[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 12]
[Senate]
[Pages 16699-16703]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



     INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000--Continued

  Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I will also make some comments about the 
reorganization of the Department of Energy with regard to its nuclear 
activities.
  I heard my colleagues speaking earlier on this subject. I think it is 
one of those great times in the Senate where Members from both sides of 
the aisle can come together and try to get something done for the 
benefit of the country and for the benefit of our safety in a troubled 
world. It is a historic opportunity.
  Perhaps to lend a little bit of a different perspective or additional 
perspective, I should say, with regard to some of the work we do in the 
Governmental Affairs Committee, it has to do generally with the 
operation of Government. We continually face instances where the 
Government is not performing the way it should. The taxpayers are not 
getting their money's worth. We continually see instances of waste, 
fraud, and abuse. We have what is known as the high risk list; that is, 
those Departments and agencies which are most prone to waste, fraud, 
and abuse. We see the same agencies year in and year out. We have 
reports year in and year out about these kinds of problems. It is 
affecting the way our people look at their own Government, which I 
think is probably the most important underlying problem that we have in 
this country. This lack of faith and trust in Government has become a 
recurring theme in recent nonpartisan and bipartisan surveys of public 
opinion toward Government. This trend is definitely in the wrong 
direction.
  A poll released by the Counsel for Excellence in Government last week 
found that just 29 percent of Americans say that they trust the 
Government in Washington to do what's right most of the time. This is 
down even from last year's poll, which found only a 38 percent level of 
trust. The National Academy of Public Administration recently released 
a national election study poll this June that pegged the percentage of 
Americans who trust Government at a meager 32 percent. According to the 
Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, it is poor Government 
performance that is the leading indicator, the leading factor, in 
Americans' distrust of the Federal Government. An overwhelming majority 
of the public--74 percent--say that the Government does only a fair or 
poor job in managing its programs and providing services. The National 
Academy of Public

[[Page 16700]]

Administration reports that survey respondents complain about 
Government failures, stating that Government becomes part of the 
problem, is too big, serving others, doing nothing, and wasting money. 
So we have seen that over a period of years.
  Time and time and again, we have had reports bringing this to our 
attention. All too often, we wind up talking about it and doing very 
little about it. But now we find that we are faced with a different 
kind of lack of performance as far as our Government is concerned. 
Maybe we can afford certain breakdowns. Maybe we can afford certain 
fraud, inefficiencies, and waste, but we are facing a different kind 
now, and that has to do with our national security. Time and time 
again, we see instances where the right hand within a department does 
not know what the left hand is doing.
  We recently received the inspector general's report from the 
Department of Justice which demonstrated that we on the Governmental 
Affairs Committee did not receive evidence and did not receive 
materials showing people with strong ties to the Chinese government at 
the same time they were making political contributions in this country. 
Six inspectors general gave us a report recently regarding how our 
export control system was working. We found out that it is not working 
very well at all. We don't know very much, sometimes, about who is 
doing the exporting. We don't know much about who the end users are and 
what they are doing with these dual-use technologies we are sending 
them, some of which can be used for military purposes. The law requires 
that we train our licensing officers. But we are not following that 
law. We have no training programs with regard to our licensing 
officers. We are supposed to be checking up on our foreign visitors 
there and making sure that when they visit the labs, they are not 
coming away with information that they should not be having. We are not 
doing a good job there.
  The law requires that we keep up with the cumulative effect of the 
exports we are sending to these other countries, but we are not doing 
that either. We found out recently that, with regard to trying to get 
materials regarding someone who is a suspect, actual espionage 
activities broke down interdepartmentally between the Department of 
Energy and the Department of Justice because of a lack of 
communication. We were trying to get a search warrant there; it never 
came about. If we had the correct information and had been really 
talking to each other and had a system whereby we could exchange 
information after asking the right questions, we would not even have 
needed that search warrant. These are all instances where the 
Government is not performing in the way the Government should be 
performing. And now we see a systematic breakdown with regard to the 
security at our national laboratories.
  This is bad enough in and of itself at any time. But I think it is 
especially disturbing now that we understand more and more that we are 
living in a different world than we have been living in in times past. 
I think that after the end of the Cold War, when we didn't have the big 
Soviet Union threat anymore, we let our guard down in this country. We 
thought that we could place less emphasis on preparedness, readiness, 
national security, and things of that nature. The Chinese were in no 
position to pose a direct threat to us, and we felt the Soviet Union 
certainly was not. Yet as we look around the world, we see that new 
threats are developing. We got the Rumsfeld report, and we understand 
now that rogue nations around this world are rapidly developing 
biological, nuclear, and chemical capabilities that pose a threat to 
this country. Then we have the Cox report, which tells us what we have 
lost with regard to our own national laboratories, in terms of nuclear 
technology and perhaps even nuclear materials. The President's own 
Federal foreign intelligence advisory committee, led by Senator Rudman, 
now points out the difficulties that we are having in that regard.
  It is a different world. So we must ask ourselves: If not now, when? 
If we can't, at long last, after all these reports--and Senator Rudman 
pointed out that there had been over a hundred reports over the years 
pointing out the problems that we were having at our national labs. Yet 
very little was done. So it takes a tremendous amount. We have seen in 
these nonmilitary matters, non-national security matters, how difficult 
it is. The Government has gotten too big and complex, with layer upon 
layer of assistants and deputy assistants in these departments, and we 
are having less and less accountability and more and more complexity, 
more and more of the right hand not knowing what the left hand is 
doing.
  So now, at long last, when we have someone, such as the President's 
own commission, report to us that within the Department of Energy there 
is no accountability, that it is dysfunctional, that it is saturated 
with cynicism and disregard for authority, that it is incapable of 
reforming itself, that it will do whatever is necessary, apparently, to 
delay reform, certainly this must get our attention.
  I believe from listening to my colleagues and the way this thing is 
developing, perhaps maybe at long last our attention has been gotten. 
And what is being proposed now in terms of reorganization is a very 
straightforward approach. It is not nearly as radical as some people 
would like to go. Many people would like to take matters of nuclear 
safety, our laboratories and nuclear materials totally outside the 
Department of Energy and set up a totally different entity to deal with 
them. This bill doesn't do that. It keeps it within the Department of 
Energy. The Secretary of Energy continues to set the policy for the 
department. And the newly created Under Secretary for Nuclear 
Stewardship reports to the Secretary and is under the supervision of 
the Secretary. So you still have direct lines of reporting. You have 
more accountability. You have a simplified reporting system. You would 
not have any more of this Rube Goldberg-type of organization chart that 
we see within the Department of Energy, under which you could not tell 
who is responsible for what.
  At long last, as difficult as it is to reform Government, as 
difficult as it is to stop waste, fraud, and abuse, when we are told 
about it every year, told about it all the time, now that we know we 
have this significant problem with regard to the most significant 
matter that can plague a country, dealing with national security, 
surely we can take the necessary steps in order to turn this thing 
around.
  I know there will be amendments proposed. I have never seen a piece 
of legislation that perhaps could not stand a bit of improvement. I do 
not really know the thrust of the amendments that will be proposed. But 
I urge my colleagues that, as we go along in considering these 
amendments, ask the question: Does this enhance or does this defuse 
accountability?
  We need accountability more and more throughout Government. We can 
very seldom place responsibility anywhere anymore for mishaps in 
Government. But here we must have it. We certainly must have it with 
regard to the Department of Energy and our nuclear stewardship. I am 
delighted with the way this has progressed. The changes are not a 
draconian, and it is a revolutionary approach. It is an approach that 
will enhance accountability. It gives us an opportunity not only to do 
something with regard to national security in this country but perhaps 
to take some first steps toward restoring the American public's faith 
in their own Government.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. COVERDELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. COVERDELL. I ask unanimous consent that the pending Kyl amendment 
be temporarily set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[[Page 16701]]




                           Amendment No. 1259

(Purpose: To block assets of narcotics traffickers who pose an unusual 
and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and 
                     economy of the United States)

  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Coverdell], for himself, Mrs. 
     Feinstein, Mr. DeWine, Mr. Helms, Mr. Lott, Mr. Torricelli, 
     Mr. Craig, Mr. Graham, and Mr. Reid, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 1259.

  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of the bill, add the following new title:
        TITLE__--BLOCKING ASSETS OF MAJOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS

     SEC. _01. FINDING AND POLICY.

       (a) Finding.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Presidential Decision Directive 42, issued on October 
     21, 1995, ordered agencies of the executive branch of the 
     United States Government to, inter alia, increase the 
     priority and resources devoted to the direct and immediate 
     threat international crime presents to national security, 
     work more closely with other governments to develop a global 
     response to this threat, and use aggressively and creatively 
     all legal means available to combat international crime.
       (2) Executive Order No. 12978 of October 21, 1995, provides 
     for the use of the authorities in the International Emergency 
     Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to target and sanction four 
     specially designated narcotics traffickers and their 
     organizations which operate from Colombia.
       (b) Policy.--It should be the policy of the United States 
     to impose economic and other financial sanctions against 
     foreign international narcotics traffickers and their 
     organizations worldwide.

     SEC. _02. PURPOSE.

       The purpose of this title is to provide for the use of the 
     authorities in the International Emergency Economic Powers 
     Act to sanction additional specially designated narcotics 
     traffickers operating worldwide.

     SEC. _03. DESIGNATION OF CERTAIN FOREIGN INTERNATIONAL 
                   NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS.

       (a) Preparation of List of Names.--Not later than January 
     1, 2000 and not later than January 1 of each year thereafter, 
     the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the 
     Attorney General, Director of Central Intelligence, Secretary 
     of Defense, and Secretary of State, shall transmit to the 
     President and to the Director of the Office of National Drug 
     Control Policy a list of those individuals who play a 
     significant role in international narcotics trafficking as of 
     that date.
       (b) Exclusion of Certain Persons From List.--
       (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this section, the list described in subsection (a) shall not 
     include the name of any individual if the Director of Central 
     Intelligence determines that the disclosure of that person's 
     role in international narcotics trafficking could compromise 
     United States intelligence sources or methods. The Director 
     of Central Intelligence shall advise the President when a 
     determination is made to withhold an individual's identity 
     under this subsection.
       (2) Reports.--In each case in which the Director of Central 
     Intelligence has made a determination under paragraph (1), 
     the President shall submit a report in classified form to the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Represent setting forth the reasons for the determination.
       (d) Designation of Individuals as Threats to the United 
     States.--The President shall determine not later than March 1 
     of each year whether or not to designate persons on the list 
     transmitted to the President that year as persons 
     constituting an unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
     national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United 
     States. The President shall notify the Secretary of the 
     Treasury of any person designated under this subsection. If 
     the President determines not to designate any person on such 
     list as such a threat, the President shall submit a report to 
     Congress setting forth the reasons therefore.
       (e) Changes in Designations of Individuals.--
       (1) Additional Individuals Designated.--If at any time 
     after March 1 of a year, but prior to January 1 of the 
     following year, the President determines that a person is 
     playing a significant role in international narcotics 
     trafficking and has not been designated under subsection (d) 
     as a person constituting an unusual and extraordinary threat 
     to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the 
     United States, the President may so designate the person. The 
     President shall notify the Secretary of the Treasury of any 
     person designated under this paragraph.
       (2) Removal of Designations of Individuals.--Whenever the 
     President determines that a person designated under 
     subsection (d) or paragraph (1) of this subsection no longer 
     poses an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national 
     security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, 
     the person shall no longer be considered as designated under 
     that subsection.
       (f) References.--Any person designated under subsection (d) 
     or (e) may be referred to in this Act as a ``specially 
     designated narcotics trafficker''.

     SEC. __04. BLOCKING ASSETS.

       (a) Finding.--Congress finds that a national emergency 
     exists with respect to any individual who is a specially 
     designated narcotics trafficker.
       (b) Blocking of Assets.--Except to the extent provided in 
     section 203(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers 
     Act (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in regulations, orders, 
     directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this 
     Act, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any 
     license or permit granted prior to the date of designation of 
     a person as a specially designated narcotics trafficker, 
     there are hereby blocked all property and interests in 
     property that are, or after that date come, within the United 
     States, or that are, or after that date come, within the 
     possession or control of any United States person, of--
       (1) any specially designated narcotics trafficker;
       (2) any person who materially and knowingly assists in, 
     provides financial or technological support for, or provides 
     goods or services in support of, the narcotics trafficking 
     activities of a specially designated narcotics trafficker; 
     and
       (3) any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, 
     in consultation with the Attorney General, Director of 
     Central Intelligence, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of 
     State, to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on 
     behalf of, a specially designated narcotics trafficker.
       (c) Prohibited Acts.--Except to the extent provided in 
     section 203(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers 
     Act or in any regulation, order, directive, or license that 
     may be issued pursuant to this Act, and notwithstanding any 
     contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior 
     to the effective date, the following acts are prohibited:
       (1) Any transaction or dealing by a United States person, 
     or within the United States, in property or interests in 
     property of any specially designated narcotics trafficker.
       (2) Any transaction or dealing by a United States person, 
     or within the United States, that evades or avoids, has the 
     purpose of evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, 
     subsection (b).
       (d) Law Enforcement and Intelligence Activities Not 
     Affected.--Nothing in this section is intended to prohibit or 
     otherwise limit the authorized law enforcement or 
     intelligence activities of the United States, or the law 
     enforcement activities of any State or subdivision thereof.
       (e) Implementation.--The Secretary of the Treasury, in 
     consultation with the Attorney General, Director of Central 
     Intelligence, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State, 
     is authorized to take such actions, including the 
     promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all 
     powers granted to the President by the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act as may be necessary to carry 
     out this section. The Secretary of the Treasury may 
     redelegate any of these functions to any other officer or 
     agency of the United States Government. Each agency of the 
     United States shall take all appropriate measures within its 
     authority to carry out this section.
       (f) Enforcement.--Violations of licenses, orders, or 
     regulations under this Act shall be subject to the same civil 
     or criminal penalties as are provided by section 206 of the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) 
     for violations of licenses, orders, and regulations under 
     that Act.
       (g) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Entity.--The term ``entity'' means a partnership, 
     association, corporation, or other organization, group or 
     subgroup.
       (2) Narcotics trafficking.--The term ``narcotics 
     trafficking'' means any activity undertaken illicitly to 
     cultivate, produce, manufacture, distribute, sell, finance, 
     or transport, or otherwise assist, abet, conspire, or collude 
     with others in illicit activities relating to, narcotic 
     drugs, including, but not limited to, heroin, methamphetamine 
     and cocaine.
       (3) Person.--The term ``person'' means an individual or 
     entity.
       (4) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' means any United States citizen or national, 
     permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of 
     the United States (including foreign branches), or any person 
     in the United States.

[[Page 16702]]



     SEC. __05. DENIAL OF VISAS TO AND INADMISSIBILITY OF 
                   SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS.

       (a) Prohibition.--The Secretary of State shall deny a visa 
     to, and the Attorney General may not admit to the United 
     States--
       (1) any specially designated narcotics trafficker; or
       (2) any alien who the consular officer or the Attorney 
     General knows or has reason to believe--
       (A) is a spouse or minor child of a specially designated 
     narcotics trafficker; or
       (B) is a person described in paragraph (2) or (3) of 
     section _04(b).
       (b) Exceptions.--Subsection (a) shall not apply--
       (1) where the Secretary of State finds, on a case-by-case 
     basis, that the entry into the United States of the person is 
     necessary for medical reasons;
       (2) upon the request of the Attorney General, Director of 
     Central Intelligence, Secretary of the Treasury, or the 
     Secretary of Defense; or
       (3) for purposes of the prosecution of a specially 
     designated narcotics trafficker.

  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I ask for 20 minutes to be equally 
divided between myself and Senator Feinstein.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, the amendment just sent to the desk, it 
is my understanding, has now been agreed to by both sides, which 
Senator Feinstein and I are most happy about.
  This piece of legislation evolved earlier in the year. Senator 
Feinstein will speak for herself, but she and I have been engaged in 
the issue of narcotics trafficking in our hemisphere and in the world 
and have become deeply worried about its effect on the United States 
and have envisioned this as a new tool for our Government.
  To give you a bit of a background, the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act is a follow on to the former Trading With The Enemy 
Act. Its purpose is to stop all economic activity, commerce, trade, and 
finance with rogue nations, such as Libya and North Korea, that are 
national security threats to the United States.
  In 1995, President Clinton expanded this act through an executive 
order to include specially designated narcotics traffickers. As issued, 
the President's executive order applies to four drug traffickers 
affiliated with the Colombian Cali cartel. The goal was and remains to 
completely isolate the targeted drug traffickers. The executive order 
that the President issued in 1995 blocks any financial, commercial and/
or business dealings with any entity associated with the four named 
drug traffickers, to include criminal associates, associated family 
members, related businesses and financial accounts.
  What would this amendment accomplish? It takes the President's 1995 
Executive order and codifies it in the law and expands it to include 
other foreign narcotic traffickers deemed as a threat to our national 
security.
  It freezes the assets of drug traffickers under U.S. jurisdiction and 
cuts off their ability to do business in the United States.
  There is the arrow pointed at the problem. It begins to isolate these 
nefarious forces and their effect on the United States.
  As under the President's Executive order, the Treasury Department's 
Office of Foreign Assets Control would develop a list of specially 
designated narcotics traffickers in consultation with the Department of 
Justice and the Department of State. Anyone who appears on the list is 
prohibited from conducting any economic activity with the United 
States.
  American firms or individuals who violate this prohibition will be 
subject to significant financial penalty and potential prison terms. 
The Treasury Office of Foreign Assets would enforce the sanctions, 
which carry criminal penalties of up to $500,000 per violation for 
corporations, and $250,000 for individuals, as well as up to 10 years 
in prison.
  The goal is to provide another weapon in the war on drugs by 
completely isolating targeted drug traffickers.
  Taking legitimate U.S. dollars out of drug dealers' pockets is a 
vital step in destroying their ability to traffic narcotics across our 
borders. This is a bold but necessary tool to fight the war on drugs.
  Let me say before I turn to the distinguished Senator from 
California, as early as 1 hour ago I was in communication with 
representatives of the Treasury Department and the administration of a 
willingness to continue as this legislation works its way through the 
Congress to work with them to perfect the legislation. It is an 
important new tool. It is premised on an action this President has 
already emboldened and taken and simply expands it.
  We must confront the growing strength of impunity of drug cartels. 
Several months ago former DEA Administrator, Tom Constantine, testified 
about Mexican drug cartels. He said:

       Organized crime groups from Mexico continue to pose a grave 
     threat to the citizens of the United States. In my lifetime, 
     I have never witnessed any group of criminals who have had 
     such a terrible impact on so many individuals and communities 
     in our Nation.

  Of course, this is not Mexico-specific. This is a broad tool to deal 
with narcotics and their activities anywhere in the world. With drugs 
continuing to pour across our border, there is no other way to think 
about drug trafficking than as a fundamental threat to our national 
security.
  Several years ago, in a meeting with the President of Mexico, 
President Zedillo, he said--and he has said such publicly since--that 
there is no threat as dangerous to the security of the Republic of 
Mexico as the narcotics traffickers.
  We must use every weapon in our arsenal to strike at the heart of 
this scourge--those who traffic these drugs. By expanding the use of 
the President's international emergency economic powers to target drug 
kingpins and their empires, we can work year-round to help drive these 
traffickers out of business--no matter where they exist.
  I thank my colleague, the Senator from California, not only for her 
work in perfecting this amendment but for her ongoing work and concern 
about the effects of narcotics on the stability of the democracies in 
this hemisphere, and, of course, its effect--its dramatic effect--on 
the citizens of the United States.
  I am reminded--as we talked during several debates about things that 
are so critically important to us--and we might be reminded that 14,000 
people a year die of the narcotic impact, not to mention 100,000 crack 
babies. The list goes on and on.
  There is no segment of public policy that is any more important. 
There are some that are as important but none any more important with 
regard to the safety of the people of the United States--and, for that 
matter, this hemisphere--than our work on narcotics and the peripheral 
issues that deal with it.
  I yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from California.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.
  I want to begin by thanking the Senator from Georgia. We have been at 
this for a few years now. I want him to know it has been a great 
pleasure for me to work with him, and I thank him for the leadership 
and the spirit he has shown on this issue.
  It has been very heartening for me to work across that center divide 
and hopefully see this amendment finally enacted today, and hopefully 
after going to the House in conference, come back here, and then be 
signed by the President.
  Mr. COVERDELL. I thank the Senator.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, as the Senator from Georgia so well 
stated, this legislation is patterned after the President's Executive 
order that he issued in 1995 which targeted the assets of the powerful 
Colombian drug kingpins.
  That order expanded the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
to include ``specially designated narcotics traffickers.'' As issued, 
the President's Executive order applied to four drug traffickers 
affiliated with the Colombian Cali cartel. The goal is to completely 
isolate those targeted drug traffickers.
  The Executive order blocks any financial, commercial, and/or business 
dealings with any entity associated

[[Page 16703]]

with those named traffickers--to include criminal associates, 
associated family members, related businesses, and financial accounts.
  The way this amendment would work is the Treasury Department's Office 
of Foreign Assets Control would develop a list of specially designated 
narcotics traffickers worldwide in consultation with the Department of 
Justice, the CIA, and the Department of State.
  The President could amend the list, and he would officially sign off 
on the list. Then that Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets 
Control would enforce sanctions with criminal penalties of up to 
$500,000 per violation for corporations, and $250,000 for individuals, 
as well as up to 10 years in prison.
  It is a meaningful sanction.
  By focusing on the financial relationship between drug cartels and 
their associated business relationships, the Executive order--and now 
this amendment--is directed toward those entities that created the drug 
problem in our country. And those entities can be located anywhere in 
the world. They are major drug traffickers.
  This order has proven successful in quelling the Colombian Cali 
cartel. This amendment expands it worldwide. Under this Executive 
order, more than 400 Colombian and other companies and individuals 
affiliated with drug trafficking have been targeted by the Treasury 
Department. These entities are denied access to banking services in the 
United States and Colombia. Existing bank accounts have actually been 
shut down. As a result, more than 400 Colombian accounts have been 
closed. That has affected over 200 companies and individuals engaged in 
drug trafficking.
  By February 1998, through the President's Executive order, over 40 of 
these companies with estimated combined annual sales of over $200 
million have been forced out of business.
  The Rodriguez Orejuela business of the Cali cartel has been 
particularly damaged by their lack of access to banks in the United 
States and Colombia. These companies have been forced to operate 
largely on a cash basis because most banks now refuse to provide them 
services.
  One of the cartel's holdings, Laboratorios Kressfor, eventually went 
through liquidation because of blocking actions by the U.S. banks. 
Other business accounts were closed because of the sanctions it 
incurred as a result of doing business with drug traffickers. This 
company, too, is now in liquidation.
  Drug cartels today are more powerful, more violent, and have a far 
greater reach than traditional organized crime organizations ever had 
in the past, and they kill more people.
  I believe they pose a most significant threat to the national 
security of this country.
  We have seen that destructive power over and over again. In Colombia, 
Mexico, Burma, Cambodia, Nigeria, and elsewhere drug traffickers have 
used violent means to pursue their deadly trade. They are the common 
enemy of all civilized nations. We need to work together to meet this 
common threat.
  The United States is not immune from the devastating effects of 
global drug trade. Measured in dollar values, at least four-fifths of 
all illicit drugs consumed in the United States are of foreign origin. 
Four-fifths of drugs consumed in the United States are of foreign 
origin, including virtually all of the cocaine and heroin.
  These cartels have now made strong inroads in major cities including 
Los Angeles, Phoenix, Dallas, San Francisco, and San Diego. They are 
enlisting and have enlisted street gangs as distributors. They are 
spreading their operations throughout our Nation and arrests are taking 
place in less likely places--Des Moines, IA; Greensboro, NC; Yakima, 
WA; New Rochelle, NY.
  The President's 1995 Executive order targeting the Cali cartel in 
Colombia was an effective means of isolating the cartel and its 
affiliated businesses. It choked off vital revenue streams and helped 
the Colombian Government take down the cartel.
  With the authority to reach countries beyond Colombia, the President 
can now work, if this amendment is passed, to isolate other major 
criminal drug syndicates around the world and impose upon them and 
their associates a similar fate to that of the Cali cartel. It is my 
hope that with a new emphasis on this expanded authority and with the 
concerted intelligence effort to develop sufficient data about the 
cartels and their associates in this country and abroad, the United 
States will be able to work with our allies to expose, isolate, and cut 
off the major drug-trafficking syndicates that pose a threat to all of 
our societies.
  This crucial mission can only be accomplished together. We must work 
together to see that our governments are properly equipped to carry it 
out successfully. To that end, this amendment establishes clear 
procedures through which the Treasury Department, the Justice 
Department, the CIA, and the Defense Department can gather information, 
share that information with their counterparts, and make 
recommendations to the President as to those cartels that represent the 
greatest risk to our Nation.
  Coordinated by the Office of Foreign Assets Control in the Department 
of Treasury, the expanded program will target new international drug 
cartels with the same successful financial choke holds that worked so 
well in Colombia. This will not be an easy process. The results will 
not be immediate. A great deal depends on intelligence and its 
availability. It also must be applied universally.
  This legislation is a serious effort to hit the world's major 
traffickers where they live and to put them and their associates out of 
business.
  I thank Senator Coverdell for working so tirelessly with me on this 
bill. I thank my colleagues on both sides of the aisle for supporting 
our efforts.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The chairman is recognized.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I will take a minute this evening to thank 
Senator Coverdell and also Senator Feinstein for having the foresight 
and initiative to expand and to improve upon what is already a highly 
successful weapon in our Nation's fight against international narcotics 
trafficking.
  The International Emergency Economic Powers Act was expanded 4 years 
ago under Executive order to target specific drug trafficking kingpins 
operating from Colombia.
  Our colleagues' legislation expands upon that Executive order by 
allowing similar actions to be taken against additional kingpins 
worldwide.
  Any future designation of foreign narcotics traffickers under this 
act would still be made by the President, but recommendations to the 
President will now come from the entire U.S. counter-narcotics 
community, to include law enforcement, intelligence, and regulatory 
officials.
  Once designated, those foreign drug kingpins would soon see their 
access to the U.S. economy completely disappear.
  Without the ability to place illicitly derived proceeds into commerce 
and trade in the United States, these kingpins and their illicit 
organizations will wither and fade away.
  Denying these foreign traffickers the opportunity to participate in 
the vibrant and growing U.S. economy is truly a decisive weapon in the 
war on drugs.
  I again thank my colleagues for their fine work on this measure. I 
also state for the Record that I fully support and approve 
incorporating their measure into the Legislation Authorization Act 
which is before the Senate. I also state that my colleague, the vice 
chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Kerrey, has asked I 
note for the Senate that he also concurs in this amendment and extends 
his congratulations.
  I urge adoption of this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 1259) was agreed to.
  Mr. SHELBY. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. SHELBY. I suggest the absence of a quorum.


  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________