[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 16]
[Senate]
[Pages 23592-23594]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



       UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENT--COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, as in executive session, I ask unanimous 
consent that at 9:30 a.m. on Wednesday, October 6, the Foreign 
Relations Committee be discharged from further consideration of Treaty 
Document 105-28 and the document be placed on the Executive Calendar, 
if not previously reported by the committee.
  I should note, that is something that was requested by the Democratic 
leadership, and we think it is a reasonable request.
  I further ask consent that at 9:30 a.m. on Friday, October 8, the 
Senate begin consideration of Treaty Document 105-28 and the treaty be 
advanced through the various parliamentary stages, up to and including 
the presentation of the resolution of ratification, and there be one 
relevant amendment in order to the resolution of ratification to be 
offered by each leader.
  There was a request for additional time for that debate. Therefore, I 
ask consent that there be a total of 14 hours of debate on the treaty 
itself, to be equally divided in the usual form, and no other 
amendments, reservations, conditions, declarations, statements, 
understandings, or motions be in order, and that amendments be filed at 
the desk 24 hours before they are called up.
  I think it is fair. If we are going to have an amendment on our side 
and the other side, we need some notification of its content.
  There was a thought we might need additional time for discussion on 
those amendments. Therefore, I ask there be a time limitation of 4 
hours equally divided on each amendment, in addition to the 14 hours, 
for a total of 18 hours over a 2-day period, but spread over a period 
of time that I believe will run about 6 days.
  I further ask consent that following the use or yielding back of time 
and disposition of the amendments, the Senate proceed to vote on the 
adoption of the resolution of ratification, as amended, if amended, all 
without any intervening action or date.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  The minority leader.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Reserving the right to object, and I will not object, I 
think this unanimous consent request represents progress from the first 
request made by the majority leader. But I still believe this procedure 
is unfair, and I would even say dangerous.
  This is the most significant treaty with which we will deal on 
nuclear proliferation maybe in the time that the majority leader and I 
will be leaders. We are going to be taking this up on the Senate floor 
without one hearing in the Foreign Relations Committee. We have looked 
back. We do not know when that has ever happened before, when the 
Foreign Relations Committee has not acted upon a treaty, even though it 
has been pending for 2 years.
  We are hoping that the Committee on Armed Services will take up the 
treaty next week, but I believe that alone is irresponsible. But we 
believe we have no choice. Our choice is to send the message as an 
institution that this treaty is not important, it does not even deserve 
a hearing, or to send the message, God forbid, that the Senate would 
reject this treaty and say it was not the U.S. intention to send the 
message around the world that we will ban nuclear weapons testing. 
Those are the options on the negative side.
  On the positive side, the option might be between now and October 12, 
we can convince the necessary two-thirds of the Senate to support this 
treaty. We still hope, we believe, that might be within our reach. But 
I know what some of the debate will be, and the Presiding Officer or 
the majority leader will mark my words. We will hear somebody say this 
treaty is not verifiable, in spite of the fact that expert after expert 
has noted that it is verifiable, but there will have been no hearings 
to verify the fact that, indeed, this treaty is subject to all the 
verification elements required of a treaty of this kind.
  We are going to hear all kinds of complaints and all kinds of 
allegations and rumors about what this treaty does or does not do, and 
when you do not have hearings, that is what is going to happen.
  So we are extremely disappointed with the way this has been handled. 
As I said, I believe it is irresponsible and dangerous. But we also 
note this may be the best we can get, and if it is the best we can get, 
as troubled as we are, we will take it. We will have our day in court. 
We will make our best arguments. We will let the judgment of this 
Senate prevail.
  I am very hopeful the administration will be engaged. I am very 
hopeful

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those who care as deeply as we care about this issue will join us in 
making the arguments and in dealing with the issue. I also say it is my 
intention, as Democratic leader, to conduct hearings of my own as part 
of the Democratic Policy Committee to ensure that we do have experts in 
Washington to express themselves. We will do that at the appropriate 
moment.
  I do not object, but I must express very grave reservations.
  Mr. LOTT. Has the Chair ruled?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Roberts). Is there objection to the 
leader's request?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I appreciate the Democratic leader has 
agreed to this request. We have worked back and forth now over 2 or 3 
days. This is a fair approach, especially with the two leaders' 
amendments, if they are needed, and a guarantee we will file them in 
time to take a look at them.
  It is serious. I take it very seriously. I do want to make the 
Senator aware that at least one chairman has notified me he intends to 
have three hearings before the final vote--Senator Warner of the Armed 
Services Committee, which certainly has an interest in this because of 
what it does involve, weapons.
  I believe--I cannot confirm the exactness of these dates or that they 
will be able to do them all--he is thinking in terms of hearings on the 
6th, 9th, and 12th, and that is a committee which has a great deal of 
jurisdiction. I do not know yet if Senator Helms plans additional 
hearings before the 12th, although certainly that is a possibility now 
that we have a time agreed to.
  In addition, I understand there have been discussions with regard to 
this treaty in the Foreign Relations Committee on February 10, 1998; 
May 13, 1998; June 3, 1998; June 18, 1998; July 13, 1998; February 24, 
1999; and March 23, 1999. Perhaps it was not a full-blown hearing just 
on that subject; I cannot say, but I refer to these dates that were 
included in the Record just yesterday by Senator Helms.
  There will be at least a couple, if not more, hearings in the 
appropriate committee or committees prior to the final vote.
  I see Senator Warner is here. He might want to comment on his 
thinking as to the witnesses and how he plans to proceed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, with my distinguished leader and Senator 
Helms, we met today for the better part of an hour--and through Senator 
Levin. As my colleague knows, he is absent for reasons of a personal 
need today. We have carefully laid the foundation for a very thorough 
hearing by the Armed Services Committee. Our committee has supervision 
over the stockpile, and really the stockpile is a central body of fact 
which I urge each Senator to study very carefully.
  What we have proposed to do on Tuesday of next week is to have the 
experts from the Central Intelligence Agency, from the various 
laboratories, in closed hearing to lay out the facts with regard to 
this stockpile. The following Wednesday, we are going to invite the 
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and former 
Secretaries of Defense and former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs, and 
Senator Levin, of course, will have his selection of witnesses.
  The following day, on Thursday, we again, with the directors of the 
laboratories and others, will cover more details about the stockpile 
issue and the efforts by this country to put in place testing to be a 
substitute--that is, computer analysis, and so forth, as a substitute 
for actual testing.
  Our committee will have a very thorough set of hearings. We will 
distill the facts, provide them for the record, and bring them to the 
respective leaders, and hopefully perhaps the Senate, as a whole, can 
consider parts or all of this important testimony.
  Mr. LOTT. I thank Senator Warner for that information and for his 
plan and for his working and discussing this with Senator Helms. I 
believe it will add a great deal of vital and interesting information 
for the Senate, and I am sure he will have testimony based on what he 
just said on both sides of the issue. That will be helpful.
  I have no further business at this time.
  Mr. President, does Senator Daschle have anything further at this 
time?
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I do not. I appreciate the majority 
leader yielding.
  The majority leader made reference to meetings where the CTBT has 
been discussed. Certainly we were not in any way acknowledging that 
this issue has never come up. But I think it is important for the 
record, once again, to say that in the time that this treaty has been 
before the Senate, not one hearing has been held.
  I am grateful for the chair of the Armed Services Committee at least 
taking this initiative, as late as the date may be. It sounds to be a 
very comprehensive set of hearings. That will be helpful.
  But I must say, it is equally irresponsible for us to be here at this 
moment without 1 day where the committee of jurisdiction has held 
hearings on an issue of this import and then ask our colleagues--the 
Senate--to pass judgment.
  The majority leader knows we have attempted to bring the Senate to 
this point now for some time. We are pleased that we have made this 
progress. But, frankly, this isn't the way to do it. We should have had 
hearings in the committee. We are glad we are having hearings in the 
Armed Services Committee. But to rush to judgment on an issue of this 
importance is not the way to do business.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I say most respectfully to my good friend, 
the minority leader, each year the Armed Services Committee reviews the 
stockpile issues. Each year we go through our normal oversight 
hearings. A part of it relates to the very issues that we will again 
bring to the Senate by virtue of the hearings in our committee and the 
record that we will put together.
  So I must say, most respectfully, our committee annually looks at 
these issues. So for members of our committee, and to the extent others 
have been interested, in fact, the record is there.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, let me just respond quickly.
  I acknowledge that. But I believe there is a huge difference between 
looking at the issue of stockpile and looking at the importance of the 
treaty per se, at the language of the treaty, and whether or not we 
ought to ratify a treaty, whether or not we ought to send the message 
to the rest of the world that we want them to ratify the treaty, 
whether the treaty is in our long-term interests, and what the 
ramifications of the treaty are. That is what I am suggesting ought to 
be the subject of these hearings.
  We ought to be looking at stockpiles, and we ought to be looking at 
the ramifications of our current nuclear weaponry. And certainly the 
chairman has done an admirable job of that, as has the committee as a 
whole, but we have not held hearings until now. I think they are long 
overdue. I think we as a Senate have made a very big mistake in calling 
this treaty to the floor prior to the time we have had that kind of 
consideration in the Foreign Relations Committee or, for that matter, 
in the Armed Services Committee.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, if I could respond on that.
  I do think that a critical part of our decision involves the armed 
services aspect of it. The review of nuclear weapons--what their 
condition is, what it will be, what it means for the future--that is at 
the heart of the concerns that a lot of Senators have, including this 
Senator. I have enough background, having been on the Armed Services 
Committee in the House and the Senate, to be able to assess, as most 
Senators, after reading the documentation, the ramifications around the 
world.
  But if we cannot be assured of the safety and the reliability of 
these weapons, then that goes right to the heart of the whole issue. 
Before you get to discussion about what it means to

[[Page 23594]]

Pakistan or India or North Korea, you need to know what is going to 
happen over a period of time in terms of safety, the risk to people in 
the areas, or the surety that we will have these weapons if, in fact, 
we do need them.
  I say to Senator Warner, you and I have discussed this already. I 
know that is the crux of what you are saying.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, my concern, as you have said, is a decade 
hence. Will there be some leader in the world or, indeed, some rogue or 
some other individual who wants to challenge our country who will have 
any basis to believe we have less than 100-percent reliability in that 
arsenal of weapons we will have in a decade or 15 years out? That is 
the critical period of time.
  I say to my good friend, Senator Daschle, everyone knows my very 
strong opposition to this treaty. Frequently, colleagues on both sides 
of the aisle engage me in informal debate of what it is about the 
treaty, what it is about the facts that lead me to this conclusion.
  So, yes, perhaps we could have been more formalized at some point in 
time. But I think it is important that we focus on it at this critical 
time, and that we are going to have very thorough hearings in our 
committee. I have looked over the hearings of the Foreign Relations 
Committee over the year and they, indeed, covered many of the subjects 
relating to this treaty in that period of time.

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