[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 16] [Senate] [Pages 22596-22597] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND GENERAL SHORT Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss an important--a historically important--vote taken in the course of our recent deliberations on defense policy. I am speaking of the rollcall vote this Chamber took on May 25 requesting the long-overdue, posthumous advancement of two fine World War II officers, Adm. Husband Kimmel and Gen. Walter Short. The Senate voted in support of the Kimmel-Short resolution, and I wish to take a moment to underscore the historic import of that vote. As you may recall, Admiral Kimmel and General Short were publicly and wrongly accused of dereliction of duty and unfairly scapegoated with singular responsibility for the success of the fateful December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. After the end of World War II, this scapegoating was given a painfully unjust and enduring veneer when Admiral Kimmel and General Short were not advanced on the retired lists to their highest ranks of war-time command--an honor that was given to every other senior commander who served in war-time positions above his regular grade. After over 50 years, this injustice remains a prominent, painful spur in the integrity of our Nation's military honor. After numerous official investigations totaling well over 30 volumes of thick text absolved these officers of dereliction of duty and highlighted gross negligence and ineptitude on the part of their superiors as predominant factors in the Pearl Harbor disaster, these officers still remain unfairly treated. For those of you who are interested, I will shortly send to the desk for placement in the Congressional Record a set of excerpts from these investigations. This is a short document, but it poignantly highlights how unjust treatment endured by Kimmel and Short just does not correlate with the official history--the official documented history-- of the Pearl Harbor disaster. Anyone who looks over these few pages cannot but feel uncomfortable with how our Nation has so unfairly turned its back on these two officers who dedicated their lives to our own freedoms. Mr. President, a great step, indeed an historic step was taken toward the correction of this injustice last May, on May 25 to be exact. This Chamber, the U.S. Senate, the legislative body our Constitution deems responsible for providing advice and consent in the promotion of military officers, voted and passed an amendment to the Senate Defense authorization bill that stated: This singular exclusion from advancement of Rear Admiral (retired) Kimmel and Major General (retired) Short from the Navy retired list and the Army retired list, respectively, serves only to perpetuate the myth that the senior commanders in Hawaii were derelict in their duty and responsible for the success of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and is a distinct and unacceptable expression of dishonor toward two of the finest officers who have served in the Armed Forces of the United States. This resolution then requested the President to advance the late Rear Adm. Husband Kimmel to the grade of admiral on the retired list of the Navy and the late Maj. Gen. Walter Short to the grade of lieutenant general on the retired list of the Army. Mr. President, the injustice suffered by Admiral Kimmel and General Short remains a flaw in the integrity of our Nation's chain of command and its unparalleled military honor. In this regard, the Senate's vote on the Kimmel-Short resolution was of great historic importance. The Senate has every right to be proud of this vote. This Chamber, which under the Constitution is responsible for promotion of military officers of our Armed Forces, deemed the treatment of Kimmel and Short to be unfair and unjust and inconsistent with our national sense of honor. That vote gave formal and official recognition to this injustice and highlighted it as a pernicious inconsistency in the application of our national understanding of military accountability. It demonstrated that no wrong, no matter how distant in the past will be ignored by this Chamber. it correctly called upon the President to correct this injustice by advancing these two fine officers on the retired lists. It is now up to the President to take this corrective action. I hope that he will not heed the contradictory conclusions of his advisors on this matter. While the Pentagon opposes the advancement of Kimmel and Short, they nonetheless recognize that, and I quote their own 1995 report, ``responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short, it should be broadly shared.'' How they square this conclusion with the reality that today Kimmel and Short are the only two officials to suffer from official sanction is beyond me. I hope that the President of the United States will use his wisdom to listen beyond this contradictory and unjust advice. I hope that he will look at the official record compiled by over eight official investigations. I hope that he will listen to the studied voice of the Senate and take the final step necessary to correct this injustice by advancing these two fine officers to their highest grade of World War II command on the retired lists. Mr. President, the Senate has once again ably demonstrated that it is never too late to correct an injustice. I urge the President of the United States to do the same and advance Kimmel and Short to their highest grade of [[Page 22597]] command as was done for their peers who served in World War II. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have an attachment printed in the Record. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows: Key Excerpts From the Pearl Harbor Investigations the dorn report (1995) ``Responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General Short; it should be broadly shared.'' ``It is clear today, as it should have been since 1946 to any serious reader of the JCC (Joint Congressional Committee) hearing record, that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were not solely responsible for the defeat at Pearl Harbor.'' ``. . . the evidence of the handling of these (intelligence) messages in Washington reveals some ineptitude, some unwarranted assumptions and misestimates, limited coordination, ambiguous language, and lack of clarification and follow-up at higher levels.'' ``The `pilot', `fourteen-point' and `one o'clock' messages point, by the evening of December 6th, to war at dawn (Hawaiian time) on the 7th--not to an attack on Hawaii--but officials in Washington were neither energetic nor effective in getting that warning to the Hawaiian commanders.'' The Army Board for the Correction of Military Records (1991) ``The Army Pearl Harbor Board (of 1944), held that General Marshall and the Chief of War Plans Division of the War Department shared in the responsibility for the disaster.'' ``The applicant in this case . . . must show . . . that the FSM (in this case Major General Short) was unjustly treated by the Army . . . the majority found evidence of injustice.'' ``In this regard, the majority was of the opinion that the FSM, singularly or with the Naval commander, was unjustly held responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster.'' ``Considering the passage of time as well as the burden and stigma carried until his untimely death in 1949, it would be equitable and just to restore the FSM to his former rank of lieutenant general on the retired list.'' ``Recommendation.--That all of the Department of the Army records, related to this case be corrected by advancing the individual concerned to the rank of lieutenant general on the retired list.'' the army pearl harbor board inquiry (1944) ``The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars: (a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for war, of which information he had an abundance and Short had little. (b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941, when evidently he failed to realize the import of General Short's reply of November 27th, which indicated clearly that General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the message of November 27 and had not adequately alerted his command for war. (c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost imminent break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this.'' ``Chief of War Plans Division War Department General Staff, Major General Leonard T. Gerow, failed in his duties in the following respects: (a) To send to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 27, 1941, a clear, concise directive; on the contrary, he approved the message of November 27, 1941, which contained the confusing statements. (b) To realize that the state of readiness reported in Short's reply to the November 27th message was not a state of war readiness, and he failed to take corrective action.'' the naval court of inquiry (1944) ``It is a prime obligation of Command to keep subordinate commanders, particularly those in distant areas, constantly supplied with information. To fail to meet this obligation is to commit a military error.'' ``It is a fact that Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operation of the Pacific Fleet, and having important information in his possession during this critical period, especially on the morning of 7 December, failed to transmit this information to Admiral Kimmel, this depriving the latter of a clear picture of the existing Japanese situation as seen in Washington.'' ``The Court is of the opinion that the deficiencies in personnel and materiel which existed in 1941, had a direct adverse bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor on and prior to 7 December.'' ``The Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's decision, made after the dispatch of 24 November, to continue preparations of the Pacific Fleet for war, was sound in light of the information then available to him.'' ``The Court is of the opinion that Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations . . . failed to display the sound judgement expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel . . . during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had regarding the Japanese situation, and especially on the morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately the fact that a message had been received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon.'' the joint congressional committee report (1946) ``The errors made by the Hawaiian commanders were errors of judgment and not derelictions of duty.'' ``The War Plans Divisions of the War and Navy Departments failed: ``(a) To give careful and thoughtful consideration to the intercepted messages from Tokyo to Honolulu of September 24, November 15, and November 20 (the harbor berth plan and related dispatches) and to raise a question as to their significance. Since they indicated a particular interest in the Pacific Fleet's base, this intelligence should have been appreciated and supplied to the Hawaiian commanders for their assistance, along with other information available to them, in making their estimate of the situation. ``(b) To be properly on the qui vive to receive the `one o'clock' intercept and to recognize in the message the fact that some Japanese military action would very possibly occur somewhere at 1 p.m., December 7. If properly appreciated this intelligence should have suggested a dispatch to all Pacific outpost commanders supplying this information, as General Marshall attempted to do immediately upon seeing it.'' ____________________