contrary, 
     the opposition to this treaty can be justified as much on its 
     adverse impact on ``serious'' efforts to control nuclear 
     weapons as on the fact it will undermine the U.S. nuclear 
     deterrent. As Sen. Lugar put it:
       ``I do not believe that the CTBT is of the same caliber as 
     the arms control treaties that have come before the Senate in 
     recent decades. Its usefulness to the goal of non-
     proliferation is highly questionable. Its likely 
     ineffectuality will risk undermining support [for] and 
     confidence in the concept of multilateral arms control. Even 
     as a symbolic statement of our desire for a safer world, it 
     is problematic because it would exacerbate risks and 
     uncertainties related to the safety of our nuclear 
     stockpile.''
       In short, by making it clear the Comprehensive Test Ban 
     Treaty is incompatible with U.S. national security 
     requirements and bad for arms control, Richard Lugar has 
     delivered the kiss-of-death to the CTBT. Without his support, 
     it is inconceivable that a two-thirds majority could be found 
     in the Senate to permit ratification of this accord.
       The question that occurs now is: Since the CTBT is so 
     fatally flawed and so injurious, will the Senate's Republican 
     majority agree to let it continue to bind the United States 
     for the foreseeable future? That would be the practical 
     effect of exercising the option a number of GOP senators 
     (including, it must be noted, Mr. Lugar) hope President 
     Clinton will allow them to exercise--unscheduling the vote 
     this week and deferring further Senate action on the 
     Comprehensive Test Ban until after the 2000 elections, at the 
     earliest.
       Under international law, that would mean only one thing: 
     Until such time as our government makes it clear the CTBT 
     will not be ratified, the United States will be obligated to 
     take no action that would defeat the ``object and purpose'' 
     of the CTBT. This would mean not only no resumption of 
     testing. Under the Clinton administration, there will 
     certainly be no preparations to conduct explosive tests 
     either--or even actions to stop the steady, lethal erosion of 
     the nation's technical and human capabilities needed to do 
     so.
       If national security considerations alone were not 
     sufficiently compelling to prompt the Senate leadership to 
     stay the course and defeat the treaty, the conduct of the 
     president and his surrogates should be sufficient inducement. 
     After all, administration spokesmen are using every available 
     platform to denounce Republicans for playing ``political'' 
     games with this treaty. (Never mind that the president and 
     every one of his allies on CTBT in the Senate had a chance to 
     reject the time-agreement that scheduled the vote. As long as 
     they thought their side would prevail, the 14 hours of debate 
     were considered to be sufficient; only when more accurate, 
     and ominous, tallies were taken did the proponents begin to 
     whine there was too little time for hearings and floor 
     deliberation.)
       Moreover, in refusing to date to commit not to push for a 
     vote in an even more politically charged environment next 
     year, the CTBT's champions are behaving in a manner that can 
     only encourage GOP speculation that the president and his 
     partisans have every intention of using whatever deferral 
     they are granted to campaign against the Republican 
     majority--with the hope not only of changing minds, but 
     changing senators and even control of the Senate in the 
     upcoming election.
       With Dick Lugar arguing that the zero-yield, permanent 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty must be defeated, Senate 
     Republicans can safely do what is right without fear of 
     serious domestic political repercussions. And, while there 
     will be much bellyaching around the world if the CTBT is 
     rejected by the U.S. Senate, the real, lasting impact will 
     not be to precipitate nuclear proliferation; it is happening 
     now and will intensify no matter what happens on this treaty. 
     Neither will it be to inflict mortal harm or 
     ``embarrassment'' on the presidency. No one could do more to 
     demean that office than the incumbent.
       Rather, the most important--and altogether desirable--
     effect will be to re-establish the U.S. Senate as the Framers 
     of the Constitution intended it to be: a co-equal with the 
     president in the making of international treaties; a quality-
     control agent pursuant to the sacred principles of checks-
     and-balances on executive authority, one that if exercised 
     stands to strengthen the leverage of U.S. diplomats in the 
     future and assure that the arms control and other treaties 
     they negotiate more closely conform to American security 
     interests. Mr. Lugar put it very well in his formidable press 
     release of last Thursday:
       ``While affirming our desire for international peace and 
     stability, the U.S. Senate is charged with the constitutional 
     responsibility of making hard judgments about the likely 
     outcomes of treaties. This requires that we examine the 
     treaties in close detail and calculate the consequences of 
     ratification for the present and the future. Viewed in this 
     context, I cannot support the [CTBT's] ratification.''

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent 
that Cline Crosier on my staff be granted the privilege of the floor 
for the remainder of the debate on this issue.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Madam President, it was interesting to 
hear my colleague from Delaware. He is correct. I remember those signs, 
``One hydrogen bomb could ruin your day.'' I think the reason we are 
here today is a second hydrogen bomb that ruined their day. I think we 
need to make sure they understand we have the capability to respond in 
kind with weapons that will work. I think that is really the subject of 
the debate.
  It takes a very confident person to criticize Edward Teller a little 
bit.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, if the Senator will yield, not on his 
scientific assessments, on his political judgment.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Right.
  The Senator from Delaware also said that if you can't verify the 
reliability or certify the reliability, you can always get out of the 
treaty. That is true. But my concern is, will it be too late to catch 
up at that point? How much time will have elapsed?
  I wonder sometimes how the results of the cold war might have come 
out had we yielded to all of the arms control pressures and adopted 
every arms control agreement exactly as it was pushed upon us, not only 
in the Senate but also in the House over the years. I

[[Page 24896]]

look at arms control agreements in the 1960s and 1970s and 1980s. In 
spite of the fact we had a full-scale Soviet expansion throughout the 
world and full-scale nuclear buildup and absolutely no verification for 
the most part and cheating year after year, time after time we still 
pushed hard for these arms control agreements.
  Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield for 30 seconds for me to respond? 
We did pass the ABM Treaty, SALT I treaty, the INF Treaty, the CFE 
Treaty, and we did it during the cold war.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. And the Soviets violated every one of 
them.
  Mr. BIDEN. They seem to work.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. They work if you want to accept the fact 
that they violated it. We got lucky. That is the bottom line. As to the 
violations that President Reagan said trust but verify, in this 
particular case, I am not prepared to trust the North Koreans or the 
Libyans or the Iranians or the Iraqis or the Red Chinese, No. 1; and, 
No. 2, we cannot verify anything they are doing. That has been 
testified to over and over and over again.
  I rise in very strong opposition to this Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty and, in doing so, know full well that we have one of the 
greatest communicators and spinners in American history in the White 
House. The idea will be that this will become a political debate in 
that how could anyone not be in favor of or how could anybody be 
opposed to a comprehensive test ban where we would ban the testing of 
nuclear weapons. That is the way it will be spun.
  The answer is very simple. Because if you can't verify what the other 
side is doing, then you are at a disadvantage because we have the 
superiority of the arsenal. So if we don't verify that they are not 
testing, and we don't keep our stockpile up to speed because of that, 
and we don't know it is reliable and they do, then we are gradually 
losing that advantage. That is the issue.
  In spite of all the spin we will hear over the next day or two after 
this treaty is voted on, that is the crux of the issue. Let us separate 
the spin. Let us take the politics out of this. Let us take the spin 
out of it and go right to the heart of it. We can't verify what they 
do, and if our stockpile is not reliable because we don't test, they 
gain on us.
  The other point is, some of these nations, such as North Korea, might 
decide to test it on us and think nothing of it. Does anybody feel 
confident that the Iranians or the Iraqis would feel they had to test a 
nuclear weapon before they tried it on us? I don't feel that confident. 
I certainly don't think many in America do either. This treaty is wrong 
for our nuclear weapons program. It is wrong for America. It is wrong 
for the international community. It cannot be verified. It does not 
help us in maintaining our own stockpile.
  Time after time the past several weeks, I have heard members of the 
administration try to spin this issue and claim that every President 
since Eisenhower has sought a comprehensive test ban. Basically, that 
is an attempt to hide the truth, to fool the American people into 
thinking this treaty would have had unanimous support from all of those 
Presidents. It wouldn't have had the unanimous support of those 
Presidents. To make those of us who oppose this treaty look as if we 
are standing out on the fringes is simply wrong. Yet that is the way it 
is reported. That is the way it is written. That is the way it will be 
spun tonight, tomorrow, and the next day by members of the 
administration as they move out on to the talk shows--at taxpayers' 
expense, I might add--and criticize those of us in the Senate who in 
good conscience vote against this treaty.
  What they haven't told the American people about these Presidents is 
that not one single President--not Eisenhower, not Kennedy, Johnson, 
Nixon, Carter, no one, not Reagan--no one until Bill Clinton ever 
proposed a test ban of zero yield and unlimited duration--zero yield, 
unlimited duration.
  In the past few days, the spin machines have been working overtime 
telling the American people this issue is far too critical to national 
security for the Senate to make such a rash decision on its 
ratification. The administration now wants to pull the treaty, saying 
we haven't had enough time to study it. For up until a week or two ago, 
they were pushing us for a vote on it.
  My colleague from Delaware mentioned the coup in Pakistan, did that 
bother me. No, frankly. I don't think it has a heck of a lot to do with 
this decision. I don't like to see coups anywhere. They contribute to 
the instability in the world. But it has nothing to do, in my view, 
with the issue before us.
  I would like to remind my colleagues, this treaty was signed by 
President Bill Clinton in 1996 and transmitted to the Senate in 1997. 
Over 2 years, we have had this treaty before us. One of the problems I 
have in the Senate is that it doesn't matter how much time you spend on 
something or how long something is before this body; the only time we 
try to get really involved in it is when we are about to vote on 
something. Then those who haven't done their homework want to come out 
here and say we need more time.
  We have had plenty of time. I have had 5 years of hearings on this 
issue. I chaired them myself and have listened to people testify for 
the past 5 years on this issue. I remind my colleagues, just a few 
months ago the minority threatened to hold up every single piece of 
legislation that came to the Senate floor until we agreed to have a 
vote on the test ban treaty. Now they are criticizing us because we are 
having one. It was President Clinton and the minority who demanded the 
treaty be brought before the Senate; it was President Clinton and the 
minority who urged consideration; and it was President Clinton and the 
minority who scolded the majority for failing to act on this issue. 
That was 2, 3 weeks ago.
  So when things go sour on the President, he has a unique way--and a 
very good way, frankly--of twisting things around to his benefit. We 
found that out here on the floor in a very important impeachment vote a 
few months ago. The President has been demanding a vote on this treaty 
for 2 years. Now he has it. But now it is our fault because he is not 
going to get the vote he wants. The President said in remarks on the 
50th anniversary of the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 
August, 1999--not too many months ago--``I ask the Senate to vote for 
ratification as soon as possible.'' That was 2 months ago. He asked the 
Senate, ``to give its advice and consent to the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty this year.''
  The problem with the President is, he wants us to give consent, but 
he doesn't like our advice. That is the problem. The Constitution 
requires both advice and consent. This President needs to learn that 
the Senate is here to advise, and if you want the consent, then you 
need to advise and discuss. That is part of the process. It is part of 
the process in treaties, and it is part of the process in judicial 
nominations, and it is part of the process in other appointments in his 
administration. After 7 years, almost, he still hasn't learned that.
  In his State of the Union, in 1998, President Clinton said, ``Approve 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty this year.'' That was last year. The 
Vice President, Mr. Gore, said, ``The U.S. Congress should act now to 
ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.'' That now was July 23, 1998.
  Now, because the votes are going against him, he is now saying we 
need more time, don't vote now. It is just spin at its best, and he is 
good at it; there is no question about it. That was pure partisan 
politics because when the majority leader finally consented and offered 
to bring the treaty to the floor, it was objected to. Let's remind the 
American people of that. You can bet the President is not going to 
remind them of that. This treaty was objected to when the majority 
leader asked to bring it to the floor. Then he offered a second time to 
bring the treaty to the floor and this body agreed by unanimous consent 
to a debate and a vote.
  Let me say again: Unanimously, we agreed to a debate and a vote.
  The minority party had ample opportunity at that time to object on 
the

[[Page 24897]]

grounds that we haven't had enough time to study the treaty. Why didn't 
they say so then? Because the answer is, that is not the issue. We have 
had plenty of time to study the treaty. ``We haven't had enough time to 
have hearings,'' they said. The minority leader objected. Once the 
President sensed he was going to lose the vote, the spin machine began 
and he tried to figure out a way not to vote on what the President 
urged us so desperately to schedule in the first place--to avoid the 
vote he asked us to have.
  I agreed with the President then that this treaty deserved 
consideration by the Senate. I wish we had more chance to advise, but 
he didn't choose that. So he asked for our consent. As it turns out, we 
are not going to give it to him. That is our constitutional right. It 
should not be spun and changed. It should be truthfully debated. We are 
all accountable. Some have said they don't want to vote on this treaty. 
I am not one of those people. We are here to be held accountable; we 
are here to vote. That is why we are here. If we disagree, we can vote 
against it. If we agree, we can vote for it.
  My objection to this treaty is not based on partisan politics; it is 
based on careful, thoughtful study of the treaty and its implications 
both here in the United States and around the world. I believe the 
world will be more unstable--contrary to the feelings of my colleague 
from Delaware--not a more stable place, and America's nuclear deterrent 
capability will become more unreliable than at any time in the history 
of America if this treaty were to be ratified.
  There are three points that would support that argument:
  One, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is not verifiable.
  Two, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will not stop proliferation.
  Three--and perhaps most important--the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
puts our nuclear arsenal at risk.
  My job as chairman of the Strategic Subcommittee is to oversee that 
arsenal. I have been out to the labs, and I have had 5 or 6 years of 
hearings on these issues. Others will discuss the first two points in 
more depth than I will, and some have already. Let me focus on the 
third concern, which is that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is not 
verifiable.
  Last week, we saw reports in the media that the CIA admitted they 
were unable to verify key tests that may even be taking place today. We 
can't base our national security on an ability --which arguably may not 
exist--to detect an adversary's covert activity, and that the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will not stop proliferation. We already 
have a treaty in place to do that, the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This 
treaty has been violated repeatedly, over and over, year after year, by 
rogue nations that don't respect international law.
  Do you think, with this kind of treaty, that every nation is going to 
have this great respect for international law and they are going to 
allow us total access to their country to verify this? When are we ever 
going to learn? Some have mentioned how futile the treaty would be in 
asking rogue nations not to test the same nuclear weapons they promised 
not to develop in the first place under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
And it is false hope that our adversaries will abide by international 
law if we just promise to do this treaty.
  As I mentioned, the safety and reliability of the nuclear arsenal is 
my most serious concern. Rather than relying solely on the good 
intentions of other countries--and they may be good or they may not 
be--or on our ability to detect violations by other countries, my 
concern is ensuring that we remain capable of providing the safeguard 
and nuclear deterrent that won the cold war. That is what won the cold 
war-- the fact that other nations knew what would happen. They knew 
what would happen if they messed with us; we had the arsenal.
  The linchpin of this treaty, as I see it, is whether or not you 
believe the United States can maintain a safe, credible, and reliable 
nuclear arsenal, given a zero-yield ban in perpetuity. The Stockpile 
Stewardship Program is really at the heart of this matter. If you think 
that we can have a reliable nuclear arsenal, with a zero-yield ban, in 
perpetuity, you should be for this treaty. Even the Secretary of 
Defense, William Cohen, has illustrated this point. This was 2 days 
ago. I want this to be listened to carefully. During testimony before 
the Armed Services Committee.

       Senator Snowe. Would you support ratification of this 
     treaty without the Stockpile Stewardship Program?
       Secretary Cohen. No.
       Senator Snowe. No? So then, obviously, you are placing a 
     great deal of confidence in this program.
       Secretary Cohen. I oppose a unilateral moratorium, without 
     some method of testing for the safety and security and 
     reliability of our nuclear force. The question right now is, 
     does the Stockpile Stewardship Program give us that 
     assurance? If there is doubt about it, then, obviously, you 
     would say we cannot rely upon it and we should go back to 
     testing.

  Let me repeat that last line:

       If there is doubt about it, then, obviously, you would say 
     we cannot rely upon it and we should go back to testing.

  Well, that is a critical point. Which of us would knowingly ratify a 
treaty that was advertised to put the safety, reliability, and 
credibility of the United States nuclear deterrent stockpile at risk 
and place the lives of the American people at risk? None of us would do 
that. Certainly not us, not the Secretary, not anybody. But that is the 
linchpin. If you believe in the Stockpile Stewardship Program, a series 
of computer simulations and laser experiments--that is what the program 
is, that we don't need to test, and that we do these computer tests and 
laser experiments--if you think that can sufficiently guarantee the 
safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons program, without testing 
of any kind forever--forever--then you should vote for the treaty 
because that is what this is about. As the Senator from Delaware said, 
you can get out of the treaty, but if you don't like what is going on, 
then it is too late.
  If, however, you do not believe that the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program can sufficiently guarantee the safety and reliability of our 
nuclear weapons programs, then you should vote against the treaty.
  Well--as Chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, I have 
oversight of all three of the Nation's nuclear laboratories--Los 
Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia. I have been to the labs, I have 
seen the computer simulations, I have talked with the physicists and 
programmers. Just last February Senator Landrieu and I traveled to 
Lawrence Livermore Lab for a field hearing and a very productive set of 
tours and briefings.
  Based on my experience--based on what I've seen, I don't have the 
confidence that the Stockpile Stewardship Program can sufficiently 
guarantee the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons arsenal--
forever--without any testing of any kind.
  But don't just take my word for it--after all I'm not a physicist--
I'm not a nuclear lab director. To settle the question about whether 
this Stockpile Stewardship Program can guarantee the safety and 
reliability of our nuclear weapons, we must turn to those lab 
directors, the men directly responsible for administering, executing, 
and overseeing the Stockpile Program.
  Those three gentlemen testified before the Armed Services Committee 
just last week, and I think it is absolutely critical to share that 
testimony with my colleagues as we debate this treaty.
  Dr. John Browne, Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, had this 
to say about the condition and reliability of the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program:

       Maintaining the safety and reliability of our nuclear 
     weapons without nuclear testing is an unprecedented technical 
     challenge.
       The Stockpile Stewardship Program is working successfully 
     toward this goal, but it is a work in progress.
       There are simply too many processes in a nuclear explosion 
     involving too much physics detail to perform a complete 
     calculation. At present, with the most powerful 
     supercomputers on Earth, we know that we are not doing 
     calculations with sufficient accuracy and with sufficient 
     detail to provide maximum confidence in the stockpile.

[[Page 24898]]

       We know that we do not adequately understand instabilities 
     that occur during the implosion process and we are concerned 
     about the aging of high explosives and plutonium that could 
     necessitate remanufacture of the stockpile.
       We do not know the details of how this complex, 
     artificially produced metal (plutonium) ages, including 
     whether pits fail gradually, giving us time to replace them 
     with newly manufactured ones, or whether they fail 
     catastrophically in a short time interval that would render 
     many of our weapons unreliable at once.
       It is important to note that even with a complete set of 
     tools we will not be able to confirm all aspects of weapons 
     safety and performance. Nuclear explosions produce pressures 
     and temperatures that cannot be duplicated in any current or 
     anticipated laboratory facility. Some processes simply cannot 
     be experimentally studied on a small scale because they 
     depend on the specific configuration of material at the time 
     of the explosion.
       On the basis of our experience in the last 4 years, we 
     continue to be optimistic that we can maintain our nuclear 
     weapons without testing. However, we have identified many 
     issues that increase risk and lower our level of confidence.

  Dr. Bruce Tarter, Director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
testified:

       We have not been able to meet the deadlines of the program 
     as we thought we could.
       It (the stockpile stewardship program) hasn't been 
     perfect--the challenge lies in the longer term.
       The stockpile stewardship program is an excellent bet--but 
     it's not a sure thing.

  Dr. Paul Robinson, director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, which 
is responsible for the engineering of more than 90 percent of the 
component parts of all U.S. nuclear warheads, provided an even more 
ominous testimony.

       There is no question from a technical point of view, actual 
     testing of designs to confirm their performance is the 
     desired regimen for any high-technology device.
       For a device as highly consequential as a nuclear weapon, 
     testing of the complete system both when it is first 
     developed and periodically throughout its lifetime to ensure 
     that aging effects do not invalidate its performance, is also 
     the preferred methodology.
       I could not offer a proof, nor can anyone, that such an 
     alternative means of certifying the adequacy of the U.S. 
     stockpile will be successful. I believe then as I do now that 
     it may be possible to develop the stockpile stewardship 
     approach as a substitute for nuclear testing for keeping 
     previously tested nuclear weapon designs safe and reliable. 
     However, this undertaking is an enormous challenge which no 
     one should underestimate, and will carry a higher level of 
     risk than at any time in the past.
       The difficulty we face is that we cannot today guarantee 
     that stockpile stewardship will be ultimately successful; nor 
     can we guarantee that it will be possible to prove that it is 
     successful.
       Confidence in the reliability and safety of the U.S. 
     nuclear weapons stockpile will eventually decline without 
     nuclear testing.
       The stockpile stewardship program--though essential for 
     continual certification of the stockpile--does not provide a 
     guarantee of perpetual certifiability.
       I have always said actual testing is preferred method--to 
     do otherwise is acceptable risk.
       I cannot ensure the program will mature in time to ensure 
     safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile in 
     the future.
       I have always felt if you are betting your country--you 
     better be conservative.

  I find this testimony absolutely chilling. I am not willing to ``Bet 
my country'' on the stockpile stewardship program. America's lab 
directors who are directly responsible for the execution of the 
stockpile stewardship program testified before Congress that this 
program cannot guarantee the future security or stability or our 
nuclear weapons. I am not willing to accept any risk. I will not risk 
the lies of the American people on a program who's director--empowered 
by the President with the responsibility for running that program--are 
so very uncertain about its reliability.
  On the basis of the expert testimony of these three lab Directors 
alone, if any Senators had any doubt about how they would vote on this 
treaty--it should now be gone!
  And I cannot for the life of me understand why the President would 
ask the Senate to ratify a treaty that lives or dies based on the 
stockpile stewardship program--a program that our lab Directors are 
telling us they cannot guarantee!
  If we ratify this treaty, there is a very high probability we will 
have to start looking for a way out of it within 10-15 years--maybe 
even sooner. I don't understand entering into a treaty you know full 
well you may have to pull out of almost as soon as it goes into effect.
  Now, supporters of the treaty will point out that if in fact the lab 
Directors, and the Secretary of Energy all agree in 10 years that the 
stockpile stewardship isn't working, the President, in consultation 
with Congress, can just pull us out of the treaty.
  Well, treaties tend to take on a life of their own, and I do not 
believe it would be that easy. Just look at the ABM Treaty of 1972. Our 
co-signer, the U.S.S.R. doesn't even exist anymore, and although there 
is overwhelming agreement between the defense and intelligence 
communities, and the American public, that our national interests are 
at stake, the President still opposes pulling out of the ABM Treaty!
  The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty of 1968 are two more examples. These treaties have both been 
violated. But have we pulled out of either one despite the legal right 
to do so--absolutely not!
  My friends and colleagues, it makes no sense to ratify a treaty that 
our own nuclear experts tell us we may have to negotiate a way out of 
within a decade.
  This treaty is dangerous and ill-advised. It places our nuclear 
stockpile, and hence our nuclear deterrent capability, at considerable 
risk. This treaty is bad for America, and it is bad for the 
international community, and I will vote against it.
  That is if I'm given the opportunity to vote against it. While Senate 
Democrats and the White House are back pedaling furiously, some in the 
Senate are anxious to rescue them from their miscalculation and deliver 
them from a major legislative defeat. It might be tempting to view this 
as a ``win-win'' situation for those who oppose the treaty. The 
reasoning goes like this: If we effectively kill this flawed treaty 
without a vote, we will have forced the White House to back down, and 
have won without letting the White House accuse us of killing the 
treaty. This is superficially appealing. But it is a strategy for, at 
best, a half-victory, and at worst, a partial defeat.
  Postponing a vote on the CTBT will allow the White House to claim 
victory in saving the treaty, and will allow the White House to 
continue to spin the American people by blaming opponents for not 
ratifying the treaty. There is no conservative victory in that.
  Every single Senator knows today how he or she will vote on this 
treaty. More debate and more hearings won't change that. It's time to 
put partisan politics aside and stand firm on our beliefs. The die is 
cast, and Republicans and Democrats alike have staked out their 
positions. It's time for Senators to stand by those positions and vote 
their conscience. Mr. President, I oppose postponing the vote on this 
treaty, and I urge my colleagues to do the same.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. HELMS. I feel obliged to observe that the United States has 
already flirted with an end to nuclear testing--from 1958 to 1961. It 
bears remembering that the nuclear moratorium ultimately was judged to 
constitute an unacceptable risk to the nation's security, and was 
terminated after just three years. On the day that President Kennedy 
ended the ban--March 2, 1962--he addressed the American people and 
said:

       We know enough about broken negotiations, secret 
     preparations, and the advantages gained from a long test 
     series never to offer again an uninspected moratorium. Some 
     urge us to try it again, keeping our preparations to test in 
     a constant state of readiness. But in actual practice, 
     particularly in a society of free choice, we cannot keep top 
     flight scientists concentrating on the preparation of an 
     experiment which may or may not take place on an uncertain 
     date in the future. Nor can large technical laboratories be 
     kept fully alert on a standby basis waiting for some other 
     nation to break an agreement. This is not merely difficult or 
     inconvenient--we have explored this alternative thoroughly 
     and found it impossible of execution.

  This statement is very interesting. It makes clear that the 
fundamental problems posed by a test ban remain unchanged over the past 
27 years. The United States certainly faces a Russian

[[Page 24899]]

Federation that is engaging in ``secret preparations'' and likely is 
engaging in clandestine nuclear tests relating to the development of 
brand-new, low-yield nuclear weapons. The United States, on the other 
hand, cannot engage in such nuclear modernization while adhering to the 
CTBT.
  Likewise, the Senate is faced with the same verification problem that 
it encountered in 1962. As both of President Clinton's former 
intelligence chiefs have warned, low-yield testing is undetectable by 
seismic sensors. Nor does the United States have any reasonable chance 
of mobilizing the ludicrously high number of votes needed under the 
treaty to conduct an on-site inspection. In other words, the treaty is 
unverifiable and there is no chance that cheaters will ever be caught.
  This is not my opinion. This is a reality, given that 30 of 51 
countries on the treaty's governing board must approve any on-site 
inspection. Even the President's own senior arms controller--John 
Holum--complained in 1996 that ``treaty does not contain . . . our 
position that on-site inspections should proceed automatically unless 
two-thirds of the Executive Council vote ``no.'' Instead of an 
automatic green light for inspections, the U.S. got exactly the 
opposite of what it requested.
  But most importantly, in 1962 President Kennedy correctly noted that 
the inability to test has a pernicious and corrosive effect--not just 
upon the weapons themselves (which cannot be fully remanufactured under 
such circumstances)--but upon the nation's nuclear infrastructure. Our 
confidence in the nuclear stockpile is eroding even as we speak. Again, 
this is not my opinion. It is a fact which has been made over and over 
again by the nation's senior weapons experts.
  In 1995, the laboratory directors compiled the following two charts 
which depict two simple facts: (1) that even with a successful science-
based program, confidence will not be as high as it could be with 
nuclear testing; and (2) even if the stockpile stewardship program is 
completely successful by 2010, the United States will not be able to 
design new weapons, and will not be able to make certain types of 
nuclear safety assessments and stockpile replacements.
  Senators will notice that, on both charts, there is mention of ``HN'' 
(e.g. hydronuclear) and 500 ton tests. The laboratory directors, in a 
joint statement to the administration in 1995, said: ``A strong 
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program is necessary to underwrite 
confidence. A program of 500-ton experiments would significantly reduce 
the technical risks.''
  This judgment has not changed over the past several years. Both 
weapons laboratory directors stated in 1997 that nuclear testing would 
give the United States greater confidence in the stockpile.
  So as I listen to these claims that the United States is ``out of the 
testing business,'' I make two basic observations. First, we are only 
out of the testing business because President Clinton has taken us out. 
There is no legal barrier today to conducting stockpile experiments. 
The reason is purely political. Indeed, the White House is using 
circular logic. The United States is not testing because the White 
House supports the test ban treaty; but the White House is claiming 
that because we are not testing, we should support the treaty.
  Second, I remind all that the United States thought it was out of the 
testing business in 1958, only to discover how badly we had 
miscalculated. President Kennedy not only ended the 3-year moratorium, 
but embarked upon the most aggressive test series in the history of the 
weapons program. If Senators use history as their guide, they will 
realize that the CTBT is a serious threat to the national security of 
the United States.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise today to express my very grave 
concerns over the path down which we are heading. The United States 
Senate is on the verge of voting down a treaty the intent of which is 
consistent with U.S. national security objectives, but the letter and 
timing of which are fraught with serious implications for our security 
over the next decade.
  Mr. President, I will vote against ratifying the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty. This is not a vote I take lightly. I am not ideologically 
opposed to arms control, having voted to ratify the START Treaty and 
the Chemical Weapons Convention. But, my concerns about the flaws in 
this Treaty's drafting and in the administration's plan for maintaining 
the viability of the stockpile leave me no other choice.
  On October 5, Henry Kissinger, John Deutch and Brent Scowcroft wrote 
to the majority and minority leaders stating their serious concerns 
with the Senate's voting on the treaty so far in advance of our being 
able to implement its provisions and relying solely on the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program. They noted that ``. . . few, if any, of the 
benefits envisaged by the treaty's advocates could be realized by 
Senate ratification now. At the same time, there could be real costs 
and risks to a broad range of national security interests--including 
our nonproliferation objectives--if [the] Senate acts prematurely.'' 
These are sage words that should not be taken lightly by either party 
in the debate on ratification.
  In the post-cold-war era, a strong consensus exists that 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is our single greatest 
national security concern. Unfortunately, a ban on nuclear testing, 
especially when verification issues are so poorly addressed, as in this 
treaty, will not prevent other countries from developing nuclear 
weapons. A number of countries have made major strides in developing 
nuclear weapons without testing. South Africa and Pakistan both built 
nuclear stockpiles without testing; North Korea may very well have one 
or two crude nuclear weapons sufficient for its purposes; and Iraq was 
perilously close to becoming a nuclear state at the time it invaded 
Kuwait. Iran has an active nuclear weapons program, and Brazil and 
Argentina were far along in their programs before they agreed to 
terminate them. Testing is not necessary to have very good confidence 
that a first generation nuclear weapon will work, as the detonation 
over Hiroshima, utilizing a design that had never been tested, 
demonstrated more than half-a-century ago.
  Whenever an arms control agreement is debated, the issue of 
verification rightly assumes center stage. That is entirely 
appropriate, as the old adage that arms control works best when it is 
needed least continues to hold true. That the leaders of Great Britain, 
France, and Germany support ratification is less important than what is 
going on inside the heads of the leaders of Russia, China, India, 
Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. We don't need arms control 
agreements with our friends; we pursue arms control as a way of 
minimizing the threat from those countries that may not have our 
national interests at heart. Some of the countries with active nuclear 
weapons programs clearly fall into that category. On that count, the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty falls dangerously short.
  In order to fully comprehend the complexity of the verification 
issue, it is important to understand the distinction between monitoring 
and verifying. Monitoring is a technical issue. It is the use of a 
variety of means of gather information--in other words, detecting that 
an event took place. Verification, however, is a political process.
  Even if we assume that compliance with the treaty can be monitored--
and I believe very strongly, based in part on the CIA's recent 
assessment, that that is not the case--we are left with the age-old 
question posed most succinctly some 40 years ago by Fred Ikle: After 
Detection--What? What are we to make of a verification regime that is 
far from prepared to handle the challenges it will confront. For 
example, we are potentially years from an agreement among signatories 
on what technologies will be employed for monitoring purposes. More 
importantly, the treaty requires 30 disparate countries to agree to a 
challenge on-site inspection when 19 allies couldn't agree on how to 
conduct air strikes against Yugoslavia?
  Furthermore, we are being asked to accept arguments on verification 
by an

[[Page 24900]]

administration that swept under the rug one of the most egregious cases 
of proliferation this decade, the November 1992 Chinese transfer of M-
11 missiles to Pakistan, and that continues to cling tenaciously to the 
ABM Treaty despite the scale of global change that has occurred over 
the last 10 years.
  In determining whether to support this treaty at this time, it is 
essential that we examine the continued importance of nuclear weapons 
to our national security. Last week's testimony by our nuclear weapons 
lab directors that the Stockpile Stewardship Program will not be a 
reliable alternative to nuclear testing for five to 10 years is a clear 
and unequivocal statement that ratification of this treaty is 
dangerously premature. General John Vessey noted in his letter to the 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee that the unique role of the 
United States in ensuring the ultimate security of our friends and 
allies, obviating their requirement for nuclear forces in the process, 
remains dependent upon our maintenance of a modern, safe and reliable 
nuclear deterrent. As General Vessey pointed out, ``the general 
knowledge that the United States would do whatever was necessary to 
maintain that condition certainly reduced the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons during the period and added immeasurably to the security 
cooperation with our friends and allies.'' This sentiment was also 
expressed by former Secretaries of Defense Schlesinger, Cheney, 
Carlucci, Weinberger, Rumsfeld, and Laird, when they emphasized the 
importance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and its deterrent value 
relative not just to nuclear threats, but to chemical and biological 
ones as well.
  The immensely important role that a viable nuclear deterrent 
continues to play in U.S. national security strategy requires the 
United States to be able to take measures relative to our nuclear 
stockpile that are currently precluded by the Test Ban Treaty. Our 
stockpile is older today than at any previous time and has far fewer 
types of warheads--a decrease from 30 to nine--than it did 15 years 
ago. A fault in one will require removing all of that category from the 
stockpile. The military typically grounds or removes from service all 
of a specific weapons system or other equipment when a serious problem 
is detected. Should they act differently with nuclear warheads? 
Obviously not.
  Finally, this treaty will actually prevent us from making our nuclear 
weapons safer. Without testing, we will not be able to make essential 
safety improvements to our aging stockpile--a stockpile that has 
already gone seven years without being properly and thoroughly tested.
  I hope the time does arrive when a comprehensive ban on nuclear 
testing will be consistent with our national security requirements. We 
are simply not yet there. I will consider supporting a treaty when 
alternative means of ensuring safety and reliability are proven, and 
when a credible verification regime is proposed. Until then, the risks 
inherent in the administration's program preclude my adopting a more 
favorable stance.
  These are the reasons that I must vote against ratification of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at this time. The viability of our 
nuclear deterrent is too central to our national security to rush 
approval of a treaty that cannot be verified and that will facilitate 
the decline of that deterrent. Preferably, this vote would be delayed 
until a more appropriate time, but, barring that, I cannot support 
ratification right now.
  The operative phrase, though, is ``right now.'' The concept of a 
global ban on testing has considerable merit. Defeating the treaty 
would not only imperil our prospects of attaining that objective at 
some future point, it would in all likelihood send a green light to 
precisely those nations we least want to see test that it is now okay 
to do so. Such a development, I think we can all agree, is manifestly 
not in our national interest.
  In articulating his reasons for continuing to conduct nuclear tests, 
then-President Kennedy stated that, ``If our weapons are to be more 
secure, more flexible in their use and more selective in their impact--
if we are to be alert to new breakthroughs, to experiment with new 
designs--if we are to maintain our scientific momentum and leadership--
then our weapons progress must not be limited to theory or to the 
confines of laboratories and caves.'' This is not an obsolete 
sentiment. It rings as true today as when President Kennedy uttered 
those words 37 years ago.
  I thank the Chair.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, today the Senate debates an arms control 
treaty of idealistic intent, vague applicability, and undetermined 
effects. Given today's state of scientific, geopolitical and military 
affairs, I must vote against the resolution of ratification of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a treaty that will lower confidence in 
our strategic deterrent while creating an international regime that 
does not guarantee an increase in this country's security.
  On balance--and these matters are often concluded on balance, as 
rarely are we faced with clear-cut options--it is my reasoned 
conclusion that the CTBT does not advance the security of this nation.
  Some people think that, by passing the CTBT, we will be preventing 
the horrors of nuclear war in the future. There is great emotional 
content to this argument.
  But in deliberations about a matter so grave, I had to apply a 
rational, logical analysis to the affairs of nations as I see them. 
And, on reflecting on half a century of the nuclear era, I can only 
conclude that it is the nuclear strategic deterrent of this country 
that is the single most important factor in explaining why this country 
has not been challenged in a major military confrontation on our 
territory. We emerged victorious from the cold war without ever 
engaging in a global ``hot'' war.
  Despite the security we have bought with our nuclear deterrent, the 
world we live in today is more dangerous than the cold war era. Today, 
we are faced with the emergence of new international threats. These 
include rogue states, such as Iraq, Sudan, and North Korea; 
independent, substate international terrorists, such as Osama bin 
Laden; and international criminal organizations that may facilitate 
funds and, perhaps, nuclear materials to flow between these actors. 
Some of these actors, of course, can and have developed the ``poor 
man's'' nukes, as they are called: biological and chemical weapons.
  It is to the credit of the serious proponents of this treaty that 
they have not argued that this treaty can effectively prevent these new 
actors on the global scene from developing primitive nuclear weapons--
which can be built without tests. The CTBT does not prevent them from 
stealing or buying tactical nuclear weapons that slip unsecured out of 
Russian arsenals. The CTBT cannot prevent or even detect low-yield 
testing by rogue states which have a record of acting like treaties 
aren't worth the paper they're written on. These are the threats we 
face today.
  In this new threat environment, the proponents of this treaty suggest 
that we abandon testing to determine the reliability of our weapons, to 
increase their safety, and to modernize our arsenal.
  Yet we have recent historical evidence that our nuclear deterrent is 
a key factor in dealing with at least some of these actors. Recall 
that, in the gulf war, Saddam Hussein did not use his chemical and 
biological weapons against the international coalition. This was not 
because Saddam Hussein was respecting international norms. It was 
solely because he knew the United States had a credible nuclear 
deterrent that we reserved the right to use.
  Proponents of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty argue that scientific 
tests at the sub-critical level can replace testing as the methodology 
to ensure the reliability and safety of our nuclear arsenal, which, we 
all know, has not been tested since 1992. The question of reliability 
of our deterrent is absolutely essential to this nation's security. And 
yet the proponents of our science-based alternative program to 
testing--known as the Stockpile Stewardship Program--all acknowledge 
that

[[Page 24901]]

this critical replacement to testing is not in place today and will not 
be fully developed until sometime in the next decade.
  Even if the Stockpile Stewardship Program is fully operational in 
2005, as the most optimistic representations suggest, that will be more 
than 10 years since we have had our last tests. After a decade of no 
testing, the confidence in our weapons will have declined. Throughout 
this period, we will be relying on a scientific regime whose evolution 
and effectiveness we can only hope for.
  This is the concern of numerous national security experts, and their 
conclusions were not supportive of the CTBT. Addressing this central 
issue, six former Secretaries of defense (Schlesinger, Cheney, 
Carlucci, Weinberger, Rumsfeld, Laird) said:

       The Stockpile Stewardship Program, which will not be mature 
     for at least 10 years, will improve our scientific 
     understanding of nuclear weapons and would likely mitigate 
     the decline in our confidence in the safety and reliability 
     of our arsenal. We will never know whether we should trust 
     the Stockpile Stewardship if we cannot conduct tests to 
     calibrate the unproven new techniques.

  Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former National Security 
Advisor Brent Scowcroft, and former Director of Central Intelligence 
John Deutch said recently:

       But the fact is that the scientific case simply has not 
     been made that, over the long term, the United States can 
     ensure the nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing . . . 
     The Stockpile Stewardship Program is not sufficiently mature 
     to evaluate the extent to which it can be a suitable 
     alternative to testing.

  I hasten to point out that the experts who have spoken against the 
CTBT have served in Republican and Democratic Administrations. 
Secretary Kissinger served in the Nixon administration, for example, 
which negotiated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty banning tests above 150 
kilotons. This treaty was ratified during the Bush Administration. John 
Deutch, as we all know, was head of the CIA in the present 
Administration.
  I support the Stockpile Stewardship Program, and will continue to 
support it. There may be a day when my colleagues and I can be 
convinced that science-based technology can ensure the reliability and 
safety of our arsenal to a level that matches what we learn through 
testing. That would be a time to responsibly consider a Comprehensive 
Test Ban. And that time is not now.
  This central point on the reliability of our nuclear deterrent has 
not escaped the public's view of the current debate. Utahns have 
approached me on both sides of the argument.
  Yes, we have seen numerous polls that suggest that the public 
supports the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. When people are asked, ``do 
you support a global ban on nuclear testing?'' majorities respond 
affirmatively. However, when people are asked, as some more specific 
polls have done, ``Do you believe our nuclear arsenal has kept this 
country free from attack?'' the majority always answers overwhelmingly 
affirmatively. When asked whether we need to continue to rely on a 
nuclear deterrent, the answer is always overwhelmingly affirmative, as 
it is when the public is asked whether we need to maintain reliability 
in our nuclear deterrent. Once again, I find the public more 
sophisticated than they are often given credit for.
  When I speak with people about the limits of monitoring this global 
ban, and the numerous methods and technologies available to parties 
that wish to evade detection, confidence in the CTBT falls even lower. 
The fact is--and, once again, the proponents of the treaty concede 
this--that a zero-yield test ban treaty is unverifiable.
  Small but militarily significant tests--that is, 500-ton tests, 
significant to the development and improvement of nuclear weapons--will 
not always be detectable. Higher yield tests--such as 5 kilotons--can 
be disguised by the techniques known as ``decoupling,'' where 
detonations are set in larger, either natural or specially constructed, 
subterranean settings.
  Today we are uncertain about a series of suspicious events that have 
occurred recently in Russia, a country that has not signed the CTBT. 
Some Russian officials have suggested that they would interpret the 
CTBT to allow for certain levels of nuclear tests, a view inimical to 
the Clinton administration's proponents of the CTBT. These are 
troubling questions, Mr. President, which should cast great doubt on 
the hopes of the proponents of the CTBT.
  But the proponents say, under a CTBT regime we could demand an on-
site inspection. But the on-site inspection regime is, by the terms of 
the treaty, weak. It is a ``red-light'' system, which means that 
members of the Executive Council of the Conference of States Parties 
must vote to get affirmative permission to inspect--and the vote will 
require a super-majority of 30 of 51 members of the Council for 
permission to conduct an inspection. The terms of the treaty allow for 
numerous obstructions by a member subject to inspection. Some of these 
codified instructions appear to have come out of Saddam Hussein's play 
book for defeating UNSCOM.
  Some have suggested that Senate rejection of this treaty, which seems 
likely, will undermine this country's global leadership. It is said 
that, if we fail to ratify, critical states will not ratify the treaty. 
This assertion strikes me as highly suppositious.
  Since the end of World War II, there are very few instances of the 
United States using its nuclear threat explicitly. Besides the Soviet 
Union, locked in a bipolar global competition with us until its 
collapse in 1991, other nations' decision to develop nuclear programs 
were based, not on following ``U.S. leadership,'' but on their 
perception of regional balances of power, or on their desire to 
establish global status with a strategic weapon. Their decisions to 
cease testing will be similarly based.
  The CTBT, it is argued, will prevent China from further modernizing 
its nuclear forces. It would be more accurate, in my opinion, to state 
that the treaty, if it works as its proponents wish, may constrain 
China from testing the designs for nuclear warheads it has gained 
through espionage. The debate over future military developments always 
hinges on the distinction between intentions and capabilities. China's 
current nuclear capabilities are modest, although it has a handful of 
warheads and the means to deliver them to the North American continent.
  But I have to ask: Are the analysts in the Clinton administration 
confident that China's intentions are consistent with a view embodied 
in the CTBT that would lock China into substantive nuclear inferiority 
to the United States?
  Is that what their espionage was about? Or their veiled threats--such 
as the famous ``walk-in'' in 1995, when a PRC agent showed us their 
new-found capabilities? And how about the PRC's explicit threat to rain 
missiles on Los Angeles? That was a reflection on intentions.
  Those of us who study intentions and capabilities of such a key 
geopolitical competitor as China know that their capabilities are far 
inferior to us. But you have to wonder, based on their statements and 
other actions, whether the Chinese are willing to accept the current 
strategic balance that would be locked in with the CTBT.
  And, does it make sound strategic sense for the defense of our 
country that the United States, in effect, unilaterally disarms our 
technological superiority by freezing our ability to modernize and 
test?
  When we freeze our deterrent capability, we are, in effect, 
abandoning America's technological edge and mortgaging that 
deteriorating edge on the belief and hope that all of our geopolitical 
competitors will do the same. This reflects a view of the world that is 
far more optimistic than I believe is prudent. A substantial dose of 
skepticism should be required when thinking about the defense of our 
country.
  To address these concerns, the administration has waived ``Safeguard 
F,'' which it will attach to the treaty. This addendum states that it 
is its understanding that if the Secretaries of Defense and Energy 
inform the President that ``a high level of confidence in the safety or 
reliability of a nuclear weapon type which the two Secretaries

[[Page 24902]]

consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be 
certified, the President, in consultation with Congress, would be 
prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under the standard ``supreme 
national interests'' clause in order to conduct whatever testing might 
be required.''
  This vaguely worded escape clause is the manifestation of what is 
known in international law as rebus sic stantibus. This famous 
expression is attributed to Bismark, who declared: ``At the bottom of 
every treaty is written in invisible ink--rebus sic stantibus--`until 
circumstances change'.'' This is a recognition common in international 
law, and now manifest in black-and-white in ``Safeguard F,'' that 
agreements hold only as long as the fundamental conditions and 
expectations that existed at the time of their creation hold.
  The fundamental conditions that the CTBT seeks to address are where 
my fundamental reservations lie. There are too many factors that we 
cannot control and that will not be restrained by the best intentions 
of a testing freeze.
  The world is changing, and alliances are subtly changing. 
Geopolitical competitors such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea 
are undergoing radical--radical--social changes that are demonstrably 
affecting their governments, foreign policies, and militaries. An 
agreement on a test ban freeze today does not reconcile with these 
realities.
  Even the most stalwart proponents of the treaty can only argue that 
U.S. ratification of the treaty may influence other states' behaviors. 
That is a hope, not a certainty. The need for a reliable nuclear 
deterrent, last tested in 1992, remains a certainty. I firmly believe 
that the CTBT will not control these external realities. While some 
countries may see a test ban regime in their interests, others, 
motivated not by the norms we hope for in the international community, 
but by the more historic realities of national interest and 
competition, may not.
  The timing is simply wrong to pass this treaty. The science has not 
been sufficiently reassuring, and global developments have not been 
encouraging.
  I must admit that my ongoing concerns about this administration's 
understanding of the world do not promote confidence in their support 
for this treaty. Under this administration, we have seen a precipitous 
decline in the funding of the military; we have seen an unacceptable 
resistance to missile defense; we have seen that it was Congress that 
had to promote sanctions on nuclear and missile proliferation from 
Russian firms spreading nuclear and missile technology to rough states. 
All of this belies confidence.
  Combine this with a lack of confidence in the science-based 
alternative to testing promoted by the administration, which even its 
supporters recognize is not up to speed, and I must conclude that it is 
against the U.S. national interest to vote for the CTBT.
  This vote is not about the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is 
about whether the nuclear deterrent that has kept this country secure 
for half a century and will keep this country secure for the 
foreseeable future.
  Deterrence is not static, it is dynamic. The world is not static, it 
is unpredictable and dangerous. The CTBT is an attempt to impose a 
static arms control environment--to freeze our advantage--while 
gambling that our competitors abide by the same freeze. Today, that is 
unsound risk.
  I will vote to oppose the resolution of ratification of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I rise today to speak on the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Signed by the President on 
September 24, 1996, and submitted to the Senate approximately one year 
later, the CTBT bans all nuclear explosions for an unlimited duration.
  Every member of the Senate would like to strengthen the national 
security of the United States. Every member of the Senate would like to 
leave this country more safe and secure. There are time-honored 
principles which undergrid genuine security, however. As George 
Washington stated over two centuries ago, ``There is nothing so likely 
to produce peace as to be well prepared to meet an enemy.'' Washington 
believed that if we wanted peace, we must be prepared to defend our 
country.
  The CTBT is not based on the national security principles of 
Washington or any other President who used strength and preparedness to 
protect our way of life and advance liberty around the globe. This 
treaty is based on an illusion of arms control, dependent on the 
unverifiable good will of signatory nations--some of which are openly 
hostile to the United States. The CTBT will do nothing to stop 
determined states from developing nuclear weapons and will degrade the 
readiness of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The U.S. nuclear arsenal is 
still the most powerful deterrent to aggression against the United 
States, but this treaty would place the reliability of that arsenal in 
question.
  Is such a step worth the risk? What does the CTBT give us in return? 
Is the treaty really the powerful weapon in the war against 
proliferation that the Administration claims? Several critical 
deficiencies of the CTBT make this treaty a genuine threat to U.S. 
national security.
  First, the monitoring system of the treaty will not be able to detect 
many nuclear tests. The International Monitoring System (IMS) of the 
CTBT is designed to detect nuclear blasts greater than one kiloton, but 
tests with a smaller blast yield may be used to validate or advance 
nuclear weapons designs. Tests larger than one kiloton can be masked 
through certain testing techniques. By testing underground, for 
example, the blast yield from a nuclear test can be reduced by a factor 
of 70. The bottom line is that countries will be able to continue 
testing under this treaty and not be detected.
  The unverifiability of the CTBT was highlighted by the Washington 
Post on October 3, 1999. In an article entitled ``CIA Unable to 
Precisely Track Testing,'' Roberto Suro writes that ``the Central 
Intelligence Agency has concluded that it cannot monitor low-level 
nuclear tests by Russia precisely enough to ensure compliance with the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. . .'' Twice last month, Russia may have 
conducted nuclear tests, but the CIA was unable to make a 
determination, according the Post article.
  Senator John Warner, the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee, is quoted in the Post article concerning a broader pattern 
of Russian deception with regard to nuclear testing. According to a 
military assessment mentioned in the Post, Russia has conducted 
repeated tests over the past 18 months to develop a low-yield nuclear 
weapon to counter U.S. superiority in precision guided munitions.
  Such behavior reinforces the central point that proponents of the 
CTBT seem to miss in this debate. When nations have to choose between 
the communal bliss of international disarmament or pursuing their 
national interest, they follow their national interest. Countries such 
as Russia have the best of both worlds with an unverifiable treaty like 
the CTBT: Russia can continue to test without being caught and the U.S. 
nuclear arsenal cannot be maintained or modernized and eventually 
deteriorates over time.
  A second critical problem with the CTBT is that countries do not have 
to test to develop nuclear weapons. The case of India and Pakistan 
provides perhaps the best example that a ban on nuclear testing can be 
irrelevant. Pakistan developed nuclear explosive devices without any 
detectable testing, and India advanced its nuclear program without 
testing for twenty-five years.
  Proliferation in South Asia also lends itself to a broader discussion 
of this Administration's nonproliferation record. The Administration's 
rhetoric on the CTBT has been strong in recent weeks, but has the 
Administration always been as committed to stop proliferation?
  The case of Pakistan is particularly illustrative of this 
Administration's flawed approach to nonproliferation and arms control. 
In an unusually candid report in 1997, the CIA confirmed China's role 
as the ``principal supplier''

[[Page 24903]]

of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Although the Administration has 
been careful to use milder language in subsequent proliferation 
reports, China is suspected of continuing such assistance. Rather than 
take consistent steps to punish Chinese proliferation, however, the 
Administration is pushing a treaty to stop nuclear testing--testing 
which is not needed for the development of nuclear weapons in the first 
place.
  This Administration would have more credibility in the area of 
nonproliferation if it had been taking aggressive steps to punish 
proliferators and defend America's interests over the last seven years. 
When China transfers complete M-11 missiles to Pakistan, this 
Administration turns a blind eye. When China is identified by the CIA 
in 1997 as the ``. . . the most significant supplier of WMD-related 
goods and technology to foreign countries,'' the Administration rewards 
China with a nuclear cooperation agreement in 1998.
  These severe lapses in U.S. nonproliferation policy cannot be covered 
over with the parchment of another unverifiable arms control treaty.
  A third problem with the CTBT is that it places the reliability of 
the U.S. nuclear arsenal at risk. While other countries can develop 
simple nuclear weapons without testing, such tests are critically 
important for the maintenance and modernization of highly sophisticated 
U.S. nuclear weapons. In that it forbids testing essential to ensure 
the readiness of the U.S. stockpile, the CTBT is really a back door to 
nuclear disarmament. The preamble of the CTBT itself states that the 
prohibition on nuclear testing is ``a meaningful step in the 
realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament . . 
.''
  Proponents of the CTBT argue that we have the technology and 
expertise to ensure the readiness of our nuclear arsenal through the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program. The truth of the matter is that only 
testing can ensure that our nuclear weapons are being maintained, not 
computer modeling and careful archiving of past test results. As Dr. 
Robert Barker, a strategic nuclear weapons designer and principal 
advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all nuclear weapons matters from 
1986-92, stated, ``. . . sustained nuclear testing . . . is the only 
demonstrated way of maintaining a safe and reliable nuclear 
deterrent.''
  Dr. James Schlesinger, a former Secretary of the Defense and Energy 
Departments, is one of the most competent experts to speak on the 
national security implications of the CTBT and the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program. His comments on the Stockpile Stewardship Program 
should be heeded by every Senator. In testimony before Congress, Dr. 
Schlesinger stated that the erosion of confidence in our nuclear 
stockpile would be substantial over several decades. Dr. Schlesinger 
states that ``In a decade or so, we will be beyond the expected shelf 
life of the weapons in our nuclear arsenals, which was expected to be 
some 20 years.''
  The real effect of the CTBT, then, is not to stop the spread of 
nuclear weapons, for less developed countries can develop simple 
nuclear weapons without testing and countries like Russia and China can 
test without being detected. The real effect of the CTBT will be to 
degrade the U.S. nuclear arsenal, dependent on periodic testing to 
ensure readiness.
  Modernization and development of new weapons systems, also dependent 
on testing, will be precluded. The need to modernize and develop new 
nuclear weapons should not be discounted. New weapons for new missions, 
changes in delivery systems and platforms, and improved safety devices 
all require testing to ensure that design modifications will and be 
effective. In supporting this treaty, the President is saying that 
regardless of the future threats the United States may face, we will 
surrender our ability to sustain a potent and effective nuclear 
deterrent. Mr. President, such shortsighted policies which leave 
America less secure are completely unacceptable and should be rejected.
  It is difficult for me to understand how a President who determines 
that ``the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile to be a 
supreme national interest of the United States'' can support the CTBT, 
a treaty which could jeopardize the entire nuclear arsenal within 
years.
  Those who favor the CTBT argue that the treaty will create an 
international norm against the development of nuclear weapons. If the 
United States will take the lead, advocates for the treaty state, then 
other countries will see our good intentions and follow our example.
  Mr. President, moral suasion carries little weight with countries 
like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. Moral suasion means little more to 
Russia, China, Pakistan, and India. These countries follow their 
security interests, not the illusory arms control agenda of another 
international bureaucracy.
  It is folly to degrade the U.S. nuclear deterrent through a treaty 
that has no corollary security benefits. I am not opposed to treaties 
and norms which seek to reduce the potential for international 
conflict, but arms control treaties which are not verifiable leave the 
United States in a more dangerous position. When we can trust but not 
verify, the better path is not to place ourselves in a position where 
our trust can be broken, particularly when the security of the American 
people is at stake.
  I thank the Chair for the opportunity to address this important 
matter and I urge my colleagues to oppose the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the incredible and contrived rhetoric 
pouring forth constantly from the White House for the past few weeks 
has at times bordered on absurd and futile efforts to sell to the 
American people the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. For example, only 
this administration could attempt to put a positive spin on a 
Washington Post article reporting that the CTBT is unverifiable. It 
didn't work and once again it was demonstrable that you can't make a 
silk purse out of a sow's ear.
  No administration, prior to the present one, has ever tried to argue 
with a straight face that a zero yield test ban would or could be 
verifiable. A treaty which purports to ban all nuclear testing is, by 
definition, unverifiable. In fact, previous administrations admitted 
that much less ambitious proposals, such as low-yield test ban, were 
also not verifiable.
  This is not a ``spin'' contest. This is a fact.
  There is one hapless fellow, at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, 
who is bound to know this, and he should not be lending his name to 
such shenanigans.
  I am not referring to the President. This is his treaty--the only 
major arms control agreement negotiated on his watch--and its 
ratification is entirely about his legacy. No, I am talking about Vice 
President Gore, who took the correct, flat-out-position--when he was a 
United States Senator--he was opposed to even a 1-kiloton test ban. 
According to then Senator Gore, the only type of test ban that was 
verifiable was, in his estimation, one with no less than a 5-kiloton 
limit. He was quite clear, Mr. President, in saying that anything 
less--such as the CTBT treaty now before the Senate--would be 
unverifiable.
  On May 12, 1988, Senator Gore objected to an amendment offered to the 
1989 defense bill which called for a test ban treaty and which 
restricted nuclear tests above 1 kiloton. Then-Senator Gore declared:

       Mr. President, I want to express a lingering concern about 
     the threshold contained in the amendment. Without regard to 
     the military usefulness or lack of usefulness of a 1 kiloton 
     versus the 5 kiloton test, purely with regard to 
     verification, I am concerned that a 1 kiloton test really 
     pushes verification to the limit, even with extensive 
     cooperative measures. . . . I express the desire that this 
     threshold be changed from 1 to 5.

  In other words, the Vice President knows full well that a 1-kiloton 
limit--to say nothing of 0-kiloton ban--was unverifiable. In fact, at 
his insistence, the proposed amendment was modified upwards to allow 
for all nuclear tests below 5 kilotons.
  Why then, is the administration, of which he is now a part, claiming 
that a

[[Page 24904]]

zero-yield ban is ``effectively verifiable''?
  Numerous experts have cautioned the Senate that a ``zero-yield'' CTBT 
is fundamentally unverifiable. Other nations will be able to conduct 
militarily significant nuclear tests well below the detection threshold 
of the Treaty's monitoring system, and even below the United States' 
own unilateral capability.
  President Clinton's own former Director of Central Intelligence, Jim 
Woolsey, testified before the Foreign Relations Committee, on May 13, 
1998, that ``With the yield of zero, I have very serious doubts that we 
would be able to verify.''
  On August 5, 1999, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger noted: 
``When I was involved in test-ban negotiations, it was understood that 
testing below a certain threshold was required to ensure confidence in 
U.S. nuclear weapons. It also was accepted that very low-yield tests 
would be difficult to detect, and an agreement to ban them would raise 
serious questions about verifiability.''
  Most significantly, Fred Eimer, former Assistant Director of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency and chief verification expert for both 
the Reagan and Bush administrations, wrote to me this past Sunday 
stating his opposition to the CTBT.
  Dr. Eimer noted that: ``Other nations will be able to conduct 
militarily significant nuclear tests well below the verification 
threshold of the Treaty's monitoring system, and well below that of our 
own National Technical Means.''
  Now, of course, the Administration has claimed on a variety of 
occasions that the CTBT is ``effectively verifiable.'' It seems, 
however, that this administration is saying one thing to the Senate and 
the American people, and admitting quite another thing overseas. I will 
read into the Record the criticism that was leveled against the CTBT on 
August 1, 1996, by Mr. John Holum--President Clinton's ACDA Director--
when he was in Geneva. Mr. Holum stated:

       The United States' views on verification are well known: We 
     would have preferred stronger measures, especially in the 
     decision-making process for on-site inspections, and in 
     numerous specific provisions affecting the practical 
     implementation of the inspection regime. I feel no need to 
     defend this view. The mission on the Conference on 
     Disarmament is not to erect political symbols, but to 
     negotiate enforceable agreements. That require effective 
     verification, not as the preference of any party, but as the 
     sine quo non of this body's work. . . . On verification 
     overall, the Treaty tilts toward the `defense' in a way that 
     has forced the United States to conclude, reluctantly, that 
     it can accept, barely, the balance that Ambassador Ramaker 
     has crafted.

  ``Reluctantly''?
  ``Accept, barely''?
  Does this sound like a ringing endorsement of the CTBT's verification 
regime? I would say this is tantamount to ``damnation by faint 
praise''.
  The fact of the matter is that the CTBT's much-vaunted international 
monitoring system (IMS) was only designed to detect ``fully coupled'' 
nuclear tests down to one kiloton, and cannot detect evasive nuclear 
testing. Any country so-inclined could easily muffle its nuclear tests 
by conducting them in natural cavities (such as salt domes or caverns) 
or in man-made excavations. This technique can reduce the seismic 
magnitude of a test by a factor of 70. In other words, countries can 
conduct tests of up to 60 kilotons without being detected by the IMS.
  Every country of concerns to the United States is technically capable 
of decoupling its nuclear explosions. In other words, countries such as 
North Korea, China, and Russia will be able to conduct very significant 
work on their weapons programs without fear of detection by the IMS. I 
point out to Senators that, according to Department of Energy data, 56 
percent of all U.S. nuclear tests were less than 20 kilotons in yield. 
Such tests, if decoupled, would all have been undetectable by the IMS. 
In other words, one out of every two nuclear tests ever conducted by 
the United States would not have been detected by the IMS--had the U.S. 
chosen to mask its program. I fail to see how the administration does 
not think this monitoring deficiency is not militarily significant.
  Moreover, claims that the IMS will provide new seismic monitoring 
capabilities to the United States are ludicrous. The vast majority of 
seismic stations listed in the CTBT already exist, and were funded by 
the U.S. taxpayer; 68 percent of the ``Primary Seismological 
Stations,'' and 47 percent of the ``Auxiliary'' stations called for 
under the treaty already are in place because the United States put 
them there years ago. I repeat, the only reason the IMS has any value 
to the United States is because it was already U.S. property long 
before the CTBT was negotiated.
  So where are the additional 32 percent of the stations going to be 
located? In places such as the Cook Islands, the Central African 
Republic, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Cameroon, Niger, Bolivia, 
Botswana, Costa Rica, Samoa, and so on and so forth. There is no 
benefit to having seismic stations in these places. In other words, Mr. 
President, the CTBT will provide zero benefit to our nuclear test 
monitoring.
  In fact, it is going to make life more difficult for the United 
States. The same ``overselling'' of the IMS that is going on here in 
the United States is also occurring internationally. Ultimately, this 
is going to cause great problems for the United States in arguing that 
a country has violated the treaty when the much-vaunted IMS has not 
detected anything. Few nations are likely to side with the United 
States in situations where the IMS has not detected a test.
  Moreover, the IMS also will complicate U.S. efforts by providing 
false or misleading data, which in turn will be used by countries to 
conceal treaty violations. Specifically, the CTBT fails to require 
nations to ``calibrate'' their regional stations to assess the local 
geology.
  Naturally, countries such as Russia and China have refused to 
volunteer to do so. By consequence, these stations will record data 
that will be inconsistent with U.S. national information and will be 
used to argue against U.S. on-site inspection initiatives.
  While it is important to realize the deficiencies of the CTBT's 
seismic monitoring regime, it also is a fact that several treaty 
provisions will severely impair the ability of any on-site inspection, 
if launched, to uncover credible evidence of a violation. First, the 
aforementioned failure to calibrate regional stations will introduce 
inaccuracies in the location of suspicious events, creating a broader 
inspectable area than otherwise would be the case. Second, if the 
United States requests an inspection, no U.S. inspectors would be 
allowed to participate, and the country in question can refuse to admit 
other specific inspectors. Third, the treaty allows for numerous delays 
in providing access to suspect sites, which will cause dissipation of 
most of the best technical signatures of a nuclear test.
  Indeed, in the case of low-yield testing, there are few enough 
observable signatures to begin with, and on-site inspections are 
unlikely to be of use at all. Finally, the inspected party is allowed 
to restrict access under the treaty and to declare up to 50 square 
kilometers as being ``off-limits.'' As UNSCOM found with Iraq, any time 
a country is given the right to designate sites as off-limits to 
inspectors, the inspection regime is undermined.
  In conclusion, the IMS and the inspection regime is likely to be so 
weak that I would not be surprised if countries such as Iraq and North 
Korea did not ultimately sign and ratify. Because of the technical 
impossibility of verifying a zero-yield test ban, such rogue regimes 
can credibly claim to adhere to a fraudulent, unverifiable norm against 
testing without fear of ever getting caught.
  The only puzzling question for me, Mr. President, is why, with a Vice 
President who knows the truth quite well, does the Clinton 
administration continue to insist otherwise?
  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Senate giving its 
advice and consent to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
  Debate on the CTBT has unfortunately become politicized. It should 
not be. The series of hearings held in

[[Page 24905]]

the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee were 
fair and serious. I was impressed by the intelligent discussion and 
debate. But I wish that we had heard more. As Senator Hagel indicated 
in his statement on the floor, we should not be compressing debate on 
this issue. We should hold more extensive hearings.
  This treaty is about the future. It is about making a world more 
secure from the threat of nuclear war. This issue is too important, too 
important for the Senate of the United States not to have held hearing 
after hearing on all aspects of the treaty. Such hearings would, in my 
view, have better clarified all the benefits of the Treaty.
  I have supported the treaty, I continue to support the treaty, and I 
will vote for the treaty, not because it is perfect--the CTBT does not 
mean an end to the threat of nuclear war or nuclear terrorism or 
nuclear proliferation, but it does represent a step in the right 
direction of containing these threats.
  Let us be clear on what not ratifying the CTBT means:
  A vote against the CTBT is a vote for the resumption of nuclear 
testing by the United States.
  A resumption of nuclear testing is the clear consequence of the 
criticism by opponents of the CTBT that the stockpile Stewardship 
Program is not sufficient to guarantee the safety, reliability and 
performance of the nation's nuclear weapon stockpile.
  Critics of the Stockpile Stewardship Program argue that only actual 
testing can preserve our nuclear deterrence. Indeed at least one 
witness testifying before the Armed Services Committee advocated a 
resumption of 10 kiloton testing. That means testing a weapon almost 
the size of what was dropped on Hiroshima.
  I do not believe that the American public wants to see the resumed 
testing of Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons.
  Nor do I believe such testing is necessary, not as long as America 
persists in investing sufficient resources in the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program.
  Yes, there are uncertainties about the ability of the Stewardship 
Program over time to be successful. As the Director of Los Alamos 
National Laboratory, John Browne, has testified, ``the average age of 
the nuclear stockpile is older than at any time in history, and nuclear 
weapons involve materials and technologies found nowhere else on 
earth.'' And as his colleague at the Lawrence Livermore laboratories, 
Bruce Tarter, stated, ``the pace of progress must be quickened. Much 
remains to be accomplished, and the clock is running.''
  Indeed, the United States has no alternative to the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program unless we want to return to the level of nuclear 
testing that we saw prior to President Bush ordering a moratorium on 
testing in 1992.
  I ask unanimous consent that a chart demonstrating the number of 
United States nuclear tests, from July 1945 through September 1992, be 
printed in the Record following my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 1.)
  Mr. AKAKA. The United States needs to train people, design equipment, 
and to invent new techniques if it is going to preserve the safety and 
reliability of its nuclear deterrent. The Stockpile Stewardship Program 
can accomplish all of these objectives.
  The Stockpile Stewardship Program has had problems but it has made 
great progress. As Director Tarter noted, it has opened up new 
possibilities for weapons science not even contemplated a few years 
ago.
  This is the future: one of science, not one of testing.
  As a strong advocate of National Missile Defense, I have been struck 
by how some are willing to have such extraordinary confidence in the 
ability of American scientist and engineers to overcome problems in 
missile defense but do not seem to place the same confidence in the 
ability of American scientists and engineers to do the same with 
stockpile stewardship.
  Choosing the path of science does not mean the United States cannot 
test if science proves inadequate to practice. The assurances contained 
in the President's six safeguards attached to this treaty mean that, if 
necessary, we can resume testing. I have full confidence in this 
President or any future President being willing to take this 
extraordinary step, and I have full confidence that this or any future 
Congress will back that President up should such a decision to return 
to testing be necessary.
  Supporting the CTBT does not preclude America from taking whatever 
steps are necessary to preserve our national security.
  I would argue, as have many of my colleagues, and interestingly 
enough, many of our allies, that ratification of the treaty helps 
preserve American security by locking in our nuclear superiority and 
limiting the abilities of other nations to match our nuclear 
capability. Our allies, who benefit from the security of the American 
nuclear umbrella, want the CTBT because they know it enhances, not 
detracts, from their security.
  Yes, it is true that the treaty will not prevent proliferation 
absolutely. A country does not need to conduct nuclear tests to have a 
nuclear capability. But will it have a reliable weapons system? I do 
not think so.
  Yes, it is true that the CTBT will not prevent a country from trying 
to hide small scale nuclear tests. But I believe that the international 
monitoring system which will be in place as well as the United States' 
own national technical means will be so extensive that any test will be 
detected. That country will then be subject to an international 
inspection. Some suggest that the United States will not be able to 
gain a consensus for such an inspection. I do not see why not: it will 
be in the interest of all signatories to ensure that no countries 
violate the agreement. I cannot envision a majority of states not 
agreeing to an inspection of a suspected nuclear test.
  I do not know if the CTBT will create a new international norm 
discouraging nuclear weapons development. I do know that the CTBT will 
make such development technically more difficult to do and politically 
more difficult to deny.
  Let me conclude by asking this simple question: do my colleagues who 
oppose the CTBT want our country to resume nuclear testing?
  If not, then I suggest that the only course is to invest in the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program. I say, give American science a chance. 
Invest in the future of weapons science, not in the past of weapons 
testing by ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

                             Exhibit No. 1

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    U.S.      U.S.-U.K.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total tests by calendar Year:
    1945........................................         1             0
    1946........................................         2             0
    1947........................................         0             0
    1948........................................         3             0
    1949........................................         0             0
    1950........................................         0             0
    1951........................................        16             0
    1952........................................        10             0
    1953........................................        11             0
    1954........................................         6             0
    1955........................................        18             0
    1956........................................        18             0
    1957........................................        32             0
    1958........................................        77             0
    1959........................................         0             0
    1960........................................         0             0
    1961........................................        10             0
    1962........................................        96             2
    1963........................................        47             0
    1964........................................        45             2
    1965........................................        38             1
    1966........................................        48             0
    1967........................................        42             0
    1968........................................        56             0
    1969........................................        46             0
    1970........................................        39             0
    1971........................................        24             0
    1972........................................        27             0
    1973........................................        24             0
    1974........................................        22             1
    1975........................................        22             0
    1976........................................        20             1
    1977........................................        20             0
    1978........................................        19             2
    1979........................................        15             1
    1980........................................        14             3
    1981........................................        16             1
    1982........................................        18             1
    1983........................................        18             1
    1984........................................        18             2
    1985........................................        17             1
    1986........................................        14             1
    1987........................................        14             1
    1988........................................        15             0
    1989........................................        11             1
    1990........................................         8             1
    1991........................................         8             1
    1991........................................         7             1
    1992........................................         6             0
                                                 -----------------------
      Total tests...............................     1,030            24
Total tests by location:
    Pacific.....................................         4             0
    Johnston Island.............................        12             0
    Enewetak....................................        43             0
    Bikini......................................        23             0
    Christmas Island............................        24             0
                                                 -----------------------
      Total Pacific.............................       106             0
    Total S. Atlantic...........................         3             0

[[Page 24906]]

 
    Underground.................................       604            24
    Atmospheric.................................       100             0
                                                 -----------------------
      Total NTS.................................       813            24
                                                 =======================
    Central Nevada..............................         1             0
    Amchltka, Alaska............................         3             0
    Alamogordo, New Mexico......................         1             0
    Carlsbad, New Mexico........................         1             0
    Hattiesburg, Mississippi....................         2             0
    Farmington, New Mexico......................         1             0
    Grand Valley, Colorado......................         1             0
    Rifle, Colorado.............................         1             0
    Fallon, Nevada..............................         1             0
    Nellis Air Force Range......................         5             0
                                                 -----------------------
      Total Other...............................        17             0
                                                 =======================
      Total tests...............................     1,030            24
                                                 =======================
Total tests by type:
    Tunnel......................................        67             0
    Shaft.......................................       739            24
    Crater......................................         9             0
                                                 -----------------------
      Total underground.........................       815            24
                                                 =======================
    Airburst....................................         1             0
    Airdrop.....................................        52             0
    Balloon.....................................        25             0
    Barge.......................................        36             0
    Rocket......................................        12             0
    Surface.....................................        28             0
    Tower.......................................        56             0
                                                 -----------------------
      Total atmospheric.........................       210             0
      Total underwater..........................     1,030            24
                                                 =======================
      Total tests...............................     1,030            24
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total detonations by purpose: Joint US-UK, 24 detonations; Plowshare, 35
  detonations; Safety Experiment, 88 detonations; Storage-
  Transportation, 4 detonations; Vela Uniform, 7 detonations; Weapons
  Effects, 98 detonations; Weapons Related, 883 detonations.
176 detonations (1980-1992)    14 detonations (1980-1992).
 
Note: Totals do not include two combat uses of nuclear weapons, which
  are not considered ``tests.'' The first combat detonations was a 15 kt
  weapon airdropped 08/05/45 at Hiroshima, Japan. The second was a 21 kt
  weapon airdropped 08/09/45 at Nagasaki, Japan.

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, yesterday President Clinton sent a written 
request to the Senate asking that we ``postpone'' a vote on the CTBT. 
In light of the President's outburst on Friday lashing out at Senate 
Republicans, and his adamant declaration that he would never submit a 
written request asking the Senate to withdraw the CTBT from 
consideration, his decision to send just such a letter is interesting.
  His letter, was a baby-step in the right direction, insufficient to 
avert a vote on the CTBT today. The President is clearly playing poker 
with the Senate, but he doesn't have a winning hand, and I think he 
knows it.
  The President sent this letter only because he realizes he has failed 
to make a compelling case for the treaty, and failed to convince two-
thirds of the Senate that this treaty is in the national interest. He 
knows that if we vote on the CTBT today, the treaty will be defeated.
  His letter did not meet both the criteria set by me and others. For 
example, he requested: (a) that the treaty be withdrawn and (b) that it 
not be considered for the remainder of his presidency.
  The President has repeatedly dismissed the critics of this treaty as 
playing politics. Look who's talking. In his mind, it seems, the only 
reason anyone could possibly oppose this treaty is to give him a 
political black eye. Putting aside the megalomania in such a 
suggestion, accusing Republicans of playing politics with our national 
security was probably not the most effective strategy for convincing 
those with substantive concerns about the treaty.
  The fact is, we are not opposed to this treaty because we want to 
score political points against a lame-duck Administration. We are 
opposed because it is unverifiable and because it will endanger the 
safety and reliability of our nuclear arsenal. The White House and 
Senate Democrats have failed to make a compelling case to the contrary. 
That is why the treaty is headed for defeat.
  Of course, treaty supporters want to preserve a way to spin this 
defeat into a victory, by claiming that they have managed to ``live to 
fight another day.'' That's probably the same thing they said after 
President Carter requested the SALT II Treaty be withdrawn. But they 
will be fooling no one but themselves.
  Before this debate is over, it must be made clear that to one and all 
this CTBT is dead--and that the next President will not be bound by its 
terms. The next administration must be left free to establish its own 
nuclear testing and nuclear non-proliferation policies, unencumbered by 
the failed policies of the current, outgoing administration.
  Without such concrete assurances that this CTBT is dead, I will 
insist that the Senate proceed as planned and vote down this treaty.

                          ____________________