[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 12]
[Senate]
[Pages 16945-16949]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
resume consideration of H.R. 1555, which the clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (H.R. 1555) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 2000 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the United States Government, the Community 
     Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

  Pending:

       Kyl amendment No. 1258, to restructure Department of Energy 
     nuclear security functions, including the establishment of 
     the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Under the previous order, the Senator from New Mexico, Mr. Bingaman, 
is recognized to offer an amendment.


                Amendment No. 1260 to Amendment No. 1258

   (Purpose: Relating to the field reporting relationships under the 
                    Agency for Nuclear Stewardship)

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I send a second-degree amendment to the 
desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Bingaman], for himself, 
     Mr. Domenici, and Mr. Reid, proposes an amendment numbered 
     1260 to amendment No. 1258.

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       In section 213 of the Department of Energy Organization 
     Act, as proposed by subsection (c) of the amendment, at the 
     end of subsection (k), insert the following:
       ``Such supervision and direction of any Director or 
     contract employee of a national security laboratory or of a 
     nuclear weapons production facility shall not interfere with 
     communication to the Department, the President, or Congress, 
     of technical findings or technical assessments derived from, 
     and in accord with, duly authorized activities. The Under 
     Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship shall have responsibility 
     and authority for, and may use, as appropriate field 
     structure for the programs and activities of the Agency.''.

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I offer this amendment on behalf of 
myself and my cosponsors, Senator Domenici and Senator Reid.
  The amendment does two things. The first sentence of the amendment 
says:

       Such supervision and direction of any Director or contract 
     employee of a national security laboratory or of a nuclear 
     weapons production facility shall not interfere with 
     communication to the Department, the President, or Congress, 
     of technical findings or technical assessments derived from, 
     and in accord with, duly authorized activities.

  That sentence makes clear that communication which presently occurs 
is

[[Page 16946]]

intended to continue. The clarification is necessary because in the 
underlying amendment officers and employees of contractors, including 
the Directors and employees of the three National Laboratories, are 
referred to as ``personnel of the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship'' and 
all personnel of the Agency are subject to the supervision and 
direction of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship.
  We want to be sure if they have information of a technical nature or 
based on their technical assessment that they believe should be 
directly communicated, that communication occur.
  The Directors of the three nuclear weapons laboratories are 
responsible for certifying the adequacy of the nuclear weapons 
stockpile. Their independence and the integrity of their judgments are 
critical to the national security of the Nation. It is important that 
the legislation recognize and protect that independence and integrity 
by ensuring that these lab Directors and employees can communicate 
these technical findings and assessments to the Department, the 
President, and the Congress.
  The second sentence of the amendment simply provides that the Under 
Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship may use field offices for the 
programs and activities of the Agency. This is a departure from one of 
the recommendations of the Rudman report. The Rudman report proposed 
streamlining the reporting chain for the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship 
by cutting the ties between the weapons labs and the Department of 
Energy field offices.
  We had a hearing in the Energy Committee last week, and I asked Dr. 
Vic Reis, who is the Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense 
Programs, whether he agreed with that Rudman report recommendation. He 
said he did not. He said we certainly need weapons ties in the field 
office because ``we cannot run the operation entirely from 
Washington.''
  All we are saying is the Secretary has authority to use the field 
offices in an appropriate fashion--we are not dictating how but in an 
appropriate fashion to carry out the policies of the Department.
  As I understand what Dr. Reis was saying, the important point is to 
clarify the lines of authority between the Agency for Nuclear 
Stewardship and the labs. The underlying amendment does that. But he 
said the new Under Secretary will still need field offices to help them 
oversee and run the complex of weapons laboratories and production 
facilities, and this gives the Under Secretary that option.
  I believe this amendment is straightforward. My colleague on the 
Republican side, Senator Domenici, is the prime cosponsor of this 
amendment. I hope it is acceptable. I believe it is acceptable to all 
Senators, and I hope the Senate will adopt it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico, Mr. Domenici.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I wholeheartedly agree we ought to adopt 
the amendment. I will speak for one moment on it. I will not address 
the first portion of it, wherein the amendment discusses the 
responsibility that rests with reference to making sure that 
appropriate communications occur rather than be stymied by the new 
Agency. I think that is good language. I do not know that we would have 
had anything different than that in the underlying bill, but this 
clarifies it. I am pleased to be part of that.
  With reference to the second part of the amendment, the Department of 
Energy has been operating with field offices--some of them very 
successful, some of them not so successful. There has even been a 
clamor over the past 5 or 6 years to create more of them rather than 
fewer of them. In fact, there have been proposals to create more field 
offices that this Senator personally has had to confront in the 
appropriations bill.
  What this says is that rather than being silent in the bill with 
reference to the Rudman recommendation regarding field offices, this 
says the Deputy Secretary may use an appropriate field structure for 
programs and activities of the agency. I think that is good. It gives 
them the options and it gives them all they need for good management. 
What we are talking about is good management--field offices versus the 
national office.
  So I urge the Senate to adopt this amendment. We have no objection on 
our side. I urge the chairman and cochairman of the Intel Committee to 
concur in our recommendations.
  Mr. SHELBY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I commend Senator Bingaman for offering 
this amendment. I believe it is constructive in nature. It is something 
we believe will, at the end of the day, clarify what we are trying to 
do. That is what this legislation is all about--to restructure the 
labs, making it harder for espionage to go on at the labs. So it is a 
good amendment. I urge that at the proper time we adopt it.
  Mr. KERREY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I also believe this is a good amendment. I 
am going to accept it. I think it is a sign that Senators on both sides 
of the aisle understand that we have an opportunity to do something 
that is long overdue, but that there is a reason in the past this has 
not been done; that is to say, restructuring the agency to increase the 
accountability for the work that is being done on nuclear weapons, both 
to make certain we preserve sound science at its best and security at 
its best.
  I fervently hope we continue in this spirit, because if we do, we 
will produce a bill with a big vote, and we will be able to conference 
it, be able to change the law, and enact good reform that will keep the 
United States of America and our people safe.
  Mr. DOMENICI addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. It has been a pleasure working with Senator Bingaman on 
this and on some other amendments. I say to the two floor managers, it 
is my hope we can take the four or five remaining issues and see if we 
can't get one amendment put together to see if we can resolve them. We 
should have an answer to that for the floor managers within the next 
half hour, 45 minutes.
  Having said that, let me talk about the field offices for a moment. I 
have also been a proponent of the belief that if you can do some of the 
business of government down close to where the problems are, you are 
better off. I believe that such is the case with field offices. If 
properly run, under the appropriate accountability rules, wherein 
everybody knows who is accountable for what, I believe they can be very 
helpful.
  Because I believe that, I think this amendment gives the option to 
retain them in a manner that will be helpful to the new Under Secretary 
as he puts together the semiautonomous entity.
  I think much of the activity in field offices has been good. The fact 
the entire Department has made it very difficult to run the nuclear 
weapons part may be some of the reason the Rudman board was not 
thinking of field offices in a very good light. I believe it is 
imperative we look at it that way--in a good light. We have not told 
them how to use them. We have not told them what kind of role they 
play. We have said they may be used for programs and activities of the 
agency.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, one of the most important contributions to 
our national security is the annual stockpile report to the President 
and the Congress in which the safety, security, and reliability of the 
stockpile is assessed.
  A very important piece of that report is an assessment by the 
Directors of the national security laboratories regarding the results 
of their technical investigations.
  That assessment by the lab Directors combines scientific and 
engineering findings with expert professional judgment to form an 
independent evaluation of the quality and character of the weapon 
designs that make up our nuclear stockpile.
  The scientific and engineering findings are derived from data 
developed at Pantex, at Oak Ridge's Y-12 plant, at the Kansas City 
Plant, at the Nevada

[[Page 16947]]

Test Site, and at the national security labs, Sandia, Los Alamos, and 
Lawrence Livermore.
  Experts from all of these sites combine their efforts to review and 
validate this information upon which the effectiveness of our stockpile 
is determined.
  More experts are convened to consider the ramifications of findings 
and the whole effort is finally integrated into a certification of the 
reliability, the safety, and the security of the stockpile.
  It is absolutely essential that this effort be free of political or 
bureaucratic interference.
  Scientists, engineers, and technicians at these national security 
facilities are hired for their expertise and diligence.
  They are the only experts who know the significance of their findings 
and they should remain absolutely unimpeded in exercising their 
professional skills and judgment.
  At the same time, the lab Directors earn their positions of trust and 
responsibility by a lifetime of outstanding technical accomplishments, 
demonstrated skill at integrating large complex bodies of information, 
and consummate integrity in reporting their conclusions.
  They, too, should remain absolutely unimpeded in the performance of 
their stockpile certification responsibilities.
  Mr. President, in matters as important as certification of our 
stockpile, the possibility of interference, or even just the appearance 
of the possibility of interference, can affect the exercise of skills 
and professional judgment.
  These professionals should retain their independence from 
bureaucratic or political interference.
  Unfortunately, this amendment takes a step that will destroy that 
independence by asserting that these civilian contractor employees 
``shall be responsible to, and subject to the supervision and direction 
of, the Secretary and the Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship or 
his designee.''
  So now there are at least three Federal officers, necessarily 
politicized by their positions, and undoubtedly bureaucratic in their 
origins, who can direct these professionals in any or all aspects of 
their work.
  That is not an environment that promises assessments that are 
independent of political or bureaucratic interference.
  Mr. President, the labs and production facilities should not be 
independent of Federal direction, but that direction must not be 
allowed to dictate technical findings or their interpretation.
  My concerns in this regard could be adequately addressed by adding to 
the appropriate section the following clarification:

       Such supervision or direction of any Director or contract 
     employee of a national security laboratory or of a nuclear 
     weapons production facility shall not interfere with 
     communication to the Department, to the President, or to the 
     Congress, of technical findings or technical assessments 
     derived from, and in accord with, duly authorized activities.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 1260) was agreed to.
  Mr. KERREY. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. KERREY. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hutchinson). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in 
morning business for 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The remarks of Mrs. Murray pertaining to the introduction of S. Res. 
158 are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced 
Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative assistant proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I would like to return to the business of 
today, the Intelligence Committee authorization bill and the underlying 
Kyl-Domenici-Murkowski amendment to that authorization bill which 
provides for the reorganization of the Department of Energy with a 
semiautonomous agency responsible for our nuclear weapons programs. 
That is the business of the Senate since this time yesterday.
  Americans who are watching the activities of the Senate might be a 
little confused. I would like to try to straighten out some of the 
confusion. I challenge my colleagues who have a different point of view 
to express that if, in fact, they care to do so.
  We are well aware, over the last several years now, of espionage that 
has been occurring within our nuclear laboratories and other facilities 
in this country which has resulted in a significant number of very 
important secrets of this country being obtained by others who should 
not have them, including, we believe, the Government of China. This is 
not minor. The secrets that have been obtained, we believe, from our 
nuclear laboratories include the information necessary to build the 
most sophisticated weapons ever designed by man. They include the 
designs for the most sophisticated weapons in our arsenal--the seven or 
eight nuclear warheads the United States now has on our existing 
weapons, as well as designs for a weapon that we never produced but 
which we understand because the Chinese have now said they have; the 
so-called neutron bomb that they have developed; as well as some other 
technology dealing with radar, for example, that can detect our 
submarines under the sea.
  These are the most sophisticated technological developments of our 
country in recent years. Design information about these weapons has 
been obtained by others. So, naturally, one of the questions is: How 
did it happen, and how can we prevent it from happening in the future?
  We don't know the answer to the question of how it happened exactly, 
because people involved in espionage don't come forward and say to you, 
well, here is what I did. But piecing the information together, we have 
concluded that it is likely that information was obtained from our 
nuclear weapons laboratories, and this information got into the wrong 
hands.
  So part of the question of how to prevent this in the future is: What 
do we need to do, if anything, to ensure security at our nuclear 
laboratories?
  Now, it turns out that over the years there have been numerous 
General Accounting Office studies, studies by other independent groups, 
and even studies of the Department of Energy itself, which has 
jurisdiction over these National Laboratories, which have highlighted 
the ongoing problems and have suggested that there have to be changes 
made in the organizational structure of the DOE if we are ever to stop 
this espionage.
  Most recently, the President's own Foreign Intelligence Advisory 
Board, chaired by former Senator Warren Rudman, issued a scathing 
report and made some very important recommendations about the 
reorganization of the Department of Energy. In this report, in effect, 
the Rudman panel said to the President that the Department of Energy 
will tell you that it can reorganize itself. It can't. It is the 
problem.
  Many of the bureaucrats within the Department don't want to 
reorganize in a way that will solve these problems. They want to 
protect their turf. Therefore, it is going to have to be up to Congress 
to pass a new statute that literally reorganizes the Department of 
Energy to get this done.

[[Page 16948]]

  Now, interestingly, just before that Presidential advisory panel made 
its recommendations, Senator Domenici of New Mexico, in whose State two 
of the three primary weapons labs are located, had come to the same 
conclusion, based upon a lot of these previous reports that I talked 
about, and had actually developed an idea of how to reorganize the 
Department of Energy to provide for greater accountability and 
responsibility. He discussed those ideas with me and with Senator 
Murkowski, chairman of the Energy Committee. The three of us decided to 
introduce legislation, which we attempted to attach to the Department 
of Defense authorization bill back in May, to accomplish this exact 
result.
  At that time, for a variety of reasons, the leadership, including 
Senator Warner and others, said: Don't attach that to this bill, do it 
later with the intelligence authorization bill--which we now have 
before us. For one thing, no hearings have been held, and we need time 
to work out the specific language.
  So Senators Domenici and Murkowski and I agreed to do that back in 
May. Since then, there have been, I believe, six different hearings by 
four different committees specifically on this legislation. Senator 
Rudman has testified, as has Secretary Richardson, and many others, 
about this specific legislation.
  Since the time of our initial introduction of the amendment, the 
Rudman panel made its recommendations. It was so close to what Senator 
Domenici and the rest of us had originally proposed that we conformed 
our legislation to that recommendation so that we were in effect asking 
the Department to be reorganized exactly along the lines recommended by 
the President's own advisory panel. That was back in May.
  A lot of time has now elapsed, obviously--almost 2 months--while we 
have been going over this. We have been meeting with Secretary 
Richardson. We have been talking to each other trying to come up with 
some compromise language where we thought it was appropriate.
  But in the meantime, we have the question of whether our secrets are 
being protected at our National Laboratories. The Rudman report, and 
Senator Rudman's testimony before at least one of these committees in 
the interim, made it clear that we had not solved the problem. The Cox 
report made the point that espionage was still continuing. The Rudman 
report specifically said the recommendations of the Secretary of Energy 
and the implementation of what he was doing was in effect too little 
too late; it was not solving the problem; it didn't go far enough; and 
we had to get on with the urgent business of solving this problem.
  The reason I point this out is that we agreed to delay even though 
that delay poses a risk to the people of the United States of America; 
that more secrets will fly out the window before we get this thing 
resolved. But we agreed to hold the hearings and to try to get the 
acquiescence of the Secretary of Energy.
  He has now finally agreed with the proposition that was recommended 
to the President's advisory panel that we need a semiautonomous agency.
  We are now arguing about a lot of the details. But in this matter the 
details matter. The details matter because it is possible for the 
bureaucrats within the Department of Energy to scuttle the reform if 
they can take enough pieces of it out and create the same kind of 
burdensome, multimanagement kind of structure that exists today which 
the Rudman report criticized as being so ineffective.
  We fear that is what some of the amendments which will be proposed 
will do.
  We have been trying over the last 48 hours literally to bring this 
bill before the Senate. We had to actually invoke cloture in order to 
begin debating the intelligence authorization bill. Democrats objected 
to the consideration of the intelligence authorization bill.
  What does that mean? Without an intelligence authorization bill, the 
programs for fiscal year 2000 in our intelligence community cannot go 
forward.
  Why would people object to even considering the bill, not voting on 
it, but even bringing it up when these kinds of threats to our national 
security exist? Why would they object to the consideration of the 
amendment for the reorganization of the Department of Energy along the 
lines recommended by the President's own panel of advisers, the concept 
of which has been signed off by his Secretary of Energy?
  Why would we have this delay? Why now for the last 48 hours have the 
people who want to amend our proposal not come forward to present this 
amendment so we can get on with this?
  We have had this bill pending for 24 hours. People watching might 
say: Why have we heard speeches about everything under the Sun except 
the Department of Energy reorganization?
  The answer is because people who object to our proposal have not come 
to the floor and have not been willing to offer their own amendments.
  Senator Domenici has been laboring mightily in the back rooms trying 
to work out some language differences. We have been willing to meet 
others more than halfway in trying to resolve differences that we could 
resolve. We have agreed to accept a couple of amendments and make some 
modifications to language so we can work together in a bipartisan 
fashion. But I have yet to hear anybody say, who has proposed 
amendments that we have accepted, that they will agree with and support 
the legislation at the end of the day, even if we accept what they have 
offered.
  I am not going to suggest a lack of good faith. But there is a matter 
of national security involved. Time is wasting.
  I see nobody on the floor willing to debate with us or tell us where 
they think we are wrong or to offer amendments to what we are trying to 
propose.
  Under the rules of the Senate, unless they come down and do that, we 
are stuck.
  We don't want to spend all of the time just reiterating what Senators 
Domenici, Murkowski, Thompson, Bunning, and myself and others have 
already said on the floor. We could keep talking about this.
  I sometimes wonder what the American people think. They hear there is 
a crisis with intelligence. They hear there is a problem with these 
National Laboratories. They hear there is a suggestion to fix it made 
to the President by his own advisory board, and we have amendments to 
implement those recommendations. Yet nothing happens. In fact, people 
actually object to bringing up the bill that would begin to fix the 
problem.
  When we finally bring it up because we invoked cloture, we actually 
made them vote on that--they all agreed to bring it up at that point--
and nobody comes down to offer amendments.
  I urge my colleagues, even those who disagree with us, to come to the 
floor. Let's debate this. If you think you have a legitimate point of 
view, let's talk it out. Reasonable people can differ about these 
things. If you have an amendment, bring it to the floor so we can 
debate and vote on it.
  But, sooner or later, the American people are going to reach a 
conclusion, which is that this matter is being delayed.
  I find it unconscionable that anybody would delay efforts to secure 
the Nation's most important secrets and to delay our efforts to ensure 
the security of our National Laboratories. That is what we are all 
about here.
  I just hope that sooner rather than later people will be willing to 
come down and work with us to bring this bill to a conclusion so that 
we can get on with the important business of this country in protecting 
our national security.
  I see Senator Domenici is on the floor. I know he has been working 
mightily to try to work out some language. I think it would be 
appropriate now to call upon him for a report on the success of his 
efforts.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, let me, first of all, congratulate and 
thank Senator Kyl.
  There have been many Senators involved, including the occupant of the

[[Page 16949]]

Chair, who have serious concerns about the issue. But I believe we have 
a great threesome who worked together fundamentally from the beginning. 
Senator Kyl was more than willing right up front when the idea evolved. 
When we said let's work on it, he was most willing to take the lead, 
and, frankly, knows a lot about nuclear weapons, the safety, and the 
well-being of them. He knows a lot about the so-called science-based 
stockpile stewardship. He has not been an advocate of doing anything 
with reference to nuclear weapons that would diminish in any way 
America's great strength in that regard. I commend him and thank him 
for it.
  I want to comment for just about 3 minutes on the issue that he 
raised.
  There have been contentions that the Department of Energy is moving 
in the right direction. In fact, I think the Secretary misspoke once 
when he said to the Congress and to the people we have taken care of 
the security problems. That is not a quote. It is just a general notion 
of what he said.
  I noted over the weekend that the new four-star general, retired, has 
been put in charge of security and counterintelligence. They called him 
the czar. I note that he has indicated he is a year away from getting 
what he thinks is necessary under this dysfunctional department to be 
able to say we are taking care of the security issues in the best 
possible way.
  Why wouldn't we hurry up and reorganize? Instead of that czar 
spending all of his time trying to get a structure set up under the old 
system--which everybody says isn't going to work, and which says, Good 
luck, general, but when you are finished with all of that, it isn't 
going to work--we ought to get this reorganization in the hands of that 
Department, in the hands of the President of the United States, and 
say, Let's get on with trying to implement.
  I submit that it is going to be hard to implement.
  There are many ties that are going to have to be broken. There are 
many parts of the Energy Department that are going to go down swinging 
in terms of them having little or nothing to say anymore about the 
nuclear weapons aspect of this. They all have parts in it. It has made 
it such a bureaucratic mess that even as I look at amendments that want 
to ease up a little on the semiautonomous nature, my mind immediately 
goes back to, well, if we open the door a little bit, we are just going 
to end up in 10 or 5 years right back where we are.
  I want to make sure everybody understands that we want to keep it 
semiautonomous where the Secretary is ultimately engaged, but within 
that is something similar to the FAA that is doing its own work on 
nuclear weapons. I think we are close.
  However, I suggest to those Senators who want to discuss amendments 
or who contemplate offering amendments, including the ranking member of 
the Armed Services Committee, Senator Carl Levin, that we hear from him 
soon as to what he wants to do. We have a proposal we are discussing 
about going somewhat in his direction but not totally.
  I am trying to see if we can minimize amendments and get this done 
quickly. If not, I think we will just start voting. Some don't want to 
do that. I think we will have to do that within the next hour or so if 
we can't put things together. Then I will have a couple amendments, if 
that is the case. I think they are more acceptable than what I 
understand others are going to offer. We will get those debated.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I ask unanimous consent I be permitted to speak as in 
morning business for 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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