[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 13]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 18139-18141]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



             DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2000

                                 ______
                                 

                               speech of

                           HON. JACK KINGSTON

                               of georgia

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, July 22, 1999

       The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of 
     the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2561) making 
     appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal 
     year ending September 30, 2000, and for other purposes:

  Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, the House Department of Defense 
Appropriations Bill for FY00 provides an extremely important allocation 
of resources in a serious effort to improve critical shortcomings 
affecting the readiness of our armed forces. This bill meets the budget 
authority and outlay limits set in the Committee's 302(b) allocation, 
provides a critical $15.5 billion increase over appropriations in FY99, 
and provides $2.8 billion above the President's request. This 
legislation goes a long way to address critical readiness, recruitment, 
retention, operational maintenance, and quality of life needs that are 
so important for our military. However, I am concerned about one aspect 
of the legislation's strategy, cutting

[[Page 18140]]

programmed funding for the initial production of the Air Force's number 
one development priority, the F-22, Raptor.
  We expect our military to remain the world's best, head and shoulders 
above any potential aggressor. We demand that our armed forces reign 
supreme in personnel, training, professionalism, and equipment. We do 
not want parity with our enemies, we demand superiority. We do not want 
to win conflicts by attrition but by overwhelming our foes. A most 
critical aspect of our superiority is our ability to achieve and 
maintain air superiority in any conflict. Furthermore, today Americans 
have grown to expect to win conflicts with minimal or even no 
casualties. The best trained pilots in the most advanced aircraft are 
the great enabler in any conflict whether to protect our Navy, or to 
allow the introduction and free maneuver of our ground forces. Air 
superiority is vital. Experience in modern warfare has continued to 
reflect the importance of this from success in World War II to 
operations during Desert Storm and Operation Allied Force.
  The F-22 aircraft is being produced to replace the F-15 fighter and 
to accomplish its air superiority mission beginning in 2005. The F-15 
currently represents 1960's technology and the aging fleet will average 
26 years old when the F-22 is scheduled to be operational. Today's F-
15's have served our country well, but in the future our pilots will be 
at risk. Its capabilities today are at parity with the Russian SU-27, 
MIG-29 and by 2005 will be at a disadvantage facing the Russian SU-35 
or the French Rafael, and the European Fighter 2000 aircraft that will 
be available on the world market. Additionally, the surface to air 
missile threat continues to advance world wide. Today the SA-10 and SA-
12 missile availability pose a threat to the F-15. Proliferation of SA-
10 and SA-12 capability has increased from four countries in 1985 to 
fourteen in 1995 and an estimated 22 by 2005. The F-22 will have the 
capability to counter the surface to air missile threat through stealth 
technology, supercruise capability that will significantly reduce 
missile engagement opportunity, maneuverability and unequaled pilot 
awareness.
  The F-22 aircraft does bear costs, $19 billion has been invested to 
date, but the cost and advanced technology provide significant 
efficiencies and long term savings. The F-22 will reduce by half the 
number of maintenance personnel for each aircraft. It is expected to 
have 30 percent reduction in direct operations and sustainment costs 
per squadron per year when compared to the F-15. A quicker combat 
turnaround time will allow higher sortie rates during a conflict. The 
F-22 program costs are under control and are within the Congressionally 
mandated cost caps for both development and production. This plane 
utilizes cutting edge technology to ensure our Air Force continues to 
maintain our nation's superiority in air combat.

  Based upon the status of the current F-22 program, a pause in funding 
the F-22 procurement requested for FY00 would put the entire program at 
serious risk. Contract obligations would be breached if aircraft 
procurement is not funded. This would result in at least a three year 
delay in the program, would increase costs by $6-8 billion, and exceed 
the caps set by Congress. The production delay could seriously affect 
numerous suppliers that could not afford to stop and restart production 
causing significant erosion of the program's industrial base. Such a 
pause would seriously disrupt an intricate supply system established in 
all but a few states.
  A pause or end of the F-22 program would have a very negative impact 
on the future of an important complementary aircraft, the Joint Strike 
Fighter (JSF). The JSF also under development is being designed as a 
multi-role aircraft for three services to replace the capabilities of 
the F-16 and A-10 fleet, with fielding goals in FY10. It is being 
developed to perform as an air-to ground combat aircraft to complement 
the air-to-air combat role of the F-22. The characteristics of these 
planes will differ greatly. If the F-22 program is killed, the U.S. 
will have a void in the capabilities required by the F-22, the action 
could cause great changes to JSF, or require development of a whole new 
kind of aircraft all of which would delay the fielding of the JSF. 
Additionally, the JSF leverages certain technologies from the F-22, 
including avionics and engines that use the F-22 as a stepping stone 
for advancements. Setback of the F-22 program will degrade progress on 
the JSF. Ultimately, this action could place our air supremacy 
capability in extreme danger.
  Finally, as the F-22 harnesses and employs superb, advanced 
technology, the development and testing of the aircraft does the same. 
Flight testing of two test aircraft has proceeded well. Avionics 
testing has been ongoing through three bench labs and one flying test 
bed, a 757 aircraft with all avionics including a full cockpit from an 
F-22. Advanced computer models have also enhanced the ability to hone 
the technical aspects of the plane. Nine aircraft are funded in the 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase of this program. 
All nine aircraft will be delivered by FY01. Production aircraft that 
have been requested by the Air Force to be funded in FY00 will not 
complete production until FY03. This low rate initial production is 
necessary to efficiently utilize the open delivery line. Testing will 
be 90% complete and initial operational testing and evaluation will 
complete in mid-year 2003. This program minimizes risks and employs 
efficiency and responsible costing to meet delivery milestones. When 
compared with previous aircraft production such as the F-15 and F-16, 
the F-22 minimizes, by a large degree, the number of production 
aircraft during the EMD phase.
  In closing, the House Department of Defense Appropriations Bill for 
FY00 is a good bill that will provide relief for many aspects of our 
services needs. It goes far to take care of the men and women who serve 
in America's Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. I will vote in 
favor of this legislation, but with apprehension that this bill does an 
injustice to the number one Air Force development priority and a 
critical Department of Defense program that has vital implications on 
how we remain the undisputed air superiority and air supremacy power in 
the world.

 Amendment to the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Appropriations Bill Offered 
                            by Mr. Kingston

       In the ``Aircraft Procurement, Air Force'' account 
     (beginning at page 29, line 11 of the committee print), 
     increase the pending amount by $630,297,000, representing an 
     increase of $1,852,075,000 in the F-22 aircraft program and a 
     decrease of $1,221,778,000 in other programs.
       In the ``Aircraft Procurement, Navy'' account (beginning at 
     page 25, line 3 of the committee print), reduce the pending 
     amount by $387,897,000.
       In the ``Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air 
     Force'' account (beginning at page 35, line 14 of the 
     committee print), reduce the pending amount by $242,400,000.
       And amend the committee report accordingly.


       
                                  ____
              Detailed Amendments for the Committee Report


           Change: Increase the following lines as specified

       Aircraft, Procurement, Air Force. (Report page 173).
     Tactical Forces (in thousands of dollars);
       F-22 Raptor: $1,574,981.
       F-22 Raptor (AP-CY): $277,094.
         Total: $1,852,075.


            Offsets: Reduce the following lines as specified

                         Title III Procurement

            Air Force Procurement (in thousands of dollars)

       Combat Aircraft (Report page 173).
     Tactical Forces:
       F-15: $440,000.
       F-16 C/D (MYP): $98.000.
       F-16 C/D (MYP) ADV PROC: $24,000.
     Mission Support Aircraft:
       Operational Support Aircraft: $63,000.
       E-8C: $188,200.
       Predator UAV: $20,000.
     Modification of Inservice Aircraft:
       B-1B: $16,650.
       A-10: $5,000.
       F-15: $58,328.
       F-16: $46,000.
       C-135: $137,800.
       DARP: $124,800.

                       Aircraft Procurement, Navy

       Other Aircraft (Report Page 148).
       KC-130J: $281,897.
     Modification of Aircraft:
       EA-6 Series: $66,000.
       AH-1 W Series: $3,000.
       H-1 Series: $10,000.
       EP-3 Series: $17,000.
       P-3 Series: $10,000.

          Title IV, Research, Development, Test and Evaluation

                    RDT&E, Air Force (Rpt page 248)

     Demonstration & Validation (In thousands of dollars):
       Joint Strike Fighter: $100,000.
     Engineering & Manufacturing Development (In thousands of 
         dollars):
       B-2 Advanced Technology Bomber: $142,400.


       
                                  ____
                          Why We Need the F-22


                                 Threat

       Need F-22 to counter future and current surface-to-air 
     missile (SA 10/12) threats. The F-15 cannot operate in this 
     environment by itself.
       21 countries expected to posses SA 10/12's (advanced SAMS) 
     by 2005.
       237 of world's 267 nations have surface to air missiles.
       There will be a five fold increase in the number of 
     countries with radar guided air to air missiles.

[[Page 18141]]

       As many as 700 MIG-21's may be upgraded between 1995 and 
     2000.
       F-15 began service in early 1970's (almost 25 years ago).
       When F-22 becomes operational in FY06, the F-15 will 
     average 26 years old.
       When JSF becomes operational in FY10, the F-16 will be 24 
     years old.
       30-40 year old F-15's put our pilots at risk.
       Today the F-15 is just at parity with the SU-27 and MIG-29.
       By 2005 the F-15 will be disadvantage to the SU-35 and the 
     export versions of the Rafale and European Fighter 2000.
       Air to air missiles are proliferating and becoming more 
     capable.


                       Impact of Slipping Program

       3 year delay in program, voids contracts, and kills 
     program.
       This is not a pause, it kills the production program.
       Increase in costs breaks the contract price and the 
     Congressional costs caps.
       Increases Air Force costs by $6.5 billion.
       Set back for Army's number one priority the Commanche 
     helicopter since they have some common systems).
       $16 billion already invested to date.
       Loss of industrial base to support F-22 program.
       Upgrading the F-15 would cost about $26 million per plane.


                                  F-22

       F-22 replaces the F-15 for all weather superiority and deep 
     attack.
       Increased capabilities: stealth, supercruise, 
     maneuverability, avionics, weapons playload.
       First look, first shot, first kill against multiple 
     targets.
       Flight tests have gone well.
       Cost are controlled, costs are within funding caps set by 
     Congress.
       The F-22 will reduce by half the number of maintenance 
     personnel for each aircraft.
       F-22 will cost $500 million less to operate and support 
     over 20 years than an F-15 squadron.
       F-15 afterburner operations are limited to 5-7 minutes, F-
     22 can operate at supercruise for a significant period of 
     time without afterburners.
       20% lower combat turnaround time for the F-22/higher 
     sorties rate.
       Lower deployment requirements (14 C-17s to deploy F-15 vs. 
     4C-17s for F-22).


                                  JSF

       JSF leverages technologies from the F-22 (avionics, 
     engines).
       JSF is a multi-role air to ground fighter to complement 
     (not replace) the air-to-air role of F-22.
       JSF replaces the F-16 and A-10 and meets requirements for 
     other military services.
       Without the F-22, the requirements for JSF change and will 
     delay JSF by several years.
       For more information contact Cong. Kingston (5-5831) or 
     Cong. Chambliss (5-6531).


     
                                  ____
                Point Paper on HAC-D to F-22 Procurement


                BACKGROUND--WHY THE USAF NEEDS THE F-22

                    The 21st Century Force Structure

       The Air Force's modernization strategy is built on the 
     proper mix of ``High'' capability F-22s and ``Low'' cost 
     Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) to achieve the dominant 
     capability and operations tempo to support Joint Vision 2010s 
     goal of full spectrum dominance.
       F-22 is the high-capability force enabler designed to 
     accomplish the most demanding missions of air superiority and 
     attack of high-value, highly defended targets.
       A combination of stealth, supercruise, integrated avionics, 
     and larger internal air-to- air weapons payload are its 
     primary attributes.
       The JSF is the low-cost majority of the force--balance of 
     affordability and capability allows procurement of greater 
     numbers to perform a variety of missions and sustain the 
     required high tempo of modern warfare.

             JSF Will Rely on the F-22 for Air Superiority

       JSF will modernize the largest part of our fleet providing 
     an affordable replacement for the F-16 and A-10.
       JSF is dependent upon F-22 technologies and will complement 
     the F-22 in the future as the F-16 complements the F-15 
     today.

                         The Need for the F-22

       Joint Vision 2010 requires the Air Force to achieve Air 
     Dominance--the ability to completely control adversary's 
     vertical battlespace.
       The current air superiority fighter, the F-15, is at parity 
     today with the SU-27 and MIG-29; by IOC for F-22 in 2005, the 
     F-15 will be at a disadvantage with the fielding of the SU-35 
     and export versions of the Rafale and Typhoon, and the 
     proliferation of advanced air-to-missiles such as the AA-11, 
     AA-X-12, and MICA.
       The development and proliferation of advanced surface-to-
     air missiles (SAMs) such as the SA-10 and SA-12 result in a 
     sanctuary for the enemy because the F-15 will be unable to 
     operate in this environment without a protracted, asset 
     intensive, defense suppression campaign.
       F--22's attributes of stealth, supercruise, and integrated 
     avionics will allow it to operate in the presence of the 
     total threat--emerging threat aircraft, advanced SAMs, and 
     advanced air-to-missiles.
       Provides American forces the freedom from attack, freedom 
     to maneuver and freedom to attack.

                            The Time is Now

       The current Air Force fighter modernization program is an 
     affordable and effective solution demanded by the increasing 
     age of our current fighter force structure.
       By F-22 IOC in 2005, the average age of the F-15 will be 26 
     years old.
       By JSF IOC in 2010, the average age of the F-16 will be 24 
     years old.
       F-22 is an essential investment to achieve air dominance--
     the key enabler for 21st Century Combat Operations.


 DISCUSSION--IMPACT OF THE HAC-D REDUCTION ON THE CURRENT F-22 PROGRAM

       The proposed reduction of the F-22 funding has a net impact 
     of terminating the current production program and increases 
     total Air Force costs by $6.5 Billion (does not include costs 
     for Service Life Extension of F-15 to accommodate 2 year slip 
     to F-22 Initial Operational Capability).

             Termination of the Current Production Program

       The current F-22 production strategy to procure all 339 
     aircraft within the Congressional Cost cap of $39.8B Key 
     elements of this strategy are: Fixed price options for the 
     PRTV and Lot 1; Target Price Curve (TPC) for Lots 2-5; and 
     Multi-year contracts for lots 5-12.
       Impact: Termination of the Lot 1 buy voids the fixed price 
     agreement for the PRTV/Lot 1 buy and contractually requires 
     termination of the PRTV aircraft buy. This in turn breaks the 
     TPC and results in a production cost increase over the 
     Congressional cost caps. A new production strategy initiated 
     in FY02 with an 8 aircraft buy (requires Advance Buy in FY01) 
     and a new production profile (8, 10, 16, 24, 36) results in a 
     production cost increase of $5.3B, which breaks the 
     Congressionally mandated production cost cap of $39.8B.

               Extension of the EMD Program by 15 Months

       The cancellation of the PRTV aircraft drives the 
     requirement to retrofit the EMD aircraft to a production 
     configuration for dedicated initial operational test and 
     evaluation, which would have been accomplished by the PRTVs.
       An additional $500M is required for EMD to fund for Out-of-
     Production parts associated with these aircraft due to the 
     lack of an active production program.
       Impact: With the EMD stretchout and above considerations 
     the total cost impact to the EMD program is $1.2B, which 
     breaks Congressionally mandated EMD cost cap of $18.8B.

              Delay to Initial Operating Capability (IOC)

       F-22 IOC is currently scheduled for December 2005, the 
     change to the production profile would delay IOC (stand up of 
     the first F-22 squadron) to Dec 2007.
       Delay in IOC would force the Air Force to execute an F-15 
     Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) on one Fighter Wing (72 
     aircraft).