[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 16]
[Senate]
[Pages 23255-23267]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                     COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I said a moment ago, and I repeat for 
emphasis, I am absolutely astonished our friends across the aisle 
refuse to agree to the majority leader's unanimous consent agreement to 
bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the Senate floor for debate 
and vote on October 7.
  I think this refusal is significant because of the incessant 
grandstanding that has been going on by the administration and some 
Senators and, of course, the liberal media that are not going to tell 
the facts about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty--all clamoring that 
there is such an urgent need for immediate Senate action on the CTBT. 
It has been proclaimed constantly that the Senate absolutely must 
ratify the treaty so the United States can participate in the October 6 
through 8 conference in Vienna. Yet when the majority leader offered a 
unanimous consent agreement to bring the treaty to a vote in time for 
that conference, the same people clamored for more action, running for 
the hills and demanding more time and making other demands.
  If it were not so pitiful, this behavior would be amusing. I am not 
going to let Senators have it both ways. The same people who have been 
criticizing the Foreign Relations Committee for inaction on the CTBT 
are now refusing to a date certain, and a timely vote on the CTBT.
  Of course, some are hiding behind the idea that more hearings are 
needed for a full Senate vote. Hogwash. For the record, the Committee 
on Foreign Relations has held in the past 2 years alone 14 hearings in 
which the CTBT was extensively discussed. Most folks don't show up for 
the hearings--the train was too late or whatever. This number of 14 
does not include an even larger number of hearings held by the Armed 
Services Committee and the Intelligence Committee on CTBT relevant 
issues, nor does this include three hearings by the Governmental 
Affairs Committee on the CTBT and relevant issues.
  I ask unanimous consent this list documenting each Foreign Relations 
Committee hearing be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

    Foreign Relations Committee Hearings During Which the CTBT Was 
                               Discussed

       February 10, 1998--(Full Committee/Helms), 1998 Foreign 
     Policy Overview and the President's Fiscal Year 1999 Budget 
     Request. (S. Hrg. 105-443.)
       May 13, 1998--(Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian 
     Affairs/Brownback), Crisis in South Asia: India's Nuclear 
     Tests. (S. Hrg. 105-620.)
       June 3, 1998--(Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian 
     Affairs/Brownback), Crisis in South Asia, Part 2: Pakistan's 
     Nuclear Tests. (S. Hrg. 105-620.)
       June 18, 1998--(Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
     Affairs/Thomas), Congressional Views of the U.S.-China 
     Relationship.
       July 13, 1998--(Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South 
     Asian Affairs/Brownback), India and Pakistan: What Next? (S. 
     Hrg. 105-620.)
       February 24, 1999--(Full Committee/Helms), 1999 Foreign 
     Policy Overview and the President's Fiscal year 2000 Foreign 
     Affairs Budget Request.
       March 23, 1999--(Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
     Affairs/Thomas), U.S. China Policy: A Critical Reexamination.
       April 20, 1999--(Full Committee/Hagel), Current and Growing 
     Missile Threats to the U.S.
       April 27, 1999--(Full Committee/Helms), Nonproliferation, 
     Arms Control and Political Military Issues.
       May 5, 1999--(Full Committee/Hagel), Does the ABM Treaty 
     Still Serve U.S. Strategic and Arms Control Objectives in a 
     Changed World?
       May 25, 1999--(Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian 
     Affairs/Brownback), Political/Military Developments in India.
       May 26, 1999--(Full Committee/Helms), Cornerstone of Our 
     Security?: Should the Senate Reject a Protocol to 
     Reconstitute the ABM Treaty with Four New Partners?
       June 28, 1999--(Full Committee/Hagel), Nomination (Holum).
       September 28, 1999--(Full Committee/Helms), Facing Saddam's 
     Iraq: Disarray in the International Community.

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at least 17 respected witnesses have 
discussed their views on both sides of the CTBT question in the past 2 
years. The administration itself has included this treaty in testimony 
on five occasions. More than 113 pages of committee transcript text are 
devoted to this subject. I have a stack of papers here that are CTBT 
testimony and debate within the committee. A record can be made of how 
this has been delayed and by whom.
  Mr. President, I find it puzzling that some in the Senate are 
objecting to the unanimous-consent request of the majority leader. The 
Foreign Relations Committee has thoroughly examined this matter. We 
have heard from experts on this very treaty. Let me share this with the 
Senate, the people listening, and the news media--that have not covered 
hearings on this matter but whose editors have said it is a disgrace 
that a vote has not been allowed on the CTBT treaty. Here are the 
people who have discussed the CTBT before the Foreign Relations 
Committee.
  Let me point out, we have hearings fairly early in the morning, maybe 
too early for some to come. But I look on both sides of the aisle, and 
I have seen, sometimes, nobody on one side. Anyway, here is a list of 
the people I recall having discussed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
with the Committee on Foreign Relations:

       The Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State;
       The Honorable Karl F. Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary of 
     State for South Asian Affairs;
       Mr. Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
     Nonproliferation;
       The Honorable R. James Woolsey, Former Director, Central 
     Intelligence Agency;
       Dr. Fred Ikle, Former Director, Arms Control and 
     Disarmament Agency;
       The Honorable Stephen J. Solarz, Former U.S. Representative 
     from New York;
       The Honorable William J. Schneider, Former Under Secretary 
     of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology;
       Dr. Richard Haass, Former Senior Director, Near East and 
     South Asia, National Security Council;
       The Honorable Stanely O. Roth, Assistant Secretary of State 
     for East Asian and Pacific Affairs;
       The Honorable James R. Schlesinger, Former Secretary of 
     Defense;

[[Page 23256]]

       The Honorable Eric D. Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State 
     for Political-Military Affairs;
       The Honorable Ronald F. Lehman, Former Director, Arms 
     Control and Disarmament Agency.

  Parenthetically, I might say, not one word, as I recall, has been 
published by the same newspapers that have been piously declaring there 
must be action on the CTBT.
  To continue the list:

       General Eugene Habiger, Former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. 
     Strategic Command;
       The Honorable Frank G. Wisner, Vice Chairman, External 
     Affairs, American International Group;
       Dr. Stephen Cohen, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, 
     The Brookings Institution;
       The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Former Secretary of 
     State; and
       The Honorable Richard Butler, Former Executive Chairman 
     United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM).

  I think this record will show--it should--that the Foreign Relations 
Committee has thoroughly examined this matter. We have pleaded for 
members of the committee, several of them, to come to a meeting once in 
a while. I have done everything I could to get this thing orderly 
presented to the Senate. All I have received are communications from 
Senators with a veiled threat if I did not proceed in some other way. 
We have certainly talked about this treaty in more depth than many 
other treaties, to my knowledge.
  Those who are objecting, and objected to the majority leader's 
proposition this morning, don't want more hearings; what they want is 
more delay. You see, until a few minutes ago, until the majority leader 
offered his unanimous consent request, the same people who are now 
demanding more hearings were ready to dispense with further debate and 
go to a vote. Let me tell you what I mean.
  The American people may recall, if they were watching C-SPAN, that 
President Clinton, in his State of the Union Address on January 27, 
1998, declared: ``I ask the Senate to approve it''--the CTBT--and he 
said ``this year'' in mournful tones.
  In other words, the President was ready for a vote in 1998. Then a 
year later, the President said:

       I ask the Senate to take this vital step: Approve the 
     Treaty now.

  ``Approve it now,'' he said. He did not say approve the CTBT after 
more hearings.
  On July 23, 1998, the Vice President, Mr. Gore, asked the Senate to 
``act now'' on the CTBT, and all the while the New York Times and the 
Washington Post, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, have been saying that 
Helms is holding up this treaty.
  In February, Secretary Albright asked for approval of the CTBT ``this 
session.'' And in April she said:

       . . . the time has come to ratify the CTBT this year, this 
     session, now.

  On January 12, 1999, the National Security Adviser, Sandy Berger, 
declared:

       . . . it would be a terrible tragedy if our Senate failed 
     to ratify the CTBT this year.

  The point I am making is that the list goes on and on.
  Mr. President, 45 Democratic Senators wrote to me asking me to allow 
a vote:

       . . . with sufficient time to allow the United States to 
     actively participate [sic] in the Treaty's inaugural 
     Conference of Ratifying States. . . .

  That conference begins next week.
  At a recent press conference for the cameras, Senator Specter, my 
friend, declared:

       The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was submitted to the 
     Senate months ago, and it is high time the Senate acted on 
     it.

  Senator Murray called for:

       . . . immediate consideration of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
     Treaty.

  Senator Dorgan said that:

       . . . we must get this done at least by the first of 
     October.

  I must observe that the distinguished Democratic leader, Senator 
Daschle, also had very strong words on this matter. Just 6 days ago, he 
proclaimed:

       Senate Republicans have permitted a small number of Members 
     from within their ranks to manipulate Senate rules--

  I wonder how we did that when I was not looking. No rules have been 
manipulated, and I resent the inference. But to continue his quote--

     from within their ranks to manipulate Senate rules and 
     procedures to prevent the Senate from acting on the CTBT. . . 
     . I would hope we would soon see some leadership on the 
     Republican side of the aisle to break the current impasse and 
     allow the full Senate to act on the CTBT. . . . That effort 
     must begin today.

  Mr. President, I hope when we get to the debate, however long it 
lasts, that we will not have the spectacle of Senator Kennedy again and 
again offering his minimum wage amendment. He keeps it in his hip 
pocket all the time and pulls it out anytime he can stick it up, and he 
will debate it for an hour or 2. We have to have some understanding 
about what we are going to debate, when we do debate, and I hope we 
will debate on the terms the Senator from Mississippi, the majority 
leader, offered.
  I think all this speaks well of the majority leader, and I 
congratulate him.
  I congratulate him for having the will to do this because this has 
been insulting on many occasions as a political issue, which it is not.
  I hope the Senate Democrats will reconsider their refusal to agree to 
a CTBT vote after having demanded it so often.
  Let me go back in time a little bit. I have been waiting for the 
President of the United States to follow up on his written commitment 
to me that he will send up the ABM Treaty, and I have been hoping to 
see a treaty on two or three other things.
  I am not in the mood to leave the American people naked against a 
very possible missile attack, and that has been my problem. The 
President of the United States has insisted on keeping the ABM Treaty 
alive when that would forbid anything happening in terms of defending 
the security of the American people. I was unwilling to do that until 
he followed through on his written guarantee to me that he would send 
the ABM Treaty to me and to the Senate.
  I trust in the future that the media will, for once, acknowledge some 
of their statements regarding the CTBT for what they have really said 
because it is inaccurate and misleading to the American people.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I say to my colleague from North Carolina, 
for whom I have great respect, it is not and will never be my intention 
to prevent him from speaking on the floor. That was not the purpose of 
the unanimous consent request or the objections.
  I have talked to him personally about this issue. He feels very 
strongly about it, as the Senator from Delaware indicated. The Senator, 
who is the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has a right to 
feel very strongly about his position. I respect that very much. This 
is an issue that is very important to this country and, in my judgment, 
to the world.
  We have a circumstance where 154 countries have become signatories to 
something called the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Forty-seven 
countries have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This 
country has not.
  Mr. President, 737 days ago or so, this treaty was sent to the Senate 
by this administration; 737 days later we have not acted on this 
treaty. Some feel very strongly this treaty is not good for our 
country. The majority leader made that case. The chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, the Senator from North Carolina, makes 
that case. They have strong feelings about it. I respect that. Other 
people have strong feelings on the other side, including myself.
  I believe strongly this country has a moral responsibility in the 
world to lead on the question of the nonproliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Not many countries have access to nuclear weapons or possess 
nuclear weapons. Many would like to. How do we prevent the spread of 
nuclear weapons in this world, at a time when the shadow of nuclear 
tests recently made by India and Pakistan suggest there is an appetite 
for acquisition of nuclear weapons and testing of nuclear weapons? Two 
countries that do not like each other

[[Page 23257]]

and share a common border explode nuclear weapons literally under each 
other's chins. Shouldn't that tell us there are serious challenges 
ahead with respect to nuclear weapons and the spread of nuclear 
weapons? I think so.
  A unanimous consent request was propounded by the majority leader to 
bring up the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty next week. As far as I am 
concerned, it is all right with me. I have been suggesting it ought to 
be brought up for a debate. It probably would be better if there was a 
hearing first and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and other respected 
folks came and set out their views and then, a couple of days later, 
debate it and vote on it. That would probably be a better course.
  Even in the absence of that, as far as I am concerned, bring it up. 
The Democratic leader said he thought 10 hours was probably not enough 
time. The majority leader said in response we can perhaps lengthen 
that. Maybe, based on that discussion, there can be an agreement today. 
I hope so. This ought to be brought up for a vote. I do not think the 
objection by the Democratic leader was an objection to say it ought not 
be brought up. He was concerned about time. It occurred to me from the 
response of the majority leader that can be worked out. In any event, 
as far as I am concerned, bring it up next week. Let's have a debate 
next week and a vote next week.
  Twenty-one nations have ratified this treaty since the beginning of 
this year. Most of our allies have ratified this treaty, but we have 
not. Some say it is dangerous, as the majority leader alleged today, 
using the term ``dangerous'' for this country. Others say it is not in 
this country's interest, that it will weaken this country, leave us 
unprotected.
  Let me describe some of the support for this treaty, going back to 
President Eisenhower who pushed very hard in the final term of his 
Presidency to get a treaty of this type. General Shelton, the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supports this treaty and testified 
recently again in support of the treaty. Four previous Chairmen of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff--General Shalikashvili, Gen. Colin Powell, 
Admiral Crowe, and Gen. David Jones--also endorse that same position, 
that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is good for this country 
and ought to be ratified by this Senate.
  Does anyone really feel Gen. Colin Powell, General Shalikashvili, and 
General Shelton would take a position that they think will weaken this 
country? Are they the extreme left? Are they the folks who, on the 
extreme of politics in this country, believe we ought to disarm? I do 
not think so. The Secretary of Defense supports this treaty and 
believes it ought to be ratified. I would not expect that he and Colin 
Powell and Admiral Crowe and all of those folks would do so unless they 
felt very strongly that this treaty is in this country's interest.
  A former Member of this body, Senator Hatfield, someone for whom I 
have the greatest respect, offered some sound advice on this subject. 
Senator Hatfield, incidentally, was one of the first servicemen to walk 
in the streets of Hiroshima after the nuclear strike on that city. I 
want to read what former Senator Hatfield said to us. He said:

       It is clear to me that ratifying this treaty would be in 
     the national interest, and it is equally clear that Senators 
     have a responsibility to the world, to the Nation and their 
     constituents to put partisan politics aside and allow the 
     Senate to consider this treaty.

  He, perhaps better than anybody in this body, understands the horror 
of nuclear weapons, having walked the streets of Hiroshima after the 
strike on that city.
  I quoted the other day Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union who 
warned that in a nuclear war the living would envy the dead.
  The question for this country is, Will we stand and provide world 
leadership on the issue of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons or 
will we decide it is not our country's responsibility; it is someone 
else's responsibility? Let England do it. Let France do it. Let Germany 
do it. Let Canada do it.
  We are the only country in the world with the capability of providing 
significant leadership in this area. We must, in my judgment, ratify 
this treaty.
  There are safeguards in this treaty. I will not spend much more time 
discussing it right now because we are on another piece of legislation, 
and that is important, too. But I make these comments because the 
safeguards in this treaty are quite clear.
  This is not a case where this country will ratify a treaty that, in 
effect, disarms us. We are not conducting explosive tests of nuclear 
weapons now. We have unilaterally decided--7 years ago--we are not 
exploding nuclear weapons.
  What contribution would be made by a test ban treaty? Simply this: If 
you cannot test your weaponry, you have no notion and no certainty that 
any weapons you develop are weapons that work. We have known for 30 and 
40 years that the ability to suppress the testing of nuclear weapons 
will be the first step, albeit a moderate step, in halting the spread 
of nuclear weapons. This, in my judgment, in fact, is not a moderate 
step--this is a baby step.
  If we cannot take this baby step on this important treaty, how on 
Earth are we going to do the heavy lifting that is necessary following 
this that will lead to the mutual reduction in the stockpile of nuclear 
arms? Tens of thousands of nuclear arms--30,000 nuclear weapons between 
us and Russia alone.
  How are we going to reduce the stockpile of nuclear weapons and halt 
the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries and reduce the threat 
that comes from the nuclear weapons tests that occurred in Pakistan and 
India? How on Earth are we going to provide the leadership that is 
necessary, the tough leadership that is necessary in these areas if we 
cannot take this small step to ratify a treaty that has been signed by 
154 countries now, and that makes so much sense, and that our Joint 
Chiefs of Staff have said represents this country's interests? How on 
Earth are we going to do the tough work if we cannot take this first 
step?
  I have a lot more to say on this subject. I have expressed to the 
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, it is not my intention to 
be an irritant to anybody in this Chamber personally. I do not ever 
intend to suggest that someone who believes differently than I do is 
taking that position for any other reason except for the passion they 
have about this country and the policies they think will strengthen it.
  But we have a very significant disagreement about this issue. It is a 
very significant and important issue. I believe in my heart very 
strongly this country has a responsibility to lead in the right way on 
this matter.
  My hope is the unanimous consent request propounded by the majority 
leader--if there is more time needed; and the majority leader indicated 
that he was agreeable to that--my hope is that before the end of today 
we will have an agreement on when it will be brought to the floor, and 
then let's have a robust, aggressive, thoughtful debate so the country 
can understand what this means. Then let's have a vote and decide 
whether this country decides to ratify this important treaty that has 
been discussed for some 40 years--whether this country will take the 
first step that will help halt the spread of nuclear weapons around the 
world.
  Mr. WARNER. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. DORGAN. Of course I will yield.
  Mr. WARNER. First, I wish to commend our colleague for the very 
forthright way in which he has, for some period of time, expressed his 
strong views, the need for this treaty to be considered by the Senate. 
I strongly support the request of the majority leader, and I share with 
you the hope that our leadership can work this out and we can move 
expeditiously.
  I assure my colleague, I have just had the opportunity to speak with 
my distinguished ranking member, Senator Levin. The Armed Services 
Committee will promptly conduct hearings regarding that area for which 
we have oversight responsibility.
  The point I wish to make to my colleague is, it is going to require 
the most careful consideration by all Senators to reach this vote. Much 
of the

[[Page 23258]]

relative material that convinces this Senator to oppose the treaty 
simply cannot be disclosed in open. I am going to urge our colleagues, 
and I am sure with the assistance of our leadership, we can provide 
more than one opportunity for each Senator to learn the full range of 
facts regarding this treaty and its implications for this Nation.
  Yes, I want to see America lead, but I want to make certain that 
leadership role that exists today can exist a decade hence, 15 years, 
20 years hence. That is the absolute heart of this debate: What steps 
do we take now to ensure that our country can maintain its position of 
world leadership in the decades to come?
  We shall develop the facts, those of us who are most respectful of 
your viewpoint, as I am sure you are of mine. It will be a historic 
vote for this Chamber.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I appreciate the comments of the Senator 
from Virginia. One of my deep regrets is that he does not support this 
treaty because I have great respect for him and have worked with him on 
a number of matters. He truly knows this area and studies this area. 
There is room for disagreement.
  But I say, again, that Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen, former 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell, General Shalikashvili, 
General Shelton, and so many others have reviewed all of the same 
material--much of it secret material, secret documents--and have come 
to a different conclusion, believing that this treaty is very important 
for this country and that it is very important to ratify this treaty.
  But my hope mirrors that of Senator Warner, that when we have this 
debate, we will have a debate about ideas and about the kind of public 
policy that will benefit this country and the world, the kind of public 
policy that will allow us to continue to be strong, to have the 
capability to defend our liberty and freedom, but the kind of policy 
that will also provide leadership so this country can help prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons in the years ahead.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. DURBIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. President.
  I first acknowledge the leadership of my colleague from North Dakota, 
Senator Dorgan, who has called the attention of this Congress and this 
Senate to this important issue. I hope his efforts will prevail in 
bringing this issue to the floor of the Senate.
  In my lifetime, it is interesting to look back and reflect on things 
which were so commonplace and now are so rare. I can recall, as a child 
in the 1950's, in my classroom when we were being instructed about the 
need to ``duck and cover,'' the possibility that there might be an 
attack on the United States of America. That was generated by the fact 
that the Soviets had detonated a nuclear weapon. We were technically 
emerging into a cold war, and there was a belief that we had to be 
prepared for the possibility of an attack.
  In my hometown of Springfield, IL, when my wife and I bought a little 
house, the first house we ever owned--1600 South Lincoln Avenue; an 
appropriate name in Springfield, IL--we moved into the house and went 
in the basement and were startled to find a fallout shelter that had 
been built to specifications. Someone had believed in the 1960s this 
was an appropriate thing to put in a house in Springfield, IL, because 
of the possibility that we may face some sort of attack, a nuclear 
attack on the United States.
  You can remember the monthly air raid sirens that used to call our 
attention to the fact that we had a system to warn all of America of a 
potential attack. You may remember, not that many years ago, movies on 
television and long debates about a ``nuclear winter,'' what would 
happen with a nuclear holocaust.
  That conversation was part of daily life in America for decades. Then 
with the end of the cold war, and the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, and the Warsaw Pact nations not only leaving the Soviet 
domination but gravitating toward the West--with countries such as 
Poland and Hungary and Czechoslovakia coming to join NATO--many of us 
have been lulled into a false sense of security that the threat of 
nuclear weapons is no longer something we should take seriously. In 
fact, we should.
  In fact, we are reminded, from time to time, that the so-called 
nuclear club--the nations which have nuclear capability--continues to 
grow. That is why this particular treaty and this debate are so 
important.
  One of the most compelling threats we in this country face today is 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Threat assessments 
regularly warn us of the possibility that North Korea, Iran, Iraq, or 
some other nation may acquire or develop nuclear weapons. Our most 
basic interest in relations with Russia today is to see that it 
controls its nuclear weapons and technology and that Russian scientists 
do not come to the aid of would-be nuclear proliferators. In other 
words, in a desperate state of affairs, with the Russian economy, we 
are concerned that some people will decide they have a marketable idea, 
that they can go to some rogue nation and sell the idea of developing a 
nuclear weapon, adding another member to the nuclear club, increasing 
the instability in this world.
  Congress spends millions of dollars to fight nuclear proliferation, 
to stop the spread of nuclear weapons worldwide, and to support the 
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
  For the past several years, I have been involved in an Aspen 
Institute exchange, which has opened my eyes to the need for our 
concern in this area. Senator Lugar is a regular participant as well, 
and Senator Nunn has been there in the past, when we have met with 
members of the Russian Duma and leaders from that country and have 
learned of the very real concern they have of the stockpile of nuclear 
weapons still sitting in the old Soviet Union, a stockpile of weapons 
which, unfortunately for us, has to be minded all the time for fear 
that the surveillance, the inspection, and the safety would degrade to 
the point that there might be an accidental detonation. Those are the 
very real problems we face, and we vote on these regularly.
  Yet we in the Senate, despite all of these realities, have had 
languished in the committee one of the most effective tools for 
fighting nuclear proliferation--the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a 
treaty which, as the Senator from North Dakota indicated, has been 
ratified by over 130 nations but not by the United States of America.
  The idea of banning nuclear tests is not a new one. It is one of the 
oldest items on the nuclear arms control agenda. Test bans were called 
for by both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. Steps were taken toward 
a ban in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, but other incremental 
steps were eschewed in favor of a comprehensive treaty.
  The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a key piece of the broader 
picture of nuclear nonproliferation and arms control. Consider this: 
When nonnuclear countries--those that don't have nuclear weapons--agree 
they are not going to have a nuclear arsenal and sign the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, an essential part of that bargain for the smaller 
nations, the nonnuclear powers, and those that have it, was that 
nuclear countries were going to control and reduce the number of 
nuclear weapons.
  An integral part of that effort is this treaty. It is virtually 
impossible to make qualitative improvements in nuclear weapons or 
develop them for the first time without testing. Just a few months ago, 
the Senate overwhelmingly voted to reorganize the Department of Energy 
because of our deep concern about what secrets may have been stolen 
from our nuclear labs. The potential damage from this espionage is 
disturbing.
  In the case of China, the entry into force of this treaty could help 
mitigate the effect of the loss of our nuclear secrets. More than old 
computer codes and blueprints would be needed to deploy more advanced 
nuclear weapons. Extensive testing would be required. In

[[Page 23259]]

the cases of India and Pakistan, U.S. ratification of this treaty would 
pressure both countries to sign the treaty, as they pledged to do 
following their nuclear test last year.
  In fact, the leadership role of the United States is essential to 
encourage the ratification of the treaty by many other nations. If the 
leading nuclear power in the world, the United States of America, fails 
to ratify this treaty to stop nuclear testing, why should any other 
country? The United States has a responsibility of moral leadership. 
Many who take such pride in our Nation and its role and voice in the 
world tremble when faced with the burden of leadership. The burden of 
leadership comes down to our facing squarely the need to ratify this 
treaty.
  The United States has declared that its own nuclear testing program 
has been discontinued, but it is still absolutely in our national 
interest to be part of a multinational monitoring and verification 
regime. That way we can shape and benefit from that same regime. The 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty says if the treaty has not been entered 
into force 3 years after its being open for signing, the states that 
have ratified it may convene a special conference to decide by 
consensus what measures consistent with international law can be taken 
to facilitate its entry into force.
  Only those states that have ratified it would be given full voting 
privileges. The special conference is going to take place this fall. It 
will set up monitoring and verification of nuclear testing worldwide so 
the components will be operating by the time the treaty does enter into 
force. This regime will include the International Data Center and many 
other elements that are important for success.
  The United States should be part of that process, but it will not be, 
because the Senate has not voted on this treaty. This country certainly 
conducts its own monitoring for nuclear tests, but if we participate in 
an international regime, our country can benefit from a comprehensive 
international system. It is important to recall that if China or Russia 
were to resume testing, the United States, under this treaty, would 
have the right to withdraw and resume our own, if that is necessary for 
our national defense.
  If the United States does not ratify the treaty in the first place, 
however, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty may never enter into force. 
We would be faced with the prospect, once again, of a major nuclear 
power's resuming nuclear testing. When President Eisenhower and 
President Kennedy called for a nuclear test ban, a major impetus was 
the public outcry over environmental damage caused by these tests.
  I ask unanimous consent to print in the Congressional Record at this 
point a letter I received from major national environmental 
organizations supporting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and decrying 
the environmental damage to both our national security and our planet 
if the treaty is not ratified.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,

                                    Washington, DC, June 30, 1999.
     Hon. Richard Durbin,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

      Re: Major national environmental organizations' support of 
                     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

       Dear Senator Durbin: We urge the Senate to give its consent 
     to ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty this year. The 
     timing is critical so that the United States can participate 
     in this fall's special international conference of Treaty 
     ratifiers.
       We support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) because 
     it is a valuable instrument in stemming the proliferation of 
     nuclear weapons and reducing the environmental and security 
     threats posed by nuclear arms races. Under the CTBT, non-
     nuclear weapons states will be barred from carrying out the 
     nuclear explosions needed to develop compact, high-yield 
     nuclear warheads for ballistic missiles and confidently 
     certify nuclear explosive performance. The Treaty is 
     therefore vital to preventing the spread of nuclear missile 
     capability to additional states. In addition, the Treaty will 
     limit the ability of the existing nuclear weapons states to 
     build new and destabilizing types of nuclear weapons.
       Since 1945, seven nations have conducted over 2,050 nuclear 
     test explosions--an average of one test every 10 days. 
     Atmospheric tests spread dangerous levels of radioactive 
     fallout downwind and into the global atmosphere. Underground 
     nuclear blasts spread highly radioactive material into the 
     earth and each one creates a permanent nuclear waste site. 
     This contamination presents long-term hazards to nearby water 
     sources and surrounding communities. Also, many underground 
     tests have vented radioactive gases into the atmosphere, 
     including some of those conducted by the United States. Of 
     course, the ultimate threat to the environment posed by 
     nuclear testing is the continuing and possibly increasing 
     risk of nuclear war posed by proliferating nuclear arsenals.
       In addition to protecting the environment, the CTBT will 
     enhance U.S. security with its extensive monitoring system 
     and short-notice, on-site inspections. These will improve our 
     ability to discourage all states from engaging in the testing 
     of nuclear weapons.
       Ending nuclear testing has been a goal of governments, 
     scientists, and ordinary citizens from all walks of life for 
     over forty years. The CTBT has already been ratified by many 
     other nations, including France, the United Kingdom, and 
     Japan. The vast majority of Americans support approval of the 
     CTBT. The effort in this country to stop nuclear testing that 
     began with public outrage about nuclear fallout and has been 
     pursued by American Presidents since Dwight Eisenhower can 
     now be achieved. With U.S. leadership on the CTBT, entry into 
     force is within reach. It is vital that the U.S. set the 
     example on this important environmental and security issue; 
     with your leadership and support, the CTBT can finally be 
     realized.
           Yours sincerely,
         Rodger Schlickeisen, President, Defenders of Wildlife; 
           Mike Casey, Vice-President for Public Affairs, 
           Environmental Working Group; Matt Petersen, Executive 
           Director, Global Green USA; John Adams, Executive 
           Director, Natural Resources Defense Counsel; Amy Coen, 
           President Population Action International; James K. 
           Wyerman, Executive Director, 20/20 Vision; Brian Dixon, 
           Director of Government Relations, Zero Population 
           Growth; Fred D. Krupp, Executive Director, 
           Environmental Defense Fund; Brent Blackwelder, 
           President, Friends of the Earth; Phil Clapp, President, 
           National Environmental Trust; Robert K. Musil, 
           Executive Director, Physicians for Social 
           Responsibility; Carl Pope, Executive Director, Sierra 
           Club; Bud Ris, Executive Director, Union of Concerned 
           Scientists.

  This is a letter that has been circulated and signed by the leaders 
of at least a dozen major environmental groups. I note in the letter it 
states that since 1945, the last 54 years, seven nations in this world 
have conducted 2,050 nuclear test explosions, an average of 1 test 
every 10 days, leaving nuclear fallout, radioactive gases, in many 
instances, in our atmosphere. We certainly never want to return to that 
day again. Unless the United States is a full partner in this 
international effort to reduce nuclear testing, that is a possibility 
looming on the horizon.
  Senator Helms, who spoke on the floor earlier, has said he puts this 
treaty in line behind amendments to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
and the Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. convention on global climate change, 
both of which the President has not yet submitted to the Senate. My 
colleague says that ABM changes are essential for the national missile 
defense to move forward, which is true. But national missile defense 
does not yet work. We don't have this technology to build an umbrella 
of protection over the United States so that any nuclear missile fired 
on us can somehow be stopped in the atmosphere without danger to the 
people living in this country.
  If we decide to deploy such a defense, we will need to negotiate more 
ABM Treaty changes. That is something in the future. We have time to 
address that. But we also need to accept the immediate responsibility 
of ratifying this treaty. Not too many months ago in this Chamber, we 
passed a resolution which says if the national missile defense system 
or so-called star wars system should become technologically possible, 
we will spend whatever it takes to build it. I have to tell you that I 
voted against it. I thought it was not wise policy.
  Quite honestly, the idea that we are somehow going to insulate the 
United States by building this umbrella and therefore don't have to 
deal with the world and its problems in nuclear proliferation, in my 
mind, is the wrong way to go. We should be working diplomatically as 
well as militarily for

[[Page 23260]]

the defense of the United States. When we have the support of the 
commanders of the Nation, of course, and those who are in charge, the 
Joint Chiefs, time and again for this treaty, it is evidence to me that 
it is sound military policy.
  In short, Mr. President, I conclude by saying, we must not delay any 
longer. We must ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I yield the 
floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I know my colleagues are anxious to get to 
the business at hand. I assure the floor I will take only 5 minutes. If 
the clerk will let me know when I am headed towards 5 minutes, I would 
appreciate it.
  I will refrain from responding and speaking to the Test Ban Treaty at 
length at this moment.
  The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee is not only a 
colleague, but he is a personal friend. We have strong disagreements on 
this issue.
  I don't mean to nickel and dime this, but we haven't had any hearings 
on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  At the outset, I send to the desk a list of all the hearings the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee had for the 105th and 106th 
Congress's since submission of the CTBT.
  I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                               Activities

       January 8, 1999, Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       January 27, 1999 (Subcommittee on International Economic 
     Policy, Export, and Trade Promotion/Hagel), IMF Reform and 
     the Global Financial Crisis.
       January 29, 1999, Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       February 5, 1999, Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       February 24, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), 1999 Foreign 
     Policy Overview and the President's Fiscal Year 2000 Foreign 
     Affairs Budget Request.
       February 24, 1999 (Subcommittee on European Affairs/Smith), 
     Anti-Semitism in Russia. (S. Hrg. 106-6.)
       February 25, 1999 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
     Affairs/Thomas), Asian Trade Barriers to U.S. Soda Ash 
     Exports.
       March 2, 1999 (Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace 
     Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism/Coverdell), U.S. Relief 
     Efforts In Response to Hurricane Mitch. (S. Hrg. 106-5.)
       March 3, 1999 (Subcommittee on International Economic 
     Policy, Export and Trade Promotion/Hagel), Commercial 
     Viability of a Caspian Sea Main Export Energy Pipeline.
       March 4, 1999 (Subcommittee on International Operations/
     Grams), FY 2000 Administration of Foreign Affairs Budget.
       March 9, 1999 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
     Affairs/Thomas), Post Election Cambodia: What Next?
       March 9, 1999 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian 
     Affairs/Brownback), U.S. Policy Toward Iraq. (S. Hrg. 106-
     41.)
       March 10, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Castro's Crackdown 
     in Cuba: Human Rights on Trial. (S. Hrg. 106-52.)
       March 11, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Embassy Security for 
     a New Millennium.
       March 12, 1999, Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       March 17, 1999 (Full Committee, jointly with Energy and 
     Natural Resources Committee/Helms and Murkowski), New 
     Proposals to Expand Iraqi Oil for Food: The End of Sanctions? 
     (S. Hrg. 106-86.)
       March 17, 1999 (Full Committee/Coverdell), The Convention 
     on Nuclear Safety.
       March 17, 1999 (Full Committee/Grams), Nomination (Seiple).
       March 18, 1999 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
     Affairs/Thomas), Indonesia: Countdown to Elections. (S. Hrg. 
     106-76.)
       March 23, 1999 (Subcommittee on African Affairs/Frist), 
     Sudan's Humanitarian Crisis and the U.S. Response.
       March 23, 1999 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
     Affairs/Thomas), U.S. China Policy: A Critical Reexamination.
       March 23, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Business Meeting.
       March 24, 1999 (Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace 
     Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism/Coverdell), Colombia: The 
     Threat to U.S. Interests and Regional Security.
       March 24, 1999 (Subcommittee on European Affairs/Smith), 
     The European Union: Internal Reform, Enlargement, and the 
     Common Foreign and Security Policy. (S. Hrg. 106-48.)
       March 25, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), U.S. Taiwan 
     Relations: The 20th Anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act. 
     (S. Hrg. 106-43.)
       April 13, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Trade vs. Aid: NAFTA 
     Five years Later. (S. Hrg. 106-80.)
       April 14, 1999 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South 
     Asian Affairs/Brownback), The Continuing Crisis in 
     Afghanistan.
       April 15, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), U.S. Vulnerability 
     to Ballistic Missile Attack.
       April 16, 1999, Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       April 19, 1999 (Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace 
     Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism/Coverdell, closed session), 
     Targeting Assets of Drug Kingpins.
       April 20, 1999 (Full Committee/Hagel), Current and Growing 
     Missile Threats to the U.S.
       April 20, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), The War in Kosovo.
       April 21, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Markup of Foreign 
     Relations Authorization Act FY 00-01.
       April 21, 1999 (Full Committee/Smith), NATO's 50th 
     Anniversary Summit. (S. Hrg. 106-144.)
       April 22, 1999 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
     Affairs/Thomas), The Forgotten Gulag: A Look Inside North 
     Korea's Prison Camps.
       April 27, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Nonproliferation, 
     Arms Control and Political Military Issues.
       April 29, 1999 (Subcommittee on International Economic 
     Policy, Export and Trade Promotion/Hagel), International 
     Software Piracy: Impact on the Software Industry and the 
     American Economy.
       April 30, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Business Meeting. 
     (S.J. Res. 20.)
       May 4, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Ballistic Missile 
     Defense Technology: Is the United States Ready for a Decision 
     to Deploy?
       May 5, 1999 (Full Committee/Hagel), Does the ABM Treaty 
     Still Serve U.S. Strategic and Arms Control Objectives in a 
     Changed World?
       May 6, 1999 (Full Committee/Coverdell and Frist, closed 
     session), The Growing Threat of Biological Weapons.
       May 7, 1999, Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       May 11, 1999 (Full Committee/Ashcroft), U.S. Agriculture 
     Sanctions Policy for the 21st Century.
       May 12, 1999 (Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace 
     Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism/Coverdell), The State of 
     Democracy and the Rule of Law in the Americas.
       May 13, 1999 (Full Committee/Hagel), ABM Treaty, START II 
     and Missile Defense.
       May 25, 1999 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian 
     Affairs/Brownback), Political/Military Developments in India.
       May 25, 1999 (Full Committee/Ashcroft), The Legal Status of 
     the ABM Treaty.
       May 26, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Cornerstone of Our 
     Security?: Should the Senate Reject a Protocol to 
     Reconstitute the ABM Treaty with Four New Partners?
       May 27, 1999 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
     Affairs/Thomas), The Chinese Embassy Bombing and Its Effects 
     on U.S.-China Relations.
       May 27, 1999 (Full Committee/Hagel), Nominations (Sandalow 
     and Harrington).
       June 8, 1999 (Subcommittee on African Affairs/Frist), The 
     Central African Wars and the Future of U.S.-Africa Policy.
       June 9, 1999 (Full Committee/Smith), Nominations (Bandler, 
     Einik, Keyser, Limprecht, Morningstar, Napper, Miller and 
     Pressley).
       June 9, 1999 (Full Committee/Coverdell), Nominations 
     (Garza, Almaguer, Hamilton and Bushnell).
       June 11, 1999, Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       June 16, 1999 (Full Committee/Frist), Nominations (Carson, 
     Dunn, Erwin, Goldthwait, Leader, Metelits and Myrick).
       June 17, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Nomination 
     (Holbrooke).
       June 22, 1999 (Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace 
     Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism/Coverdell), Confronting 
     Threats to Security in the Americas.
       June 22, 1999 (Full Committee/Coverdell), Nomination 
     (Clare).
       June 22, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Nomination 
     (Holbrooke).
       June 23, 1999 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian 
     Affairs/Brownback), U.S. Policy Toward Iraq: Mobilizing the 
     Opposition.
       June 23, 1999 (Full Committee/Hagel), Nomination 
     (Sandalow).
       June 24, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Nomination 
     (Holbrooke).
       June 24, 1999 (Subcommittee on International Economic 
     Policy, Export and Trade Promotion/Hagel), U.S. Satellite 
     Export Controls and the Domestic Production/Launch 
     Capability.
       June 28, 1999 (Full Committee/Hagel), Nomination (Holum).
       June 30, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Business Meeting.
       July 1, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), The Role of Sanctions 
     in U.S. National Security Policy.
       July 1, 1999 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
     Affairs/Thomas), Hong Kong Two Years After Reversion: Staying 
     the Course, Or Changing Course?
       July 16, 1999, Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       July 20, 1999 (Full Committee/Thomas), Nominations 
     (Burleigh, Gelbard, Siddique and Stanfield).
       July 20, 1999 (Subcommittee on International Operations/
     Grams, closed session), U.N. International Criminal Court: 
     Prospects for Dramatic Renegotiation.

[[Page 23261]]

       July 21, 1999 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
     Affairs/Thomas), Recent Strains in Taiwan-China Relations.
       July 21, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), The Role of Sanctions 
     in U.S. National Security Policy, Part 2.
       July 21, 1999 (Full Committee/Smith), Nominations 
     (Fredericks, Griffiths, Miles, Spielvogel and Taylor).
       July 22, 1999 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asia 
     Affairs/Brownback), Iran: Limits to Rapprochement.
       July 22, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Nomination 
     (Anderson).
       July 23, 1999 (Full Committee/Coverdell), Nomination 
     (Sheehan).
       July 26, 1999 (Full Committee/Grams), Nomination 
     (Lieberman).
       July 27, 1999 (Subcommittee on African Affairs/Frist), 
     Barriers to Trade and Investment in Africa.
       July 28, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Business Meeting.
       July 28, 1999 (Subcommittee on International Economic 
     Policy, Export and Trade Promotion/Hagel), The Agency for 
     International Development and U.S. Climate Change Policy.
       July 29, 1999 (Subcommittee on European Affairs/Smith), 
     Prospects for Democracy in Yugoslavia.
       July 30, 1999 (Subcommittee on International Operations/
     Grams), U.S. Policy Towards Victims of Torture.
       August 4, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), S. 693: The Taiwan 
     Security Enhancement Act.
       August 4, 1999 (Subcommittee on International Economic 
     Policy, Export and Trade Promotion, jointly with Subcommittee 
     on East Asian and Pacific Affairs/Hagel and Thomas), Economic 
     Reform and Trade Opportunities in Vietnam.
       August 5, 1999 (Full Committee/Frist), Nominations (Bader, 
     Brennan, Elam, Johnson, Kaeuper, Kolker, Lewis, Nagy and 
     Owens-Kirkpatrick).
       August 6, 1999, Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       September 8, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms, closed session), 
     Proliferation Activities of a Certain Russian Company.
       September 9, 1999 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
     Affairs, jointly with House Subcommittee on Asia and the 
     Pacific/Thomas and Bereuter), The Political Futures of 
     Indonesia and East Timor.
       September 10, 1999, Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       September 14, 1999 (Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, 
     Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism/Coverdell), An Overview 
     of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy and President Clinton's 
     Decision to Grant Clemency to FALN Terrorists.
       September 16, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Foreign Missile 
     Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United 
     States Through 2015.
       September 23, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Corruption in 
     Russia and Recent U.S. Policy.
       September 27, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Business 
     Meeting.
       September 28, 1999 (Full Committee/Helms), Facing Saddam's 
     Iraq: Disarray in the International Community.
       September 28, 1999 (Full Committee/Smith), U.S.-Kosovo 
     Diplomacy: February 1998-March 1999.
       September 30, 1999 (Full Committee/Smith), Corruption in 
     Russia and Future U.S. Policy.
       September 24, 1997 (Full Committee/Thomas), Nominations 
     (Foley, LaPorta and Bosworth).
       September 24, 1997 (Full Committee/Helms), Business 
     Meeting.
       September 25, 1997 (Subcommittee on African Affairs/
     Ashcroft), Religious Persecution in Sudan. (S. Hrg. 105-280.)
       September 25, 1997 (Full Committee/Hagel), Maritime 
     Boundaries Treaty with Mexico (EX. F, 96-1); Protocol 
     Amending Migratory Birds Convention with Canada (Treaty Doc. 
     104-28); and Protocol Amending Migratory Birds and Game 
     Mammals Convention with Mexico (Treaty Doc. 105-26). (Printed 
     in Exec. Rept. 105-5.)
       October 1, 1997 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South 
     Asian Affairs/Brownback), Events in Algeria.
       October 7, 1997 (Full Committee/Helms), Strategic Rationale 
     for NATO Enlargement. (S. Hrg. 105-285.)
       October 7, 1997 (Full Committee/Hagel), Bilateral Tax 
     Treaties and Protocol (Turkey/TDoc. 104-30; Austria/TDoc. 
     104-31; Luxembourg/TDoc. 104-33; Thailand/TDoc. 105-2; 
     Switzerland/TDoc. 105-8; South Africa/TDoc. 105-9; Canada/
     TDoc. 105-29; and Ireland/TDoc. 105-31). (S. Hrg. 105-354.)
       October 8, 1997 (Full Committee/Brownback), Proliferation 
     Threats Through the Year 2000. (S. Hrg. 105-359.)
       October 8, 1997 (Full Committee/Helms), Business Meeting.
       October 9, 1997 (Subcommittee on International Economic 
     Policy, Export and Trade Promotion/Hagel), The Road to Kyoto: 
     Outlook and Consequences of a New U.N. Climate Change Treaty.
       October 9, 1997 (Full Committee/Helms), Pros and Cons of 
     NATO Enlargement. (S. Hrg. 105-285.)
       October 10, 1997, Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       October 21, 1997 (Full Committee/Thomas), Nomination 
     (Green).
       October 21, 1997 (Full Committee/Ashcroft), Nominations 
     (Schermerhorn, Schoonover and Twaddell).
       October 22, 1997 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South 
     Asian Affairs/Brownback), The Situation in Afghanistan.
       October 23, 1997 (Full Committee/Smith), Nominations 
     (Fried, Tufo, Rosapepe, Vershbow, Miller, Johnson and Hall).
       October 23, 1997 (Subcommittee on International Economic 
     Policy, Export and Trade Promotion/Hagel), U.S. Economic and 
     Strategic Interests in the Caspian Sea Region: Policies and 
     Implications. (S. Hrg. 105-361.)
       October 24, 1997 (Full Committee/Coverdell), Nominations 
     (Ashby, Carney, Curiel, McLelland and Marrero).
       October 28, 1997 (Full Committee/Helms), Costs, Benefits, 
     Burdensharing and Military Implications of NATO Enlargement. 
     (S. Hrg. 105-285).
       October 28, 1997 (Full Committee/Brownback), Nominations 
     (Celeste, Donnelly, Gabriel, Hume, Kurtzer, Larocco and 
     Walker).
       October 29, 1997 (Full Committee/Hagel), Nominations 
     (Babbitt, Bondurant, Brown, Fox and Robertson).
       October 29, 1997 (Full Committee/Smith), Nominations 
     (Montgomery, Pifer, Proffitt, Olson, Hormel, Hermelin, 
     Presel, Escudero and Pascoe).
       October 29, 1997 (Full Committee & Senate Caucus on 
     International Narcotics Control/Coverdell & Grassley), U.S. 
     and Mexico Counterdrug Efforts Since Certification. (S. Hrg. 
     105-376.)
       October 30, 1997 (Full Committee/Helms), NATO/Russia 
     Relationship, Part 1, (S. Hrg. 105-285.)
       October 30, 1997 (Full Committee/Hagel), NATO/Russia 
     Relationship, Part 2, (S. Hrg. 105-285.)
       October 31, 1997 (Full Committee/Grams), Nominations 
     (French, King, Moose, Oakley, Rubin and Taft).
       November 4, 1997 (Full Committee/Helms), Business Meeting.
       November 5, 1997 (Full Committee/Smith), Public Views on 
     NATO Enlargement. (S. Hrg. 105-285.)
       November 6, 1997 (Full Committee/Helms), Commercial 
     Activities of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). (S. 
     Hrg. 105-332.)
       November 6, 1997 (Subcommittee on International Operations/ 
     Grams), The United Nations at a Crossroads: Efforts Toward 
     Reform. (S. Hrg. 105-386.)
       November 7, 1997, Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       December 9, 1997, Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       January 9, 1998, Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       February 3, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), the Military 
     Implications of the Ottawa Land Mine Treaty. (Protocol II to 
     Treaty Doc. 105-1.)
       February 6, 1998, Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       February 10, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), 1998 Foreign 
     Policy Overview and the President's Fiscal Year 1999 Budget 
     Request. (S. Hrg. 105-443.)
       February 11, 1998 (Full Committee/Hagel), Implications of 
     the Kyoto Protocol on climate Change. (S. Hrg. 105-457.)
       February 12, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), International 
     Monetary Fund's Role in the Asia Financial Crisis.
       February 24, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), Administration 
     Views on the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on 
     Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. (S. 
     Hrg. 105-421.)
       February 25, 1998, (Subcommittee on International Economic 
     Policy, Export and Trade Promotion/Hagel) Implementation of 
     U.S. Policy on Construction of a Western Caspian Sea Oil 
     Pipeline.
       February 25, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), Nomination 
     (Grey).
       February 26, 1998 (Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific 
     Affairs/Thomas), Are U.S. Unilateral Trade Sanctions an 
     Effective Tool of U.S. Asia Policy?
       February 26, 1998 (Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and 
     Peace Corps Affairs/Coverdell), Drug Trafficking and 
     Certification.
       March 2, 1998 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian 
     Affairs/Brownback), Iraq: Can Saddam Be Overthrown? (S. Hrg. 
     105-444.)
       March 3, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), Business Meeting.
       March 4, 1998 (Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific 
     Affairs/Thomas), The WTO Film Case and Its Ramifications for 
     U.S.-Japan Relations.
       March 6, 1998, Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       March 10 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), The Plight of the 
     Montagnards. (S. Hrg. 105-465.)
       March 11, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), Business Meeting.
       March 11, 1998 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South 
     Asian Affairs/Brownback), Developments in the Middle East.
       March 12, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms, closed session), 
     Chinese Nuclear Cooperation with Various Countries.
       March 12, 1998 (Subcommittee on African Affairs/Ashcroft), 
     Democracy in Africa: The New Generation of African Leaders. 
     (S. Hrg. 105-559.)

[[Page 23262]]

       March 18, 1998 (Subcommittee on International Economic 
     Policy and Trade Promotion/Hagel), The Role of the IMF in 
     Supporting U.S. Agricultural Exports to Asia.
       March 24, 1998 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
     Affaris/Thomas), the Present Economic and Political Turmoil 
     in Indonesia: Causes and Solutions.
       March 25, 1998 (Subcommittee on International Economic 
     Policy, Export and Trade Promotion/Hagel), S. 1413, the 
     Enhancement of Trade, Security, and Human Rights Through 
     Sanctions Reform Act.
       April 3, 1998, Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       May 6, 1998 (Subcommittee on European Affairs/Smith), the 
     Crisis in Kosovo. (S. Hrg. 105-649.)
       May 7, 1998 (Full Committee/Brownback), Nominations (Burns 
     and Crocker).
       May 7. 1998 (Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, 
     Export and Trade Promotion/Hagel), Oversight of the Overseas 
     Private Investment Corporation.
       May 8, 1998, Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       May 12, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), S. 1868, The 
     International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. (S. Hrg. 105-
     591.)
       May 13, 1998 (Full Committee/Hagel), EX. B, 95-1, Montreal 
     Protocol No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of 
     Certain Rules Pertaining to International Carriage by Air; 
     Treaty Doc. 104-17, International Convention for the 
     Protection of New Varieties of Plants; Treaty Doc. 105-4, 
     Grains Trade Convention and Food Aid Convention; Treaty Doc. 
     104-36, Convention on the International Maritime 
     Organization; and Treaty Doc. 105-35, Trademark Law Treaty. 
     (Hearing on EX. B, 95-1 Printed in Exec. Rept. 105-20.)
       May 13, 1998 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian 
     Affairs/Brownback), Crisis in South Asia: India's Nuclear 
     Tests. (S. Hrg. 105-620.)
       May 14, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), U.S. Interest at the 
     June U.S.-China Summit. (S. Hrg. 105-568.)
       May 14, 1998(Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian 
     Affairs/Brownback), U.S. Policy Toward Iran. (S. Hrg. 105-
     611.)
       May 18, 1998 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
     Affairs/Thomas), Present Political in Indonesia.
       May 19, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), Business Meeting.
       May 20, 1998 (Subcommittee on European Affairs/Smith), 
     Overview of Russian Foreign Policy and Domestic Policy.
       May 20, 1998 (Subcommittee on International Operations/
     Grams), The Secretary's Certification of a U.N. Reform Budget 
     of $2.533 Billion. (S. Hrg. 105-682.)
       May 21, 1998 (Full Committee, jointly with Energy and 
     Natural Resources Committee/Helms and Murkowski), Iraq: Are 
     Sanctions Collapsing? (S. Hrg. 105-650.)
       May 21, 1998. (Full Committee/Coverdell), Nomination 
     (Davidow).
       June 3, 1998 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian 
     Affairs/Brownback), Crisis in South Asia, part 2: Pakistan's 
     Nuclear Tests. (S. Hrg. 105-620.)
       June 5, 1998 Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       June 9, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), Convention on 
     Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
     International Business Transactions (Treaty Doc. 105-43). 
     (Printed in Exec. Rept. 105-19.)
       June 10, 1998 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
     Affairs/Thomas) U.S. Policy Strategy on Democracy in 
     Cambodia.
       June 11, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), Chinese Missile 
     Proliferation, (S. Hrg. 105-841.)
       June 11, 1998 (Full Committee/Coverdell), Nominations 
     (Crotty, O'Leary and Schechter).
       June 16, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), The Panama Canal and 
     U.S. Interests. (S. Hrg. 105-672)
       June 16, 1998 (Full Committee/Ashcroft), Nominations 
     (Barnes, Clarke, Derryck, Haley, Peterson, Stith and Swing).
       June 16, 1998 (Full Committee/Smith), Nominations (Cejas, 
     Edelman, Ely-Raphel, Lemmon, Perina, Romero, Schneider and 
     Yalowitz).
       June 17, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), S. 1868, The 
     International Religious Freedom Act: Views from the Religious 
     Community. (S. Hrg. 105-591.)
       June 18, 1998 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
     Affairs/Thomas), Congressional Views of the U.S.-China 
     Relationship.
       June 23, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), Business Meeting.
       June 24, 1998 (Subcommittee on International Economic 
     Policy, Export and Trade Promotion/Hagel), The Asian 
     Financial Crisis: New Dangers Ahead?
       June 24, 1998 (Subcommittee on European Affairs/Smith), 
     U.S. Policy in Kosovo. (S. Hrg. 105-649.)
       June 25, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms, closed session), 
     Chinese Missile Proliferation.
       July 8, 1998 (Subcommittee on International Economic 
     Policy, Export and Trade Promotion/Hagel), Implementation of 
     U.S. Policy on Caspian Sea Oil Exports. (S. Hrg. 105-683.)
       July 10, 1998 Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       July 13, 1998 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian 
     Affairs/Brownback), India and Pakistan: What Next? (S. Hrg. 
     105-620.)
       July 14, 1998 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
     Affairs/Thomas), KEDO and the Korean Agreed Nuclear 
     Framework: Problems and Prospects. (S. Hrg. 105-652.)
       July 15, 1998 (Subcommittee on European Affairs/Smith), 
     Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and United States Baltic 
     Policy. (S. Hrg. 105-651.)
       July 16, 1998 (Full Committee/Hagel), Nominations (Parmer 
     and West).
       July 16, 1998 (Full Committee/Brownback), Nominations 
     (Craig, Kattouf, McKune, Satterfield and Milam).
       July 16, 1998 (Full Committee/Smith), Nominations (Homes, 
     Mann, Swett and Wells).
       July 20, 1998 (Full Committee/Thomas), Nominations 
     (Hecklinger, Kartman and Wiedemann).
       July 22, 1998 (Full Committee/Grams), Nominations 
     (Carpenter, Edwards and Spalter).
       July 23, 1998 (Subcommittee on International Operations/
     Grams), Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. 
     National Interest? (S. Hrg. 105-724.)
       July 23, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), Business Meeting.
       July 23, 1998 (Full Committee/Ashcroft), Nominations 
     (Felder, Ledesma, Melrose, Mu, Perry, Robinson, Staples, 
     Sullivan, Swing and Yates). (S. Hrg. 105-674.)
       August 7, 1998 Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       September 3, 1998 (Full Committee, jointly with Armed 
     Services Committee/Lugar and Thurmond), U.N. Weapons 
     Inspections in Iraq: UNSCOM At Risk.
       September 9, 1998 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South 
     Asian Affairs/Brownback), U.S. Policy in Iraq: Public 
     Diplomacy and Private Policy. (S. Hrg. 105-725.)
       September 10, 1998 (Full Committee/Hagel), World 
     Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty and World 
     Intellectual Property Organization Performances and 
     Phonograms Treaty (Treaty Doc. 105-17). (Printed in Exec. 
     Rept. 105-25.)
       September 10, 1998 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
     Affairs/Thomas), Recent Developments Concerning North Korea. 
     (S. Hrg. 105-842.)
       September 11, 1998 Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       September 15, 1998 (Full Committee/Grams), Extradition, 
     Mutual Legal Assistance and Prisoner Transfer Treaties. (S. 
     Hrg. 105-730.)
       September 15, 1998 (Subcommittee on European Affairs/
     Smith), Crisis in Russia: Policy Options for the United 
     States.
       September 16, 1998 (Full Committee, jointly with Caucus on 
     International Narcotics Control/Coverdell and Grassley), U.S. 
     Anti-Drug Interdiction Efforts and the Western Hemisphere 
     Drug Elimination Act. (S. Hrg. 105-844.)
       September 17, 1998 (Subcommittee on International 
     Operations, jointly with International Affairs Task Force of 
     the Senate Budget Committee/Grams and Smith), Examination of 
     Major Management and Budget Issues Facing the Department of 
     State. (S. Hrg. 105-806.)
       September 23, 1998 (Full Committee/Smith), Nominations 
     (Jones, Finn, Shattuck and Sullivan).
       September 25, 1998 (Full Committee/Thomas and Brownback), 
     Nomination (Randolph).
       September 25, 1998 (Full Committee/Thomas), Nominations 
     (Pascoe and Watson).
       September 25, 1998 Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       September 29, 1998 (Full Committee/Coverdell), Nominations 
     (Beers and Ferro).
       October 1, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), United States 
     Responses to International Parental Abduction. (S. Hrg. 105-
     845.)
       October 2, 1998 (Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
     Affairs/Thomas), Cambodia: Post Elections and U.S. Policy 
     Options. (S. Hrg. 105-846.)
       October 2, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), Nomination 
     (Johnson).
       October 2, 1998 (Full Committee/Hagel), Nomination (Loy).
       October 5, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms, closed session), 
     START Treaty Compliance Issues.
       October 6, 1998 (Full Committee/Helms), The Ballistic 
     Missile Threat to the United States. (S. Hrg. 105-847.)
       October 7, 1998 (Full Committee/Grams), Nominations (Bader, 
     Koh and Welch).
       October 8, 1998 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South 
     Asian Affairs/Brownback), Events in Afghanistan.
       November 6, 1998 Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.
       December 4, 1998 Informal State Department Briefing on 
     Peacekeeping.

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I can understand why the Senator may think 
we have had hearings because we have had hearings on other subjects 
that implicate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It is mentioned by 
witnesses. But we have never had a hearing on the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty--a treaty of great consequence to the United States and the 
world--conducted in the traditional way. We

[[Page 23263]]

never had a hearing where we said this is what we are going to talk 
about. We need a hearing where we bring up the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, or major voices in 
America who oppose this treaty--fortunately, I think there are not that 
many--or significant figures and scientists who have spoken and know 
about this issue. We haven't had one of those hearings at all.
  I submit for the Record, again, a letter from the chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee sent to the President of the United States 
on January 21, 1998, with a concluding paragraph, which reads as 
follows:

       Mr. President, let me be clear. I will be prepared to 
     schedule Committee consideration of the CTBT only after the 
     Senate has had an opportunity to consider and vote on the 
     Kyoto Protocol and the amendments to the ABM Treaty.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:
                                                      U.S. Senate,


                               Committee on Foreign Relations,

                                 Washington, DC, January 21, 1998.
     The President,
     The White House, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: As Congress prepares to reconvene 
     shortly, I am convinced that it is important to share with 
     you the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's agenda relating 
     to consideration of treaties during the second year of the 
     105th Congress.
       There are a number of important treaties which the 
     Committee intends to take up during 1998, and we must be 
     assured of your Administration's cooperation in making 
     certain that these treaties receive a comprehensive 
     examination by the Senate.
       Mr. President, the Committee's first priority when Congress 
     reconvenes will be to work with you and Secretary Albright to 
     secure Senate ratification of NATO expansion. The expansion 
     of the Atlantic Alliance to include Poland, Hungary and the 
     Czech Republic is of critical importance, and we have come a 
     long way in resolving some of the concerns that I, and other 
     Senators, had raised about various details of this expansion 
     (e.g., ensuring an equitable distribution of costs, limiting 
     Russian influence in NATO decision making, et al.)
       While much work remains to be done, I am confident that if 
     we continue to work together, the Senate will vote to approve 
     the expansion of the Atlantic Alliance early this Spring.
       Following the vote on NATO expansion, the Committee will 
     turn its attention to several other critical treaties which 
     could affect both the security of the American people and the 
     health of the United States' economy. Chief among these are 
     the agreements on Multilateralization and Demarcation of the 
     1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the Kyoto 
     Protocol to the UN Convention on Climate Change.
       Mr. President, I feel obliged to make clear to you my 
     concern that your Administration has been unwisely and 
     unnecessarily engaged in delay in submitting these treaties 
     to the Senate for its advice and consent.
       Despite your commitment, made nearly eight months ago, to 
     submit the amendments to the ABM Treaty to the Senate, we 
     have yet to see them. As our current stand-off with Iraq 
     clearly demonstrates, the danger posed by rogue states 
     possessing weapons of mass destruction is growing--and, with 
     it, the need for a robust ballistic missile defense.
       The Senate has not had an opportunity to consider the 
     rationale behind the ABM Treaty since that treaty was 
     ratified nearly 26 years ago, in the midst of the Cold War. 
     The world has changed a great deal since then. It is vital 
     that the Senate conduct a thorough review of the ABM Treaty 
     this year when it considers and votes on the ABM 
     Multilateralization and Demarcation agreements.
       Similarly, the Senate is forced to continue to wait for any 
     indication that your Administration intends to submit the 
     Kyoto Protocol for the Senate's advice and consent. Indeed, I 
     have heard a great deal of discussion from supporters of this 
     treaty indicating that the Administration may attempt to 
     circumvent both the Senate--and the American people--by 
     simply imposing the treaty's requirements on U.S. businesses 
     by executive order. Mr. President, I must respectfully 
     counsel this would be extremely unwise.
       This treaty clearly requires the advice and consent of the 
     Senate. further, because the potential impact of the Kyoto 
     Protocol on the American economy is so enormous, we owe it to 
     the American people to let them know sooner, rather than 
     later, whether they will be subject to the terms of this 
     treaty.
       Ironically, while the Administration has delayed in 
     submitting these vital treaties to the Senate, some in your 
     Administration have indicated that the White House will press 
     the Senate for swift ratification of the Comprehensive Test 
     Ban Treaty (CTBT) immediately following the vote on NATO 
     expansion.
       Such a deliberate confrontation would be exceedingly unwise 
     because, Mr. President, the CTBT is very low on the 
     Committee's list of priorities. The treaty has no chance of 
     entering into force for a decade or more. Article 14 of the 
     CTBT explicitly prevents the treaty's entry into force until 
     it has been ratified by 44 specific nations. One of those 44 
     nations is North Korea, which is unlikely to ever ratify the 
     treaty. Another of the 44 nations--India--has sought to block 
     the CTBT at every step: vetoing it in the Conference on 
     Disarmament so that it could not be submitted as a Conference 
     document. India has opposed it in the United Nations. And, 
     India has declared that it will not even sign the treaty.
       By contrast, the issues surrounding the ABM Treaty and the 
     Kyoto Protocol are far more pressing (e.g., the growing 
     threat posed by nuclear, biological, or chemical tipped 
     missiles, and the potential impact of the Kyoto Protocol on 
     the U.S. economy).
       Mr. President, let me be clear: I will be prepared to 
     schedule Committee consideration of the CTBT only after the 
     Senate has had the opportunity to consider and vote on the 
     Kyoto Protocol and the amendments to the ABM Treaty.
       When the Administration has submitted these treaties, and 
     when the Senate has completed its consideration of them, 
     then, and only then, will the Foreign Relations Committee 
     consider the CTBT.
       Mr. President, please let's work together, beginning with 
     the effort to secure Senate ratification of NATO expansion 
     this Spring, and then with your timely transmittal of these 
     treaties.
           Sincerely and respectfully,
                                                      Jesse Helms.

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the chairman has been true to his word. He 
has had no hearings because that has not been done yet.
  I think I understand how the Senator from North Carolina connects the 
rationale of these treaties, and he thinks the orderly way to do it is 
to do it only after we do other things, but that makes the point. We 
have had no hearings on this treaty.
  I think the public may be surprised to know this treaty calls for no 
more nuclear testing by the United States and other nations. We haven't 
been testing. There is a moratorium on nuclear testing. That occurred 
in 1992 in the Bush administration.
  What we are talking about doing that my friends are talking about is 
so dangerous and damaging to U.S. interests; that is, to sign a treaty 
to say we will not test, we are not testing now. The United States made 
a unilateral decision not to test.
  Now we have the rest of the world ready to sign up, and we are saying 
we are not going to ratify, or up to now we are saying we are not even 
going to have a hearing on this subject.
  Again, I will get into the merits of the treaty later because I am 
confident the leadership of the Senate will come up now with the 
proposal as to how to proceed.
  But I urge my friend from North Carolina, and I urge my colleagues to 
urge my friend from North Carolina, to hold hearings. Bring the experts 
up. Bring the military up.
  By the way, one last substantive thing I will say about the treaty is 
that we are the only nation in the world that has spent billions of 
dollars and committed billions in the future to a method by which we 
can take our existing stockpile of nuclear weapons and test them for 
their continued utility without ever exploding them. I will explain in 
detail later what I mean by the stockpiling program we have.
  We, of all nations in the world, are the one best prepared and best 
suited for taking the last chance of any nation in the world to promise 
not to test because we are one of the few nations in the world with 
certainty that can guarantee that even if we don't test weapons we can 
test, by exploding them, their continued utility by very complicated, 
very sophisticated scientific computer models that we have designed. We 
have committed that we will continue in the future to fund to the tune 
of billions of dollars this program.
  In a strange way, if you went out to the public at large and said: By 
the way, do you think we should sign a treaty that says we can't test 
nuclear weapons if the rest of the world signs a treaty that says you 
can't test nuclear weapons, knowing that we can detect all but those 
kinds of explosions that will not have any impact on another

[[Page 23264]]

nuclear capability, when we have already decided not to test 
unilaterally, and we are the only nation in the world that has the 
sophistication and capacity to test by means other than exploding our 
nuclear arsenal; what do you think the public would say?
  I conclude by saying this: We have had no hearings. There is a 
legitimate debate about whether or not we should do this.
  This is a thing for which the Senate was conceived--to make big 
decisions such as this.
  This is the reason the founders wrote in a provision in the U.S. 
Constitution that said a treaty can be negotiated by a President, but 
it can only come into effect after the Senate has ratified it. It 
didn't say the House. It didn't say a referendum. It didn't say the 
American people. It said the Senate. Other than the Supreme Court of 
the United States, in a decision of who should sit on it, there is no 
other function that is of greater consequence that the Senate performs 
than determining whether to ratify or reject a treaty with the United 
States of America.
  It seems to me that when we exercise that function, we should do it 
responsibly and thoroughly.
  We have never done it on a matter of grave consequence without 
thoroughly investigating it through the hearing process and through one 
of the oldest committees that exists in the Senate--the Foreign 
Relations Committee--the unique function of which is to recommend to 
this body what our bipartisan considered opinion is after hearing the 
details of the treaty.
  I look forward to the debate.
  I have urged the President of the United States--I will urge him 
personally--and have urged the administration, if this date is set, 
that the President take this case directly to the American people on a 
nationally televised broadcast and lay out for them what the stakes 
are.
  This is no small decision. This is a vote that I promise you, whether 
you are for it or against it, your children and your grandchildren and 
history will know how you cast it. I am not so smart to know exactly 
what the outcome will be in history's judgment, but I am certain of one 
thing: You are not going to be in a position where you can say at a 
later date this was a vote of little consequence.
  Mr. President, as folks back home in Delaware say, this is what we 
get paid the big bucks for. This is why we are here. This is the 
purpose of our being here.
  It is true. The amendments we are going to discuss on legislation 
that is before us are important. It is true that some of it will affect 
the lives of hundreds or thousands of Americans. But I can't think of 
anything we will do in this entire Congress or have done in the 
previous Congress that has the potential to have as much impact on the 
fate of the world as this treaty. I cannot think of anything. I defy 
anyone to tell me, whether they are for or against this treaty, what we 
could be discussing of greater consequence than how to deal with the 
prospect of an accidental or intentional nuclear holocaust.
  Tell me if there is anything more important to discuss than whether 
or not over the next days, weeks, months, years, and decades we should 
make a judgment from both a survival as well as environmental 
standpoint that we will or will not continue to blow up, in the 
atmosphere or underground, nuclear weapons. I defy anyone to tell me 
what is more important to discuss.
  That is not to suggest that those who think this treaty is a bad idea 
are motivated by anything other than good intentions. As my dear mother 
would say and as the nuns used to make me write on the blackboard after 
school when I misbehaved: The road to hell is paved with good 
intentions.
  Failure to ratify this treaty, I firmly believe, paves the road to 
hell--to nuclear hell. I don't know whether it will work, but I am 
virtually certain in my mind--just Joe Biden, my mind--that if we do 
not ratify this treaty, we virtually lose any ability to control the 
proliferation of nuclear capability.
  They talked about when the Russians detonated their first hydrogen 
bomb. I am not sure, but I think it was Edward Teller who said: Now we 
have two scorpions in the bottle. I am here to tell my colleagues what 
they already know. We have many more than two scorpions in that bottle 
now. If we do not begin to take a chance, a very small chance, on a 
treaty that says no more detonation of nuclear weapons, we will have 
dozens of scorpions in that bottle with not nearly as much to lose as 
the former Soviet empire and the United States.
  There was one advantage when there was a Soviet empire: They had as 
much to lose as they had to gain. The only person I worry about in a 
contest of any kind--athletic, political, or as a representative of the 
Federal Government of the United States of America with another 
country--I don't like dealing with someone else who has little to lose 
but has significant capacity to inflict a vast amount of damage.
  While I have the floor, I thank my friend from Pennsylvania, Senator 
Specter. My friend from Pennsylvania has been one of the most outspoken 
proponents of bringing up this treaty. I am sure it will be before the 
Senate because of his advocacy.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. SPECTER. If I may have the attention of the Senator from 
Delaware, I do believe it is important for the Senate to consider the 
treaty. I support it. I believe it is very difficult for the United 
States to use moral suasion on India and Pakistan not to have nuclear 
tests if we have not moved forward on the ratification process.
  However, I ask my colleague from Delaware about the problems of 
considering the treaty on this state of the record where we have been 
looking for some expert guidance on some questions which are 
outstanding as to whether there can be an adequate determination of our 
preparedness without having tests.
  One thing we have to consider very carefully is whether the interests 
of disarmament will be promoted by pressing to bring the treaty now, 
which may result without the two-thirds ratification, as opposed to 
trying to clear up some concerns which some have expressed.
  I am prepared to vote in favor of the treaty.
  Mr. BIDEN. If I may respond to the Senator, he raised the $64 
question. He and I have been discussing how to get this up for a long 
time, over 2 years. He will recall, last year, I was of the view I did 
not want to take a chance of having the treaty up for fear it could be 
defeated before we had the ability to get all the data before the 
Senate that I believed would persuade Senators to overwhelmingly 
support the treaty.
  I changed my mind. The reason I changed my mind is--I have great 
respect for my friend from North Carolina, Senator Helms--I have 
learned one thing: When he says something ain't going to happen, it 
ain't going to happen on his watch. He made it very clear, there will 
be no hearings on this treaty. I have been with him for 27 years. We 
are truly personal friends. I know when he says it, he means it, which 
means I have lost any hope that he will be persuaded, or be persuaded 
by his Republican colleagues in the caucus, to have hearings.
  I then reached the second conclusion: We are hurtling toward a 
disaster on the subcontinent with India and Pakistan, and with Korea. 
As the Senator knows, if they arm, if they deploy, we will see China 
making a judgment to increase its nuclear arsenal and we will see the 
likelihood that Korea will not be able to be leveraged.
  Here is the point. I have made the judgment, for me--and I may be 
wrong--if we don't agree to this proposal, we will get no vote on this 
treaty for 2 years and the effect will be the same.
  I am being very blunt. I believe I am looking for the political God's 
will to have people have a little bit of an altar call. It is one thing 
to say privately you are against the treaty or to say you are for it 
but there is no vote on it. It is another thing to be the man or woman 
who walks up in that well and casts the 34th vote against the treaty 
and kills the treaty. They will have on their head--and they may turn 
out to be right--and they will be determining

[[Page 23265]]

by their vote the single most significant decision made relative to 
arms, nuclear arms, that has been made since the ABM Treaty. I think 
they may begin to see the Lord. If they don't, then I think the 
American public will make a judgment about it. The next President--
whether it be Bush, Gore, or McCain--will be more likely to send back 
another treaty.
  I am at a point where it is time to bring in the sheep. Let's count 
them, and let's hold people responsible. That is as blunt as I can be 
with my friend.
  Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Senator from Delaware for responding, and I 
will not ask another question because I want to move on to the next 
amendment.
  Mr. President, it is my hope that whatever technical information is 
available on some of the outstanding questions will be made available 
to the Senators before the vote so we can have that determination made 
with all the facts available.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, it is appalling that our Republican 
friends will use any means necessary to kill the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty. We need time to debate this Treaty in a responsible manner, 
especially since the Foreign Relations Committee has still not held a 
single hearing devoted solely to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  On September 24, 1996, President Clinton became the first world 
leader to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. On that day, 
President Clinton praised the treaty as the ``longest-sought, hardest--
fought prize in the history of arms control.''
  Today, we stand on the verge of losing this valuable prize. For 
almost two years, the Treaty has languished in the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee--with no action, no debate, and no results. Now, 
with the September 23 already passed, the United States may well 
forfeit its voice on the treaty if the Senate does not act quickly, and 
in a responsible way, to ratify it.
  We have a unique opportunity in the Senate to help end nuclear 
testing once and for all. Other nations look to the United States for 
international leadership. President Clinton has done his part, in 
signing the Treaty and submitting it to the Senate for ratification, as 
the Constitution requires. Now the Senate should do its part, and 
ratify the Treaty. Ratification is the single most important step we 
can take today to reduce the danger of nuclear war.
  Withholding action on this treaty is irresponsible and unacceptable. 
The Treaty is in the best interest of the United States and the global 
community. Ratification of this agreement will increase the safety and 
security of people in the United States, and across the world. But, 
until the Senate ratifies this treaty, it cannot go into force for any 
nation, anywhere.
  The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is in the interest of the American 
people and it has widespread public support. Recent bipartisan polls 
found that over 8 out of 10 Americans support its ratification. These 
statistics cut across party lines and are consistent in all geographic 
regions. The Treaty also has the strong support of present and past 
military leaders, including four former Joint Chiefs of Staff--David 
Jones, William Crowe, Colin Powell, and John Shalikashvili--and the 
current JCS, Hugh Shelton.
  The United States has already stopped testing nuclear weapons. 
Ensuring that other nations follow suit is critical for our national 
and international security. Particularly in the wake of recent 
allegations of Chinese nuclear espionage, it is essential that we act 
promptly to ratify this agreement. China is a signatory of the Treaty, 
but like the United States, China has not yet ratified it. Prompt 
Senate ratification of the Treaty will encourage China to ratify, and 
discourage China from creating new weapons from stolen nuclear secrets.
  In 1963, after President Kennedy had negotiated the landmark Limited 
Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union to ban tests in the atmosphere, 
he spoke of his vision of a broader treaty in his commencement address 
at American University that year. As he said:

       The conclusion of such a treaty, so near and yet so far, 
     would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most 
     dangerous areas. It would place the nuclear powers in a 
     position to deal more effectively with one of the greatest 
     hazards which man faces in 1963, the further spread of 
     nuclear arms. It would increase our security--it would 
     decrease the prospects of war. Surely this goal is 
     sufficiently important to require our steady pursuit, 
     yielding neither to the temptation to give up the whole 
     effort nor the temptation to give up our insistence on vital 
     and responsible safeguards.

  In 1999, those words are truer than ever.
  I commend President Clinton and my colleagues on both sides of the 
aisle who have joined together to speak out on this issue, and I urge 
the Senate to act responsibly on this very important treaty.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to join a number of our 
colleagues in support of prompt Senate consideration of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty the CTBT.
  The issue of arms proliferation is at the heart of our national--and 
international--security. In the post-cold war world we are no longer 
faced with a military threat posed by the Soviet Union, but in some 
ways the world now is a more dangerous place than it was just a decade 
ago, with many smaller, unpredictable threats taking the place of a 
single large one. U.S. and international security are now threatened by 
transfers of nuclear, conventional and non-conventional materials among 
numerous states. Nuclear testing last year by India and Pakistan, the 
attempts of other states to obtain nuclear and ballistic missile 
technology, and the growing threat of weapons of mass destruction 
reinforce the need for a comprehensive international effort to end 
nuclear testing and curb the illicit transfer and sale of nuclear, 
ballistic, and other dangerous technology.
  I have been a strong supporter of prompt Senate action on the CTBT 
since President Clinton submitted the treaty to the Senate for its 
advice and consent on September 22, 1997--2 years ago last week. As a 
member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, I continue to feel 
strongly that the committee should have thorough hearings specifically 
on this important treaty at the earliest possible date. I know that the 
chairman of the committee and I do not agree on the importance of the 
CTBT, but I hope he will agree that the Senate must fulfill its advice 
and consent obligations with respect to this treaty.
  I continue to hear from numerous Wisconsin residents who favor prompt 
Senate action on--and ratification of--the CTBT.
  The CTBT, which has been signed by more than 150 nations, prohibits 
the explosion of any type of nuclear device, no matter the intended 
purpose. India and Pakistan's nuclear tests only underscore the 
importance of the CTBT, and serve as a reminder that we should redouble 
our efforts to bring the entire community of nations into this treaty. 
While I am pleased that both of those countries have agreed to sign the 
treaty, I regret that they did so only after intense international 
pressure, and only after they conducted the tests they needed to become 
declared nuclear states.
  We must do more to ensure that no further tests take place.
  The United States must lead the world in reducing the nuclear threat, 
and to do that we must become a full participant in the treaty we 
helped to craft. I am deeply concerned that the third anniversary of 
the date the CTBT opened for signature, September 24, 1996, passed last 
week without Senate advice and consent to ratification. This failure to 
act by the United States Senate means that, according to the treaty's 
provisions, the United States will not be able to participate actively 
in the upcoming conference, which is reserved for only those countries 
who have deposited their instruments of ratification. That conference 
is currently scheduled to begin on October 6, 1999. Because we cannot 
participate, the United States will be at a severe disadvantage when it 
comes to influencing the future of the treaty and encouraging other 
countries to sign or ratify.
  Mr. President, I again urge the Senate to act on this important 
treaty at

[[Page 23266]]

the earliest possible date. The credibility and leadership of the 
United States in the arms control arena is at stake.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I wish to take a few moments today to 
offer some remarks on a matter of extreme importance to this Nation and 
to the world--the matter of preventing the further proliferation of 
nuclear weapons among the nations of the world through ratification and 
implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  Two weeks ago--September 10--was the third anniversary of the United 
Nation's overwhelming vote to approve a treaty banning the testing of 
nuclear weapons. The General Assembly voted 158 for to 3 against the 
treaty, with a handful of abstentions.
  Last week, on September 24, the United States observed the third 
anniversary of signing that treaty and, on September 22, marked the 
second anniversary of its receipt by the Senate for our advice and 
consent.
  In accordance with article 14 of the treaty, preparations are now 
underway to convene an international conference of states which have 
ratified the treaty to negotiate measures to facilitate its 
implementation. I'm sorry to say, Mr. President, that unless the Senate 
acts immediately to ratify this treaty, the United States--an original 
signatory to the treaty and a leader in the global movement to stop the 
testing of nuclear weapons--will not take part in that conference.
  Our absence sends a troubling message to the international community 
looking for our leadership.
  Mr. President, I am very sorry to say that essentially nothing has 
happened since President Clinton signed the treaty on behalf of the 
United States on September 24, 1996, and sent it to the Senate for 
consideration on September 22, 1997.
  There have been no hearings, there has been no debate on the Senate 
floor, there has been no vote on ratification. This is an extremely 
important treaty that I believe, and the great majority of Americans 
agree, would help to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
during the coming millennium. And yet the Senate has not even begun the 
debate.
  Mr. President, I believe the United States and the nations of the 
world have come to a historic crossroads--a crossroads that symbolizes 
America's view of the future and the potential direction of the 
international system regarding the control and eventual eradication of 
nuclear weapons.
  The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty lies at the center of the 
crossroads, and provides us with two basic options.
  We could elect to ratify the treaty and seek its broadest 
implementation in order to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear 
weapons;
  Or, we could elect not to ratify the treaty, having decided as a body 
that permitting the testing of nuclear weapons by all current and 
future nuclear powers is in the interest of safety and security of the 
United States and the world.
  If we chose not to ratify the treaty, that choice would permit us to 
pursue future avenues for nuclear superiority in response to nuclear 
weapons developed by our real or potential adversaries.
  Mr. President, I believe that our Nation has already been down that 
road. It was called the nuclear arms race. It cost the Nation over a 
trillion dollars according to a recent study by the Brookings 
Institution. And that's just money. It doesn't include the opportunity 
cost of brainpower and skills not used to address other national 
problems such as medical and environment science or education.
  The fact is, Mr. President, that the way things stand, we are not 
being permitted to make either choice. Despite repeated requests by 
Members of the Senate to address this vital national and international 
security issue, the Senate has done nothing to move this treaty forward 
and debate it.
  The Foreign Relations Committee has taken no action with respect to 
the treaty and is preventing the Senate from debating and voting in 
this most critical issue to the future of world peace. By his actions, 
the chairman of the committee is preventing the Senate from carrying 
out its constitutional duties and obligations to give advice and 
consent regarding the CTBT.
  Mr. President, I support the call to hold hearings and bring this 
treaty to the floor for a debate and a vote. The American people 
strongly support this treaty and deserve to have that view represented 
and debated in the Halls of Congress.
  Will the treaty be an effective means to prevent the spread of 
nuclear weapons? Let's debate the point.
  Will the treaty be verifiable? Let's hear from the experts on that 
crucial issue.
  Will the CTBT serve America's national security interest? Let's 
examine that from every angle.
  As I mentioned at the outset of my remarks today, Mr. President, I 
believe the Nation and the world stand at a historic crossroads with 
respect to the spread of nuclear weapons. I believe it is our duty and 
obligation to the American people to choose the proper road to take. 
The key word, Mr. President, is ``Choose.'' The Senate is currently 
being prevented from making a choice--and in so doing, a choice is 
being made for us--by a few individuals seeking to advance an unrelated 
political agenda.
  I'm certain I share an abiding faith in our democratic system with 
the Members of this body. If that's so, a debate, discussion, and vote 
on perhaps the most critical security issue facing our Nation today 
should be placed before the Senate as soon as possible. Failure to 
permit such a debate and vote suggests to me either a lack of faith in 
the democratic process or a disdain for its importance or validity.
  Mr. President, I strongly urge my colleagues to support efforts to 
bring the CTBT to the floor.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I would like to add a few thoughts for 
today's debate regarding consideration of the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty.
  I strongly believe that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty--or C-T-B-
T--is in our Nation's national security interests. But before I discuss 
my reasons for supporting the treaty, let me first say why the Senate--
even those who are unsure of the treaty-should support its 
consideration by the Senate.
  The Senate should hold hearings and consider and debate the treaty. 
The Senate should vote on the treaty by March of next year.
  Let me now mention some history of this issue and mention some of the 
major milestone along the road to ending nuclear weapons testing. In 
fact, next month, the month of October, is the anniversary of many 
important events.
  On October 11, 1963, the Limited Test Ban Treaty entered into force 
after being ratified by the Senate in an overwhelming, bipartisan vote 
of 80-14 just a few weeks earlier. This treaty paved the way for future 
nuclear weapons testing agreements by prohibiting tests in the 
atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. It was signed by 108 
countries.
  Our nation's agreement to the Limited Test Ban Treaty marked the end 
of our above ground testing of nuclear weapons, including those at the 
U.S. test site in Nevada. We now know, all too well, the terrible 
impact of exploding nuclear weapons over the Nevada desert. Among other 
consequences, these tests in the 1950's exposed millions of Americans 
to large amounts of radioactive Iodine-131, which accumulates in the 
thyroid gland and has been linked to thyroid cancer. ``Hot Sports,'' 
where the Iodine-131 fallout was the greatest, were identified by a 
National Cancer Institute report as receiving 5-16 rads of Iodine-131. 
The ``Hot Spots'' included many areas far away from Nevada, including 
New York, Massachusetts and Iowa. Outside reviewers have shown that the 
5-16 rad level is only an average, with many people having been exposed 
to much higher levels, especially those who were children at the time.
  To put that in perspective Federal standards for nuclear power plants 
require that protective action be taken

[[Page 23267]]

for 15 rads. To further understand the enormity of the potential 
exposure, consider this: 150 million curies of Iodine-131 were released 
by the above ground nuclear weapons testing in the United States, above 
three times more than from the Chernobyl nuclear power plants disaster 
in the former Soviet Union.
  Mr. President, it is all too clear that outlawing above-ground tests 
were in the interest of our nation. I strongly believe that banning all 
nuclear test is also in our interests.
  October also marked some key steps for the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty. On October 2, 1992, President Bush signed into law the U.S. 
moratorium on all nuclear tests. The moratorium was internationalized 
when, just a few years later, on September 24, 1996, a second step was 
taken--the CTBT, was opened for signature. The United States was the 
first to sign this landmark treaty.
  President Clinton took a third important step in abolishing nuclear 
weapons tests by transmitting the CTBT to the Senate for ratification. 
Unfortunately, the Senate has yet to take the additional step of 
ratifying the CTBT. I am hopeful that we in the Senate will debate and 
vote on ratification of the Treaty, and continue the momentum toward 
the important goals of a worldwide ban on nuclear weapons testing.
  Many believed we had conquered the dangerous specter of nuclear was 
after the Cold War came to an end and many former Soviet states became 
our allies Unfortunately, recent developments in South Asia remind us 
that we need to be vigilant in our cooperative international efforts to 
reduce the dangers of nuclear weapons.
  The CTBT is a major milestone in the effort to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. It would establish a permanent ban on 
all nuclear explosions in all environments for any purpose. Its 
``zero--yield'' prohibition on nuclear tests would help to halt the 
development amd development of new nuclear weapons. The treaty would 
also establish a far reaching verification regime that includes a 
global network of sophisticated seismic, hydro-acoustic and 
radionuclide monitoring stations, as well as on-site inspection of test 
sites to deter and detect violations.
  It is vital to our national security for the nuclear arms race to 
come to an end, and the American people recognize this. In a recent 
poll, more than 80% percent of voters supported the CTBT.
  It is heartening to know that the American people understand the 
risks of a world with nuclear weapons. It is now time for policymakers 
to recognize this as well. There is no better way to honor the hard 
work and dedication of those who developed the LTBT and the CTBT than 
for the Senate to immediately ratify the CTBT.

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