[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 15]
[Senate]
[Pages 21989-21992]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                       THE IMPORTANCE OF VIEQUES

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I do want to talk about some of the tax 
ramifications, today's subject. I think it is very significant.
  Prior to doing that, though, we have an issue that is current, rather 
sensitive, and is rather serious in terms of our Nation's security.
  Tomorrow, the committee I chair, the Readiness Subcommittee of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, will be holding a hearing to review 
the national security requirement for continued training operations of 
the naval facility off the island of Puerto Rico called Vieques. It is 
a very important issue, military readiness, with the lives of military 
personnel on one side of the debate and the interests of the local 
community on the other.
  At this point, I remind the President that for 57 years we have used 
this island of Vieques, an island that is approximately 20 or 25 miles 
wide, one small area way over on the east end of this island as a 
range, a bombing range--57 years. During that time, we have lost the 
lives of one person, who was a civilian employee working for the Navy. 
This happened last April and created quite a bit of hysteria. There are 
many people trying to use this as an excuse to close down the range 
that is so vital to our interests.
  We have seen all the press reports outlining the concerns of those 
who oppose the military's use of the island. We have also witnessed the 
introduction of legislation to close this range. Unfortunately, far 
less attention has been given to the national security requirement for 
continued access to the training provided by this range. In fact, I 
have not heard anyone address the increased risk to our Nation's youth 
who serve in uniform and what they will face if we send them into 
combat without the benefit of the training that is offered only at 
Vieques Island. The subcommittee will be meeting tomorrow to explore 
the requirements of this language.
  It is my hope that once the panel, appointed by the Secretary of 
Defense to review this matter and make recommendations for appropriate 
resolution, issues its report, the committee will be able to then meet 
to review those recommendations and hear from the people of Puerto Rico 
as well as the military.
  The Secretary of the Navy recently released a report, prepared by two 
of its senior officers, which examines our training activities on 
Vieques and explores potential alternative training sites. Although no 
alternative site has yet been identified that would replace the 
training Vieques provides, I understand the panel appointed by the 
Secretary of Defense and by the President continues to seek a 
resolution to this issue.
  I will read a couple paragraphs out of the Navy report prepared by 
those individuals. I think it is very significant:

       The Inner Range at Vieques is the only range along the 
     Atlantic seaboard that can accommodate naval gunfire, the 
     only range at which strike aircraft are afforded the use of 
     air-to-ground live ordnance with tactically realistic and 
     challenging targets and airspace which allows the use of high 
     altitude flight profiles.

  This is very similar to what we witnessed in Kosovo, and they were 
very successful. Even though to begin with we should not have been 
involved, it was necessary to use high-altitude bombing to be out of 
the range of surface-to-air missiles. We did that successfully, and 
they received their training at Vieques. I do not know what the degree 
of success would have been otherwise.
  Continuing from the report:

       It is the only range at which live naval surface, aviation 
     and artillery ordnance can be delivered in coordination. 
     Additionally, Vieques is the only training venue that can 
     accommodate amphibious landings supported by naval surface 
     fires. . . .

  It continues and talks about how this is the only facility we have, 
and if we do not have this facility, we are going to be deploying 
troops into areas without proper training. One of the conclusions of 
the report is:

       This study has reaffirmed that the Vieques Inner Range 
     provides unique training opportunities vital to military 
     readiness, and contributes significantly to the ability of 
     naval expeditionary forces to obtain strategic objectives. 
     This study examined alternative plausible sites and concluded 
     that none, either in existence or yet undeveloped, would 
     provide the range of training opportunities at Vieques Inner 
     Range.

  The U.S.S. Eisenhower is going to be deployed in February to the 
Arabian Gulf and to the Mediterranean to do just this type of exercise 
and will be called upon to do something to defend this country when 
they will not have had the proper training from Vieques because right 
now there is a moratorium and the U.S.S. Eisenhower has not had the 
opportunity to have that training.
  Any resolution must provide the military with the ability to achieve 
the same level of proficiency that the training operations at Vieques 
currently provide. Any proposal to move operations to a phantom or an 
unidentified site as of yet is unacceptable. Before any decision is 
made to move operations from Vieques, a specific alternative site must 
be identified and all actions necessary to make it functional, from 
environmental studies to military construction, must be completed. 
Failure to identify a specific site and make it available will simply 
prove the validity of the Navy's position that no viable alternative 
exists. Therefore, any decision to continue the use of Vieques, but at 
a reduced level of operations, must still allow the military to perform 
the training necessary to meet the required wartime proficiency.
  I fear that a decision is going to be made based on politics rather 
than national security. I am concerned that this administration may 
take action that will place at risk the lives of sailors and marines 
simply to court the popular vote in favor of candidates with close ties 
to this President.
  One only has to look back at the recent decision to release 
terrorists from prison to fully appreciate the extent to which this 
President is willing to place American lives and interests at risk in 
order to garner votes for his friends and family. The inappropriate 
politicization of the issue has already been demonstrated by the 
Justice Department and the U.S. attorney's office in Puerto Rico which 
have refused take necessary action to protect the lives of American 
citizens.
  As many of my colleagues already know, as we speak today, there are 
protesters over there, some four groups of protesters, who are on the 
live range with live ordnances. I had occasion to spend a good bit of 
the recess looking at this. I have been over every inch of the island 
either by helicopter or by car or on foot. I have seen the protesters 
out there throwing around live ordnances. Just imagine, in 57 years, 
how much is out there. One particular individual came out carrying a 
live ordnance and tried to get on a commercial aircraft, which would 
have killed everybody on the aircraft.
  It is a very serious thing, and I cannot believe our Justice 
Department has refused to enforce the laws of trespassing on Federal 
military Government property. I hope these explosives do not fall into 
the hands of some of

[[Page 21990]]

the terrorists the President recently released from prison.
  One thing about this issue is certain. The primary mission of 
Roosevelt Roads is to support training operations at Vieques. If 
military access to Vieques is eliminated, the value of Roosevelt Roads 
will be greatly reduced, and those functions, other than supporting 
this range, can be performed very well in other areas where there is 
excess capacity.
  The U.S. military cannot afford to fund a base that provides little 
or no benefit to national security. Therefore, today I have introduced 
S. 1602, legislation which will close naval station Roosevelt Roads at 
such time as the military terminates military operations at Vieques, if 
that should become a reality.
  I have seen this. I have become convinced. Our hearing tomorrow will 
either disprove or prove what I am saying today--that it is absolutely 
necessary to have the benefits of this range and that there is no place 
else we have in our arsenal, no other range, that provides the type of 
training that will save American lives. If we send in our troops, as we 
are preparing to do right now on the U.S.S. Eisenhower, and they get 
involved in some kind of a problem and do not have the benefit of the 
training at Vieques as those who participated in Kosovo, it could 
certainly cost American lives, and we will be sending our troops at far 
greater risk, which I weigh and measure in terms of human life.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. INHOFE. I am happy to yield to the distinguished chairman of the 
Armed Services Committee.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague, the chairman of the 
subcommittee of jurisdiction over this issue, for spending the time on 
a careful analysis of this very important problem. We will have the 
hearing tomorrow. We consulted on this, and I am hopeful that he will 
consider a follow-on hearing, because as I look over tomorrow's agenda, 
given the time we have, it is my view that we will need a subsequent 
hearing on this.
  Mr. INHOFE. Let me respond to the chairman. In the subcommittee, we 
are only going to address what alternatives there are, why it is 
critical. There are far more things to consider. It is my hope the full 
committee that my colleague chairs will hold a hearing.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I agree that we will look at the policy 
issues involved. At the moment, we need to have a record before the 
Senate on the absolutely vital nature of this range to the very safety 
of individual service persons, primarily those flying aircraft, but in 
every respect those in the Marine Corps doing amphibious work.
  Mr. President, we cannot send, as the Senator from Oklahoma said, 
these individuals into harm's way without adequate training. We are 
doing that with the next battle group, as you pointed out.
  So I think we should advise the Senate of the hearing tomorrow, the 
importance of that, the subsequent hearing, maybe at the subcommittee 
level, depending on further readiness aspects, and then the full 
committee on a policy issue.
  Mr. INHOFE. I agree with the Senator.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator.
  I had the opportunity last night to be with the President--Senator 
Domenici and I--with regard to the debate that we will have tonight on 
the conference report of the authorization bills of the Senate and the 
House, and I brought this subject up.
  I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of the colloquy with 
the Senator from Oklahoma my letter to the President, which I discussed 
with him last night on the VA issue, be printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 1.)
  Mr. WARNER. I am sure you mentioned that across the board the 
uniformed side of the Department of Defense stands foursquare with the 
comments that you have made today. I have had consultations, as you 
have had, with the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, General Shelton, the Chairman, and others, on this issue.
  This is an issue that I have had considerable familiarity with for 
many years--when I was the Under Secretary and Secretary of the Navy in 
1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, and 1972. We had recurring problems of this 
nature down at Vieques. We constantly worked with the political 
structure at that time to resolve the problems.
  But I think you are absolutely correct. At the moment, we have to 
regain control of this range for training purposes. I hope the 
commission--the several officers looking at this--will come forward 
with a program that will indicate to the Puerto Ricans we want not to 
be offensive to the people of Puerto Rico but to indicate the need for 
this area and, hopefully, to have some program by which we can meet the 
desires of all parties to work it out in some way.
  At this moment, I am not prepared to indicate what the workout should 
be. I want to study the report of this commission. The Senator from 
Oklahoma and I should have private consultation with the Secretary of 
Defense and others. But let's see what we can do to meet the 
requirements of all parties involved but focusing on the essential 
nature of this range to America's readiness of its Naval and Marine 
Corps forces and embarking periodically to trouble spots in the world 
from the East Coast.
  I thank the Senator.
  Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Senator from Virginia.
  I would only say that it is not very often you get total agreement 
from all of the commanders in the field, all of the CINCs in the field, 
as well as all the chiefs. All four chiefs are on record right now 
saying this is absolutely necessary to have as part of our training.
  One of the things I have been trying to do is to quantify in terms of 
American casualties when you go from low to high to very high risk--
what that means. There is no question there is not one who will not say 
if we send our troops in there without this very valuable training that 
they can only get at the Vieques, it is going to be at a higher risk, 
which means American lives.
  I certainly hope the people of Puerto Rico understand we are talking 
about their lives, too. So we should all be focused on the same thing.
  Mr. WARNER. I presume you include in your remarks direct reference to 
the Navy and Marine Corps aviators who flew missions in Kosovo, who are 
flying tonight and tomorrow and for the indefinite future missions with 
regard to the containment of Iraq, in many instances in hostile fire. 
Tonight, tomorrow, and the next day----
  Mr. INHOFE. Yes.
  Mr. WARNER. For the indefinite future, we are asking them to endure 
this hostile fire. And from time to time they have to drop live 
ordnance to protect themselves in fulfillment of this containment 
mission over Iraq.
  Mr. INHOFE. I did allude to that.
  I suggest to the Senator from Virginia also the fact that the 
successes we had in Kosovo were directly related to the Vieques. The 
last place they got training before going into Kosovo was at the 
Vieques.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. INHOFE. I yield the floor, Mr. President.

                             Exhibit No. 1

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                  Committee on Armed Services,

                               Washington, DC, September 20, 1999.
     The President,
     The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear. Mr. President: As Chairman of the Senate Armed 
     Services Committee, I write to express my grave concern over 
     the future of the United States Navy's training facility 
     located on the Puerto Rican Island of Vieques. Ever since I 
     was the Secretary of the Navy, I have worked to keep this 
     facility available to the Department of Defense.
       The last two east coast carrier battlegroups which deployed 
     to the Adriatic and Arabian Gulf, completed final integrated 
     live fire training at Vieques. Both battle groups, led by the 
     carriers U.S.S. Enterprise and U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt, saw 
     combat in Operations Desert Fox (Iraq) and Allied Force 
     (Kosovo) within days of arriving in theater. Their success, 
     with no loss of American life, was largely attributable to 
     the realistic and integrated live fire training completed at 
     Vieques. This island is unique in character, both in terms of 
     its geography,

[[Page 21991]]

     with deep open water and unrestricted airspace, and its 
     training support infrastructure. The training range is 
     absolutely vital to our readiness, and there is no 
     replacement facility available.
       Without a doubt, America enjoys the best trained, best 
     equipped and most motivated military force in the world. But 
     combat skills, practiced at Vieques, are perishable. Aviators 
     must hone targeting and weapons delivery skills; ammunition 
     leaders and flight deck personnel must coordinate weapons 
     assembly and leading; naval surface fire support teams must 
     integrate calls for fire support with ground units; gunfire 
     spotters must refine targeting skills; and ground units must 
     practice the seamless transfer of command ashore. The Armed 
     Forces have learned these lessons well. Untrained forces are 
     exposed to higher casualty rates and experience less mission 
     success.
       Mr. President, I urge you to take no action which limits or 
     degrades our Armed Force's ability to properly and thoroughly 
     prepare for the challenges they face in today's world.
       The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton, 
     who testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee last 
     week, confirmed the continuing requirement for live fire 
     training operations at Vieques.
       Due to the moratorium on training on Vieques, the next 
     carrier battlegroup is deploying with reduced combat 
     readiness in its airwing and naval surface fire support 
     capability. I encourage you to now signal your support for 
     all the men and women of our Armed Forces by allowing the 
     critical live fire training at Vieques to continue.
       With kind regards, I am,
           Respectfully,
                                                      John Warner,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                                Comander in Chief,


                                        U.S. Atlantic Command,

                                                  August 27, 1999.
     Hon. William S. Cohen,
     Secretary of Defense, 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Secretary, I can appreciate the difficulty of 
     adjudicating the competing desires of groups for the use of 
     Vieques Island. It is important to me to be clear . . . 
     Vieques training area is not just nice to have . . . it is 
     part of the complex training regime that allows us to send 
     our men and women into harms way with a clear conscience. As 
     I mentioned to you in my July Quarterly Issues and Activities 
     Report, the moratorium on this live fire training will have 
     an impact on the readiness of military forces assigned to 
     U.S. Atlantic Command and on the quality of the joint forces 
     that I provide worldwide to the other CINCs.
       Continued access to the Vieques training area, because of 
     its geographic location and access to base support, provides 
     us with a unique ability to conduct year-round integrated 
     live fire training. The island is one of the few locations in 
     the world where carrier battle groups can conduct high volume 
     ordinance training, from ``magazine to target.'' It is the 
     only East Coast facility that offers a live fire land target 
     complex with unencumbered access to airspace and deep-water 
     sea space. Shifting portions of this training to other 
     locations would degrade the quality of training while 
     increasing the OPTEMPO for our East Coast forces.
       I firmly believe that we have a critical need for this live 
     fire and combined arms training to fulfill my responsibility 
     of providing trained and ready joint forces worldwide. Part 
     of the equation in this complex case must be, I believe, a 
     requirement to identify a suitable alternative before we 
     restrict this realistic training in any way.
       I support the effort to retain the Vieques training area 
     and to continue this mission essential training. Combined and 
     integrated live fire training on the island is a valid joint 
     warfighting requirement. I am willing to assist in any way 
     necessary to resolve this readiness issue.
           Very respecfully,
                                                 H.W. Gehman, Jr.,
     Admiral, U.S. Navy.
                                  ____

                                                  Central Command,


                             Office of the Commander in Chief,

                                       Macdill Air Force Base, FL.
     Gen. Henry H. Shelton, USA,
     Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9999 Defense Pentagon, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear General Shelton: As the issue of the Vieques Island 
     Training Range continues to be debated, I wanted to offer the 
     CENTCOM perspective. Live fire training at the Vieques 
     Training Range is vital to the readiness of naval forces 
     assigned to U.S. Central Command. As you know, the Vieques 
     training range is the only Atlantic Fleet live-fire range 
     where land, sea, and air forces can practice combat 
     operations. Although the range closure potentially affects 
     several warfighting areas, the most serious and immediate 
     degradation would occur in our ability to conduct precision 
     air to ground strike.
       If the Vieques Training Range does not re-open soon, we can 
     anticipate less effective air to ground weapons delivery 
     accuracy in the early stages of our newly deploying battle 
     groups. Vieques is the only U.S. range that can support the 
     kind of high altitude TACCAIR ordnance delivery that we 
     regularly employ in Operation Southern Watch. It is the only 
     Atlantic Fleet range with airspace and facilities that can 
     support full air to ground and Naval Surface Fire Support 
     (NSFS) training from planning, to execution, to debrief. This 
     training is an absolute necessity to prepare our ships, 
     aircraft, and aircrews for ongoing operations (Southern 
     Watch), short-notice contingencies or MTW operations.
       Although we have not recently seen the use of naval gunfire 
     in surface engagements or in support of forces ashore, it is 
     a capability our ships do and should routinely exercise. 
     NAVCENT will experience the first effects of not having this 
     training when U.S.S. John Hancock in-chops on 18 October. The 
     degradation of this ship is not significant in terms of 
     present operations and can be partly mitigated by other 
     means, however this shortcoming will continue to grow and 
     will degrade our standard of readiness for combat operations.
       It is imperative that Atlantic Fleet ships and Navy and 
     Marine Corps aircraft have access to realistic training 
     ranges in support of their NSFS and air to ground 
     qualifications. Forces deployed to the CENTCOM AOR have faced 
     the very real potential for combat operations everyday. These 
     forces must be prepared to fight and win upon arrival in 
     theater. The Commander, Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic, and 
     Commander, Second Fleet have always provided me, and other 
     Unified Commanders, with battle ready forces essential to the 
     successful execution of our mission. Short of development of 
     a fully functional alternative range or training process, we 
     must reopen Vieques and allow our forces to receive this 
     critical training prior to facing real world operations and 
     contingencies in our theater.
           Respecfully,
                                                       A.C. Zinni,
     General, U.S. Marine Corps.
                                  ____

     Gen. Henry H. Shelton,
     Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon, Washington, 
         DC.
                                                  August 23, 1999.
       Dear General Shelton, I have followed with interest and 
     concern recent events in Vieques and Puerto Rico and their 
     potential impacts on Southern Command and fleet readiness. 
     This controversy has come at a crucial time for SOUTHCOM as 
     our components depart Panama and activate their new 
     Headquarters on Puerto Rico. Fortunately, up to this point 
     unit relocations and Vieques ranges have been treated as 
     separate issues on the island and by the press here in Miami 
     which has considerable influence in San Juan.
       By virtue of past assignments, I am familiar with the 
     importance of Vieques to Fleet and Fleet Marine Force 
     readiness. Working through contacts on Puerto Rico, I have 
     tried to assist the Navy by creating increased awareness of 
     the unique and vitally important nature of the training that 
     is conducted on Vieques. While doing so, I have emphasized 
     the creative steps the Navy has taken or is considering to 
     ensure the health and safety of Vieques residents and to 
     promote the economic development of the island. 
     Unfortunately, I have yet to receive an encouraging response 
     from even our most consistent and energetic supporters. I 
     have also followed closely efforts to identify alternative 
     training sites to Vieques Island. Thus far, no suitable 
     alternative has surfaced.
       Though Southern Command has a minimal stake in the training 
     that is conducted on Vieques, I am compelled to voice my 
     support for the Navy/Marine Corps cause. I have followed 
     closely efforts to identify alternative training sites to 
     Vieques Island. Due to a variety of hydrographic, geographic 
     and other considerations these efforts have not yet borne 
     fruit.
       Whether the solution is Vieques or some other site in the 
     SOUTHCOM AOR, I am prepared to assist in any way that I can 
     as we strive to ensure that our forward-deployed forces 
     maintain their combat edge.
           Very respectfully,

                                                 C.E. Wilhelm,

                            General, U.S.M.C., Commander in Chief,
     U.S. Southern Command.
                                  ____

                                               Commander in Chief,


                                        U.S. European Command,

                                                  August 16, 1999.
     Gen. Henry H. Shelton.
     Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon, Washington, 
         DC.
       Dear General Shelton: Wanted to take this opportunity to 
     address an issue of importance to the readiness on naval 
     forces assigned to the European command--live fire training 
     at Vieques Island, Puerto Rico.
       Concerned that with the current moratorium on training at 
     Vieques, the naval forces that will be assigned to EUCOM in 
     the future may not be fully combat ready to perform their 
     assigned missions. As you know, during the recent conflict in 
     the Balkans the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt battlegroup arrived 
     on station, and within hours of arrival was conducting 
     sustained combat operations. The level of precision and low 
     collateral damage achieved by naval forces during the Kosovo 
     conflict was possible primarily due to the realistic live 
     fire strike warfare training the carrier battlegroup 
     completed at Vieques just before their deployment.
       Similarly, the 26th MEU assigned to the U.S.S. Kearsarge 
     Amphibiouis Ready Group also performed flawlessly during the 
     Kosovo conflict. Although Marines were not committed ashore 
     in an opposed battlefield environment, our Marines were fully 
     prepared to

[[Page 21992]]

     conduct force entry operations if the situation would have 
     required an amphibious capability under combat conditions. 
     Clearly, the coordinated and integrated operational training 
     that they received in a live fire environment at Vieques was 
     instrumental in preparing our Marines for Kosovo and the 
     combat conditions they encountered as they entered 
     Yugoslavia. Remain deeply appreciative of the efforts of 
     Commander, Second Fleet and Commander, Marine Forces Atlantic 
     to provide me, and the other Unified Commanders with the most 
     battle ready force possible, one that is combat ready and can 
     win on the sea, in the air, and on the ground.
       Firmly believe that there is an enduring need for live fire 
     training. We fight like we train, and a great measure of the 
     success our forces achieved in Kosovo can be directly 
     attributed to the realistic training environments in which 
     they prepared for combat. The live fire training that our 
     forces were exposed to at training ranges such as Vieques 
     helped ensure the forces assigned to this theater were 
     ``ready on arrival'' and prepared to fight, win, and survive. 
     To provide our Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen with 
     less than this optimum training in the future would be 
     unconscionable, cause undue casualties, and place our 
     nation's vital interests at risk.
       Realistic training under live fire conditions is a 
     necessity to ensure our men and women are afforded every 
     possible advantage over their potential adversaries.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Wesley K. Clark,
                                                     General, USA.

  Mr. THOMAS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming.
  Mr. THOMAS. Has the Senator from Virginia concluded his comments?
  Mr. WARNER. Correct.
  Mr. THOMAS. I yield to the Senator from New Hampshire as much time as 
he needs.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized.
  Mr. GREGG. I thank the Senator from Wyoming for his courtesy in 
yielding to me.

                          ____________________