[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 13]
[Senate]
[Pages 17839-17842]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



              RATIFYING THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, speaking of polls, which are what I stood 
up to speak about this morning, I would like to turn to the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the comprehensive test ban 
treaty that was signed nearly three years ago and submitted to the 
Senate nearly two years ago. The American people overwhelmingly support 
this treaty, yet it has not even seen the light of day here in the 
Senate.
  The Senate, as we all know, is uniquely mandated under the United 
States Constitution to give its ``advice and consent'' to the 
ratification of treaties that the United States enters into. In a 
dereliction of that duty, the Senate is not dealing with the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.
  Why is this occurring? In the view of my colleagues--including some 
Democrats who support the treaty--this treaty is not high on the agenda 
of the American people. There is very little political attraction in 
the issue. It is easy to keep this treaty from being brought up and 
discussed, because people who care about nuclear testing tend to assume 
that we already have a nuclear test-ban treaty in force.
  President Bush did the right thing in accepting a moratorium on any 
nuclear tests, but that is not a permanent test-ban. It does not bind 
anybody other than ourselves. It merely implements our own conclusion 
that we don't have to test nuclear weapons anymore in order to maintain 
our nuclear arsenal.
  Faced with this perception on the part of many of our colleagues, 
several of us encouraged supporters of the Test-Ban Treaty to go out 
and actually poll the American people. Frankly, we wanted real evidence 
to show to our colleagues--mostly our Republican colleagues--that the 
American public actually cares a lot about this issue.
  I am not going to keep my colleagues in suspense. A comprehensive 
poll was done. The bottom line is that the American people support this 
treaty by a margin of 82 percent to 14 percent. That is nearly 6 to 1.
  For nearly 2 years, we Democrats--and a few courageous Republicans 
like Senator Specter and Senator Jeffords--have tried to convince the 
Republican leadership that this body should move to debate and decide 
on this treaty. Let the Senate vote for ratification or vote against 
ratification. The latest poll results are a welcome reminder that the 
American people are with us on this important issue or, I might add, 
are way ahead of us.
  I know some of my colleagues have principled objections to this 
treaty. I respect their convictions even though I strongly believe they 
are wrong on this issue. What I cannot respect, however--and what my 
colleagues should not tolerate--is the refusal of the Republican 
leadership of this body to permit the Senate to perform its 
constitutional responsibility to debate and vote on ratification of 
this vital treaty. It is simply irresponsible, in my view, for the 
Republican leadership to hold this treaty hostage to other issues as if 
we were fighting over whether or not we were going to appoint someone 
Assistant Secretary of State in return for getting someone to become 
the deputy something-or-other in another Department. This treaty isn't 
petty politics; this issue affects the whole world.
  Some of my colleagues believe nuclear weapons tests are essential to 
preserve our nuclear deterrent. Both I and the directors of our three 
nuclear

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weapons laboratories disagree. The $45 billion--yes, I said billion 
dollars--Stockpile Stewardship Program--that is the name of the 
program--enables us to maintain the safety and reliability of our 
nuclear weapons without weapons tests.
  The fact is, the United States is in the best position of all the 
nuclear-weapons states to do without testing. We have already conducted 
over 1,000 nuclear tests. The Stockpile Stewardship Program harnesses 
the data from these 1,000 tests along with new high-energy physics 
experiments and the world's most advanced supercomputers to improve our 
understanding of how a nuclear explosion--and each part in a weapon--
works.
  In addition, each year our laboratories take apart and examine some 
nuclear weapons to see how well those parts work. The old data and new 
experiments enable our scientists to diagnose and fix problems on our 
existing nuclear weapons systems without full-scale weapons testing. 
This is already being done. By this means, our nuclear weapons 
laboratories are already maintaining the reliability of our nuclear 
stockpile without testing.
  Still, if nuclear weapons tests should be required in the future to 
maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent, then we will test. The 
administration has proposed, in fact, that we enact such safeguards as 
yearly review and certification of the nuclear deterrent and 
maintenance of the Nevada Test Site.
  The administration has also made clear that if, in the future, the 
national interest requires what the treaty binds us not to do, then the 
President of the United States will remain able to say: ``No. We are 
out of this treaty. It is no longer in our national interest. We are 
giving advanced notice. We are going to withdraw.''
  Thanks in part to those safeguards I mentioned earlier, officials 
with the practical responsibility of defending our national security 
support ratification of the test ban treaty. In addition to the nuclear 
lab directors, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has spoken in 
favor of ratification.
  Support for ratification is not limited, moreover, to the current 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The four previous Chairmen of 
the Joint Chiefs--also four-star generals--support ratification as 
well. Think of that. This treaty is supported by Gen. John 
Shalikashvili, Gen. Colin Powell, Adm. William Crowe, and Gen. David 
Jones, all former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs. Those gentleman have 
guided our military since the Reagan administration.
  Why would those with practical national security responsibilities 
support such a treaty? The answer is simple: For practical reasons.
  Since 1992, pursuant to U.S. law, the United States has not engaged 
in a nuclear weapons test. As I have explained, we have been able, 
through ``stockpile stewardship,'' to maintain our nuclear deterrent 
using improved science, state-of-the-art computations, and our library 
of past nuclear test results. Other countries were free to test until 
they signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Now they are bound, as 
we are, not to test. But that obligation will wither on the vine if we 
fail to ratify this test ban treaty.
  One traditional issue on arms control treaties is verification. We 
always ask whether someone can sign this treaty and then cheat and do 
these tests without us knowing about it. The Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty will improve U.S. monitoring capabilities, with the rest of the 
world picking up three-quarters of the cost. The treaty even provides 
for on-site inspection of suspected test sites, which we have never 
been able to obtain in the past.
  Some of my colleagues believe that our imperfect verification 
capabilities make ratification of the test ban treaty unwise. New or 
prospective nuclear weapons states can gain little, however, from any 
low-yield test we might be unable to detect. Even Russia could not use 
such tests to produce new classes of nuclear weapons.
  To put it another way, even with the enhanced regimen of monitoring 
and on-site inspection, it is possible that there could be a low-level 
nuclear test that would go undetected. But what all of the scientists 
and nuclear experts tell us is that even if that occurred, it would 
have to be at such a low level that it would not enable our principal 
nuclear adversaries and powers to do anything new in terms of their 
systems and it would not provide any new weapon state the ability to 
put together a sophisticated nuclear arsenal.
  For example, the case of China is particularly important. We have 
heard time and again on the floor of this Senate about the loss, 
beginning during the Reagan and Bush years, of nuclear secrets and the 
inability, or the unwillingness, or the laxity of the Clinton 
administration to quickly close down what appeared to be a leak of 
sensitive information to the Chinese. We lost it under Reagan and Bush, 
and the hole wasn't closed under the present administration, so the 
argument goes.
  We hear these doomsday scenarios of what that now means--that China 
has all of this technology available to do these new, terrible things. 
But guess what? If China can't test this new technology that they 
allegedly stole, then it is of much less value to them. They have 
signed the Test-Ban Treaty, and they are prepared to ratify it and 
renounce nuclear testing forever if we ratify that very same test-ban 
treaty.
  Here we have the preposterous notion--for all those, like Chicken 
Little, who are crying that the sky is falling--that the sky is falling 
and China is about to dominate us, but, by the way, we are not going to 
ratify the Test-Ban Treaty. What a foolish thing.
  The Cox committee--named for the conservative Republican Congressman 
from California who headed up the commission that investigated the 
espionage that allegedly took place regarding China stealing nuclear 
secrets from us--the Cox committee warned that China may have stolen 
nuclear codes. Congressman Cox explained, however, that a China bound 
by the Test-Ban Treaty is much less likely to be able to translate its 
espionage successes into usable weapons.
  As I noted, however, the Test-Ban Treaty will wither on the vine if 
we don't ratify it. Then China would be free to resume testing. If we 
fail to take the opportunity to bind China on this Test-Ban Treaty, 
that mistake will haunt us for generations and my granddaughters will 
pay a price for it.
  The need for speedy ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
is greater than ever before. In India and Pakistan, the world has 
watched with mounting concern over the past 2 months as those two self-
proclaimed nuclear-weapons states engaged in a conventional conflict 
that threatened to spiral out of control.
  Were nuclear weapons to be used in this densely populated area of the 
world, the result would be a horror unmatched in the annals of war. 
This breaches the postwar firebreak against nuclear war--which has 
stood for over 50 years--with incalculable consequences for the United 
States and the rest of the world.
  The India-Pakistan conflict may be back under control for now. 
President Clinton took an active interest in it, and that seems to have 
been important to the process in cooling it down. The threat of nuclear 
holocaust remains real, however, and it remains particularly real in 
that region of the world. We can help prevent such a calamity. India 
and Pakistan have promised not to forestall the Test-Ban Treaty's entry 
into force. They could even sign the treaty by this fall. The Test-Ban 
Treaty could freeze their nuclear weapons capabilities and make it 
harder for them to field nuclear warheads on their ballistic missiles.
  This will not happen unless we, the United States, accept the same 
legally binding obligation to refrain from nuclear weapons tests. Thus, 
we in the Senate have the power to influence India and Pakistan for 
good or for ill. God help us if we should make the wrong choice and 
lose the opportunity to bring India and Pakistan back from the brink.
  This body's action or lack of action may also have a critical impact 
upon worldwide nuclear nonproliferation. Next spring, the signatories 
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will hold a review conference. 
(The Nuclear

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Non-Proliferation Treaty is a different treaty; the treaty that we 
still must ratify bans nuclear weapons testing, while the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, which was ratified decades ago, bans the 
development of nuclear weapons by countries that do not already have 
them.) If the United States has not ratified the Test-Ban Treaty by the 
time of the review conference, nonnuclear-weapons states will note that 
we promised a test-ban treaty 5 years ago in return for the indefinite 
extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. What we will do if we don't 
ratify is risk undermining the nonproliferation resolve of the 
nonnuclear weapon states.
  Ask any Member in this Chamber--Democrat or Republican; conservative, 
liberal, or moderate--get them alone and ask them what is their single 
greatest fear for their children and their grandchildren. I defy any 
Member to find more than a handful who answer anything other than the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons in the hands of rogue states and 
terrorists. Everybody agrees with that.
  We have a nonproliferation treaty out there, and we have got 
countries who don't have nuclear weapons to sign, refraining from ever 
becoming a nuclear weapons state. But in return, we said we will 
refrain from testing nuclear weapons and increasing our nuclear 
arsenals.
  Now what are we going to do? If we don't sign that treaty, what do 
you think will happen when the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
signatories get together in the fall and say: ``OK, do we want to keep 
this commitment or not?'' If the United States says it is not going to 
promise not to test anymore, then China will say it will not promise 
not to test either. India and Pakistan will say they are not going to 
promise to refrain from testing. What do you think will happen in every 
country, from rogue countries such as Syria, all the way to countries 
in Africa and Latin America that have the capability to develop nuclear 
weapons? Do you think they will say: ``It is a good idea that we don't 
attempt ever to gain a nuclear capability, the other big countries are 
going to do it, but not us?'' I think this is crazy.
  Let me be clear. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty must not 
be treated as a political football. It is a matter of urgent necessity 
to our national security. If the Senate should fail to exercise its 
constitutional responsibility, the very future of nuclear 
nonproliferation could be at stake.
  Two months ago I spoke on the Senate floor about the need for 
bipartisanship, the need to reach out across the chasm, reach across 
that aisle. Today I reach out to the Republican leadership that denies 
the Senate--and the American people--a vote on the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty.
  I was joined on Sunday by the Washington Post, which spoke out in an 
editorial against what it termed ``hijacking the test ban.'' I will not 
repeat the editorial comments regarding my friend from North Carolina 
who chairs the committee. I do call to the attention of my colleagues, 
however, one salient question from that editorial:

       One wonders why his colleagues, of whatever party or test 
     ban persuasion, let him go on.

  I have great respect for my friend from North Carolina. He has a 
deep-seated philosophical disagreement with the Test-Ban Treaty, and I 
respect that. I respect the majority leader, Mr. Lott, who has an 
equally compelling rationale to be against the Test-Ban Treaty. I do 
not respect their unwillingness to let the whole Senate debate and vote 
on this in the cold light of day before the American people and all the 
world.
  A poll that was conducted last month will not surprise anybody who 
follows this issue. But it should serve as a reminder to my colleagues 
that the American people are not indifferent to what we do here.
  The results go beyond party lines. Fully 80 percent of Republicans--
and even 79 percent of conservative Republicans--say that they support 
the Test-Ban Treaty.
  And this is considered opinion. In May of last year, the people said 
that they knew some countries might try to cheat on the test-ban. But 
they still supported U.S. ratification, by a 73-16 margin. As already 
announced, today's poll results show even greater support than we had a 
year ago.
  Last year's polls also show a clear view on the public's part of how 
to deal with the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan. When asked how to 
respond to those tests, over 80 percent favored getting India and 
Pakistan into the Test-Ban Treaty and over 70 percent saw U.S. 
ratification as a useful response.
  By contrast, fewer than 40 percent wanted more spending on U.S. 
missile defense; and fewer than 25 percent wanted us to resume nuclear 
testing.
  The American people understood something that had escaped the 
attention of the Republican leadership: that the best response to India 
and Pakistan's nuclear tests is to rope them in to a test-ban, which 
requires doing the same for ourselves.
  The American people reach similar conclusions today regarding China's 
possible stealing of U.S. nuclear weapons secrets. When asked about its 
implications for the Test-Ban Treaty, 17 percent see this as rendering 
the Treaty irrelevant; but nearly three times as many--48 percent--see 
it as confirming the importance of the Treaty. Once again, the American 
people are ahead of the Republican leadership.
  The American people see the Test-Ban Treaty as a sensible response to 
world-wide nuclear threats. In a choice between the Treaty and a return 
to U.S. nuclear testing, 84 percent chose the Treaty. Only 11 percent 
would go back to U.S. testing.
  Last month's bipartisan poll--conducted jointly by the Melman Group 
and Wirthlin Worldwide--asked a thousand people ``which Senate 
candidate would you vote for: one who favored CTBT ratification, or one 
who opposed it?'' So as to be completely fair, they even told their 
respondents the arguments that are advanced against ratification.
  By a 2-to-1 margin, the American people said they would vote for the 
candidate who favors ratifying the Treaty. Even Republicans would vote 
for that candidate, by a 52-42 margin.
  Now, as a Democrat, I like those numbers. The fact remains, however, 
that both the national interest and the reputation of the United States 
Senate are on the line in this matter.
  The national security implications of the Comprehensive Test-Ban 
Treaty must be addressed in a responsible manner. There must be debate. 
There must be a vote.
  In sum, the Senate must do its duty--and do it soon--so that America 
can remain the world's leader on nuclear non-proliferation; so that we 
can help bring India and Pakistan away from the brink of nuclear 
disaster; and so that the United States Senate can perform its 
Constitutional duty in the manner that the Founders intended.
  Let me close with some words from a most esteemed former colleague, 
Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon, from a statement dated July 20. I ask 
unanimous consent that his statement be printed in the Record after my 
own statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. BIDEN. He began:

       The time has come for Senate action on the CTBT 
     ratification.

  Senator Hatfield adduces some excellent arguments in favor of 
ratification, which I commend to my colleagues. But I especially want 
recommend his conclusion, which summarizes our situation with elegant 
precision:

       It is clear to me that ratifying this Treaty would be in 
     the national interest. And it is equally clear that Senators 
     have a responsibility to the world, the nation and their 
     constituents to put partisan politics aside and allow the 
     Senate to consider this Treaty.

  Senators, that says it all.

                               Exhibit 1

       Statement By Senator mark O. Hatfield on CTBT Ratification

       The time has come for Senate action on CTBT ratification. 
     Political leaders the world over have recognized that the 
     proliferation of nuclear weapons poses the gravest threat to 
     global peace and stability, a threat that is likely to 
     continue well into the next century. Ratification of the 1996 
     Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by

[[Page 17842]]

     the United States and its early entry into force would 
     significantly reduce the chances of new states developing 
     advanced nuclear weapons and would strengthen the global 
     nuclear non-proliferation regime for the twenty-first 
     century. Just as the United States led the international 
     community nearly three years ago by being the first to sign 
     the CTB Treaty, which has now been signed by 152 nations, the 
     Senate now has a similar opportunity and responsibility to 
     demonstrate U.S. leadership by ratifying it.
       The Treaty enhances U.S. national security and is popular 
     among the American people. Recent bipartisan polling data 
     indicates that support for the Treaty within the United 
     States is strong, consistent, and across the board. It is 
     currently viewed favorably by 82% of the public, nearly the 
     highest level of support in four decades of polling. Only six 
     percentage points separate Democratic and Republican voters, 
     and there is no discernible gender gap on this issue. This 
     confirms the traditional bipartisan nature of support for the 
     CTBT, which dates back four decades to President's 
     Eisenhower's initiation of test ban negotiations and was 
     reaffirmed by passage in 1992 of the Exon-Hatifield-Mitchell 
     legislation on a testing moratorium.
       It is clear to me that ratifying this Treaty would be in 
     the national interest. And it is equally clear that Senators 
     have a responsibility to the world, the nation and their 
     constituents to put partisan politics aside and allow the 
     Senate to consider this Treaty.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed 
to speak for 10 minutes in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THOMAS. I thank the Chair.

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