[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 14]
[Senate]
[Pages 19398-19399]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                   TIME TO SUPPORT CTBT RATIFICATION

  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise to urge Senate consideration of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, CTBT. As Ranking Member of the 
Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, 
Proliferation and Federal Services, I believe that ratification of the 
CTBT would enhance our nation's security for several reasons.
  It imposes a verifiable ban on all nuclear weapons testing, conducted 
anywhere, at any time; it takes a pro-active step towards ending the 
threat of nuclear tests conducted by rogue nations attempting to 
develop nuclear weapons; and it demonstrates the United States' 
commitment to a safer and more secure future free from radioactive 
fallout produced by nuclear explosions. Implementing the CTBT does not 
preclude improving our nuclear weapons. The United States will be able 
to maintain a sophisticated and viable arsenal without conducting 
dangerous nuclear tests.
  In the last decade, the most frequently cited argument against a test 
ban has been the claim that continued testing is necessary to ensure 
that stockpiled weapons are reliable; that is, they will detonate as 
planned and that the yield and effects will meet design specifications. 
Even test ban critics acknowledge that reliability stockpile testing 
has been mainly nonnuclear.
  In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Robert 
Baker, former Deputy Assistant Director for Verification and 
Intelligence at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ACDA, said, 
``[they] do not routinely go out and take nuclear weapons out of the 
stockpile and test them.'' Other weapons designers have testified that 
nuclear tests simulations on high-performance computers are adequate 
substitutes for nuclear explosions and can provide accurate data on 
warhead viability.
  The purpose of testing existing weapons has not been to detect 
unforeseen problems but rather to check on particular problems 
identified through the non-nuclear inspection and simulation program. 
With very rare exceptions, the tested weapons performed in the desired 
manner. In fact, only one stockpile confidence test performed between 
1979 and 1986 revealed a problem needing correction. The reason that 
any nuclear reliability testing of stockpiled weapons has been 
necessary in the past is that some older types of nuclear designs were 
originally put into the stockpile without the stringent production 
verification tests now standard. Our stockpile stewardship program 
enables the United States to meet the requirements for a treaty banning 
all types of nuclear testing while simultaneously maintaining a viable 
nuclear arsenal.

[[Page 19399]]

  This is not a new effort. It was not invented by the Clinton 
Administration. American presidents have sought for nearly forty years 
to negotiate a treaty that prohibits nuclear testing.
  President Eisenhower initially noted its importance in his State of 
the Union address in January of 1960 when he said that ``looking to a 
controlled ban on nuclear testing'' could be the means of ending the 
``calamitous cycle . . . which, if unchecked, could spiral into nuclear 
disaster.''
  President Kennedy later reaffirmed the United States' commitment to 
such a treaty in a 1963 commencement address at American University, 
stating that ``the conclusion of such a treaty [that ended nuclear 
testing] would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most 
dangerous areas. . . . [Furthermore,] it would increase our security 
[and] it would decrease the prospects of war.'' Today, this treaty has 
the strong support of members from both parties.
  If the Senate does not consent to the ratification of this treaty 
before the September 24, 1999, deadline, the United States will not be 
able to participate in decisions regarding the future of the treaty. 
Under the terms of Article XIV of the CTBT, a conference of the 
countries that have ratified can be convened on the third anniversary 
of the treaty's opening for signature to determine how to ``accelerate 
the ratification process in order to facilitate the [treaty's] early 
entry into force.'' Although both countries that have and have not 
ratified the treaty before the date of this conference may attend, the 
non-member countries of the treaty are only invited as observers and 
may not participate.
  The United States is one of the 44 named countries that is required 
to sign and ratify the treaty before it can ``enter into force''. If 
the United States does not ratify this treaty, we are preventing the 
CTBT's implementation. The United States must ratify this treaty so 
that it can continue its leadership role in arms control. We should not 
be the holdout country that threatens the CTBT's entry into force. By 
demonstrating our commitment to halting nuclear testing, the United 
States creates an environment that encourages other countries to ratify 
the treaty.
  The threat of rogue nations developing nuclear weapons is real and 
urgent. The July 1999 Deutch Commission's Report, entitled ``Combating 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,'' cites several examples: 
in the spring of 1998, India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, 
worsening instability on the subcontinent; during the recent crisis in 
Kashmir, a nuclear war in South Asia looked possible for the first 
time; and countries in the Middle East and East Asia attempted to 
acquire weapons of mass destruction. The CTBT prevents other nations 
who ratify it from conducting nuclear tests. It helps rein in rogue 
nations now and in the future that attempt to acquire and develop 
weapons of mass destruction.
  Finally, this is a treaty that the American people want. Recent polls 
show that 82 percent of Americans support ratification of the CTBT. 
They know that ending nuclear explosions is a better way to protect the 
United States against nuclear weapons threats.
  I urge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to hold hearings on the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty so that we may take action on this 
agreement before it is too late. We cannot allow the United States to 
be locked out of its rightful leadership role at the September review 
conference on this treaty. This treaty is the most effective step that 
we can take to enhance international security and to maintain nuclear 
safety.

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