[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 15]
[Senate]
[Pages 20824-20826]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



 SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 55--ESTABLISHING OBJECTIVES FOR THE NEXT 
                ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

  Mr. BAUCUS submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was 
referred to the Committee on Finance:

                            S. Con. Res. 55

       Whereas obtaining open, equitable, and reciprocal market 
     access will benefit both the United States and its trading 
     partners;
       Whereas eliminating or reducing trade barriers and trade 
     distorting practices will enhance export opportunities for 
     American industry, agricultural products, and services;
       Whereas strengthening international disciplines on 
     restrictive or trade-distorting import and export practices 
     will improve the global commercial environment;
       Whereas preserving existing rules that prohibit unfair 
     trade practices is a necessary adjunct to promoting commerce;
       Whereas expanding trade will foster economic growth 
     required for full employment in the United States and the 
     global economy;
       Whereas growth in international trade has immediate and 
     significant consequences for sound natural resource use and 
     environmental protection, and for the practice of sustainable 
     development;
       Whereas the World Trade Organization is the single most 
     important mechanism by which global commerce is regulated; 
     and
       Whereas the United States will host the World Trade 
     Organization Ministerial Meeting in Seattle in November 1999: 
     Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 
     concurring),

     SECTION 1. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       It is the sense of Congress that the executive branch of 
     the Government should pursue the objectives described in this 
     concurrent resolution in any negotiations undertaken with 
     respect to the next round of multilateral trade negotiations 
     at the World Trade Organization Ministerial Meeting in 
     Seattle, Washington.

     SEC. 2. AGRICULTURE.

       The negotiating objectives of the United States with 
     respect to agriculture should be the following:
       (1) To eliminate all current and prohibit all future price 
     subsidies and export taxes.
       (2) To negotiate stronger disciplines on state-owned 
     trading enterprises, including cross-subsidization, reserved 
     market share, and price undercutting.
       (3) With respect to tariffs, to pursue zero-for-zero or 
     harmonization agreements for products where current tariff 
     levels are so disparate that proportional reductions would 
     yield an unbalanced result.
       (4) To target peak tariffs for reduction on a specific 
     timetable.
       (5) To eliminate all tariffs that are less than 5 percent.
       (6) To negotiate an agreement that binds all tariffs at 
     zero wherever possible.
       (7) To phase out all tariff rate quotas.
       (8) To eliminate all market-distorting domestic subsidies.
       (9) To eliminate technology-based discrimination of 
     agricultural commodities.
       (10) To negotiate agriculture and nonagriculture issues as 
     a single undertaking, with full implementation of any early 
     agreement contingent on an acceptable final package.
       (11) To reach agreements to eliminate unilateral 
     agricultural sanctions as a tool of foreign policy.

     SEC. 3. SERVICES.

       The negotiating objectives of the United States with 
     respect to services should be the following:
       (1) To achieve binding commitments on market access and 
     national treatment.
       (2) To achieve broad participation from all World Trade 
     Organization members in the negotiation of any agreement.
       (3) To proceed on a ``negative list'' basis so that all 
     services will be covered unless specifically listed.
       (4) To prevent discrimination based on the mode of 
     delivery, including electronic delivery.
       (5) To negotiate disciplines on transparency and 
     responsiveness of domestic regulations of services.

     SEC. 4. INDUSTRIAL MARKET ACCESS.

       The negotiating objectives of the United States with 
     respect to industrial market access should be the following:
       (1) To pursue zero-for-zero or harmonization agreements for 
     products where current tariff levels are so disparate that 
     proportional reductions would yield an unbalanced result.

[[Page 20825]]

       (2) To target peak tariffs for reduction on a specific 
     timetable.
       (3) To eliminate all tariffs that are less than 5 percent.
       (4) To negotiate agreements that bind tariffs at zero 
     wherever possible.
       (5) To achieve broad participation in all harmonization 
     efforts.
       (6) To expand the Information Technology Agreement product 
     coverage and participation.
       (7) To make duty-free treatment of electronic transmissions 
     permanent.
       (8) To negotiate short timetables for accelerated tariff 
     elimination in sectors identified in prior international 
     trade meetings, particularly in environmental goods.

     SEC. 5. OTHER TRADE-RELATED ISSUES.

       The negotiating objectives of the United States with 
     respect to other trade-related issues should be the 
     following:
       (1) To achieve broad participation in Mutual Recognition 
     Agreements (MRA's) on product standards, conformity 
     assessment, and certification procedures.
       (2) To expand the scope of the Government Procurement 
     Agreement and make it part of the World Trade Organization 
     undertaking.
       (3) To strengthen protection of intellectual property, 
     including patents, trademarks, trade secrets, and industrial 
     layout.
       (4) To complete the harmonization of rules of origin.
       (5) To strengthen prohibitions against mandatory technology 
     transfer under the Trade-Related Investment Measures 
     Agreement.
       (6) To broaden agreements on customs-related issues to 
     facilitate the rapid movement of goods.
       (7) To make permanent and binding the moratorium on tariffs 
     on electronic transmissions.
       (8) To establish a consensus that electronic commerce is 
     neither exclusively a good nor exclusively a service, and 
     develop rules for transparency, notification, and review of 
     domestic regulations.
       (9) To reach a global agreement on liberal treatment of 
     digital products in a technologically neutral manner.
       (10) To negotiate an agreement for determining when 
     multilateral environmental agreements are consistent with the 
     principles of the World Trade Organization.
       (11) To undertake early review of potential environmental 
     impacts of all global agreements with a view toward 
     mitigating any adverse effects.
       (12) To reach agreement that goods and services produced by 
     forced, prison, or child labor are not protected by 
     international trade rules.
       (13) To establish a mechanism for joint research and 
     between the World Trade Organization and the International 
     Labor Organization (ILO).
       (14) To institute explicit procedures for inclusion of core 
     labor standards in the country reports of the World Trade 
     Organization Trade Policy Review Mechanism.

     SEC. 6. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES.

       The negotiating objectives of the United States with 
     respect to World Trade Organization institutional issues 
     should be the following:
       (1) To reach agreement not to implement any new trade 
     restrictive measures during the 3-year negotiating period 
     beginning with the Seattle Ministerial Meeting.
       (2) To broaden membership in the World Trade Organization 
     by accelerating accessions.
       (3) To shorten the timeframes of dispute resolution.
       (4) To increase transparency, citizen access, and 
     responsiveness to submissions from nongovernmental 
     organizations.
       (5) To strengthen disciplines governing the coverage and 
     implementation of free trade agreements.
       (6) To reach an agreement to cooperate with the 
     International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for 
     Reconstruction and Development, United Nations organizations, 
     and international economic institutions in trade-related 
     policy matters.

     SEC. 7. ISSUES NOT OPEN TO NEGOTIATION.

       In all negotiations, the United States Trade Representative 
     should ensure that the negotiations do not weaken existing 
     agreements or create opportunities for the imposition of new 
     barriers in the following areas:
       (1) Dumping and antidumping.
       (2) Competition policy.
       (3) Investment.
       (4) Textiles and apparel.

     SEC. 8. TRANSMITTAL OF RESOLUTION.

       The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of this 
     concurrent resolution to the President.

  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I send a concurrent resolution 
establishing U.S. goals for the next round of global negotiations in 
the World Trade Organization to the desk.
  In 1994, seven hard years of talks culminated the Uruguay Round 
Agreement creating the WTO. The United States can point with pride to 
the results of American leadership on trade. Among the agreement's 
notable results were beginning new countries into the rule-based trade 
regime; establishing an institution for ongoing trade talks and dispute 
resolution; and addressing some key issues for the first time.
  The 1994 WTO agreement left unfinished business in two of these key 
issues: agriculture and services. WTO members committed to return to 
the table in January 2000 to address barriers in these sectors, the so-
called ``built-in agenda.'' It will be a major challenge. Trade-
distorting domestic agricultural programs are politically sensitive, 
especially in the European Union, the world's biggest offender in this 
area. In services, efforts to open up trade run into difficult 
questions of domestic regulation and investment.
  Over the past several months, Mr. President, WTO members have 
submitted proposals for dealing with agriculture, services, and many 
other issues in a new global round of negotiations, to be launched in 
Seattle this November when the United States hosts the third WTO 
Ministerial Meeting. I have read some of these proposals, including the 
proposals submitted by the Administration, and I have compared them two 
what I hear from various groups around the country.
  I have concluded that the U.S. proposals are timid and lack 
specificity. I am very concerned about this. We can't build a strong 
global economy without a strong set of trade rules. We can't address 
emerging issues such as biotechnology and electronic commerce, areas 
where the United States has a commanding lead, unless we supply a 
concrete vision of the future. We won't reach our goals unless we can 
state our goals clearly. We need a clear set of goals for this round of 
trade talks. The American people expect us to show leadership in this 
area. Our trading partners expect America to show leadership, too.
  We in the Congress have a constitutional responsibility in this 
regard. The resolution I am submitting today fulfills our obligation by 
giving the Executive Branch specific goals for the upcoming round of 
negotiations.
  Mr. President, I would like to summarize briefly the main points of 
this resolution. It deals not only with agriculture and services, but 
also with manufactured products, institutional concerns, and a variety 
of other trade-related issues.


                              agriculture

  America's farmers compete very effectively when world markets are not 
distorted by government intervention. Eliminating these distortions is 
not only good for the farm community, it will benefit U.S. consumers 
and our trading partners. It will stimulate demand for agricultural 
output, demand which American farmers are prepared to satisfy. My 
resolution instructs the Administration to seek elimination of export 
subsidies and trade-distorting domestic subsidies, to seek substantial 
tariff reductions, and for the first time to impose discipline on State 
Trading Enterprises.


                                Services

  Services comprise almost three quarters of American output. We are a 
net exporter of services, so increased trade in services will have a 
positive effect on our current account balance. My resolution instructs 
the Administration to reach a global agreement that trade in services 
is free and open unless otherwise specified. The current system is that 
trade in services is closed unless otherwise specified. Starting from 
this principal of openness, the Administration should seek board 
participation in an agreement on services trade.,


                            Industrial Goods

  To establish a negotiating dynamic broad enough to allow for trade-
offs, it is vital that the WTO talks include manufactured products. In 
this regard, there has been some confusion as to the U.S. strategy. The 
work begun in APEC to cut tarffs in nine sectors has moved into the 
WTO. The agriculture community feared that an early agreement to cut 
tariffs on manufactured products would rob the overall negotiation of 
the required breadth of issues. My resolution makes clear that this 
negotiation should be viewed as a single undertaking to be completed in 
three years. This does not mean that

[[Page 20826]]

we can have no results on tariffs at the Senate WTO Ministerial. But 
completing accelerated tariff elimination should be contingent on 
successfully concluding the entire package, including agriculture and 
services.


                          Institutional Issues

  We now have almost five years of experience with the operation of the 
Uruguay Round agreement and the WTO. That experience has uncovered some 
areas for improvement. Chief among these is the need for greater 
transparency in WTO operations. In the state of Montana, we have a 
strong tradition of open government which serves us well. The WTO is a 
governmental body. The citizens of the nations which compose the WTO 
have a right to know what it is doing. We also need to speed up the WTO 
system for resolving trade disputes.


                       Issues Not for Negotiating

  There are several issues which the Administration should not include 
in the overall negotiation. In some cases, including them would most 
likely weaken the results we obtained in the Uruguay Round. In other 
case, I do not believe that a global negotiation would benefit the 
United States. Issues such as textiles and apparel, antidumping rules, 
competition policy, and investment should not be part of the next round 
of negotiations.


               Other Trade Issues: Environment and Labor

  Finally, Mr. President, my resolution lists a number of specific 
trade issues which the Administration should address in the next round 
of trade negotiations. These include questions such as government 
procurement and electronic commerce. Let me mention two particular 
matters which are especially important: the environment and labor.
  My resolution instructs the Administration to make specific progress 
in both of these areas. On the environment, it requires an 
environmental assessment of any new global trade agreement, and a WTO 
consensus on determining when multilateral environmental agreements are 
consistent with international trade rules. It also requires tariff 
reductions on environmental products in order to increase the flow of 
environmental technology.
  As to labor, my resolution requires the Administration to correct a 
deficiency which has existed in trade law since the United States 
signed the GATT in 1947: it does not allow countries to treat products 
made with forced labor or child labor differently. We should all have 
the right to prohibit such goods from entering our countries. It also 
calls for joint research between the WTO and the International Labor 
Organization, and for a regular examination of how WTO members are 
living up to their 1996 commitment on core labor standards. Rhetoric is 
not a substitute for action.


                     Goal: Improve Quality of Life

  Let me close, Mr. President, with a word about why this is important 
to all of us. Since the end of World War Two, we have come a long way 
in shaping the world economy. When the GATT was signed in 1947, the 
world was engaged in a bitter debate over fundamental values. The 
central question was whether national economies should be organized by 
market forces and open societies or by central government planners. 
Which is better: democracy or communism? The world now knows the answer 
to this question with absolutely no ambiguity. Today, anyone who thinks 
that central planning wins over market forces need only compare Seoul 
to Pyongyang.
  In the past decade, the former Soviet bloc national have struggled to 
turn from central planning to market forces and citizen participation. 
Developing countries abandoned bankrupt nations like ``import 
substitution'' in favor of market-based solutions. OECD countries 
deregulated and dismantled trade barriers. New technology, especially 
information technology, provided the means to take advantage of newly 
opened markets. Goods and capital move with amazing speed.
  Open markets make the global economy more efficient. But there's a 
distinction between efficiency and equity. Open markets do not make 
prosperity more fair. Many citizens believe it is not fair enough. They 
see widening income gaps, job insecurity, environmental damage, a less 
certain future.
  The next round of global trade talks can't make opening markets an 
end in itself. We no longer have to convince the world that our 
economic system is more efficient. The task now is to show that our 
system also improves the quality of their lives. We need to show that 
our system delivers benefits to them. It has to make them better off. 
If we fail to do that, we will face a world polarized by poverty as it 
was once polarized by cold war ideology.

                          ____________________