[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 14]
[Senate]
[Pages 19991-19992]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



  SENATE RESOLUTION 175--EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING 
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, IN 
 LIGHT OF THE ALLIANCE'S APRIL 1999 WASHINGTON SUMMIT AND THE CONFLICT 
                               IN KOSOVO

  Mr. ROTH (for himself and Mr. Lugar) submitted the following 
resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

                              S. Res. 175

       Whereas NATO, the only military alliance with both real 
     defense capabilities and a transatlantic membership, has 
     successfully defended the territory and interests of its 
     members over the last 50 years, prevailed in the Cold War, 
     and continues to make a vital contribution to the promotion 
     and protection of freedom, democracy, stability, and peace 
     throughout Europe;
       Whereas NATO enhances the security of the United States by 
     embedding European states in a process of cooperative 
     security planning, by preventing the destabilizing 
     renationalization of European military policies, and by 
     ensuring an ongoing and direct leadership role for the United 
     States in European security affairs;
       Whereas the March 12, 1999, accession of Poland, the Czech 
     Republic, and Hungary to NATO has strengthened the Alliance, 
     and is an important step toward a Europe that is truly whole, 
     undivided, free, and at peace;
       Whereas extending NATO membership to other qualified 
     European democracies will also strengthen NATO, enhance 
     security and stability, deter potential aggressors, and 
     thereby advance the interests of the United States and its 
     NATO allies;
       Whereas the enlargement of NATO, a defensive alliance, 
     threatens no nation and reinforces peace and stability in 
     Europe, and provides benefits to all nations;
       Whereas article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that 
     ``any other European state in a position to further the 
     principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security 
     of the North Atlantic area'' is eligible to be granted NATO 
     membership;
       Whereas Congress has repeatedly endorsed the enlargement of 
     NATO with bipartisan majorities;
       Whereas the selection of new members should depend on 
     NATO's strategic interests, potential threats to security and 
     stability, and actions taken by prospective members to 
     complete the transition to democracy and to harmonize 
     policies with the political, economic, and military 
     guidelines established by the 1995 NATO Study on Enlargement;
       Whereas the members of NATO face new threats, including 
     conflict in Europe stemming from historic, ethnic, and 
     religious enmities, the potential for the reemergence of a 
     hegemonic power confronting Europe, rogue states and nonstate 
     actors possessing weapons of mass destruction, and threats to 
     the wider interests of the NATO members (including the 
     disruption of the flow of vital resources);
       Whereas NATO military force structure, defense planning, 
     command structures, and force goals must be sufficient for 
     the collective self-defense of its members, but also capable 
     of projecting power when the security of a NATO member is 
     threatened, and provide a basis for ad hoc coalitions of 
     willing partners among NATO members;
       Whereas this will require that NATO members possess 
     national military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over 
     long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of 
     time, and operate jointly with the United States in high-
     intensity conflicts;
       Whereas NATO's military operations against the Federal 
     Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in 1999 
     highlighted the glaring short-comings of European allies in 
     command, control, communication, and intelligence resources; 
     combat aircraft; and munitions, particularly precision-guided 
     munitions; and the overall imbalance between United States 
     and European defense capabilities;
       Whereas this imbalance in United States and European 
     defense capabilities undercuts the Alliance's goal of 
     equitable transatlantic burden-sharing;
       Whereas NATO is the only institution that promotes a 
     uniquely transatlantic perspective and approach to issues 
     concerning the interests and security of North America and 
     Europe;
       Whereas NATO has undertaken great effort to facilitate the 
     emergence of a European Security and Defense Identity within 
     the Alliance, including the identification of NATO's Deputy 
     Supreme Allied Commander as the commander of operations led 
     by the Western European Union (WEU); the creation of a NATO 
     Headquarters for WEU-led operations; the establishment of 
     close linkages between NATO and the WEU, including planning, 
     exercises, and regular consultations; and a framework for the 
     release and return of Alliance assets and capabilities;
       Whereas on June 3, 1999, the European Union, in the course 
     of its Cologne Summit, agreed to absorb the functions and 
     structures of the Western European Union, including its 
     command structures and military forces, and established 
     within it the post of High Representative for Common Foreign 
     and Security Policy;
       Whereas the member States of the European Union at the 
     Cologne Summit pledged to reinforce their capabilities in 
     intelligence, strategic transport, and command and control; 
     and
       Whereas the European Union's decisions at its June 3, 1999 
     Cologne summit indicate a new determination of European 
     states to develop a European Security and Defense Identity 
     featuring strengthened defense capabilities to address 
     regional conflicts and crisis management: Now, therefore, be 
     it
       Resolved,

     SECTION 1. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD NATO.

       (a) Sense of the Senate.--The Senate--
       (1) regards the political independence and territorial 
     integrity of the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern 
     Europe as vital to European peace and security and, thus, to 
     the interests of the United States;
       (2) endorses the commitment of the North Atlantic Council 
     that NATO will remain open to the accession of further 
     members in accordance with Article 10 of the North Atlantic 
     Treaty;
       (3) endorses the Alliance's decision to implement the 
     Membership Action Plan as a means to further enhance the 
     readiness of those European democracies seeking NATO 
     membership to bear the responsibilities and burdens of 
     membership;
       (4) believes all NATO members should commit to improving 
     their respective defense capabilities so that NATO can 
     project power decisively within and outside NATO borders in a 
     manner that achieves transatlantic parity in power projection 
     capabilities and facilitates equitable burdensharing among 
     NATO members; and
       (5) endorses NATO's decision to launch the Defense 
     Capabilities Initiative, intended to improve the defense 
     capabilities of the European Allies, particularly the 
     deployability, mobility, sustainability, and interoperability 
     of these European forces.
       (b) Further Sense of the Senate.--It is further the sense 
     of the Senate that--
       (1) the North Atlantic Council should pace, not pause, the 
     process of NATO enlargement by extending an invitation of 
     membership to those states able to meet the guidelines 
     established by the 1995 NATO Study on Enlargement and should 
     do so on a country-by-country basis;
       (2) the North Atlantic Council in the course of its 
     December 1999 Ministerial meeting should initiate a formal 
     review of all pending applications for NATO membership in 
     order to establish the degree to which such applications 
     conform to the guidelines for membership established by the 
     1995 NATO Study on Enlargement;
       (3) the results of this formal review should be presented 
     to the membership of the North

[[Page 19992]]

     Atlantic Council in May 2000 with recommendations concerning 
     enlargement;
       (4) NATO should assess potential applicants for NATO 
     membership on a continual basis;
       (5) the President, the Secretary of State, and the 
     Secretary of Defense should fully use their offices to 
     encourage the NATO allies of the United States to commit the 
     resources necessary to upgrade their capabilities to rapidly 
     deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for 
     extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United 
     States in high-intensity conflicts, thus making them 
     effective partners of the United States in supporting mutual 
     interests;
       (6) improved European military capabilities, not new 
     institutions, are the key to a vibrant and more influential 
     European Security and Defense Identity within NATO;
       (7) NATO should be the primary institution through which 
     European and North American allies address security issues of 
     transatlantic concern;
       (8) the European Union must implement its Cologne Summit 
     decisions concerning its Common Foreign and Security Policy 
     in a manner that will ensure that non-WEU NATO allies, 
     including Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, 
     Iceland, Norway, Poland, Turkey, and the United States, will 
     not be discriminated against, but will be fully involved when 
     the European Union addresses issues affecting their security 
     interests;
       (9) the European Union's implementation of the Cologne 
     summit decisions should not promote a strategic perspective 
     on transatlantic security issues that conflicts with that 
     promoted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
       (10) the European Union's implementation of its Cologne 
     summit decisions should not promote unnecessary duplication 
     of the resources and capabilities provided by NATO; and
       (11) the European Union's implementation of its Cologne 
     summit decisions should not promote a decline in the military 
     resources that European allies contribute to NATO, but should 
     instead promote the complete fulfillment of their respective 
     force commitments to the Alliance.

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